Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Oversight of Government Management, the 

Federal Workforce, and the District of 

Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

NUCLEAR 

NONPROLIFERATION

Strengthened 

Oversight Needed to 

Address Proliferation 

and Management 

Challenges in IAEA’s 

Technical Cooperation 

Program 

March 2009 

GAO-09-275 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2009

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION 

Strengthened Oversight Needed to Address

Proliferation and Management Challenges in IAEA’s

Highlights of GAO-09-275, a report to the Technical Cooperation Program 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of 

Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

A key mission of the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is 

promoting the peaceful uses of 

nuclear energy through its 

Technical Cooperation (TC) 

program, which provides 

equipment, training, fellowships, 

and other services to its member 

states. The United States provides 

approximately 25 percent of the TC 

program’s annual budget. This 

report addresses the (1) extent to 

which the United States and IAEA 

have policies limiting member 

states’ participation in the TC

program on the basis of nuclear 

proliferation and related concerns; 

(2) extent to which the United 

States and IAEA evaluate and 

monitor TC projects for 

proliferation concerns; and (3) any 

limitations and challenges in IAEA’s 

management of the TC program. To 

address these issues, GAO 

interviewed relevant officials at the 

Departments of State (State) and 

Energy (DOE) and IAEA; analyzed 

IAEA, DOE, and national laboratory

data; and assessed State and IAEA 

policies toward the TC program. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is asking Congress to

consider requiring State to

withhold a proportionate share of 

its contributions to the TCF for TC 

program assistance provided to 

U.S.-designated state sponsors of

terrorism or to report to Congress 

on its rationale for not withholding 

a proportionate share of its TCF 

contribution for such countries. 

State opposed a proportionate 

withholding requirement. State

agreed with the majority of GAO’s 

other recommendations. 

Neither State nor IAEA seeks to systematically limit TC assistance to 

countries the United States has designated as state sponsors of terrorism—

Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria—even though under U.S. law these countries are 

subject to sanctions. Together, these four countries received more than $55 

million in TC assistance from 1997 through 2007. In addition, TC funding has 

been provided to states that are not party to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)—India, Israel, and Pakistan—and 

neither the United States nor IAEA has sought to exclude these countries from 

participating in the TC program. Finally, IAEA member states are not required

to complete comprehensive safeguards or additional protocol agreements 

with IAEA—which allow IAEA to monitor declared nuclear activities and 

detect clandestine nuclear programs—to be eligible for TC assistance, even 

though U.S. and IAEA officials have stressed the need for all countries to 

bring such arrangements into force as soon as possible. 

The proliferation concerns associated with the TC program are difficult for 

the United States to fully identify, assess, and resolve for several reasons. 

While State has implemented an interagency process to review proposed TC 

projects for proliferation risks, the effectiveness of these reviews is limited 

because IAEA does not provide the United States with sufficient or timely

information on TC proposals. Of the 1,565 TC proposals reviewed by DOE 

and the U.S. national laboratories for possible proliferation risks from 1998 

through 2006, information for 1,519 proposals, or 97 percent, consisted of only

project titles. 

IAEA faces several limitations and challenges in effectively managing the TC 

program. First, the TC program’s impact in meeting development and other 

needs of member states is unclear because IAEA has not updated and revised 

the program’s performance metrics since 2002. Second, the TC program is 

limited by financial constraints, including the failure of many member states 

to pay their full share of support to the program’s Technical Cooperation Fund 

(TCF). In 2007, the TCF experienced a shortfall of $3.5 million, or 4 percent, 

of the $80 million total target budget, because 62 member states did not pay 

their full expected contributions, including 47 states that made no payment at 

all. Furthermore, IAEA has not developed a policy for determining when 

countries should be graduated from receiving TC assistance, including those 

defined by the UN as high-income countries. Finally, the TC program’s longterm viability is uncertain because of limitations in IAEA efforts to track how 

project results are sustained and because of shortcomings in strategies to 

develop new TC program partners and donors. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-09-275.

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 6

Background 10

The United States and IAEA Do Not Systematically Limit or 

Prevent TC Assistance to Countries Posing Potential Terrorism 

and Proliferation Concerns 11 

The United States Faces Difficulties in Identifying, Assessing, and 

Resolving TC Program Proliferation Concerns 22 

Long-Term TC Program Effectiveness Is Limited by Outdated

Program Metrics, Financial Resource Constraints, and 

Sustainability Concerns 29 

Conclusions 35

Matter for Congressional Consideration 37 

Recommendations for Executive Action 38 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 39 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 44 

Appendix II 2007 Technical Cooperation Assistance 

Recipient States and Territories 48 

Appendix III Numbers of Technical Cooperation Proposals 

Reviewed by U.S. National Laboratories, Categorized 

by Level of Proliferation Risk, by Year, 1998 through 

2006 53 

Appendix IV 2007 Member State Contributions to the Technical 

Cooperation Fund 54 

Appendix V 2007 Technical Cooperation Disbursements, 

by Agency Program 59 

Page i GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix VI Comments from the Department of State 60 

Appendix VII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 67 

Tables 

Table 1: TC Assistance Disbursed to U.S.-designated State 

Sponsors of Terrorism, 1997 through 2007 12 

Table 2: TC Assistance Disbursed to Countries Not Party to the 

NPT, 1997 through 2007 16 

Table 3: TC Assistance Received by States and Territories without 

IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements in Force, 

2007 18 

Table 4: TC Assistance Received by States and Territories without 

IAEA Additional Protocols in Force, 2007 19 

Figure 

Figure 1: TC Program Disbursements, by Technical Area, 2007 33 

Page ii GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Abbreviations 

DOE Department of Energy 

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization 

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory 

NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 

ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory 

State Department of State 

TC Technical Cooperation 

TCF Technical Cooperation Fund 

UN United Nations 

U.S. Mission U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. 

Page iii GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

March 5, 2009

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka 

Chairman Chairman 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government 

 Management, the Federal Workforce, 

 and the District of Columbia 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government 

 Management, the Federal Workforce, 

 and the District of Columbia 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

 Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent 

international organization based in Vienna, Austria, that is affiliated with 

the United Nations (UN), has the dual mission of promoting the peaceful 

uses of nuclear energy and verifying that nuclear technologies and 

materials intended for peaceful purposes are not diverted to weapons 

development efforts. IAEA promotes peaceful uses of nuclear energy 

through its Technical Cooperation (TC) program, to support the 

development of nuclear power, applications in human health, food and 

agriculture, and nuclear safety, among other areas. All 145 IAEA member 

states are eligible for TC assistance; however, not all countries request 

assistance. The United States participates as a donor and is the largest 

financial contributor to the TC program, providing approximately 25 

percent of its budget, or about $19.8 million, in 2007. 

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent 

international organization based in Vienna, Austria, that is affiliated with 

the United Nations (UN), has the dual mission of promoting the peaceful 

uses of nuclear energy and verifying that nuclear technologies and 

materials intended for peaceful purposes are not diverted to weapons 

development efforts. IAEA promotes peaceful uses of nuclear energy 

through its Technical Cooperation (TC) program, to support the 

development of nuclear power, applications in human health, food and 

agriculture, and nuclear safety, among other areas. All 145 IAEA member 

states are eligible for TC assistance; however, not all countries request 

assistance. The United States participates as a donor and is the largest 

financial contributor to the TC program, providing approximately 25 

percent of its budget, or about $19.8 million, in 2007. 

The TC program’s mission is to help IAEA member states achieve their 

sustainable development priorities by furnishing them with relevant 

nuclear technologies and expertise. This mission is derived from Articles II 

and III of IAEA’s statute. IAEA provides TC support to member states 

through individual projects, which may be implemented on a national, 

regional, or interregional basis. A few nonmember states receive 

assistance under some regional TC projects. 

The TC program’s mission is to help IAEA member states achieve their 

sustainable development priorities by furnishing them with relevant 

nuclear technologies and expertise. This mission is derived from Articles II 

and III of IAEA’s statute. IAEA provides TC support to member states 

through individual projects, which may be implemented on a national, 

regional, or interregional basis. A few nonmember states receive 

assistance under some regional TC projects. 

The TC program also plays a role in facilitating Article IV of the Treaty on 

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which affirms that all 

states party to the treaty have a right to participate in the exchange of

equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for 

peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT also requires nonnuclear 

weapon state parties to the NPT (defined as those countries that had not 

manufactured and detonated a nuclear device before January 1, 1967) to 

The TC program also plays a role in facilitating Article IV of the Treaty on 

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which affirms that all 

states party to the treaty have a right to participate in the exchange of

equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for 

peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT also requires nonnuclear 

weapon state parties to the NPT (defined as those countries that had not 

manufactured and detonated a nuclear device before January 1, 1967) to 

Page 1 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material used in peaceful activities 

so that the agency can verify that their nuclear programs are not being 

used for weapons purposes.1

 Most countries have concluded 

“comprehensive safeguards agreements” with IAEA, under which 

governments declare their nuclear materials and activities to IAEA. The 

agency then verifies and monitors these declarations. IAEA has sought to 

further strengthen its verification efforts through a complementary 

“additional protocol” to a country’s comprehensive safeguards agreement.

Under such protocols, states must provide IAEA with broader information 

and wider access rights on all aspects of their activities related to the 

nuclear fuel cycle.

2

In 2007, the TC program disbursed over $93 million in nuclear technical

assistance to 122 countries and territories. TC projects have supported 

efforts to eradicate tsetse flies and other insect pests in certain regions, 

control communicable diseases in developing countries, and develop 

higher-yielding agricultural crops. As of June 2008, 1,290 TC projects were 

under way, with each project lasting, on average, 3 to 4 years. A TC project 

typically has several components, including equipment procurement, 

provision of expert services, training, and fellowships. Each year, about 

1,600 individuals around the world are granted fellowships by the TC 

program, allowing them to pursue specialized nuclear studies at 

universities, institutes, and other facilities outside their home countries.3

 1

The five nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT—China, France, the Russian 

Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are not obligated under the treaty 

to accept safeguards, although each nation has completed voluntary agreements with IAEA

that allow varying degrees of verification at specifically designated facilities. Other 

countries that have not joined the NPT—India, Israel, and Pakistan—also do not have 

comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA but do have limited safeguards 

arrangements with IAEA on some of their specific nuclear facilities and material stockpiles. 

2

For more information, see GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its

Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed, 

GAO-06-93 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2005). 

3

TC fellowships in the United States may be funded entirely by the TC program (referred to 

as Type I fellowships) or from U.S. funds (referred to as Type II fellowships) to reduce or 

eliminate the cost to IAEA. In addition to fellowships, the TC program also supports 

“scientific visits,” which are shorter-term scholarships awarded to senior scientists, heads

of research groups, and directors of research centers, allowing them to visit foreign nuclear 

institutes, observe nuclear research, and make professional contacts with other nuclear

scientists and experts.

Page 2 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

All TC projects are considered by the Technical Assistance and 

Cooperation Committee of IAEA’s Board of Governors—the 35-member 

policy-making body for IAEA programs—before they are approved by the 

Board of Governors. This approval covers the entire life cycle of the 

project. The TC Department and other departments within IAEA’s 

Secretariat begin working with the member states to develop project 

concepts and proposals approximately 1 year before the project is 

approved.4

Financing of TC projects is generally supported through the annual 

voluntary contributions of member states to IAEA’s Technical 

Cooperation Fund (TCF).5

 Each member state is expected to meet an 

annual financial pledge to the TCF, which is set as a percentage of the 

total fund’s target budget. The U.S. target rate has been set at 25 percent, 

while many of the least developed countries are expected to contribute 

less than 1 percent of the TCF budget. Contributions to the TCF are 

fungible—that is, they are not designated for, and cannot be traced to,

specific TC projects. 

In the United States, the two principal agencies involved in TC issues are 

the Departments of State (State) and Energy (DOE). U.S. funding to the TC

program—including its contribution to the TCF, extrabudgetary funding 

for specific projects, and “in-kind” contributions6

—is provided from State’s 

budget as part of the overall annual U.S. “voluntary contribution” to IAEA.7

In addition to providing funding to IAEA, State coordinates U.S. policy 

toward the TC program by working through the U.S. Mission to 

International Organizations in Vienna (U.S. Mission). 

 4

The other IAEA departments are the Departments of Management, Nuclear Sciences and

Applications, Safeguards, Nuclear Energy, and Nuclear Safety and Security. 

5

A TC project may be funded in whole or in part from the TCF. Projects that IAEA approves

but that cannot be supported by available TCF resources are referred to as “footnote a/”

projects and can be supported through extrabudgetary funding provided by member states 

or international organizations. Extrabudgetary funding can be allocated directly to specific 

footnote a/ projects. 

6

In-kind is defined by IAEA as “gifts” of services, equipment and facilities made available to 

IAEA by member states or other donors, such as providing experts and training course 

lecturers, sponsoring training courses, donating equipment, and sponsoring certain types of

fellowships.

7

The U.S. voluntary contribution to IAEA also supports other IAEA programs and activities, 

including safeguards, nuclear safety, and nuclear security. 

Page 3 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

We reviewed the TC program in 1997 and found that while the vast 

majority of TC projects did not involve the transfer of sensitive nuclear 

materials and technologies, nuclear assistance was provided to countries 

that posed a proliferation risk.8

 Proliferation concerns about the TC 

program have persisted because of the assistance it has provided to 

certain countries and because nuclear equipment, technology, and 

expertise can be dual-use—capable of serving peaceful purposes, such as

the production of medical isotopes, but also useful in contributing to 

nuclear weapons development. For example, in 2006, IAEA refused to 

support a TC proposal from Iran requesting assistance for a heavy water 

reactor near the town of Arak. Iran stated that the reactor was intended 

for the production of medical isotopes. The United States and other IAEA 

members objected due to concerns that the plant could serve as a source 

of plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. 

In our 1997 report, we recommended that the Secretary of State direct the

U.S. interagency group on IAEA technical assistance to systematically 

review all proposals for TC projects in countries of concern prior to their 

approval by IAEA to determine whether the projects are consistent with 

U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals. In response, an interagency process 

was established, involving State, DOE, and the DOE national laboratories,9

to evaluate proposed and active TC projects for proliferation risks. State 

leads the reviews of TC project proposals and ongoing projects. DOE 

provides technical input to this process using the technical expertise of 

the national laboratories to assess the projects’ proliferation risks and 

reports its findings to State. 

