Filed 11/15/21 (see dissenting opinion)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re S.G. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B307988

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP00090)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff,

v.

J.C.,

Defendant and Appellant;

R.G.,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Emma Castro, Judge Pro Tempore. 

Affirmed.

Caitlin Christian, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant J.C.
2

Linda Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Respondent R.G.

_________________________________________

J.C. (Mother) filed a timely appeal from the juvenile 

court’s denial of her request for a permanent restraining order

protecting her from R.G. (Father). While Mother’s appeal was

pending, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction in an order 

from which Mother did not appeal.

We hold that Mother’s failure to appeal the termination of 

juvenile court jurisdiction does not render Mother’s restraining 

order appeal moot. In so holding, we disagree with certain 

cases to the extent they stand for the broad proposition that an 

appellate court can never grant effective relief in a dependency 

appeal following the unappealed termination of juvenile court 

jurisdiction. Here, were we to conclude the juvenile court’s denial 

of Mother’s restraining order request constitutes reversible error

and direct the court to issue the restraining order, our remittitur

would vest jurisdiction in the juvenile court for the limited 

purpose of correcting that error. Correcting an erroneous denial 

of Mother’s restraining order request would immediately afford 

Mother effective relief. Mother’s appeal is therefore not moot.

As to the merits, we hold that the court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying Mother’s requested restraining order

because the evidence does not compel the conclusion that

Mother’s safety would be in jeopardy without such an order. 

Nor do we agree with Mother that the juvenile court applied an

incorrect legal standard in ruling on her request. Even assuming 

the court did so err, however, such error would not warrant 
3

reversal because it is not reasonably probable that Mother 

would have obtained a more favorable result under the correct 

standard.

Accordingly, we affirm

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

A. Background

Mother and Father ended their relationship in 2011, when 

their older daughter, S.G., was one year old, and Mother was still 

pregnant with their younger daughter, L.C. They “agree that 

their relationship was unhealthy or dysfunctional.” In a May 

2011 referral, Mother alleged that Father emotionally abused 

unborn L.C. when “Father attacked [Mother] and hit . . . her 

pregnant stomach.” Los Angeles County Department of Children 

and Family Services (DCFS) closed the referral as unfounded 

because “there was no evident injury.” A 2012 family court order 

granted Mother and Father joint legal and physical custody of the 

children.

In the years that followed, Mother and Father repeatedly 

accused each other of various forms of misconduct through

referrals to DCFS, all of which DCFS deemed unfounded or 

inconclusive. These include: February 2012 and November 2012 

referrals in which Father alleged general neglect by Mother, both 

of which DCFS deemed unfounded; a November 2012 referral in 

which Mother alleged physical abuse by Father that was deemed 

unfounded; a November 2015 referral in which Mother alleged 

emotional and physical abuse by Father that was deemed 

unfounded; February 2016 and December 2016 referrals in which 

Mother alleged general neglect and sexual abuse by Father, both 

of which DCFS again deemed unfounded; and a November 2017 
4

referral by Father alleging general neglect by Mother that was

deemed inconclusive.

Mother and Father also accused each other of various types 

of wrongdoing in their requests to the family court during custody 

proceedings. In September 2016, Father requested Mother’s 

custodial time be reduced based on allegations that she was not 

taking the children to school and was withholding the children 

from him. Less than two weeks later, Mother obtained a 

temporary restraining order against Father based on allegations 

that he was “aggressive” during custodial exchanges and that 

he had withheld the children from her. In December 2016, 

Mother sought another temporary restraining order and to have 

Father’s custody reduced based on allegations that he may have 

sexually abused S.G. In January 2017, the family court found 

the allegations were untrue, denied the restraining order request, 

and modified the custody order to name Father as the primary 

custodial parent. The parents were ordered to attend parenting 

classes, communicate through Talking Parents (an online 

co-parenting communication tool), and obtain counseling for the 

children.

Between 2010 and 2020, Mother filed approximately 

13 requests in family court for restraining orders against Father. 

Some of these resulted in the family court granting a temporary 

order, often on an ex parte basis, but the court always denied 

corresponding requests for permanent orders after an evidentiary 

hearing. Our record does not contain details regarding the bases 

for any of these requests, except the 2016 request discussed above 

and the 2019 request discussed below.
5

B. Mother’s November 2019 Request for a

Restraining Order

In November 2019, Mother filed in the family court a

request for a restraining order protecting both her and the 

children from Father. As support for her request for an order 

protecting her,1 Mother claimed that Father “consistently sen[t]

[her] messages via TP (Talking Parents) to intimidate [and] scare 

[her],” such as telling her he “had obtained new access to [her]

driving record” and criticized her for having been at certain 

locations. Mother indicated that Father refused to explain how 

he had obtained this information, and that this “invasion of [her] 

privacy terrified her.”

She also described an October 7, 2019 incident that 

occurred after Mother took S.G. home from school because S.G. 

was ill and Father could not be reached. According to Mother, 

Father came to her home, yelling and using profanity, and 

“bang[ed]” on the windows and doors. L.C. was in Father’s car 

while this occurred. Mother indicated she was in the restroom 

when Father arrived and was “scared [and] confused.” Father 

called the police, who came to the scene, but took no further 

action. The children remained with Mother after the police left.

The family court granted a temporary restraining order 

and set a hearing on the request for permanent orders.

1 Because Mother challenges only the denial of a 

restraining order protecting her, not the denial of a restraining 

order protecting the children, we do not summarize the basis 

on which Mother requested an order protecting the children. 
6

C. Initiation of Dependency Proceedings 

Before the family court could hear the request for a 

permanent restraining order, DCFS filed a petition under 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.2

D. Mother’s Renewed Restraining Order Request

All parties agreed to extend the family court’s November 

2019 temporary protective order until the juvenile court held 

a hearing on the permanent restraining order. The juvenile 

court required Mother to file a renewed request, in which 

she incorporated by reference her November 2019 restraining 

order request filed in the family court, as well as DCFS’s

detention report.

The detention report included statements by Mother that 

Father had been “verbally and physically abusive towards her” 

in the past. Specifically, she told social workers that Father had

“ ‘called her everything from here to the moon,’ ” that “ ‘he also 

punched [her] when [she] was pregnant with [L.C.],’ ”3 and that 

“there was a past fight in 2015 when . . . [F]ather got physical 

with her and they were both arrested for the incident.”

