IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-20102

SARAH WORRELL,

Plaintiff–Appellant

v.

HOUSTON CAN! ACADEMY,

Defendant–Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:07-CV-1100

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

Sarah Worrell appeals the district court’s dismissal of her employmentdiscrimination suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) based on her

failure to obey multiple discovery orders. Finding no abuse of discretion, we

affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 3, 2007, Worrell sued her former employer, Houston Can!

Academy (“HCA”), for employment discrimination and retaliation in violation of

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

May 5, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 10-20102 Document: 00511468631 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/05/2011
No. 10-20102

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Worrell was represented by Melvin

Houston. On May 29, 2008, Worrell served HCA with her initial disclosures.

The parties held a Rule 26(f) conference by telephone on June 26, and HCA

propounded its first set of interrogatories and requests for production of

documents on June 30.

On September 18, HCA filed a motion to compel, asserting that Worrell

had failed to respond to HCA’s discovery requests within thirty days, as required

by Rules 33(b)(2) and 34(b)(2)(A). In addition, HCA argued that Worrell’s initial

disclosures were “materially deficient.” Specifically, HCA argued that Worrell

had failed to (1) identify the actual addresses and telephone numbers of the

individuals likely to have discoverable information, or identify the subjects of

that discoverable information, as required by Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(i); (2) provide a

copy or description of all documents in her control that supported her claims, as

required by Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii); and (3) provide a computation of her damages

and the documents on which that computation was based, as required by Rule

26(a)(1)(A)(iii). HCA attached to its motion several exhibits showing that from

July 7 to September 17 it had faxed numerous letters to Houston demanding

that Worrell cure the deficiencies in her disclosures and respond to HCA’s

discovery requests.

Worrell did not respond to the motion. On October 22, the magistrate

judge assigned to the case, after waiting five weeks for a response, granted the

motion and ordered Worrell to provide complete disclosures and responses to

HCA within five days. The judge also sanctioned Worrell, ordering her to

reimburse HCA for the costs and expenses it had incurred in filing the motion

to compel. Further, the judge warned Worrell that “[a]ny failure . . . to comply

2

Case: 10-20102 Document: 00511468631 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/05/2011
No. 10-20102

with this Order will result in sanctions, including the possible dismissal of this

action.” (emphasis omitted.)

On October 27, Worrell filed a motion to reconsider the magistrate judge’s

order. In her motion, Worrell attempted to explain away her failure to respond

to the motion to compel by arguing that Worrell’s attorney, Houston, had been

“unaware” of the filing of the motion to compel because of the effects of

Hurricane Ike, which made landfall on September 13. According to Worrell, the

storm damaged Houston’s computer systems and caused him to lose power for

more than ten days. HCA refuted this argument by producing evidence showing

that Houston had received an e-mail from HCA’s counsel on September 17

advising him that a motion to compel would be filed the next day, and that

Houston responded to that e-mail within twenty-four hours. On December 2, the

magistrate judge denied the motion to reconsider, finding that Houston had been

on notice of the imminent filing of the motion to compel and that the effects of

Hurricane Ike could not adequately explain why Worrell had failed to respond

to the motion for over a month.

Also on October 27, Worrell served HCA with her first amended initial

disclosures and her original responses to HCA’s discovery requests. On

December 11, HCA filed a second motion to compel. In its motion, HCA argued

that Worrell’s amended disclosures were nearly identical to her original

disclosures and contained the same deficiencies. HCA also argued that Worrell’s

answers to interrogatories 1, 2, 4–8, and 10–14 were unresponsive and that she

1

Specifically, HCA argued that Worrell’s answers failed to provide, among other things,

1

(1) specific contact information for potential witnesses; (2) individualized descriptions of the

relevant knowledge of potential witnesses; (3) the amounts claimed for each type of damages,

an explanation of how each amount was calculated, and a description of the documents on

3

Case: 10-20102 Document: 00511468631 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/05/2011
No. 10-20102

had failed to sign and return various third-party records requests for access to

Worrell’s medical, education, and employment records. Lastly, HCA asserted

that Worrell had failed to produce any documents in response to HCA’s requests

for production.