As agreed with your office, this report assesses the (1) extent to which the 

United States and IAEA have policies limiting member states’ participation 

in the TC program on the basis of nuclear proliferation and related 

concerns; (2) extent to which the United States and IAEA evaluate and 

monitor TC projects for proliferation concerns; and (3) any limitations and 

challenges in IAEA’s management of the TC program. 

 8

See GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety: Concerns With the International Atomic

Energy Agency’s Technical Cooperation Program, GAO/RCED-97-192 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 16, 1997). 

9

DOE manages the largest laboratory system of its kind in the world. Originally created to

design and build atomic weapons, DOE’s 22 laboratories have expanded their missions to 

conduct research in many disciplines—from high-energy physics to advanced computing.

Page 4 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

The scope of our review covered the period from 1997 through 2007 

because our previous report on the TC program analyzed programmatic 

and financial data through 1996. To address these objectives, we 

interviewed key U.S. officials at State, DOE, and the U.S. Mission and 

analyzed documentation, such as cables, reports and analyses of the TC 

program, financial information, and statements and speeches by U.S. 

officials. We interviewed other individuals in the United States involved in

TC program issues, including U.S. national laboratory representatives 

involved in conducting proliferation risk assessments of TC projects and 

proposals; Argonne National Laboratory staff who support State’s 

oversight of the TC program and facilitate TC training and fellowship 

programs in the United States; and the U.S. representative to IAEA’s 

Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation. 

We also interviewed officials at IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria, 

including representatives from the TC Department and other agency 

departments—specifically, the Departments of Management, Safeguards, 

and Nuclear Safety and Security. We obtained and analyzed

documentation and data from IAEA, including annual reports, financial

data, program guidance and strategy documents, auditor reports, and 

speeches and other statements pertaining to the TC program. We 

interviewed knowledgeable IAEA officials on the reliability of TC financial 

data and data on the numbers of TC projects and determined that the data 

were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

As initially agreed with your office, we intended to assess the extent to 

which TC projects have contributed to the safety and security of nuclear 

installations around the world. We developed a judgmental sample of TC 

projects to serve as the basis for our assessment and interviews with 

relevant IAEA officials. However, because IAEA did not provide us with an 

opportunity to interview relevant IAEA officials who oversee these 

projects, we were unable to sufficiently assess the contributions of the TC

program in improving the worldwide safety and security of nuclear 

facilities. In addition, because IAEA restricted our access to information 

relating to reviews of TC projects by its Safeguards Department, we were 

unable to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of IAEA’s internal review

of TC projects for proliferation concerns. As agreed, we revised the 

objectives of our review accordingly.

We conducted this performance audit from December 2007 to March 2009 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

Page 5 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides more 

detailed information on our scope and methodology. 

Neither State nor IAEA has sought to systematically limit or prevent TC 

assistance to countries that (1) have been identified as sponsors of 

terrorism, (2) are not parties to the NPT, and (3) have not completed 

comprehensive safeguards or additional protocol agreements with IAEA. 

Specifically:

Results in Brief 

• State officials told us that the United States does not systematically try to

limit TC projects in Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria—which the department 

lists as sponsors of terrorism. These four countries received more than $55 

million in TC assistance from 1997 through 2007. Moreover, IAEA officials 

told us that the agency does not seek to limit or condition TC assistance in

countries such as Iran and Syria that have been found or suspected by

IAEA of having violated their safeguards commitments and may be 

engaged in undeclared nuclear activities. Under U.S. law, however, State

withholds a portion of its contributions, except for certain projects, to the 

TCF equal to the U.S. proportionate share of TC expenditures in Cuba. In

the past, State has withheld a proportionate share of its TCF contribution 

for Iran, Libya, and the Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the 

Palestinian Authority. Regarding Iran, State reported in 2007 that three TC

projects in that country were directly related to the Iranian nuclear power 

plant at Bushehr. IAEA’s Deputy Director General for the TC program told 

us that “there are no good countries and there are no bad countries” 

participating in the program and that it is more important for the program 

to engage as many countries as possible than to exclude some nations on 

the basis of political factors. 

• From 1997 through 2007, the TC program disbursed approximately $24.6

million in assistance to India, Israel, and Pakistan, although these states 

are not party to the NPT. IAEA officials told us that NPT membership is 

not required for IAEA member states to receive TC assistance under the 

agency’s statute. State officials told us that the United States does not 

attempt to systematically limit TC program support to countries that are 

not signatories to the NPT. 

• Nonnuclear weapon state members of IAEA are not required to complete 

comprehensive safeguards or additional protocol agreements with IAEA to

be eligible for TC assistance, even though U.S. and IAEA officials have 

stressed the need for all countries to bring such arrangements into force as 

soon as possible. We found that 17 states and territories without 

Page 6 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

comprehensive safeguards agreements in force in 2007 received 

approximately $6.7 million in TC program assistance that year, while 62 

states and territories without an additional protocol in force in 2007 

received approximately $43.2 million in assistance that same year. 

The proliferation concerns associated with the TC program are difficult 

for the United States to fully identify, assess, and resolve for the following

reasons: 

• Limited information on TC project proposals. State, DOE, and national

laboratory officials told us that there is no formal mechanism for obtaining

TC project information from IAEA during the proposal development 

phase. Of the 1,565 proposed TC projects DOE and the national 

laboratories reviewed for possible proliferation risks from 1998 through 

2006, information for 1,519 proposals, or 97 percent, consisted of only 

project titles. 

• Limited State documentation on how proliferation concerns of TC 

proposals were resolved. From 1998 through 2006, DOE and the national

laboratories identified 43 of the 1,565 TC proposals they reviewed as 

having some degree of potential proliferation risk. IAEA approved 34 of 

these 43 proposals. However, we were unable to determine if State 

addressed DOE’s and the national laboratories’ concerns because—with 

the exception of one case—State could not document how it responded to 

these findings. State officials told us that as a result of a 2005 

reorganization of the department’s arms control and nonproliferation 

bureaus, the office that monitors TC program issues has fewer staff to 

conduct IAEA oversight.

• Shortcomings in U.S. policies and IAEA procedures related to TC 

program fellowships. State’s Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security 

Affairs lacks a formal policy and specific criteria to serve as the basis for 

approving or rejecting requests from TC fellows to study nuclear issues in 

the United States. In addition, we found shortcomings in the extent to 

which IAEA monitors the proliferation risks of TC fellowships. 

Specifically, IAEA does not systematically track individuals who have 

completed fellowships to determine whether they are still working on 

peaceful nuclear programs in their home country. 

We identified challenges limiting the TC program’s long-term effectiveness 

in three areas: program performance metrics, financial resource 

constraints, and project and program sustainability. Specifically: 

• Inadequate program performance metrics. IAEA does not have adequate 

metrics for measuring the impact of the TC program. For example, IAEA 

Page 7 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

officials told us that performance metrics developed in 2002 did not assess 

the impact of TC projects in meeting specific member state development 

and other needs, such as the number of additional cancer patients treated 

or the number of new nuclear security safety regulations promulgated. 

IAEA’s internal auditor has also reported that the TC program lacks 

appropriate performance indicators.

• Financial resource constraints. Many member states do not pay their full 

share of support to the TCF but nevertheless receive TC assistance, while 

some high-income countries also receive support from the TC program. 

The TCF experienced a shortfall in 2007 of $3.5 million, or 4 percent, of the 

$80 million total target budget because 62 member states did not pay their 

full contributions, including 47 countries that made no payment at all. In

addition, 13 member states that the UN has defined as high-income 

received TC assistance in 2007, but IAEA has not developed a policy or 

criteria for determining when such countries should be graduated from 

assistance. 

• TC project and program sustainability challenges. IAEA does not 

systematically review completed TC projects to determine or verify 

whether the host country is sustaining project activities and results. In 

addition, the TC program overall faces sustainability challenges because 

program funding is distributed across 18 different technical areas, making 

it difficult for IAEA to set clear program priorities and to maximize the 

impact of limited program resources. Finally, IAEA has developed 

outreach strategies to engage new potential partners and donors—

primarily from international development organizations—to help sustain 

the TC program. However, this effort faces several limitations and 

shortcomings. 

We are asking Congress to consider directing State to withhold a share of 

future annual contributions to the TCF that is proportionate to the amount 

of funding provided from the fund for U.S.-designated state sponsors of 

terrorism and other countries of concern, as it currently does with Cuba 

and has done in the past with Iran, Libya, and the Territories Under the 

Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. We are also recommending that

the Secretary of State, working with IAEA and other member states 

through the Board of Governors, explore a number of actions to address 

other proliferation and management concerns in the TC program, 

including (1) developing formal mechanisms for timely information 

sharing on TC project proposals between IAEA and the United States early 

in the project development phase; (2) strengthening mechanisms for 

collecting member state contributions to the TCF; and (3) establishing 

criteria and processes for graduating high-income countries from further 

TC program support. 

Page 8 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

We provided a draft of this report to State and DOE for formal comment. 

We also provided IAEA with a detailed summary of the facts contained in

the draft report. DOE and IAEA provided technical comments that we 

incorporated as appropriate. State agreed with 7 of our 10 

recommendations, neither agreed nor disagreed with the other three 

recommendations, and strongly opposed the matter for congressional 

consideration. State objected to the matter for congressional 

consideration for a number of reasons, stating that (1) it would be 

counterproductive to a separate recommendation we made encouraging 

all states to pay their full share to the TCF; (2) it would not stop TC 

projects in targeted countries because TCF funding is fungible; (3) 

Congress has exempted IAEA contributions from this type of 

proportionate withholding; (4) none of the TC projects in state sponsors of 

terrorism have been shown to have contributed to a weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) program; (5) there are adequate safeguards within 

IAEA to prevent TC projects from contributing to a WMD program; and (6) 

it would negatively impact the ability of the United States to achieve other

critical objectives within IAEA. 

We do not believe the matter for congressional consideration is unique or

unprecedented. Congress currently requires the withholding of a 

proportionate share of the U.S. contribution to the TCF for certain 

projects in Cuba, and has required withholding in the past for Iran, Libya,

and the Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. 

However, in order to give Congress greater flexibility and more

information, we have broadened the matter for congressional 

consideration to give Congress the option of requiring State to report on 

its rationale for not withholding a proportionate share of the U.S. 

contribution to the TCF for U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism. 

Notwithstanding our modification to the matter for congressional 

consideration, we still disagree with State’s specific objections to it for the 

following reasons. First, we do not believe it is counterproductive to our 

other recommendation, which is geared toward strengthening mechanisms 

for collecting contributions to the TCF from member states that are 

receiving TC assistance, not from major donors such as the United States.

Second, we believe that withholding a proportionate share of the U.S. 

contribution to the TCF for state sponsors of terrorism and other 

countries that the United States has sanctioned is a matter of fundamental 

principle and intended to foster a more consistent U.S. policy toward such 

nations. Third, while U.S. contributions to IAEA were exempted from the 

proportionate share withholding requirement in 1994, we note that the law 

was subsequently amended to require State to withhold a proportionate 

Page 9 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

share of funding to IAEA for certain projects in Cuba and for all projects in 

Iran if State determines that such projects in Iran are inconsistent with 

U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals, will provide Iran with 

training or expertise relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, or 

are being used as a cover for the acquisition of sensitive nuclear 

technology. Fourth, given the limited information available on TC projects 

and the dual-use nature of some nuclear technologies and expertise, we do 

not believe State can assert with complete confidence that TC assistance 

has not advanced WMD programs in U.S.-designated state sponsors of 

terrorism. Fifth, we do not share State’s confidence in IAEA’s internal 

safeguards to prevent TC projects from contributing to weapons 

development, since IAEA’s information restrictions prevented us from 

assessing the effectiveness of its TC project review system. Lastly, neither 

we nor State can determine how other states might react to an increase in

the United States’ proportionate withholding of funding to the TCF and 

how it would affect U.S. ability to achieve other objectives within the 

agency. 

Overall policy direction for the TC program is set by IAEA’s policy-making 

bodies—the General Conference and the Board of Governors. The United 

States is a permanent member of the Board of Governors, which typically 

meets 5 times per year. IAEA’s Secretariat—led by a Director General and 

structured into six functional departments—is responsible for 

implementing policies established by the Board of Governors and the 

General Conference. The Department of Technical Cooperation, which is 

headed by a Deputy Director General, is structured primarily around four 

regional divisions: Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and Latin America 

and the Caribbean. The department also includes a Division of Programme 

Support and Coordination, which is responsible for developing TC 

program strategies, communications, and partnerships, and managing 

relevant information systems and TC financial resources. In addition, an 

external auditor and IAEA’s Office of Internal Oversight Services conduct

annual audits and reviews of the TC program. 

Several individuals are involved in the TC project team responsible for 

developing and overseeing the project. The team includes (1) a project 

officer within the TC Department; (2) a technical officer from each 

relevant IAEA department (such as the Department of Nuclear Sciences 

and Applications); and (3) a national liaison officer at the country level 

who represents the member state, serves as coordinator for TC projects in 

the host country, and acts as liaison with host country governments and 

institutes. 

Background 

Page 10 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

Typically, the TC program develops and approves new projects on a 2-year

cycle. The most recent set of new proposals were approved in fall 2008.10

Member states begin submitting project proposal concepts to IAEA in 

September of the year prior to approval. IAEA officials screen concepts 

through the fall, and member states develop and refine their proposals 

through March of the approval year. By July, IAEA’s Secretariat comes to a 

final agreement on TC project proposals that it will back for approval by 

the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee and the Board of 

Governors. The TC project proposals are discussed with member states in 

bilateral and regional group meetings during IAEA’s General Conference,

which is held in September; in November, the Technical Assistance and 

Cooperation Committee and the Board of Governors give final approval to

the proposed TC projects. 

Neither the United States nor IAEA seeks to systematically limit or deny 

TC assistance to countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism, even 

though under U.S. law these countries are subject to sanctions. In 

addition, TC assistance has been provided to countries that are not party 

to the NPT, and neither the United States nor IAEA has sought to exclude 

these nations from TC assistance. Finally, while the United States has 

encouraged IAEA to condition TC assistance to countries according to 

their safeguards status, IAEA does not take this factor into account when 

allocating program funds. Appendix II provides more detailed information 

on the states and territories that received TC assistance in 2007. 