The detention report also listed the family’s referral 

history and indicated that both parents have some criminal 

history related to domestic violence, although it does not indicate 

(nor does the record elsewhere clarify) whether this history 

involved arrests or convictions. Specifically, the report notes 

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory 

references and citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 

3 The timing and details of Mother’s statement in this 

regard appear to correspond to her 2011 referral, which DCFS 

deemed unfounded. 
7

that “[F]ather has [a] criminal history regarding disorderly 

conduct: . . . battery of [a] spouse on [October 26, 2015] and 

inflict[ing] corporal injury on [a] spouse/ cohabitant on [May 13, 

2011]. [¶] Mother has [a] criminal history regarding battery 

of [a] spouse on [October 26, 2015 and] battery on [a] person on 

[November 18, 2015].”4

When interviewed by DCFS about the October 2019 

incident, S.G. stated that “on a Monday this year,” “ ‘daddy came 

to mommy’s house screaming and banging on her door . . . like 

the police and kicking on the door and windows.’ ” L.C. similarly 

described the incident as having “ ‘happened on a Monday 

when [S.G.] stayed at mommy’s house sick.’ ” L.C. stated that 

“ ‘daddy came to mommy’s house’ . . . [and] ‘daddy was banging 

on the door and yelling and saying bad words.’ ” In a subsequent 

interview, L.C. further stated that, during the incident, “ ‘daddy 

was trying to get a bat in his car’ ” and that “ ‘he held it, but 

let it go’ ” while he was “ ‘sitting in the backseat of . . . [Father’s]

car, and mommy was looking out from her door.’ ” The report 

included interviews with Father, in which he denied the incident 

occurred as Mother and the children described it, and stated 

instead that he knocked on the door, and claimed that the 

children were being coached by their mother to describe the 

incident differently.

4 Mother indicated in her DCFS interviews that she was 

arrested in 2015 both for fighting with Father, and for fighting 

with an ex-boyfriend. This suggests the parents’ October 2015 

arrests involved the 2015 fight with Father that Mother 

referenced, whereas Mother’s November 2015 arrest was for 

fighting with a third party.
8

The detention report also included statements by S.G. 

that “ ‘one time daddy hit mommy around 2014 or 2015,’ ” that 

“ ‘mommy was bleeding and crying, and he pushed her one time 

when she was pregnant.’ ”

E. Hearing on Jurisdiction, Disposition, and 

Mother’s Restraining Order Request

Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, hearings on Mother’s 

request for a restraining order and jurisdiction and disposition 

were continued and did not begin until September 9, 2020.

The court conducted the jurisdiction and restraining order 

hearings together. Both parents testified. When the court asked 

Mother if Father had violated the November 2019 protective 

order, she initially testified that Father had done so “when [he] 

appeared at my property,” but later clarified that Father was 

actually in his vehicle on a public street “near [her] driveway.”

Father testified regarding Mother’s previous restraining order 

requests.

In reaching its decision denying Mother’s request for a 

permanent restraining order, the court stated that it considered 

the allegations in the request, the exhibits and testimony, 

and the family law file. The exhibits included the DCFS 

jurisdiction/disposition report, in which DCFS noted the family’s 

“on-going custody dispute,” and told the court: “This family 

has extensive child welfare referral history with a very specific 

pattern of the parents calling in referrals on one another related 

to parenting issues, and appears to be rooted in their custody 

dispute.” The family law file included two 2017 “statement[s]

of issues and contentions” filed by the children’s appointed 

counsel in family court pursuant to Family Code section 3151, 

subdivision (b). In these statements, the children’s counsel 
9

explained his view, similar to that of DCFS, that “the parties’

numerous complaints about each other” were “all . . . without 

merit . . . [and] each parent is looking for anything negative 

about the other to obtain some sort of advantage in these 

custody proceedings.” (Underscoring omitted.) The children’s 

counsel further noted that, when he interviewed the children, 

they appeared to be “ ‘par[ro]ting’ ” Mother, in that they 

“provided [the children’s] counsel a blow-by[-]blow history of

this case that they would have never been able to communicate 

to [the children’s] counsel (let alone remember) but for [Mother]

prepping them prior to the interview.” According to [the 

children’s] counsel, the “children inasmuch as confirmed during 

the interview process that their mother wanted specific issues 

discussed and how to answer the same.”

The court denied Mother’s request for the permanent 

restraining order. Specifically, the court “[found] insufficient 

evidence, certainly, not by a preponderance of the evidence to 

show that Mother and/or the children are at risk of any threats 

or actual physical violence by . . . Father towards either the 

mother or the children.” The court did, however, grant Mother’s 

alternative request for a mutual stay-away order, requiring that 

“[n]either Mother nor Father are to be within 100 yards of one 

another or their home or their job.”

The court then found that the children were persons 

described in section 300, subdivision (c) based on allegations 

that both parents’ conduct in their ongoing custody dispute was 

harming the children emotionally. The court dismissed all other 

counts in the petition. The court found “Mother to be acting in 

bad faith” based not only on “the evidence that ha[d] been 
10

presented by DCFS,” but also on “the entirety of the family 

court proceedings for the last eight years.”

F. Appeal and Post-appeal Developments

Mother filed a timely notice of appeal from the court’s 

jurisdiction and disposition orders, as well as the August 28, 

2020 order denying her request for a permanent restraining 

order. On appeal, however, she challenges only the court’s denial 

of a permanent restraining order protecting her from Father.

In a May 5, 2021 order, issued while this appeal was 

pending, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and granted

the parents joint legal and physical custody of both children. No 

party has sought review of the order.

At the request of this court, Mother and Father each filed 

a supplemental brief regarding whether the juvenile court’s 

termination of jurisdiction mooted Mother’s appeal.5

5 DCFS is not a party to this appeal, and accordingly 

neither filed a respondent’s brief, nor took a position regarding 

whether termination of jurisdiction over the children rendered 

Mother’s appeal moot.
11

DISCUSSION

A. Mootness and the Termination of Juvenile Court

Jurisdiction

In arguing Mother’s appeal is moot, Father cites a “general 

rule” tying mootness of a dependency appeal to the unappealed 

termination of juvenile court jurisdiction. (See In re C.C. (2009) 

172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488 (C.C.), citing In re Michelle M. (1992) 

8 Cal.App.4th 326, 330 (Michelle M.).) Although the termination 

of juvenile court jurisdiction can, under certain circumstances, 

render an appeal from a prior juvenile court order moot, we 

disagree that a necessary association exists between the two. In 

this section, we lay out what we view as the correct framework 

for assessing mootness under such circumstances, and how we 

reconcile that framework with existing case law. In the following 

section (see Discussion part B, post), we apply the framework to 

Mother’s appeal.

