9380 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 33 / Wednesday, February 19, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

characteristics of this non-traditional 

fuselage material. If negligible amounts 

of combustion products are produced in 

this test, the material can be considered 

acceptable with respect to post crash 

survivability. A test method developed 

by the FAA’s William J. Hughes 

Technical Center should be used (Ref. 

DOT/FAA/AR–TN07/15 dated August 

2008). 

Related regulations, including 

§§ 25.853 and 25.856(a), remain valid 

for this airplane, but they do not reflect 

the potential threat generated from toxic 

levels of gases produced from 

aluminum-lithium materials. 

Discussion of Comments 

Notice of proposed special conditions 

No. 25–13–08–SC for the Bombardier Cseries airplanes was published in the 

Federal Register on October 31, 2013 

(78 FR 65233). No comments were 

received, and the special conditions are 

adopted as proposed. 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to the Models 

BD–500–1A10 and BD–500–1A11 series 

airplanes. Should Bombardier Inc. apply 

at a later date for a change to the type 

certificate to include another model on 

the same type certificate incorporating 

the same novel or unusual design 

feature, the special conditions would 

apply to that model as well. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features on two 

model series of airplanes. It is not a rule 

of general applicability. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702, 44704. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

Administrator, the following special 

conditions are issued as part of the type 

certification basis for Bombardier Inc. 

Models BD–500–1A10 and BD–500– 

1A11 (C-series) airplanes. 

Fuselage Post-Crash Fire 

Survivability. The Bombardier C-series 

airplanes must show that any toxic 

levels of gases produced from the 

aluminum-lithium material are in no 

way an additional threat to the 

passengers and their ability to evacuate 

when compared to a typically 

constructed aluminum airplane exposed 

to a post-crash fuel-fed fire. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on January 

22, 2014. 

Jeffrey E. Duven, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2014–03585 Filed 2–18–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. FAA–2013–0819; Special 

Conditions No. 25–519–SC] 

Special Conditions: Bombardier Inc., 

Models BD–500–1A10 and BD–500– 

1A11 Series Airplanes; Fuselage InFlight Fire Safety and Flammability 

Resistance 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the Bombardier Inc. Models 

BD–500–1A10 and BD–500–1A11 series 

airplanes. These airplanes will have 

novel or unusual design features when 

compared to the state of technology 

envisioned in the airworthiness 

standards for transport category 

airplanes. These features are associated 

with the materials used to fabricate the 

fuselage, which may affect fire 

propagation during an in-flight fire. The 

applicable airworthiness regulations do 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards for this design feature. 

These special conditions contain the 

additional safety standards that the 

Administrator considers necessary to 

establish a level of safety equivalent to 

that established by the existing 

airworthiness standards. 

DATES: Effective Date: March 21, 2014. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Alan Sinclair, FAA, Airframe and Cabin 

Safety Branch, ANM–115, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue 

SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; 

telephone 425–227–2195; facsimile 

425–227–1232. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

On December 10, 2009, Bombardier 

Inc. applied for a type certificate for 

their new Models BD–500–1A10 and 

BD–500–1A1 series airplanes (hereafter 

collectively referred to as ‘‘C-series’’). 

The C-series airplanes are swept-wing 

monoplanes with an aluminum alloy 

fuselage sized for 5-abreast seating. 

Passenger capacity is designated as 110 

for the Model BD–500–1A10 and 125 for 

the Model BD–500–1A11. Maximum 

takeoff weight is 131,000 pounds for the 

Model BD–500–1A10 and 144,000 

pounds for the Model BD–500–1A11. 

The Bombardier C-series airplanes 

will be fabricated using aluminumlithium materials. The performance of 

airplanes consisting of a conventional 

aluminum fuselage in an inaccessible 

in-flight fire scenario is understood 

based on service history and extensive 

intermediate and large-scale fire testing. 