Countries deemed by State as state sponsors of terrorism—meaning the 

Secretary of State has determined that the countries’ governments have 

repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism—have 

been provided nuclear equipment and other assistance through the TC 

program. The United States has designated four countries—Cuba, Iran, 

Sudan, and Syria—as state sponsors of terrorism, pursuant to several U.S.

The United States and 

IAEA Do Not 

Systematically Limit 

or Prevent TC 

Assistance to 

Countries Posing 

Potential Terrorism 

and Proliferation 

Concerns 

Four Countries Designated 

by the United States as 

State Sponsors of 

Terrorism Receive TC 

Assistance 

 10Occasionally, a small number of TC projects are approved out of cycle; for instance, three 

new TC projects were approved at the fall 2007 meeting. In addition, in 2008, the TC 

program cycle shifted temporarily to a 3-year cycle, in which new projects were approved

for 2009 through 2011, in order to synchronize future TC cycles with the planning cycle of 

IAEA’s “regular program.” 

Page 11 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

laws.11 According to our review of IAEA data and financial records, 111 TC

projects were approved for these four countries from 1997 through 2007, 

and they received approximately $55.7 million in TC assistance over that

period. These projects ranged across a number of areas, from applying 

nuclear technologies to treat diseases and improve crop productivity to 

assisting nuclear power development. Table 1 shows the dollar amount of 

TC assistance each U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism received 

from 1997 through 2007.

Table 1: TC Assistance Disbursed to U.S.-designated State Sponsors of Terrorism, 

1997 through 2007

Dollars in thousands 

U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism 

Total TC assistance 

received, 1997 through 2007

Cuba $13,740.8

Islamic Republic of Iran 15,571.7

Sudan 11,913.9

Syrian Arab Republic 14,469.0

Total $55,695.4

Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data. 

According to State, the United States has applied several types of 

sanctions to these four countries, including restrictions on U.S. foreign 

assistance, a ban on defense exports and sales, certain controls over 

exports of dual-use items,12 and miscellaneous financial and other 

restrictions. These sanctions notwithstanding, direct U.S. nuclear trade 

with these countries involving the types of technologies provided by the 

TC program might not be permitted under U.S. adherence to other 

international nonproliferation controls. For instance, in a 2007 report to 

Congress, State concluded that three TC projects involving technology 

transfer for the operation and maintenance of the Iranian nuclear power 

plant at Bushehr could be subject to multilateral export controls if Iran 

were to procure such technology directly from suppliers. The State report 

 11On October 11, 2008, the United States rescinded North Korea’s designation as a state 

sponsor of terrorism. However, North Korea withdrew its membership in IAEA in 1994 and 

has not received TC program assistance since then. 

12Dual-use refers to equipment or technology that can contribute both to nuclear energy 

and other peaceful nuclear applications or nuclear weapons development or production.

Page 12 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

noted, “[u]nder the Nonproliferation Principle of the NSG [Nuclear 

Suppliers Group]13 Guidelines the United States and other responsible 

members of the NSG would deny such direct transfers.” 

The United States has not sought to systematically exclude or limit the 

four U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism from TC assistance. State 

officials told us that the department would not recommend withholding 

U.S. funding to the TC program because of the support that IAEA provides 

to these four countries. They said that it is a long-standing department 

policy to pay the full share of U.S. support to the TC program because 

doing so helps maintain international political support for and 

participation in IAEA, including international support for safeguards. In 

addition, because TCF resources are fungible, State officials asserted that 

withholding U.S. contributions to the TCF to punish state sponsors of 

terrorism would have no practical impact on the TC funding these nations 

receive. A U.S. Mission official told us that once the United States provides

its contribution to the TCF, it cedes control over how the funds are 

disbursed by IAEA. 

Several laws govern U.S. support to the TC program. One restriction under 

these laws prohibits U.S. funds contributed to IAEA from being used for 

projects in Cuba, except in certain circumstances. Accordingly, State 

withholds a portion of its voluntary contribution to the TCF equal to the 

U.S. proportionate share of the TC program’s expenditures in Cuba.14 In 

the past, the United States also withheld a proportionate share of its TCF 

contribution for Iran, Libya, and Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the 

Palestinian Authority. State also must report annually to Congress on all 

 13The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a group of nuclear supplier countries that seeks to 

contribute to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of 

guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports.

14In March 1997, we reported on IAEA’s technical assistance to Cuba. See GAO, Nuclear 

Safety: International Atomic Energy Agency’s Technical Assistance for Cuba, 

GAO/RCED-97-72 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 1997). 

Page 13 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

IAEA programs or projects in certain countries, including Burma 

(Myanmar), Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria.15

IAEA officials told us that the TC program does not attempt to exclude 

countries on the basis of their status as U.S.-designated state sponsors of 

terrorism or other political considerations. Under the TC program’s 

guiding principles, for example, the provision of TC assistance is not 

subject to any political, economic, military, or other conditions that are 

inconsistent with IAEA’s statute. Moreover, according to the Deputy 

Director General for the TC program, requests for TC assistance are 

evaluated strictly on technical merits and the contributions of proposed 

projects to a nation’s development priorities, subject to the conditions of 

the IAEA statute, IAEA guiding principles and operating rules pertaining to

technical assistance, and any relevant decisions by the Board of Governors 

and the UN Security Council. This official added that the program seeks to 

include as many countries as possible and that “there are no good 

countries and there are no bad countries” participating in the program. In 

her view, denying or limiting participation of member states in the TC 

program was a matter for the Board of Governors to consider. 

Other IAEA officials told us that under the agency’s statute, IAEA’s 

Secretariat is powerless to limit or condition TC assistance to specific 

countries, even in cases where countries have been deemed by the Board of

Governors to be violating their IAEA obligations or in cases where recipient

countries were suspected of being engaged in undeclared, clandestine nuclear 

activities. For instance, the Board of Governors determined in September 

2005 that Iran had breached its safeguards obligations and was not complying 

with IAEA’s statute. However, TC projects in Iran were not restricted until 

February 2007 following a UN Security Council resolution on Iran’s nuclear

 15Between 2003 and 2008, State had two additional, nearly duplicate reporting obligations. 

First, it had to undertake a comprehensive annual review of the IAEA programs and

projects in Burma, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria and submit it to 

Congress. Annual reviews of programs and projects in Iraq and Libya were only required

until 2006 and 2008, respectively. Second, it had to submit to Congress a report detailing 

certain aspects of IAEA programs in Iran and describing IAEA programs and projects in the 

countries covered by the first reporting requirement. Both of these reports had to address

inconsistencies between IAEA programs and projects and U.S. nuclear nonproliferation 

and safety goals in those countries. 

Page 14 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

activities.

16 In addition, in 2008, IAEA’s Director General stated it would be 

inappropriate to block approval of a TC project in Syria for a nuclear power

plant feasibility study before IAEA verified claims concerning Syria’s alleged 

construction of an undeclared nuclear reactor. According to State officials, 

several countries, including the United States, asserted that the approval of

this project would be “wholly inappropriate” when Syria had not provided all

of the cooperation required by IAEA to investigate these allegations. IAEA’s 

Board of Governors ultimately approved the project in November 2008. The 

United States did not attempt to block approval of the project after receiving 

assurances that IAEA would monitor the project closely, report as 

appropriate, and ensure that any equipment provided under the project would

be used only for the intended purposes. 

Finally, in addition to providing assistance to the four countries the United 

States has designated as state sponsors of terrorism, the TC program has 

also provided nuclear technology and expertise to other countries that the 

United States has sanctioned or taken other punitive actions against. 

Examples of such countries and the total amounts of TC assistance 

provided to them from 1997 through 2007 include the following: 

• Approximately $7.3 million for Burma, which is subject to targeted U.S. 

trade, financial, and other sanctions. The Secretaries of State and of 

Energy have declared jointly that the development of nuclear 

infrastructure of any kind in Burma would be inappropriate. TC projects 

have been approved for Burma to improve nuclear instrument repair and 

maintenance services, enhance pest control, and apply nondestructive 

testing techniques in construction projects. 

• Approximately $9.7 million for Belarus, which the United States has 

characterized as “a regime of repression in the heart of Europe” and 

against which the United States has imposed targeted financial sanctions 

and travel restrictions. TC support has been provided to assist Belarus in 

minimizing threats posed by radioactive waste at former military sites, 

establishing a center of competence on radiation oncology, and 

remediating areas affected by the Chernobyl accident. 

 16In December 2006, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1737, sanctioning Iran, in 

part, for its failure to suspend its uranium enrichment activities. One of the resolution’s 

provisions prohibited technical cooperation provided to Iran by IAEA that relates to 

proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. Pursuant to this resolution, IAEA’s Director 

General provided a report in February 2007 identifying 22 TC projects in Iran that could not

proceed or proceed only on a case-by-case basis, based on an evaluation of the projects’ 

contributions to proliferation-sensitive activities. 

Page 15 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

• Approximately $6.1 million for Venezuela, which, among other things, 

State has determined to be engaging in diplomacy designed to deliberately 

undermine U.S. interests, including deepening relations with Iran and 

publicly supporting Iran’s nuclear program. IAEA has approved TC 

assistance for Venezuela to help it strengthen its technical capabilities in 

radiotherapy, nuclear medicine, and radiopharmaceutical services, and to

more effectively apply nuclear techniques in managing water resources. 

Based on our review of recent project summaries, the TC assistance 

provided to these countries does not appear to involve support that could

have direct weapons applications. However, as we discuss in the following 

section, given the dual-use nature of some nuclear technology and the 

absence of more complete information from IAEA, it is difficult for the 

United States to make firm judgments about the proliferation risks of TC 

proposals and projects.

U.S. and IAEA officials have described the NPT as the cornerstone of the 

international nuclear nonproliferation regime and a key legal barrier to 

nuclear weapons proliferation. However, states that are not party to the 

NPT—India, Israel, and Pakistan—received approximately $24.6 million in 

TC assistance from 1997 through 2007. India has not received TC 

assistance through national-level TC projects but has received TC support 

as a participant in regional TC projects. Israel and Pakistan have received 

support for 63 national-level projects, as well as for regional TC projects. 

For example, national TC projects in Israel and Pakistan have included 

assistance to control fruit flies and suppress other pests, enhance nuclear 

medicine practices and establish radiation physics courses, and improve 

nuclear safety. Table 2 shows the total amount of TC assistance provided 

to each of these countries from 1997 through 2007. 

Table 2: TC Assistance Disbursed to Countries Not Party to the NPT, 1997 through 

2007 

Dollars in thousands 

Non-NPT Countries Are 

Receiving TC Assistance 

Non-NPT states Total TC assistance received, 1997 through 2007

India $3,419.1

Israel 3,891.5

Pakistan 17,254.9

Total $24,565.5

Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data. 

Page 16 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

The TC program does not differentiate between states based on their NPT 

status. IAEA officials told us that creation of IAEA predates the entry into 

force of the NPT, and treaty membership is not obligatory for IAEA 

membership and receipt of TC assistance under the agency’s statute. India, 

Israel, and Pakistan joined IAEA before the NPT entered into force. 

State officials told us that the United States does not seek to 

systematically limit TC program support to countries that are not 

signatories to the NPT. State officials also told us that, in accordance with 

statutory requirements, State must annually determine and report to 

Congress that Israel’s right to participate in IAEA activities is not being 

denied. However in its annual funding pledge to IAEA, State asks that 

IAEA give preference to states that are party to the NPT in allocating the 

U.S. contribution to the TC program. 

While U.S. and IAEA officials have stressed the need for all countries to 

bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional 

protocols with IAEA as soon as possible, neither the United States nor 

IAEA has sought to limit TC funding to countries that have not 

implemented such agreements. Together, these safeguards measures allow 

IAEA to provide assurances that all declared nuclear material is being 

used for peaceful purposes and that a country has declared all of its 

nuclear material and activities. 

Nearly all states receiving TC assistance are nonnuclear weapon state 

parties to the NPT. Under Article IV of the NPT, all states party to the 

treaty have the right to participate in the exchange of equipment, 

materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful 

uses of nuclear energy. According to IAEA, Article III of the NPT also 

makes it mandatory for all nonnuclear-weapon states to conclude 

comprehensive safeguards agreements with the agency. These agreements 

are to be concluded by such states within 18 months of their accession to 

the treaty. The United States and IAEA have recognized an inherent 

linkage between nonnuclear weapon states’ rights to access peaceful

nuclear technology and their obligation to accept safeguards on their 

nuclear activities, although State officials told us that to limit TC funding 

to states that have not completed comprehensive safeguards agreements 

with IAEA could be seen as inconsistent with IAEA’s statute. 

IAEA has not conditioned TC assistance provided to recipient states on 

the basis of their safeguards status. According to our analysis of IAEA 

records, 17 countries and territories that did not have comprehensive 

IAEA Does Not Condition 

TC Assistance on the Basis 

of the Recipient Country’s

Safeguards Status 

Page 17 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

safeguards agreements in force with the agency at the end of 2007 received 

approximately $6.7 million, or about 7 percent, of the $93.3 million in TC 

assistance disbursed in 2007. This list includes three states and one 

nonstate territory that are not party to the NPT—India, Israel, Pakistan, 

and the Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. The 

remaining 13 states have all been party to the NPT longer than 18 

months—in most cases for more than 10 years—meaning they have not 

fulfilled their NPT Article III obligation. Table 3 shows the states and 

territories that did not have comprehensive safeguards agreements in 

effect in 2007 and the amounts of TC assistance they received that year. 

Table 3: TC Assistance Received by States and Territories without IAEA 

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements in Force, 2007 

Dollars in thousands 

States and territories without IAEA comprehensive 

safeguards agreements in force, 2007 

Total TC assistance 

received in 2007

Angola $495.5

Benin 371.6

Central African Republic 365.3

Chad 143.3

Eritrea 242.2

Gabon 159.1

India 252.8

Israel 251.6

Kenya 1,093.5

Islamic Republic of Mauritania 156.1

Montenegro 18.9

Mozambique 17.5

Pakistan 2,233.9

Qatar

a

232.8

Saudi Arabiab321.5

Sierra Leone 348.4

Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority 26.3

Total $6,730.3

Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data. 

a

Qatar brought a comprehensive safeguards agreement into force in January 2009. 

b

Saudi Arabia brought a comprehensive safeguards agreement into force in January 2009. 