1. Mootness depends on our ability to grant 

effective relief

Mootness in the dependency context—as in any context—

depends on “whether the appellate court can provide any 

effective relief if it finds reversible error.” (In re N.S. (2016) 

245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60 (N.S.); accord, In re E.T. (2013) 217 

Cal.App.4th 426, 436 [“[a]n appeal may become moot where 

subsequent events, including orders by the juvenile court, render 

it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effective relief”].) 

The termination of juvenile court jurisdiction does not 

categorically prevent a reviewing court from granting effective 

relief in all cases. Thus, mootness of an appeal from a juvenile 

court order followed by the unappealed termination of juvenile 

court jurisdiction “must be decided on a case-by-case basis” (In re 
12

Kristin B. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 596, 605; accord, C.C., supra, 

172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1488), and such termination will not moot 

an appeal if, on the facts of the particular case, the appellate 

court can still grant the appellant effective relief.

2. Termination of juvenile court jurisdiction 

does not categorically prevent a reviewing 

court from providing effective relief

Code of Civil Procedure sections 43 and 906 both provide

that a reviewing court “may affirm, reverse, or modify any 

judgment or order appealed from, and may direct the proper 

judgment or order to be entered, or direct a new trial or further 

proceedings to be had.” Neither statute qualifies a reviewing 

court’s power to instruct a lower court to enter a new order or 

hold further proceedings. That power applies equally to the 

review of juvenile court decisions, and does not depend on the 

juvenile court retaining jurisdiction, because “[t]he order of the 

reviewing court . . . contained in its remittitur . . . defines the 

scope of the jurisdiction of the court to which the matter is 

returned.” (In re Anna S. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1499; 

see Hampton v. Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 652, 655 

[“When there has been a decision upon appeal, the trial court 

is reinvested with jurisdiction of the cause, but only such 

jurisdiction as is defined by the terms of the remittitur. The 

trial court is empowered to act only in accordance with the 

direction of the reviewing court.”]; In re Francisco W. (2006) 139 

Cal.App.4th 695, 704–705 (Francisco W.) [“[w]hen a judgment is 

reversed with directions, the appellate court’s order is contained 

in its remittitur, which revests the jurisdiction of the subject 

matter in the lower court and defines the scope of the lower 

court’s jurisdiction”].)
13

Put differently, the remittitur creates the limited 

jurisdiction needed for a juvenile court to correct reversible errors 

found by an appellate court. Thus, even after a juvenile court has 

terminated jurisdiction, a reviewing court can still effectively 

require the juvenile court to correct reversible error.

3. Cases reciting a rule that the unappealed 

termination of juvenile court jurisdiction

renders an appeal moot should be limited 

to their specific facts

We understand the oft-repeated “general rule” that 

termination of juvenile court jurisdiction moots an appeal as 

acknowledging that, given the unique nature of juvenile court 

jurisdiction, termination thereof will often prevent the reviewing 

court from granting effective relief. Our understanding of the 

language in this way is consistent with how, in most cases citing 

such a “general rule,” the reviewing court goes on to consider 

whether the circumstances of the case prevent the court from 

granting effective relief (see, e.g., In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 

Cal.App.5th 156, 164 (Rashad D.); C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th

at p. 1488)—something that would not be necessary, were we 

to take literally the rule’s pronouncement that termination of 

juvenile court jurisdiction renders moot an appeal of an earlier 

order.

Some decisions, including one cited by Father, have 

articulated a different basis for the “general rule” that 

termination of juvenile court jurisdiction renders a pending 

dependency appeal moot: Namely, that “the juvenile court has no 

jurisdiction to conduct further hearings in the now-closed case”

(unless a party also appeals the termination of jurisdiction)

(Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 164), so “a remand for 
14

further proceedings in the juvenile court would be meaningless.” 

(Id. at p. 165.) This reasoning ignores that when an appellate 

court reverses with directions, it revests the lower court with 

jurisdiction to follow those directions. (See, e.g., Francisco W., 

supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 704–705.) Thus, to the extent 

these cases hold that an appellate court cannot effectively require 

the juvenile court to correct reversible error solely because the 

latter has terminated jurisdiction, we disagree. 

Cases that appear to express such a view rely primarily on

Michelle M., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 330 as its source. (See, 

e.g., Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 164−165 [citing 

Michelle M. for the proposition that “[u]nless the appellate 

court reverses or vacates the order terminating dependency, 

the juvenile court has no jurisdiction to conduct further hearings 

in the now-closed case . . . [citations] . . . [and] a remand for 

further proceedings in the juvenile court would be meaningless”]; 

Michelle M., supra, at p. 330 [“Here, no direct relief can be 

granted even were we to find reversible error, because the 

juvenile court no longer has jurisdiction and we are only 

reviewing that court’s ruling. We hold that the appeal filed 

herein . . . is moot. Appellant’s remedy was to attack the juvenile 

court’s order terminating jurisdiction in order to raise the issues 

he urges before us.”].) Although the outcome in Michelle M.

may have been correct on its facts, the blanket rule it espouses 

regarding mootness is too broad.

First, the authority Michelle M. cites in establishing this 

rule—In re Lisa M. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 915, 920 (Lisa M.)—

does not support the rule, nor does Lisa M. even consider creating 

an exception to Code of Civil Procedure sections 43 and 906 and 

the corresponding power of a remittitur to revest a lower court 
15

with limited jurisdiction. In Lisa M., a mother challenged a 

juvenile court order continuing her child’s placement with a 

relative and initiating proceedings to terminate the mother’s 

parental rights. (Lisa M., supra, 17 Cal.App.3d at p. 918.) More 

than a year after that order, the juvenile court terminated the 

mother’s parental rights in an order that she did not appeal. 