The fuselage itself does not contribute to 

in-flight fire propagation. This may not 

be the case for an all-aluminum-lithium 

fuselage. Experience has shown that 

eliminating the fire propagation of the 

interior materials and insulation 

materials tends to increase survivability 

since other aspects of in-flight fire safety 

(e.g., toxic gas emission and smoke 

obscuration) are typically by-products of 

the propagating fire. The Bombardier Cseries airplanes must provide protection 

against an in-flight fire propagating 

along the surface of the fuselage. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of Title 14, Code 

of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 21.17, 

Bombardier Inc. must show that the Cseries airplanes meet the applicable 

provisions of part 25, as amended by 

Amendment 25–1 through 25–129 

thereto. 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(i.e., 14 CFR Part 25) do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for the C-series airplanes because of a 

novel or unusual design feature, special 

conditions are prescribed under the 

provisions of § 21.16. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the type certificate 

for that model be amended later to 

include any other model that 

incorporates the same novel or unusual 

design feature, the special conditions 

would also apply to the other model 

under § 21.101. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, the C-series airplanes must 

comply with the fuel vent and exhaust 

emission requirements of 14 CFR Part 

34 and the noise certification 

requirements of 14 CFR Part 36; and the 

FAA must issue a finding of regulatory 

adequacy under § 611 of Public Law 92– 

574, the ‘‘Noise Control Act of 1972.’’ 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance 

with § 11.38, and they become part of 


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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 33 / Wednesday, February 19, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 9381 

the type-certification basis under 

§ 21.17(a)(2). 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The Bombardier C-series airplanes 

will incorporate the following novel or 

unusual design features: The fuselage 

will be fabricated using aluminumlithium materials instead of 

conventional aluminum. This new type 

of material must provide protection 

against an in-flight fire propagating 

along the surface of the fuselage. 

Discussion 

The Bombardier C-series airplanes 

will be fabricated using aluminumlithium materials. The performance of 

airplanes consisting of a conventional 

aluminum fuselage in an inaccessible 

in-flight fire scenario is understood 

based on service history and extensive 

intermediate and large-scale fire testing. 

Experience has shown that eliminating 

the fire propagation of the interior 

materials and insulation materials tends 

to increase survivability since other 

aspects of in-flight fire safety (e.g., toxic 

gas emission and smoke obscuration) 

are typically by-products of the 

propagating fire. The fuselage itself does 

not contribute to in-flight fire 

propagation. This may not be the case 

for an all-aluminum-lithium fuselage. 

In the past, fatal in-flight fires have 

originated in inaccessible areas of the 

airplane where thermal/acoustic 

insulation located adjacent to the 

aluminum airplane skin has been the 

path for flame propagation and fire 

growth. Concern over the fire 

performance of thermal/acoustic 

insulation was initially raised by five 

incidents in the 1990’s, which revealed 

unexpected flame spread along the 

insulation film that covered the 

thermal/acoustic insulation. In all cases, 

the ignition source was relatively 

modest and, in most cases, was 

electrical in origin (e.g., electrical short 

circuit, arcing caused by chafed wiring, 

ruptured ballast case). 

In 1996, the FAA Technical Center 

began a program to develop new fire test 

criteria for insulation films directly 

relating to in-flight fire resistance. The 

current test standard at that time was 

evaluated as well as another small-scale 

test method that has been used by 

airplane manufacturers to evaluate 

flame propagation on thermal/acoustic 

insulation materials. 

An inter-laboratory comparison of 

these methods revealed a number of 

deficiencies. A new test method 

subjecting a material to a pilot flame 

while the material is heated by a radiant 

panel was developed. The new radiant 

panel test method and criteria were 

specifically established to improve the 

evaluation of the in-flight fire ignition/ 

flame propagation of thermal/acoustic 

insulation materials based on real-world 

fire scenarios. While these tests were 

developed for thermal/acoustic 

insulation materials, this same type of 

test methodology can be used to assess 

the flammability characteristics of the 

proposed aluminum-lithium material 

for the fuselage. 

The FAA reviewed the test method 

proposed by Bombardier Inc. and 

determined that a larger flame and test 

article would be necessary to make a 

determination of the potential 

flammability of the aluminum-lithium 

material. It would also be more 

representative of a real-life fire scenario. 

The FAA recently conducted 

additional testing in our Components 

Fire Test facility and determined that 

another way to assess the survivability 

within the cabin of the C-series 

airplanes is to use the cargo liner 

flammability test (part III of appendix F 

to part 25, Test Method to Determine 

Flame Penetration Resistance of Cargo 

Compartment Liners). However, the 

problem with using this particular test 

is that when the aluminum panels melt, 

molten globs of aluminum fall directly 

into the burner, which adversely affects 

the flame. So the FAA decided that a 

similar test for the measurement of 

insulation burnthrough resistance could 

be used (part VII of appendix F to part 

25, Test Method to Determine the 

Burnthrough Resistance of Thermal/

Acoustic Insulation Materials). 

