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i 

43–685 2009

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–128] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

MEETING JOINTLY WITH

SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES 

SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST ON DEPARTMENTS OF 

THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE TACTICAL 

AVIATION PROGRAMS 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 11, 2008 


Congress.#13
(II) 

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii, Chairman 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Professional Staff Member 

LYNN WILLIAMS, Professional Staff Member 

BEN GLERUM, Staff Assistant 

SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi, Chairman 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

LYNN WILLIAMS, Professional Staff Member 

ELIZABETH DRUMMOND, Staff Assistant 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2008 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, March 11, 2008, Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request on Departments of the Navy and Air Force Tactical 

Aviation Programs ............................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, March 11, 2008 ........................................................................................ 53 

TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 2008 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST ON DEPARTMENTS OF THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE 

TACTICAL AVIATION PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Abercrombie, Hon. Neil, a Representative from Hawaii, Chairman, Air and 

Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................................. 1 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Ranking Member, 

Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee .......................................... 5 

Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative from New Jersey, Ranking Member, 

Air and Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................... 4 

Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi, Chairman, Seapower 

and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee ........................................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Balderson, William M., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Air Programs, Department of Defense ........................................................................... 39 

Darnell, Lt. Gen. Daniel J., Deputy Chief of Staff, Air, Space and Information 

Operations, Plans and Requirements, U.S. Air Force ....................................... 42 

Hoffman, Lt. Gen. Donald, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of the Air Force for Acquisition, U.S. Air Force ................................................ 42 

Myers, Rear Adm. Allen G., Director, Air Warfare, U.S. Navy ........................... 39 

Sullivan, Michael, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 8 

Trautman, Lt. Gen. George J., III, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, U.S. 

Marine Corps ........................................................................................................ 41 

Young, John J., Jr., Under Secretary, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Balderson, William M., joint with Rear Adm. Allen G. Myers ..................... 71 

Hoffman, Lt. Gen. Donald, joint with Lt. Gen. Daniel J. Darnell ................ 113 

Sullivan, Michael .............................................................................................. 129 

Trautman, Lt. Gen. George J., III ................................................................... 98 

Young, John J., Jr. ........................................................................................... 57 

Page

IV 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Mr. Abercrombie ............................................................................................... 157 

Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Taylor .................................................................... 163 

Mr. Ellsworth .................................................................................................... 168 

Mr. LoBiondo .................................................................................................... 168 

Mr. Miller .......................................................................................................... 167 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST ON DEPARTMENTS OF 

THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE TACTICAL AVIATION PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, MEETING JOINTLY WITH SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, 

Tuesday, March 11, 2008. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Neil Abercrombie 

(chairman of the Air and Land Forces subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. NEIL ABERCROMBIE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM HAWAII, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Aloha. Good morning, everyone. 

Good morning, Mr. Young, Mr. Sullivan. A pleasure to see you 

here today. I hope you are still smiling, for those who can’t see. Appreciate that. 

I am going to make an opening statement, which I will submit 

further for the record, and then ask Mr. Taylor to submit his statement. Then we will get right to the hearing. 

This morning we are in a joint hearing of the Air and Land 

Forces and the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittees 

to receive testimony regarding the Department of the Navy and Air 

Force Aviation Programs. 

There is an awful lot to cover today and we will conduct this 

hearing in two panels. 

Leading the first panel, as I have indicated by the introductions, 

Secretary John Young, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. An unenviable post in these days, 

but one that is crucial and vital and I for one and very appreciative 

of the work you do, Mr. Young. 

You will be discussing issues related to the F–22 force structure 

and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program. Followed by Mr. Mike 

Sullivan from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), whose 

service to the United States and most particularly to the Armed 

Services Committee is invaluable. 

You are going to give us the GAO views on the risks associated 

with the current JSF program. Maybe risk is the wrong word 

there, but some of the challenges that are there, some of the perspectives that we need to take into account in our decision making, 

including an updated evaluation on the merits of the competitive 

Joint Strike Fighter engine program. 

2 

The second panel will include Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force 

witnesses to help provide information on the major issues associated with their helicopter fighter and airborne electronic attack 

programs. The Navy and Air Force aviation includes a large number of programs—I don’t know if this is being recorded or sent out 

or not, but that is one of the reasons why I wanted to go through 

a little bit in the opening statement of what we are going to take 

up, because if there is a television audience, they may not be as 

familiar with the subject matter as everybody in the audience 

might be, and some of the witnesses. 

Navy and Air Force aviation includes a large number of programs, but today we are going to focus on the Joint Strike Fighter, 

as I indicated, the F–22, tactical aircraft inventory and the CSARX 

as Air and Land Forces Subcommittee issues. 

Since 1997, the Department of Defense (DOD) has requested ap- proximately $1.1 billion for the Joint Strike Fighter alternate engine program, which will be a key element in today’s discussion. 

Congress has added $977 million to this amount for a total of $2.1 

billion being authorized and appropriated through this fiscal year. 

We understand that an additional $1.3 billion would be required 

through 2013 to complete development of the Joint Strike Fighter 

alternate engine, which would provide the Department of Defense 

a competitive choice between the two interchangeable engines for 

the 2,443 Joint Strike Fighters that the Department now plans to 

buy. 

One reason Congress has supported a competitive alternate engine program for the Joint Strike Fighter is because of the benefits 

to DOD from the competition between the F–100 and the F–110 engine manufacturers beginning in the earlier eighties. As a result of 

this competition, the GAO has indicated in the past that the Department of Defense has saved approximately $4 billion in lifecycle 

costs of 21 percent savings. 