Page 18 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

In addition, we found that 62 states and territories without an additional 

protocol agreement in effect with IAEA received approximately $43.2 

million, or approximately 46 percent, of TC assistance in 2007. Without 

additional protocols in force, IAEA has limited ability to detect clandestine 

nuclear programs, and its inspection efforts remain focused on verifying

declared nuclear material, activities, and facilities.17 Both State and IAEA 

officials have asserted that the additional protocol should become the new 

universal safeguards standard. Table 4 lists the states and territories 

without additional protocols in effect as of the end of 2007 and the 

amounts of TC assistance they received that year.

Table 4: TC Assistance Received by States and Territories without IAEA Additional

Protocols in Force, 2007 

Dollars in thousands 

States and territories without IAEA additional protocols

in force, 2007

Total TC assistance 

received in 2007

Albania $784.1

Algeria 1,361.4

Angola 495.5

Argentina 1,543.2

Belarus 969.8

Belize 61.4

Benin 371.6

Bolivia 817.4

Bosnia and Herzegovina 399.2

Brazil 1,480.4

Brunei Darussalam 0.5

Burma (Myanmar) 670.4

Cambodia 0.9

Cameroon 412.3

Central African Republic 365.3

Chad 143.3

Colombia 778.0

 17As we noted in 2005, IAEA faced a number of challenges that hampered its ability to 

implement strengthened safeguards, including that almost two-thirds of NPT signatories 

had not brought additional protocols into force. See GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA 

Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need

to Be Addressed, GAO-06-93 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2005). 

Page 19 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

States and territories without IAEA additional protocols

in force, 2007

Total TC assistance 

received in 2007

Costa Rica 749.6

Côte d’Ivoire 253.8

Dominican Republic 256.9

Egypt 1,280.9

Eritrea 242.2

Ethiopia 2,187.5

Gabon 159.1

Gambia 3.5

Guatemalaa435.6

Honduras 394.5

India 252.8

Islamic Republic of Iran 1,000.0

Iraq 190.6

Israel 251.6

Kenya 1,093.5

Kyrgyzstan 542.6

Lebanon 502.3

Malaysia 1,012.8

Islamic Republic of Mauritania 156.1

Mexico 962.8

Republic of Moldova 905.4

Montenegro 18.9

Morocco 996.9

Mozambique 17.5

Namibia 421.1

Pakistan 2,233.9

Philippines 1,510.7

Qatar 232.8

Saudi Arabia 321.5

Senegal 983.9

Serbia 2,129.4

Sierra Leone 348.4

Singaporeb137.8

Sri Lanka 810.8

Sudan 1,148.1

Syrian Arab Republic 1,525.4

Page 20 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

States and territories without IAEA additional protocols

in force, 2007

Total TC assistance 

received in 2007

Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority 26.3

Thailand 1,057.4

Tunisia 789.0

United Arab Emirates 158.7

Venezuela 681.3

Vietnam 1,770.8

Yemen 1,179.2

Zambia 618.3

Zimbabwe 571.0

Total $43,177.9

Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data. 

a

Guatemala brought an additional protocol into force in May 2008. 

b

Singapore brought an additional protocol into force in March 2008. 

In its annual pledge of funding to the TC program, State asks that IAEA 

consider whether a recipient country has in force a comprehensive 

safeguards agreement and an additional protocol when it allocates TC 

funds. However, according to IAEA officials, IAEA’s Secretariat is not in a 

position to take such considerations into account in the absence of a

decision by its policy-making bodies. The Deputy Director General for the 

TC program, for example, told us that such guidelines would need to be

developed by the Secretariat after consultation with and approval by the 

member states. IAEA officials stated that while IAEA’s statute, TC 

program guidance, and TC program agreements with individual member 

states include project- and technology-specific safeguards conditions and

peaceful use obligations, these documents do not require that member 

states have comprehensive safeguards agreements or additional protocols 

in force to receive assistance. 

Page 21 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

The proliferation concerns associated with the TC program are difficult 

for the United States to fully identify, assess, and resolve for several 

reasons. First, while State has implemented an interagency process to 

review proposed TC projects for proliferation risks, consistent with the 

recommendation in our 1997 report, the effectiveness of these reviews is 

limited because IAEA does not provide the United States with sufficient or 

timely information on TC proposals. Second, for TC proposals that DOE 

and the national laboratories have identified as having possible 

proliferation risks, State was unable to provide us with documentation 

explaining how those proliferation concerns were addressed. Finally, State 

lacks a formal policy that identifies countries from which the United 

States will not accept TC fellows, and IAEA does not systematically 

monitor former TC fellows to determine whether they still reside in their 

home country and are still involved in peaceful nuclear research related to

their fellowship studies. 

DOE and the national laboratories began reviewing TC proposals for 

possible proliferation concerns and providing their findings to State as the 

result of a recommendation in our 1997 report on the TC program.18

However, this review process is deficient because DOE and the national

laboratories receive limited information to conduct their proliferation 

assessments and have little time to complete them. According to State,

DOE, and national laboratory officials, the United States has had difficulty 

in obtaining detailed information on proposed TC projects during the 

proposal development phase. The initial proposal development process is 

internal to IAEA’s Secretariat and information is kept confidential between 

the recipient country and the agency and is not releasable to third parties, 

including the United States. According to State, DOE, and national 

laboratory officials, IAEA member state representatives, including U.S. 

Mission staff, do not have a formal mechanism to obtain information on 

project proposals while they are under development. 

DOE and national laboratory officials told us that they attempt to make the 

best possible determination of TC proposal proliferation risks on the basis

The United States 

Faces Difficulties in 

Identifying, Assessing, 

and Resolving TC 

Program Proliferation 

Concerns 

The United States Does 

Not Comprehensively 

Evaluate TC Proposals for 

Proliferation Concerns 

because IAEA Does Not 

Provide Sufficient and 

Timely Information 

 18For TC proposals approved between 1998 and 2004, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory 

(ORNL) was primarily responsible for conducting technical reviews of proposed TC 

projects for proliferation concerns. In the 2006 cycle, the Los Alamos National Laboratory 

(LANL) led the technical reviews of TC proposals. For the 2008 review of TC proposals,

DOE initiated a multilaboratory approach to assessing potential TC project proliferation 

concerns. 

Page 22 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

of all available information. However, in the vast majority of cases, the 

information they receive on TC proposals is very limited, according to our 

analysis of DOE and national laboratory data. Specifically, we found that 

national laboratory officials received only the title of proposed projects for 

97 percent—or for 1,519 of 1,565—of proposed TC projects they reviewed 

from 1998 through 2006. For the remaining 3 percent, or 46 of the 

proposed projects, DOE and the national laboratories were able to obtain

some additional information on the proposed projects. See appendix III for 

more specific information on the number of TC proposals reviewed by 

DOE and the national laboratories from 1998 through 2006. 

DOE and national laboratory officials told us that a TC project proposal 

title can occasionally raise proliferation concerns but that the title alone is 

generally insufficient to reliably assess proliferation risk. Moreover, 

proposal titles can be misleading and obscure more serious proliferation 

implications. For instance, the 2006 TC proposal from Iran requesting 

assistance for the completion of the Arak heavy water research reactor—a

type of reactor that could be a source of plutonium for nuclear weapons—

was entitled “Strengthening Safety Capabilities for the Construction of a 

Research Reactor.” Iran asserted that the reactor was intended for the 

production of medical isotopes, and the proposal was approved for 

funding by IAEA’s Secretariat. However, as a result of objections by the 

United States and other nations, the Board of Governors ultimately did not 

approve this proposal. 

In addition to the limited information on TC proposals available to the 

national laboratories, the dual-use nature of some nuclear technology also 

complicates efforts to assess TC proposals for proliferation risks. IAEA 

applies safeguards to nuclear material, equipment, and facilities provided 

through the TC program in four “sensitive technological areas”—uranium 

enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, heavy water production, and handling 

of plutonium and mixed uranium-plutonium fuel. These four areas relate 

to the production and handling of fissile material. However, according to 

DOE and national laboratory officials, these four sensitive areas do not 

address all technologies related to the production of fissile material. For 

example, “nonsensitive” technology associated with the design and 

operation of civilian, light water power reactors might prove useful to 

countries seeking to design and build a plutonium production reactor. TC 

projects providing such technology might therefore raise proliferation 

concerns. Other “nonsensitive” skills and expertise that states acquire 

through TC assistance might provide basic knowledge useful to weapons, 

such as radioactive materials handling, familiarity with chemical processes 

Page 23 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

and properties of nuclear materials, and use of various instruments and 

control systems. 

Even in cases where more information on TC proposals was obtained, 

national laboratory officials told us that they still often lacked crucial 

details—such as equipment specifications—to reliably assess the 

proliferation risks. As an example, national laboratory officials told us that 

some TC proposals could include requests for procurement of “hot cells” 

to produce isotopes—a technology with dual-use implications.19 However, 

without specific technical details of the hot cell, it would not be possible 

to determine the potential proliferation risks associated with such a 

device. 

In addition, DOE and national laboratory officials told us that in recent 

years, they have received less information about proposed TC projects. 

Moreover, DOE and national laboratory officials told us that such 

information is arriving closer to the time when such projects must be 

approved by the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee and the 

Board of Governors. The lack of full and timely information on TC project 

proposals complicates efforts by the United States and other IAEA 

member states to make informed decisions about TC proposals, including 

whether they raise proliferation concerns. State, DOE, and national 

laboratory officials told us that it is preferable to raise potential 

proliferation concerns about TC proposals with IAEA officials early in the 

development cycle, when such project proposals can be modified more 

readily. 

In 2004, IAEA’s Safeguards Department began reviewing TC projects for 

possible proliferation risks. This review process includes evaluating 

proliferation risks of TC project proposals and reviewing all procurement 

requests made to the agency under ongoing TC projects. However, IAEA 

officials told us that the results of the Safeguards Department reviews are 

confidential and are not shared with the United States or other 

governments. IAEA officials declined to provide us with certain basic 

information regarding the results of these reviews, including the total 

number of TC proposals that the Safeguards Department identified as 

having possible proliferation concerns. 

 19Hot cells are shielded containment boxes or rooms with remote handling equipment for 

examining and processing radioactive materials. 

Page 24 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

Under the interagency process for reviewing TC proposals for 

proliferation concerns, DOE and the national laboratories provide State 

with their assessments of the proposals. State, however, was unable to 

provide us with documentation describing the actions it took on the basis 

of DOE’s and the national laboratories’ findings or how, if at all, it raised 

their concerns with IAEA. According to DOE and the national laboratories’ 

assessment of TC proposals from 1998 through 2006, 43 of the 1,565 TC 

proposals reviewed had some degree of potential proliferation concern or 

required additional information to more clearly establish potential 

proliferation risk. The 43 project proposals for which the national 

laboratories raised potential concerns included, for example, projects to 

assist countries in various aspects of developing nuclear power reactors 

and research reactors, handling nuclear fuel, and using nuclear techniques

in materials testing and other industrial practices. 

We found that IAEA approved at least 34 of these 43 proposals. Of the 

remaining 9 proposals, 4 were not approved internally by IAEA’s 

Secretariat or—in the case of Iran’s 2006 Arak heavy water reactor 

proposal—by the Board of Governors, and 5 proposals in 1998 were 

reviewed by ORNL in a classified assessment. We did not determine 

whether those 5 proposals were approved by IAEA. 

We requested information from State’s Office of Multilateral Nuclear and 

Security Affairs describing how it responded to DOE’s and the national

laboratories’ findings of potential proliferation concerns among the TC 

proposals they reviewed. However, with the exception of documentation 

pertaining to U.S. objections on the Iranian heavy water reactor proposal 

in 2006, State was unable to provide us with any records documenting 

policy discussions or actions it took to address concerns in other TC 

proposals highlighted by DOE and the national laboratories. As a result, it 

is unclear what actions, if any, State took to address potential proliferation 

concerns of specific TC proposals identified by DOE and the national

laboratories. State officials told us that records substantiating discussions 

within State on the DOE and national laboratory findings existed but could

not be retrieved from State’s data and document management systems. 

State officials told us that a 2005 reorganization of the department’s arms 

control and nonproliferation bureaus resulted in the loss of staff in the 

office overseeing IAEA issues, limiting its ability to effectively monitor TC 

program developments. Specifically, they said that prior to the 2005 

reorganization, there were 14 full-time equivalent personnel working on 

IAEA- and NPT-related issues, but that this number was reduced to 5 fullState Could Not 

Substantiate How It 

Addressed TC Proposals 

Identified by DOE as 

Having Possible 

Proliferation Risks 

Page 25 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

time equivalent personnel due to the reassignment and retirement of 

personnel following the reorganization. 

State has not developed a formal policy that identifies countries that 

would not be eligible to send TC fellows to the United States to study 

nuclear issues. In addition, IAEA does not have a systematic process in 

place to track and monitor former TC fellows to determine, for instance, 

whether they still reside in their home country and are still involved in 

peaceful nuclear research related to their fellowship studies. 

The United States accepts TC fellows and TC project participants from 

foreign countries. The acceptance process involves several steps. First, 

foreign nationals interested in a TC fellowship apply to IAEA’s TC 

Department, which reviews the applications and decides which candidates 

to accept or reject. IAEA identifies fellows who would be appropriate to 

place in the United States for studies. For approved applications, IAEA 

then sends a formal request to the U.S. Mission asking that the applicants 

be permitted to study in the United States at a specific institute. 

The U.S. Mission forwards the applications to State’s Office of Multilateral 

Nuclear and Security Affairs within the International Security and 

Nonproliferation Bureau and to the Argonne National Laboratory. The 

State office reviews and approves or rejects the applications, and shares 

them with other members of the U.S. interagency committee on IAEA TC 

issues. In addition, State officials told us that foreign nationals requesting 

TC fellowships at DOE facilities would be reviewed against requirements 

in DOE orders. The Argonne National Laboratory, under a contract with 

State, facilitates placement of fellows approved by State at the institutes 

proposed by IAEA or at alternative facilities. The applicants are notified by 

IAEA of their fellowship’s acceptance by State and placement at institutes 

in the United States. 

