UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

MARIA MAGDALENA SEBASTIAN 

JUAN; JENNIFER ALVARADO 

SEBASTIAN, 

 Petitioners, 

v. 

LORETTA E. LYNCH, United States 

Attorney General, 

 Respondent. 

No. 15-9539 

(Petition for Review) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before LUCERO, McHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Maria Magdalena Sebastian Juan (“Sebastian”), a citizen of Guatemala, 

petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 

denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 

United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The parties are familiar with 

the facts of this case, which we need not recite here. Exercising jurisdiction under 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), we deny her petition. 

 

*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

December 6, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

I 

We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for 

substantial evidence. Witjaksono v. Holder, 573 F.3d 968, 977 (10th Cir. 2009). 

Under the substantial evidence standard, the record must compel reversal. Id.; see 

also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992). To secure asylum, 

Sebastian must demonstrate that she is a “refugee,” defined as a person outside of her 

country who is “unable or unwilling to return to . . . that country because of 

persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 

8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(A). An applicant can establish persecution 

by: (1) demonstrating past persecution, which gives rise to a rebuttable presumption 

of future persecution; (2) demonstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution; or 

(3) demonstrating “past persecution so severe as to demonstrate compelling reasons 

for being unwilling or unable to return,” even absent any danger of future 

persecution. Krastev v. INS, 292 F.3d 1268, 1270-71 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotation 

omitted) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)). Sebastian asserts refugee status based on the 

first and second prongs. 

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that the harms Sebastian 

suffered in Guatemala were insufficiently “extreme” to rise to the level of past 

persecution. See Tanuwidjaja v. Holder, 352 F. App’x 281, 283 (10th Cir. 2009) 

(unpublished) (quoting Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 1998)); see 

also Sidabutar v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1116, 1124 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding no past 
3 

persecution when asylum applicant was repeatedly beaten and robbed for years, twice 

resulting in serious injury). Moreover, during the two years before she entered the 

United States, Sebastian lived without major incident. Although she received some 

threats during that period, “[t]hreats alone generally do not constitute actual 

persecution.” Vatulev v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2003). 

Sebastian argues that the BIA impermissibly ignored evidence and 

mischaracterized the record. We disagree. Although the BIA recounted the facts in 

neutral language, such objective descriptions do not amount to mischaracterization. 

Nor does the BIA need to expressly state that it considered specific facts in its 

persecution analysis. Reciting those relevant facts is sufficient to show 

consideration. See Mena-Flores v. Holder, 776 F.3d 1152, 1171 (10th Cir. 2015) 

(noting the BIA’s obligation to consider a case does not require it to “expressly parse 

or refute on the record each individual argument offered by the petitioner” 

(quotations and alteration omitted)). 

Relatedly, Sebastian argues that the BIA failed to evaluate the evidence 

cumulatively. See Ritonga v. Holder, 633 F.3d 971, 975 (10th Cir. 2011). But again, 

the BIA does not need to explicitly state that it weighed the record cumulatively. Its 

aggregate assessment is evident on the face of the BIA’s decision and its reliance on 

the immigration judge’s order: both describe the multiple bases from which 

Sebastian claims past persecution, but conclude that this evidence is insufficient for 

asylum. 
4 

Sebastian also contends that the BIA ignored expert and country conditions 

evidence relevant to her claims. However, the BIA’s failure to expressly elaborate 

on the country condition documentation does not compel a conclusion that it ignored 

the evidence. Moreover, even if a country’s broader cultural and political context 

generally supports an asylum applicant’s claim, such evidence “does not substitute 

for an analysis of the facts of each applicant’s individual circumstances.” de la 

Llana-Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093, 1098 (10th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted). 

Thus, although the evidence submitted supports Sebastian’s claims generally, it does 

not compel a conclusion that she personally suffered harm rising to the level of 

persecution. Accordingly, we affirm the BIA’s finding of no past persecution. 

“Without a showing of past persecution, an [asylum applicant] must 

demonstrate that it is more likely than not that [she] will be individually persecuted 

in the future.” Witjaksono, 573 F.3d at 977. Sebastian’s claim of future persecution 

is based on the same events and country conditions that she relies upon to establish 

past persecution. Having determined that those events do not rise to the level 

required to prove past persecution, we conclude that they also do not demonstrate a 

well-founded fear of future persecution. See Gallego-Arroyave v. Holder, 505 F. 

App’x 749, 754 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished). 

II 

Because Sebastian has not met the standard for asylum, she necessarily has not 

met the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. See Karki v. Holder, 

715 F.3d 792, 801 (10th Cir. 2013). Similarly, Sebastian relies on the same evidence 
5 

to support her claim that she will face a substantial likelihood of torture upon 

returning to Guatemala under the CAT. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Because 

substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Sebastian is unlikely to face 

future persecution in Guatemala, “it is likewise against the odds that she would be 

tortured by the government or a proxy for the government.” Ritonga, 633 F.3d at 979 

(quotation omitted). Thus, Sebastian is ineligible for CAT relief. 

III 

 For the foregoing reasons, Sebastian’s petition for review is DENIED. Her 

motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge