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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (PART III) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 16, 2008 

Serial No. 110–206 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

PERRY APELBAUM, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

SEPTEMBER 16, 2008 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary ..................... 1 

The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary ......................... 2 

The Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary ................................. 3 

The Honorable Robert C. ‘‘Bobby’’ Scott, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Virginia, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary .................... 4 

The Honorable Louis Gohmert, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary ........................................ 5 

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11 

APPENDIX 

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record .......................................................... 49 

(1) 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

(PART III) 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 2008 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:17 a.m., in Room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable John Conyers, 

Jr. (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Conyers, Nadler, Scott, Lofgren, Waters, Delahunt, Sa ́nchez, Cohen, Davis, Ellison, Smith, Coble, 

Goodlatte, Lungren, Issa, King, and Gohmert. 

Staff present: Robert Reed, Majority Oversight Counsel; Caroline 

Lynch, Minority Counsel; and Renata Strause, Majority Staff Assistant. 

Mr. CONYERS. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. 

We welcome Robert Mueller, our FBI director, to yet another 

hearing which he has graced us with his presence. 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the anchor of our Nation’s 

Federal law enforcement and has the important responsibility of 

not only combatting crime, conducting surveillance, initiating investigations but now have the responsibility of dealing with the 

issue of terrorism on top of all their other existing duties. 

We appreciate the Bureau’s efforts to get us answers on our letters, particularly the September 5 letter. 

Director Mueller, we are trying to get a proposed copy of the Attorney General FBI guidelines. We are trying to identify what specific safeguards will prevent improper undercover FBI spying 

against domestic groups and citizens, abusive investigation techniques like pretext interviews; and improper racial and ethnic 

profiling. 

I would also like a statement as to whether the guidelines of 

former Attorney General Edward Levy to protect against improper 

invasions of privacy were rescinded by former Attorney General 

Ashcroft and, if they were, will they be reinstated? 

We have numerous questions on the anthrax issue, and we need 

an explanation of the improper collection of reporters’ phone 

records and what disciplinary action will be taken for the FBI’s improper collection of reporters’ phone records and abuses, particularly concerning exigent letters and national security letters. 

And, finally, we need to know how many FBI agents were devoted to mortgage fraud issues before and after a top FBI official 

warned about this problem back in 2004. Included in that is, of 

2 

course, an explanation of why fewer resources were devoted to 

mortgage fraud after the 2004 warnings. 

So that is all we want to know, and that is why we welcome you 

here this morning. 

I would like now to turn to the distinguished Ranking Member 

of House Judiciary Committee Lamar Smith of Texas. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Chairman, your 

opening statement did pretty much cover the entire arena, I do believe. 

Director Mueller, thank you for appearing again before the Judiciary Committee. We appreciate your willingness to do so. 

Mr. Chairman, on Thursday we observed the seventh anniversary of the tragic events of September 11, 2001. As a Nation, we 

also breathed a sigh of relief that in 7 years we have not had a 

single foreign terrorist attack on American soil. That fact is not an 

accident and does not reflect a lack of effort on the part of our enemies. Many plots have been prevented. 

I would like to congratulate Director Mueller and all the dedicated men and women he leads for him tremendous work in keeping this country safe. Due to his leadership and the tireless efforts 

of the men and women of the FBI, the Department of Justice and 

many others throughout the Federal Government, the Nation has 

enjoyed a level of safety that, in all honesty, most of us feared unlikely in the immediate aftermath of those attacks. 

After September 11, the Bureau became the primary investigative agency tasked with not only investigating a crime after it has 

been committed but also with investigating terrorism and national 

security threats to prevent another catastrophic attack on our 

country. 

This fundamental shift in duties is much easier said than done. 

It has required the Bureau to reshape its goals, how its trains its 

agents and its investigative techniques. It also has required the 

Bureau to break down the layers of bureaucracy to effectively collect, analyze and act on intelligence. 

The Bureau and the Justice Department have been careful to review practices and procedures in order to ensure the strongest tools 

are available to prevent future terrorist attacks. And while I commend your many strides in this direction, we both agree that these 

efforts must continue. 

Recently the Bureau and the Department of Justice informed 

Congress of their work to revise the Bureau’s investigative guidelines so that the tools available for criminal investigations would 

also be available when assessing potential terrorist threats. 

While the FBI continues its work to become a prevention-focused 

institution, it is also important that it continues to investigate traditional and newly emerging crimes, including public corruption, 

gang violence, mortgage fraud and white-collar crime, child exploitation and intellectual property theft. 

Protecting our Nation from those who wish to do it harm, whether through acts of terrorism, violent crime, crimes against our children or other criminal enterprises, requires constant vigilance. It 

requires the FBI and Congress to remain at least one step ahead 

of the criminals themselves. 

3 

Finally, I would like to congratulate the Bureau on 100 years of 

service to the American people. During the past century, FBI 

agents have investigated our Nation’s most serious crimes and handled high-profile cases, including investigations into the Oklahoma 

City bombing, the Unabomber, Al Capone, Bonnie and Clyde, Nazi 

spies, Robert Hanssen and Enron. 

The success of the FBI is not the result of people simply doing 

their jobs. As new threats develop, law enforcement officials are 

constantly charged with finding new methods to combat these 

threats. Americans have never needed the FBI more, and today, 

after 100 years of service, we continue to be grateful for the FBI 

and all that it has done and is doing to protect us. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will yield back. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes the distinguished Chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee, Jerry Nadler, of New York. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Mueller, I appreciate you being here to testify before the 

Judiciary Committee once again. 

As you saw from the September 5 letter that the Chairman and 

Mr. Scott and I sent, as a Committee, we have many issues to discuss with you. These topics include how the FBI handled the anthrax investigation, whether the FBI has been vigilant enough in 

fighting mortgage fraud and the new Attorney General Guidelines 

regarding the FBI. 

As you may recall, we asked for written responses in advance of 

the hearing. Unfortunately, we did not receive that response until 

last night, and not having those answers until just before today’s 

hearing makes meaningful oversight much more difficult. The executive branch and the American people benefit when Congress is exercising its constitutional responsibility to conduct oversight. 

In particular, we are very interested in discussing the new guidelines regarding the FBI. I am sure Members will be asking many 

questions about them. Since we have not yet been given the actual 

text of the guidelines to keep and review, here again, the Committee’s oversight role is unnecessarily more difficult. And I must, at 

this point, register my displeasure with the decision by the FBI to 

show the guidelines to staff but not to allow them to keep a copy 

or not to allow the Committee to see it. 

These guidelines are not secret, they are going to be public in a 

few weeks, and I don’t understand how it serves the purposes of 

open government to keep from the Committee to this moment 

guidelines that are going to be open in public in a few weeks as 

if it is the purpose of the FBI to make sure that the Committee 

doesn’t have enough information to ask intelligent questions before 

they go into effect. I am sure that is not the purpose. Perhaps you 

will tell us what the purpose of that secrecy policy is. 

From what I know about them, I am very concerned about the 

expanded authority being given to FBI agents. The ability to conduct physical surveillance, conduct pretext interviews, and so forth, 

in terrorism investigations without having to suspect a crime has 

occurred and without getting the approval of a supervisor leaves 

room for racial profiling and other forms of discriminatory treatment. 

4 

We have seen problems before when we gave too much authority 

to the FBI with respect, for example, to the national security letters. Two Department of Justice IG reports detailed widespread 

abuses. Peoples’ private information was improperly accessed by 

the government, and almost everyone who receives an NSL is 

gagged from talking about it, a potential violation of the First 

Amendment. 

I don’t think the FBI has demonstrated that it is using its expanded NSL authority appropriately. There is legislation that I 

have introduced which would address these problems. Among other 

provisions, it would reform NSL’s and better protect American civil 

liberties and constitutional rights. 

I also would like to discuss the FBI’s investigation into the anthrax case. Many serious questions have been raised about the arguments and evidence the FBI has shown. These questions have 

not been answered, and many outstanding issues remain. I am glad 

you are here this morning so we can get some answers. 

With that, I want to again thank Director Mueller for being here. 

I look forward to hearing his testimony and his answers to questions. 

I thank the Chairman. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes a Member who has worked on the issues 

of crime in this Congress and in the country for many years. He 

is Bobby Scott of Virginia, and we recognize him and yield to him 

now. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Mr. Director, for appearing with us today. There 

are a number of questions, and the format we have is insufficient 

to get into an in-depth dialogue on all the issues that we want to 

get into, so we will just mention those and, hopefully, we will get 

many of the responses in writing from you on the issues. 

In addition to those articulated by the Chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee, there are several others that we would like to 

get a status report on, one of which is the contractor abuse. There 

apparently are billions of dollars unaccounted for in Iraq, and we 

understand that there are some investigations going on as to 

whether or not crimes were committed as a result of that, and 

hopefully we can follow up on that. 

As you know, another issues involves torture and prisoner abuse. 

It is my understanding that the FBI has been fairly good on this 

issue, having a protocol that does not allow agents to torture, but 

there seems to be some evidence that agents were there when others were not so restrained, and we would like some information on 

that. 

On background checks, the FBI database, according to a 2006 

Department of Justice report, indicated that for approximately 50 

percent of the records, the final disposition information was not 

there so that a person who was arrested would have the arrest 

show up on the record but the subsequent exoneration would not 

show up on the record. We would like to see what we are doing or 

what we need to do to make sure the background check information is as up to date as possible. 

5 

On the mortgage fraud issue, obviously, today and yesterday it 

is a very high priority. Trillions of dollars, obviously, being lost in 

the stock market as a result of potential crimes that have been 

committed and mortgage fraud. If money has been lost, somebody 

has made the money, and we want to find out what progress has 

been made on mortgage fraud. 

On identity theft, when we passed the Identity Theft Penalty En- hancement Act several years ago, we allocated $10 million to the 

department to track down identity theft and be interested to know 

what kind of progress we are making on that. 

Over the weekend ‘‘60 Minutes’’ reported on a problem in laboratories involving ballistic tests—the reliability of some ballistics 

tests—and suggested that there may be some in jail today based 

on tests that have subsequently been found not to be reliable. We 

would like to see what we are doing to make sure that justice prevails in that situation. 

Finally, two other issues. We have had many complaints about 

crimes being committed by United States persons over in Iraq, and 

jurisdiction and who would prosecute such crimes has been the 

issue. Has the FBI actually followed through, investigated and 

prosecuted crimes that are committed by U.S. persons abroad? 

And, finally, in the civil-rights area, does the FBI have jurisdiction and an interest in voter-fraud cases. For example, if registrars 

are illegally discouraging voters from registering, does the FBI 

have jurisdiction over those kinds of cases. 

Look forward to your responses, either here today or in writing 

later, to those issues and the ones that the gentleman from New 

York mentioned. 