Once the foreign candidates confirm their acceptance, IAEA instructs 

them to apply for a U.S. nonimmigrant visa. State’s Bureau of Consular 

Affairs handles the adjudication of these visa applications, and in some 

cases, the consular officers will request a security advisory opinion, 

known as a Visas Mantis, if there are concerns that a visa applicant may 

U.S. Policies and IAEA 

Procedures for TC 

Program Fellowships Have 

Several Shortcomings 

Page 26 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

engage in the illegal transfer of sensitive technology.20 According to State,

the key role of the Visas Mantis process is to protect U.S. national security, 

particularly in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction, their delivery systems, and conventional weapons.21

Data provided to us by State indicated that 1,022 TC program fellows have

studied nuclear issues at universities and other organizations in the United

States from 1997 through 2007. In our review of this data, we found that 23 

of the 1,022 fellows were from countries that were not NPT member 

states, such as Israel and Pakistan, or were from U.S.-designated state 

sponsors of terrorism, such as Syria. The fields of study pursued by these 

fellows included entomology, soil and plant science, analytical nuclear 

physics, and nuclear medicine. 

We questioned State and Argonne National Laboratory officials to clarify 

the guidance and criteria State’s Office of Multilateral Nuclear and 

Security Affairs uses to approve TC fellowship applicants for the study of

nuclear issues in the United States. State officials told us that there is no 

formal policy or set of criteria they use to accept or reject TC fellowship 

requests on the basis of an applicant’s country of origin. However, in 

response to our inquiry, State prepared a written description of the 

informal guidelines and preferences it uses to evaluate fellowship 

requests. According to this description, individuals from countries that 

have not signed the NPT are not eligible to pursue TC fellowships in the 

United States, although fellows from Israel and Pakistan were accepted by

the United States as recently as 2002. Individuals from countries that have 

signed the NPT, however, may still “be excluded on the basis of such 

things as institutional affiliation or previous history or other political 

factors such as human rights concerns in such countries.” 

The lack of a formal State policy or guidance on this matter has led to 

differing views among U.S. officials about the countries of origin from 

which State will approve TC fellows. For instance, Argonne National 

Laboratory officials told us that they believed State’s policy was to exclude 

 20Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, an applicant is rendered inadmissible if a 

consular officer knows or has reason to believe that the applicant seeks to enter the United 

States to violate any law prohibiting the export of goods, technology, or sensitive 

information from the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(i)(II). 

21For further information on the visa adjudication process and Visas Mantis, see GAO,

Border Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to Adjudicate Visas for 

Science Students and Scholars, GAO-04-371 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2004). 

Page 27 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

fellows from any country the United States had designated as a state 

sponsor of terrorism. However, the description prepared for us by State 

does not explicitly prohibit fellows from such countries. The most recent 

TC program fellow to study nuclear issues in the United States from one of 

the U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism—Syria—was in 2001. 

In addition, the broad nature of the criteria to exclude fellows—including 

“other political factors” in their home countries—could leave fellowship 

decisions open to State officials’ subjective interpretation. For example, 

State officials told us that one country in Asia would no longer be 

permitted to send TC fellows to the United States because it is considered 

a wealthy, high-income nation, even though the description of the informal 

guidelines provided to us by State do not indicate that economic 

conditions in a TC fellow’s home country are a basis for rejection. 

With regard to IAEA’s management of TC fellows, the agency does not 

have a policy to exclude individuals from certain countries from 

participating in the TC fellowship program, including individuals from 

nations about which the United States has terrorism or proliferation 

concerns. For example, in 2007, IAEA approved 48 fellows and scientific 

visitors from Cuba, 12 from Iran, 36 from Syria, and 30 from Sudan.22

IAEA’s data did not indicate the countries and institutes where these 

fellows and scientific visitors pursued their studies. 

We also found shortcomings in IAEA oversight of TC fellowships for 

potential proliferation concerns—specifically in detecting the possible 

involvement of former TC fellows in weapons-related research activities 

after they completed their studies abroad. IAEA officials told us that the 

agency does not have a systematic process for tracking the status, 

whereabouts, and activities of former TC fellows to determine, for 

example, if they remain involved in research related to their TC project, 

changed institutes, or have immigrated to other countries. 

In 2005, however, IAEA officials surveyed fellows from 2001 and 2002 to 

determine their current activities and their views on the quality and impact 

of the fellowship program. IAEA followed up with a more in-depth survey 

of a sample of former fellows from seven countries. IAEA officials told us 

that they hope to conduct more analysis of former TC fellows, primarily to 

 22In data IAEA provided to us, the numbers of TC fellows and scientific visitors were not

counted separately. 

Page 28 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

facilitate networking between former fellows and establish lessons learned 

for improved implementation of the program, not to determine whether 

former TC fellows could be involved in nuclear weapons efforts. 

IAEA faces several limitations in effectively managing the TC program. 

Specifically, IAEA has not been able to accurately portray the TC 

program’s achievements in meeting the development and other needs of

member states in a meaningful way because it has not updated and revised 

the metrics for assessing program results. In addition, the program’s 

impact is limited by financial resource constraints, including the failure of 

many member states to pay their full share of support to the TCF. Finally, 

the TC program’s long-term effectiveness could be undermined by 

shortcomings in IAEA efforts to monitor how TC projects have been 

sustained and in recent efforts to sustain the TC program overall by 

reaching out to new partners and donors. 

The goal of the TC program is to help member states achieve their 

sustainable development needs through the peaceful application of 

nuclear energy. However, IAEA has not updated and revised TC program 

performance metrics so that it can more accurately track and assess the 

program’s overall impact in meeting member states’ needs. Under a 2002 

TC program strategy, IAEA established four strategic objectives and 12

performance metrics to assess program performance between 2002 and 

2007. These four objectives were (1) establishing greater linkages between 

TC projects and national development plans and greater government 

commitment and support to projects; (2) expanding strategic partnerships 

to improve the TC program’s visibility in resolving development problems; 

(3) increasing the level of funding for technical cooperation activities; and 

(4) strengthening the capacity of institutions in member states using 

nuclear technologies to become more technically and financially selfreliant. The 12 program performance metrics included having TC projects 

create an unspecified number of new partnerships with development 

organizations and having an increasing number of member states pay their 

full target share of funding to the TCF. 

IAEA officials declined to provide us with detailed information explaining 

how these performance indicators were established or data substantiating

how they were met. However, according to the TC program’s 2006 annual

report summarizing the program’s progress against each indicator, IAEA 

met or exceeded 6 of the 12 performance indicators, did not meet 1, could 

Long-Term TC 

Program 

Effectiveness Is 

Limited by Outdated 

Program Metrics, 

Financial Resource 

Constraints, and 

Sustainability 

Concerns 

IAEA Lacks Adequate 

Metrics to Fully Assess TC 

Program’s Impact 

Page 29 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

not measure 1, and did not provide any assessment information on the 

remaining 4 performance goals. 

The metrics developed for the program in 2002 are not meaningful 

indicators of program results and, therefore, do not provide sufficient 

information on the program’s progress in meeting the sustainable 

development and related needs of member states. For example, the 

performance metric on member state contributions to the TCF conveys 

information on program management but does not measure fulfillment of 

member state needs, such as the number of additional cancer patients 

treated or the number of new nuclear safety regulations promulgated. 

Similarly, in its 2007 evaluation of TC activities, IAEA’s internal auditor—

the Office of Internal Oversight Services—found that the TC program lacks 

a robust, consistent process for assessing the effectiveness of TC projects, 

particularly after projects are completed. 

IAEA officials acknowledged these weaknesses in the 2002 metrics, 

recognized they were out of date, and said that they wanted to develop

more effective results-based metrics. However, to date, the TC program 

has not developed new program objectives or performance measures. The 

officials noted that a new TC information technology system—the 

Program Cycle Management Framework—to plan, implement, monitor, 

and report on TC projects will eventually collect information to assess 

project results against specific goals and metrics. In addition, according to

the 2009-2011 TC program guidelines, the program needs to operate under 

results-based management principles and emphasize the importance of 

having program objectives and outcomes be linked to performance 

metrics to help measure progress in achieving results in technical 

cooperation.

IAEA officials told us that implementing a system of results-based metrics 

for the TC program faces challenges—particularly in obtaining reliable

baseline information from member states about the scope of the problems 

or needs they hope to address by participating in the TC program. Without 

such information, they told us, IAEA cannot establish reliable long-term 

performance targets. For example, according to a 2007 evaluation by 

IAEA’s internal auditor, almost half of the project performance metrics in 

the sample of projects it reviewed were not supported with baseline 

information and half did not indicate target values.

Page 30 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

We found that the TC program faces financial constraints and limitations 

due to, among other things, shortfalls in member state payments to the 

TCF and high-income nations receiving TC support. IAEA officials told us 

that the TC program is underfunded, while IAEA’s Director General has 

commented that program resources are insufficient to keep pace with 

country requests for support. Although the size of the TCF and overall 

level of funding paid by member states have increased in recent years,23

many countries that receive TC assistance still do not pay their full share 

of support to the TCF that IAEA expects them to contribute. Specifically, 

the TCF experienced a funding shortfall in 2007 of $3.5 million, or 4 

percent, of the $80 million total target budget because 62 member states 

did not pay their full contributions. Of these 62 countries, 47 states made 

no payment at all.24 Appendix IV lists member states and the amounts they 

contributed to the TCF in 2007. 

In addition, 13 member states that the UN defined as high-income 

countries in 2007—including Israel, Portugal, and Saudi Arabia—received 

a total of approximately $3.8 million in assistance from the program, or 4 

percent of the $93.3 million in total TC disbursements that year. 

Recognizing that the emphasis of the TC program is on providing nuclear 

assistance to developing countries, IAEA officials told us that it would be 

helpful if more developed countries shifted from TC recipients to donors, 

which could allow the program to provide greater support to developing

countries. For example, they stated that some member states have helped 

ease budget pressures within the TC program by voluntarily reducing the 

assistance they receive and gradually becoming donors. However, IAEA 

has not sought to formulate guidelines or criteria for determining when 

countries should be graduated from further TC assistance, and IAEA 

officials have not reached a consensus on how to pursue this matter. 

According to the Deputy Director General for the TC program, IAEA does 

not seek to retire specific countries from TC support regardless of their 

financial or development status. Nevertheless, other IAEA officials told us

that determining program graduation criteria is a good idea. Appendix II 

identifies the countries designated by the United Nations in 2007 as highincome and the amount of TCF assistance they received that year. 

Many Member States Do 

Not Provide Financial 

Contributions to the TCF 

and Some High-Income 

Countries Receive TC 

Assistance 

 23The size of the TCF increased from approximately $56.4 million in 2003 to $76.5 million in 

2007. The rate of total payment of member state contributions to the TCF rose from 75 

percent of the overall TCF target in 2003 to 96 percent in 2007. 

24The United States contributes 99 percent of its TCF target amount on an annual basis

because of the proportionate share of funding it withholds for TC projects in Cuba. 

Page 31 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

In addition, IAEA officials told us that broader issues should be considered in

graduating high-income or highly-developed countries from TC assistance.

Specifically, IAEA officials said that developed nations with more experience 

on nuclear issues could play a helpful role in providing nuclear expertise to 

less-developed nations in the same region. According to IAEA officials, this 

could entail reducing national-level TC project support to developed member 

states while continuing to provide support to them through regional projects. 

These officials also asserted that graduating states is complicated because the 

benefits provided by TC assistance keep countries involved in IAEA,

including the safeguards program. 

State and U.S. Mission officials told us that State does not have an official 

position on graduating member states from TC assistance. However, these 

officials said the idea merited consideration and suggested some countries 

whose economic wherewithal and level of nuclear development could 

justify graduation, including Brazil, China, Russia, and South Korea. 

IAEA efforts to sustain TC project results and the TC program overall face 

several significant limitations and challenges. First, at the project level, 

IAEA does not conduct systematic follow-up to verify that member states 

are sustaining the results and activities of completed TC projects. IAEA’s 

goal in providing technical cooperation is to help countries become 

technically and financially self-reliant so that they do not require future 

IAEA assistance to sustain peaceful nuclear skills and technologies. The 

Deputy Director General of the TC program stated that achieving 

sustainability hinges on having member states commit adequate financial

support, infrastructure, and personnel once the project is completed. 

IAEA officials told us that the program does assess sustainability potential of 

projects in the proposal development phase. As projects are being developed,

IAEA uses a planning tool, known as a “country programme framework,” to 

evaluate how TC project proposals contribute to the host country’s national 

development priorities and to assess the host government’s likely commitment 

to the project. However, we found that IAEA does not systematically review 

completed TC projects to verify whether the project results are being sustained 

by the recipient country, through government or other support. For example, 

the TC program does not conduct any assessments 2, 3, or 5 years past project 

completion, to see whether and how a country is maintaining established TC 

nuclear technologies and related skills. 

Second, IAEA faces challenges in sustaining the TC program over the long

term because TC funding is distributed across 18 different technical 

IAEA Faces Challenges 

Sustaining the TC Program 

Page 32 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

areas—including nuclear power, nuclear security, food and agriculture, 

water resources, and human health—making it difficult for IAEA to set 

clear TC program priorities and to maximize the impact of limited program 

resources. Appendix V provides a complete list of all the technical areas to 

which TC program funding was allocated in 2007. Figure 1 shows the 

percentage of funds disbursed by project area. 

Figure 1: TC Program Disbursements, by Technical Area, 2007 

Note: Percentages based on total 2007 TC disbursements of $93,316,600. The “Other” category 

represents four separate technical areas: nuclear fuel cycle and materials technologies; safeguards; 

public information and communication; and executive management, policy making and coordination. 

Human health

3.6%

Nuclear power

3.5%

Assessment and management of marine

and terrestrial environments

2.4%

Capacity building and nuclear knowledge

maintenance for sustainable energy

development

2.1%

Nuclear security

1.2%

Emergency preparedness

0.8%

Other

8.2%

7.5%

7.3%

6%

4.6%

4%

7.7%

12.8%

28.3%

Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data.

Water resources

Management of technical cooperation for

development

Safety of nuclear installations

Radiation and transport safety

Radioisotope production and radiation

technology

Management of radioactive waste

Nuclear science

Food and agriculture

Page 33 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

According to U.S. Mission officials, this allocation of TC funding across 

multiple technical areas and the absence of clear program priorities 

reduces overall program effectiveness. U.S. Mission officials told us that 

IAEA should work to consolidate these areas and identify four or five 

future TC program priorities. IAEA officials agreed, but told us that they 

have little flexibility to set TC program priorities because they must be 

responsive to member state needs which vary across countries and 

regions. Nevertheless, TC program officials said they are attempting to 

promote priority-setting at the project level—for example, by limiting the 

number of projects member states were permitted to submit in 2008, and

by moving away from funding mature nuclear technologies that no longer 

require development or in which member states have acquired sufficient 

capability to sustain on their own. 