(Ibid.) Thus, on the facts of that case, reversing the order on 

appeal (regarding placement with relatives) could not have 

granted the mother effective relief unless the appellate court 

also reversed an order not on appeal (the order terminating the 

mother’s parental rights). (Id. at p. 919.) The appellate court 

recognized it had no power to reverse juvenile court orders that 

had not been appealed. (Ibid.; see also id. at p. 920 [“[w]hat 

[the mother] cannot now do is seek to confer upon this court 

jurisdiction to affect appealable orders from which no appeal 

was taken”].) Thus, no effective relief could have been granted 

to the mother because reversing the placement order would have 

been “meaningless” in that it could have had no impact on the 

final, unappealed order terminating her parental rights. (Id. at 

p. 919.)

The court in Michelle M. concluded that the same reasoning

applied to the appeal from a juvenile court’s dispositional order 

at issue in that case. (Michelle M., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 328−329.) The court in Michelle M. reasoned that reversing 

the dispositional order could not facilitate effective relief unless 

the court also reversed the not-appealed-from order terminating 

juvenile court jurisdiction—otherwise the juvenile court would 

lack jurisdiction to issue a new dispositional order. (Ibid.)

But, as discussed above, an appellate court reversal and 

resulting remittitur gives the juvenile court jurisdiction to act
16

on directions the Code of Civil Procedure expressly authorizes 

an appellate court to issue. Thus, the reasoning of Lisa M. was 

not implicated in Michelle M., and is likewise not automatically 

implicated whenever juvenile court jurisdiction is terminated 

following an appeal from a juvenile court order where the 

appellant does not appeal the termination of jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, Michelle M. appears to have reached the 

correct result on the facts of that case—but not for the reasons 

reflected in the rule it created and upon which it purported 

to rely. This is because the appeal in Michelle M. was in part 

from custody and visitation rulings in a dispositional order. 

(Michelle M., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 328.) When the juvenile 

court terminated its jurisdiction in Michelle M., it also issued a 

custody and visitation order and transferred that order to family 

court to be enforced. (Ibid.) Thus, under the facts presented in 

Michelle M., the exit order provided the juvenile court’s last word

on custody and visitation (in addition to terminating jurisdiction). 

Therefore, reversing an earlier order on custody and/or visitation 

could not deliver the desired relief—namely, a change in custody 

and/or visitation. Even after such reversal, the more recent 

custody and visitation terms contained in the exit order would

govern. To effect an actual change in custody and visitation

rights, the appellate court would need to reverse the juvenile 

court’s last word on custody and/or visitation—the exit order 

terminating jurisdiction on those terms—which, as Lisa M. notes, 

the appellate court does not have the power to do if that order 

has not been appealed. This appears to have been the situation 

in Michelle M. (see Michelle M., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 328), 

and thus the failure of the appellant in that case to appeal an 

exit order that both terminated jurisdiction and set forth the
17

final custody and visitation arrangement mooted the appeal from 

the earlier dispositional order regarding custody and visitation. 

Michelle M. does not explain its holding in this way, 

however. Rather, it expressly states a broad rule that a 

reviewing court lacks the power to order further proceedings 

in the juvenile court after a nonappealed order terminating 

jurisdiction. (Michelle M., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at pp. 329−330.) 

We disagree with Michelle M. to the extent it states such a broad 

rule not necessary to the correct outcome on the specific facts of 

that case.

A few cases, including Rashad D., cite Michelle M. for this 

broad principle. Our conclusion that the Michelle M. rule is too 

broad does not mean that we view all cases citing the Michelle M.

rule as incorrectly decided. To the contrary, like the Michelle M.

decision itself, the published decisions relying on Michelle M.

appear to have been correctly decided on their facts for reasons 

other than those reflected in the Michelle M. rule and reasoning. 

(See Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 159, 164 [discussed 

below]; N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 56−57, 60 [citing 

Michelle M. in holding the mother’s challenge to jurisdictional

finding mooted by subsequent order terminating jurisdiction 

and restoring the mother full custody]; C.C., supra, 172 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1488–1489 [appeal from dispositional 

order regarding visitation mooted by unappealed exit order 

terminating jurisdiction where the exit order reinstated the 

mother’s visitation rights, providing her “the very relief she 

seeks by her appeal”].) In Rashad D., for example, the father 

challenged a “jurisdiction finding [that] resulted in an adverse 

juvenile custody order” and “[sought] to have that custody 

order set aside.” (Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 164.) 
18

Following that appeal, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction 

in an unappealed order that also addressed custody. (Id. 

at pp. 159, 164.) Although the Rashad D. court recited the 

broad Michelle M. rule, the court expressly limited its holding 

to a scenario in which an appellant challenges a custody 

determination superseded by custody terms contained in 

an unappealed exit order. (See, e.g, id. at p. 159 [noting that 

“termination of dependency jurisdiction does not necessarily 

moot an appeal from a jurisdiction finding that directly results 

in an adverse juvenile custody order,” and noting that father 

needed to also appeal “from the orders terminating jurisdiction 

and modifying the parent’s prior custody status” in order for an 

appellate court to be able to grant effective relief], italics added.)

B. Mother’s Appeal Is Not Moot

We now apply the principles and framework clarified above

to Mother’s appeal. We conclude that we can afford Mother 

effective relief.

1. Upon remand, the juvenile court would 

have the power to issue the requested 

restraining order 

Here, were we to reverse, we could instruct the juvenile 

court to issue the desired restraining order. As discussed above, 

Code of Civil Procedure sections 43 and 906 give us the power to

do so, even after termination of juvenile court jurisdiction, and 

the remittitur issued as a result would grant the juvenile court

the power to carry out our directions. The juvenile court’s order 

would then be enforceable by the family court. (See Garcia v. 

Escobar (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 267, 271 [“once the juvenile court 
19

terminates jurisdiction, the family court assumes jurisdiction 

over restraining orders issued in juvenile court”], citing § 362.4.)

The terms of the unappealed order terminating jurisdiction 

in this case do not supersede or conflict with the ruling Mother 

challenges on appeal—the denial of Mother’s request for a 

restraining order. Thus, unlike in Michelle M. and Rashad D.,

the order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction would not need 

to be modified in order to grant Mother the relief she seeks. 

Mother’s failure to appeal therefrom does not prevent us from 

providing effective relief. 