And with that, I be appreciate, Mr. Chairman, the opportunity 

to be here today and yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Chairman Scott. 

I am now pleased to recognize Mr. Louis Gohmert of Texas, the 

Ranking Member on the Crime Subcommittee. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Director Mueller, for being here today. 

Yesterday we passed a bipartisan resolution congratulating the 

FBI on 100 years of service. The FBI, obviously, was born out of 

a very difficult time in this Nation’s history, and here we are 100 

years later reliant so heavily on the FBI, and we truly do appreciate the hard work and the dedication of the men and women of 

the FBI. 

Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, the FBI has had the difficulty 

of balancing their traditional criminal investigations with new responsibilities, conduct national security and counterterrorism investigations, and that certainly has not been a simple task. Unfortunately, we continue to hear about mistakes or misuses by the 

FBI of investigative authorities, particularly within the area of national security. 

We know from the IG’s 2007 report that on 739 occasions the 

FBI obtained telephone toll billing records or subscriber information from three telephone companies without first issuing NSL’s or 

grand jury subpoenas. We know these exigent letters were signed 

by the FBI headquarters’ Counterterrorism Division, personnel who 

were not authorized to sign NSL’s. We have heard testimony here 

6 

and also have heard from other sources about how badly undermanned the Counterterrorism Division may be and that it is a very 

difficult assignment that most do not relish the idea of having to 

go serve in. 

We know that the personnel regularly issued NSL’s seeking electronic transactional records exclusively from control files, rather 

than investigative files, which is a practice not permitted under 

FBI policy. But what we didn’t know until recently is that exigent 

letters were issued in 2004 on four reporters for The New York 

Times and The Washington Post stationed in Indonesia. 

Personally, I have had concerns about The New York Times releasing classified information and whether or not some laws may 

be violated, and that it may be appropriate to do a thorough investigation of how that all came about, but still we have to utilize 

legal bases to go after such an investigation. As we talked about 

in a prior hearing, when law enforcement breaks the law, who has 

authority to raid their offices? Who has authority to get a subpoena 

and go look at records there in those offices? 

It is my understanding that, following the 2007 IG report, the 

FBI, under your leadership, Director, had ceased use of exigent letters altogether. It is troubling to continue to hear about issues that 

arise, we think we have dealt with them and then something else 

come up. And as you now talked about, I continue to wonder if 

some of these issues arise as a result of the 5-year-up-or-out policy 

that has forced, under some accounts, thousands of years of experienced staff to leave, rather than being willing to come to Washington at the end of your 5-year term. 

I have been concerned about this policy for sometime. I thought 

it was hundreds, but there has been information recently we have 

lost thousands of years of experience. 

And I look at the director of the FBI: Would I want someone 

serving there with a cornucopia of experience that you have as a 

servant of this Nation, or would I want somebody with 6 years’ experience? I know which I would want, and I would love to have 

that go back to being the policy in the local offices as well. 

In any event, Director Mueller, knowing your background—you 

are a patriot, you are a hero, you truly have a servant’s heart to 

protect this country, and we appreciate that. I know you care deeply, but I also know that some of the seasoned agents—well, the seasoned agents that we have lost also felt the same way about this 

country. They love it as well. 

But I look forward to hearing your thoughts on these issues. 

Hopefully, we can address them so these don’t keep coming up, and 

I thank you for your appearance here today. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Judge Gohmert. 

We are pleased to have Robert Mueller, III, director of the FBI 

since September 4, 2001. He has had a long career in public service 

and in the law as well. He has been an assistant United States attorney in San Francisco and in Boston and in Washington, D.C. He 

served as assistant attorney general for the Criminal Division in 

the early 1990’s, returned to San Francisco in 1998 as a United 

States attorney and has also been in private practice on at least 

two occasions with prominent national law firms. He was called 

7 

back from San Francisco to Washington in early 2001 to be acting 

deputy attorney general, where he served until assuming his current post. 

Once again, we welcome you to the Committee. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, 

DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

Mr. MUELLER. Good morning, Chairman Conyers, Representative 

Smith and Members of the Committee. I am indeed pleased to be 

here today to answer your questions. 

When I have come before the Committee in the past, I have discussed the FBI’s transformation, and I have recounted our many, 

what I believe to be, improvements and accomplishments. Marking 

milestones is about more than looking backward, it is also about 

looking forward. So today I want to focus on what the FBI is doing 

and will continue to do in order to ensure that we serve the American public for the next 100 years. 

In the interest of time, I will focus on four specific areas: intelligence, technology, human capital and the new Attorney General 

Guidelines, to which you have alluded. By giving attention to these 

and similar areas, we will be prepared to confront the threats of 

the future, from mortgage fraud to terrorism, from crimes against 

children to violent gangs. 

First, intelligence. Intelligence is crucial to every investigation 

and operation that the Bureau undertakes. The FBI has always excelled at gathering intelligence, even if we did not always call it 

that, and utilizing that intelligence—those facts—to build cases 

that led to courtroom convictions. 

After September 11, we realized that we also had to strengthen 

our intelligence analysis and sharing. I have discussed our efforts 

in great detail in the past, from ramping up, hiring and training 

of intelligence analysts to establishing the Directorate of Intelligence and then the National Security Branch at headquarters. 

But intelligence gathering does not happen in headquarters, it 

happens out in the communities we serve. And so each field office 

established a field intelligence group made up of agents, analysts, 

linguists and surveillance specialists. These are the operational 

arms of our intelligence program and crucial as well as—and crucial to their efforts are our partnerships with other Federal, state 

and local agencies. 

Their work is not limited to counterterrorism threats. For instance, field offices near research universities or defense contracting firms are also focusing on potential espionage or proliferation threats. Offices along the Southwest border are focusing on 

violent transnational gangs. And our offices around the country, 

from large cities to rural areas, are concerning themselves with violent crime. 

To accelerate our improvements in our intelligence capabilities, 

we established what we call a Strategic Execution Team to help us 

assess our intelligence program, evaluate best practices, decide 

what works, what does not work and then standardize it across the 

Bureau. And that effort continues and has been integral to the 

FBI’s effort as a full partner in the wider intelligence community. 

8 

We regularly share intelligence with our partners in more than 

18,000 state and local law enforcement agencies around the country. We also collaborate closely with our international counterparts, 

and as the world continues to flatten and threats continue to migrate across borders, it is more important than ever for the FBI to 

be able to develop and disseminate information that will assist our 

partners. 

Second, we have made substantial progress in replacing and 

transforming the FBI’s information technology systems to help us 

confront current threats and mission needs. Sentinel, a Web-based 

case-management system designed to support both our law enforcement and intelligence mission, is progressing on time and within 

budget. The first phase was successfully deployed in June, and the 

remaining phases will continue to deliver additional capability 

through the end of the program in the summer of 2010. 

We have also expanded our desktop Internet access to over 

19,000 agents, analysts, task force and support personnel, and 

when completed, we anticipate approximately 39,000 desktops will 

have been deployed at all FBI locations. 

In addition we have deployed over 20,000 BlackBerrys that have 

e-mail Internet browsing and custom features, and we are deploying other information technology systems that will dramatically enhance our ability to efficiently carry out our mission. 

Third, as you know, we have been hard at work continuing to 

build a strong human resources program to ensure we have optimal 

recruiting, hiring, training and retention for our employees. Historically, the FBI has attracted recruits from law enforcement, 

legal, military communities, particularly to fill our special-agents 

ranks, and this has served us well as a law enforcement agency. 

But as we have developed into a national security organization, we 

also require employees with specialized skills: intelligence analysts, 

scientists, linguists, computer experts. 

We are strengthening our relationships with universities as a 

primary source of recruiting individuals who want to build a career 

in national security at the FBI. We are conducting a separate targeted intelligence hiring initiative to bring hundreds more intelligence analysts on board. Our programs are modeled after successful programs in other intelligence agencies, as well as in corporate 

America. 

We have worked hard to develop and provide more training opportunities for employees at all levels, and we are focused not just 

on building isolated skills but on building a culture of leadership. 

The FBI has always been fortunate to have tremendously talented leaders. Many of them rose through the ranks of the Senior 

Executive Service, some were recruited from outside the FBI, and 

others simply led from whatever position they held. But we cannot 

have leadership on an ad hoc basis. We must continue to have an 

ethos of leadership at levels. 

Fourth, while our employees are collecting, analyzing and sharing intelligence under an improved internal framework, they will 

also be operating under new investigative guidelines. 

Let me spend a few moments discussing the new Attorney General Guidelines for domestic FBI operations, which are in the process of being finalized and which have been briefed to your staff. 

9 

With the input of this Committee, it is my hope and expectation 

that we can make these guidelines effective for agents operating in 

the field in the near term. 

Up to now, special agents have depended on several sets of 

guidelines to guide their investigations. Each set was tailored to a 

particular program area and, therefore, different rules governed 

different types of investigations. These differences were especially 

pronounced for national security investigations versus criminal investigations. 

To give you a few examples, in the guidelines governing national 

security investigations prohibited recruiting or tasking sources unless the FBI had at least a preliminary investigation open. They 

also prohibited physical surveillance other than casual observation, 

while the general crimes guidelines, which governed other criminal 

investigations, did not contain these limitations. So, ironically, in 

my cases an agent could readily use physical surveillance to watch 

a suspected smuggling route for drugs or counterfeit blue jeans but 

not for a terrorist bomb. 

In the past these rules may have been sufficient and appropriate 

to the threats they were meant to address, but criminal threats 

and national security threats do not now fall neatly into separate 

categories. The threat of today and of the future is a dangerous 

convergence of terrorists, hostile foreign governments and criminal 

groups operating over the Internet and through interconnected sophisticated networks. 

We may see organized crime laundering money for drug groups, 

drug groups selling weapons to terrorists, terrorists committing 

white-collar fraud to raise money for their operations and, most 

threatening of all, hostile foreign governments arming terrorists 

with an arsenal of biological, chemical or radiological weapons. 

Different rules should not apply depending on how the agent decides to describe what he or she is investigating. 

I must emphasize that the new guidelines are not designed to 

give the FBI any broad new authorities. The new guidelines will— 

the last vestige of the wall separating criminal and national security matters. They will replace five separate sets of guidelines with 

a single uniform set of rules to govern the domestic activities of our 

employees. 

They set consistent rules that apply across all operational programs, whether criminal or national security. They will give us the 

ability to be more proactive and the flexibility to address complex 

threats that do not fall solely under one program. They will eliminate virtually all inconsistencies that have the potential to cause 

confusion for our employees. 

Several bipartisan commissions, the Congress, the American people have asked and expect the FBI to be able to answer a question 

such as, ‘‘Are there sleeper cells in this country planning attacks 

like those our international partners in London and Spain have 

suffered since September 11th?’’ 