In addition, in 2007, IAEA initiated a fundamental review of the challenges

and opportunities facing its programs to 2020 and beyond. As part of this 

review, IAEA’s Secretariat identified priorities for the TC program and 

other IAEA programs. IAEA also convened a Commission of Eminent 

Persons to provide recommendations on the future role and activities of 

the agency, including the TC program. In its background report to the 

commission, IAEA identified future TC priorities in three main areas—

disease prevention and control, food safety and security, and sustainable 

management of natural resources and ecosystems—with a lesser focus on 

a fourth area, industrial process management. However, IAEA officials 

told us that the restructuring of TC priorities and implementing other 

recommendations from this review would be contingent on the Board of 

Governors’ approval. 

Finally, IAEA officials told us that meeting member states’ future demands 

for TC assistance—especially as interest in nuclear power grows—will 

strain program resources and pose a fundamental long-term sustainability 

challenge. As a result, IAEA is developing outreach strategies and has 

created an outreach team to attract the support and involvement of donor 

organizations and new partners—such as the UN Development Program—

in the TC program. However, this effort faces several limitations and 

shortcomings. 

The TC program outreach effort is narrowly focused on attracting donors 

and partners involved in international economic and social development. 

Although TC program guidance encourages private sector partnerships, 

IAEA officials told us that the new partner outreach effort will not extend

to the private sector because they believed the level of effort to establish 

such partnerships would outweigh the expected benefits. Furthermore, 

Page 34 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

while IAEA’s internal auditors have reported on cases where member 

states successfully obtained private sector support to sustain TC 

projects—thus alleviating the need for further support from IAEA or the 

host government—IAEA officials told us that the TC program does not 

systematically assess TC proposals with respect to their commercial 

potential. IAEA officials told us that member states are not required to 

submit information in their TC proposals—such as a market analysis, a 

summary of business plans, or potential private sector investors in project 

activities—that IAEA could use to evaluate the long-term commercial 

prospects of a TC project. 

The TC program’s strategy of focusing its outreach primarily on 

international development organizations carries risks because IAEA is not 

well recognized as a development organization within the broader 

development community. According to the Deputy Director General of the

TC Department, the development community largely perceives IAEA as a 

nuclear enforcement body and its development contributions are 

overlooked or unknown. In addition, some of the previous partnerships 

the TC program has built with international development organizations 

have been called into question. For example, a 2007 independent 

evaluation of the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 

concluded that FAO’s long-standing partnership with IAEA on the use of 

nuclear techniques in food and agriculture has ceased to yield a high 

return on investment and, therefore, recommended that FAO withdraw 

future funding from the joint FAO-IAEA unit. Furthermore, according to 

the U.S. representative to the Standing Advisory Group on Technical 

Assistance and Cooperation, the TC program faces difficulties in building 

relationships with development organizations at the project and country 

levels because it does not have a presence in the host countries to 

promote the program. For example, this representative told us that the 

national liaison officers—who serve as intermediaries on TC projects 

between IAEA and the host governments and collaborating institutes—

tend to be technical specialists who do not understand their country’s 

development needs, do not network with other development 

organizations, and are not involved in the governmental processes that set 

national development plans and priorities. 

The world today is dramatically different than when IAEA was created 

over 50 years ago. Therefore, certain IAEA policies related to the TC 

program, as well as the rights, expectations, and obligations of IAEA 

member states that are beneficiaries of the program, merit careful 

consideration and, as appropriate, re-examination. In our view, TC 

Conclusions 

Page 35 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

proposals should not be evaluated simply on their technical merits in 

isolation from political considerations concerning the countries making 

the requests, particularly since the assistance in question involves 

supplying nuclear equipment, training, and expertise, some of which is 

dual-use in nature. In that regard, we believe that State’s policy of not 

encouraging IAEA to systematically limit TC projects in countries that are 

U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism communicates a mixed 

message on the acceptability of transferring nuclear technologies and 

expertise to countries the United States has deemed inherently dangerous. 

We recognize that the TC program provides IAEA member states that are 

developing countries with many benefits and that not every project funded

by the program poses a proliferation risk. However, the United States does 

not have the necessary information available on a timely basis to make 

sound judgments about the proliferation risks of many of these projects,

particularly in the project proposal development phase. A better system, 

with more complete and timely data provided by IAEA, would help ensure 

that projects are fully and appropriately vetted by U.S. agencies and those

that pose a potential proliferation risk are identified early in the project 

development process. Until that happens, we will continue to have 

concerns about the potential proliferation risks posed by TC projects, 

particularly those linked to countries of concern. 

With greater transparency and earlier information from IAEA on TC 

project proposals, the United States government and other countries could 

raise and address proliferation concerns with IAEA’s Secretariat before it 

endorses projects for approval by the Board of Governors. We are also 

concerned by IAEA’s refusal to share information with the United States 

and other member states on findings from its internal proliferation reviews 

of TC projects. Furthermore, deficiencies in State’s record-keeping on TC 

program matters is troubling because we could not determine what, if any, 

actions State took to address concerns identified by DOE and the national 

laboratories. 

Regarding TC fellowships, State has not established a formal policy 

governing the approval of TC fellows from foreign countries interested in 

studying nuclear issues in the United States. The absence of such a policy 

has allowed individuals from non-NPT countries and individuals from 

countries that are U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism who obtain 

visas to study in the United States and potentially acquire valuable 

information. We also believe IAEA should take steps to improve 

monitoring of individuals who have completed fellowships, to track their

whereabouts and ongoing research, and to determine if the knowledge and 

Page 36 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

information they obtained on TC projects is being applied to strictly 

peaceful purposes. 

Regarding our management concerns associated with the TC program, we 

believe that all member states receiving TC support should provide their 

full contribution to the TCF. We also question the need to provide TC 

assistance to high-income countries that have the apparent economic 

means to finance their nuclear research and development needs 

independently. In our view, IAEA could enhance the impact of its limited 

resources by developing and applying reasonable “means testing” criteria 

in future allocation of TC funding and consider ways in which high-income 

countries can be graduated from continued TC assistance. In addition, the 

metrics IAEA has used to track TC program performance do not provide 

the United States and other member states with sufficient information on 

the TC program’s overall value. Development of more meaningful resultsbased performance measures could allow IAEA to more effectively 

demonstrate the TC program’s impact. 

Finally, IAEA could enhance the impact of the TC program’s limited 

resources by formally setting priorities for future TC funding, as well as 

identifying areas that are less urgent because of the availability of mature 

nuclear technologies and other donors. In terms of IAEA’s outreach to 

potential new TC donors, we believe that the private sector could be a 

crucial partner in supporting the TC program generally and in sustaining 

the results of TC projects so that member states can become technically 

and financially less dependent on IAEA. In our view, IAEA should also 

assess TC proposals not only for technical feasibility and host government 

support, but also for potential private sector support to sustain project 

activities and results. 

If Congress wishes to make known that the United States does not support 

IAEA’s policy of permitting TC projects in countries that State has 

designated as state sponsors of terrorism, or other countries where other 

concerns persist, it could explicitly require—as it currently does with 

Cuba and has done in the past with Iran, Libya, and the Territories Under 

the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority—that State withhold a 

proportionate share of the U.S. voluntary contribution to the TC program 

that is equivalent to the amounts of TCF funding that would otherwise be 

made available to these countries. Alternatively, if Congress wishes to 

obtain additional information before making this decision, it could require 

State to report to Congress explaining its rationale for not withholding a 

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration 

Page 37 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

proportionate share of the U.S. contribution to the TCF for U.S.-designated 

state sponsors of terrorism. 

To address the range of proliferation and management concerns related to

the TC program, we recommend that the Secretary of State, working with 

IAEA and member states through the Board of Governors, explore 

undertaking the following eight actions: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• Establish a formal mechanism to facilitate greater and more timely 

information sharing on TC project proposals between IAEA and the United 

States and other countries—including detailed information on the TC 

proposals themselves, as well as the results of IAEA’s internal 

proliferation reviews of the proposals—so that proliferation and other 

concerns can be identified and addressed early in the project development 

cycle.

• Promote a regular and systematic process for obtaining, retaining, and

updating information on prior TC project fellows to better track where and 

how the knowledge and expertise they have obtained is being applied. 

• Strengthen the TC program’s mechanisms for collecting member states’ 

contributions to the TCF to include withholding from nonpaying states a 

percentage of TC assistance equivalent to the percentage of their target 

rate that they fail to contribute to the TCF. 

• Establish criteria for determining when member states, especially those 

defined as high-income countries, no longer need TC assistance in 

particular fields and when such states could be graduated from further TC

support altogether. 

• Seek to implement new results-based performance metrics for the TC 

program that establish specific national, regional, and interregional social

and economic needs and measure the collective impact of TC projects in 

meeting those objectives. 

• Focus the TC program on a more limited number of high-priority technical

areas to maximize the impact of program resources. 

• Encourage the TC program to reach out to private sector entities as part of

its new partner and donor development strategy.

• Request member states to assess in their TC project proposals the 

prospects for commercialization of and private sector investment in the 

results of the projects. Such steps could include requiring information in 

the proposals on potential business plans, marketing strategies, and 

strategies for attracting commercial partners once IAEA support has 

concluded.

Page 38 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

Finally, to clarify and improve U.S. oversight of the TC program, we 

recommend that the Secretary of State undertake the following two 

actions: 

• Enhance record-keeping and formally document management actions 

regarding the discussion, action, and disposition of TC project proposals 

that DOE and the national laboratories identify as having potential 

proliferation concerns. 

• Issue formal guidance with well-defined criteria—such as countries 

designated by State as sponsors of terrorism or gross human rights 

violators—that State should use as the basis for approving or rejecting TC

fellowship requests for nuclear studies in the United States. This guidance 

could include, among other things, a list of specific countries from which 

State would not approve TC fellows that could be updated and revised 

annually, or as other circumstances warrant. 

We provided a draft of this report to State and DOE for formal comment. 

We also provided IAEA with a detailed summary of facts contained in the 

draft report. State provided written comments on the draft report, which 

are presented in appendix VI. DOE and IAEA provided technical 

comments that we incorporated as appropriate. 

State strongly opposed the matter for congressional consideration to 

require State to withhold a proportionate share of the U.S. voluntary 

contribution to the TC program that is equivalent to the amounts of TCF 

funding that would otherwise be made available to U.S.-designated state 

sponsors of terrorism and or other countries of concern. State objected for 

a number of reasons, contending that (1) it would be counterproductive to 

a separate recommendation we made in the report encouraging all states 

to pay their full share to the TCF; (2) it would not stop TC projects in 

targeted countries because TCF funding is fungible; (3) Congress has 

exempted IAEA contributions from this type of proportionate withholding; 

(4) none of the TC projects in state sponsors of terrorism have been 

shown to have contributed to a WMD program; (5) there are adequate 

safeguards within IAEA’s Secretariat to prevent TC projects from 

contributing to a WMD program; and (6) it would negatively impact the 

ability of the United States to achieve other critical objectives within 

IAEA. 

We do not believe the matter for congressional consideration is unique or

unprecedented. As we noted in our report, U.S. law currently requires the 

withholding of a proportionate share of the U.S. contribution to the TCF 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 39 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

for certain projects in Cuba, and has required withholding in the past for 

Iran, Libya, and the Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian 

Authority. However, in order to give Congress greater flexibility and more

information, we have broadened the matter for congressional 

consideration to give Congress the option of requiring State to report on 

its rationale for not withholding a proportionate share of the U.S. 

contribution to the TCF for U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism. 

Notwithstanding our modification to the matter for congressional 

consideration, we still disagree with State’s specific objections to it for the 

following reasons: 

• We do not believe the matter for congressional consideration is 

counterproductive to our recommendation to strengthen mechanisms for 

collecting member state contributions to the TCF. That recommendation is 

geared toward strengthening mechanisms for collecting contributions to 

the TCF from member states that are receiving TC assistance. The United

States is the largest donor to the TC program, providing approximately 25 

percent of the TCF annual budget, and is not a beneficiary of TC 

assistance. 

• While contributions to the TCF are fungible, we believe there is a 

fundamental principle at stake. As we described in our report, the United 

States has applied several types of sanctions limiting foreign assistance 

and trade to states it has designated as sponsors of terrorism and to other 

countries. To avoid the appearance of an inconsistent approach and to 

foster greater cohesion in U.S. policy toward such nations, we believe that 

it is fair for Congress to consider requiring State to withhold a share of the 

U.S. contribution to the TCF for program activities in countries that the 

United States chooses not to engage directly in trade, assistance, and other 

forms of cooperation. 

• We are aware that in 1994 U.S. contributions to IAEA were exempted from 

the law requiring State to withhold proportionate shares of funding to 

international organizations for programs in certain countries. However, we 

note that the IAEA exemption was enacted in 1994. In our view, the 

proliferation concerns about some countries receiving TC assistance—

such as Iran and Syria—have increased rather than diminished since that

time. Furthermore, we note that since the enactment of the 1994

exemption, the law has been further amended to require State to withhold 

a proportionate share of funding to IAEA for certain projects in Cuba and 

for all projects in Iran if State determines that such projects in Iran are 

inconsistent with U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals, will 

provide Iran with training or expertise relevant to the development of 

Page 40 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

nuclear weapons, or are being used as a cover for the acquisition of 

sensitive nuclear technology. 

• We do not believe that State can assert with confidence that TC projects 

have not contributed to WMD programs in state sponsors of terrorism. The 

absence of evidence showing that TC projects have assisted nuclear 

weapons development in U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism does 

not, in our view, constitute proof that such countries have not exploited 

TC assistance to advance possible weapons development skills and 

activities. Based on findings in our report—including the limited 

information available to DOE and the national laboratories on TC projects 

and the inherent dual-use nature of some nuclear expertise and 

technology—we believe it is difficult to say with confidence that TC 

projects are not contributing indirectly to weapons-related knowledge and 

expertise in such countries. 

