1 Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the

Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year at issue. All Rule

references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. 

T.C. Memo. 1996-219

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

MICHELLE BIRD MEYERS, Petitioner v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 560-95. Filed May 7, 1996.

Michelle Bird Meyers, pro se.

Bryan E. Sladek, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COUVILLION, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard

pursuant to section 7443A(b)(3)1 and Rules 180, 181, and 182.

Respondent determined a deficiency of $1,589 in petitioner's

1981 Federal income tax.
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2 Respondent concedes that petitioner is entitled to head of

household filing status and a dependency exemption for her son

for 1981.

After concessions by respondent,2 the issues for decision

are: (1) Whether petitioner has unreported wage income of

$12,031.22; (2) whether petitioner is entitled to certain medical

and unreimbursed employee business expense deductions; and

(3) whether the interest due on any deficiency in petitioner's

Federal income tax for 1981 may be abated.

Some of the facts were stipulated, and those facts, with the

annexed exhibits, are so found and are incorporated herein by

reference. At the time the petition was filed, petitioner's

legal residence was Sacramento, California.

Petitioner did not file a Federal income tax return for

1981. During 1981, petitioner received wages from the following

employers in the following amounts:

Employer Wages

Lasher Service Corp. $ 5,842.91

Swift Chevrolet 670.82

Inland Business Machines 5,517.49

 Total $12,031.22

In the notice of deficiency, respondent determined

petitioner's taxable income and income tax deficiency based on

single filing status, one personal exemption, and the income

information received from the payers shown above.
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The determinations of the Commissioner in a notice of

deficiency are presumed correct, and the burden of proof is on

the taxpayer to prove that the determinations are in error. Rule

142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).

Section 61 provides that gross income means all income from

whatever source derived, including wage and salary income. Sec.

1.61-1, Income Tax Regs. Accordingly, the wages received by

petitioner during 1981 totaling $12,031.22 constitute taxable

income. Respondent is sustained on this issue.

At trial, petitioner claimed that she is entitled to

deductions for medical expenses and employee business expenses

for travel incurred by her during 1981. The medical expenses

incurred by petitioner relate to two car accidents, in February

and October 1981, and a 30-day substance abuse program. With

respect to the car accidents, petitioner claims that emergency

room costs of approximately $600 and chiropractic treatments of

approximately $350 were not covered by insurance. With respect

to the substance abuse program attended by petitioner in June

1981, petitioner claims that her medical insurance did not cover

$1,960 of the $9,780 cost of the program. Other than one

chiropractic statement indicating charges of $94 on December 21,

1981, petitioner did not present any documentary evidence to

substantiate the claimed expenses.
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With respect to the unreimbursed employee business expenses,

petitioner claims that, while she was employed by Inland Business

Machines in outside sales, she traveled, in her own car,

sometimes several hundred miles a day selling office equipment. 

Petitioner estimated she traveled 22,000 business-related miles

in her car during 1981. Petitioner claims she is entitled to

deductions of $4,800 for mileage and $50 for parking fees and

tolls.

All taxpayers are required to keep sufficient records to

enable the Commissioner to determine their correct tax liability. 

Sec. 6001; Meneguzzo v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 824, 831-832

(1965). Moreover, deductions are a matter of legislative grace,

and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that he or she is

entitled to any deduction claimed. Rule 142(a); New Colonial Ice

Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934); Welch v. Helvering,

supra. This includes the burden of substantiation. Hradesky v.

Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 90 (1975), affd. per curiam 540 F.2d

821 (5th Cir. 1976).

As a general rule, if the record provides sufficient

evidence that the taxpayer has incurred a deductible expense, but

the taxpayer is unable to adequately substantiate the amount of

the deduction to which he or she is otherwise entitled, the

Court, in some situations, may estimate the amount of such

expense and allow a deduction to that extent. Cohan v.
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Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930). However, in

order for the Court to estimate the amount of an expense, there

must be some basis upon which an estimate may be made. Vanicek

v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 743 (1985). Without such a basis,

any allowance would amount to unguided largesse. Williams v.

United States, 245 F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir. 1957).

With respect to the medical expenses claimed by petitioner,

pursuant to Cohan v. Commissioner, supra, the Court is satisfied

that petitioner incurred $500 of the expenses claimed and,

therefore, is entitled to a deduction for that amount, subject to

the 5-percent limitation of section 213(a). With respect to

petitioner's unreimbursed employee business expenses for travel,

which specifically include vehicle expenses, section 274(d)

overrides the so-called Cohan rule. Sanford v. Commissioner, 50

T.C. 823, 827 (1968), affd. per curiam 412 F.2d 201 (2d Cir.

1969). Under section 274(d), no deduction may be allowed for

expenses incurred for travel on the basis of any approximation or

the unsupported testimony of the taxpayer. Section 274(d)

imposes stringent substantiation requirements to which a taxpayer

must strictly adhere. Thus, that section specifically proscribes

deductions for travel expenses in the absence of adequate records

or sufficient evidence corroborating the taxpayer's own

statement. Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to

meet the requirements of section 274(d) with respect to
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unreimbursed employee expenses for travel. Petitioner,

therefore, is not allowed a deduction for these expenses.

Finally, petitioner contends that the interest due on any

deficiency under section 6601 should be abated. With the

exception of a limited grant of jurisdiction under section

7481(c), this Court has no jurisdiction to abate or reduce

interest on deficiencies and thus is unable to afford the

requested relief. Standard Oil Co. v. McMahon, 244 F.2d 11, 13

(2d Cir. 1957); Rutland v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1137, 1155

(1987); LTV Corp. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 589, 597 (1975);

Hudgins v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 534, 538 (1970). Section

7481(c), by its very terms, is inapplicable in this case. Under

that limited grant of jurisdiction, the Tax Court may reopen a

closed case under limited circumstances solely to determine if

the amount of statutory interest calculated by the Commissioner

and paid by the taxpayer was correctly computed. Bax v.

Commissioner, 13 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1993).

Section 6404(e)(1)(A) provides generally that the Secretary

may abate the assessment of all or any part of the interest on

any deficiency attributable in whole or in part to any error or

delay by any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service,

acting in his official capacity, in performing a ministerial

act. In 508 Clinton Street Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 352,

354-355 (1987), it was held that this Court has no jurisdiction
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over the abatement of interest under section 6404(e) as that

provision, by its very terms, does not operate until after there

has been an assessment of interest. There has been no assessment

of interest in this case as respondent has been precluded under

section 6213(a) from making any assessment until the decision of

this Court becomes final.

Decision will be entered 

under Rule 155.