Competition, the GAO has noted, has had other benefits, such as 

improvements in engine performance, reliability and maintainability. Again, it is not just Mr. Sullivan, and you, Mr. Young, that 

don’t know all these things. But I think it is important that we 

have a foundation for the discussion that may help direct your remarks. 

I would like to note that Section 213 of last years authorization 

bill, that is to say this year’s fiscal 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, requires the Secretary of Defense to insure the obligation and expenditure of sufficient annual amounts for the continued development and procurement of two options for the propulsion 

system for the Joint Strike Fighter. 

Despite this provisional law, the Department has not included 

funding for a competitive Joint Strike Fighter engine in its budget 

request, and I am hoping, Mr. Young, you will address that issue. 

Funding for the F–22 will be another important issue for the 

subcommittee this year. The budget before us would authorize a 

final F–22 20-aircraft procurement. Although DOD officials have 

indicated the anticipated fiscal year 2009 supplemental will include 

four additional aircraft, neither the advanced procurement funding 

for additional F–22s in fiscal year 2010 or the F–22 line shutdown 

cost is included in the budget request before us. 

3 

And I expect that you will also address the question of why we 

are putting replacement planes in the supplemental budget instead 

of the regular budget that is before us right now. You already know 

you need it. Why is it going into a supplemental? 

The current F–22 program of record is 183 F–22s. The Air Force 

asserts that it requires a fleet of 381 F–22s to meet its requirements under the national military strategy. In future years, the defense program has presented end of production at 183 F–22 aircraft 

with the possibility of an additional four more aircraft, as I indicated. The Joint Strike Fighter, the F–35A, is planned to complete 

the remainder of the future Air Force fighter force structure. The 

F–35A is now planned to achieve its initial operation capability in 

2013. Whether that is possible remains to be discussed and seen. 

The 2009 average procurement unit cost of the 20 F–22s is said to be $205 million in the information given to me. The projected 

cost of the F–35A is $73 million. We are much more certain of the 

cost of the F–22s, since we have an ongoing production line. I hope 

to hear from the GAO this morning on the high risk that the F– 

35 program will not achieve its cost, schedule or performance parameters. I hope that will be addressed. 

The F–22 and the F–35 have a similar 12-year development period. If we go back to where the F–22 was 5 years into its development in 1996, about where the F–35 is now in terms of development years, projections were for about 438 aircraft and an average 

procurement of $104 million in 2008 dollars. Today we are planning for 183 rather than 438, and the unit cost have increased 97 

percent. What is the harbinger of the F–35A, we have to explore. 

If the cost of the F–35 increases similar to the F–22, costs could 

increase by a similar amount, if it was just the same, it would be 

$156 million per aircraft in 2008 dollars and that is without a reduction of the currently projected 2,443 aircraft total procurement. 

Whether that number sustains itself is, again, something I think 

we need to address honestly. 

So I am asking for your assessment of the competitive engine 

program, the development and procurement challenges in the Joint 

Strike Fighter and the way forward for the F–22 production. And 

then when we get to the second panel, I will go into further discussion. 

Before we go further then, I will ask Mr. Taylor if he has a statement that he would like to either submit or state at this time. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM MISSISSIPPI, CHAIRMAN, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to have a statement that I would like to submit for 

the record. Additionally, I would hope at some point that Mr. 

Young could address the situation with the P–3s over in Iraq, what 

is the Department’s plan to either replace them, fix them or find 

a suitable replacement aircraft for the time being. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

That will be submitted for the record without objection. 

Any other members like to make an opening statement? 

4 

Mr. Saxton. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

NEW JERSEY, RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND FORCES 

SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to begin by welcoming our witnesses, of course, and 

particularly I would like to thank Secretary Young for joining us 

today. We have worked on many programs and projects together 

over the years. 

Mr. Chairman, the President’s budget request for fiscal year 

2009 has left Congress, in my opinion at least, in quite a quandary. 

Simply put, the dollars available do not provide the level of support 

necessary to meet Air Force needs. Not only does the budget fail 

to reflect a decision on whether or not to buy more C–17s and F– 

22s, it fails to fund congressionally mandated programs, as you 

pointed out, such as the JSF competitive engine and a minimum 

required B–52 force structure. 

After reviewing the budget request, I can only come to one conclusion. Once again, I will state it again, there is not enough money 

in the defense top line to meet the nation’s requirements. As a result, folks who are with us today testifying are faced with making 

what I think are impossible choices. I say impossible because they 

are charged with training and equipping the military forces to support the national military strategy, and yet they are not resourced 

to do so. 

In previous years, the Department has made things work by assuming risks in areas where they could, and they have tried to 

spread that risk across the Department so that no one capability 

would suffer too greatly. I believe that we are seeing in this year’s 

budget request that we have stolen all we can from Peter and Paul 

is issuing foreclosure notices. We are up against the wall. 

Folks, we have got to increase the defense top line. We have 

failed to adequately resource the Department’s requirements and 

the fiscal year 2009 budget request is a clear indication that they 

are left with impossible choices. This base budget says, first, we 

need more C–17s, but we can’t pay for them. Second, we need more 

F–22s, but we can’t pay for them. Third, we need 76 B–52s, but we 

can only pay for about 40. We need a competitive engine for the 

JSF, but we can’t pay for it. In fact, we need more money in the 

JSF program to ensure an adequate test and development strategy, 

as the chairman just noted, but we can’t pay for that either. 

