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PAKISTANI ELECTIONS: WILL THEY BE FREE AND

FAIR OR FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 20, 2007

Serial No. 110–130

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.oversight.house.gov

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman

TOM LANTOS, California

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland

PETER WELCH, Vermont

TOM DAVIS, Virginia

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

BILL SALI, Idaho

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

PHIL SCHILIRO, Chief of Staff

PHIL BARNETT, Staff Director

EARLEY GREEN, Chief Clerk

DAVID MARIN, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

DAVE TURK, Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on December 20, 2007 ...................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Daschle, Thomas A., former Senate Majority and Minority Leader; Thomas E. Garrett, regional program director, Middle East and North Africa

for the International Republican Institute [IRI]; and Mark L. Schneider, senior vice president of the International Crisis Group [ICG] and

former Peace Corps director ......................................................................... 8

Daschle, Thomas A. ................................................................................... 8

Garrett, Thomas E. ................................................................................... 30

Schneider, Mark L. .................................................................................... 38

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Daschle, Thomas A., former Senate Majority and Minority Leader, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 10

Garrett, Thomas E., regional program director, Middle East and North

Africa for the International Republican Institute [IRI], prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 33

Schneider, Mark L., senior vice president of the International Crisis

Group [ICG] and former Peace Corps director, prepared statement of .... 43

Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Massachusetts, prepared statement of ................................................... 4

(1)

PAKISTANI ELECTIONS: WILL THEY BE FREE

AND FAIR OR FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED?

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 20, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN

AFFAIRS,

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tierney, Yarmuth, and Van Hollen.

Staff present: Dave Turk, staff director; Davis Hake, clerk; Andy

Wright, professional staff member; A. Brooke Bennett, minority

counsel; Christopher Bright, minority professional staff member;

Todd Greenwood, minority legislative assistant; and Nick Palarino,

minority senior investigator and policy advisor.

Mr. TIERNEY. Good morning. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs hearing entitled, ‘‘Pakistani Elections: Will They Be Free and Fair or Fundamentally Flawed,’’ will come to order.

I ask unanimous consent that the chairman and ranking member

of the subcommittee be allowed to make opening statements. Mr.

Yarmuth, we’re happy to have an opening statement from you as

well, when it comes to that, if you’d like. Without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept open

for 5 business days so that all members of the subcommittee will

be allowed to submit a written statement for the record. Without

objection, so ordered.

I want to thank our witnesses for coming here today and assisting us in this hearing. We’re going to continue our sustained oversight of U.S. policy toward Pakistan.

Here in the States, we’re well into our longest-ever Presidential

campaign; and the future course of U.S. national security is at

front and center as an issue. On January 8th, as New Hampshire

voters brave the cold to vote in the first of the Nation’s primary,

another election that very same day, a parliamentary election halfway around the world in Pakistan, will also have a profound effect

and consequences on U.S. national security.

We’ve noted at previous hearings that Pakistan is at a crossroads. After a year of extremist violence spreading throughout its

western regions and ambivalent military response and increasing

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pressure from pro-democracy groups, President Musharraf declared

a state of emergency on November 3rd.

Pakistan’s emerging civil society appeared to be the main target.

President Musharraf sacked judges who refused to surrender their

independence. He jailed lawyers, human rights advocates and political opposition leaders. He banned public political gatherings. He

muzzled the nation’s independent media; and, worst of all, he

turned Pakistan’s guns on its civil society instead of on the Taliban

and al Qaeda.

The Bush administration initially made some gestures to pressure President Musharraf to reverse course. Ambassador Ann Patterson, for example, made very important and visible efforts to

highlight the detention of lawyers and the crackdown on independent media. However, the administration, especially recently, has

appeared to undermine the pro-democracy message.

Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte and Richard Boucher

continue to refer to Musharraf as an ‘‘indispensable’’ ally. President

Bush said that President Musharraf ‘‘hadn’t crossed any lines’’ by

imposing the state of emergency. Just 2 weeks ago, Ambassador

Boucher referred to the state of emergency as ‘‘a bump in the

road.’’

I’m concerned that such statements greatly undermine U.S.

credibility with the Pakistani people. We should never forget that

the Pakistani people are indispensable and our long-term ally, not

necessarily one leader, whether it be President Musharraf or anyone else.

Over the last several weeks, there have been some positive developments. President Musharraf resigned as Army Chief; the leaders

of the two mainstream opposition parties, Benazir Bhutto and

Nawaz Sharif, are now back in Pakistan; and President Musharraf

revoked the state of emergency just this past weekend.

Still, much of the damage remains. Judges have not been reinstated, media outlets now operate under a code of conduct restricting criticism of the government, leading opposition lawyers remain

under arrest, the election commission lacks independence, the voter

rolls continue to inspire little confidence, and evidence mounts that

raises serious concerns about President Musharraf using the power

of the state to gain unfair advantage in the elections.

For example, this is a photograph—shown on the screen over

there—that was taken last week depicting an armed Pakistani security official actually posting signs on behalf of President

Musharraf’s political party, the PML-Q.

There is also evidence that the crackdown against civil society

continues, notwithstanding formal revocation of the state of emergency. This picture on the screen is of security forces beating a

woman at a peaceful protest taken just a few days ago. We note

that this confrontation happened after the state of emergency was

purportedly lifted.

Taking all of this into account, there are grave concerns and

many questions about the prospects for free and fair parliamentary

elections less than 3 short weeks from now on January 8th.

How will the code of conduct imposed on the media allow the

kind of unbiased political expression necessary for a free and fair

election?

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How much of a chilling effect will there be on a robust political

opposition when activists continue to fear crackdowns and arrests?

How accurate are the voter rolls going into this election and

what effect will Nawaz Sharif’s ineligibility to stand for election

have?

How will political parties campaign in the western regions of the

country that have been inflamed by Taliban and al Qaeda violence?

How will the removal of judges unwilling to go along with President Musharraf and the lack of an independent election commission hamper the ability to ward off and root out corruption and unfair practices at the polls?

We also think it merits taking a few minutes now before the heat

of the election day itself to discuss the following:

First, what standards must be met for an election to be deemed

free and fair? What is the dividing line between minor problems

and massive election fraud?

Second, how should the United States react if the international

community and credible election observers deem it to be a fundamentally flawed election?

I look forward to engaging with our distinguished panel that is

before us today about these particular questions. I want to thank

all of you for sharing your expertise with the Congress and with

the American people. In particular, I look forward to hearing your

experiences, since you have closely monitored the buildup to these

Pakistani parliamentary elections with business there in the nottoo-distant past. So thank you.

And, Mr. Yarmuth, if you have some comments, we’d love to here

those as well.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]

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Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really don’t have too

much.

I want to thank you for and commend you for holding this hearing. It is a very important topic, and I’m particularly interested in

an assessment of just what the risks and the possibilities are from

U.S. relationships in Pakistan. Because I’ve seen in a number of

cases throughout many years that there are usually a lot of unintended consequences from our involvement, our relationships within a country in terms of the results of elections and the perception

of the United States as a result of that. So I’m very interested in

the witnesses’ testimony and the discussion that we’ll have.

Thank you very much.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Yarmuth.

The subcommittee will now receive testimony from the witnesses

that are here with us today. I want to begin by introducing each

of the witnesses on the panel.

We have, starting from my left, Senator Thomas A. Daschle, who

is a former two-time Senate majority and minority leader in the

Senate. Senator Daschle recently co-authored a pre-election assessment report after he had led a team to Pakistan on behalf of the

National Democratic Institute.

Mr. Thomas E. Garrett is the regional program director for the

Middle East and North Africa for the International Republican Institute. The IRI was awarded the election observer grant on behalf

of the U.S. Government and released a survey of the Pakistan public opinion just last week.

Mr. Mark L. Schneider is a senior vice president of the International Crisis Group and a former U.S. Peace Corps Director. The

ICG closely monitors events on the ground in Pakistan and has employees stationed there to assist in that project as well.

Welcome to all of you and thank you again.