In order to answer these questions, the FBI has to expand its intelligence collection beyond that which is collected as part of predicated investigations. It must examine threats in a proactive fashion 

and not simply rely on information that is volunteered to us. 

10 

We have asked our employees to think proactively about the 

threats and vulnerabilities in their areas of responsibility, and our 

employees are up to the task. But they need consistent, clear guidelines that do not vary based on whether they are facing a threat 

from MS-13 or Hezbollah. 

The FBI has the responsibility, indeed the privilege, of upholding 

the Constitution. We know that, if we safeguard our civil liberties 

but leave our country vulnerable to terrorism and crime, we have 

lost. If we protect America from terrorism and crime but sacrifice 

our civil liberties, we have also lost. We are always mindful that 

our mission is not just to safeguard American lives but to also safeguard American liberties. We must strike the appropriate balance 

at all times. 

Finally, I am well aware of the public’s interest, as well as the 

interest of this Committee, in the anthrax investigation. As you 

know, the Department of Justice and the FBI do not typically publicly disclose evidence against a suspect who has not been charged, 

in large part because of the presumption of innocence afforded an 

accused. 

But because of the extraordinary and justified public interest and 

with special concern for the victims of the 2001 and 2002 anthrax 

mailings, we, the Department of Justice and the United States 

Postal Service briefed victims, Members of Congress and the media 

to provide information unsealed by the district court after the 

death of the person we believed was responsible for the attack. 

This included information about science developed during the investigation, and that was central to the ultimate focus of the case 

on Dr. Bruce Ivins. 

The science employed was developed and validated throughout 

the investigation with the help of more than 60 outside experts and 

researchers. Nevertheless, because of the importance of science to 

this particular case and to perhaps cases in the future, we have initiated discussions with the National Academy of Sciences to undertake an independent review of the scientific approach used during 

the investigation. 

We have worked diligently to provide as much information as we 

can within legal parameters, including privacy rights and also 

mindful that, for the time being, this case remains open while certain investigative activity winds up. 

One last point, Mr. Chairman. Given the headlines of the last 

few days, we will say that although we have—referring, quite obviously, to the mortgage crisis that is affecting our economy—we will 

say that, although we have currently over 1,400 open cases and almost 500 convictions just in the last 2 years, the Committee should 

understand that, just like the S&L crisis in the early 1990’s and 

the corporate excesses of the beginning of this decade, the FBI will 

pursue these cases as far up the corporate chain as necessary to 

ensure that those responsible receive the justice they deserve. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude by thanking you 

and the Committee for your support, your suggestions, and I certainly would be happy to answer any questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mueller follows:] 

11 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. MUELLER, III 


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Mr. CONYERS. Thank you very much. 

The Chair neglected to mention that we are grateful to your 

Chief of Staff Lisa Monaco and FBI General Counsel Valerie 

Caproni, and there are two others with them, and we are grateful 

to them as well. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you. 

Mr. CONYERS. Now, you have given a very thoughtful look at the 

good things that have come out of the Bureau, which is totally appropriate, but it is like we didn’t make any opening statements 

hardly at all. I mean, look, for months we have been trying to get 

a reasonable response to the seven questions that I have put to you 

in my opening. I asked someone to give them to you in writing at 

the beginning. 

What is this? I mean, we only get 5 minutes up here each. You 

know that. What can we accomplish between two people talking 

every 5 minutes? By then it’s the end of the hearing, and we go 

back and start writing you more letters? How come we can’t get 

some straight answers on the questions that I sent you, I ask you, 

I give you in person? What is this? 

Mr. MUELLER. Mr. Chairman, there are a number of mechanisms 

for my working with the Committee. I have always made myself 

available to sit down and discuss particular issues. When it comes 

to questions for the record, as I am sure you understand, we draft 

responses, it goes through a thorough review by the Justice Department, and there is, inevitably, some delay. 

We understood the question that you had put to us, and we 

worked to get the response to the letter back to you by as soon as 

we could yesterday—it does have to go through the review process. 

But we do our level best to either orally or in writing get you responses to your questions as soon as we can. 

I also, as I think you understand, and the other Members of the 

Committee to the extent that you would like to, not in this format 

but another format—to sit down and discuss the issues. I am available to sit down and discuss what issues may be on your mind. 

Whether it be myself or my general counsel or my chief of staff or 

others in the organization, to the extent that briefings are requested and, certainly, from our perspective, necessary, we have 

tried to make persons within the Bureau available both to you, as 

well as to your staff. 

And my own—I am sure you will correct me if I am wrong, but 

I thought we had a—have had a very good relationship with this 

Committee and have been responsive, not, occasionally, because of 

necessity of vetting but—there has been delay—but, nonetheless, 

we have been forthcoming and straightforward with our answers. 

Mr. CONYERS. Director Mueller, we have a very good relationship. But we just don’t get anything. You don’t give us anything. 

And at a song and dance hearing like this, 5 minutes each from 

25 Members, what is that going to get us? Where will we be if we 

never had the hearing in the first place? 

I mean, look, these are serious, important questions that we keep 

writing you, meeting with you about, talking with you, holding 

hearings, and you say we have a good relationship. Well, maybe it 

is, but we don’t get any information in this relationship. 

Mr. MUELLER. The only—what I can say—— 

26 

Mr. CONYERS. Well I gave you—— 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. Seven is—— 

Mr. CONYERS [continuing]. Seven questions. You didn’t mention 

them. I mean are you, like, ‘‘So. This is another set of the same 

questions they keep on asking me?’’ 

Mr. MUELLER. We worked hard to respond to your letter. I do believe we got a response to that letter last evening after it had been 

vetted throughout the administration. I met with you, as you are 

aware, and we discussed some of these issues, and I would be 

happy to meet with any of the other Members and discuss these 

issues. 

Mr. CONYERS. Why won’t you give us what we ask for? That is 

all I want to know. If you are not going to give it, at least I can 

rationalize or tell the Committee why we are not getting it. I am 

not forcing you to give it to me, but if you are not going to give 

it to me, you could give me some direct answers so I don’t have to 

do this in the Committee. 

Mr. MUELLER. Mr. Chairman, we did respond to your letter. It 

was received. I think it was sent up last night after it had been 

vetted. And that was on very short notice. So I do believe we have 

tried to be responsive. And the questions for the record, we try to 

be responsive to each one of the questions for the record we have 

and receive, and I do believe we have been responsive to those 

questions. 

Mr. CONYERS. On July 28 in Cleveland, we had an FBI and, I 

guess, police raid. Two-hundred officers came to Jimmy Demora’s 

home to find out who paid for the paving of his driveway. And it 

just so happens he is the chairman of the Cuyahoga County Democratic Party, as well as a commissioner on the county board, and 

also involved is Frank Russo, the Cuyahoga County auditor. Can 

you give us some information about this? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I am not familiar with the particular search 

that apparently was executed on that day or the specifics of the investigation, but I would be glad to get back to you, to the extent 

that we can, since it, quite probably, is an ongoing investigation— 

with what information we can, and we will do it promptly. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

Mr. Lamar Smith? 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I am going to defer to the gentleman 

from North Carolina, Mr. Coble, who has a conflict in about 2 minutes in another hearing, and then I will ask my questions later on. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank the Ranking Member. 

Thank—transportation hearing is going on now, Mr. Chairman. 

I have got to attend. 

Director, good to have you with us. 

Director, you mentioned the mortgage crisis problem regarding 

the bad actors, and I think, in some instances, the bad actors can 

be the lenders as well as the borrowers. 

Let me put a two-part question to you. Is mortgage fraud primarily a Federal offense, A, and, B, what role does state prosecutor—the state banking regulators play in identifying and shutting down fraudulent lenders? 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me, if I could, respond to the first part of the 

question by saying it is both a Federal offense but also a state and 

27 

local offense. And recognizing that, we now have 42 task forces 

around the country, which include personnel from the Federal authorities, but in many cases personnel from state authorities as 

well, and we will take cases either in the state criminal justice system—to the state criminal justice system or the Federal system as 

is warranted. 

We have over 1,400 mortgage-fraud cases that are directed principally at brokers, appraisers, buyers, lenders and the like. We 

have another set of cases which are directed at large institutions, 

where we are looking at allegations of misstatements of assets. We 

have 24 of those cases we are currently looking at. 

That latter group of cases are ones that most likely, if there are 

charges to come from them, will be Federal charges. But in terms 

of the other class of cases, where you have brokers and appraisers 

and buyers and the like, they can go either federally or locally, and 

we bring them in whichever jurisdiction makes some sense given 

the particular case. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, sir. 

Director, some critics assert that scarce Federal law enforcement 

resources should not be expended on the investigation and prosecution of intellectual property rights cases. They contend that private 

right’ holders should look to their own resources to protect their intellectual property rights and that Federal law enforcement authorities should be encouraged to focus on what they call ‘‘higher 

priority matters.’’ What do you say to that? 

Mr. MUELLER. We do have jurisdiction, along with other entities, 

to investigate and prosecute—or investigate and turn over to the 

prosecutor the investigations of intellectual property cases. We 

have a number of priorities. Intellectual property is something that 

we handle when we can bring something special to the table and 

this—as I indicated in my remarks, in this increasingly flattened 

world, where globalization means that crooks can cross borders at 

will, whether it be with the Internet or otherwise, many of the intellectual property investigations require a—or have an international nexus. And when that occurs, we have over 60 legal attache officers around the world, and we involve them in those large 

investigations. 

We recently had a case, as an example, we did it with ICE and 

with Customs and Border Patrol and in conjunction with the Chinese authorities in which we seized millions and millions of dollars 

of counterfeit goods and a number of persons were arrested. That 

case is indicative of the type of effort we will put in when it is a 

case that lends itself to being handled by the Bureau. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you. Thank you, Director. 

Speaking of crossing borders, put on your immigration hat, Mr. 

Director, if you will. What are the risks that the violence caused 

by increasingly brazen drug cartels in Mexico will spill over across 

the border into the U.S., particular as to border towns? 

Mr. MUELLER. What our great concern is, as the Mexican authorities have cut down drugs coming to the United States as well 

as—in conjunction with Department of Homeland Security cut 

down on numbers of persons coming across the borders, there has 

been a battle between the cartels—in that arena. 

28 

Most of the violence occurs south of the border. However, there 

have been a number of instances where there have been 

kidnappings of individuals—American citizens—who have traveled 

either to their business or to visit family in Mexico and have been 

kidnapped. Where that has occurred along the border, we have established antikidnapping task forces in conjunction with state and 

local law enforcement and also with vetted counterparts across the 

border in Mexico. 

We have had a few instances where the violence has spilled 

across the border in the sense that there have been shootings on 

this side involving persons who were participants or associated 

with a group south of the border, but they, thankfully, have been 

relatively few. 