The Congress cannot allow this or any Administration to obscure 

the true strategic risks of their decisions by offering a snapshot of 

the potential threat taken through a straw. This budget request is 

an indication that they have done just that in my opinion. Although the budget process is complex, it is based on a very simple 

framework. You start with an analytically supported and agreed 

upon threat assessment, then you generate a strategy to deal with 

that threat. Finally, you allocate resources and you mitigate the 

risks associated with resource constraints. 

This budget request does things in the reverse order, and it simply assumes away the threat in order to balance the equation. I believe we have a responsibility. That responsibility is to adequately 

5 

equip the brave men and women that voluntarily serve this nation, 

and this budget request is a clear indicator that we do not intend 

to do so, at least not without an unacceptable risk. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will repeat once again, I think that 

we need to increase the top line. And thank you for giving me this 

opportunity to make this statement. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Saxton. We are certainly 

going to explore all of that, I assure you. 

Mr. Bartlett, my good friend, do you have an opening statement? 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SEAPOWER AND 

EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I know we have a number of aviation programs to discuss today 

and quite a few witnesses and I expect we will examine more closely a few acquisition efforts, so I will keep my remarks brief. 

Today the United States airpower is unrivaled. It allows us to 

hold virtually any fixed surface target, and many moving or buried 

targets, on the planet at risk. Where we used to require many 

planes to service a single target, or at least one plane per target, 

now a single aircraft can perform multiple missions. 

Indeed, we are no longer constrained by the physical location of 

the pilot. With the advent of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), 

which of course cannot replace manned aircraft in all circumstances, we are able to command and control aircraft around 

the world from air bases in the United States. In fact, it is these 

very advances which have led me to question, as have Admirals 

Stansfield Turner and Art Cebrowski, the day of the aircraft carrier may have come and gone. 

I do not pose the question to cast doubt on the need for naval 

aviation. Nor do I question the need to project power in access-denied environments. I have pushed for further examination of this 

issue primarily because of the vast improvements in combat airpower, unmanned aviation and guided munitions and the vulnerability our carriers face as targets in today’s threat environment. 

With that said, we should not maintain false confidence in our 

technological superiority. Other nations such as China and India 

are fielding modern fighter aircraft, multi-level air defense systems 

and aerial surveillance systems. At the same time, the United 

States has to make difficult and expensive choices regarding the recapitalization of our aging aircraft. What is more, these choices are 

not confined to a single service. The need to replace the Air Force’s 

F–16s and F–15s is arguably no greater than the need to provide 

new fighters to the Marine Corps and Navy. 

While one can certainly point to critical capability gaps within 

the Air Force, particularly given the recent issues with the F–15s, 

the Department of the Navy has a projected shortfall of nearly 

three carrier aircraft wings by 2017, yet we may not be able to simply buy our way out of this predicament. The replacement aircraft, 

the so-called fifth generation fighters, like the F–22 and the F–35, 

are very expensive. 

6 

On a separate note, related to acquisition of future aviation platforms, I hope our witnesses will comment today about a recommendation from the recent Defense Science Board report on 

DOD energy strategy, ‘‘More Fight, Less Fuel.’’ As I am sure our 

witnesses know, mobility platforms consume the most energy used 

by the Department, with jet fuel representing nearly 60 percent of 

fuel consumed by all of DOD. Consequently, the Defense Science 

Board’s first recommendation was that the Department accelerate 

efforts to implement energy efficiency key performance parameters, 

KPPs, for weapons systems, and use the fully burdened cost of fuel 

to inform all acquisition trades and analyses about their energy 

consequences. 

Some important steps were already taken prior to the release of 

the Defense Science Board report. In August 2006, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued a memorandum endorsing a Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) decision to 

establish an energy efficiency KPP. In April 2007, a USDAT&L 

memorandum established that it is department policy to use the 

fully burdened cost of fuel for all acquisition trade analyses. 

Chief executives from ConocoPhillips and Shell oil companies 

doubt the ability for world supplies to meet demand by 2015, a 

very short time period in DOD planning horizons. Oil is over $100 

a barrel and Goldman Sachs is among those estimating it could go 

to $150 or $200 a barrel this year. 

That is why I believe it is very important for our witnesses to 

assess the status, importance and future impact of creating and implementing this recommendation for an energy efficiency KPP and 

use of the fully burdened cost of fuel. How critical are they in every 

stage of our planning processes to achieve the Defense Science 

Board’s proposal to reduce the energy intensity of our operational 

forces to enhance our warfighting capabilities. 

I understand the requirements for F–22 and F–35 are already 

long established. What is the likelihood that an energy efficiency 

KPP could be added to these programs or any other aviation platforms in the near term? 

Finally, as we examine these issues, I would strongly urge the 

Department to maintain transparency with Congress regarding the 

true requirements for aviation programs. We need to know the real 

cost of fulfilling these requirements. We need to know the amount 

of risk that each year’s budget accepts. It does a disservice to the 

American people if requirements are masked or changed on the 

basis of what the Department of Defense believes it can afford. Lay 

out the true requirement and propose a budget that is the President’s best attempt to balance many competing needs. 

We are at an important crossroads in our nation’s history. The 

world around us is changing rapidly. We must be judicious in our 

choices as we face what seem to be unlimited requirements with 

a very limited budget. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. Thank you all for 

being with us today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. 