It is the policy of the subcommittee to swear in our witnesses before we take testimony, so I please ask you to stand and raise your

right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TIERNEY. The record will please reflect that all witnesses answered in the affirmative.

You have full written statements that you have been kind

enough to supply to the committee, and those will be put on the

record with unanimous consent. We ask that you keep your oral

statements somewhere within the 5-minute range. So we have a

small panel here today, so we’re more than happy to let you go a

little bit beyond that, And we do want to hear a full assessment

of your thoughts and your observations.

Senator Daschle, we will be pleased to start with you.

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STATEMENTS OF THOMAS A. DASCHLE, FORMER SENATE MAJORITY AND MINORITY LEADER; THOMAS E. GARRETT, REGIONAL PROGRAM DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH

AFRICA FOR THE INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE

[IRI]; AND MARK L. SCHNEIDER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT

OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP [ICG] AND FORMER

PEACE CORPS DIRECTOR

STATEMENT OF THOMAS A. DASCHLE

Mr. DASCHLE. I appreciate the opportunity to be here with you

today. I commend you on your opening statement, Mr. Chairman;

and I’m very pleased to be a part of the distinguished panel that

is appearing before you today.

I come before you on behalf of the National Democratic Institute

regarding the prospects for free and fair elections in Pakistan. I’m

a member of the Board of Directors of NDI and, as you noted, was

pleased to be able to lead a pre-election assessment of Pakistan for

NDI from October 17th–21st.

NDI has been actively involved in supporting the electoral process in Pakistan now for nearly two decades. The Institute organized the international delegations to observe the national and provincial elections in 1988, 1990, 1993, and 1997. This year, NDI is

implementing a program to train political party representatives to

monitor polling stations across the country on election day.

The Institute also conducted two pre-election assessment missions to Pakistan, both prior to the imposition of marshal law. The

first was held in May, and I led the second held in October. These

missions identified a number of critical issues that needed to be addressed by the Pakistani government to improve the inclusiveness

and credibility of the polls.

The most recent delegation identified the following critical issues

affecting these elections: first, the high incidence of election-related

violence, second, the killing and abduction of journalists and political party workers; third, the infringement of the rights of women

to vote; fourth, the ban on political parties operating in the federally administered tribal areas. Next, the lack of regular consultation by the election commission with the political parties and civil

society on election procedures and policies and the inaccuracy of

the voters list.

President Musharraf’s recent retirement from his military post

and the lifting of the state of emergency on Saturday have been

welcome developments, but much remains to be done before the upcoming polls could be viewed as free and fair by any international

standard. In fact, we urge the members of this committee not to

be distracted by President Musharraf taking off his uniform. It has

not undone the damage of 8 years of military rule to the basic institutions of rule of law and democracy in Pakistan.

Similarly, the lifting of the state of emergency is not alone sufficient for ensuring free and fair elections. It is only the first of many

steps the government must take to avoid a further deepening of the

Pakistan crisis today.

Among the serious impacts of the recent state of emergency was

the severe erosion of the independence of Pakistan’s judiciary.

Musharraf’s replacement of several Supreme Court justices who

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threatened to rule his re-election unconstitutional undermines the

democratic principle of checks and balances. Without the restoration of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and the other deposed

judges, public confidence in the ability of the judicial system to act

independently and to ensure the transparence of the electoral process will be significantly curtailed.

Lingering restrictions on the press and opposition political parties also pose a threat to free and fair elections. Vibrant independent media and political competition are important elements in free

society. While many restrictions imposed during the state of emergency have been lifted, one major television station continues to be

prohibited from broadcasting, while others face strict limitations on

the content of their political coverage. Many opposition supporters

remain under arrest while their parties do not have the freedom

to campaign openly.

In addition, both of NDI’s assessments identified a host of very

serious and basic issues that, if not addressed, would adversely affect the election. Virtually none has been done since our first report

to strengthen the prospects for free and fair elections. While the

government has allowed the return of two former prime ministers,

Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, after years of exile, Sharif has

been barred from standing for a seat in parliament, thus diminishing his party’s ability to fully participate in these elections. The

other issues identified by the NDI delegations, which remain

unaddressed today, are still fundamental to an inclusive, credible

and transparent electoral process.

Only elections that are viewed as legitimate by the people of

Pakistan can resolve the instability that has long plagued their

country. Robust institutions, an independent judiciary, free and

independent media, vibrant political parties and transparent elections are all fundamental to a stable and democratic future for

Pakistan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Senator.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Daschle follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Garrett.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS E. GARRETT

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Yarmuth, for

this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the upcoming elections in Pakistan.

The International Republican Institute is actively engaged in

programs to support the democratic process in Pakistan, ranging

from public opinion polling to work with nongovernmental organizations to a political party strengthening program. These activities

have been funded through the National Endowment for Democracy.

As you mentioned, with recent funding from the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, as

well as the U.S. Agency for International Development, IRI has

also undertaken a comprehensive elections effort that includes a

pre-election assessment, deployment of long-term observers across

the country and fielding of a 65-person international election day

observer team. I mention the polling as a specific activity that IRI

conducts in Pakistan.

Our public opinion research has revealed that Pakistanis are

committed to democracy and concerned about the future direction

of their country. In IRI’s February 2007, poll, 81 percent were optimistic that democracy would improve their lives. Over the course

of the past year, increasing numbers have expressed their desire

for the army to remove itself from civilian government and for

President Musharraf to resign his post as army chief of staff. Even

when President Musharraf was at the peak of his popularity in IRI

polling, strong majorities supported the return of exiled leaders

Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in order to contest elections.

Our most recent poll, conducted just this past month, found that

voters overwhelmingly opposed the President’s declaration of emergency. Voters were also opposed in large numbers to the various

measures that accompanied this state of emergency declaration.

For instance, 71 percent opposed the suspension of the constitution,

76 percent of Pakistanis opposed the closure of TV news channels,

76 percent opposed the crackdown on lawyers, and 62 percent supported the demonstrations you saw on the street against the declaration.

On the day before President Musharraf declared the state of

emergency, IRI had a pre-election assessment team concluding its

8-day visit to the country. While there, we met with 12 political

parties, representatives of the election commission, civil society and

media as we traveled throughout the country visiting Islamabad,

Quetta, Karachi, Lahore. What we found in this pre-election assessment was a strong commitment on the part of civil society and

political parties to engage in the democratic process, even among

those who identified as early as November/October a lack of a level

playing field in the pre-election environment.

One of the overriding concerns expressed to our pre-election assessment team was the continued decline of law and order within

Pakistan. People who intended to stand for candidate—excuse

me—stand for office expressed fears about their personal safety

while electioneering. The media told us they were worried about

the vulnerability of their reporters and camera people as they tried

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to carry out their work to bring information to the public. But even

these concerns of election period instability did not result in the

majority of Pakistanis we spoke to from saying that they agreed

with the governmental band to limit rallies or to stop political

gatherings.

Questions as to the capacity of the election commission of Pakistan to meet electoral needs in a timely fashion were often raised

with IRI’s delegation. One consistent issue of concern was the accuracy of the official voter list and the possible exclusion of eligible

voters on election day.

Our election assessment also noted the important role played by

Pakistan’s nonstate media. If you look back to 1999, the year during which General Musharraf took power in Pakistan, you can see

the limited number of private media that existed at the time. During these last several years, media outlet numbers have grown tremendously and today they play a very important role in the roadmap to democracy in Pakistan.

In IRI’s most recent polling, the media actually outstrips institutions such as the judiciary and the army as the highest-rated institution in the country. That makes it all the more important, we believe, that private television stations that have been removed from

the air—some restored but also still have media curbs in place

against them—be allowed to report freely and fully on this election

campaign period.

The declaration of emergency on November 3rd was a very significant obstacle to the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Several individuals that IRI met with during that time were under detention or still face the threat of detention today.

