___________ No. 95-3900

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the District * of Minnesota. James Chavers, Jr., * * [TO BE UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

__________ Submitted: May 17, 1996 Filed: May 30, 1996

__________ Before MAGILL, ROSS, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. James Cha vers appeals his conviction on two counts of being a felon in possession of a fi rearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994), contending that th ere was insufficient evidence that he constructively possessed th e firearms. We affirm.
I. On Octobe r 10, 1992, Nett Lake police officer Ron Quetone stopped a spe eding car owned and driven by Chavers. During the course of a subsequent search of the car, officer Quetone fo und a deer rifle partially conce aledin the hatchback area of the car. The gun was owned by Lewi s Drift, who was not present when the car was stopped. Drift testified at trial that he had lent the gun to

### The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge 1 

### for the District of Minnesota. -2- Chris Day, who was then in the company of Chaver s. However, special agent Debra Decker of the FBI testified at trial that Chavers identified th e weapon as "one of my deer rifles" and that he had argued with her that it was permissible for him to have the weapon in the car.
OnAugust 19, 1994, officer James Scott observed Chavers speeding . After Chavers and his passenger, Barry Day, abandoned the car, office r Scott q uickly glanced into the car before serving the traffic ticket . Scott noticed a rifle on the front seat of the car, which he confiscated. As he did so, Chavers asked officer Scott why Scott was taking "his" gun. Cha vers told Scott that he and Day had been out deer hunting tha t afternoon, although D ay testified at trial that only he, and not Chavers, had actually handled the gun. Chavers, previously convicted of assault on a federal officer an d aiding and abetting a second degree burglary, was indicted on two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C . § 922(g)(1). On July 13, 1995, a jury convicted Chavers on both counts. The district court imposed a sentence of 72 months imprisonment, thre e 1 year s of supervised release, and a $100 special assessment. Chaver s appeals, contending that there was insufficient evidence that he possessed the firearms in Counts I and II.
II. When evaluating an insufficiency of the evidence claim, "we view the evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences from it, in the light mos t favorable to the government." United States v. Felici , 54 F.3d 504, 506-0 7 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 116 S. Ct.

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251 (1995). We will uphold a jury verdict "unless no reasonable jury coul d have concluded beyonda reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense." Id. at 507. A convict ion for violating § 922(g)(1) may be based on constructive possessionof a firearm. See United States v. Boykin , 986 F.2d 270, 274 (8th Cir.), cert. den ied , 114 S. Ct. 241 (1993). Constructive possession of a fire arm is established if the defendant "has dominion over th e premises where the fi rearm is located, or control, ownership, or dominion over the firearm itself." Id. ; see also United States v. Eldridge , 98 4 F.2d 943, 946 (8th Cir. 1993) (same). In this case, there is sufficient evidence of constructive poss ession to support the § 922(g)(1) convictions. First, the jury heard testimony that, in both instances, Chavers claimed that the firearm was his. Even if Chaver s did not actually own the rifles, a jury could properly infe r that, by these statements, Chavers was indicatin g that he had control over the firearms. Further, the rifles were located in cars driven or owned by Chavers. Based on this, a jury could conclude t hat Chavers constructively possessed the firearms. See Eldridge , 984 F.2d at 946 (defendant found to constructivelypossess firearm when he knew that firearm was in trunk of car and he had control of the keys to that car).
III.
Because there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury t o conclude that Chavers constructively possessed the firearms, we affirm.

### -4- A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.