Filed 6/20/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re H.B., A Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B322472

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

S.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP07101A)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. Gabriela H. Shapiro, Juvenile Court Referee. 

Affirmed.

Richard L. Knight, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Senior Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

S.B. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order 

terminating his parental rights over his daughter H.B. pursuant 

to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26. Father

contends only that the juvenile court erred in finding the Indian 

Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)

inapplicable based on the record of inquiry made by the Los 

Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services 

(Department) with H.B.’s extended family members. Finding no 

error, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

H.B. was born November 2016 to father and R.V. (mother). 

Just days after her birth, the Department received a report that 

mother had used methamphetamine during her pregnancy with 

H.B. and that father was also a methamphetamine user. The 

Department’s investigation into general neglect of H.B. was 

closed as inconclusive. 

This case began about three years later. At the time, father 

was on probation for methamphetamine charges. Law 

enforcement conducting a probation check on him at the family 

home turned up “large amounts of methamphetamines . . . in 

plain sight and completely accessible to [H.B.].” Law 

enforcement contacted the Department. A Department social 

worker joined law enforcement at the home. The social worker 

noted the home was dirty and in disarray, with trash piled 

around and large rat traps, in addition to methamphetamine, in 

areas accessible to H.B. The social worker removed H.B. Mother 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
3

and father were both arrested and detained. The Department 

filed a dependency petition and these proceedings ensued.

As the issue on appeal is limited to the adequacy of the 

Department’s inquiry supporting the juvenile court’s ICWA 

findings, we limit our recitation of the facts accordingly.

The Department filed its petition on November 1, 2019. 

Attached to the petition was a form ICWA-010(A) reflecting that 

the Department had questioned mother about Indian2 ancestry,

and she denied having any. 

At the November 2019 detention hearing, paternal 

grandmother, paternal aunt, and maternal great-grandmother 

were present in court. The parents were not present. The 

juvenile court found ICWA did not apply based on the 

information before it but ordered the parents to keep the 

Department, their counsel, and the court aware of any new 

information relating to possible ICWA status. Paternal 

grandmother, paternal aunt, and maternal great-grandmother 

made no statements in response to the court’s ICWA finding. 

Later in November 2019, on the day of the arraignment 

hearing, father and mother filed their respective form

ICWA-020’s, stating they had no Indian ancestry as far as they 

knew. At the hearing, in addition to the parents, paternal 

grandmother, paternal grandfather, paternal stepgrandmother, 

and paternal aunt were present in court. The juvenile court 

noted the parents’ ICWA-020 forms were filed and found no 

reason to know H.B. was an Indian child. The juvenile court 

2 In this opinion, we use the term “Indian” as defined in 

section 1903 of title 25 of the United States Code.
4

ordered H.B. detained and set the case for an adjudication 

hearing. 

In its January 2020 jurisdictional and dispositional report, 

the Department reported mother was raised by maternal 

grandmother and maternal grandfather until she was 10 years 

old, when maternal grandmother left the family home. After her 

parents’ separation, mother stayed in the home with maternal 

grandfather and maternal great-grandmother for a time. But 

when she was 14, mother moved in with maternal greatgrandfather to be closer to maternal grandmother (who had been 

incarcerated) when she was released from jail. Mother has since 

lost contact with maternal grandfather. 

Father’s parents are similarly separated. He was raised by 

paternal grandmother and paternal stepgrandfather until he was 

in ninth or 10th grade. Then he moved in with paternal 

grandfather. He has a half brother and half sister on paternal 

grandmother’s side, two half sisters on paternal grandfather’s 

side, a full sister, and a stepbrother through paternal 

stepgrandmother. Father is in contact with his parents and all of 

his siblings. 

At the January 2020, adjudication hearing, paternal 

grandmother, paternal stepgrandfather, and maternal aunt were 

present in court. The juvenile court sustained amended counts in 

the section 300 petition and set the case for a dispositional

hearing. 