The government of Pakistan’s decision to lift the emergency and

proceed with elections offers some hope the process toward democratization may be restored. However, I have to say it is very difficult to envision how elections conducted in a matter of only a few

days and weeks under these kinds of rules while many participants

are otherwise still detained or face the threat of detention—it is

very difficult to envision how these elections can achieve legitimacy

in the minds of the Pakistani citizenry. Of course, it is the Pakistani citizens who will judge this election’s credibility. Based upon

the polling figures that we have seen, we think this will be very

difficult to achieve.

Within IRI, we’ve examined whether or not our presence as observers on this election January 8th is necessary or desirable, given

the flawed conditions in which we see this election proceeding. As

recently as last week while I was in Pakistan, we met in consultation with our Pakistani partners and others as to the viability of

an observer mission. But with the decision of the majority of parties to contest the election, IRI determined that its role as an NGO

that promotes democracy was to work with our Pakistani partners

on this election in the hope that future elections can be improved

to democratic standards.

So, over the next few weeks, our long-term and short-term observer delegation will be arriving in Pakistan to observe the electoral process. We will attempt to put people, observers in all four

provinces of Pakistan, depending upon security at the time.

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Our preliminary mission findings will be presented shortly after

election day at a press briefing, and within 45 days we’ll issue a

comprehensive report. It is our hope that the recommendations

that report contains will strengthen the future elections in Pakistan. We hope that these recommendations will set benchmarks

that serve as a guide for Pakistani election officials, political parties and civil society on how future elections may improve the country’s democratic standing.

Just before I close, let me say that much of my comments were

geared toward the role of the government in this election. As a result of our pre-election assessment, I’d also like to point to the role

played by political parties in Pakistan, including those in the opposition. We think that a commitment by the parties to run issuebased rather than personality centered election campaigns would

break with the disastrous cycle of elections that have taken place

in Pakistan since 1970. We think it is an important role for the

parties to come forward with political programs or platforms that

motivate the people of Pakistan to participate in elections.

If you look at our polling, the issues which predominate are not

those concerned with foreign policy or the war on terror. But, for

Pakistanis, it is bread and butter issues such as inflation. When

presented with a number of issues and asked to select what was

most important in determining which party they’d vote for, 77 percent of Pakistanis chose economics related issues. Inflation was the

top issue by far, having been selected by 53 percent of the respondents.

Just finally, in closing, let me say that restoring public as well

as international confidence in the electoral process in Pakistan is

going to be very, very difficult. But we can see again through 2

years of polling that the urge among Pakistanis for democracy remains strong.

Thank you very much.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Garrett.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Garrett follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Schneider.

STATEMENT OF MARK L. SCHNEIDER

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me again express our appreciation to you and to the subcommittee for maintaining this focus on U.S. relations with Pakistan and on the Musharraf government’s performance on democracy, extremism and terrorism.

This hearing asks whether the parliamentary elections now

scheduled for January 8th are going to be fair and free or fundamentally flawed, and it is appropriate that the question is asked

now because election day is too late.

And, unfortunately, the answer today is that Pakistan’s parliamentary elections will be fatally flawed unless fundamental, political, electoral and legal conditions are rapidly improved. Today,

those conditions do not permit a fair and free election. It is December 20th. Martial law was lifted only 5 days ago. The elections will

take place in 18 days. There is a very short time.

There is nothing like time for a long-term observation. That was

long ago that the observation should have begun, and there should

have already been a finding that the conditions that are required

do not exist.

Election day, remember, is the final act of a democratic drama.

The first act is establishment of neutral rules and standards that

all of the major players agree will permit a level playing field. That

does not exist.

Act two is for all of the parties to be able to name their own candidates and then to be able to campaign freely and the press to be

able to ask their questions of all parties. That again does not exist.

It is only finally when you get to the final act, if you will, when

all eligible voters are permitted to vote, when votes are honestly

and accurately counted and reported and when the complaints are

heard before a neutral body, then one can say that the full drama

is complete. At the moment, all of those factors are in high question as to whether or not those conditions will be met, because the

emergency government of General Musharraf and now the current

post-December 15th government of President Musharraf have violated the country’s constitution and undermined the essential conditions for a fair and free election.

As you noted, I was in Pakistan the week before the emergency

was declared. At the beginning of the week, the assumption was

that there would be no emergency because people did not think the

court would dare to rule against Musharraf on the two key constitutional challenges to his re-election, wearing the uniform at the

same time as being president and attempting to be re-elected within 2 years of holding an office as a military officer.

By the end of the week, the views had changed; and that really

gives you an indication of the timing for his action to declare an

emergency. By the end of the week, in fact, it was viewed that the

Supreme Court would disqualify him on one or both of the constitutional grounds; and, in addition, his government faced contempt

charges for having refused to abide by the court decision to permit

Nawaz Sharif to return to Pakistan from Saudi Arabia and forcibly

deported him.

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He essentially preempted the court on November 3rd. He imposed an emergency rule, he voided the constitution, he essentially

adopted martial law. And there is a key disconnect between his justification of terrorism, the threat of terrorism, and his actions. The

first people arrested were not terrorists. They were political party

leaders. The first people released from prison were terrorists, in

fact, those that had been linked to suicide bombings. They were exchanged for army hostages. Of the dozen or so paragraphs in the

proclamation of emergency, 2 were solely linked to terrorism, 10

complained about an independent judiciary.

His actions in time revealed his fundamental motive, which was

to maintain power. The reason for acting was to retain political

power and not to fight terrorism, and martial law was the means.

To be frank, everybody in Pakistan I think was surprised by the

level of repression that followed that decision. You’ve already heard

some of it: Thousands rounded up and detained, Supreme Court

justices, other justices removed. Remember, 13 of the 17 Supreme

Court justices essentially were detained and have been fired; and

more than 40 of the provincial High Courts, essentially the state

Supreme Courts, have also been fired.

The independent judiciary has been undermined, fundamentally;

and I’m going to get to the point, which is that the linkage between

the judiciary and fair and free elections in Pakistan is fundamental.

Now, you have to understand that the reason that he did not use

the emergency provision of the constitution and apply that as

President, which I put into the testimony, is that would not have

voided the roles of the other agencies of government. It would have

kept the Supreme Court which had the power under the constitution to review his actions. He didn’t do that. He voided the constitution. He essentially took the country back to 1999 and worse.

Because what he said was that there will be no review of my action

by the court or any other institution.

In fact, now when he lifted the emergency last Saturday, he acknowledged what he had done. He said—and I’m quoting—have I

done anything constitutionally illegal? Yes, I did on November 3rd.

His order deprived the courts of the authority to challenge any Executive order for unconstitutionality and gave him the power to

amend the constitution.

Before they were placed under confinement, 7 members of the

Supreme Court, a majority of the panel of 11, ruled that his actions

were illegal and unconstitutional.

And then you asked the question about the reaction in Pakistan

to what has occurred and to U.S. actions. Pakistanis and others

found it utterly incomprehensible that President Bush asserted

that Musharraf had not crossed any red line in terms of undemocratic actions.

This is the second time he crossed the red line. The first time

was 1999, and the second time was when he voided the constitution

on November 3rd.

Now, afterwards, I think the United States, the U.K. and the EU

made appropriate statements expressing the view that the emergency rule was unwise and the martial law abuses are unacceptable; and it essentially said that he needed to give up his army

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post, hold fair and free elections and end the emergency rule. But

it is interesting that the U.S. Government at all levels has been utterly silent about the importance of an independent judiciary, it

has been utterly silent about the need to restore the court and to

restore the judges who have been fired, and that is a tragedy.

Now, to the casual observer, it may appear that Musharraf has

met those three conditions. He gave up the army post November

28th, he announced the parliamentary elections would be held, and

he issued the order Saturday ending the emergency. Unfortunately,

he did so with caveats, with restrictions and with limitations which

violate fundamental freedoms and which make fair and free elections highly dubious.

The day before he lifted the emergency, he imposed six new constitutional amendments, again which challenged the role of the judiciary; and his orders simply said that nothing that had occurred

during the emergency period could be reviewed by the courts or by

parliament.

And, by the way, some of those items—it is important to recognize what they were.

