[Cite as In re V.W., 2022-Ohio-2487.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re: [V.W.], :

: No. 21AP-437

(C.P.C. No. 19JU-4802)

[R.W. Father, :

(REGULAR CALENDAR)

Appellant]. :

In re: [V.W.], :

: No. 21AP-438

(C.P.C. No. 19JU-4802)

[B.R. Mother, :

(REGULAR CALENDAR)

Appellant]. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on July 19, 2022

On brief: William T. Cramer, for appellant, R.W. 

On brief: April F. Campbell, for appellant, B.R. 

On brief: Robert J. McClaren, for appellee, Franklin County 

Children Services. 

APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,

Division of Domestic Relations and Juvenile Branch

SADLER, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, R.W., biological father of V.W., a minor child, and appellant B.R.,

biological mother of V.W., appeal the August 23, 2021 judgment of the Franklin County 

Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations and Juvenile Branch, which

granted permanent custody of V.W. to appellee, Franklin County Children Services 

("FCCS"). For the following reasons, we affirm that judgment.
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 2

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} Appellants are the biological, unmarried parents of V.W. (born January

2019). On April 19, 2019, when V.W. was three months old, FCCS filed a complaint alleging 

that V.W. was a neglected child pursuant to R.C. 2151.03(A)(2) and a dependent child

pursuant to R.C. 2151.04(C), (D)(1), and (D)(2). To support these causes of action, the 

complaint alleged two of V.W.'s siblings had previously been removed from B.R.'s custody. 

One sibling was in the temporary custody of FCCS, with a pending motion for permanent 

custody after being found to be an abused child due to conditions of a legal custodian's 

home and physical abuse. Another sibling of V.W. was in the legal custody of a relative after 

that child was found to be a dependent minor due to B.R.'s incarceration for endangering 

children. Specific to the incident causing V.W.'s removal from the home, the complaint 

alleged B.R. left V.W. in the care of R.W., who is a sex offender and not legally permitted to 

be left alone with children. The complaint states that, in addition to his conviction for 

unlawful contact with a minor, R.W. had a criminal history that included failure to file 

notice of change of address and aggravated involuntary manslaughter. The complaint 

further alleged that a loaded gun was found in the home and the conditions of the home 

were unacceptable for an infant.

{¶ 3} V.W. was removed from the home under an emergency care order and placed 

with a relative. R.W. was arrested and incarcerated due to a parole violation. A few days 

later, on April 22, 2019, a juvenile court magistrate granted a temporary order of custody 

to FCCS. A guardian ad litem ("GAL") was appointed for V.W., and FCCS prepared and 

filed case plans with the goal of reunifying V.W. with appellants. After the relative caring 

for V.W. advised FCCS that she was no longer able to keep V.W., at the end of May 2019,

FCCS placed V.W. in the same certified foster home as her older sibling, B.R.R. On June 24, 

2019, following a hearing, the juvenile court found V.W. to be neglected and dependent,

granted FCCS temporary court custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(2), and approved and 

adopted the case plan.

{¶ 4} On March 11, 2020, FCCS filed a motion for permanent custody of V.W. for 

purposes of adoption. A month later, B.R. gave birth to A.R.; A.R. was placed in the custody 

of a relative, S.P. S.P. moved the court to be added as a party in order to pursue custody of 

V.W. and filed a motion for legal custody.
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 3

{¶ 5} In June 2020, following a hearing on FCCS's motion for permanent custody, 

the juvenile court extended the temporary court commitment and the case plan. In doing 

so, the trial court found that reasonable efforts had been made by FCCS to prevent or 

eliminate the need for removal of V.W. from the home, and that placement and casework 

services were provided by FCCS to the family of the child, but the removal of V.W from 

home continued to be necessary because the circumstances giving rise to the original filing 

had not been sufficiently alleviated. The trial court further ordered R.W. to have no contact 

with V.W.

{¶ 6} R.W. was released from prison on August 25, 2020. He was placed on parole 

supervision with conditions that included a prohibition against unsupervised contact with 

minors.

{¶ 7} B.R. had twins in March 2021. The twins were also removed from B.R.’s care 

and placed in the foster home with V.W. and B.R.R. In June 2021, an amended case plan 

was approved adding information pertaining to the twins and allowing R.W. to have 

supervised visitation with V.W. as permitted by his parole officer.

{¶ 8} A dispositional hearing on FCCS's motion for permanent custody occurred 

on August 2 and 16, 2021. Appellants both attended the hearing and were represented by 

counsel. Appellants testified as well as the FCCS caseworker (Brittany Gilmore), the GAL 

for V.W., an Adult Parole Authority specialist (Ruth Peters-Freeman), the parole officer for 

R.W (Patrick Sylvester), and a family coach familiar with R.W.

{¶ 9} B.R testified that she has six children, all of whom reside out of her custody: 

N.R. (in the custody of a relative); A.R. (in the custody of S.P.); B.R.R. (in the permanent 

custody of FCCS and placed in a foster home)1; V.W. (in the temporary custody of FCCS and 

placed in a foster home); and twins (both initialed Y.R.) (in the temporary custody of FCCS 

and placed in a foster home). B.R. admitted she plead guilty to and was convicted of child 

endangering regarding B.R.R.

{¶ 10} According to B.R., she had been working with a caseworker, Ms. Gilmore, 

who discussed the case plan elements with her. B.R. characterized the case plan as 

including completing "parenting class[es], counseling, drug tests, work, Netcare." (Aug. 2., 

2021 Tr. at 19.) B.R. testified that her caseworker provided her a referral list for parenting 

1 See In re B.R., 10th Dist. No. 20AP-117, 2021-Ohio-2324.
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 4

classes, referrals for two psychological evaluations, and transportation assistance including 

bus passes and tickets to Columbus. According to B.R., she completed the parenting 

classes, one of the two psychological evaluations referred to her, a drug and alcohol 

assessment, and one (negative) urine screen. B.R. stated she was waiting on a call to 

schedule the second psychological evaluation. B.R. testified that she attended weekly 

visitations with V.W.

{¶ 11} Regarding housing, B.R testified that when she was pregnant with V.W. she 

was "in and out of [a] shelter" and, once she gave birth to V.W., she lived with R.W. until 

V.W. was removed from the home. (Aug. 2, 2021 Tr. at 12.) Since the removal of V.W., she 

had lived with a friend, her aunt, and at a shelter again. At the time of the hearing, B.R. 

reported she was currently staying at a shelter, where she had resided for approximately a 

month. B.R.'s plan was to get a house and live alone with V.W. without R.W. involved. She 

testified she did not have anyone to support her in taking care of V.W. According to B.R., 

she was on a waiting list for a house since the landlord required her to be employed for 90 

days prior to getting the house.