We are looking and monitoring the situation to assure that violence that is occurring south of the border does not spill in to the 

United States, and if it does, we, along with the other Federal authorities and state and local authorities, will take swift action. 

Mr. COBLE. I see my time has expired. 

Thank you, Mr. Director. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Mr. Coble. 

Chairman Jerry Nadler? 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Director, first, before I give my questions, let me congratulate you on what was—on your role in standing up heroically 

against abuse of power as revealed in the last couple of days in The 

Washington Post with respect to a few years ago. And I mean that 

sincerely. 

Now, I want to talk some—ask a couple questions about the anthrax investigation. 

Now, the FBI has said that—essentially that this fellow, Ivins, 

apparently was the culprit. And he is, of course, deceased. Now, in 

understanding the bottom line of the Bureau’s investigation and 

how accurate we can take it to be, it is important to understand 

the actual nature of the murder weapon, that is, the anthrax that 

was sent through the mails. 

The scientists at the U.S. Armed Forces Institute of Pathology 

who examined the powder contained in the letter to Senator 

Daschle’s office said it contained silica. Now, some observers say 

the silica may have been a sophisticated additive designed to make 

the powder a more deadly killer. Now, this additive requires special 

expertise to apply to anthrax spores, an expertise that, according 

to his former boss at USAMRIID, the chief suspect, Mr. Ivins, simply did not have. 

Now, the briefing last month convened by the Justice Department to lay out details of its case, government scientists said the 

powders in the attacks contained no additives, only some silicon, 

which they described as naturally occurring. 

Now, scientists say that a percentage of silicon higher than half 

of 1 percent has never been recorded in the scientific literature as 

naturally occurring. So if that percentage is higher than half of 1 

percent, it would be indicated that it was not natural, that it was 

added by a sophisticated operator. 

29 

So for the record I want to ask you, what was the percentage of 

weight of the silicon in the powders that your experts examined? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would have to get back to you on that. 

Mr. NADLER. I assumed you were going to say that. 

Mr. MUELLER. But I will tell you that issue came up early in the 

investigation. It was vetted not just by our scientists but scientists 

around the country who specialize in this. And the last point I 

would make is that we—as I have indicated, we are in discussions 

with the National Academy of Sciences to do an independent review, in which that issue, quite obviously, would be one of those 

issues addressed. 

Mr. NADLER. But you can tell us what that percentage was? 

Mr. MUELLER. I believe I can, yes. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Now, if the percentage is greater than half of 1 percent—or certainly greater than 1 percent—then that would be a strong indicator that the anthrax was manipulated deliberately to be a very 

sophisticated killer. There are only a handful of facilities in the 

United States which have been publicly identified as having the experienced personnel and equipment necessary to make anything 

approaching such an anthrax powder, including the U.S. Army’s 

Dugway Proving Grounds and the Battelle Memorial Institute in 

Jefferson, Ohio, a CIA contractor. 

Were those facilities ever targets in the investigation? 

Mr. MUELLER. Using ‘‘target’’ is somewhat a weighted word in 

terms of—— 

Mr. NADLER. Well, were they ever looked at? 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. In terms of what we looked at in the 

course of the investigation, you can assume that we looked at every 

laboratory in the United States and several overseas that had both 

the type of the Ames anthrax that we found in this case but also 

had individuals capable of undertaking the drying and preparing of 

the anthrax that was sent in the letters. 

Mr. NADLER. Well, if—and the addition of the silica if that proves 

to be the case. 

Now, if these facilities were looked at, could you tell us how and 

why they were ruled out since, obviously, you zeroed in on Fort 

Dietrich and on Mr. Ivins? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would have to get back to you on individual facilities. I would think, as you are well aware, that, over a period 

of time, we developed the genetic morphology of the anthrax used 

in the letters and—which was relatively unique, having four separate distinct genetic markers, and that led to identifying the vial 

that was labeled RMR1029 and was found in Dr. Ivins’s laboratory. 

And so there was a clear identification of the anthrax in the letters 

back to being—referred—or related back to the anthrax that was 

in the vial in Dr. Ivins’s laboratory. 

And that, in and of itself would give you one means of eliminating others, although to the extent that there was anthrax that 

had been distributed from that vial, we traced all of that anthrax 

and eliminated any other persons who may have had access or utilized that access as a suspect which is—— 

Mr. NADLER. Final question. Do you agree, as many have suggested, that there may be a need for an independent review of the 

30 

evidence, especially given that bioforensics is such a new field, and 

would the Bureau cooperate with such an effort, and what possible 

downside could there be from such a review if it were to take 

place? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, as I have indicated that—we are in discussions with and are going to request of the National Academy of 

Sciences review the work that was done in the course of this investigation and it is an independent review by a panel of scientists 

that will be pulled together by the National Academy. Many of the 

scientists the National Academy ordinarily would seek to have on 

a panel are scientists that were already used in the course of the 

investigation. But as I say, the National Academy is an independent entity and will be conducting a review. 

Mr. NADLER. Well, thank you, and I just want to say I hope you 

will get back to us relatively quickly with the weight of the percentage of the silica and why these other facilities were ruled out. 

Mr. MUELLER. Will do so, sir. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Chairman Nadler. 

Ranking Member Lamar Smith? 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Mueller, I would like to go back to three subjects that 

you touched upon in your opening statement just to get you to 

elaborate a little bit more upon them. 

The first is what, again, are some of the disadvantages, defects 

of the current system when it comes to trying to prevent terrorist 

attacks? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, with particularly the Attorney General 

Guidelines, which is one of the subjects, I know, we wish to address 

today, there is several reasons why they need to be changed. 

The first is, as many entities that have looked at what happened 

on September 11—whether it be the Joint Congressional Committees, the 9-11 Commission, the WMD Commission—have looked at 

the Bureau, they have come to say that the Bureau needs to be 

more proactive, you have to prevent another September 11. It is 

not sufficient that you do the job of investigating after the attack 

and brining the persons responsible to justice. 

And we have to build up our intelligence. And in doing so, we 

have to understand that we need all of the tools—the ones that we 

use on the criminal side—to be applicable on the national security 

side. If we can do surveillances, pretext interviews and the like on 

the criminal side, when we have a threat, we should be able to do 

the same thing on the national security side. So the purpose of the 

guidelines is to eliminate that wall, allow us to utilize those techniques to prevent terrorist attacks, as well as to investigate them 

after the fact. 

Mr. SMITH. Next question is this: I think you have made a persuasive argument on the need to change the rules or guidelines. 

Can you give us, though, some visual, graphic, real-life examples 

of the kinds of terrorist crimes that could be prevented if you— 

when you implement these new rules and guidelines that could not 

be prevented under the current rules and guidelines? 

31 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me use, perhaps, two examples. One is the 

Phoenix memorandum. Most people are familiar with the fact that 

a very good agent in Phoenix prior to September 11 noted that individuals from the Middle East who were associated with more radical elements in the Phoenix area were taking flight lessons. He 

drafted a memorandum, it was sent back to headquarters, and no 

action was taken on it by the time of the attacks. 

It is that kind of threat and identification of a very suspicious 

circumstance that would warrant further investigation. And under 

the preceding guideline, it would be problematic in order to undertake the activities we wanted to follow up on. 

Another example would be we know, quite obviously, that in 

western Pakistan now—that there are camps in which individuals 

are being trained. The U.K. knows that very well because individuals who were involved in the 2005 attacks and later attacks had 

traveled to Pakistan for training in the camps and then come back. 

I believe the American public, this Committee would want us to 

understand that potential threat and do what is necessary to try 

to identify persons who had traveled to Pakistan—whatever their 

heritage, whatever their background, whatever their ethnicity—to 

determine who is going to Pakistan to obtain that training and 

may be coming back to the United States to undertake an attack. 

Under the previous guidelines, undertaking that type of investigation would be problematic because we had not focused on one particular crime and one individual. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Director Mueller. 

One last question, and you did mention this in your opening 

statement. It is true, I believe, that some of these rules and guidelines—most of them—can now be used to try to solve the usual 

types of crimes that we would consider sort of everyday crimes but 

under current rules cannot be used to try to prevent terrorist attacks. I don’t know what the genesis of that distinction was, but 

clearly, in this day and age, as a—and the subsequent era of 9-11, 

we need the same tools and guidelines that have been used to solve 

robberies to enable us to prevent terrorist attacks. 

I don’t know if you want to comment on that any more than you 

already had, but it clearly seems to me that, if you are going to use 

them for one type of crime, you ought to be able to use them for 

other types—to prevent other types of crime as well. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, perhaps I could use an example. If we received word that there was drug dealing out of a particular bar in 

a area of the city, under the criminal guidelines we would be able 

to put up a surveillance on that bar to determine whether or not 

a person was—whether there was drug traffic coming in or not, we 

could send an agent doing pretext interviews to gain information. 

We could recruit and task sources to go in to determine whether 

there was drug trafficking in that bar. 

However, if the allegation was that Al Qaida was recruiting suicide bombers in that bar or Hezbollah was seeking to generate 

funds in that bar, we would be precluded by the national security 

guidelines from conducting a surveillance, recruiting and tasking 

sources or doing a pretext interview. We would be limited to going 

in there and saying, ‘‘Okay. I am the FBI. Is there any illegal activity happening here?’’ 

32 

And that is the contradiction between the two sets of guidelines. 

Mr. NADLER. That is a good example, and it is a good one to end 

on as well. 

Thank you, Director. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Lamar Smith. 

Chairman Bobby Scott? 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

And thank you, Mr. Director. 

There is concern about the upcoming election—that if be fair. It 

looks like—every indication—there will be several states that will 

be extremely close so we want to make sure there is no problem. 

If someone were running a voter scheme to violate your right to 

vote, would that be something the FBI would have an jurisdiction 

over or an interest in? 

Mr. MUELLER. We would. I will tell you that we have a person 

steeped in election law in every one of our field offices who will be 

alert at the time and before the election. I won’t go so far as to say 

we have got a task force, but we have people standing by in the 

course of each election to respond to complaints along those lines. 

Mr. SCOTT. And—and—— 

Mr. MUELLER. And we do it in conjunction with the Department 

of Justice. 

Mr. SCOTT. And if voter registrars, for example, were giving out 

information that was inaccurate, would that be something—and 

discouraging people from registering to vote—would that be something the FBI would have an interest in? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would have to look specifically at the statutes, 

but my assumption would be that, with the Department of Justice, 

it is something we would examine. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. MUELLER. Depending on the intent and, quite obviously, the 

facts of the situation. 

Mr. SCOTT. You are familiar with the report that was on ‘‘60 

Minutes’’ over the weekend about ballistics tests? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. What—and apparently, at the time the report was 

given, there were people in jail based on evidence that has subsequently been found not to be reliable? 