First, of course, it said that the 2-year bar would no longer apply

to the President. Second, that the dismissal of the Supreme Court

judges and High Court judges can’t be challenged by or before any

court. An amendment to the 1952 Army Act made retroactive from

its military courts now to try civilians for a wide range of offenses,

including causing public mischief. Another decree threatens freedom of association by giving the new hand-picked High Court the

authority to disbar lawyers. And, again, none of these decrees are

subject to review under his order.

The linkage between the judiciary and elections. The election

commission of Pakistan is comprised of a retired Supreme Court

justice and a serving High Court judge from each of the four provinces. Two of those remain unfilled. By permanently barring the

previous Supreme Court provincial High Court judges who refuse

to bow to his edict, he has basically assured that the commission

represents only hand-picked judges that he is satisfied with.

But it is even more than that. In every province, above the polling station, when the returns are collated, if you will, at a district

level—let’s say first at a municipal level and here let’s say at a

county level—there are what are called district returning officers,

returning officers and assistant returning officers who run that.

They manage it. In Pakistan, they are either district judges, assistant district judges or civil judges; and they all have to respond to

the high—to the High Court of that province. And so the judiciary

in Pakistan fundamentally is responsible for running the elections.

That judiciary has now been totally tarnished by Musharraf’s actions.

And, in addition, it should be remembered that whenever there

are complaints made, those complaints go to an electoral tribunal

made up of judges and then from there to the High Court in each

province and then to the Supreme Court, again, courts which now

are filled with hand-picked Musharraf choices. By stacking the full

range of High Courts, including, by the way, now naming a totally

new High Court for Islamabad, he has essentially hijacked the electoral process.

41

In terms of ensuring credible elections, could it still be done?

Possibly. But you’d have to do a range of actions:

One, establish a neutral caretaker government that doesn’t exist.

He has refused to do so.

Establish a neutral and accepted electoral commission. Tomorrow, he could go and ask the parties for recommendations, and

there are scores of acceptable individuals if he would restore the

judges who could form that commission.

The voters’ rolls. You’ve heard just mention of them. But what

occurred was that the commission established new voters’ rolls for

this election. By August, they had come up with 52 million names.

There was a protest from the parties, because, in 2002, there were

72 million names, and it was clear that something was wrong. And

it went to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court said to the

electoral commission, fix this.

What the electoral commission did was say, OK, here is the 2002

list. Here is the list we came up with. Those who aren’t on our list

that were in 2002 we’ll add. They added about 25 million names.

Nobody reviewed who died. Nobody reviewed who wasn’t on—

shouldn’t have been on that list because they perhaps were terrorists and in jail. Nothing.

The parties said, put this on a mechanism where we can electronically go through it and try and say these people are dead,

these people on our party lists are not on it. And when we were—

when I was in Islamabad, I spoke to the electoral commission; and

they said, yes, we can do it and we’re figuring out how to and we’ll

do it shortly. That has not yet been done. So you still have voter

rolls which are highly suspect.

Finally, you’ve heard mention of the code of conduct, so I won’t

go into that. But it basically establishes serious curbs on public

statements, press statements and what the parties can say.

Let me just note as well that as one looks down the road what

is needed: full restoration of the constitution, full restoration of

independent judiciary, voiding the emergency period of press prohibition, press ordinances—by the way, they provide for criminal penalties, not simply civil penalties. Up to 3 years in jail, in addition

to a $200,000 fine and loss of television licenses. And that’s for

anyone who publicly criticizes Musharraf, the military, the emergency, the emergency rule or foreign affairs.

Establish a neutral electoral commission and a neutral caretaker

government and consult with the parties on all of the issues relative to the elections and release from house arrest judges and

their lawyers and the others detained for engaging in democratic

protests.

The United States and Western allies must recognize that fair

and free elections are the best option for a secular, moderate parliamentary majority, a unified country against extremists, Jihadi

organizations, the Taliban and al Qaeda. A rigged election will

produce the worst of all possible worlds. The election will not be

credible, the parliament will not be credible, and the parliament

will be controlled by a Musharraf-linked majority of religious parties who themselves have links to the Taliban, and the country will

be fundamentally and sharply divided.

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Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Schneider.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schneider follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, all of you. We went a little bit over the

5-minute line, as we thought we would, but I think it was worth

listening to what you all had to say, and I appreciate it.

The very last thing that Mr. Schneider said—saving the best for

last, I think, is really the crux of the matter, isn’t it—that the

United States, the Western allies have to recognize that free and

fair elections are the best option for a secular and moderate parliamentary majority in a unified country against extremist jihadi

organizations, the Taliban and al Qaeda. Do all of the panel agree

with that statement, that is really the best option here?

Mr. DASCHLE. Well, Mr. Chairman, I certainly do. I think Mr.

Schneider said it very well, and I’m concerned—and I will say that

in answer to your questions, I’ll speak for myself and not for NDI.

But I’m concerned, as he noted, that there has been far too much

silence with regard to the U.S. position on many of these fundamental questions in Pakistan today. But your question is appropriate, and I would answer in the affirmative.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Garrett.

Mr. GARRETT. Yes, sir, I agree. I think that really our future policies should be determined in large part by whether or not these

elections are conducted in any type of a rigged or free and fair

manner.

Mr. TIERNEY. When I look at your polls, Mr. Garrett, and I see

the number of people responding to this declaration and all, I’m

hard pressed to think how without legitimacy—I mean, if there

aren’t free and fair elections and if somebody isn’t given a legitimate mandate, how they are going to marshal all of the people in

their country to help us in other countries push back against terrorists and al Qaeda? You’re going to have a continuation, I would

think, of what we see now as sort of the government fighting those

secular forces, moderate forces, lawyers, judges and everything,

just to stay in power, as opposed to focusing on these external and

some internal problems. Am I right?

Mr. GARRETT. I would agree.

Mr. TIERNEY. So, following that, Mr. Garrett, I have an issue

with you. Are you at all concerned that your IRI’s mission is going

to be seen as some sort of a validation of what might very likely

be illegitimate elections? And how are you guarding against being

put in that position?

Mr. GARRETT. It is difficult to say what the final report that we’d

produce 45 days after the election is going to say at this time. However our pre-election statement which we have issued publicly—it

is on our Web site—does say that we see this as a very troubled

election, pre-election environment, flawed.

As I mentioned in my statement, I believe if the political parties

of Pakistan had decided not to contest—and they are saying that

they’re contesting this knowing it is going to be highly flawed. If

it weren’t for them, we wouldn’t be there. But we do feel like we

need to stand with the political parties of Pakistan as they do

make that courageous stand themselves for democracy and elections.

Mr. TIERNEY. I would ask just a series of questions; and, Mr.

Garrett, if you feel uncomfortable answering them because you

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have a report coming out afterwards, then just defer. But I would

like the Senator and Mr. Schneider to answer.

I want to talk about what are the standards that have to be met

for free and fair if the judges aren’t reinstated. Have they failed to

meet the standard?

Mr. DASCHLE. I don’t see how you can meet the standard without

a restoration of the rule of law. And the rule of law cannot be reinstated without the restoration of the judges. So I think it is pretty

fundamental.

Mr. TIERNEY. Do you agree, Mr. Schneider.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Absolutely.

Mr. TIERNEY. Do you want to defer, Mr. Garrett, or make a comment.

If you don’t reinstate to the media the ability to report on election occurrences, including criticizing the President and other authorities on that, how can you have a free and fair election? Would

that failure to reinstate their ability to do that, to not make them

subject to a $200,000 fine, loss of a license and possible imprisonment for reporting a critical aspect, if that doesn’t occur between

now and January 8th, how can we infer that there are free and fair

elections? Is that a fair statement?

Mr. DASCHLE. I think that is a fair statement, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Schneider.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Absolutely.

Mr. TIERNEY. If we don’t release from prison people like Aitzaz

Ahsan, the president of the bar association, the senator of the PPP,

a known democracy proponent and others that are imprisoned over

there, how can we determine if it is a free and fair election? Am

I right?