{¶ 12} As to employment, B.R. testified that she had been employed by Waffle 

House since May 17, 2021. Prior to Waffle House, she worked at another business for about 

two months, since March 2021, and had not held another job before that point. B.R. 

believed she could get insurance through her job but had not signed up yet; she probably 

would be able to enroll in a few days after the hearing. B.R. reported having a car as 

transportation.

{¶ 13} R.W. also contested FCCS's permanent custody motion and testified at the 

August 2021 hearing. R.W. testified that he pleaded guilty to unlawful conduct with a minor 

and failure to register address in February 2012, and testified the victim was not a minor 

that lived in his home. He agreed he is under a requirement to register as a sex offender for 

25 years. R.W. additionally admitted he entered a no contest plea to aggravated riot and 

involuntary manslaughter in April 2015. After R.W. got out of prison, he admitted he lived 

with B.R. and V.W. in early 2019.

{¶ 14} R.W. testified it was not his fault that V.W. was removed from his home in 

April 2019; he believed he "was supposed to be allowed" to be unsupervised with minors 

since he completed a sex offender class, and he was unsure why his parole officer said 
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 5

otherwise and V.W. was removed. (Aug. 2, 2021 Tr. at 30.) R.W. testified he was arrested 

the day V.W. was removed, and that the gun found in his home (not his contact with V.W.) 

violated the terms of his parole. Despite challenging the reason V.W. was removed and the 

basis for his parole violation, R.W. agreed that, at the time of the August 2021 permanent 

custody hearing, he was subject to a condition of parole prohibiting unsupervised contact 

with minors.

{¶ 15} R.W. testified that Ms. Gilmore talked with him about a case plan and agreed 

the case plan included completing a sexual offender assessment, a domestic violence 

assessment, and parenting classes, which R.W. testified he completed. According to R.W., 

he completed the case plan on his own. He obtained secure housing in Youngstown, Ohio

(a two-bedroom, furnished apartment) and is employed as a traveling welder making 

$22.75 an hour. He works 14 to 16 hours a day, six days a week. R.W. testified that he is 

also going to college, and in a year would have a degree in business entrepreneurship with 

the goal of eventually owning and renting real estate and possibly a nightclub. R.W. plans, 

if he is awarded custody, to enroll V.W. in a specific preschool and to seek help from his 

siblings and relatives in Youngstown, who he said are "already talking about helping [him]." 

(Aug. 2, 2021 Tr. at 43.)

{¶ 16} According to R.W., the parole authority would work with him to amend his 

sentence to allow unsupervised contact with V.W. He agreed he needed the judge or parole 

board to change the current terms of his parole in order to regain custody of V.W. R.W. 

believed that, although he is on parole supervision until August 2023, he could get off 

early—possibly August 2022—for good behavior.

{¶ 17} R.W. began supervised visitations in February 2021 and visited with her a 

total of six times for one hour each visit. According to R.W., he believes he is also the father 

of the twins born to B.R. in March 2021. R.W. agreed that he does not have any children in 

his custody.

{¶ 18} Ms. Gilmore, the FCCS caseworker, testified to initially being assigned to this 

case in 2017 through her involvement with V.W.'s older sibling, B.R.R. FCCS opened a case 

specific to V.W. after B.R. disclosed that she had left V.W. alone with R.W. After V.W. was 

removed from the home, FCCS placed V.W. with a maternal cousin. That placement lasted 

about a month, until the relative no longer wished to care for V.W. According to 
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 6

Ms. Gilmore, she submitted the case for additional kinship placements to be evaluated. 

Although some relatives were located and talked to, none of those relatives lead to a 

placement. As a result, V.W. was placed in the same foster home as B.R.R. on May 30, 

2019.

{¶ 19} Ms. Gilmore testified that a case plan was adopted for B.R., which required 

B.R. to complete services for parenting, working with a parent mentor, obtain an updated

psychological assessment and follow through with all of the recommendations, obtain 

stable housing and income sufficient to meet the needs of V.W., complete an alcohol and 

drug assessment and complete random screens, not allow V.W. to have unsupervised time

with R.W., and follow through with all court orders.

{¶ 20} Ms. Gilmore provided referral sheets for the parenting classes, two 

psychological assessments, and linked her to a community service worker to assist with 

housing and income issues. The referral for the parent mentor requirement could not be 

completed, according to Ms. Gilmore, because the referral must be made when the child is 

close to returning home, which is not the case with V.W. since B.R. had not obtained stable 

housing or completed an updated psychological assessment.

{¶ 21} Ms. Gilmore testified that B.R. completed the parenting classes, signed 

releases of information for all service providers, completed a drug and alcohol assessment 

and one screen in July 2021, and obtained employment at Waffle House. B.R. was available 

for home visits with Ms. Gilmore "sporadically" since B.R. did not have housing of her own. 

(Aug. 2, 2021 Tr. at 59.) Ms. Gilmore testified that B.R had never had her own housing 

since V.W. was born. Ms. Gilmore testified that she did not supply B.R. with referrals for 

housing specific to Mahoning County since B.R. told her she was already on a waiting list, 

which B.R. had been asserting for a "span of time" and not just recently and did not 

otherwise request help in that regard. (Aug. 2, 2021 Tr. at 124.) According to Ms. Gilmore, 

B.R. completed a psychological assessment before V.W. was born, but did not complete a 

new assessment after V.W. was born even though Ms. Gilmore made two referrals to assist 

in this effort. Ms. Gilmore noted the agency required B.R. to have an updated psychological 

assessment because the information B.R. provided in the first assessment did not match 

information B.R. provided to FCCS. In Ms. Gilmore's view, B.R. did not substantially 
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 7

complete the case plan since she had not obtained stable housing, completed the updated 

psychological assessment, or worked with a parent mentor.

{¶ 22} Ms. Gilmore also described B.R.'s visits with V.W. as "sporadic": although 

B.R. had been set up to have weekly visits, she only attended the scheduled visits about once 

a month. (Aug. 2, 2021 Tr. at 70.) During the visits, B.R. engaged with V.W., tended to her 

needs, and played with her. In Ms. Gilmore's view, V.W. did have a bond with B.R. Despite 

a bond between the two, Ms. Gilmore testified she would not recommend V.W. be placed 

with B.R. due to B.R.'s housing situation, lack of completion of an updated psychological 

assessment, and her relationship with R.W. According to Ms. Gilmore, B.R. disclosed she 

had lived with R.W. as recently as April 2021. 