The dissent concludes that the juvenile court lacks 

fundamental jurisdiction to issue Mother’s requested restraining 

order upon remand based not on the broad Michelle M. rule with 

which we disagree above, but rather on the language of the 

specific statute governing Mother’s restraining order request, 

section 213.5. The dissent notes that section 213.5 only 

authorizes a juvenile court to issue a restraining order “until the 

time that the [dependency] petition is dismissed or dependency 

is terminated.” (§ 213.5, subd. (a).) Because this period of 

authority had ended, the dissent reasons, were we to find 

reversible error and remand, the juvenile court would lack 

fundamental jurisdiction to provide effective relief—that is, to 

issue the requested restraining order—and any effort by the 

juvenile court to issue such a restraining order would be void.

None of the fundamental jurisdiction cases the dissent 

cites addresses a lower court’s jurisdiction—fundamental or 

otherwise—following remand to correct errors a reviewing court 

has identified on appeal. Rather, these cases consider arguments 

that a lower court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to rule on a 

particular issue at the time of that ruling. Certainly, had the 
20

juvenile court here lacked fundamental jurisdiction to issue 

a restraining order at the time it ruled on Mother’s request, 

remittitur following an appeal could not vest the juvenile court 

with fundamental jurisdiction it otherwise lacks. But that is 

not the case here. The dissent does not dispute that the juvenile 

court had fundamental jurisdiction to rule on Mother’s request 

for a restraining order at the time of that ruling. And, as 

discussed above, a remittitur with directions provides a lower 

court with the requisite authority to correct errors that a 

reviewing court has identified on appeal. The dissent identifies 

no case supporting a contrary view. Nor would such a rule make 

sense. Consider, for example, a civil jury trial in which the 

defendant is found liable, and a final judgment to this effect is 

entered. The trial court under those circumstances lacks any 

power after the expiration of its statutory authority to order a 

new trial. Yet this is exactly what a trial court may do, following 

an appeal in which the judgment for plaintiff is reversed and the

case is remanded with directions to grant a new trial. This is

because a remittitur with directions reinstates the trial court’s 

power to act. So, too, could a reversal with directions and 

resulting remittitur in this case provide a juvenile court 

jurisdiction to execute those directions—namely, to issue the 

permanent restraining order Mother seeks. The cases regarding 

fundamental jurisdiction that the dissent cites are inapposite. 

They consider, retrospectively, whether the lower court lacked 

the power to issue the decision being reviewed by the appellate 

court—not prospectively whether the lower court has the power 

to issue a decision upon remand, were an appellate court to so 

instruct. Here, there is no question that the juvenile court had 

the power to act under section 213.5 when it issued the order 
21

from which Mother appeals. The cases the dissent cites do not 

consider, let alone stand for the proposition, that a remittitur 

cannot empower a lower court to correct an erroneous decision—

here, by issuing the requested restraining order.6

2. Issuing Mother the requested restraining 

order would still immediately afford 

Mother effective relief

We must next determine whether the juvenile court issuing 

Mother the desired restraining order upon remand would still 

afford Mother effective relief, now that the dependency 

proceedings have been terminated. We conclude that it clearly 

would. The restraining order a juvenile court could issue 

6 Because a remittitur could revest jurisdiction in the 

juvenile court for the limited purpose of issuing Mother’s 

requested section 213.5 restraining order upon remand, the 

dissent’s conclusion that a family court could not issue such 

an order is beside the point. Moreover, the dissent appears to 

base this conclusion on a view that section 213.5 and Family 

Code section 6320, the statutory authority for family court to 

issue restraining orders, apply different substantive standards. 

They do not. (See, e.g., Priscila N. v. Leonardo G. (2017) 17 

Cal.App.5th 1208, 1214 [“[S]ection 213.5 was amended so that

the juvenile court could issue [domestic violent restraining 

orders] under the same standards provided for in the [Domestic 

Violence Prevention Act of which Family Code section 6320 is 

a part].” “[Domestic violent retraining orders] issued after a 

noticed hearing by the juvenile court under . . . section 213.5 . . . 

are indistinguishable in every respect from those issued after 

noticed hearing under article 2 of the [Domestic Violence 

Prevention Act].”]; In re Bruno M. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 990, 997 

[applying language from Family Code section 6320 to define the 

term “disturbing the peace” in section 213.5], italics omitted.)
22

following reversal and remand could afford Mother protection 

necessary to assure her safety in the same way it would have, 

had the juvenile court issued the order while dependency 

proceedings were still pending. Mother’s need for such protection 

did not end simply because the dependency proceedings 

concluded. A juvenile court order granting Mother’s request 

would immediately provide her such protection. Her appeal is 

not moot. 

We now turn to the merits of that appeal.

C. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion 

in Denying Mother’s Request for a Permanent 

Restraining Order

Section 213.5 governs the issuance of restraining orders 

by the juvenile court. Thereunder, the juvenile court may issue,

inter alia, an order “enjoining any person from molesting, 

attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, . . . battering, 

harassing, telephoning, . . . contacting, . . . coming within a 

specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of . . . any parent . . . 

of the child [who is the subject of dependency proceedings], 

regardless of whether the child resides with that parent, . . .

upon application in the manner provided by Section 527 of the 

Code of Civil Procedure or, if related to domestic violence, in the 

manner provided by Section 6300 of the Family Code.” (§ 213.5, 

subd. (a).) Mother challenges the juvenile court’s denial of 

her section 213.5 request as unsupported by the evidence. She 

argues in the alternative that the court abused its discretion 

because it applied the wrong legal standard in adjudicating 

her request. We disagree on both counts for reasons we explain 

below.
23

1. The evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

denial of Mother’s restraining order 

request

“[A]ppellate courts apply the substantial evidence standard 

to determine whether sufficient facts supported the factual 

findings in support of a [section 213.5] restraining order and 

the abuse of discretion standard to determine whether the court 

properly issued the order.” (In re Carlos H. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 

861, 866.) When an appellant challenges “the sufficiency of 

the evidence, . . . [i]f there is substantial evidence supporting 

the order, the court’s issuance of the restraining order may not 

be disturbed.” (In re Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 199, 

210−211.)

The substantial evidence standard of review takes on a 

unique formulation where, as here, “the trier of fact has expressly 

or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof 

did not carry the burden and that party appeals.” (In re I.W.