Mr. DASCHLE. That’s exactly right.

Mr. TIERNEY. The voter polls, Senator Daschle, you made mention of that in your report and Mr. Schneider mentioned it again.

Twenty-five million people all of a sudden mysteriously appear and

get thrown on there. If that isn’t corrected by allowing the parties

to go through and scrutinize and make comments about who perhaps ought not to be on for whatever infirmity or ought to be on

because they’re missing, how can that be termed a free and fair

election? Am I correct?

Mr. DASCHLE. Precisely.

Mr. TIERNEY. The problem that I’m seeing here is we have 3

weeks to go, some very, very serious impediments on that; and it

is almost—and I didn’t want to put Mr. Garrett in this position because he is going to put a report out. How in the world do you even

think that there can possibly be free and fair elections unless

President Musharraf has a sudden turn of heart here and within

the next couple of days changes all these things? And I think it

would be arguably possible to do if you did things today or tomorrow, but anytime beyond that you just run out of time and you

don’t have it.

So I think the next question is, how does the United States

react? How are we to react if all of these things don’t get changed

so that the elections are put on a footpath toward free and fair

elections?

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Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. Chairman, again speaking for myself, I would

say that the United States needs to be far more assertive, far more

vocal, far more aggressive in stating our position, as Mr. Schneider

noted and we’ve noted this morning. The silence is a message, and

that silence cannot go unnoted.

We just passed the omnibus, as no one knows better than the

chairman and Mr. Yarmuth. But that conditionality in the omnibus

is a beginning, but it is only a beginning. I think it is a very mellow statement with regard to what it is that this government needs

to do, but you have to start somewhere. I would hope that we could

build on that in the future, and I would hope that we could be a

lot more assertive with regard to the conditionality of assistance.

But, most importantly, in the next 3 weeks—and we won’t be—

you won’t be in session during the next 3 weeks—I think it is very

critical that the State Department step up to the plate and voice

these concerns with a lot more vigor than I’ve seen so far.

Mr. TIERNEY. I have to agree with you.

My problem is that, other than ambassador Patterson, who has

done, arguably, a good job on at least some of these aspects of

being outspoken, I’m really concerned about Mr. Negroponte and

Mr. Boucher and their statements. To say that it hasn’t crossed

any red line to me is absurd. They crossed when they declared the

state of emergency and all the other things that followed from it.

But then for Richard Boucher to indicate that it is a bump in the

road—if it happened in this country, I don’t think we’d look at it

as a bump in the road. So I don’t know what hope we can hold out

for this administration really doing that.

For the record, I’ll make note that the Senator referenced action

that was taken on spending bills, appropriation bills last night

where the House and the Senate decided to put some constraints

on the financial aid that the United States was giving to Pakistan,

a significant amount of money. $50 million was held aside until the

Secretary of State can make certain representations about corrections of the conditions we mentioned here today, the judges and

others being put out of jail, reinstated to the bench, the media

being given back the license that it had to report and so on. So,

also, money being put more toward development and education and

other things, as opposed to just indiscriminate money to the

Musharraf regime to do what they want to do.

And also directing some money away from money that had been

spent militarily for things like F–16s and focusing it more on the

battle against terrorism and the Taliban. Although the administration’s surprising remark to that was they didn’t quite know how

that was going to happen because the F–16s were so important to

Musharraf and the military. Notwithstanding the fact that F–16s,

to my knowledge, haven’t been used to fight terrorism and the

Taliban and al Qaeda in that region of the world, nor do they need

submarines or some of the other things it was being spent on.

So those are the things that were referenced there.

I’m going to have Mr. Yarmuth ask some questions. I have a

number of questions I’d like to get back to, but I do want to let the

other panelists—and I welcome Mr. Van Hollen who is joining us

as well. Mr. Yarmuth.

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Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the testimony of the witnesses.

I want to give the President the benefit of the doubt for a second,

and I don’t usually do that, but I’ll do it for the time being. Is he

in essentially—are we in a no-win situation in that the likelihood

we’re going to have to deal with President Musharraf in some way

in terms of our fight against radical Islam versus our desire to

have a pure democracy, an American-style democracy, is he—how

much of a thin line is he treading here in terms of the real politic

of the situation?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think really that is a fundamental question. I

think the mistake is to assume that the Pakistan military is solely

made up of President Musharraf. It is not. The Pakistan military

has for its own reasons—if it is working with the civilian democrat,

the elected government, efforts to try and stop the Islamic Jihadi

forces which have been carrying out, as you know, suicide bombings and other attacks—the issue is that, politically, President

Musharraf has linked himself to religious parties which are linked

to some of the extremists, including Taliban, in order to gain a majority he hopes in the parliament. That is the problem. All the pressure is on him in terms of his own political interests, are to go soft

on the terrorists.

On the other hand, both Benazir Bhutto, the PPP and the PML

and Nawaz Sharif, their instinct and their desire is to have a secular, moderate majority; and they will be even more concerned about

putting restrictions on the religious extremists. So, in a sense, it

is a win-win for us to press for a fair and free democratic election

which would produce, as we’ve heard from the polling numbers, a

moderate majority. And I believe that if worst—if the United

States is taking that position, along with its allies, the military will

understand that if they take the position of supporting Musharraf

against the majority of the Pakistan population again and put at

risk their relationship in terms of aid with the United States and

others, that is not in their institutional interests. And at some

point—and I would suspect it would be sooner rather than later—

they’ll press President Musharraf to either change significantly or

remove himself.

And I should say, by the way, that at this point it seems to me

there is something that the State Department can do even at this

12th hour and that is to specify what are those conditions that are

required to provide an opportunity for a relatively credible election

on January 8th. Present those—and I mean this. They are not hidden. As you’ve heard from all of us, we all generally agree on what

they are. Present those privately to President Musharraf and to the

leadership in Pakistan. And if within a number of days that they

have not begun to move, then publicly say these are the things

which are—that publicly that we’ve asked because we think it is

crucial to a fair and free election.

Because, relatively speaking, the short time period—if the people

of Pakistan see that the United States is complicit with the steps

that rule out any possibility of a democratic election, the future relationship with the United States is going to be, unfortunately, far

worse than it is today.

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Mr. DASCHLE. I would only add that if we learned anything from

history it is that personality driven foreign policy will ultimately

lead to a disaster within any country where it is practiced. Personality driven policies in Iran, in the Philippines and in many other

countries today have complicated, not simplified, our challenges in

the years to follow. We ought to learn those lessons here.

The people of Pakistan generally are very supportive of the people of the United States. But over and over again when I was there

they asked the question, where is your government? Why aren’t

they speaking out? Why is it that they seem to be supporting

Musharraf against us? And I think we have to make it clear we’re

with the people of Pakistan, not with the Musharraf government.

Mr. YARMUTH. That was actually going to be one of my followup

questions, is how aware are the Pakistani people of what this government is doing, what our government is doing? Apparently,

they’re very aware.

Mr. DASCHLE. They are very aware.

Mr. YARMUTH. Mr. Chairman, I’m lost without the clock. I don’t

know when my time is up.

In terms of the ramifications for the international situation—

again, our war on terror and so forth—are we—is the failure of a

free and fair election in a few weeks, that we have the status quo—

in other words, do we have a downside from where we are now?

Can it make it worse? Or is there only an upside?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Let me give you just one example.

Already, as you know, President Musharraf’s party, the PML-Q,

has indicated that it is going to align itself with the JUIF during

the election campaign. That is the extreme religious right party

that has been seen to be linked with Taliban. In other words, to

create their majority, they’re going to link themselves in the parliamentary elections and then in the parliament with that party.

That means that the pressures to go after the Taliban particularly—remember, the Taliban military and political headquarters,

according to U.S. military sources testifying before the Congress,

are in and around Quetta and Peshawar. These are cities. These

are not mountain—isolated mountain regions. Any effort to go after

them is going to be undermined by this process of an unfair election because it is going to result in a majority of the religious right

linked to parties which have their own ties to the Taliban.