{¶ 23} Regarding R.W., Ms. Gilmore testified that she spoke with him about his case 

plan. She discussed the plan with him on the phone while he was incarcerated and met 

with him to discuss the plan when he was released from prison in August 2020. According 

to Ms. Gilmore, the case plan for R.W. required him to: follow rules of the court, parole, 

probation, and community; not have unsupervised time with V.W. or any minors; not place 

V.W. in any harmful situation; not have firearms; complete a sex offender and domestic 

violence assessment; follow through with all recommendations of the assessment; take 

parenting classes; sign releases of information; have safe, stable, and clean housing; 

maintain a legal and stable source of income; and obtain permission from parole authority 

for every visit with the children. Ms. Gilmore provided R.W. with information for a referral 

for a domestic violence assessment in Youngstown and referral information for other 

services in Franklin County, since he had told her that he was obtaining housing in Franklin 

County.

{¶ 24} Ms. Gilmore confirmed R.W. completed the sex offender assessment and 

followed through with those recommendations, completed parenting classes, secured 

acceptable housing and employment, and obtained permission from the parole authority 

to visit with V.W. A family coach with Alta Behavioral Healthcare called by R.W. confirmed 

that R.W. was an active participant in a parenting group for preschool age children, 

completed that program successfully, and is voluntarily attending another parenting 

program. Ms. Gilmore testified that R.W. had visited V.W. approximately six times 
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 8

consisting of once-a-month visits for an hour. Ms. Gilmore witnessed two of those visits, 

and reported that R.W. interacted appropriately with V.W.

{¶ 25} Despite R.W.'s completion of his case plan, Ms. Gilmore testified that she 

would not recommend him for placement because, "[h]e is a registered sex offender [who 

has] been charged with Unlawful Contact with a Minor[;] * * * [the] terms of his parole, he's 

not to have unsupervised contact with any minor children, including his own, and would 

be at risk of returning back to prison"; his past history of violence; and reports of threats of 

violence. (Aug. 2, 2021 Tr. at 78.) She testified that R.W. had only shown it was 

"theoretically possible" for him to address barriers to him having unsupervised contact with 

a minor child. (Aug. 2, 2021 Tr. at 93.) Ms. Gilmore further testified that S.P. and B.R. 

disclosed that R.W. had made threats of violence toward them, and she noted that the 

violence assessment completed by R.W. was based on self-reported information. 

Ms. Gilmore agreed completion of the case plan is only one consideration as to whether 

FCCS would pursue reunification with a parent.

{¶ 26} Ms. Gilmore testified that she had visited the foster home where V.W. is 

placed twice a month since the placement. According to Ms. Gilmore, V.W. is doing well in 

foster care, which includes living with three of her siblings, calls the foster care provider 

"mom," and is bonded to her. Ms. Gilmore reported that the foster home is a possible 

adoptive home. (Aug. 2, 2021 Tr. at 73.) According to Ms. Gilmore, she has continued to 

investigate relatives for possible placement, including, most recently, S.P., who ultimately 

declined a home study to support placement, thereby closing that referral. Ms. Gilmore did 

not personally investigate possible placements with R.W.'s relatives and could not recall if 

R.W. ever told her about a possible placement with his relatives. According to Ms. Gilmore, 

the kinship department typically handles those investigations, and she did not know 

whether that department investigated his family. According to Ms. Gilmore, V.W. did not 

have a relationship with the two siblings that were not placed with her in the foster home.

{¶ 27} Next, a CASA Volunteer testified to being the court appointed special 

advocate (GAL) for V.W. beginning in April 2019, and previously being assigned as the 

special advocate for B.R.R. in 2017. According to the GAL, she had not observed B.R. or 

R.W.'s visitations with V.W. but did not believe there was any issues regarding either 

parent's interactions with V.W.
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 9

{¶ 28} The GAL visited the foster home, and testified that the foster mom is 

divorced, a special education teacher, and a foster parent. According to the GAL, V.W. and 

her foster mom are "quite bonded" and V.W. is very happy and comfortable with her. 

(Aug. 16, 2021 Tr. at 35.) The foster mom is a "gentle disciplinarian" who does not raise her 

voice and is able to maintain a happy home environment. (Aug. 16, 2021 Tr. at 38.) 

{¶ 29} The GAL observed that V.W. and B.R.R. are "very close" and B.R.R. is very 

fond of V.W. and are "often hugging and doing things together." (Aug. 16, 2021 Tr. at 35.) 

V.W. was initially "a little jealous" of her younger twin siblings, but that reaction has 

lessened over time. (Aug. 16, 2021 Tr. at 36.) The foster mom has three biological 

children—one in middle school and two in high school—and the GAL thought all the 

children seemed very compatible and polite with one another, were "a very loving group,"

and remarked that the older children take V.W. places and play with her. (Aug. 16, 2021 

Tr. at 37.) The GAL testified that V.W. is "not verbally" capable of expressing her wishes, 

but that she is "very, very happy in [her foster] household." (Aug. 16, 2021 Tr. at 38.)

{¶ 30} In the GAL's opinion, FCCS should be granted permanent custody of V.W.

with the objective of facilitating her adoption with the foster mom. Her view was based 

both on V.W. being in a safe, nurturing environment where she is doing well, her need for 

permanency, and the inability of both biological parents to provide a comfortable, safe, and 

happy environment. The GAL noted B.R. is 25-years-old with six children, none of whom 

are in her custody, and is not in a position to create a home environment for V.W. In the 

GAL's view, R.W. had not changed his ways, has been belligerent and domineering, and 

"believes that rules do not apply to him and that he should have his way[.]" (Aug. 16, 2021 

Tr. at 42.)

{¶ 31} Ruth Peters-Freeman, a sex offender specialist for the Akron region of the 

Adult Parole Authority, testified R.W. is currently on post-release control for a previous sex 

offense conviction and that supervision expires October 6, 2023. Ms. Peters-Freeman 

unequivocally stated R.W. is not eligible for a reduction in supervision. According to 

Ms. Peters-Freeman, as a condition of his parole, R.W.is prohibited from having 

unsupervised contact with minors, which includes a strict prohibition of residing or having 

overnight contact with a minor and having other forms of contact reviewed by the parole 

officer and subject to her approval. Ms. Peters-Freeman testified no requests had been 
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 10

made to expand R.W.'s contact with V.W., and outlined a multiple-step, "complicated"

process to change parole restrictions. (Aug. 16, 2021 Tr. at 13.) 