7 

I might note in relation to your remarks that the last word I 

heard this morning is that speculation in oil futures have gone over 

$109 a barrel today. 

I want to thank you both for your statements, as always. They 

are clearly stated and insightful and provocative. 

With that, Mr. Young, would you like to come up and have the 

four of us go down and sit there and then you question us? How 

would that work? 

Secretary YOUNG. That would be great. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Do you have enough—I saw you making notes 

as fast as you could, there. Do you simply want to agree with everybody and we can close down, or would you like to get started 

and perhaps make a statement of your own, and then we will go 

from there. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN J. YOUNG JR., UNDER SECRETARY, ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

Secretary YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, that would be great, I think. 

Chairman Abercrombie, Chairman Taylor, Ranking Member 

Saxton and Ranking Member Bartlett, and distinguished members 

of the respective subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you today. 

I will try to be brief and directly address the issues highlighted 

by the committee hearing letter. 

First, as you know, the Defense Department has analyzed the requirement for F–22 aircraft and determined that the current budgeted inventory of 183 is adequate. It is critical for the Defense Department to move forward to the next generation of supportable 

and highly capable fighter aircraft, the Joint Strike Fighter. 

Frankly, the Defense Department still has work to do on the F– 

22. A number of concerns were raised during recent operational 

testing. Further, current Air Force plans do not upgrade 100 early 

F–22s to the most capable block 35 configuration. Upgrading F–22s 

that DOD has already purchased should be considered ahead of 

any other F–22 options. 

The Joint Strike Fighter program, with the tremendous help 

of—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Could you repeat—I am sorry. Could you repeat your last statement? I want to make sure I got it correctly. 

Secretary YOUNG. Upgrading F–22s that the Department of Defense has already purchased should be considered ahead of any 

other F–22 options. 

The Joint Strike Fighter program, with the tremendous help and 

support of this committee, has gone reasonably well. Indeed, I was 

a new member of the Pentagon leadership when the system development and demonstration contract was awarded in 2001. The fiscal year 2009 budget before you requests funds for the 3rd year of 

low-rate initial production. The Congress has given the Defense Department and the industry a chance to efficiently execute this program. This is in contrast to the fact that the F–22 SDD contract 

was awarded in 1991 and low-rate production did not begin until 

2001. 

8 

The SDD program for the F–135 Pratt & Whitney engine has 

also gone well, leveraging heavily the investment made in the Pratt 

& Whitney F–119 engine for the F–22. The engine recently experienced a repeat blade failure and we are confident that modest design modifications will correct this issue, which is linked to a rare 

flight condition, military power in the vertical STOVL mode. 

I believe we may need to add modest funds to the Joint Strike 

Fighter program budget to complete development. One major factor 

is the loss of $1.1 billion from the JSF SDD program over the last 

5 years due to Pentagon budget cuts and Congressional marks. 

Pentagon and Congressional marks make a real impact on program 

execution and a well-planned program. 

The Department is proceeding with the obligation of funds to develop an alternate engine, consistent with congressional direction. 

In the past, I have been an advocate of the alternate engine program. In an unconstrained budget environment, the alternate engine provides some potential benefits to the Defense Department. 

However, I feel the pressure on me as the defense acquisition executive is to deliver appropriate defense capability at the lowest possible cost, carefully using each tax dollar. 

The alternate engine program will cost a minimum of $1.6 billion 

for development and an additional $1.9 billion to establish production. The Defense Department, according to the KEG would need 

to save 16 to 22 percent on the planned JSF engine procurement 

in order to have a business case for the development of the alternate engine. The $1.6 billion to develop an alternate engine represents funds that can be used now to buy other needed capability 

for our warfighters and our Nation. 

Furthermore, the F–136 engine is not derived from the F–119 

and presents a risk of technical issues and cost growth during development, another risk to the warfighters capability. 

Finally, the Defense Department budget has proposed termination of C–17 production. After reviewing these issues in detail 

through the C–5 re-engining program, I believe this is a well-considered decision. In many ways, it is like the alternate engine decision. Purchase of additional C–17s is not necessary and use of 

funds for this purpose in a constrained budget environment will result in denying other capabilities to our warfighters. 

Again, I appreciate the chance to testify. I am sure I have not 

been able to address all of the committee’s concerns, so I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Young can be found in the 

Appendix on page 57.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you for a very succinct summary. That 

is one of the best I have heard. Thank you. 

Mr. Sullivan. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION 

AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Chairman Abercrombie, Chairman 

Taylor, Ranking Member Saxton, Ranking Member Bartlett. It is 

a pleasure to be here this morning. 

9 

My testimony is going to be more specific to the Joint Strike 

Fighter. It discusses emerging risks to the overall program and updates information from the analysis we performed last year regarding different cost scenarios for the alternate engine. I will briefly 

summarize my written statement, which I will submit for the 

record. 

Also, I would like to note that the information on overall program risks is taken from our annual mandated report, which is 

also being issued today. 

First, let me begin with observations on the overall current program cost estimate. In the past year, the Department reported that 

the Joint Strike Fighter programs procurement cost estimate increased by more than $23 billion due to a 7-year extension to the 

procurement period, increased estimates of future contract prices 

and airframe material cost increases. 

The program’s official development cost estimate remained about 

the same. However, to maintain that estimate the program made 

decisions that we believe may have increased overall risks. In order to replenish $600 million in program reserves that were 

spent too quickly, the Department has approved a plan that will 

eliminate two test aircraft, reduce flight tests and accelerate the reduction of the prime contractor’s development workforce. Several 

prominent defense offices found the plan was too risky and we 

agree with that. Our report issued today recommends revisiting the 

plan to examine alternatives. 