Mr. MUELLER. What I believe you are talking about is ‘‘60 Minutes’’ had a story about what we call ‘‘bullet lead analysis,’’ which 

was an analysis we did for a number of years several years ago. 

We went to—I believe it was the National Academy of Sciences— 

and said, ‘‘We believe the science is appropriate. Would you review 

it.’’ They reviewed it, said the science is appropriate but it lends 

itself to experts at trial exaggerating the import of the science. 

We decided to discontinue that. At the time, we sent letters out 

to prosecutors that had had cases in which that bullet lead analysis 

expertise was utilized. We sent it out to National Association of Defense Attorneys. We identified and sent letters to the departments 

that had utilized it, as well as the prosecutors. 

We came to find that in several circumstances, a number of circumstances, that was insufficient. And since then we have gone 

back and are pulling all of the transcripts of the trials in which our 

33 

expertise was used to determine what impact the expert had and 

to determine whether or not the expert stayed within the confines 

of his expertise. 

And we are doing this with the Innocence Project, I might add, 

who did a very good job of looking at this issue, bringing it to our 

attention and then is working with us to make certain that we 

evaluate the import of this testimony in each case in which it was 

used. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. And on mortgage fraud, is your investigation on fraud in the mortgage industry aimed at individual cases 

or an organized, systematic situation where the entire industry was 

involved in defrauding people out of their money? 

Mr. MUELLER. We are looking at all—I guess I would say all levels of the issue. On the one hand, as I indicated before, we are 

looking at brokers and appraisers and buyers and lenders at the 

local level, but we also have 24 investigations that are looking at 

corporations—large corporations, where the allegations would be 

that there were misstatement of assets. So we are looking at it 

from the large corporation perspective, as well as various schemes 

that were undertaken at the local level. 

As I said, we have had in the last 2 years, I think, more than 

500 indictments—I am not sure of the actual number of convictions 

but—and we currently have 1,400 cases of the state—the local variety and 24 cases of the corporate variety. 

Mr. SCOTT. What is the jurisdiction of the FBI over the Federal 

Prison Industries? 

Mr. MUELLER. I don’t think it is a question of jurisdiction. I do 

believe that is a question of purchase of furniture from prison industries that has been an issue. And as to that, I know it was 

raised before, we went back to our legal counsel and to the purchasing department to make certain that we are maximizing our 

ability under the law to look at the purchase of furniture from the 

prison industries. And we have followed the law with regard to 

those purchases. 

Mr. SCOTT. Is the Federal Prison Industries an important agency 

as far as the FBI is concerned? 

Mr. MUELLER. My understanding is it is part of the Bureau of 

Prisons, quite obviously, and we are close to our sister agency, but 

we have to follow the law when it comes to purchases, understanding that the desirability of assisting the Bureau of Prisons 

and providing work for its inmates and producing furniture that 

then can be sold. We have to—whatever purchases we make have 

to be done according to the applicable purchasing regulations. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. Darrell Issa, California, serves with distinction on 

both the Intelligence Committee and the House Judiciary Committee. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Mr. Chairman, before I begin, I would like to suggest that 

we look at Mr. Scott’s reference to prison industries and on a bipartisan basis look at the history of unsuccessful reform to make that 

an industry in which government would want to buy the output, 

and I would offer—I am a former appointee to the California Prison 

Industries board. I would be more than willing to work on the reVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:11 Apr 20, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\FULL\091608\44492.000 HJUD1 PsN: 44492
34 

form that could lead to improvement in the skills training and the 

output, and hopefully that would help solve a problem that I know 

vexes all of us here on the podium. 

Mr. SCOTT. If the gentleman would yield? 

Mr. ISSA. Of course. 

Mr. SCOTT. We have had bipartisan cooperation on that and, unfortunately, bipartisan opposition. So I would be more than willing 

to work with you on that. 

Mr. ISSA. I thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for yielding time. 

Director Mueller, this is never an easy place for you to come so 

I will start off by saying congratulations on being at the helm on 

the 100th anniversary of the creation. You know, the fact is the 

FBI has gone from 30 or so—30,000 over the last 100 years and 

has proven to be the one go-to for all levels of investigation. 

And I would like to touch on a couple of things because I am concerned today that, because we give you everything to investigate, 

that perhaps how you prioritize has been a problem. 

First of all, in dealing on a global basis with the global war on 

terror and the resources you have had to be put in foreign embassies and so on, have you been given the resources necessary to do 

that while continuing to increase your vigilance in the other areas 

of Federal crime? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, we had to—in the wake of September 11, we 

moved almost 2,000 agents from the criminal side of the house to 

national security, and national security being counterterrorism, as 

well as counterintelligence give the threats from various countries 

wishing to steal our secrets. And the third aspect of national security is cyber security. So those three national security priorities received almost 2,000 agents. 

The directive to every one of our special agents in charge is you 

have to know what is happening in your domain, in your jurisdiction when it comes to counterterrorism. That is number one. Counterintelligence is number two, and cyber is number three. Then you 

hit the criminal priorities. 

And we have had to, on the criminal side, prioritize. We took, I 

would say, better than half of those agents from the drug program. 

We have very significantly ratcheted back our participation in the 

war on drugs, limiting it to participation in the OCDETF program. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. Director Mueller, because my time is limited, I 

would like to follow up because I think you have made my point 

very well. 

The war on terror, China and other countries’ relentless attack 

on cyber world—both DOD but also even the U.S. House of Representatives has been invaded, and Trojans have been put inside 

our computers by China, other countries as well. You have never 

been given significant new resources for that. You have never been 

given significant resources for all the other counterterrorism you 

are doing. 

Can you tell this Committee today—or can you respond in writing—recognizing that you transcend administrations, what it is 

going to take give 100 percent appropriate effort in those new 

tasks, including this exponentially growing attack on the Internet 

35 

while getting you back to historic levels of such things as the gentleman from Virginia mentioned? 

Look, we have got House and Senate members who are implicated in receiving discount loans from Countrywide. We have tens 

of thousands of people who in some way, shape or form were part 

of the problem of subprime, and you have made it clear, you are 

resources are limited and some of your investigation capability of 

September 11 left those areas. 

So because the time is limited, and because I know that the majority will ask a lot of other questions, I would really appreciate it 

if you would give me a short response and then go on beyond this 

so this Committee could begin to look—because my guess is that 

you are 30,000 men and women and your budget should have been 

increased by a good 10,000 if you were to deal with cyber security 

and with the threat of Al Qaida and other groups, and please respond. 

Mr. MUELLER. We continuously put in requests for resources. It 

goes through the Department of Justice, OMB, the administration, 

quite obviously, as you are all too well familiar—— 

Mr. ISSA. But they have never asked for those kinds of numbers, 

and this is your chance. 

Mr. MUELLER. I would be happy to. We have a 5-year plan in 

which we have laid out the growth of the Bureau. I would be happy 

to come and try to make that available to you with the assistance 

of Department of Justice. 

And it is a question of prioritization, and we have done everything we can to make certain that we have our prioritization right. 

As I say, we are not doing what we did on the war on drugs, and 

we are not doing as many smaller white-collar criminal cases apart 

from the mortgage-fraud case that we have done before. And it is 

continuously an effort to request new resources while prioritizing 

the resources that we have. But I would be happy to provide you 

some information with regard to the future of the Bureau and what 

we expect and hope. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Director, and, hopefully, it will be your information and your aspirations. 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. My aspirations. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thanks, Darrell Issa. 

Chairwoman Zoe Lofgren Immigration Committee, California? 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Director Mueller, it is good to see you again. 

I want to get back to a topic that I have raised, I think, every 

time you have appeared before the Committee, and that has to do 

with the FBI name checks for immigration purposes. Specifically, 

I know there have been changes made in the processing of legal 

permanent resident requests that USCIS made to expedite, but certainly they have not, nor would I suggest, that they make any 

changes when it relates to citizenship applications. 

So the question is where are we? A year ago—actually, a little 

over a year ago, you indicated that we were on the verge of taking 

a great leap forward on the FBI name checks, and then again in 

April of this year, you indicated that we would have—the leap had 

36 

not yet occurred but that we were going to get all of the FBI name 

checks down to a 30-day period. 

However, this June the inspector general indicated that the 

name check program is using outdated technology and that the 

staff is poorly trained, that the supervisors are overworked and 

that they are falling behind. So I want to know where are we? Are 

we 90 days current? Are we 30 days current? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am ready for you, Congresswoman. I knew—I 

anticipated—— 

Ms. LOFGREN. I knew that you knew I would ask this. 

Mr. MUELLER. Since we first discussed this, we have done a 

number of things to address it. We have raised the fees, revised criteria, prioritized the workload, we are building a central records 

complex and we hired over 200 contractors to address this. 

As a result, in July of this year, we eliminated the backlog where 

we had cases pending longer than 2 years. By November this year, 

we will have eliminated the backlog of any case that is pending 

longer than 1 year. And by June of 2009, we hope to have 98 percent done within 30 days. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, if I may, right now, you know, in the—1990’s 

are done within a few minutes because of the mechanization. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. Yes. 

Ms. LOFGREN. It is the problem when that doesn’t work where 

we have these big delays. So when are we going to get to the 30- 

day goal that USCIS—— 

Mr. MUELLER. I do not believe that you will get—in certain cases 

you will not get to the 30-day goal, which is why it is 98 percent. 

You will have persons that come up—and multiple files. We have, 

I think, it is something like 100, 172 million. What is it—172—yes. 

We have got miles and miles and miles of files. We cannot digitize 

all the files. We will always have files from many years ago, although we are not going back now as often as we did, where we 

have to go to paper files. And those paper files can be located anyplace around the country. 

And, consequently, we will never, I don’t believe, be able to have 

100 percent done within 30 days, but it will very, very few, and it 

will be down to—as we said, 98 percent will be done within 30 

days. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Let—— 

Mr. MUELLER. And as I said—the other thing I think is important to note is that, as of November of this year, we will have totally limited the backlog of those that were pending longer than 1 

year. So it may be 30 days, it may be 45 days, it may be 60 days, 

but it will be nowheres like it was 2 or 3 years ago. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Do you have information of the name checks that 

were in this process what percentage of individuals were found 

problematic and illegible as a consequence of the search? 

Mr. MUELLER. I think I heard at one point it was very low, but 

I would have to get back to you with that statistic. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Could you get that information if you have it? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, I could. Yes. Yes. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I mean, if you don’t have it, I wouldn’t want you 

to put a huge amount of personnel into finding it, but I would 

like—I am interested in knowing that. 

37 

Mr. MUELLER. I will make one point if I could is, even if it is 

low—and I expect it to be fairly low—you don’t know where that 

one person—— 

Ms. LOFGREN. No. 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. Where that person—— 

Ms. LOFGREN. As you have—I have not suggested that this be— 

as I opened, that this be abbreviated in any way, but I am interested in—— 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. LOFGREN [continuing]. In the statistics. 