2

On February 11, 2009, the magistrate judge granted the second motion to

compel over Worrell’s opposition. The judge determined that Worrell’s amended

disclosures and original discovery responses were “not complete”:

For example, the amended initial disclosures list numerous persons

likely to have discoverable information. Each person is then

identified as having the exact same type of discoverable information,

and each person’s address is listed as “c/o” Defendant’s counsel.

That same type of response is provided in response to Interrogatory

Nos. 1 and 2. Similarly deficient is Plaintiff’s calculation of

damages for which no calculation at all has been provided. Finally,

Plaintiff has not provided to Defendant any documents responsive

to Defendant’s requests for production[;] Plaintiff instead

respond[ed] that responsive documents would be made available for

copying and inspection.

which the calculations were based; (4) information concerning Worrell’s physicians and other

health-care providers; (5) the identity of any person who may have witnessed the alleged

discrimination or retaliation; (6) a description of Worrell’s sources of income; (7) complete

information concerning Worrell’s education and employment history; (8) information

concerning any complaints of discrimination that Worrell may have filed in other matters or

any other litigation involving Worrell; (9) a complete description of Worrell’s mitigation efforts;

(10) the identity of each person with whom Worrell had communicated concerning her

allegations, and the substance of those communications; and (11) information concerning

occasions when Worrell has been unable to work.

Although the magistrate judge’s October 22 order expressly required Worrell to 2

“provide Defendant with . . . all documents responsive to Defendant’s Requests for Production,”

Worrell responded to every single request with one of two cut-and-paste statements: (1) “Any

documents responsive to this request that pertain to this case in any way are available for

inspection and copying at the offices of Melvin Houston & Associates”; or (2) “At this time,

Plaintiff has not assessed the location of any documents responsive to this request. Plaintiff

will supplement.”

4

Case: 10-20102 Document: 00511468631 Page: 4 Date Filed: 05/05/2011
No. 10-20102

Accordingly, the magistrate judge held that Worrell had failed to comply with

the October 22, 2008 order, and the judge ordered her, for the second time, to

provide complete disclosures and responses. The judge warned Worrell that

“[a]ny information and documents not so provided by February 16, 2009, cannot

be used, in any form, at trial.” Worrell filed a motion to reconsider on February

13, which the magistrate judge denied on March 10.

Worrell served HCA with her second amended initial disclosures and first

amended discovery responses on February 18, two days after the deadline set by

the magistrate judge in the February 11 order. On March 20, ten days before

the discovery deadline, HCA filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, among other

things, that Worrell’s most recent disclosures and responses remained

incomplete and that dismissal was an appropriate sanction given Worrell’s

continued failure to obey the October 22, 2008 and February 11, 2009 orders.

The motion also sought lesser sanctions.

At a show-cause hearing held on August 14, which Worrell herself

attended, the district court orally found that Worrell still had not fully complied

with the two previous discovery orders. The court stayed the case for sixty days

and ordered Worrell, for the third time, to provide complete disclosures and

responses. The court did not dismiss the case, but it ordered Worrell to

reimburse HCA for the expenses it had incurred in filing and presenting the

motion to dismiss, and it explicitly warned Worrell that if she did not fully

comply within the sixty-day stay period ending on October 13, her case would be

dismissed. Finally, the court instructed the parties that “[u]pon compliance,”

they would be permitted to “move the Court to lift the stay and enter an

amended scheduling order.”

5

Case: 10-20102 Document: 00511468631 Page: 5 Date Filed: 05/05/2011
No. 10-20102

Worrell served HCA with her third amended initial disclosures and second

amended interrogatory answers on October 13. Worrell did not serve HCA with

an amended response to HCA’s requests for production, however, until October

14, one day after the deadline set by the district court. On November 11, almost

one month after the end of the sixty-day stay period, Worrell finally filed a

motion to lift the stay. HCA responded to Worrell’s motion by arguing that

Worrell had failed to comply with the district court’s August 14, 2009 order (and,

by extension, the magistrate judge’s October 22, 2008 and February 11, 2009

orders), and it again requested dismissal of the case.