• We do not have the same level of confidence as State in the safeguards 

within IAEA’s Secretariat to prevent TC projects from contributing to 

weapons development. As we stated in the report, we were unable to 

assess the effectiveness of IAEA’s internal process for reviewing TC 

proposals and projects for proliferation concerns because IAEA’s 

Secretariat declined to provide us with basic information and 

documentation regarding the results of its reviews. Furthermore, as 

described in the report, IAEA’s Secretariat approved at least one TC 

project proposal—involving the Iranian heavy water reactor at Arak—that 

State later objected to. 

• Finally, neither we nor State can conclude with certainty how other states 

might react to an increase in the United States’ proportionate withholding 

of funding to the TCF and how this would affect U.S. ability to achieve 

other objectives within the agency. 

State agreed with 7 of our 10 recommendations to improve TC program 

management and oversight. It neither agreed nor disagreed with the three

other recommendations that called on State, working with IAEA and 

member states through the Board of Governors, to explore (1) establishing 

a formal mechanism to facilitate greater and more timely information 

sharing on TC proposals between IAEA, the United States, and other 

countries; (2) strengthening TC program mechanisms for collecting 

member state contributions to the TCF, including withholding a 

percentage of TC assistance to recipient countries that fail to pay their 

target contribution; and (3) establishing criteria for determining when 

member states no longer require TC assistance and could be graduated 

from further TC support. 

Page 41 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

Regarding the recommendation concerning the establishment of a formal 

mechanism to facilitate greater and more timely information sharing on TC 

project proposals between IAEA and the United States and other 

countries, State noted that it would be difficult to implement through 

IAEA’s Board of Governors because TC proposals are considered 

confidential between IAEA and the recipient state. State commented that a 

more achievable goal could be to work with IAEA to ensure that it 

publishes a complete listing of project proposals earlier. Because TC 

projects can involve transfer of equipment, technology, and expertise that

could potentially contribute to nuclear weapons development, we 

continue to believe that TC proposals demand the highest level of scrutiny, 

transparency, and information sharing. We question why details of TC 

proposals are considered confidential, and believe the United States and

other major donors should have a full understanding of the proposals that 

they are being asked to support through their TCF contributions. Finally, 

as noted in the report, we found that the quantity of information about TC

proposals currently available to DOE and the national laboratories is 

insufficient in many cases—especially in cases where DOE and the 

national laboratories obtained only lists of proposal titles—to make 

accurate determinations of potential proliferation risks. It is unclear 

whether State’s suggestion to work with IAEA to publish the complete 

listing of proposed projects earlier would result in sufficient details being 

provided to DOE and the national laboratories to allow them to more 

reliably assess proliferation risks. 

On our recommendation to strengthen the mechanisms for collecting 

member state contributions to the TCF, State commented that the rate of

payment to the TCF by member states has improved in recent years. 

However, as we noted in the report, many states receiving assistance are 

still not paying their full share of contributions to the TCF. We believe 

there is room for continued improvement and that mechanisms should 

continue to be strengthened toward that end. We believe the 

recommendation is sound and should be implemented. 

Finally, concerning the recommendation to establish criteria for 

determining when member states no longer require further TC assistance 

and could be graduated from further TC support, State observed that a 

proposal for graduating higher-income TC recipient states based on their 

per capita gross national product was put forward in 1997. State noted that 

one member state objected to graduating countries based solely on such 

criteria. We recognize the political and practical challenges of

implementing a graduation strategy for member states receiving TC 

assistance. However, as noted in our report, both State and IAEA officials 

Page 42 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
 

supported the principle of graduating countries that no longer require TC 

assistance. Moreover, our recommendation does not identify specific 

graduation criteria or specify that a member state’s income ranking be the 

sole factor to serve as the basis for graduating a state from further TC 

support. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested 

congressional committees and Members of Congress, the Secretary of 

State, and the Secretary of Energy. In addition, this report will be available 

at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix VII. 

Sincerely yours, 

Director, Natural Resources and Environment 

Gene Aloise 

Page 43 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 44 GAO-09-275

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

To review the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Technical

Cooperation (TC) program we assessed the (1) extent to which the United

States and IAEA have policies limiting member states’ participation in the 

TC program on the basis of nuclear proliferation and related concerns; (2) 

extent to which the United States and IAEA evaluate and monitor TC 

projects for proliferation concerns; and (3) limitations and challenges in 

IAEA’s management of the TC program. We employed several 

methodologies to address these objectives. 

Our review of the TC program covered the years 1997 through 2007. We 

chose this period because our previous report on the TC program reported 

on TC programmatic and financial data through 1996. We interviewed key 

officials and analyzed documentation, such as cables, presentations, 

financial information, and reports and analyses of TC program issues from 

the Departments of State (State) and Energy (DOE). State officials also 

provided us with relevant IAEA documentation and information, such as 

copies of IAEA’s annual “white books” identifying TC projects approved 

by IAEA, as well as information on specific TC projects from IAEA’s “TCPRIDE” database. We also interviewed officials in the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission’s Office of International Programs who participate in U.S. 

interagency meetings on IAEA TC issues. In addition, we met with 

representatives from five national laboratories involved in the DOE 

Interdiction Technical Analysis Group, a multilaboratory team providing 

DOE with technical analysis of proliferation-related issues, including the

TC program. We also visited the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to 

obtain documentation and interview current and former ORNL staff 

involved in previous and ongoing assessments of TC proposals and active 

projects for potential proliferation concerns. In addition, we visited the 

Argonne National Laboratory to interview representatives who provide 

support and analytical services to State on TC issues, organize training 

seminars for foreign nationals involved in TC projects, and facilitate TC 

fellowships for foreign nationals to study nuclear issues in the United 

States. 

We also interviewed officials at IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria, 

including representatives from the TC Department and other IAEA 

departments, including the Departments of Management, Safeguards, and 

Nuclear Safety and Security; the Office of Internal Oversight Services; and

the Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination. We reviewed and 

analyzed information provided by IAEA officials, including presentation 

slides, annual reports, internal and external auditor reports, and TC 

project brochures. We also reviewed speeches and other statements by 

IAEA officials on the TC program and related IAEA issues. IAEA officials 

Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

provided us with data on the number of TC projects by year, country, and 

technical area, as well as financial information on the TC program over the 

past decade. We interviewed knowledgeable IAEA officials on the 

reliability of these data, including issues such as data entry, access, quality 

control procedures, and the accuracy and completeness of the data. We 

determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 

review. 

Furthermore, we interviewed officials at the U.S. Mission to International

Organizations in Vienna (U.S. Mission) regarding TC program policies and

processes. We also met with officials from the Canadian Permanent 

Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna who work on IAEA 

issues to gain their perspectives on the TC program. We also conducted 

interviews with several nongovernmental experts who have monitored 

IAEA and developments in the TC program, and met with and obtained 

documentation from the U.S. representative to IAEA’s Standing Advisory 

Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation. 

We discussed U.S. and IAEA policies and criteria with State and IAEA 

officials on the extent to which countries are limited from receiving TC 

assistance because of proliferation and related concerns. We also 

reviewed (1) speeches, articles, and other statements made by IAEA 

officials; (2) annual State reports to Congress on IAEA assistance provided 

to some states that the United States has identified as countries of 

concern; (3) speeches and statements by U.S. officials; and (4) cables 

between State and the U.S. Mission outlining U.S. policy toward the TC 

program. We obtained and analyzed the lists of countries that (1) are 

designated by the United States as state sponsors of terrorism, (2) are 

party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 

and (3) have comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional 

protocols in force with IAEA. We cross-referenced each of these lists 

against IAEA financial records to determine how much TC support has 

been provided to countries that the United States has listed as state 

sponsors of terrorism, are not party to the NPT, or do not have 

comprehensive safeguards or additional protocol agreements in force with 

IAEA. 

To assess the extent to which the United States and IAEA evaluate and 

monitor TC projects for proliferation concerns, we interviewed State and 

DOE officials regarding their TC program review processes. We also 

interviewed representatives from five of the U.S. national laboratories 

involved in past and current evaluations of TC proposals and projects for 

proliferation concerns. Through DOE, we obtained and analyzed 

Page 45 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

information from ORNL and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to 

determine the numbers of TC proposals the national laboratories reviewed 

each year between 1998 and 2006. We reviewed and verified these data 

with DOE and the national laboratory officials, and discussed and verified 

the proliferation risks DOE and the national laboratory officials identified 

in specific TC proposals. We used IAEA records of approved TC projects 

to determine whether TC proposals that the national laboratories had 

identified as having possible proliferation risks were approved by IAEA. 

Because of IAEA policies that restricted our access to data and related 

information on TC proposal and project reviews by IAEA’s Safeguards 

Department, we were unable to assess the effectiveness of IAEA’s internal 

review of TC proposals and projects for proliferation concerns. 

To determine the challenges and limitations in IAEA’s management of the 

TC program, we interviewed officials from State, Argonne National 

Laboratory, and IAEA, as well as the U.S. representative to IAEA’s 

Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation. We 

obtained and reviewed relevant IAEA documentation addressing TC 

program metrics, such as TC program guidance and strategy documents, 

IAEA internal audit reports, and meeting reports by IAEA’s Technical 

Assistance and Cooperation Committee. To assess financial resource 

challenges facing the TC program, we analyzed financial data from TC 

program annual reports between 1997 and 2007—including annual budgets 

of the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF), annual contributions by 

member states to the TCF, and amounts of annual TC assistance provided 

to recipient countries and territories—to determine the level of funding 

countries contributed to the TCF and the amounts some countries 

received from the TC program over the past decade. We used the United 

Nation’s (UN) annual Human Development Reports to determine country 

income classifications. For each country, we cross-referenced TC financial 

data against country income classifications to determine the amounts of 

funding countries designated by the UN as “high-income” contributed to 

and received from the TC program. Additionally, we reviewed TC program 

annual reports to determine the technical areas covered and funded by the 

program. 

As initially agreed with your office, we intended to assess the extent to 

which TC projects have contributed to the safety and security of nuclear 

installations around the world. Toward that end, using data provided by 

State from IAEA’s TC-PRIDE database, identifying all TC projects funded 

in the nuclear security and safety fields since 1997, we developed a 

judgmental sample of 22 TC projects (17 national projects and 5 regional 

projects) to serve as the basis for our assessment and interviews with 

Page 46 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

relevant IAEA officials. We selected this judgmental sample by focusing on 

projects completed since 2005. Using the data provided by State, we 

calculated the average cost of national-level nuclear security and safety 

projects completed since that time and selected the 17 projects that 

exceeded this average cost. The 5 regional projects in our judgmental 

sample were selected by identifying the highest budget project in each of 

the five TC program regions completed since 2005. We briefed IAEA 

officials on our project selection methodology, and they agreed that it was 

fair and unbiased. However, IAEA officials declined to make additional 

information available to us on these projects and did not provide us with 

an opportunity to interview relevant IAEA officials who oversaw these 

projects to discuss their impact and results. As a result of these restrictive 

policies, we were unable to sufficiently assess the TC program’s 

contributions to improving the safety and security of nuclear facilities 

around the world. 

We conducted this performance audit from December 2007 to March 2009, 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Page 47 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II: 2007 Technical Cooperation 

Assistance Recipient States and Territories 

Dollars in thousands 

Country

Total 2007 

TC funding 

received

IAEA 

member 

state?

U.S.-

designated 

state sponsor

of terrorism?

NPT 

state 

party?

Comprehensive 

safeguards 

agreement in force?

Additional

protocol in 

force?

2007 UN 

income 

category 

Africa region

Algeria $1,361.4 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

Angola 495.5 Yes No Yes No No Middle

Benin 371.6 Yes No Yes No No Low

Botswana 393.1 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Burkina Faso 567.4 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Low 

Cameroon 412.3 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

Central African Republic 365.3 Yes No Yes No No Low 

Chad 143.3 Yes No Yes No No Low

Côte d’Ivoire 253.8 Yes No Yes Yes No Low 

Democratic Republic of 

the Congo 

699.1 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Low

Egypt 1,280.9 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

Eritrea 242.2 Yes No Yes No No Low

Ethiopia 2,187.5 Yes No Yes Yes No Low

Gabon 159.1 Yes No Yes No No Middle

Gambia 3.5 No No Yes Yes No Low

Ghana 1,184.1 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Low

Kenya 1,093.5 Yes No Yes No No Low

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 894.4 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle 

Madagascar 870.6 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Low

Malawi 35.2 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Low

Mali 1,021.9 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Low

Islamic Republic of 

Mauritania 

156.1 Yes No Yes No No Low

Mauritius 368.9 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Morocco 996.9 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

Mozambique 17.5 Yes No Yes No No Low

Namibia 421.1 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

Niger 596.5 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Low

Nigeria 1,527.0 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Low

Senegal 983.9 Yes No Yes Yes No Low

Seychelles 100.3 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Appendix II: 2007 Technical Cooperation 

Assistance Recipient States and Territories 

Page 48 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II: 2007 Technical Cooperation 

Assistance Recipient States and Territories 

Country

Total 2007 

TC funding 

received

IAEA 

member 

state?

U.S.-

designated 

state sponsor

of terrorism?

NPT 

state 

party?

Comprehensive 

safeguards 

agreement in force?

Additional

protocol in 

force?

2007 UN 

income 

category 

Sierra Leone 348.4 Yes No Yes No No Low 

South Africa 1,142.3 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle 

Sudan 1,148.1 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Low

Tunisia 789.0 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

Uganda 689.3 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Low

United Republic of 

Tanzania 

1,925.3 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Low

Zambia 618.3 Yes No Yes Yes No Low

Zimbabwe 571.0 Yes No Yes Yes No Low

Subtotal, Africa $26,435.6 

Asia and the Pacific region

Afghanistan 111.3 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Low

Bangladesh 1,130.4 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Low

Brunei Darussalam 0.5 No No Yes Yes No High 

Burma (Myanmar) 670.4 Yes No Yes Yes No Low 

Cambodia 0.9 No No Yes Yes No Low

China 2,007.1 Yes No Yes aYes Middle

India 252.8 Yes No No No No Low

Indonesia 1,168.6 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Islamic Republic of Iran 1,000.0 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Middle 

Iraq 190.6 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

Israel 251.6 Yes No No No No High

Jordan 930.6 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Republic of Korea 636.3 Yes No Yes Yes Yes High 

Kuwait 152.2 Yes No Yes Yes Yes High

Lebanon 502.3 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

Malaysia 1,012.8 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

Marshall Islands 0.4 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle 

Mongolia 697.2 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Low

Pakistan 2,233.9 Yes No No No No Low

Philippines 1,510.7 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

Qatar 232.8 Yes No Yes NobNo High

Saudi Arabia 321.5 Yes No Yes NocNo High

Singapore 137.8 Yes No Yes Yes NodHigh 

Sri Lanka 810.8 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle 

Page 49 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II: 2007 Technical Cooperation 

Assistance Recipient States and Territories 

Country

Total 2007 

TC funding 

received

IAEA 

member 

state?