{¶ 32} Patrick Sylvester, a State of Ohio parole officer, testified that he has 

supervised R.W. for a couple of years. Mr. Sylvester testified that R.W. had been compliant 

as to this current period of supervision (not in reference to his previous parole violations 

that led to incarceration). In Mr. Sylvester's view, R.W. doesn't have an early release date, 

but instead has a "maximum release date" of around early 2023, and believed it was 

"possible" his release date could be moved up due to his compliance, but he would "have to 

actually check on that again" to make sure. (Aug. 16, 2021 Tr. at 25.) Mr. Sylvester testified 

that the parole authority would follow orders of the court.

{¶ 33} S.P. did not appear at the hearing and no party moved to continue the hearing 

to investigate any other relative. At the end of the hearing, the trial court judge dismissed, 

without objection, S.P.'s motion for legal custody for failure to prosecute.

{¶ 34} On August 23, 2021, the juvenile court issued a judgment granting FCCS 

permanent custody of V.W. for the purposes of adoption. Specifically, the juvenile court 

found: FCCS made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of V.W. 

from her home and to return her to B.R. and/or R.W.; FCCS presented clear and convincing 

evidence that "[a]t least one (1) of the sections listed under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) applies";

R.W. abandoned V.W. as a result of his incarceration; V.W. was in the custody of FCCS for 

12 or more months out of a consecutive 22 month period; V.W. cannot be placed with her 

mother or father within a reasonable time since FCCS presented clear and convincing 

evidence as to the existence of factors stated in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (E)(7)(c), and (E)(16) 

as to B.R. and factors R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (E)(10), and (E)(12) as to R.W.; no relative or 

other interested person has been identified and approved as an appropriate placement for 

legal custody; and granting FCCS' motion for permanent custody is in the child's best 

interest considering the factors in R.C. 2151.414(D). (Aug. 23, 2021 Decision & Entry at 20-

21.)

{¶ 35} R.W. and B.R. filed timely appeals. Those appeals were consolidated for 

review.

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶ 36} R.W. submits four assignments of error:
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 11

1. The juvenile court's judgment erroneously relied in part on 

R.C. 2151.414(B)(2) to award permanent custody. 

2. The trial court's finding that the agency made reasonable 

efforts toward reunification is not supported by clear and 

convincing evidence.

3. Trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the 

possibility of placement with father's relatives.

4. [R.W.]'s due process rights were violated by a grant of 

permanent custody that was not supported by the weight of 

the evidence.

B.R. submits four assignments of error:

1. The trial court's decision to grant permanent custody of 

V.W. to [FCCS] should be reversed, because the record 

does not support the trial court's finding that V.W. could 

not be placed with her mother within a reasonable time.

2. The trial court's decision to grant permanent custody of 

V.W. to [FCCS] should be reversed, because it was not in 

V.W.'s best interest to do so.

3. The trial court's decision should be reversed because the 

finding that the agency made reasonable efforts toward 

reunification in [B.R.]'s case was not supported by clear 

and convincing evidence.

4. The trial court's decision should be reversed because the 

evidence weighed manifestly against granting permanent 

custody of V.W. to [FCCS].

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶ 37} A parent has a "fundamental liberty interest * * * in the care, custody, and 

management of [his or her child]." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). The 

Supreme Court of Ohio has noted that "[p]ermanent termination of parental rights has 

been described as 'the family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case.' * * * 

[and] parents 'must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection the law 

allows.' " In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48 (1997), quoting In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 

16 (1991). 

{¶ 38} "However, [parental] rights are not absolute." In re A.S., 10th Dist. No. 

20AP-93, 2021-Ohio-218, ¶ 19. "[I]t is plain that the natural rights of a parent * * * are 

always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the polestar or controlling 

principal to be observed." In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106 (1979) (internal 
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 12

quotation omitted). "Parental interests must be subordinated to the child's interest in 

determining an appropriate disposition of any petition to terminate parental rights." Id. 

{¶ 39} "A trial court's determination in a permanent custody case will not be 

reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence." In re K.L., 10th 

Dist. No. 13AP-218, 2013-Ohio-3499, ¶ 13. "Judgments supported by some competent, 

credible evidence as to each of the essential elements of the case are not against the manifest 

weight of the evidence." Id. " 'Where clear and convincing proof is required at trial, a 

reviewing court will examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact had sufficient 

evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.' " In re B.R., 10th Dist. No. 18AP903, 2019-Ohio-2178, ¶ 37, quoting In re J.F., 8th Dist. No. 105504, 2018-Ohio-96, ¶ 47.

"Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the 

trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the facts to be established." In re K.L. at ¶ 14, 

citing Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. "It is more 

than a mere preponderance of the evidence but does not require proof beyond a reasonable 

doubt." "In conducting our review, every reasonable presumption must be made in favor 

of the trial court's findings of fact and judgment." In re L.W., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-586, 

2018-Ohio-2099, ¶ 8.

{¶ 40} Purely legal questions are reviewed de novo on appeal. Zimmer v. Zimmer, 

10th Dist. No. 00AP-383, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 713 (Feb. 27, 2001); see, e.g.,In re N.M.P., 

160 Ohio St.3d 472, 2020-Ohio-1458, ¶ 1, 13-29 (determining the meaning of the "12 

months of a consecutive 22 month period" requirement stated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d)).

IV. ANALYSIS

{¶ 41} The appellants' eight assignments of error collectively challenge the trial 

court's decision to grant permanent custody of V.W. to FCCS for purposes of adoption. For 

clarity of analysis and to avoid duplication, we address the appellants' assignments of error 

in five categories: (1) reasonable efforts at reunification; (2) reliance on R.C. 2151.141(B)(2); 

(3) placement with B.R. within a reasonable time; (4) best interests of V.W.; and (5) 

placement with R.W.'s relative.