Mr. YARMUTH. I’ll yield.

Mr. TIERNEY. I just want to add one thing, and that is we’ve seen

this before. If we don’t have free and fair elections now, when the

prospects are that if they were held in that manner that people

that were secular probably, at least were moderate and certainly

and shared interests with others would be not likely to win. You

have a fraudulent election or fundamentally flawed election and

one or two terms down the road here you could end up with a team

in there that you don’t even want to see. That’s why it is so disturbing to have this administration sitting on the sidelines and not

speaking out.

Mr. Van Hollen.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Tierney; and thank you for

holding this series of hearings on Pakistan. I thank all of our panelists, witnesses here today.

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I just want to start by looking at the context by which we find

ourselves in right now in Pakistan. I think we obviously need to

look forward and anticipate what is going to happen after these

elections, but it is also important to remind ourselves how we got

here. And we did get here in large part because the U.S. Government, under the Bush administration, did not take action nearly

early enough to put—keep pressure on Pakistan to move in the direction of greater democratization and essentially bought into

Musharraf’s argument that he was the only guy in Pakistan that

was willing to stand up to the Taliban and be able to fight al

Qaeda. When in fact, as you pointed out, Mr. Schneider, his ability

to stay in power was in part due to the fact that he had at least

the tacit support of some of the extreme religious groups within

Pakistan and that they provided him his margin, in fact, for the

majority. And if you looked at sort of the secular opposition, that

they in fact represented a much greater threat, so to speak, to the

Taliban and the extremists.

So what our policy did was reinforce Musharraf; and we sort of

saw this in stark terms when Musharraf recently, instead of keeping his guns trained on al Qaeda and the extremists, actually

turned against the lawyers and those fighting for democracy in the

streets. So we sort of saw in very vivid form when push came to

shove where he saw some of the threats within Pakistan coming

from.

So I do think we’ve got a lot of work to do dealing with the Pakistani public in letting people know that we’re on the side of democracy, let the chips fall where they may. And clearly his decision to

remove the chief judge had everything to do with the fact that they

were about to rule that he could no longer serve, he couldn’t serve

as President because of the constitutional limitations.

So given that we’re in that situation and we’re going forward

now with the elections, if the elections are not perceived to be fair

and given what you have all said with regard to the current judges

and the election, you know, overseers who were all supporters of

Musharraf at this point, if it is not perceived to be fair, where does

that leave the United States and what should we both be doing

right now?

You’ve answered some of that. But looking to the future, what

kind of scenarios should we anticipate and what kind of measure

should be willing to take if we judge—we, the U.S. Government,

judge that the outcome was not fair?

Mr. DASCHLE. I’d say the three things that we ought to do.

First, as we’ve all said this morning, I think the most important

thing in the immediate 3 weeks is to put as much pressure as we

can verbally and in other ways on the government to do the right

thing, to make them as free and fair as they can, given the limited

time available to us.

Once the election has been held, I think it is important that we

work with political leadership within the country, do as much as

possible to ensure that, whatever the results of the election, we

work with all interested parties to enhance the institutions of government themselves and not look at that election as the last word

but only really the beginning of an ongoing effort to try to put

Pakistan on the right path. I think that is critical.

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And then, third, I think it is important for us to involve the

international community as well. This shouldn’t just be a bilateral

experience. It is important for us to involve others as well in the

region and around the world and add to that pressure on the

Musharraf government and those responsible for making these decisions.

But that all has to be done both in the short term and in the

longer term in a concerted way, And we can’t afford to wait a day.

It has to start now.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I would just add to that really one thing, I

think; and that is that, instead of the conditionality applying softly

to 50 out of the 300, I think you should apply it to all 300 million.

I think that anything that we provide thereafter should be clearly

performance based in relation to going after Taliban fully, not in

a half-way manner and that it should be based clearly on evidence

that they have, in fact, taken significant steps to go after the

Taliban leadership, the core leadership throughout the country and

as well as al Qaeda. I think that is a minimum.

But, clearly, we should also be looking for ways to strengthen our

relationship with the rest of the political—not just the political parties but civil society as well, the human rights groups, many of

which have—their leaders have been detained, the women’s organizations. All of those that represent civil society, we should be increasing our support for them. This is not going to remain—even

if this outcome of these elections is, as we believe, not going to be

fair and free, that is not going to be the future of Pakistan.

Mr. GARRETT. If I could just add to that. We feel very strongly

at IRI that we don’t need to fear the outcome of any free and fair

elections in the country, but we do need to be very concerned in

the United States about what is to come if it is seen as an American validation of a rigged election.

As my fellow witnesses have said, I think an investment needs

to be made, a long-term investment, in Pakistani civil society. We

are seeing the students now stepping up for, really, one of the first

times in some years—the lawyers and the political parties—but an

investment needs to be made in developing those groups.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Just to followup on that, Mr. Garrett, in terms

of the tools that are at your disposal in terms of the election monitoring, what kind of cooperation have you gotten? What resources

do you have at your disposal? At what point would you be in a position to give an assessment, again, prior to the election, as to whether or not you thought you had the resources and tools available to

actually make a fair judgment? Because it gets to the point you

just raised. We do not want to be in a position here of sort of certifying the fairness of an election or in suggesting we think it was

fair if, in fact, we are not in a position to do so, and many in the

country see it as unfair.

So what resources are at your disposal? At what point do you

think you would be able to say that the election monitoring that

is going to be put in place will be adequate to make a determination on the fairness of the election?

Mr. GARRETT. Well, the resources to date that we have been operating on were provided by the National Endowment for Democracy, and they have been our only funding source in the country,

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until very recently, for this election when we did receive USAID

money and State Department money to conduct the election observation itself. A 65-person observation delegation is fairly large.

However, in a nation of 160 million people and tens of thousands

of polling stations, you can see that will not go very far. That is

why I think it is important that the work of our sister organization—the National Democratic Institute—trains the political parties to try to get as many of their own observers there. That has

been very, very important to this.

There are Pakistani groups that are also domestic observers. As

I understand it, as of today, they have still not been given credentials by the government, allowing them, although they are a very

well-established NGO, to go out and to try to cover some of these

polling stations on election day and to record their findings. There

is one more thing that could be done, and that is to encourage the

Government of Pakistan to allow its own domestic groups to participate in the election as monitors.

As for the resources for the future, as I say, I think we need to

try to commit more to these very sectors and to try to do that, possibly, through our USAID programs as opposed to simply through

the Pakistani Government.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Following on that thought, there are a number of

areas of that country that are deemed to be not particularly safe

by the Pakistani Government itself, and by our own government on

that.

Are you going to be able to get into those areas with the IRI to

monitor the situations there—into Balochistan, Peshawar and up

in the FATA areas?

Mr. GARRETT. During the preelection assessment, we were able

to get into Balochistan. We did not go to the frontier. I believe, a

few weeks before, NDI was able to visit Peshawar during their

preelection assessment. We do not really know as of now what is

going to be happening on election day. There are certainly parts of

the country that, I think, are just a ‘‘no go’’ for us, but for the most

part I think we are going to see a fairly good distribution in all four

provinces of our international observer team.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Schneider, tell us a little bit about the alleged

role of the intelligence services and their impact and intimidation,

or at least alleged intimidation. Also, the local mayors and local authorities, what is their role in the election? What are their concerns

around that?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. There are three things it seems to me that are

of major concern.

You have already had the parties file complaints with the Election Commission about the intelligence services’ having threatened

and, in some cases, detained their party leaders at the local level.

You have had the decision by the newly named high court judges

in several of the provinces to move hundreds of local district judges

around. Remember, I mentioned that they are going to be, essentially, the electoral voting managers on election day. Well, they

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where. So you have a real concern about those kinds of administrative actions at the local level.

The state governments have the responsibility for the local administration. Again, there has been evidence—and you have some

of it on your screen—of the use of government resources and of government security forces campaigning for Musharraf. So all of these

things are major concerns that the parties have. Up to this point,

the Electoral Commission has not responded to any of these complaints, so it is a major concern.