I will just express a concern and I know that you did address 

your interest in technology in your testimony and talking about 

deployable biometric tools. But those goals, which I think are useful ones and important ones, seem to be at odds with the intensive 

by-hand search of paper files that you have just described for the 

name check. Can you rectify your statement about the new technology and where we are in this name check? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, it is time, personnel and money to digitize 

every file the Bureau has and—— 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, certainly, some files are closed. Some files 

everybody is dead. I mean you don’t want to do that. 

Mr. MUELLER. What we have done is, where we are looking at 

a file, we will digitize that file. In other words, if it comes up—if 

there is something comes up in the course of a background check, 

we will digitize that file and—at least I—in most cases I think we 

do—when the possibility will be that that files need to be retrieved 

again. 

We are utilizing technology to both digitize and have files remotely reviewed. We are using technology we can in this—addressing this particular problem, but the idea would be to digitize everything. But OCR’ing a handwritten record would take forever, and 

it wouldn’t—— 

Ms. LOFGREN. You could—— 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. Do what you—— 

Ms. LOFGREN [continuing]. You could make it searchable. 

Mr. MUELLER. It might well, but you have to code it or you have 

to OCR it in order to make it retrievable in a digital file. So there 

is some pushes and takes in terms of what you can do in terms of 

digitizing all our files. Ideally, the model is digitize everything and 

make it immediately searchable, but it is an ideal that really you 

can’t obtain and so you have to have a number of strategies to 

maximize your ability to retrieve those records quickly. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I know my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. 

But I am very interested—and I don’t know whether you want 

to do it here in a public forum or at a more discreet forum, but we 

have, as we digitize information, I do have a concern about what 

security we have in place to keep that database secure from intruders. And I don’t want to talk about the FBI, but the Federal Government as an entity does not have a great track record of maintaining security of its databases so I am very, very interested in 

what you have deployed in that area, and whether you want to address that now or at a later day, I—— 

Mr. MUELLER. We are very concerned about that, quite obviously, 

and what I would have to do, I think, is get back to you, if I could, 

38 

with some information on the particular processes, audit trails and 

the like that—— 

Ms. LOFGREN. I would very much appreciate that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. Dan Lundgren is a former Member of Congress 

who did a stint as attorney general of California and is now back 

with the Committee. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Director Mueller, for being here. 

Let me go back to something that we have gone over in your previous appearances here, and that is the experience we had with national security letters and exigent letters. And we saw the report 

from the inspector general on that and your response of the 

changes that you had made to ensure that we didn’t have those 

problems. 

But I would like to ask once again, was there any disciplinary 

action taken with respect to anybody on that? Because, as I recall, 

the conclusion of the inspector general was not that there was any 

intentional wrongdoing or criminal activity but that it was essentially—I will use a word that he didn’t use but it sounded like sloppiness and lack of training of the agents of the seriousness of it, 

lack of enforcement by the SAC’s and so forth. 

And while I appreciate you have made changes—and I think you 

have made changes—to ensure that doesn’t happen again, was anybody ever found at fault, or was it just one of these things where 

we say, ‘‘Well, gee, no one did a good enough job, and that is too 

bad’’? 

Mr. MUELLER. We, as I believe you are aware, the investigation 

is ongoing in exigent letters, which is one of the areas that was 

harshly described by the IG, and that is an ongoing investigation. 

My expectation is, as this happened in other similar instances, that 

the IG will reach some findings with regard to individuals, and I 

will look at those findings and determine whether or not action 

should be taken. 

With regard to the over-arching problem that you—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Right. 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. You, I think, paint a picture of what 

happened, and it is very difficult that, other than me, who did not 

to put into place the appropriate procedures—not procedures because procedures were in place but the compliance to ensure that 

it was done to point one person who was responsible for what was 

a widespread departure from the procedures that have been put in 

place. 

Mr. LUNGREN. And what about the question we have talked 

about before, which was the legal advisor to the SAC is someone 

who is in the chain of command underneath the SAC and, therefore, very much—their advancements or their evaluations are very 

much in the bailiwick of the person to whom they are to give legal 

advice. And one of the questions that arose during this whole process was why didn’t any of the legal advisors to the SAC’s every 

raise this problem. And the question was whether or not there 

ought to be a greater chain of command from your general counsel 

to those legal advisors? What have you done with respect to that? 

39 

Mr. MUELLER. A couple things. We had a substantial training 

program and—with CDC’s in terms of their responsibilities, particularly when it goes to this particular program, and we have in 

process a change of changes with regard to the selection and the 

performance evaluations with regard to CDC’s in which the general 

counsel will play a much more substantial role. That has not been 

finalized at this point. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Let me raise what may be a touchy question from 

both your side and our side. 

One of the things that is raised with me when I go to other Members and talk to them about the responsibilities of your bureau and 

the necessary authority for your bureau and even adopting these 

new guidelines from the Department of Justice is a concern that 

was raised amidst the investigations of some Members of Congress. 

And why it is touchy is because I don’t want to say anything that 

would suggest you shouldn’t be doing that, but at the same time, 

there have been leaks that have come out of the Department of 

Justice. I recall, when Speaker Hastert raised the institutional constitutional question about the manner in which a subpoena was 

carried out here on the capital grounds, that, when Speaker 

Hastert raised that with respect to a subpoena served on a Member 

of the other party but nonetheless a Member of the House of Representatives, a leak appeared out of the Department of Justice, 

which appeared to call in to question Speaker Hastert and whether 

or not he was under investigation. You may recall there were three 

different statements that were released to finally putting that to 

bed. And at least some Members said to me it appeared that that 

came from the FBI. 

There have been some other investigations of Members where 

leaks have taken place, and when I try and assure other Members 

that, look, there ought to be investigations of Members of Congress 

where there appears to be wrongdoing, not all of those most likely 

are going to end up in finding criminal activity. At least in my experience as attorney general of California investigating public officials is many of them never did arise to criminal liability. 

But what would you have me say to Members who say, ‘‘You are 

asking us to extend the authority of the FBI. You are asking us to 

give them greater power with respect to national security letters. 

You are asking us to pass on these new guidelines, and yet we see 

in our own experience that there appear to be leaks from time to 

time and nothing ever appears to happen. You and I have had this 

discussion. You said, if you could find them, you would punish 

them. 

But the problem is Members sit there and say, if they can’t control that, how can you convince us we ought to give them additional authority or even continue the authority that they have? 

That is the dilemma I have when I am talking to other Members. 

And, again, it is touchy because it is a proper role for you to play. 

I don’t want anybody to believe that I am saying, you know, ‘‘Back 

off of investigations,’’ but a leak can destroy a Member, but, more 

importantly, it can undermine the independence of the legislative 

branch versus the executive branch, and I know you understand 

that. 

40 

What do you say to a Member—or what should I say to a Member—with respect to that kind of a problem, where it appears that 

leaks occur and nothing every happens? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would start by saying I abhor leaks. Everybody 

in the organization knows that. They have for some time. We will 

investigate and do investigate leaks and as aggressively as we investigate anything else. 

I would say too often that we are the entity that people turn to 

as the leaking institution when in very many of these cases it is 

not the FBI at all, it is others who have access to the investigation, 

whether it be the Department of Justice or defense counsel or other 

players. 

And the last point I would make is I would like nothing more 

than to successfully prosecute, whether it be somebody in the FBI 

or elsewhere, but all too often the one entity that has the evidence 

as to the leaks is unattainable, quite obviously, and that would be 

the reporters. And so you have one party that you are looking at, 

but you do not have access to the information on the other side 

that would enable you to actually bring the case before a jury. 

All I can tell you is that it hurts the reputation of the FBI, it 

undercuts our prosecutions and our investigations, and I do whatever I can—I do, I think, what I can to assure that there is no leak 

from the FBI in these very sensitive investigations. I mean, we 

have any number of sensitive investigations that are maintained 

confidential all the way up in time until indictment, and, as I said, 

the abhor the leaks and other investigations that are disclosed 

prior to the appropriate time. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes the a civil-rights and voter-rights champion 

on Judiciary Committee, Maxine Waters. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry 

I could not be here for the entire hearing. I have been running between several Committees here, but I am very pleased that you are 

holding this hearing. 

And I would like to welcome our FBI Director, Mr. Mueller, 

today. 

I wish I had time to talk more about mortgage fraud, but I would 

like to just say, from the information that I have, I am very 

pleased to see that the FBI has been doing a rather good job in 

dealing with this issue, and I hope to be able to talk with Mr. 

Mueller at some time in the near future. 

I have to bring up another very, very urgent issue at this time 

that deals with what is happening, not only in my district in one 

of the small cities there, the city of Inglewood—and I don’t know 

if he has been briefed on this—but what appears to be happening 

in too many places around the country. 

You may be aware of the problem in the city of Inglewood, California, where in the last 4 months four residents have been shot 

and killed by Inglewood police officers under what can be described 

as questionable circumstances. I asked the Department of Justice 

to investigate these incidents to determine whether there is a pattern or practice of discrimination or other police misconduct that 

41 

could result in the violation of civil rights or other Federal criminal 

statutes. 

I have not received an answer yet about my specific request, but 

I would like to know from you whether there are other investigations looking in to these kinds of problems? Have you been made 

aware of the problems in the city? I know you probably hear a lot 

about complaints about police misconduct all over the country, but 

Inglewood emerges pretty much on the radar screen of many of the 

people who watch these issues all over the country because each 

month for the past 4 months an African-American male has been 

killed by this police department. 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not familiar with the specifics of Inglewood. 

I will tell you that, when we receive allegations or patterns of what 

appear to be—suspicious patterns which may raise to the level of 

a violation of the civil-rights laws, we do investigate along with the 

Department of Justice. I would have to get back to you on that particular set of allegations. 

Ms. WATERS. Do you know of any investigations that may be 

going on on this time in any cities in the country around police 

misconduct? 

Mr. MUELLER. Oh, I am sure we—— 

Ms. WATERS. The pattern—— 

Mr. MUELLER. I am sure we have numerous investigations. I can 

get you the numbers. I don’t know it off the top of my head. But 

at any point in time we have a number of investigations into police 

brutality in a variety of forms. 

Ms. WATERS. All right. Well, I appreciate that, and your offer to 

get back to us with information about Inglewood would be very 

helpful. 

And since I have just a few more minutes left here on the time 

that I have to raise questions, let me just ask you a little bit about 

the mortgage-fraud work that you have been doing. 

As you know, aside from just the regular operation of the new 

products that were put on the market, like the ARM’s—the adjustable rate mortgages—and the resets and all that caused part of the 

subprime meltdown, we have a lot of allegations of people who actually did not know what they were signing or somebody else 

signed for them, they were misled about the ability to refinance 

and other things that look as if there was mortgage fraud. 