Although this test method uses the same 

burner as the cargo liner test, it uses a 

slightly larger flame. In addition, the 

burner is not vertical, so there was no 

problem with molten material falling 

into it, requiring disassembly of the 

burner. The only slight change was the 

size of the sample and the sample 

holder. These were modified slightly to 

accommodate the samples that we 

received. 

The recent FAA tests that were 

conducted in our Components Fire Test 

facility used a 6-gallon/hour oil burner, 

the same apparatus used to determine 

burnthrough resistance of thermal/

acoustic insulation (part VII of appendix 

F to part 25). The test used 16 by 24- 

inch Al-Li panels that were installed 

into a sheet steel subframe, which 

measured 18 by 32 inches (outside 

dimensions). The subframe had an 

opening cut into it, which measured 

14.5 by 22.5 inches; this allowed the test 

panels to be mounted onto the subframe 

using .250–20 UNC threaded bolts. 

The FAA proposes that Bombardier 

use the test method contained in part 

VII of appendix F to part 25, Test 

Method to Determine the Burnthrough 

Resistance of Thermal/Acoustic 

Insulation Materials, with the slight 

changes to the sample size and sample 

holder as an alternate test method to 

show compliance with applicable 

requirements. Bombardier Inc. is 

responsible for finding a suitable testing 

facility in which to conduct the testing. 

Discussion of Comments 

Notice of proposed special conditions 

No. 25–13–06–SC for the Bombardier Cseries airplanes was published in the 

Federal Register on October 31, 2013 

(78 FR 65231). No comments were 

received, and the special conditions are 

adopted as proposed. 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to the Models 

BD–500–1A10 and BD–500–1A11 series 

airplanes. Should Bombardier Inc. apply 

at a later date for a change to the type 

certificate to include another model on 

the same type certificate incorporating 

the same novel or unusual design 

feature, the special conditions would 

apply to that model as well. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features on two 

model series of airplanes. It is not a rule 

of general applicability. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702, 44704. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

Administrator, the following special 

conditions are issued as part of the type 

certification basis for Bombardier Inc. 

Models BD–500–1A10 and BD–500– 

1A11 (C-series) airplanes. 

1. Fuselage In-Flight Fire Safety and 

Flammability Resistance. Bombardier 

must demonstrate that the fuselage 

would not materially contribute to the 

propagation of an in-flight fire or 

introduce any additional in-flight fire 

risk. 

2. To demonstrate compliance, the 

test set-up and methodology must be 

commensurate with 14 CFR Part 25, 

appendix F, part VII, except the size of 

the test samples, modifications to the 

sample holder, and the test 

methodology would be varied as 

described below. 


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9382 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 33 / Wednesday, February 19, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

3. In demonstrating that the 

aluminum-lithium material used to 

fabricate the fuselage has equal or better 

flammability resistance characteristics 

than the aluminum alloy sheet typically 

used as skin material on similar 

airplanes, the accepted test methods for 

compliance include: 

a. Each test sample must consist of a 

flat test specimen. A set of three 

samples of the material must be tested. 

The size of each sample must be 16 

inches by 24 inches by 0.063 inches. 

b. The test samples must be installed 

into a steel sheet subframe with outside 

dimensions of 18 inches by 32 inches. 

The subframe must have an opening cut 

into it of 14.5 inches by 22.5 inches. The 

tests samples must be mounted onto the 

subframe using .250–20 UNC threaded 

bolts. 

c. Test specimens must be 

conditioned at 70 °F ± 5 °F and 55 

percent ± 5 percent humidity for at least 

24 hours before testing. 

4. Demonstration of compliance will 

be achieved if the material is not ignited 

during any of the tests. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on January 

22, 2014. 