I will also note that with FATA right now, the political parties,

the moderate political parties, are not able to operate there. In the

past, in fact, the PPP won in FATA in the distant past, but now

they cannot operate there, and the area is essentially controlled by

the religious parties.

Mr. TIERNEY. It is disturbing on that.

I guess, Mr. Garrett—again, not wanting to be unfair to you, but

I keep coming back to this—can you conceive at all of an outcome

of this where you deem these elections to be free and fair if that

judiciary continues to be stacked the way it is? Is that even a prospect? Would you take one of the other criteria, the fact that the

media is still restricted and that they suffer the possibility of a

prison sentence of up to 3 years under this code of conduct if they

criticize the president or the military? If that does not change between now and then, can you even fathom saying that those elections were free and fair?

I think we all know it is not about how transparent the boxes

are on the election day. You can monitor that all day long, but if

none of this in the lead-up changes—the voter polls do not change,

the ability of the press to report, the parties to participate, people

to get out of jail, the judiciary to not be stacked—is it really even

fair to think that you might come up with any kind of a stamp of

approval on this or just a report about how bad it went?

Mr. GARRETT. Let me just say that we had our preelection assessment team in the country the day the emergency was declared.

So, as we became aware of the emergency’s being declared, it was

one by one that the television stations were disappearing. You were

watching one, and it was saying, ‘‘There are troops arriving in the

capital. The Supreme Court has been surrounded.’’ Then it went off

the air. You would switch to the next station, and it would be on

for a while, reporting, and it would go, so forth and so on. However,

during that entire period up to today, there was still print media

that was allowed, I think, to operate unfettered. It was the electronic media that was singled out. It was not the nation’s substantial print media.

If you look at our polling, it says that in a free and fair election,

over 50 percent of the seats would very likely go to a coalition of

opposition parties. There are places where these political parties

have a very solid basis of support. So I see these sorts of things,

and I think that once again we cannot really prejudge, because we

do not know what might change in the next few weeks.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, the one thing that has changed is how the

print media is subject to the code of conduct as well.

Mr. GARRETT. That is true. But as recently as this past week

when I was there, they were printing their cartoons against the

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president. They were doing editorials that were very well written,

explaining what were the root issues with the emergency.

I would just say that it is going to be very difficult—I think I

said that in my statement earlier—it is going to be very difficult

to imagine how this election is going to emerge with any type of

a positive reference given the things that we are already seeing

going into it. It will be very difficult.

Mr. TIERNEY. All three of you probably have far more experience

on previous elections than the panel up here does. But my understanding of the electioneering process that goes on out there is that

parties take to the streets, that they have large rallies, that they

motivate tens of thousands of people on that. There are serious

constraints on that as I understand it.

How does that affect the ability of any one party to really go

through with their historically understood to be the way of conducting an election? What impact is that going to have?

Senator Daschle.

Mr. DASCHLE. Well, Mr. Chairman, even by Pakistani standards,

you are not going to have anything close to that resembling a free

and fair election. I mean it starts with the ISI and Mr. Schneider’s

description of the circumstances involving the pervasiveness of ISI

involvement at the local level now with regard to the elections. You

have the incompetence and the intransigence of the Election Commission. You have serious problems with regard to the freedom of

press. You have the inability on the part of parties to organize

themselves and have the public demonstrations of support for candidates that you have just described. You have a Supreme Court

that is now completely violated and that is not in standing within

the country. So, as I say, even by past standards in Pakistan, the

circumstances today are deplorable, and I do not see how you begin

to change that.

Having said that, I think the parties have come to the conclusion

of what is the alternative. What do you do in a situation like this

when the alternative, probably, is Musharraf’s dictatorship for an

indefinite period of time and no opportunity for them to voice themselves and to be participants in the political process even under

this corrupted basis? So I think they probably made the right decision, but we all like to know, going in, that this is really a joke in

terms of the capacity to produce any real results.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Could I, Mr. Chairman?

On the question of the press, I have just a couple of things.

Mr. TIERNEY. Sure.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. In the last couple of days, the Pakistan media

regulatory authority has actually sent new letters to the owners of

the private television stations, and they have basically told them

that they are being watched and that they cannot do live coverage,

live programs that deal with political issues in ways which, in their

view, violate the code of conduct in terms of ridiculing or in any

other way criticizing the president and the military, etc.

When we talk about intelligence agencies, they have also made

it known to reporters that their actions are as clearly questionable

with respect to some of the things they have written as it relates

to individuals like President Musharraf. You have to remember

that during the emergency period, then-General Musharraf issued

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ordinances which increased the restrictions on both the electronic

media and on the print media.

I was just looking at Ordinance No. 14, for example, on the print

media. It says that any material, printed or graphic, that defames

or ridicules members of the armed forces, etc., are barred, and they

are potentially liable for 3 years in jail and for major fines.

So the kinds of restrictions that now exist are far greater than

anything in the past. Obviously, this has an enormous chilling effect on all of the media.

Mr. TIERNEY. When we look at the unfortunate circumstances—

I think, Mr. Garrett, you put it out in your testimony pretty well.

We were looking at it, and we were thinking there was a really

good system or that there were parties that would have a platform

and that would stand for principles and policies. Historically, it has

been very personality-driven, and I do not think that is going to

change overnight.

So, given the fact that it has now prohibited Nawaz Sharif from

even participating, what does that do to at least one of those major

parties and their prospects in this election?

Mr. DASCHLE. I think it makes it almost impossible for the full

participation of the parties of consequence to have the ability to

participate openly and freely. I think once you have eliminated one

of the major opponents in the political process, I mean, by the very

nature of that act, you are not going to get where you need to go,

aside from all of the other things we have already talked about.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Schneider, you made mention in your testimony that 7 out

of the 11 original judges on the highest court voted, before they

were displaced, that the action of President Musharraf, or General

Musharraf at that time, actually was unconstitutional.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Right.

Mr. TIERNEY. What is the effect of that order now?

If that were put in place before they were actually removed or

whatever, is it still valid? Has it been invalidated by his subsequent actions? Is it lingering out there?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. It is very difficult to say because, as I say, that

action took place before they were removed from their position. So

the argument could be made that still stands. There are some legal

voices of impact who are going to say that is the case; that this was

an unconstitutional act, that it was found unconstitutional by the

court and that court ruling still stands. Obviously, President

Musharraf subsequently has said that no order by any court can

void what he has done during the emergency law period. But the

entire order establishing the provisional constitutional order was

declared unconstitutional by the court before it left office, before

they were thrown out.

So I think at some point in time, you are going to go back. I do

think that, at some point, you will have a democratic government.

I do think at some point they will find that the original orders by

General Musharraf were unconstitutional and invalid and that he

could not, essentially, bar the court from reviewing his actions.

Mr. TIERNEY. One of the prospects that elections held is that the

PPP takes some, that the PML-N takes some, and that, of course,

the PML-Q takes some.

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Are we looking at deadlock? Are we looking at a constitutional

crisis? Is there any way that we can estimate at this time?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Not at all.

Traditionally in parliamentary democracies, you have coalitions

that are built after the elections because you rarely have an overwhelming majority. So, in this case, what seems likely is that you

both will have the PPP and the PML-N, plus some of the individual

regional parties, moderate regional parties, joining in an effective

majority.

As I say, if the polling that the IRI has done is reflected in the

voting and those votes are counted, then I think you will have a

coalition that will be put together and that will choose its prime

minister. At that point, I suspect that majority in the Parliament

will challenge the actions that President Musharraf has taken and,

in fact, may well challenge his reelection.

Mr. DASCHLE. I am actually somewhat encouraged for the reasons you have just heard, in the longer term, Mr. Chairman.

I think the parties and the people of Pakistan are increasingly

determined to deal with these challenges in a very forceful and effective way. It is going to take some time. I do not think they are

probably going to be able to do it in the next 3 weeks. After the

election and with the continued effort to organize and to form the

coalitions that Mr. Schneider just addressed, in the longer term

and with the kind of pressure internally and from the external

source, if it can be done as well as we have discussed today, especially by the United States, I think we have reason to be optimistic

about the prospects in Pakistan, ultimately.