The Department has stated that it believes the plan is manageable, but it will monitor its execution and revise it if necessary in 

the future. 

At this point in the program, we believe its cost estimate lacks 

reliability. It does not include all applicable costs. For example the 

alternate engine program is not included. It relies on data from deficient reporting systems, earned value management systems, and 

it is at variance with other independent cost estimates. The KEG, 

for example, and DCMA, also has another estimate. 

The Department has identified billions of dollars in unfunded requirements and the development schedule continues to degrade. In 

our report, we recommended a new, full, independent cost estimate 

be conducted so that Congress will have an accurate understanding 

of future funding needs. 

The Department generally agreed with this recommendation and 

I believe is in the process of beginning a new independent estimate. 

The foremost challenge for the program at this point continues 

to be affordability. From its outset, its goal was to field an affordable common family of strike aircraft. Since then, unit procurement 

prices have continued to rise. The program also makes unprecedented demands for funding from the defense budget, averaging 

about $11 billion each year for the next two decades. This is competing with other critical priorities for the shrinking Federal discretionary dollar. This raises concerns about how many Joint 

Strike Fighters we will eventually be able to afford. 

I would now like to briefly touch on the alternate engine competition. This year, the Department is again proposing cancellation of 

the Joint Strike Fighter alternate engine program. Under a solesource scenario, the current estimated remaining lifecycle cost for 

10 

the engine program is about $55 billion. The remaining initial investment in the alternate engine program would require an additional $3.5 billion to $4.5 billion over the lifecycle. However, as we 

reported last year, that investment could return at least that much 

in savings over the lifecycle of the engine. 

Our updated analysis suggests that a savings rate of 9 to 11 percent would recoup that investment and prior experience indicates 

that it is reasonable to assume savings of at least that much. Last 

year when we did this, the estimate was, I believe it was 10 to 12 

percent. So the savings has actually—the savings needed to recoup 

has actually gone down. 

Finally, the non-financial benefits, such as better performance 

and reliability, more responsive contractors and industrial based 

stability, are more likely outcomes in a competitive environment. 

Just to conclude, Mr. Chairman, the upshot of our analysis on a 

Joint Strike Fighter is that the Department is challenged once 

again with weighing short-term funding needs against potential 

long-term cost savings on the program. We and others believe that 

the Department’s new plan to cut test resources and flight tests to 

fund manufacturing cost overruns will add costs in time to the program later. 

Likewise, the Joint Strike Fighter engine acquisition strategy 

poses a critical choice between short-term funding needs and future 

rewards. The Department can use funds for other costs in the short 

term with a sole-source strategy, but all indications are the competition would save money in the long run. Such are the difficult 

choices that will have very long-lasting budget implications. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I look forward to 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan can be found in the Appendix on page 129.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Again, Mr. Sullivan, thank you for that succinct and direct response. Really, both of them are excellent in 

terms of giving us the foundation for questioning. 

It has been a while since we have had a hearing. I just want to 

remind everybody, I like to go in reverse each time, and I think 

now this time we start at the least senior members, which is not 

pejorative by way of description, I assure you, and we will work our 

way back up. 

So Mr. Akin, I think that you would be first under that procedure. Is that okay with you? 

Mr. AKIN. Mr. Chairman, I didn’t realize a bluebird was going to 

visit me this morning this way, but thank you very much. I appreciate that. 

I understand—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I have been called a lot of things, but bluebird 

isn’t one of them. 

Mr. AKIN. I wasn’t saying you were the bluebird. I just appreciate that one flew in the window. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think that Mr. Sullivan’s comment about difficult choices and 

long-term consequences, boy, that really seems to summarize where 

all of us are, find ourselves this morning. And I really think that 

11 

Mr. Saxton’s comments about not enough money in the top line is 

also a major piece of what we are dealing with. 

I guess the concern I had, and this might have been—this is 

something I imagine you will hear repeatedly this morning, and 

that is in terms of the difficult choices and long-term consequences, 

we have seen a number of major, major contracts being awarded 

overseas. And I guess the concern I have is, what happens to our 

industrial base? 

I guess this has become even more vivid to me because in the 

last week or two I have had a chance to visit a lot of small machine 

shops and different people who are not major subcontractors, they 

are not sub sub, they are like, way, way, down the food chain, but 

there are these jobs that are all networked throughout our country. 

And what you said was you are going to close down the C–17 

line. We are not going to be building U.S.-made tankers anymore. 

I assume if we need more C–17 capability, we will let the Europeans do it. I bet the Chinese, you know, they probably make a 

good fighter aircraft too. 

But I guess there is a certain point where it seems to me that 

there has to be some consideration of capabilities that we retain inside the country, and I don’t know if that is part of your acquisition 

consideration or not, whether you are very focused on getting the 

very best, you know, answer to a particular specific contract. But 

I think that is a trend that a lot of people are paying attention to. 

That is a very general question, but one that I think is of grave 

concern to many of us. 

Another one would be, are there C–17s in the unfunded request? 

Because when I have talked to the people out at the airbase by us 

in the St. Louis area, they are saying, boy, that C–17 is working 

for us. We are using it in new ways. And we can use more of them. 

And it goes back to that old C–5 question, whether we can get the 

politics of that straightened out. 