(2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved on other grounds 

in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) 

“[W]here the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, 

the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence 

compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.” 

(In re I.W., supra, at p. 1528.) Specifically, we ask “whether the 

appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’

and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for 

a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a

finding.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) 

Issuance of a restraining order under section 213.5 does 

not require “evidence that the restrained person has previously 

molested, attacked, struck, sexually assaulted, stalked, or 

battered the [petitioner or person to be protected].” (In re B.S.
24

(2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.) It may be sufficient to show 

that the person to be restrained “disturb[ed] the peace” of the 

petitioner (§ 213.5, subd. (a)), meaning he or she engaged in 

conduct that destroyed the petitioner’s “mental or emotional 

calm.” (In re Bruno M., supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 997.)

Section 213.5 is analogous “to Family Code section 6340, which 

permits the issuance of a protective order under the Domestic 

Violence Prevention Act . . . if ‘failure to make [the order] may 

jeopardize the safety of the petitioner.’ ” (In re B.S., supra, at 

p. 194; accord, In re N.L. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1466; 

In re C.Q. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 355, 364.)

Mother argues that the record contains evidence 

“compel[ling] a finding in her favor” and thus that the court’s 

denial of her section 213.5 request should be reversed. We 

disagree. 

The parties presented competing and conflicting evidence 

on key issues related to Mother’s request. Father denied banging 

on the doors and windows of Mother’s home during the October 

2019 incident, whereas Mother and the children indicated that he 

did. Mother and S.G. indicate Father has hit Mother in the past, 

but Father denies these allegations. All allegations of physical 

aggression by Father made in referrals, family court custody 

disputes, and juvenile court requests were ultimately deemed 

unsupported or inconclusive.

These evidentiary conflicts must be considered in the 

larger context of a record reflecting almost 10 years of the 

parents falsely accusing each other of a myriad of wrongs and 

misbehavior, as well as the conclusion of the children’s counsel 

in the family court proceedings that Mother had coached the 

children regarding what to say about Father and the custody 
25

dispute. Mother’s restraining order request thus obligated 

the juvenile court to make highly subjective evaluations about 

competing evidence. The court appears to have considered this 

evidence and discounted Mother’s and the children’s accounts 

of Father’s behavior, expressly finding that Mother had coached 

the children in connection with their statements to DCFS, and 

that Mother had acted “in bad faith.” It is not our function 

to second-guess such credibility determinations or weighing of 

the evidence. (See R.M. v. T.A. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 760, 780 

[“[w]e defer to the trial court’s credibility resolutions and do not 

reweigh the evidence”].) Nor does merely conflicting evidence 

support an insufficiency of the evidence claim (see In re 

Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228 [substantial evidence 

review does not require reversal merely because “the trial court

might have reached a different result had it believed other 

evidence”])—let alone a claim that the evidence in the record 

compels resolution of Mother’s request in her favor.

Mother further points to Father’s criminal history in 

2011 and 2015, which included either arrests or convictions for 

domestic violence, as well as her testimony that Father violated 

the 2019 temporary restraining order by parking near her 

driveway. This evidence—even considered together with the 

conflicting evidence discussed above—is not “ ‘of such a character 

and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that 

it was insufficient to support’ ” the requisite finding—namely, 

that a permanent restraining order was necessary to protect 

Mother’s safety. (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528; 

see In re B.S., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 193.) 

The court expressly questioned Mother’s credibility, and 

the record does not contain even the most basic details of Father’s 
26

at least six-year-old criminal history (such as whether he was 

arrested or convicted). If the court chose to believe Father’s 

version of events—as it reasonably could have, and as its findings 

regarding Mother suggest it did—then the record does not 

contain substantial evidence of any violent behavior by Father for 

almost four years before Mother’s November 2019 restraining 

order request (or, for that matter, thereafter). (See In re C.Q., 

supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 364 [reversing grant of restraining 

order where no violent behavior for a year following a domestic 

violence incident].) We therefore decline Mother’s implicit 

invitation to reevaluate the competing evidence and revisit the 

juvenile court’s failure-of-proof conclusion.

2. The juvenile court did not apply the 

incorrect legal standard

Mother argues in the alternative that the juvenile court 

applied the incorrect legal standard in assessing her request, 

and thus abused its discretion. “ ‘If the court’s decision is 

influenced by an erroneous understanding of applicable law or

reflects an unawareness of the full scope of its discretion, the

court has not properly exercised its discretion under the law. 

[Citation.] Therefore, a discretionary order based on an 

application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is 

not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal. 

[Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘The question of whether a trial court 

applied the correct legal standard to an issue in exercising its 

discretion is a question of law [citation] requiring de novo review

[citation].’ ” (Rodriguez v. Menjivar (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 816, 

820–821.)

Mother argues that, because “a restraining order under 

section 213.5 does not require ‘reasonable apprehension of 
27

physical abuse,’ or threats of harm,” the juvenile court applied 

the incorrect standard when it denied Mother’s request by 

finding “insufficient evidence . . . to show that Mother and/or the 

children [were] at risk of any threats or actual physical violence 

by . . . Father.” We are not convinced that the juvenile court’s 

statement indicates the court viewed harm, threats of harm, or 

reasonable apprehension of same as prerequisites for granting a

section 213.5 restraining order. The court’s statement could also 

be understood as a rephrasing of the rule that an order should 

issue only if “ ‘failure to make [the order] may jeopardize the 

safety of the petitioner.’ ” (In re B.S., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 194.)

Even if the juvenile court did incorrectly understand 

the scope of its discretion, we “should not disturb the exercise 

of a trial court’s discretion unless it appears that there has been 

a miscarriage of justice.” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 

2 Cal.3d 557, 566.) Thus, as Mother concedes, a lower court 

decision applying the incorrect legal standard “is subject to 

reversal upon a showing it is reasonably probable that, but 

for the error, the appealing party would have obtained a 

more favorable outcome.” (See Sabato v. Brooks (2015) 242 

Cal.App.4th 715, 724−725 [applying “reasonably probable” 

prejudice analysis in the context of an appeal from a Domestic 

Violence Prevention Act restraining order]; see also In re 

Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 60 [a “miscarriage of justice” 

occurs and requires reversal in dependency proceedings when 

“the reviewing court finds it reasonably probable the result 

would have been more favorable to the appealing party but for 

the error”].)
28

For the reasons discussed above, and particularly in light 

of the juvenile court’s findings bearing on Mother’s credibility and 

that Mother coached the children, “[o]n this record, we can say 

with some confidence that [Mother] did not carry the burden of 

showing” the requested order was necessary to protect her safety. 