At the dispositional hearing the following month, the 

presence of a “maternal step-sister” was noted on the record. The 

juvenile court ordered the Department to place H.B. with 

paternal grandfather if there were no safety concerns and, 

alternatively, with paternal grandmother. The juvenile court 
5

declared H.B. a dependent of the court and ordered family 

reunification services for the parents. 

H.B. was initially placed in the home of paternal 

grandmother and paternal stepgrandfather. Shortly thereafter 

she was moved to the home of paternal grandfather and paternal 

stepgrandmother. 

In January 2021, the Department reported visiting 

maternal great-uncle’s home, where mother was living, to assess 

its suitability for visits between mother and H.B. The 

Department made an unannounced visit to the same home in 

March 2021 and met maternal great-aunt, maternal great-uncle, 

and a maternal cousin. 

In January 2022, the juvenile court terminated family 

reunification services for the parents and set the case for a 

section 366.26 hearing. 

In its May 2022 section 366.26 report, the Department 

recommended termination of parental rights, and that H.B. be 

adopted by paternal grandfather and paternal stepgrandmother. 

On the date initially set for the section 366.26 hearing, the 

juvenile court ordered the Department to interview all known 

living relatives regarding possible Indian heritage. It continued 

the hearing for approximately two months to permit the 

Department to comply with its order.

At an intervening hearing in July 2022, the juvenile court 

asked father if he was aware of any Native American heritage or 

any type of relationship with anyone in his familial lineage that 

might have lived on a reservation, have received benefits from a 

tribe, or be enrolled in a tribe. Father replied in the negative. 

The court reminded the Department of its continuing duty to 
6

inquire with extended family members and report its findings in 

advance of the scheduled section 366.26 hearing.

The Department provided a summary of its efforts to 

determine whether H.B. has Indian ancestry in a last minute 

information filed with the juvenile court on July 28, 2022. 

According to that report, a social worker spoke with paternal 

grandfather, who stated, “ ‘No, I do not have any Native 

American Heritage.’ ” The social worker asked him if there was 

anyone else that might have information, and he said “no,” but 

promised to inform the social worker if he had additional 

information. He also provided contact information for paternal

grandmother. 

The social worker asked father if he had any Indian 

heritage, and he again said “no.” The social worker asked father 

if there was anyone else the social worker could speak to about 

Indian heritage, and he suggested only his parents, but, from his 

understanding, he did not have any such heritage. 

By text message, paternal grandmother informed the social 

worker that she was not aware of any Indian heritage. 

Maternal grandmother also confirmed by text message she 

was not aware of any Indian heritage but promised to follow up 

with the social worker if she learned of any. 

The social worker asked mother if she had any Indian

heritage and mother reconfirmed that she did not. Mother could 

not think of anyone else for the social worker to ask about Indian 

heritage. The social worker asked mother to provide contact 

information for maternal grandfather and maternal great-uncle. 

Mother responded that she did not have contact information for 

maternal grandfather but would follow up with the information 

for maternal great-uncle. She apparently provided the 
7

information for maternal great-uncle, who told the social worker 

he did not think his family had any Indian heritage.3 He 

explained his father was adopted so he did not know if his 

father’s biological parents were Indian. He denied knowing 

anyone that would know about possible Indian heritage. He 

promised to let the social worker know if he learned anything 

further. 

On July 29, 2022, the juvenile court found that H.B. was 

not an Indian child and terminated parental rights. 

On August 1, 2022, father’s counsel filed a notice of appeal 

on father’s behalf. 

DISCUSSION

In involuntary state court proceedings concerning child 

custody, such as these dependency proceedings, ICWA requires 

notice to the relevant Indian tribe “where the court knows or has 

reason to know that an Indian child is involved.” (25 U.S.C. 

§ 1912(a).) It is incumbent upon the court administering such a 

proceeding to inquire whether the subject child is an Indian child. 

The scope of the duty on the court, as well as certain participants 

in the proceeding, is defined by federal regulations and related 

state law. (See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 23.107 (2023); Welf. & Inst. 