But I guess my main concern is our industrial base, and if you 

could comment on that, I would appreciate it. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Before you do, as you gather your thoughts, 

because of the two panels, I am going to try to stay to 5 minutes 

and try to go rounds, if we can. So if you can keep your answers, 

again, as succinct as possible in the same tenor as your opening 

statements, I would be grateful. 

Secretary YOUNG. Congressman, we do consider the industrial 

base, particularly when it comes to critical technologies that are 

necessary for our nation’s defense capabilities. The Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) office studies that issue 

constantly to report on it. 

In terms of larger-scope competitions, we conduct those competitions in accordance with the law and the Federal acquisition regulations. And so when bidders—those regulations don’t necessarily 

consider the origin of products. They don’t necessarily consider 

where the factory is. They consider getting good capability, best 

value capability to the Nation for a price. There are rules that have 

to be complied with in terms of U.S. content. Bidders always comply with those rules, so they know them. But beyond that, you 

know, we can’t use competitions to structure an industrial base. 

12 

Mr. AKIN. I guess I understand that, but the thing that struck 

me is, I am talking to these people, this is a mom and pop shop 

that have these different pieces of equipment that they are buying. 

They own everything. And they are taking their own money and 

plucking $3 million or $4 million down to buy some great, big, you 

know, five or six axis, you know, equivalent of a milling machine, 

and all. 

They don’t know what contracts they are going to be able to build 

parts on on that piece of equipment. They are gambling that somehow in the next five or seven years, they will get enough business 

to cost-justify doing it. 

Connected with that is also the technologist who has to run the 

machine. Now, if those people don’t get the contracts, what happens is that industrial base goes away. The guy goes and finds another job. The machine is sent overseas or something. The next 

time we bid something, our cost is going to go up because we don’t 

have the base. I mean, there is sort of a self-feeding. And that was 

why that term long-term consequences is of tremendous concern to 

me. 

I understand. I used to be in charge of maintenance of a steel 

mill. I understood the tradeoffs. But there are some that are a little 

bit less tangible but still very significant in terms of their implications for our country, and I certainly hope that we build that in 

somehow into our equation. 

How about the C–17? Did you have any—are there some of those 

in the unfunded request again? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Could you answer as briefly as possible? 

Secretary YOUNG. Congressman, as part of the Nunn-McCurdy 

process for C–5, particularly started with the requirements, I think 

the requirement—we would have to talk on a classified basis—is 

substantial for the C–17. One could argue it is very conservative. 

Through the C–5 Nunn-McCurdy decision and the C–17s we have 

procured, we meet that requirement with some margin and we 

have the capability to enhance the maintenance of those planes 

and overachieve that requirement, and I do believe there is no argument, as I said, to buy or issue C–17s for the Defense Department. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

Chairman Ortiz. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Young, Mr. Sullivan, thank you so much for joining us 

this morning. We certainly thank you for your service. 

Secretary Young, the Navy’s original long-standing requirement 

for training aircraft identified as the 234 jet trainers is the absolute minimum number of aircraft needed to support pilot training. 

Training requirements have continued to increase, yet the Navy’s 

last budgeted procurement of the T–45 was in 2007 with a total 

procurement of just 221 aircraft. 

Are 221 aircraft enough to support current and future training 

requirements, especially with the Joint Strike Fighter coming online? And if more T–45s are needed to meet future training requirements, would it be not most cost effective to revive the production 

line prior to full closing to preserve manufacturing experience, decrease costs and the potential delay of a follow-on jet trainer? 

13 

Secretary YOUNG. Obviously, the next panel can probably address that in more detail. From my time in the Navy, I have some 

experience with this, and that has been one of the stable requirements in the Department, is the number of T–45 jet trainers. In 

fact, a story I often tell that is of relevance I think to the committee is, in our budget processes, we bought T–45s at low rates 

and they cost upwards of $30 million a copy. We bought them at 

high rates, and they cost only about $20 million a copy. 

To buy the inventory you talked about, we spent several hundred 

million dollars, more taxpayer money, to get absolutely no more capability. We need more discipline in rate procurement for our procurements, and that is one aspect of Joint Strike Fighter, is staying 

the course and trying to efficiently execute that program. 

But the Navy has moved increasingly and, I think, smartly, and 

it has some energy consciousness to doing more ground-based 

training and simulation-based training. So I am not aware of an 

additional requirement for aircraft training. I think the Department as a whole, not just the Navy, is doing a very good job of 

making greater use of those assets that are cost efficient and energy efficient to accomplish training needs. 

Mr. ORTIZ. You know, I think it is very, very important, because 

we are inundated with a bunch of problems. And I would hope that 

by keeping the production line, not that I am really advocating that 

we do that, but I think that it is important, if we are going to try 

to save some money. But if you think that the aircraft that we have 

now is sufficient, we just hope that we don’t come back again and 

say, you know what, we made a mistake. We have to go and open 

the production line. And then the cost of this aircraft is not going 

to be $20 million or $30 million. 

I don’t want to take too much time. I would like to allow other 

members to ask questions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Gingrey is next. 

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

I am going to direct my question to the Secretary. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here today. 

I think you know the situation with the F–22 better than anyone. 

The base budget for fiscal year 2009 contains no funds, as you said. 

The lines shut down our advance procurement of the F–22s. 

There seems to be a discrepancy between where that will leave 

us in terms of the size of the F–22 fleet and where the Air Force 

and most independent experts believe that number should be. That 

will leave us at 183 and possibly 187, as you indicate in your testimony an additional four F–22s in the supplemental request. But 

needless to say, the Department has left Congress with some work 

to do here to reconcile this discrepancy. 