(Guardianship of Kassandra H. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1228, 

1240.) We conclude it is not reasonably probable that, even 

assuming the court applied the incorrect legal standard, Mother 

would have obtained a more favorable outcome under the correct 

one.

Accordingly, we find no reversible error in the court’s 

denial of Mother’s restraining order. 
29

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

ROTHSCHILD, J.

I concur:

BENDIX, J.
CHANEY, J., Dissenting.

If we were to reverse the juvenile court’s denial of mother’s 

request for a restraining order under section 213.5, subdivision 

(a) and remand for further proceedings, neither the juvenile court 

nor any other court would be able to grant any relief under 

section 213.5 because the juvenile court has terminated 

jurisdiction in the underlying dependency matter. No party has 

appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating jurisdiction. 

We can grant no effective relief in this particular juvenile 

proceeding.1 The appeal is moot and should be dismissed.

“ ‘When courts use the phrase “lack of jurisdiction,” they 

are usually referring to one of two different concepts, although, as

one court has observed, the distinction between them is “hazy.” 

[Citation.]’ [Citation.] A lack of jurisdiction in its fundamental 

or strict sense results in ‘ “an entire absence of power to hear or

determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject 

matter or the parties.” [Citation.] On the other hand, a court 

may have jurisdiction in the strict sense but nevertheless lack 

“ ‘jurisdiction’ (or power) to act except in a particular manner, or 

to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrence of 

certain procedural prerequisites.” [Citations.] When a court fails 

to conduct itself in the manner prescribed, it is said to have acted 

in excess of jurisdiction.’ [Citation.] [¶] The distinction is 

important because the remedies are different. ‘[F]undamental 

jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver, estoppel, or consent. 

Rather, an act beyond a court’s jurisdiction in the fundamental 

sense is null and void’ ab initio.” (People v. Lara (2010) 48 

1 Mother’s remedy, if she continues to believe she needs 

and is entitled to a protective order, is to seek one in the family 

court under Family Code section 6200 et seq.
2

Cal.4th 216, 224-225; accord Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 

Third Dist. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 287-288; Kabran v. Sharp 

Memorial Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 369; In re J.W. (2020) 53

Cal.App.5th 347, 356 (J.W.); Schrage v. Schrage (2021) 69 

Cal.App.5th 126, 138-139.) And a remittitur from this or any 

other appellate court does no more than re-vest a lower court 

with the power to act of which it had been divested with the filing 

of a notice of appeal or a petition for review. Neither an appellate 

court order nor a remittitur creates fundamental jurisdiction 

where it does not otherwise exist, on even a limited basis.2

“In this state, fundamental jurisdiction over juvenile 

dependency cases . . . is governed by Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 300, which states that a child described by that

section ‘is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.’ ” (J.W., 

supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 357-358; cf. In re Anna S. (2010) 180 

Cal.App.4th 1489, 1493 [dealing with “jurisdiction” of juvenile 

court to make orders in ongoing dependency proceedings even 

during the pendency of an appeal from an order that may be 

affected by the appeal—jurisdiction as court’s power to act 

compared to fundamental jurisdiction].) “ ‘In dependency 

proceedings, “ ‘[a] superior court convened as and exercising the 

special powers of a juvenile court is vested with jurisdiction to 

make only those limited determinations authorized by the 

legislative grant of those special powers.’ ” ’ ” (In re A.R. (2012) 

203 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1170.) “The filing of [a] dependency 

2 Indeed, if fundamental jurisdiction exists in the trial 

court, it continues to exist even during a pending appeal, and the 

trial court retains the power to act as to matters not affected by 

the pending appeal. (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2018) 28 

Cal.App.5th 862, 877.) 
3

petition vest[s] the juvenile court with subject matter 

jurisdiction, i.e., the inherent authority to deal with the case or 

the matter before it.” (Ibid.) Dismissal of a petition or 

termination of jurisdiction terminates that authority. And an 

appellate opinion does not create a person described by section 

300 where the juvenile court has said none exists and no party 

has challenged that finding.

Here, the juvenile court terminated its “fundamental 

jurisdiction,” and no party appealed from the order terminating 

that jurisdiction. There is no mechanism before us by which we 

could reinstate or otherwise affect that conclusion. (In re A.R., 

supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1171.)

Mother sought a restraining order in the juvenile court 

pursuant to section 213.5. Section 213.5 gives the juvenile court 

the “exclusive jurisdiction” to enter that order “[a]fter a petition 

has been filed pursuant to Section 311 to declare a child a 

dependent child of the juvenile court, and until the time that the 

petition is dismissed or dependency is terminated . . .” or “[a]fter a 

petition has been filed pursuant to Section 601 or 602 to declare a 

child a ward of the juvenile court, and until the time that the 

petition is dismissed or wardship is terminated . . . .”3 (§ 213.5, 

subds. (a), (b), italics added.)

By its express terms, then, a court may only act under 

section 213.5 during the pendency of a juvenile court petition. 

Section 213.5 conveys no authority to any court outside the 

bounds of that timeline.

3 Because of the issues presented in this appeal, I have 

largely limited my discussion to jurisdiction of dependents (§ 300) 

and omitted any substantial discussion of wards (§ 601 et seq.).
4

A protective order issued under section 213.5 survives the 

termination of jurisdiction. (§ 362.4, subd. (a).) And the superior 

court (expressly not acting as a juvenile court) may subsequently 

modify or terminate an order issued under section 213.5. 

(§ 362.4, subds. (b), (c).) The Legislature created a mechanism to 

enforce protective orders issued under section 213.5 by providing 

that an order issued under section 213.5 “may be used as the sole 

basis for opening a file” in the family court: “The [juvenile] court 

may direct the parent or the clerk of the juvenile court to 

transmit the order to the clerk of the superior court of the county 

in which the order is to be filed. The clerk of the superior court 

shall, immediately upon receipt, open a file, without a filing fee, 

and assign a case number.” (§ 362.4, subd. (c).)