U.S.-

designated 

state sponsor

of terrorism?

NPT 

state 

party?

Comprehensive 

safeguards 

agreement in force?

Additional

protocol in 

force?

2007 UN 

income 

category 

Syrian Arab Republic 1,525.4 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Middle 

Territories Under the 

Jurisdiction of the 

Palestinian Authority 

26.3 No No No No No Middle

Thailand 1,057.4 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

United Arab Emirates 158.7 Yes No Yes Yes No High 

Vietnam 1,770.8 Yes No Yes Yes No Low

Yemen 1,179.2 Yes No Yes Yes No Low

Subtotal, Asia and the

Pacific 

$21,681.3 

Europe region 

Albania 784.1 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

Armenia 1,308.7 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Azerbaijan 312.1 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Belarus 969.8 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

Bosnia and Herzegovina 399.2 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle 

Bulgaria 898.7 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Croatia 1,141.6 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Cyprus 140.5 Yes No Yes Yes Yes High

Czech Republic 564.4 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle 

Estonia 808.9 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Georgia 811.5 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Greece 332.5 Yes No Yes Yes Yes High

Hungary 389.4 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Kazakhstan 1,303.1 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Kyrgyzstan 542.6 Yes No Yes Yes No Low

Latvia 247.3 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Lithuania 2,607.0 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Malta 405.7 Yes No Yes Yes Yes High

Montenegro 18.9 Yes No Yes No No Middle

Poland 1,553.8 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Portugal 504.3 Yes No Yes Yes Yes High

Republic of Moldova 905.4 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

Romania 1,276.5 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Russian Federation 919.4 Yes No Yes aYes Middle

Serbia 2,129.4 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

Page 50 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II: 2007 Technical Cooperation 

Assistance Recipient States and Territories 

Country

Total 2007 

TC funding 

received

IAEA 

member 

state?

U.S.-

designated 

state sponsor

of terrorism?

NPT 

state 

party?

Comprehensive 

safeguards 

agreement in force?

Additional

protocol in 

force?

2007 UN 

income 

category 

Slovakia 628.3 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Slovenia 481.3 Yes No Yes Yes Yes High

Tajikistan 855.9 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Low

The Former Yugoslav 

Republic of Macedonia 

642.0 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Turkey 466.7 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Ukraine 2,466.2 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Uzbekistan 1,015.4 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Low

Subtotal, Europe $27,830.6 

Latin America region

Argentina 1,543.2 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

Belize 61.4 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

Bolivia 817.4 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

Brazil 1,480.4 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

Chile 1,112.6 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Colombia 778.0 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

Costa Rica 749.6 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle 

Cuba 1,323.7 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Middle

Dominican Republic 256.9 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle 

Ecuador 849.1 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

El Salvador 531.9 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle 

Guatemala 435.6 Yes No Yes Yes NoeMiddle 

Haiti 450.1 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Low

Honduras 394.5 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

Jamaica 298.4 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Mexico 962.8 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

Nicaragua 1,516.3 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Panama 549.4 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Paraguay 384.3 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Peru 670.8 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Uruguay 655.6 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Middle

Venezuela 681.3 Yes No Yes Yes No Middle

Subtotal, Latin America $16,503.3 

Page 51 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II: 2007 Technical Cooperation 

Assistance Recipient States and Territories 

Country

Total 2007 

TC funding 

received

IAEA 

member 

state?

U.S.-

designated 

state sponsor

of terrorism?

NPT 

state 

party?

Comprehensive 

safeguards 

agreement in force?

Additional

protocol in 

force?

2007 UN 

income 

category 

Interregional and global TC funding

Interregional 24.3

Global 842.6

Subtotal, Interregional 

and Global 

$866.9

Total $93,317.7

Source: GAO analysis of State, IAEA, and UN data. 

a

As nuclear-weapon states, China and Russia are not obligated under the NPT to accept 

comprehensive safeguards on their nuclear activities. 

b

Qatar brought a comprehensive safeguards agreement into force in January 2009. 

c

Saudi Arabia brought a comprehensive safeguards agreement into force in January 2009. 

d

Singapore brought an additional protocol into force in March 2008. 

e

Guatemala brought an additional protocol into force in May 2008. 

Page 52 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix III: Numbers of Technical 

Cooperation Proposals Reviewed by U.S. 

National Laboratories, Categorized by Level 

of Proliferation Risk, by Year, 1998 through 

2006 

Appendix III: Numbers of Technical 

Cooperation Proposals Reviewed by U.S. 

National Laboratories, Categorized by Level of 

Proliferation Risk, by Year, 1998 through 2006

National laboratory assessment of TC proposal proliferation risks 

Number of proposals reviewed, title only review

Number of proposals reviewed, additional 

information obtained

Review

year 

Lead

reviewer

No 

concern

Some 

concern

but 

insufficient 

data to 

assess 

Low,

minimal 

concern

Medium, 

moderate 

concern

High 

concern

No 

concern

Some 

concern

but 

insufficient 

data to 

assess 

Low,

minimal 

concern

Medium, 

moderate 

concern

High 

concern

1998 ORNL 3 0 0 0 0 12 0 3 2 0

2000 ORNL 270 2 0 0 0 1 1 6 1 0

2002 ORNL 86 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0

2004 ORNL 478 1 0 0 0 12 1 2 1 1

2006 LANL 659 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total 1,496 23 0 0 0 26 3 12 4 1

Source: GAO analysis of ORNL, LANL, and DOE data. 

Page 53 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix IV: 2007 Member State 

Contributions to the Technical Cooperation 

Fund 

In U.S. dollars 

Member state TCF target share Amount paid to TCF 

Percentage of target 

share paida

Holy See $800 $2,632 329%

Iceland 26,400 34,256 130

Canada 2,171,200 2,389,558 110

Lithuania 18,400 19,500 106

Belgium 824,800 860,215 104

United Republic of Tanzania 4,800 5,000 104

Syrian Arab Republic 29,600 30,000 101

Egypt 92,800 92,800 100

Liechtenstein 4,000 4,000 100

Australia 1,228,800 1,228,800 100

Albania 4,000 4,000 100

Austria 663,200 663,200 100

Bangladesh 8,000 8,000 100

China 1,584,800 1,584,800 100

Cuba 32,800 32,800 100

Cyprus 30,400 30,400 100

Czech Republic 140,800 140,800 100

Denmark 554,400 554,400 100

Finland 411,200 411,200 100

France 4,653,600 4,653,600 100

Hungary 96,800 96,800 100

India 324,800 324,800 100

Japan 15,024,800 15,024,800 100

Jordan 8,800 8,800 100

Malaysia 156,800 156,800 100

Netherlands 1,304,000 1,304,000 100

Norway 524,000 524,000 100

Pakistan 42,400 42,400 100

Poland 356,000 356,000 100

Romania 46,400 46,400 100

Slovakia 39,200 39,200 100

Slovenia 63,200 63,200 100

South Africa 225,600 225,600 100

Sweden 770,400 770,400 100

Appendix IV: 2007 Member State 

Contributions to the Technical Cooperation 

Fund 

Page 54 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix IV: 2007 Member State 

Contributions to the Technical Cooperation 

Fund 

Member state TCF target share Amount paid to TCF 

Percentage of target 

share paida

Switzerland 924,000 923,975 100

Thailand 160,800 160,800 100

Tunisia 24,800 24,800 100

United Kingdom 4,728,800 4,728,800 100

Vietnam 16,000 16,000 100

Zimbabwe 5,600 5,600 100

Sri Lanka 12,800 12,800 100

Republic of Korea 1,386,400 1,386,400 100

Turkey 287,200 287,200 100

Ireland 270,400 270,400 100

Spain 1,944,800 1,944,800 100

Bulgaria 12,800 12,800 100

Afghanistan 1,600 1,600 100

Armenia 1,600 1,600 100

Belarus 13,600 13,600 100

Cameroon 6,400 6,400 100

Croatia 28,800 28,800 100

Ecuador 14,400 14,400 100

Estonia 9,600 9,600 100

Ethiopia 3,200 3,200 100

Germany 6,684,800 6,684,800 100

Greece 408,800 408,800 100

Haiti 2,400 2,400 100

Italy 3,770,400 3,770,400 100

Kazakhstan 19,200 19,200 100

Kenya 7,200 7,200 100

Kuwait 124,800 124,800 100

Luxembourg 59,200 59,200 100

Mauritius 8,800 8,800 100

Mongolia 800 800 100

Nicaragua 800 800 100

Niger 800 800 100

Singapore 299,200 299,200 100

Uganda 4,800 4,800 100

Ukraine 30,400 30,400 100

United Arab Emirates 181,600 181,600 100

Page 55 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix IV: 2007 Member State 

Contributions to the Technical Cooperation 

Fund 

Member state TCF target share Amount paid to TCF 

Percentage of target 

share paida

Yemen 4,800 4,800 100

Zambia 1,600 1,600 100

Latvia 11,200 11,200 100

Malta 10,400 10,400 100

Republic of Moldova 800 800 100

Angola 800 800 100

Burkina Faso 1,600 1,600 100

Tajikistan 800 800 100

Botswana 9,600 9,600 100

Kyrgyzstan 800 800 100

Serbia 14,400 14,400 100

Belize 800 800 100

United States of America 20,000,000 19,775,000 99

Algeria 58,400 58,000 99

Namibia 4,800 4,650 97

Russian Federation 848,800 821,231 97

Burma (Myanmar) 8,000 7,714 96

Indonesia 109,600 104,458 95

Venezuela 132,000 118,800 90

Colombia 119,200 105,856 89

Chile 172,000 140,000 81

Portugal 362,400 289,662 80

Mexico 1,453,600 1,109,294 76

Israel 360,000 140,000 39

Brazil 1,175,200 450,000 38

Argentina 737,600 113,084 15

Philippines 73,600 5,000 7

Morocco 36,000 0 0

Nigeria 32,000 0 0

Paraguay 9,600 0 0

Sudan 6,400 0 0

Uruguay 36,800 0 0

Islamic Republic of Iran 120,800 0 0

Bolivia 7,200 0 0

Bosnia and Herzegovina 2,400 0 0

Costa Rica 23,200 0 0

Page 56 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix IV: 2007 Member State 

Contributions to the Technical Cooperation 

Fund 

Member state TCF target share Amount paid to TCF 

Percentage of target 

share paida

Côte d’Ivoire 8,000 0 0

Democratic Republic of Congo 2,400 0 0

Dominican Republic 27,200 0 0

El Salvador 16,800 0 0

Gabon 7,200 0 0

Georgia 2,400 0 0

Ghana 3,200 0 0

Guatemala 23,200 0 0

Iraq 12,000 0 0

Jamaica 6,400 0 0

Lebanon 18,400 0 0

Liberia 800 0 0

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 101,600 0 0

Madagascar 2,400 0 0

Mali 1,600 0 0

Marshall Islands 800 0 0

Monaco 2,400 0 0

New Zealand 170,400 0 0

Panama 14,400 0 0

Peru 71,200 0 0

Qatar 49,600 0 0

Saudi Arabia 550,400 0 0

Senegal 4,000 0 0

Sierra Leone 800 0 0

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 4,800 0 0

Uzbekistan 10,400 0 0

Benin 1,600 0 0

Central African Republic 800 0 0

Azerbaijan 4,000 0 0

Eritrea 800 0 0

Honduras 4,000 0 0

Seychelles 1,600 0 0

Islamic Republic of Mauritania 800 0 0

Chad 800 0 0

Montenegro 800 0 0

Malawi 800 0 0

Page 57 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix IV: 2007 Member State 

Contributions to the Technical Cooperation 

Fund 

Member state TCF target share Amount paid to TCF 

Percentage of target 

share paida

Mozambique 800 0 0

Palau 800 0 0

Total $80,003,200 $76,491,085 96%

Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data. 

a

IAEA defines the percentage of target share paid as the “rate of attainment,” a percentage arrived at

by taking the total voluntary contributions paid to the TCF by member states for a particular year and 

dividing them by the TCF target for the same year.

Page 58 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix V: 2007 Technical Cooperation Appendix V Disbursements, by Agency Program : 2007 Technical Cooperation 

Disbursements, by Agency Program 

In U.S. dollars 

Program 

Disbursement 

amount

Percentage of total TC 

disbursements

Nuclear power $3,346,800 3.6%

Nuclear fuel cycle and materials technologies 319, 200 0.34

Capacity building and nuclear knowledge maintenance for sustainable 

energy development 

2,273,900 2.4

Nuclear science 7,611,300 8.2

Food and agriculture 11,911,500 12.8

Human health 26,410,000 28.3

Water resources 3,718,300 4.0

Assessment and management of marine and terrestrial environments 3,310,900 3.5

Radioisotope production and radiation technology 6,991,000 7.5

Safety of nuclear installations 5,601,200 6.0

Radiation and transport safety 6,830,100 7.3

Management of radioactive waste 7,177,000 7.7

Nuclear security 1,982,100 2.1

Safeguards 55,100 0.06

Public information and communication 2,400 0.003

Management of technical cooperation for development 4,291,300 4.6

Executive management, policy-making and coordination 405,500 0.43

Emergency preparedness 1,079,000 1.2

Total $93,316,600 100.0%

Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data. 

Note: Percentages might not add to 100 due to rounding. 

Page 59 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department Appendix VI: Comments from the of State 

Department of State 

Page 60 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 61 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 62 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 63 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 64 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 65 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 66 GAO-09-275 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix VII: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 67 GAO-09-275

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Glen Levis (Assistant Director), 

Eugene Gray, Simon Hirschfeld, and William Hoehn made key 

contributions to this report. Other technical assistance was provided by

Jeffrey Phillips, Carol Herrnstadt Shulman, Jay Smale, and Jeanette 

Soares. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(360915) 
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