Mr. Secretary, in your testimony you indicate that the Department’s program requirement for F–22 Raptor is 183. Can you tell 

us what the Air Force’s requirement for Raptors is? 

Secretary YOUNG. I think it would be better for the Air Force 

to—— 

Dr. GINGREY. Well, let me tell you. I will speak for the Air Force, 

then. It is 381. And Secretary Wynne and General Moseley indiVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:29 Mar 03, 2009 Jkt 043685 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-128\43685.TXT HAS1 PsN: LINDA
14 

cated to us in previous hearings that it is 381. Hearing materials 

also indicate the Air Force needs these 381 F–22s to meet the national military strategy, which requires ability to perform two near 

simultaneous major combat operations and also to perform homeland defense missions, and the quadrennial defense review requirements. An integral part of meeting the national military strategy 

is to outfit each of the Air Force’s 10 air expeditionary forces with 

one squadron of 24 F–22s. 

The Air Force and the Joint Requirement Oversight Council, 

JROC, believe the force structure needed to accomplish this is 240 

assigned aircraft and 141 for testing, training and backup. 

Clearly we cannot accomplish this with 187 F–22 Raptors, which 

translates to about 110 that are operationally available. So I want 

to ask you again, Mr. Secretary, point blank, are 187 Raptors 

enough to ensure the Nation can successfully carry out the national 

military strategy as I have outlined it without taking on substantial risks? 

Secretary YOUNG. Congressman, 187 Raptors are adequate to accomplish the national military strategy. There are at least two 

other studies that look at this. 

Let me start with the threat assessment, which suggests after 

2025 it is hard to see multiple high-end peers for those high-end 

threat engagements. A joint air dominance study looks at one military combat operation, not two. That two that you mentioned, the 

Air Force study, is a driver. The Air Force study is 6 years old. It 

is also driven by the force structure requirement to equip 10 squadrons, but not necessarily grounded in the intelligence assessment 

of the threat or the probability that we will simultaneously conduct 

two military major combat operations. 

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, that is not supported by any rigorous campaign-based analysis assessing the most 

stressing scenarios and rapidly growing threats and that at least 

three independent studies commissioned by DOD recommended 

procuring significantly more than 220 Raptors, and the Air Force 

urgently needs to replace approximately, what 500 1970 and 1980 

vintage F–15A to D Eagles. Not to mention over the last 10 years 

multiple independent studies and over 20 Air Force studies have 

all recommended the Air Force requires far, far more than 187 F– 

22 Raptors to do the job previously done by 800 F–15A to Ds. 

Secretary YOUNG. Well, another factor in this is Joint Strike 

Fighter. And the analysis behind the DOD joint air dominance 

study makes clear that you need a certain number of fifth generation fighters for these high-threat military combat—major combat 

operations. But to change that mix to a higher-cost F–22 at the expense of the lower-cost Joint Strike Fighter, the studies show variation in there does not change our effectiveness or our loss ratios, 

and we need to get you the classified data—— 

Dr. GINGREY. But, Mr. Secretary, there is a tremendous gap 

there—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. Sorry. This is a good discussion, 

but I think we are going to have to carry it on at another point. 

Do you want to—— 

Dr. GINGREY. I have got a few more seconds left, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You do now—— 

15 

Dr. GINGREY. Let me just conclude my remarks by saying 

that—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. Because you are such a good guy. 

Dr. GINGREY [continuing]. I think it is ludicrous to say that upgrading F–22s is more important, the existing fleet, upgrading 

them, is more important than buying additional planes. I mean, 

this is the most highly sophisticated tactical fighter that we have 

ever developed, and I mean, the upgrading of the existing fleet is 

not more important, in my opinion, than buying more. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. I see the red 

light has come on. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is a good point. 

We will pursue this obviously further in the course of the hearing 

and perhaps afterward, Mr. Young. The points are well taken in 

terms of trying to establish where we are going to go in terms of 

recommendation. 

I appreciate, again, trenchant analysis. 

Mr. Smith is next. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, let me just say we have more programs to fund than 

we have money to fund them. And that makes for some very difficult choices, which we understand on this committee quite well. 

We appreciate the best information possible. 

I do want to ask a couple of questions about the recent tanker 

decision. I know we have other hearings coming up this week that 

will focus on that directly. But it is just a lot of information that 

we can’t quite get access to at this point, so we are looking to take 

this opportunity to get some answers. 

I think the biggest question I have is on the request for proposal 

(RFP) for this, because the reason I think everyone was so surprised is originally when the RFP was put out, it seemed to fit, you 

know, what Boeing was proposing with the 767, a more mediumsized tanker. In fact, I think there was a point at which the Airbus 

consortium was saying because of the RFP they were probably not 

going to submit a proposal, arguably because they couldn’t meet 

the RFP that was described. 

And then we here on this committee and elsewhere started to 

feel some lobbying pressure for changes in the RFP and it happened. It got changed in the middle of the game, which is a little 

bit unusual. And I guess the question I am asking is, you know, 

why the change? Why did the Air Force all of the sudden go from 

thinking that the medium-sized tanker—and there are pros and 

cons in terms of costs and a variety of different items. I would note, 

you know, connected to my earlier comment about we have so 

many programs, we can only afford so many—here we went with 

the higher-cost option. Which, of course, only makes that problem 

worse. 