By contrast, no authority to issue an order under section 

213.5 exists outside the window of dependency jurisdiction 

ending with either a dismissal or termination of a petition under 

section 300.

The mootness doctrine commands us to “dismiss an appeal 

when an event occurs that renders it impossible for the court to 

grant effective relief.” (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 59.) 

Here, regardless of whether we affirm the juvenile court’s order 

or reverse it, there is no relief any court can grant mother on 

remand. The juvenile court lacks fundamental jurisdiction, as 

that term is discussed above, and is therefore currently without 

authority to enter an order under section 213.5 even if we 

concluded that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it 

declined to do so on mother’s request; any order the juvenile court 

entered on remand would be beyond its jurisdiction—void ab 

initio. If the appellate court reversed this juvenile court’s ruling 

on the requested restraining order under section 213.5 given the 
5

trial court’s unappealed termination of jurisdiction, any order 

under section 213.5 the juvenile court later entered would have 

no legal effect.

To contrast, this is not the case where fundamental 

jurisdiction in the juvenile court persists. This is not an appeal 

from an order finding jurisdiction that also includes review of a 

restraining order issued under section 213.5, where we could 

order the juvenile court to modify or otherwise act under section 

213.5 before dismissing or terminating jurisdiction. Here, in 

stark contrast, the juvenile court has terminated jurisdiction, and 

there has been no appeal from any jurisdictional or dispositional 

order or the order terminating jurisdiction. The foundational 

element of any action under section 213.5 is juvenile court 

jurisdiction. That foundational element is absent.

“As a general rule, an order terminating juvenile court 

jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the 

dependency proceedings moot. [Citation.] However, dismissal for 

mootness in such circumstances is not automatic, but ‘must be 

decided on a case-by-case basis.’ [Citations.] [¶] ‘An issue is not 

moot if the purported error infects the outcome of subsequent 

proceedings.’ ” (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488.) 

“[A]n erroneous jurisdiction finding,” for example, “can have 

unfavorable consequences extending beyond termination of 

dependency jurisdiction and that termination does not 

necessarily moot an appeal of such a finding.” (In re Rashad D.

(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 164.) As in all cases, the mootness 

analysis in this case is specific to this case. I am aware of no 

authority to support the obviously incorrect proposition that an 

appellate court can never grant effective relief in a dependency 

appeal following the unappealed termination of juvenile court 
6

jurisdiction. But the fact that an appellate court may view a trial 

court’s order as reversible error does not itself on remand vest a 

trial court with subject matter jurisdiction that it otherwise 

would not have.

An erroneous finding under section 213.5 can have 

unfavorable consequences extending beyond termination of 

dependency jurisdiction. In In re Cassandra B. (2004) 125 

Cal.App.4th 199, for example, the Court of Appeal considered 

mootness in the context of a juvenile court protective order 

granted under section 213.5, subdivision (a). The Court of Appeal 

explained that “[b]efore a hearing on the issuance of an order 

pursuant to . . . section 213.5, subdivision (a), the juvenile court is 

required to conduct a search as described in Family Code section 

6306, subdivision (a). Family Code section 6306, subdivision (a) 

in turn provides: ‘Prior to a hearing on the issuance or denial of 

an order under this part, the court shall ensure that a search is 

or has been conducted to determine if the subject of the proposed 

order . . . has any prior restraining order.’ Under . . . section 

213.5, subdivision (k)(2), the juvenile court must consider the 

existence of the prior restraining order in determining whether to 

issue another one against the same party: ‘Prior to deciding 

whether to issue an order under this part, the court shall 

consider the following information obtained pursuant to a search 

conducted under paragraph (1): . . . any prior restraining order; 

and any violation of a prior restraining order.’ ” (Cassandra B. at 

p. 209, italics added.) The Court of Appeal explained that the 

fact that the juvenile court must consider the existence of the 

prior restraining order—the fact that the existence of a 

potentially erroneous prior restraining order might infect the 

outcome of subsequent proceedings—was a sufficient basis to 
7

conclude that the matter was not moot.4 Correcting error that 

might infect subsequent proceedings is itself effective relief. But if

the juvenile court’s order here was erroneous, it did not have the 

potential to infect subsequent proceedings.

There is no statutory or any other legal requirement that a 

court, when considering whether to grant a restraining order 

under any statutory authority, consider a previous denial of a 

request for a restraining order. And to suggest that a court 

4 The appropriate disposition on reversal of a juvenile 

court’s order under section 213.5 after termination of jurisdiction 

would involve either vacatur of the order or remand to the family

court for further proceedings, and then under Family Code 

section 6200 et seq. (See In re John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th

961, 965.) The Legislature appears to have intended the end of 

dependency proceedings to be the end of juvenile court 

involvement in family disputes. (See § 362.4.) While the 

statutory frameworks of section 213.5 and Family Code section 

6200 et seq. restraining orders are virtually identical, in practice, 

there are meaningful differences that render the juvenile court 

an inappropriate forum for custody fights not involving 

dependency jurisdiction. (See In re Travis C. (1991) 233 

Cal.App.3d 492, 502 [outlining critical distinctions between 

juvenile dependency and family court proceedings]; In re John 

W., at pp. 970-973 [same].) If the request for a restraining order 

were brought in family court under Family Code section 6200 

et seq., for example, the court would not consider the question 

in light of how a restraining order would benefit the children; 

the juvenile court, considering a request under section 213.5, 

however, must: “Juvenile courts and other public agencies 

charged with enforcing, interpreting, and administering the 

juvenile court law shall consider . . . the best interests of the 

minor in all deliberations pursuant to this chapter.” (§ 202, subd. 

(d).)
8

should or might consider a previous denial of a restraining order 

when determining a request—in the absence of any authority 

that it do so—has potentially dangerous consequences. In sum, 

the denial of a restraining order under section 213.5 does not 

have even the potential to infect subsequent proceedings 

(assuming it was erroneous), but suggesting that it does may lend 

itself to improper considerations of that premise in the future.

To conclude that potentially erroneous orders remain 

justiciable because they are potentially erroneous is to conclude 

that mootness is no more. 

Holding that an appeal is not moot solely because a trial 

court might have erred dismantles the mootness doctrine 

wholesale.

I would have concluded that the appeal was moot. On that 

basis, I would dismiss the appeal.

I respectfully dissent.

CHANEY, J.