On January 15, 2010, the district court denied Worrell’s motion to lift the

stay and dismissed her case. In its order, the district court closely examined

Worrell’s most recent disclosures and interrogatory answers. The court found

that the amended disclosures “reiterated the[ ] same deficiencies”:

Nearly all of Plaintiff’s witnesses are described as having the exact

same global knowledge of the events purportedly giving rise to the

suit. In addition, Plaintiff again lists as the addresses for many of

her witnesses not their own addresses but the office address of

Defendant HCA’s counsel. Most, if not all, of these witnesses are

former employees of Defendant who are not in HCA’s control, and

who do not reside at the office address of Defendant’s counsel.

Plaintiff has shown no good faith effort to ascertain the addresses

of her witnesses and, if she possesses the addresses, she has been

obstinate in refusing to provide them to Defendant.

(footnote and emphasis omitted). The court also found that Worrell’s

interrogatory answers were still incomplete:

HCA has repeatedly requested documents about Plaintiff’s interim

earnings and her alleged emotional distress following her

termination by HCA, and Plaintiff has not provided any documents

in response. In HCA’s Interrogatory No. 6, Plaintiff was asked to

identify persons who had witnessed alleged discrimination or

6

Case: 10-20102 Document: 00511468631 Page: 6 Date Filed: 05/05/2011
No. 10-20102

retaliation against her, and to identify related documents. Instead

of giving particularized answers, Plaintiff in her response merely

directs HCA to her answers to other interrogatories that list the

names of all 44 of her ostensible witnesses and all pages of all

documents she has produced. In response to Interrogatory No. 8,

Plaintiff failed to state, as requested, whether her departure from

each employer was voluntary or involuntary.

(footnotes omitted). Lastly, the court determined that Worrell’s amended

response to HCA’s requests for production had been filed late:

Plaintiff produced only a one-page witness statement (which

contained a time stamp showing Plaintiff possessed it for at least

nine months) before the expiration of the 60-day deadline on

October 13th. After expiration of the deadline, Plaintiff proffered to

HCA her “Supplemental” responses to HCA’s requests for

production, with no explanation as to why the response had not

timely been made during the generous 60-day extension. Nor has

Plaintiff provided any explanation as to why she failed to move to

reopen the case until a month after expiration of the deadline set by

the Court.

Based on these factual findings, the district court ruled that Worrell had

“substantially and materially failed and refused to comply with” the August 14,

2009 order. The court then held that given Worrell’s “failure to provide any

justification” for her refusal to comply and “the contemptible manner” in which

she had prosecuted her case, her misconduct was “contumacious and in bad

faith.” After finding that Worrell had been aware of her obligations to the court,

3

The district court also highlighted several other instances in which Worrell or 3

Houston, or both, had defied court orders or failed or refused to observe the rules of procedure,

thereby causing unnecessary expense and delay: (1) The district court sanctioned Houston

after he refused to dismiss the second defendant in Worrell’s original complaint, GreatSchools,

Inc. (“GSI”), even though he knew that GSI had no connection to either Worrell or HCA. We

affirmed this sanction on appeal. See Worrell v. Hous. Can! Acad., 287 F. App’x 320, 325 (5th

Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished). (2) Houston refused to pay the above sanction until,

more than three months after we issued our mandate affirming the sanction, GSI filed a

7

Case: 10-20102 Document: 00511468631 Page: 7 Date Filed: 05/05/2011
No. 10-20102

that HCA had been prejudiced as a result of Worrell’s misconduct, and that no

lesser sanction alone would be sufficient, the court dismissed the case with

prejudice under Rule 37(b)(2). Worrell appeals.

4 5

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) authorizes a district court “to

dismiss a complaint with prejudice when a party refuses to obey a valid

discovery order.” Batson v. Neal Spelce Assocs., Inc., 765 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir.

motion to hold him in contempt. (3) Worrell failed to serve HCA within 120 days after the

filing of the complaint, as required by Rule 4(m). When Worrell finally effected service, the

district court determined that Worrell’s failure to follow Rule 4(m) was without good cause,

although the court exercised its discretion to extend the time for service on other grounds.