Jeffrey E. Duven, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2014–03586 Filed 2–18–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2013–0632; Directorate 

Identifier 2013–NM–045–AD; Amendment 

39–17752; AD 2014–03–14] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all 

Airbus Model A330–200 and –300 series 

airplanes, and Model A340–200, –300, 

–500, and –600 series airplanes. This 

AD was prompted by results from fuel 

system reviews conducted by the 

airplane manufacturer. This AD requires 

removing bulb-type maintenance lights; 

installing a drain mast on certain 

airplanes; and installing muffs on 

connecting bleed elements on certain 

airplanes. We are issuing this AD to 

prevent ignition sources inside fuel 

tanks, which, in combination with 

flammable fuel vapors, could result in 

fuel tank explosions and consequent 

loss of the airplane. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

March 26, 2014. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in this AD 

as of March 26, 2014. 

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov/

#!docketDetail;D=FAA-2013-0632; or in 

person at the Docket Management 

Facility, U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 

Washington, DC. 

For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Airbus SAS, 

Airworthiness Office—EAL, 1 Rond 

Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac 

Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36 

96; fax +33 5 61 93 45 80; email 

airworthiness.A330-A340@airbus.com; 

Internet http://www.airbus.com. You 

may view this referenced service 

information at the FAA, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue 

SW., Renton, WA. For information on 

the availability of this material at the 

FAA, call 425–227–1221. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Vladimir Ulyanov, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 

98057–3356; telephone 425–227–1138; 

fax 425–227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to all Airbus Model A330–200 

and –300 series airplanes, and Model 

A340–200, –300, –500, and –600 series 

airplanes. The NPRM published in the 

Federal Register on July 31, 2013 (78 FR 

46306). The NPRM was prompted by 

results from fuel system reviews 

conducted by the airplane 

manufacturer. The NPRM proposed to 

require removing bulb-type 

maintenance lights; installing a drain 

mast on certain airplanes; and installing 

muffs on connecting bleed elements on 

certain airplanes. We are issuing this 

AD to prevent ignition sources inside 

fuel tanks, which, in combination with 

flammable fuel vapors, could result in 

fuel tank explosions and consequent 

loss of the airplane. 

The European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA), which is the Technical Agent 

for the Member States of the European 

Community, has issued EASA 

Airworthiness Directive 2013–0033, 

dated February 19, 2013 (referred to 

after this the Mandatory Continuing 

Airworthiness Information, or ‘‘the 

MCAI’’), to correct an unsafe condition 

for the specified products. The MCAI 

states: 

[Subsequent to accidents involving fuel 

tank system explosions in flight and on 

ground], the FAA published Special Federal 

Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88 [66FR 23086, 

May 7, 2001], and the Joint Aviation 

Authorities (JAA) published Interim Policy 

INT/POL/25/12. 

In response to these regulations, a global 

design review conducted by Airbus on the 

A330 and A340 type design Section 19, 

which is a flammable fluid leakage zone and 

a zone adjacent to a fuel tank, highlighted 

potential deviations. The specific identified 

cases were that drainage is inefficient in 

flight on A340–500/–600 aeroplanes, 

maintenance lights are not qualified 

explosion proof, and hot surfaces may exist 

on bleed system during normal/failure 

operations. 

This condition, if not corrected, in 

combination with a fuel leak generating 

flammable vapours in the area, could result 

in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss 

of the aeroplane. 

For the reasons described above, this 

[EASA] AD requires removal of bulb type 

maintenance lights for all aeroplanes, 

installation of the drain mast between Frame 

(FR) 80 and FR83 for A340–500/–600, and 

installation of muffs on connecting bleed 

elements to minimize hot surfaces on A330 

and A340–200/–300. 

You may examine the MCAI in the 

AD docket on the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov/

#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2013-0632- 

0002. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. We 

have considered the comments received. 

The following presents the comments 

received on the proposal (78 FR 46306, 

July 31, 2013) and the FAA’s response 

to each comment. 

Request To Require New Service 

Information 

Airbus requested that we specify the 

use of Revision 01 of Airbus Mandatory 

Service Bulletin A340–36–4035, dated 

September 24, 2013, instead of the 

original issue of Airbus Mandatory 

Service Bulletin A340–36–4035, dated 

September 18, 2012. Airbus stated that 

since the issuance of the MCAI, it 

identified an inversion of configurations 

in Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin 

A340–36–4035. Airbus stated that it 


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