(1)Reasonable efforts at reunification (R.W.'s second assignment of 

error, B.R.'s third assignment of error)

{¶ 42} Both appellants argue the trial court erred in concluding FCCS made 

reasonable efforts to reunify the family as required by R.C. 2151.419. R.C. 2151.419(A)(1) 
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 13

provides that, at certain hearings, the trial court is obligated to determine whether the

children's services agency met its burden of proving it made "reasonable efforts to prevent 

the removal of the child from the child's home, to eliminate the continued removal of the 

child from the child's home, or to make it possible for the child to return safely home" or 

whether certain exceptions listed in R.C. 2151.419(A)(2) apply. The exceptions listed in 

R.C. 2151.419(A)(2) include situations where a parent abandons a child, a parent has had 

parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling of the child, or a parent 

was convicted of or pleaded guilty to certain offenses, including R.C. 2919.22(B)(2). See

R.C. 2151.419(A)(2)(a)(iii), (A)(2)(d), (A)(2)(e). A children's services agency may not file 

for permanent custody "[i]f reasonable efforts to return the child to the child's home are 

required under [R.C. 2151.419, and] the agency has not provided the services required by 

the case plan to the parents of the child or the child to ensure the safe return of the child to 

the child's home." R.C. 2151.413(D)(3)(b).

{¶ 43} By its plain terms, "R.C. 2151.419(A)(1) does not apply in a hearing on a 

motion for permanent custody filed pursuant to R.C. 2151.413." In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 

73, 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 43. However, if the agency is not relieved of its burden to prove 

reasonable efforts under R.C. 2151.419 through an exception, and it "has not established 

that reasonable efforts have been made prior to the hearing on a motion for permanent 

custody, then it must demonstrate such efforts at that time." Id. In re K.D., 10th Dist. No. 

18AP-746, 2019-Ohio-1077, ¶ 50.

{¶ 44} Here, the trial court found as a part of its permanent custody determination 

that FCCS had made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of V.W. 

from the home. Both R.W. and B.R. argue that the trial court's reasonable efforts finding 

is not supported by the record. R.W. argues the caseworker admitted that she continued to 

provide him with referrals for Franklin County when he lived in Youngstown and he 

effectively had to work the case plan on his own. B.R. similarly argues the agency never 

gave "V.W. a referral to [B.R.] to establish housing in the county in which she resided," and 

adds that the caseworker had no knowledge as to why further efforts were not made to place 

V.W. with another family member, S.P. (Brief of Appellant B.R. at 12.) 

{¶ 45} FCCS counters that the trial court was not required to make reasonable 

efforts findings since it had already made that determination prior to the permanent 
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 14

custody hearing and since exceptions apply under R.C. 2151.419(A)(2)(d)(abandonment by 

R.W. while incarcerated), (A)(2)(e) (sibling of V.W. involuntarily placed into permanent 

custody of FCCS), and R.C. 2151.419(A)(2)(a)(iii) (B.R.'s guilty plea to child endangering 

under R.C. 2919.22 involving a sibling of V.W.). FCCS adds, in the alternative, that the trial 

court did not err in determining FCCS did make reasonable efforts to reunify V.W. with 

B.R. and R.W.

{¶ 46} We agree with FCCS. Initially, it does appear that this case involves 

exceptions that relieve FCCS of its burden to prove it made reasonable efforts at 

reunification under R.C. 2151.419(A)(1). B.R. does not dispute that she had her parental 

rights involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling of V.W., and R.W. fails to rebut the 

presumption he abandoned V.W. while he was incarcerated for more than 90 days with his 

bare statement that he did not abandon V.W. "intentionally." (Brief of Appellant R.W. at 

21.) See R.C. 2151.011(C) ("For the purposes of this chapter, a child shall be presumed

abandoned when the parents of the child have failed to visit or maintain contact with the 

child for more than ninety days, regardless of whether the parents resume contact with the 

child after that period of ninety days."); In re L.M., 6th Dist. No. L-16-1212, 2017-Ohio-610, 

¶ 27-28 ("This provision creates a presumption of abandonment, which may be rebutted"), 

citing In re S.B., 183 Ohio App.3d 300, 2009-Ohio-3619, ¶ 33 (10th Dist.); In re M.A., 10th 

Dist. No. 20AP-345, 2021-Ohio-1078, ¶ 51 (noting that a parent's intent to relinquish 

parental rights is irrelevant to a determination of abandonment under R.C. 2151.011(C)).

{¶ 47} Regardless, FCCS did attempt to engage in efforts to reunify V.W. with both 

appellants, and the trial court in this case did not rely on any R.C. 2151.419(A)(2) exception 

but instead assessed FCCS's efforts to reunify V.W. with B.R. and R.W. and determined 

those efforts to be reasonable. As indicated by FCCS, the trial court made this 

determination prior to the August 2021 permanent custody hearing. Specifically, on 

June 25, 2020, following a hearing, the trial court adopted a magistrate's decision, without 

objection, finding reasonable efforts had been made by FCCS to prevent or eliminate the 

need for removal of V.W. from the home, and that although placement and casework 

services were provided by FCCS to the family of the child, the removal of V.W from home 

continued to be necessary because the circumstances giving rise to the original filing had 

not been sufficiently alleviated. These findings satisfy the reasonable efforts requirement 
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 15

under R.C. 2151.419(A)(1), and the trial court was not obligated to make a fresh 

determination on this issue in its August 2021 decision. In re K.D. at ¶ 51 (determining 

reasonable efforts requirement satisfied by trial court decision indicating FCCS made 

reasonable efforts to prevent the continued removal of the child from the home, biological 

father was not participating in case services at that time and had a criminal background 

including sexual abuse of a minor); In re A.N.F., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-905, 2018-Ohio-3689, 

¶ 22 (determining reasonable efforts requirement satisfied by trial court decision indicating 

"[c]ontinuation in the child's own home would be contrary to the child's welfare and that 

reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of said child 

from the child's own home").

{¶ 48} "We cannot reverse a judgment based on an alleged error in a finding that the 

trial court never had to make in the first place." In re J.H., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-517, 2021-

Ohio-807, ¶ 66. Nevertheless, we agree that the record of this case supports the trial court's

conclusion that FCCS made reasonable efforts to reunify V.W. with B.R. and/or R.W. As 

discussed by the trial court, this family has a long history of involvement with child 

protective services stemming from issues surrounding V.W.'s older sister. FCCS developed 

case plans, which were adopted by the court, with the goal of reunifying V.W. with B.R. and 

R.W. B.R. and R.W. testified the caseworker reviewed the case plan with them. The record 

shows that FCCS made efforts to assist appellants in possibly reunifying with V.W. While 

appellants take issue with FCCS not providing enough referral assistance outside of 

Franklin County, the caseworker explained that R.W. had indicated an intent to move to 

Franklin County and B.R. reported that she had been placed on a waiting list for housing

and did not seek further assistance. Neither R.W. nor B.R. provide legal authority 

pertaining to provision of services and referrals to biological parents who do not reside in 

the county where the child is placed. State v. Hubbard, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-945, 2013-

Ohio-2735, ¶ 34 ("An appellant must support their assignments of error with an argument, 

which includes citation to legal authority"), citing App.R. 16(A)(7) and App.R. 12(A)(2).