(4) The district court dismissed the second defendant in Worrell’s amended complaint, America

Can! Academy, after Worrell completely failed to serve it with process. (5) In response to

HCA’s second motion to compel, Worrell inappropriately filed a retaliatory motion to compel

against HCA. In the February 11, 2009 order, the magistrate judge denied Worrell’s motion

after determining that it contained “only conclusory statements” and that it failed to “identify

any particular discovery request that [was] deficient.”

The district court also ordered Houston to reimburse HCA for the costs and expenses

4

HCA had incurred in prosecuting the motion to dismiss, and the court forwarded a copy of its

order to the Chief Judge of the Southern District of Texas to determine if disciplinary action

should be taken against Houston for what the district court characterized as “serious and

repetitive” violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.

Worrell’s notice of appeal states that she is appealing from the “Memorandum and 5

Order and Final Judgment entered in this action on January 15, 2010, wherein the district

court dismissed all of the Plaintiff’s claims.” “[O]ur review of a district court’s sanction for the

violation of . . . its discovery order[s] necessarily includes a review of the underlying discovery

order[s],” which in this case are the magistrate judge’s October 22, 2008 and February 11,

2009 orders and the district court’s August 14, 2009 order. FDIC v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376,

1381 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Worrell’s opening brief

also purports to appeal the magistrate judge’s April 16, 2009 order, which imposed sanctions

on Worrell for her refusal to return to HCA documents that contained legally protected

information. But this argument is inadequately briefed on appeal, and thus it is waived. See

FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(9)(A) (requiring that an appellant’s brief “contain . . . [the] appellant’s

contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record

on which the appellant relies”).

8

Case: 10-20102 Document: 00511468631 Page: 8 Date Filed: 05/05/2011
No. 10-20102

1985) (citing Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 640

(1976)). “The district court’s discretion under Rule 37 is broad.” Id. at 515.

Thus, “[i]n reviewing a [Rule 37] dismissal by the district court, our duty is to

decide not whether we would have dismissed the action as an original matter,

but whether the district court abused its discretion in so doing.” Id. at 514

(citing Nat’l Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 642). Moreover, we will not disturb the

factual findings on which the district court based its decision unless they are

clearly erroneous. See Bluitt v. Arco Chem. Co., 777 F.2d 188, 191 (5th Cir.

1985).

III. ANALYSIS

In determining whether a district court abused its discretion, our case law

has addressed a number of considerations:

First, dismissal is authorized only when the failure to comply with

the court’s order results from willfulness or bad faith, and not from

the inability to comply. Next, dismissal is proper only in situations

where the deterrent value of Rule 37 cannot be substantially

achieved by the use of less drastic sanctions. Another consideration

is whether the other party’s preparation for trial was substantially

prejudiced. Finally, dismissal may be inappropriate when neglect

is plainly attributable to an attorney rather than a blameless client,

or when a party’s simple negligence is grounded in confusion or

sincere misunderstanding of the court’s orders.

Prince v. Poulos, 876 F.2d 30, 32 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Bluitt, 777 F.2d at

190–91); see also Batson, 765 F.2d at 514–15 (same). Applying this standard to

the facts of this case, we have no difficulty in concluding that the district court

did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Worrell’s case with prejudice under

Rule 37(b)(2).

9

Case: 10-20102 Document: 00511468631 Page: 9 Date Filed: 05/05/2011
No. 10-20102

First, the district court’s findings that Worrell failed to comply with

multiple court orders and that she did so in bad faith are not clearly erroneous.