Code, § 224.2; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481.)

The duty of inquiry has three “phases.” Father claims error 

with respect to the first. This phase—the “initial inquiry”—

3 Maternal great-uncle is referred to as “paternal uncle” in 

the Department’s last minute information. This is obviously an

error. Maternal great-uncle is identified by name and shares a 

common surname with mother (which is not the same as 

father’s). Elsewhere in the record, the same named individual is 

identified as mother’s uncle. 
8

applies in every case. In broad terms, the initial inquiry requires 

the court and the Department to ask certain persons related to 

the proceedings about the child’s possible Indian ancestry. (See 

§ 224.2, subds. (a), (b), (c); In re S.S. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 575, 

581; In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.) As relevant to 

father’s appeal, section 224.2, subdivision (b) requires a county 

welfare department, like the Department, to ask, among others, 

the child’s “extended family members” about “whether the child 

is, or may be, an Indian child.” (Ibid.) “Extended family 

members” include adults who are the child’s grandparent, aunt or 

uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or 

nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent. (25 U.S.C. 

§ 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).)

A juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply in a 

proceeding implies that (a) neither the Department nor the court 

had a reason to know or believe the subject child is an Indian 

child; and (b) the Department fulfilled its duty of inquiry. (In re

Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 388, 401.) “ ‘ “[W]e review the 

juvenile court’s ICWA findings under the substantial evidence 

test, which requires us to determine if reasonable, credible 

evidence of solid value supports the court’s order. [Citations.] 

We must uphold the court’s orders and findings if any substantial 

evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them, and we 

resolve all conflicts in favor of affirmance.” ’ ” (Ibid.)

Father claims error based on the Department’s failure to 

inquire with maternal grandfather, paternal stepgrandmother, 

and an unidentified paternal aunt and maternal stepsister.

Father acknowledges that paternal stepgrandmother and 

maternal stepsister are not among the statutorily defined 

extended family members. Nonetheless, he asserts that because 
9

the initial inquiry duty in section 224.2, subdivision (b), is “not 

limited to” inquiring of extended family members, we should 

treat the steprelatives as extended family members that should 

have been interviewed about Indian ancestry. We reject this 

argument. 

The Legislature expressly adopted the definition of 

“extended family member” contained in section 1903(2) of title 25 

of the United States Code (§ 224.1, subd. (c)) and used that 

definition in defining the scope of the initial inquiry (§ 224.2, 

subd. (b)). Nothing in section 224.2, subdivision (b) suggests that 

a more expansive definition of “extended family members” was 

intended. That the inquiry may extend to classes of persons in 

addition to “extended family members” and those other classes 

referenced in the statute4 does not expand who is an “extended 

family member.” 

Aside from legally irrelevant family ties, father offers no 

reason that the Department should have inquired with paternal 

stepgrandmother and maternal stepsister about Indian ancestry. 

Put another way, he interprets the words “not limited to” in 

section 224.2, subdivision (b) as making the duty of initial inquiry 

limitless. This interpretation is absurd. Absent some affirmative 

obligation to interview them under the statute, the Department’s 

failure to inquire with paternal stepgrandmother and maternal 

stepsister cannot form the basis for error.

Thus, the question comes down to whether substantial 

4 The other classes are: “the child, parents, legal guardian, 

Indian custodian, . . . others who have an interest in the child, 

and the party reporting child abuse or neglect . . . .” (§ 224.2, 

subd. (b).)
10

evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings that the 

Department’s initial inquiry was adequate despite the 

Department failing to inquire with maternal grandfather and an 

unidentified paternal aunt. We conclude that substantial 

evidence supports the court’s findings.

Father’s arguments notwithstanding, the extended family

member inquiry mandated by section 224.2, subdivision (b) is

limited. (In re S.S. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 694, 704-705.) It is not

intended to obligate county welfare departments to search for

possible Indian ancestry without regard to cost or other practical

considerations. Rather, it is intended to ensure social workers

“ask an added question of extended family members whom [they]

often already are investigating in their usual course of work.” 