Have you discovered any specific operation or operations that you 

could safely say were involved with mortgage fraud? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. We have had a number of prosecutions over 

the last 2 years, I think, in excess of 500 of a variety of mortgagefraud schemes that preyed on unwitting consumers and others. So, 

yes, around the country, particularly in those pockets where the 

subprime mortgage crisis is affecting the community is where many 

of these investigations reside. 

We also, as I indicated earlier, have a number of investigations 

going against financial institutions who may well have misrepresented their assets in the course of filings and otherwise. And so 

we are looking at it from both the top, as well as those schemes, 

at what would be the bottom of the pyramid. 

And we are doing it in 42 task forces around the country, and 

on those 42 task forces will be agents and specialists and experts 

42 

from a variety of Federal agencies, as well as from state and local 

law enforcement, and then we will choose the particular jurisdiction in which to file the case depending on the circumstances of the 

case. 

Ms. WATERS. Well, just to alert you probably read the newspapers about it already—the foreclosure problem that we have is 

not simply a problem where people are losing their homes. It is not 

simply a problem where the value of homes and communities is 

being driven down. Because those homes that are not foreclosed are 

losing value because they are next door to or on the same block as 

houses that are not being kept up, and we tried to do something 

about this in the housing legislation that we passed. 

But the latest scheme is that we hear that people are going to 

be challenged at the polling place, whose addresses match up with 

the homes that have been foreclosed. For example, we are told, and 

information is being revealed, that there will be lists of foreclosed 

homes and people will be asked at the polling place who represent 

that this is their voting address, this is their home, and it is very, 

very serious. And I never dreamed that foreclosure would bring us 

even this additional problem. 

But whether we are talking about people whose homes have been 

foreclosed on or people maybe who have lost their homes through 

storms and hurricanes and damage—all of that—this business of 

challenging people at the poll about whether or not they are a resident of the state because they are address appears to be a foreclosed property is something that we all are going to have to deal 

with. Have you heard about this? 

Mr. MUELLER. I had not heard about it, but I can understand it. 

But I am not a—I must confess, I am not that familiar with the 

election laws as they apply to circumstances such as this and particularly different—— 

Ms. WATERS. Who enforces the Voting Rights Act? 

Mr. MUELLER. We would do the investigation. The Justice Department would be doing the prosecution. 

Ms. WATERS. Okay. So I am bringing it to your attention in this 

hearing today that there are allegations and newspaper reports of 

foreclosure lists being used as a way to challenge voters at the 

polls. I am adding to that people who are the victims of storms and 

hurricanes and natural disasters because they would fall in the 

same category. And I am asking you to get in front of it and ask 

the appropriate entities in the Department of Justice to take a look 

a this, and let’s not have this fight on election day at the polling 

places. 

Mr. CONYERS. Would the gentlelady yield? 

Ms. WATERS. Yes. I will yield to the Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. Who is in charge of this in the Department of Justice, sir? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would have to look. I am not—hold on just a sec. 

It is the Civil Rights Division. 

Mr. CONYERS. Uh-huh. And that is—— 

Mr. MUELLER. I will follow up on it. 

Mr. CONYERS. Okay. Do you know who is in charge of the Civil 

Rights Division? 

43 

Mr. MUELLER. I must confess, off the top of my head, I do not 

at this juncture. 

It is acting A.A.G. Grace Chung Becker. 

Mr. CONYERS. Ms. Becker is coming over—— 

Ms. WATERS. She is coming over? 

Mr. CONYERS. Yes, Ms. Waters. We have a hearing scheduled 

with her. 

Ms. WATERS. Well, I guess one of the things that I am taking the 

opportunity to do is sound the alarm so that we are not talking 

about it after the election what happened and investigating. This 

can be stopped now. We believe it is unconstitutional, it is a violation of the Voting Rights Act, and we shouldn’t linger with this. We 

got an election coming up. And we don’t want to see these challenges based on foreclosure or natural disasters. Okay? 

Mr. CONYERS. The Chair is pleased now to recognize Bill 

Delahunt, the former Massachusetts prosecutor and a Member of 

the Foreign Affairs Committee, as well as Judiciary Committee. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would welcome Mr. Director. Let me echo the compliments that 

I think Mr. Nadler sent your way earlier. I was watching his testimony, and let me say that I am pleased with the report of the inspector general regarding the FBI’s behavior in terms of enhanced 

interrogation techniques at Guantanamo. And I also read the twopart series reviewing the book on The Washington Post, and you 

are to be commended personally, as well as the agency. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I would like to just have a conversation for my 

limited time about how do we improve the efficacy of oversight in 

terms of this Committee and the Bureau? I would like you to go 

back to your office and reflect on how together we could accomplish 

that. 

I think you heard the Chair of the full Committee in his opening 

remarks. His frustration was palpable. It is clear that the Bureau 

has a significant investment in how it is perceived, not just here 

in Congress but, more importantly, by the American people because, if there is a lack of confidence, it is dangerous because the 

Bureau and the Department of Justice are integrated into the judicial branch in some aspects, obviously. 

And I share that frustration, and we need timely oversight to reassure the public that the Bureau with its power and its lack of 

transparency simply because of its mission in many respects is 

being conducted. I think we have to address that. 

And let me suggest to the Chair—— 

Well, before I get to talking to Mr. Conyers, let me note that, as 

you are aware, Mr. Lungren and I have had an interest and we 

have had discussions with you personally on the issue of informant 

guidelines. I appreciate that, and I hope to have further discussions 

with you on that matter. 

But the new attorney general’s secret guidelines at this point in 

time, even if they were adopted, what kind of assurances will the 

American people have and this Committee that they are being fully 

complied with? That goes to the significance of vigorous, timely 

oversight. Not that we are questioning the integrity of individuals 

44 

in the FBI, but we know from our experience as a democracy that 

checks and balances work; otherwise, we put our democracy at risk. 

But as I was suggesting to you, this format doesn’t work—5 minutes, an appearance once or twice a year by yourself or even your 

designee in an open session. I would ask you to consider designating individuals within the Bureau to constantly communicate 

with members of the staff, who will be vetted and preapproved by 

the Chair and the Ranking Member, to maintain a constant flow 

of and exchange of information. There is so many issues to attend 

to, we are busy here, we leave here and we are on to something 

else. A 5-minute rule doesn’t work. We are not going to get the 

kind of information that is necessary in a short, brief exchange like 

this. 

And I would encourage the Chair to consider reviewing the rules 

of the Committee, whether it is extending the time for questioning, 

whether it is having staff or individual Members interview FBI 

prior to public hearings so that we know what we are getting into, 

whether it is the creation of a Subcommittee under your direction 

to focus in on specific areas of significant concern, as is constantly 

being brought up here. 

But it is not working, and I am not suggesting that it is the responsibility exclusively of the FBI, the Department of the Justice 

or, clearly, this particular director, whom I have worked with in 

the past and for whom I have respect. But it isn’t working, and I 

think it is important that we work together to ensure that there 

is vigorous, timely oversight so that the American people feel confident that a system of checks and balances is working in terms of 

an agency that, by its very nature, operates with limited transparency. 

I, for one, would be willing—I chair Oversight on Foreign Affairs. 

We have different rules there, which basically is we have no rules. 

We just go on and on and on, and Mueller would be there for an 

hour and a half. But I think it is much more effective, and I really 

do think that it is time that we reconsider revising our rules and 

maybe even adding an additional Subcommittee that you could appoint a Chair to that would report to you directly because it is not 

working now. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, let’s invite Director Mueller to make a response if he chooses. 

Mr. MUELLER. I am going to start by saying, I guess I am glad 

I am in this Committee and not in total anarchy in some other 

Committee. [Laughter.] 

But the—several aspects perhaps. First, in terms of questions for 

the record, I don’t care which administration it is—and I have been 

in a number now—you are somewhat always going to be frustrated 

because, whatever administration it is wants to do the vetting of 

the questions that are going in, and that takes a long time, and it 

gets prioritized, and that which is important gets vetted early, and 

that which is perceived by others who have to look at it does not. 

And so, regardless of the administration, I think there will be some 

frustration. 

I do believe that it is important for us and the staff of the Congressional Affairs Office and the FBI to work very closely with the 

45 

staff of the Committee, and we have, and we have attempted to respond to questions and to provide briefings upon request. 

Lastly, I would say that I would be—and have—if there is an 

issue that I can come up and discuss with the Committee as a 

whole or a segment of the Committee that has a particular interest 

in an issue, such as the issue of handling informants, I am always 

to come up and have an informal dialogue for whatever it takes to 

have a dialogue—a discussion—that is not in the somewhat formalistic confines of a hearing but in addition to a hearing. And so 

whatever I can do to make it work better with the structures we 

currently have, I am willing to try. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

Attorney Artur Davis, a former member of the Department of 

Justice, from Alabama. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I will have to be brief, Mr. Director, as we have a vote that 

has got about 6 minutes left on it. 

But let me try to turn, if I can, to the question of the new Attorney General Guidelines. I know you have been asked about that, 

but I wanted to flesh out some areas that are left over. 

You probably saw The New York Times story by Eric Lichtblow 

on August 21, and this is his characterization—his phrase—but he 

opens the story by saying that the new standard doesn’t require, 

‘‘a clear basis for suspicion.’’ 

The Supreme Court and, to my knowledge, no other court have 

ever grappled with the question of the relationship between the 

standard for investigation in a FBI bureau context and, say, the relationship between that standard and the conventional Terry standard that we have. As you know from your days on the street, your 

days as a prosecutor, Terry v. Ohio states that there has to be a 

clear, articulable basis for a police encounter with someone. And 

that is kind of informally been thought to be the standard for opening up some kind of an investigation, I suppose, and the departmental context. This seems to weaken that standard. So I want you 

to comment on that for a second. 

What, based on your time as a U.S. attorney and your time now 

as director of the Bureau, what do you understand the relationship 

to be between, say, a Terry standard for a police encounter and the 

Bureau’s own internal standards for opening an investigation? 

Mr. MUELLER. I guess I would start by saying I am not certain 

I would agree that the appropriate analogy is a police encounter 

because there is, I believe, some Fourth Amendment—there is a 

Fourth Amendment right that attends to a person walking on the 

street, although it is not the same as, quite obviously, a search 

warrant. And I am not certain that is the correct analogy. 

I do believe that we open investigations on the criminal side with 

an allegation. It can be a criminal tax case in which a spouse says 

the other spouse is breaking the income tax laws. We open an investigation, we do it on that allegation, and it may well turn out 

that it was one spouse trying to get back to another—— 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, given time constraints, let me jump in. 

As I understand the plan, as it has been characterized in print, 

agents pursuing national security leads could employ physical surveillance, deploy informants and engage in pretext interviews. 