Rather, there is sufficient evidence showing that Worrell: (1) served initial

disclosures that were “materially deficient” under Rule 26(a); (2) failed to

respond to HCA’s discovery requests, in violation of Rules 33 and 34; (3) ignored

numerous out-of-court demands from HCA’s counsel to resolve these issues;

(4) failed to respond to HCA’s first motion to compel for over a month without

explanation; (5) made false representations in her October 27, 2008 motion to

reconsider about Houston’s awareness of the filing of the first motion to compel;

(6) violated the October 22, 2008 order by serving amended disclosures that

contained the same deficiencies as the original disclosures, by serving

unresponsive interrogatory answers, and by failing to produce any document in

response to HCA’s requests for production; (7) failed to serve her second

amended initial disclosures and first amended discovery responses before the

February 16, 2009 deadline set by the magistrate judge’s February 11, 2009

order; (8) violated the February 11, 2009 order by serving second amended

disclosures that contained the same deficiencies as the first amended disclosures

and by serving first amended discovery responses that were incomplete;

(9) failed to serve her amended responses to HCA’s requests for production

before the October 13, 2009 deadline set by the district court’s August 14, 2009

order; and (10) violated the August 14, 2009 order by failing to serve disclosures

and discovery responses that were complete under the federal rules and

responsive to prior court orders.

In addition, the record is rife with evidence showing that Worrell and

Houston delayed the proceedings, missed deadlines, caused the other parties to

10

Case: 10-20102 Document: 00511468631 Page: 10 Date Filed: 05/05/2011
No. 10-20102

incur needless expense, violated multiple orders from multiple courts, ignored

the requirements of the rules of procedure, failed to respond to the reasonable

inquiries of opposing counsel, and otherwise conducted themselves in a wholly

inappropriate and unprofessional manner. Given this voluminous record of

misconduct, we cannot say that the district court’s finding of bad faith was

clearly erroneous.

Second, at the time the district court dismissed the case, Worrell had

already received several lesser sanctions related to the discovery violations at

issue here: (1) the October 22, 2008 and August 14, 2009 orders’ monetary

sanctions requiring Worrell to reimburse HCA for the expenses it had incurred

in prosecuting the September 18, 2008 motion to compel and the March 20, 2009

motion to dismiss; (2) the February 11, 2009 order’s preclusion of all information

and all documents not produced before the February 16, 2009 deadline; and

(3) the August 14, 2009 order’s sixty-day stay of the case. Moreover, the October

22, 2008 and August 13, 2009 orders both explicitly warned Worrell that her

continued failure to obey court orders would result in dismissal of her case.

Based on this record, we refuse to hold that the district court should have given

Worrell yet another chance to do what she should have done more than fifteen

months earlier and had refused to do on three prior occasions. See Prince, 876

F.2d at 32 (affirming a district court’s dismissal under Rule 37(b)(2) when “prior

to dismissing the appellant’s complaint the district court twice imposed

monetary sanctions for discovery abuses and warned the appellant that further

failure to comply with such orders would result in dismissal of his complaint”).

Rather, the record is more than sufficient to prove that the imposition of lesser

sanctions would have been an exercise in futility.

11

Case: 10-20102 Document: 00511468631 Page: 11 Date Filed: 05/05/2011
No. 10-20102

Third, there can be no doubt that HCA was substantially prejudiced by

Worrell’s misconduct. Worrell’s repeated failures to comply with the prior

discovery orders denied HCA the most basic information about Worrell’s claims,

hampering its ability to prepare a defense. Additionally, HCA unnecessarily

incurred significant attorney fees and expenses seeking discovery of that

information, and the many delays caused by Worrell’s misconduct caused a

straightforward single-plaintiff employment-discrimination case to drag on

without resolution for nearly three years.

Fourth, as the district court correctly found, this is not a case where a

blameless client had been made to suffer for her attorney’s misdeeds. Worrell

was present at the August 14, 2009 show-cause hearing at which the district

court orally held that her current disclosures and responses were deficient and

explicitly ordered her to provide complete disclosures and responses within sixty

days or face dismissal of her lawsuit. She was also personally sanctioned on two

prior occasions for the underlying discovery abuses. Thus, Worrell knew about

her obligations to the court and bears considerable personal responsibility for

her failure to satisfy those obligations. Cf. Woodson v. Surgitek, Inc., 57 F.3d

1406, 1418 (5th Cir. 1995) (affirming the involuntary dismissal of an action as

a sanction even though the client shared little of the blame for his attorney’s

sanctionable conduct).