Furthermore, B.R. does not explain how FCCS's (purported) lack of consideration of S.P. as 

a (once) prospective placement is relevant to FCCS's efforts to reunify V.W. with B.R. to 

support this assignment of error. 
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 16

{¶ 49} Based on the record of this case, FCCS made reasonable efforts under the 

circumstances to facilitate B.R. and R.W.'s participation in the case plan in order to reunite 

with V.W. R.W. and B.R.'s arguments to the contrary lack merit.

{¶ 50} Accordingly, considering all the above, we overrule R.W.'s second assignment 

of error and B.R.'s third assignment of error. 

(2) Reliance on R.C. 2151.141(B)(2) (R.W.'s first assignment of error)

{¶ 51} R.W. contends the trial court erred "insofar as it relied on" 

R.C. 2151.414(B)(2). (Brief of Appellant R.W. at 15.) Our review of the trial court's decision 

shows the trial court cited R.C. 2151.414(B)(2) as a part of the statutory framework but did 

not rely on R.C. 2151.414(B)(2) as the basis for its decision to grant permanent custody to 

FCCS. Specifically, the trial court does not expressly make any findings under this section, 

and in its conclusions of law the trial court made its determination regarding permanent 

custody under "at least one" section of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). (Decision & Entry at 20.) 

Therefore, R.W.'s first assignment of error is contrary to the record and lacks merit.

{¶ 52} Accordingly, we overrule R.W.'s first assignment of error. 

(3) Placement with B.R. within a reasonable time (B.R.'s first 

assignment of error)

{¶ 53} B.R. contends there is an insufficient factual basis to determine that V.W. 

could not be placed in her care within a reasonable time since she made "substantial efforts 

with respect to her reunification plan[.]" (Brief of Appellant B.R. at 6.) Although B.R. does 

not cite a statutory provision, we assume she refers to the trial court's determination that 

V.W. could not be placed with B.R. within a reasonable time to satisfy R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1)(a). This statute section is one of five alternative factors that must be met as 

a first step to determining a permanent custody motion. In re A.S., 10th Dist. No. 20AP93, 2021-Ohio-218, ¶ 20 ("In deciding to award permanent custody, the trial court must 

take a two-step approach * * * The court must first determine if any of the factors set forth 

in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) apply.")

{¶ 54} Here, in addition to determining V.W. "cannot be placed with either of her 

parents within a reasonable time" under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), the trial court also held the 

"twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period" factor described in R.C. 
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 17

2151.414(B)(1)(d) applies. (Decision & Entry at 12.) B.R. does not assign the trial court's 

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) determination as error or otherwise challenge that holding.2

{¶ 55} In such circumstances, this court has determined the issue of whether a child 

cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time is moot and the 

determinative issue becomes the best interests of the child. In re K.J., 10th Dist. No. 19AP727, 2020-Ohio-4391, ¶ 31 (finding assignment of error concerning placement of the child 

with the mother to be "moot" where the mother did not challenge the finding that the child

had been in the custody of FCCS for 12 or more months of the consecutive 22-month period

under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d)); In re T.W., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-897, 2011-Ohio-903, ¶ 51-

52 ("[W]hen R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) has been satisfied, it is unnecessary for the trial court 

to analyze when a child could or should be placed with either parent and [the appellate 

court] need not consider such extraneous findings as to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)."); In re 

M.W., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-769, 2020-Ohio-5199, ¶ 17-18 (proceeding to best interests of 

the child determination where mother did not dispute the trial court's conclusion that the 

child was in the temporary custody of FCCS for more than 12 months out of a consecutive 

22-month period under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d)). See also In re N.D., 2d Dist. No. 28687, 

2020-Ohio-3203, ¶ 18 (finding that since "there was no dispute that [the child] had been in 

the temporary custody of [the agency] for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month 

period," the agency "only needed to establish that an award of permanent custody to the 

agency was in N.D.'s best interest").

{¶ 56} Moreover, while the trial court was not obligated to make the alternative 

holding that V.W. could not be placed with B.R. within a reasonable time, our review shows

the trial court's determination in that regard is not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. See In re T.W. at ¶ 51 ("A trial court is not limited to making only the minimum 

number of required findings in any given case, and it remains free to make additional 

findings if it so chooses."); In re K.J. at ¶ 35 (discussing appropriateness of trial court's

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) determination "[e]ven if the issue is not moot[.]").

{¶ 57} R.C. 2151.414 states that, "[i]f the court determines, by clear and convincing 

evidence, at a [R.C. 2151.414(A) hearing] * * * that one or more" of a list of factors exist, "the 

court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a 

2 We note R.W. expressly concedes R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is met. 
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 18

reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent." R.C. 2151.414(E). Here, the 

trial court found R.C. 2151.414(E)(1); R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)(c); R.C. 2151.414(E)(11); and R.C. 

2151.414(E)(16). B.R. does not challenge the trial court's findings under 

R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)(c) and R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), which concern an endangering children 

conviction and having parental rights terminated with respect to a sibling. Therefore, these 

findings alone support the trial court's determination that V.W. could not be placed with 

B.R. within a reasonable time or should not be placed with B.R. The trial court's 

determination that R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) was met is also supported by this record, which 

clearly shows B.R. "failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy" her chronic 

lack of housing. R.C. 2151.414(E)(1).

{¶ 58} Accordingly, we overrule B.R.'s first assignment of error. 

(4) Best interests of V.W. (R.W.'s fourth assignment of error, B.R.'s 

second and fourth assignments of error)

{¶ 59} After a trial court determines at least one of the factors set forth in 

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) applies, the trial court must then determine, by clear and convincing 

evidence, whether a grant of permanent custody is in the best interest of the child. In re 

A.J., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-864, 2014-Ohio-2734, ¶ 16; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). In determining 

the best interest of a child, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) directs that the trial court must consider all 

relevant factors including, but not limited to, the following:

(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the 

child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-ofhome providers, and any other person who may significantly 

affect the child;

(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or 

through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the 

maturity of the child;

(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the 

child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public 

children services agencies or private child placing agencies for 

twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month 

period, or the child has been in the temporary custody of one 

or more public children services agencies or private child 

placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive 

twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) 

of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was 

previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in 

another state;
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 19

(d) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement 

and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a 

grant of permanent custody to the agency;

(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this 

section apply in relation to the parents and child.