46 

Now, some of those do look a lot like what Terry means to guard 

against, encounters with individuals. 

So do you believe that the new standards create a doctrine that 

is less than the Terry standard of reasonable, articulable suspicion? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, it is not a new doctrine. It is the ability to 

employ particular methods at a particular point in time with regard to, on the national security side—— 

Mr. DAVIS. I understand. 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. But tied to—— 

Mr. DAVIS. Is it less than the Terry standard of reasonable, 

articulable suspicion, in your opinion? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. DAVIS. And how would you define the new standard? 

Mr. MUELLER. It can be an allegation. It can be a threat. It can 

be, for instance, a perceived threat by the U.S. government that 

one particular country is intent on stealing its secrets and, therefore, you have to identify the secrets that they are going to try to 

steal and then address the threat and identify those persons who 

are going to—or intend to steal the secrets. 

Mr. DAVIS. Should there be—— 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. Can identify a particular person at 

the point, you know the threat is there. Or I used the example previously of western Pakistan, where we know persons are going for 

training in terrorist camps. 

Mr. DAVIS. But let me jump in again given time constraints. 

Should there be a more protective standard for American citizens 

than non-American citizens? 

Mr. MUELLER. I don’t believe that is the case. We operate within 

the United States—fully 99 percent of our encounters—— 

Mr. DAVIS. I understand that. But should there be a more protective standard for an American citizen who might be subject to 

physical surveillance, as opposed to a non-American citizen? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, there is that distinction in certain of the 

more intrusive areas, such as interceptions and the like. I do not 

believe at the outset, where you have an allegation or you have a 

threat that you are investigating, that there ought to be a more 

substantial standard. 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, let me just end this, Director, by saying that I 

think that the problem, frankly, doesn’t so much lie with your intent. I think you have been an outstanding director of the Bureau. 

The problem, as we know, lies with how individual agents may 

take the new grant of authority. And you and I both know that 

good agents try to push the bounds. And if you lower the scope, if 

you lower the standard, they are going to engage in more aggressive conduct. 

It seems there are a lot of open questions here as to whether 

American citizens should be subjected to a more protective standard. I would argue they should. And, finally, it seems there are 

very real questions as to exactly how this new scope of authority 

is going to operate and practice, not in theory but in practice. 

Mr. MUELLER. I meant to point out and should have pointed out 

that there is one area in which you can’t collect. You cannot collect 

on a U.S. citizen, for instance, who is—solely to monitor First 

47 

Amendment activities, whatever those First Amendment activities 

might be. Now, that is a different standard than for noncitizens. 

But, nonetheless, I do believe that the bar should be relatively 

low in terms of initiating what we call an assessment to determine 

whether or not it is a valid threat or not. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Mueller. 

We have in Michigan in the Macomb County the Republican 

Party Chair, Mr. James Carabelli, announcing that they are going 

to examine whether people are using the polls who once lived in 

foreclosed homes. 

We have another issue in which attorney Eric Doster, a lawyer 

for the Michigan Republican Party, who is involved in election-day 

challenges to voters, saying that they intend to use the practice of 

voter caging, in which, based on returns of mail, that anybody that 

fits in to that category, will also be challenged. 

Can you help us initiate an investigation into these two considerations? 

Mr. MUELLER. Our protocol, when it comes to election crimes, is 

to consult with the Department of Justice and put the fact pattern 

that you have described to the Department of Justice—I think it 

is the Election Crime section—and to the extent that further investigation is warranted, we will do so at the direction of the Election 

Crimes section. 

Mr. CONYERS. Can I be advised of the outcome of that? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. We will get back to you—— 

Mr. CONYERS. Between today and tomorrow? 

Mr. MUELLER. We will try to do so. We will have to get the fact 

pattern from your staff and then consult with the Department of 

Justice and perhaps have the department get back to you. If not, 

we will get back to you one way or the other. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

And thank you very much for your attendance today. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you. 

Mr. CONYERS. That ends the Committee hearing. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you, sir. 

[Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(49) 

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDI- CIARY

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and ranking member, for convening today’s very important hearing on the oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The 

Committee has general oversight jurisdiction over the FBI as part of the Department of Justice. There are a number of issues relating to the FBI which require congressional oversight, including the FBI’s use of national security letters (NSLs) and 

Section 215 orders for business records, the Sentinel Program, name-checks for immigration beneficiaries, and wire-tapping of congressional offices, among other 

issues. 

The FBI was established in 1908 and has approximately 30,341 employees, 12, 

590 of which are special agents. In fiscal year 2007, the FBI’s total budget was approximately $6.04 billion, including $318 million in program increases for its 

counterterrorism, surveillance, information technology, forensics, training, and information sharing programs. 

The goal of the FBI is to protect and defend the United States against terrorist 

and foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the 

United States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, 

state, municipal, and international agencies and partners. In executing its priorities, 

the FBI produces and uses intelligence to protect the nation from threats and to 

bring to justice those who violate the law. 

The FBI lists ten priorities: 1) protect the United States from terrorist attack; 2) 

protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage; 3) 

protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes; 

4) combat public corruption at al levels; 5) protect civil rights; 6) combat 

transnational/national criminal organizations and enterprises; 7) combat major 

white-collar crime; 8) combat significant; 9) support federal, state, local and international partners; and 10) upgrade technology to successfully perform the FBI’s mission. 

Last month, the Justice Department’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) released its report on the FBI’s use of National Security Letters (NSLs) in 2006. OIG 

stated in that report that since the issuance of its March 2007 report, the FBI and 

the Department have made progress in implementing the recommendations from 

the 2007 report and adopting other corrective actions regarding the use of NSL. OIG 

noted that the FBI has issued guidance on the use of NSLs, provided mandatory 

training to FBI employees on the use of NSLs, and developed a new data system 

to facilitate the issuance of NSLs and improve accuracy of NSL data in required 

congressional reports. 

The FBI also created a new Office of Integrity and Compliance to ensure that national security investigations and other FBI activities are conducted in a manner 

consistent with appropriate laws, regulations, and policies. Importantly, the OIG report noted that the policies initiated from top levels did not always adequately filter 

down to the FBI field offices. 

The OIG provided several recommendations for the information to be implemented in the field offices. The OIG noted that it was troubled by the fact that 11 

blanket NSLs issued by headquarters in 2006 that sought telephone data on 3,800 

telephone numbers did not comply with the Patriot Reauthorization Act requirements regarding these provisions, internal FBI policy, or both. 

OIG also identified 84 possible intelligence violations involving the use of NSLs, 

of which the FBI determined that 34 needed to be reported to the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board. OIG also found that Section 215 orders were the subject 

50 

of processing delays. These delays were the result of too few resources being allocated to handle the requests, a complex review process, and legal questions regarding whether the applications met the statutory requirements. 

The March 2008 OIG report also determined that the FBI is the only component 

of the Justice Department that nominates known or suspected terrorists for inclusion on the consolidated terrorist watchlist. The OIG report has found that the FBI 

has not been diligent in updating or removing information concerning suspected terrorists. 

The FBI runs the National Name Check Program to provide information in FBI 

files to other government agencies requesting information about an individual. The 

United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) within the Department 

of Homeland Security and the Department of State requests such information for 

most immigration beneficiaries before any either agency grants a benefit. There is 

a backlog of name checks cases that have not been addressed by the FBI. 

The FBI wiretaps came under increasing scrutiny when they picked up the voices 

of several members of Congress in their conversations with Congressman Rick 

Renzi. The wiretaps reportedly were authorized pursuant to the FBI’s investigation 

of Congressman Renzi’s land deal. There has been no indication of any wrongdoing 

by any member other than Congressman Renzi. 

Violent crime is on the rise and Congress under the Bush Administration has severely cut federal crime-fighting funds. Since 2002, the Bush Administration has cut 

$2 billion from federal crime-righting funds. The cuts would come from funds for 

grants to state and local law enforcement. Thus, the Administration is dedicating 

vast federal resources to counter-terrorism but it has done so at the expense of state 

and local law enforcement. For example, I have implored the head of the Department of Justice, Attorney General Michael Mukasey, to investigate the myriad 

abuses by prison officials at the Texas Youth Commission and abuses by the prison 

officials at Harris County Jail. At the Texas Youth Commission there were allegations of sexual and physical abuse of children and youth by prison officials. In Harris County Jail, prisoners were denied medical treatment, access to religious services, and other abuses. Today, I would like to know what steps the FBI is prepared 

to take to curb abuse directed at the incarcerated and perpetrated by prison officials. 

Another area of concern with the FBI is the need to address contractor abuse. In 

December 2007, the Crime Subcommittee held a hearing in December on the enforcement of U.S. federal criminal laws to protect U.S. contractors in Iraq. The hearing was held to address the rape of Jamie Leigh Jones by U.S. contractors employed 

by KBR/Haliburton. The Department sent no witnesses to the hearing because it indicated that it was investigating the matter and has failed to respond to several letters issued by the Committee in January. 

Jamie Leigh Jones, from my District in Houston, Texas, testified that in July 

2005, she was approximately 20 years old, and was on a contract assignment in Iraq 

for KBR/Haliburton, when her fellow male contractors drugged, imprisoned, and repeatedly gang-raped her. 

Neither the Department of Justice nor the FBI have brought criminal action 

against the alleged assailants. Despite claims to the contrary Title 18, Part I, Chapter 1, Section 7, of the United States Code, entitled ‘‘Special maritime and territorial 

jurisdiction of the United States defined,’’ the United States has jurisdiction over 

the following: ‘‘any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an 

offense by or against a national of the United States’’ does allow for the Department 

to prosecute Ms. Jones’s alleged assailants. I have concerns and questions regarding 

what the FBI is doing about Ms. Jones: why was there a failure to prosecute individuals in this case. 

I am also concerned and want answers as to why it taking such a long time to 

address the backlog of name checks with respect to the watchlist. Specifically, I 

want to know why it takes so long to remove persons’ names from the watchlist 

when they are wrongfully added—this wrongful addition of names disproportionately affects African Americans and persons with Muslim sounding names. I would 

like an explanation of the criteria used in adding and removing names from the 

watchlist. 

Other issues of concern are that the FBI has declined to investigate illegal mailers 

sent to African Americans in Dallas threatening criminal punishment if they registered to vote through ACORN. The FBI claimed that no federal law was violated. 

These reports of voter suppression surfaced from the election primaries in Dallas, 

Texas. Specifically, there were reports that African American voters were sent letters threatening them with criminal punishment if they registered to vote. Neither 

the DOJ nor the FBI have taken action. My question is whether the FBI is taking 

51 

action and what the FBI is doing or plans to do to address this recent allegation 

of voter disenfranchisement. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing some answers to the questions from our 

distinguished panelist. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time. 

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