Lastly, there is no evidence in the record to support an argument that

Worrell’s failure to obey the prior discovery orders was grounded in confusion or

a sincere misunderstanding. The prior orders were clear and easy to

understand, and Worrell did not seek clarification of those orders from the

district court. Accordingly, under the analysis required by our case law, we find

12

Case: 10-20102 Document: 00511468631 Page: 12 Date Filed: 05/05/2011
No. 10-20102

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Worrell’s case

under Rule 37(b)(2).

6

None of Worrell’s arguments to the contrary are availing. First, Worrell

contends that she failed to respond to HCA’s original discovery requests because

those requests had been “prematurely propounded” on June 20, 2008, prior to

the scheduling conference on September 2, 2008. Rule 26(d), however, expressly

sets the starting point for discovery at the Rule 26(f) conference, not the

scheduling conference. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). In this case, the Rule 26(f)

conference took place on June 26, 2008, four days before HCA propounded its

first discovery requests. Therefore, HCA’s actions were proper, and, under Rules

33 and 34, Worrell should have responded to those requests within thirty days.

Worrell failed to do so.

Second, Worrell argues that her failure to respond to HCA’s first motion

to compel should have been excused because of Hurricane Ike. This argument

was rejected by the magistrate judge’s December 2, 2008 order because of

evidence presented by HCA showing that on September 17, 2008, Houston had

received an e-mail from HCA’s counsel advising him that a motion to compel

would be filed the next day, and that Houston had responded to that e-mail

within twenty-four hours. Worrell now asserts that this e-mail exchange is

irrelevant because the e-mail account (i.e., Houston’s e-mail account on his

Blackberry phone) was not the official e-mail account on file with the district

court for purposes of service (i.e., Houston’s Yahoo! e-mail account). This

In her opening brief, Worrell also appeals the portion of the February 11, 2009 order 6

in which the magistrate judge denied Worrell’s retaliatory motion to compel. See supra note

3(5). The magistrate judge’s reasoning in the order is sound, and therefore we find no abuse

of discretion.

13

Case: 10-20102 Document: 00511468631 Page: 13 Date Filed: 05/05/2011
No. 10-20102

argument is misguided. Even if we were to accept that Houston did not have

access to his Yahoo! account because of Hurricane Ike and thus did not receive

a copy of the motion to compel at the time it was served, the record does not

show that the motion was not properly served on Houston via the Yahoo!

account, and the e-mail exchange that was presented to the magistrate judge

still shows that Houston had notice of the imminent filing of the motion. In

these circumstances, it was Houston’s responsibility either to locate a copy of

the motion through other channels or to notify the court that because of

Hurricane Ike, he would need an extension of deadlines. Houston failed to do

either. Moreover, as the magistrate judge explained, the effects of Hurricane Ike

do not adequately explain why Worrell failed to respond to the motion for over

a month. Therefore, we cannot say that the magistrate judge’s December 2, 2008

decision was in error.

Lastly, Worrell insists that her disclosures and responses were complete

under the federal rules. We disagree. At every stage of the proceedings,

Worrell’s disclosures and responses were insufficient under Rules 26(a), 33, and

34. More to the point, however, they were also unresponsive to the orders

entered by the magistrate judge and district court. Ultimately, the district court

dismissed Worrell’s case not because her disclosures and responses were

deficient under the federal rules, but because she had repeatedly failed to obey

court orders requiring the correction of those deficiencies. Even if the orders

required more of Worrell than the federal rules, Worrell still had an obligation

to abide by those orders until such time as she could appeal. Because she did not

do so, her argument about the completeness of her disclosures and responses

does not absolve her of her disobedience.

14

Case: 10-20102 Document: 00511468631 Page: 14 Date Filed: 05/05/2011
No. 10-20102

IV. CONCLUSION

Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing

Worrell’s case with prejudice pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2), we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

15

Case: 10-20102 Document: 00511468631 Page: 15 Date Filed: 05/05/2011