" 'R.C. 2151.414(D) does not give any one factor 'greater weight than the others.' " In re 

M.T., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-344, 2020-Ohio-2950, ¶ 17, quoting In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio 

St.3d 498, 2006-Ohio-5513, ¶ 56.

{¶ 60} The trial court considered each factor and ultimately determined that clear 

and convincing evidence showed granting FCCS permanent custody was in the best 

interests of V.W. We agree.

{¶ 61} Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a), in making its best interest determination, the 

trial court must consider the interactions and relationships between the child and the 

individuals in the child's life, including the child's parents, siblings, relatives, and "any other 

person who may significantly affect the child." The evidence here showed a bond between 

V.W. and B.R. and a developing bond between V.W. and R.W., and each parent was 

reported to behave appropriately with V.W. at visitations. However, the evidence also 

showed a very strong bond between V.W. and her foster mother, her foster siblings, and her 

older sister B.R.R., who is in the permanent custody of FCCS and in the care of the foster 

mom. The evidence shows V.W. is happy and very well cared for in her foster home 

placement. V.W. did not have a strong bond with her other siblings. 

{¶ 62} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) required the trial court to consider V.W.'s wishes, 

expressed either directly or through the child's guardian ad litem. Here, the GAL testified 

that V.W., who was approximately two and one-half years old at the time of the hearing, is 

not capable of expressing her wishes, but she is "very, very happy in [her foster] household"

and testified that it was in V.W.'s best interest for FCCS to be granted permanent custody 

for purposes of adoption with her foster family. (Aug. 16, 2021 Tr. at 38.) The trial court 

found V.W. to be "too young and too immature to understand the nature of these 

proceedings and/or to articulate her wishes." (Decision & Entry at 19.) As another relevant 

best interest factor, the trial court cited the GAL's opinion that it is in V.W.'s best interest 

for permanent custody to be granted to FCCS for the purposes of adoption.
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 20

{¶ 63} B.R. contends that the trial court's decision should be reversed because there 

is no clear and convincing evidence as to V.W.'s wishes. Contrary to this argument, this 

court previously found where the record affirmatively shows that a child not capable of 

communicating wishes, as is the case here, the trial court is excused from considering the 

child's wishes and may rely on insights of the GAL. In re J.W., 10th Dist. No. 06AP-864, 

2007-Ohio-1419, ¶ 18, citing In re Wright, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-435, 2004-Ohio-4045, ¶ 12.

See, e.g., In re Schaefer ¶ 60 (finding trial court satisfied its statutory duty when it found 

that at 14 months of age, the child was too immature to articulate his wishes, but noted that 

the guardian ad litem had testified that it was in the best interest of the child that permanent 

custody be granted to GCJFS so that the child could be adopted by his foster family); In re 

Lopez, 166 Ohio App.3d 688, 2006-Ohio-2251, ¶ 37 (3d Dist.) (determining that trial 

court's finding that two- and three-year old children were too young to express their wishes 

was supported by the record and permanent custody to the agency was appropriate for 

those children, but that the trial court's same finding regarding a five-year old child's wishes 

was not supported by clear and convincing evidence and, therefore, the trial court's grant 

of permanent custody of the older child should be reversed). Having reviewed this record, 

we find the GAL competent, and find B.R.'s argument as to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) to lack 

merit.

{¶ 64} Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c), the trial court must consider the custodial 

history of the child. V.W. has been out of her biological parents' care since April 2019, when 

she was removed when she was only a few months old and was adjudicated neglected and 

dependent in June 2019. She has been in the same foster placement since May 2019, where 

three of her siblings also reside. Neither party challenges the trial court's findings under 

this factor nor argues against its applicability in favor of the permanent custody 

determination.

{¶ 65} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) addresses the child's need for a legally secure 

permanent placement and required the trial court to consider whether this can be achieved 

without a grant of permanent custody to FCCS. The record supports both aspects of this 

section. At the time of the hearing, V.W. had her future subject to uncertainty for over two 

years. The GAL, who has been involved with appellants even prior to V.W.'s birth, testified 

for the need for a secure, permanent home for V.W. and emphasized that V.W. has the 
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 21

opportunity to secure a future with her older sister and younger twin siblings with a foster 

mother she is very bonded to. See In re K.J. at ¶ 25 ("K.J.'s interactions and 

interrelationships show a mother-child bond with her foster mother that could meet the 

need for permanency described by her GAL.").

{¶ 66} Further, no relatives sought custody of V.W.; S.P.'s motion was dismissed for 

failure to prosecute. Contrary to B.R.'s argument, the record supports the trial court's 

finding that B.R. could not meet V.W.'s needs for a legally secure permanent home. 

Namely, a review of the record and testimony clearly shows B.R. is unlikely to gain, and 

keep, suitable housing. This finding is not premature, as suggested without legal support 

by B.R.; no party suggests FCCS lacked statutory authority to move for permanent custody, 

and in this case, the record clearly shows B.R. is not a viable option to give V.W. the legally 

secure home that she needs.

{¶ 67} Moreover, appellants' prior convictions, which include endangering children 

for B.R. arising out of an injury to B.R.R. and unlawful sexual conduct with a minor for 

R.W., present ongoing serious concerns about whether either appellant can safely care for 

V.W. (as testified to by the GAL and the caseworker) and legal barriers to regaining custody 

of her. The trial court found R.W. had not started any process to attempt to remove legal 

barriers to having custody of V.W. and "cannot demonstrate a reasonable assurance that he 

will be able to until at least October 2023." (Decision & Entry at 19.) R.W. challenges the 

trial court's finding regarding the legal impediment of his inability to have unsupervised 

contact with minors poses to gaining custody of V.W.

{¶ 68} This challenge fails. While R.W.'s parole officer believed it was "possible" 

R.W's release date could be shortened, he also noted he would "have to check on that again" 

to make sure. (Aug. 16, 2021 Tr. at 25.) Ms. Peters-Freeman unequivocally stated R.W. is 

not eligible for a reduction in supervision. In re M.W. at ¶ 42 (emphasizing that the weight 

to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily questions to be 

answered by the trier of fact). R.W. admits the testimony by Ms. Peters-Freeman described 

a complicated process to have restrictions changed and does not dispute he had not started 

that process. R.W.'s suggestion that Ms. Peters-Freeman also described an easier process 

that was "much easier" to go from supervised to unsupervised contact both defies logic and 

does not reflect the testimony of Ms. Peters-Freeman, who appears to have thought the 
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 22

question addressed the process to "approve * * * supervised contacts" on a limited, visit-tovisit basis. (Brief of Appellant R.W. at 23; Aug. 2, 2021 Tr. at 15.) To the extent R.W. argues 

the parole board would "go along with whatever the court approved in terms of visitation," 

the trial court here evidently did not decide altering his visitation restrictions was in the 

best interest of V.W. and instead, appropriately determined that this record showed 

granting FCCS permanent custody for purposes of adoption is in V.W.'s best interest. 