(Ibid.) Despite its broad terms, section 224.2, subdivision (b) does

not require inquiry with every adult living extended family

member. “[C]omplying with the literal language of the statute—

that is, making an initial and further ICWA inquiry of every 

member of a child’s extended family . . . —is absurd at best and 

impossible at worst.” (In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th

984, 1006.) Our review is therefore not a mechanistic analysis of

whether the record supports a finding of literal compliance with

the statute, but “whether the ICWA inquiry conducted has

reliably answered the question at the heart of the ICWA inquiry:

Whether a child involved in a proceeding ‘is or may be an Indian

child.’ ” (Id. at p. 1009.)

In answering this question, we must also consider the

limitations on the Department’s ability to carry out its inquiry

under the particular facts of the case. “Where . . . a parent

largely fails . . . to provide names and contact information for

extended family members, [the Department’s] ability to conduct
11

an exhaustive ICWA inquiry necessarily is constrained.” (In re

Q.M. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1082.) “[W]e cannot ask the

[Department] to intuit the names of unidentified family members

or to interview individuals for whom no contact information has

been provided.” (Ibid.) Requiring the Department to track down

information about extended family members beyond that offered

by participants in the proceedings would impose an undue

burden on the Department and necessarily reduce the resources

it has to otherwise protect the welfare of dependent children. 

(Ibid.)

Whether remand for an expanded inquiry is appropriate

must also be assessed in light of how much information the

Department has already obtained. The more family members the

Department has already inquired of, the less the benefit that is

likely to obtain from an additional inquiry. At the same time as

the incremental value of another interview decreases, the burden

of locating and contacting the next family member typically

increases. The juvenile court has discretion to determine when

enough is enough. (In re Ezequiel G., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at

p. 1008.)

In this case, the Department did not disregard its duty to 

inquire with extended family members about possible Indian 

ancestry. The juvenile court specifically ordered the Department 

to carry out such an inquiry. The Department expanded its 

initially deficient inquiry and reported the scope and results of its 

expanded inquiry to the court. The court impliedly found the 

Department’s expanded inquiry was satisfactory in concluding 

the ICWA was inapplicable.

We find no basis for disturbing the juvenile court’s 

conclusion. After the juvenile court ordered it to expand its 
12

inquiry, the Department asked both parents to direct them to 

other people who might have knowledge about possible Indian 

ancestry. Father identified only his parents as an avenue for 

further inquiry. Paternal grandfather suggested only that the 

Department inquire also with paternal grandmother. The 

Department inquired with paternal grandmother. 

The Department also inquired with maternal grandmother. 

After the Department informed mother it had done so, mother 

was unable to suggest anyone else for the Department to speak 

with on the topic. Nevertheless, the Department asked mother 

for contact information for mother’s father, but mother explained 

she did not have this information. In lieu of maternal 

grandfather’s information, the Department requested and 

obtained contact information for mother’s uncle—maternal 

grandfather’s brother—and inquired with him about Indian 

ancestry. He denied it, denied knowing anyone who could 

provide more information, and further explained that, because 

his father (maternal great-grandfather) was adopted, the 

likelihood of getting reliable information on the topic was limited.

In short, the Department inquired about Indian ancestry 

with representatives from both sides of two generational levels of 

H.B.’s family. It contacted every person its interviewees 

identified as a likely source of information about ancestry. The 

juvenile court had an adequate basis on which to conclude the 

Department fulfilled its inquiry obligations under section 224.2, 

subdivision (b), and that neither the Department nor the court

had reason to know or believe that H.B. is an Indian child. 

Under our deferential standard of review, the juvenile court did 

not need the Department to contact every unnamed extended 

family member that had attended a court hearing, regardless of 
13

difficulty in doing so, to reach its conclusion.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights over 

H.B. is affirmed.

GRIMES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J. 

VIRAMONTES, J.