Mr. TIERNEY. I think the unfortunate consequence, however, is

that coalition will be mindful of the fact that this U.S. Government

did not speak up as strongly as it should have for the people, and

it made their work harder for them. I think, also, that all of that

focus on resolving those internal problems will probably detract

from efforts that could be used to focus on the Taliban and on al

Qaeda and on other situations. So it is unfortunate in that regard.

Do either of my colleagues have any more questions?

Mr. Yarmuth.

Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It seems like we have already decided here that in terms of our

standards, there is no chance of a fair and free election there. And

that the administration does not seem to want to at least set the

stage by saying that is the case.

I am more concerned in this question as to what measures the

Pakistani people themselves will judge this election by. I mean, is

it going to be a repudiation of the Musharraf rule? With all due respect, it does not sound like it is going to be whether Mr. Garrett’s

organization says it was a free and fair election. The process is

probably less significant than the outcome, but I would like your

answer as to that. How are they going to judge whether it was a

fair election or not?

Mr. DASCHLE. I would just say that the IRI poll was really helpful in creating sort of a picture of where the people of Pakistan are.

I do not think anyone challenges the results of that poll. In fact,

it has been cited all through the country and in the international

community. I think the degree to which people, in spite of all these

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problems, will find some confidence that the elections are at least

accurate is whether they conform at all to the polling data that we

know to be fairly accurate. I mean, if they do and if the results of

the election reflect that degree of support for the political opposition that we know to exist, I think we can salvage a lot in spite

of the difficulties.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I will just add one other thing.

I do believe that the Pakistani press is not cowed by the restrictions that have been placed on them, and I have no doubt at all

that they will be monitoring the voting. As to the degree that they

also are reporting that voters are not permitted to vote who are on

the rolls, and that others cannot find where they can vote, etc.,

they will be reporting that. If there is a general judgment that

there has been an unfair process at that time, along with the view

that the outcome does not conform to anything that one would expect given the polling, then you will see a fundamental rejection.

I just want to note here that this is not us. This is one of the

leading newspapers in Pakistan, the newspaper DAWN. It says

that Pakistan is recognized as a genuine democracy and all that

goes with it—an independent judiciary, the equality of all before

the law and a media that is truly free. The country can ill afford

to go through another flawed exercise, which would be catastrophic.

The people who are the public opinion leaders in Pakistan, I

think, will set the standards. They are not our standards. They are

their standards. They do believe in democracy. I think that they

will see what has occurred up to this point, and they will see the

outcome on election day, and they will make their own judgments.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Van Hollen.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Yes.

Just briefly, again, as we discussed earlier on, I think that the

reason the Bush administration has been so slow to push

Musharraf and others in Pakistan more quickly toward democratization has been this assertion made by Musharraf, and that was

essentially picked up by the Bush administration, that he is the

only guy standing in the way between the radical extremists taking

over in Pakistan.

As you pointed out, Mr. Schneider, in your testimony, if you look

at some of the sort of bases of operation of al Qaeda, we are talking

about places like Quetta. We are talking about Peshawar. We have

also seen that the deal President Musharraf struck many months

ago with the folks in the federally Administered Tribal Areas was,

essentially, that they entered into a nonaggression pact, and, according to the publicly announced portions of the National Intelligence Estimate here, which as you know represent the consensus

position of all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies, that led directly to an

increase in Taliban strength, and it increased the sort of sanctuary

for al Qaeda-type elements.

So I think it is very important as we go forward here that people

in the United States understand that Musharraf is not the bulwark

against extremism in Pakistan. To the extent that you do not allow

the political process to be more open, in fact, you strengthen the

extremist elements.

So I would just like all of you to respond to: If you were to have

the sort of secular opposition win this election and if we were to

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continue to push Musharraf to more openness and to more democratization in the process, how would that affect Pakistan’s policy

with respect to the Taliban and to the anti-al-Qaeda effort? Would

it hurt that effort or would it strengthen it or would it, essentially,

represent——

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think it would definitely strengthen it. Simply,

as I said earlier, there would be no countervailing political pressures to try and go soft on the Taliban because they are linked to

the religious parties in the case of Musharraf, that I support. So

it seems to me that you are likely to see a much stronger, unified

civilian leadership in the Parliament, pressing for the military to

take actions against the Taliban and al Qaeda. Both parties—both

the PPP and the PML-N—have stated in a coalition statement that

they would go after al Qaeda and the Taliban terrorists.

Mr. GARRETT. I agree. I think it would strengthen this struggle

that their country and our country are in.

Mr. DASCHLE. I think a lot of the government’s actions, the repressive actions, have emboldened the extremist elements within

the country and have given them all the more empowerment in

these regions outside of the larger cities. I cannot think of a better

anecdote to that than to empower the opposition and to give them

an opportunity to work these areas and to say, ‘‘We are going to

take back our government and, in your name and in the name of

people across the country, restore the democracy that Pakistan is

proud of.’’

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Could I just add one thing?

Mr. TIERNEY. Sure.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Quetta is in Balochistan. One of the changes

with a democratic government would be that—both the PPP and

the PML-N have stated that they would end the direct confrontation with the Baloch national parties in Balochistan. That would

then provide a unified government’s aiming at restricting the

Taliban and al Qaeda in that province, which you do not have now.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

I would like to give each of you gentlemen an opportunity to

make some overarching closing statement if you would care to.

Senator Daschle.

Mr. DASCHLE. First of all, I want to reiterate how pleased I am

that you are holding this hearing because I think it sends the message that there are people within this government who are very

deeply concerned about circumstances in Pakistan, and I think that

is exactly the message we need to send to the people there today.

I think we need to keep the pressure on, not only from the administration but from the Congress, and you are doing that, in

part, with this hearing. I think we ought to go back and look at

the conditionality of aid in the future, and we should not wait for

a long period of time for us to revisit the question as to how far

we should go with regard to conditionality.

Third, I think it is important for us to watch this very carefully

and to respond as quickly as we can once the elections have been

held.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Garrett.

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Mr. GARRETT. Let me also thank you for letting me appear before

you today.

I think the people of Pakistan are watching what is done here,

what is done in the United States. I just wanted to take that opportunity to say that it has been our consistency in our work with the

people there that they desire democracy. I think they will see this

as an important contribution toward being placed back on the road

map to democracy.

So thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Schneider.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I agree with everything said.

Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding the hearing. I hope

that you will consider holding a hearing early in January on the

same issue, on what did the elections show and on where do we go

from here.

I would just simply note something. Today, in Islamabad and in

Pakistan, the newspapers are giving a great deal of attention to

what the Congress did in terms of conditionality. So they are

watching what the United States is doing, and it is crucial that the

message from the United States—from both parties and from the

administration as well as the Congress—be that the United States

stands for democracy and that the United States believes that democracy is in the interest of Pakistan and in the interest of the

United States.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, thank you. You will be comforted to know

that we do intend to have a hearing on the financial aspect of it,

certainly, in January. We can certainly do a recapture of what happened with the elections as well. We think it is important, and we

have a good bipartisan group on this panel and elsewhere that believes strongly that Congress has to speak up, given the silence of

the administration. We have to try to get the administration to

speak up as well.

I want to just publicly thank each of the three of you gentlemen.

I am not sure the public is aware of the sacrifices you make in your

personal lives with traveling, making the observations, and then in

coming back and sharing them. It is important for us to have people willing to do that, to make observations on the ground and

come back.

Mr. Garrett, in particular. I will note that you just got home this

past weekend, and right after Christmas you are going back again

and are staying through the election. So thank you for your service.

Thank you, Senator and Mr. Schneider, as well.

Your testimony here today has been incredibly helpful, and it

helps us build a record, and it points us in a direction of where we

go from here. We thank you for all of your assistance on that and

for your public service. We look forward to the hearings in January

as well.

I thank my colleagues for their input as well.

This meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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