(Decision & Entry at 23.)

{¶ 69} Under this factor, R.W. also submits that, "[b]ut for the supervision 

restriction, father was a viable placement." (Brief of Appellant R.W. at 24.) The record 

shows otherwise. R.W. has a concerning criminal history, including unlawful sexual 

conduct with a minor, and a willingness to violate restrictions of his parole, even when 

doing so may jeopardize the safety of his children. See In re S.D., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-546, 

2009-Ohio-1047, ¶ 14 ("[H]is history of domestic violence made him a questionable 

placement, even if he had completed his incarceration."). The GAL testified to having 

concerns R.W. had not changed his ways and to believing rules did not apply to him, and 

did not recommend V.W. be placed with R.W. Moreover, even though R.W. completed case 

plan elements, "R.C. 2151.414(D) does not require courts to deny a children services 

agency's motion for permanent custody solely by virtue of a parent's substantial compliance 

with the case plan." In re A.S. at ¶ 23, citations omitted. Contrary to R.W.'s argument, the 

record supports the trial court's finding that he could not meet V.W.'s need for a legally 

secure permanent home.

{¶ 70} Lastly, under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e), the court was required to consider 

whether any of the factors in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11) apply, which include: whether the 

parent has been convicted of or pled guilty to certain crimes; whether the parent withheld 

medical treatment or food from the child; whether the parent has placed the child at a 

substantial risk of harm due to alcohol or drugs; whether the parent has abandoned the 

child; and whether the parent has had parental rights terminated with respect to a sibling 

of the child. The trial court found R.W. legally abandoned V.W. and B.R. was convicted 

under R.C. 2919.22. Neither appellant presents a legal supported argument to the contrary.

{¶ 71} Overall, we find the trial court thoroughly reviewed and weighed the evidence 

in relation to all factors relevant to determining whether granting permanent custody to 
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 23

FCCS was in the best interest of V.W. Competent, credible evidence supported the trial 

court's conclusion that granting permanent custody to FCCS was in V.W.'s best interest. As 

a result, we find that the manifest weight of the evidence supports the trial court's

determination of the best interest of the child under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and (D).

{¶ 72} Accordingly, we overrule R.W.'s fourth assignment of error and B.R.'s second 

and fourth assignments of error. 

(5) Placement with R.W.'s relative (R.W.'s third assignment of error)

{¶ 73} R.W. contends the trial court abused its discretion in "dismissing the 

possibility of placement with [his] relatives." (Brief of Appellant R.W. at iii, 16.) According 

to R.W., he testified that he had sisters who lived near him and were looking forward to 

helping him care for V.W., suggested a relative for placement, and contends FCCS admitted 

they failed to follow up on or investigate these leads. R.W. acknowledges that "some courts 

have held that there is no statutory duty to make reasonable efforts to place children with

relatives[,]" but asserts that R.C. 2151.412 establishes guidelines that create a priority on 

placement with relatives while in temporary custody and the child's relationship with 

relatives is a factor to consider in the best interests determination. (Brief of Appellant R.W.

at 17.)

{¶ 74} R.W. cites to, and attempts to distinguish this case from, In re S.D., which 

found the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting permanent custody of a child 

to FCCS without requiring a more diligent effort to find a potential placement with a 

relative. R.W. believes the case is different since the trial court here did not acknowledge 

FCCS's (purported) failure to investigate placement with R.W.'s relatives, and concluded 

FCCS made reasonable efforts to identify, locate, and approve placements with relatives 

despite contrary evidence in the form of the caseworker's admission otherwise. R.W. also 

contends that unlike In re S.D., R.W. completed the case plan and therefore the child's 

interest weighs more in favor of maintaining familial bonds and a potential reunification 

with father.

{¶ 75} FCCS argues that we should follow In re S.D. in this case. FCCS contends

that, as in In re S.D., there were no motions from any relatives for custody of the child and 

V.W. is receiving good care from the long-term foster placement. FCCS also argues that 

even if a relative appeared, it is unlikely placement with that relative would be in V.W.'s 
Nos. 21AP-437 & 21AP-438 24

best interest since V.W. is placed in the same, stable household as three of her siblings and

that placement is a possible adoptive home. FCCS notes R.W. did not raise the existence of 

relatives at trial or ask for a continuance to pursue relatives as placements.

{¶ 76} On the record of this case, we agree with FCCS. First, the trial court does not 

have a duty to find by clear and convincing evidence that no suitable relative was available 

for placement. In re Schaefer at ¶ 64. In other words, "while biological relationships may 

be important considerations, they are not controlling when ascertaining a child's best 

interest." In re C.M., 4th Dist. No. 17CA16, 2017-Ohio-9037, ¶ 86.

{¶ 77} Second, it is unclear from the record whether R.W. suggested a relative to 

FCCS to investigate and the record does not show, as R.W. suggests, that FCCS then failed 

to undertake a related investigation. The caseworker had no personal knowledge of an 

investigation into R.W.'s relatives, but also said that effort was assigned to a specific kinship 

department. We do not find the record establishes FCCS failed to investigate R.W.'s family 

for possible placements.

{¶ 78} Third, we find In re S.D. supports FCCS's position. Like In re S.D., at the date 

of the final hearing, no relative had presented himself or herself as a potential placement, 

V.W. had received good care in the foster home after a failed attempt to place her in the 

custody of a relative, and, as indicated in addressing the best interests issue above, the 

record indicates that the trial court considered the evidence presented and found by clear 

and convincing evidence that FCCS should be granted permanent custody of V.W. As in In 

re S.D., we do not find the trial court abused its discretion in not considering placement 

with a relative of R.W. under these circumstances.

{¶ 79} Accordingly, we overrule R.W.'s third assignment of error. 

V. CONCLUSION

{¶ 80} Overall, the trial court decision to grant FCCS permanent custody of V.W. is 

not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Having overruled R.W.'s four assignments 

of error and B.R.'s four assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County 

Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations and Juvenile Branch.

Judgment affirmed.

LUPER SCHUSTER, P.J., and DORRIAN, JJ., concur.

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