And so the question I have is, why did the RFP change in the 

middle and what is, sort of, the argument for the bigger, more expensive tanker as opposed to the medium-sized one that the original RFP had asked for? 

Secretary YOUNG. I hope we don’t tailor RFPs to products. That 

is wrong. We tailor RFPs to capabilities. That RFP was tailored to 

capability. The companies had a chance to respond to the draft 

16 

RFP and make comments about things they thought were flawed 

in it, and the government could adjust or not adjust. 

So at the end, both companies accepted the RFP and proposed 

products against that RFP that they thought would be capable. 

Both companies did an excellent job, provided high-quality proposals and high-quality products. I think as more information is 

available, it is going to become clearer to you that the higher-cost 

product was not selected. Both products did meet the requirements 

and capabilities and the Department did its very best to evaluate 

two very high-quality proposals with excellent dialogue with both 

industry partners, and now we will continue the process of explaining how we made that choice. 

Mr. SMITH. Understood. We look forward to it. 

I guess on the higher-cost item, it is a higher per-copy cost and 

it is also higher maintenance once you get it, to operate it. So I 

guess I am puzzled by you saying it is not the higher-cost choice. 

Secretary YOUNG. I think the Air Force will over time talk to you 

about it, but the proposals we have in hand do not support the suggestion that a higher procurement cost item was offered. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. And did you consider the subsidy issue? Because one of the things that we are really wrestling with here is 

we are starting a WTO case against Airbus for unfairly subsidizing 

in competition against U.S. products. Obviously, the case is still in 

development, but for years it hasn’t been terribly debated that Airbus is subsidized. At a minimum, you know, they have a bank out 

there that they can take risks against that they know will cover 

them, which is no small item. 

So I guess how do we balance within the government here the 

fact that we on the one hand are complaining about a subsidized 

competitor, and then on the other hand giving that subsidized competitor a contract, which arguably part of the reason they are able 

to keep their costs down is because they are being unfairly subsidized? 

Secretary YOUNG. Again, the laws and regulations don’t let me 

address really in any way a subsidy issue that will be settled, as 

you know, in another forum, on a nation-to-nation and international forum. 

What we evaluated was products that were proposed. I did have 

a discussion with the Air Force to try to make sure—and I would 

do this in any program, it is not just this particular program. We 

don’t want industry to buy into programs, because usually that 

comes back to haunt us in terms of increase in cost and other factors. 

My understanding is that the Air Force has assessed both teams’ 

proposals. Both teams’ proposals present accurate assessments of 

their costs. And both proposals, I will tell you, include profit for 

both makers. So we believe people proposed their costs plus profit. 

We evaluated those performance and those cost benefits to the government. 

Mr. SMITH. So just so I can clarify, your decision therefore was 

based in no way on the subsidy issue, whether they are subsidized 

or not? So in essence, what you are saying is, if that is an issue 

of public policy, then it is an issue of public policy that Congress 

will have to address. It was not addressed in your original decision. 

17 

And I guess the same can be said on the domestic issue that was 

raised earlier, I forget—I think one of my colleagues raised that 

issue—that that too was something that, within your parameters, 

you are not allowed to assess. 

So, again, if that was an issue that was important to this country, it is something that Congress would have to deal with. 

Secretary YOUNG. Again, we don’t—procurement rules and regulations don’t do that. We seek to assess the valid cost of offers from 

competitors, and that is what we evaluate. What we—— 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. And so subsidies don’t become a part of 

that. If we think it will cost them money that they didn’t propose, 

the government assesses a higher cost to that proposal and—— 

Secretary YOUNG [continuing]. Well, to the extent that you are 

suggesting subsidies let them lower their costs, I am telling you the 

government independently assesses their likely costs and we grade 

proposals on their likely cost, not their subsidized cost. 

Mr. SMITH. Understood, but wherever the money comes from, you 

know—I understand what you are saying, but the subsidy is not 

something that you consider in that situation, because what difference does it make to you if they—if they can deliver it for that 

cost, however they get there, then that is okay. 

Secretary YOUNG. No. We assess what it is going to cost them, 

not what they propose it to cost. So if they find a way to eat costs, 

and I have had other competitions where companies come in and 

say we will put X-hundred million dollars on the table. We don’t 

generally assess their contribution. We assess what it is really 

going to cost them to do the work. 

And I would point out, too, this is a bigger global policy issue, 

because we do have defense products that compete in foreign markets very successfully that were clearly developed by the U.S. taxpayer. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is the end of discussion. 

Mr. SMITH. My time is up. I apologize. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is all right. 

Mr. SMITH. Your first answer to that question didn’t seem to jibe 

with the second answer to that question, but I will try to get greater clarity on that before our hearing later in the week. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thanks, Mr. Smith. 

Secretary Young, before I go to the next member, for purposes of 

the record, could you clarify your role and your mission in the selection process you just discussed? 

Secretary YOUNG. Absolutely. Mr. Chairman, I greatly appreciate 

the chance to do that. 

This was a Department of the Air Force source selection process. 

I am the milestone decision authority for the program, so I approve 

the milestones that let the program go forward, but I do not have 

a role in the source selection. 

I did, because of the great interest here, ask part of my Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) team to observe the source 

selection process and help the Air Force, because it is so important 

to the Nation that we successfully conduct these source selections. 

18 

So I have information from observing and watching and making 

sure the process was well executed, but I am not the source selection authority. I did not have an impact on the source selection. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. But you are familiar with what was required, 

as the acquisition Under Secretary, right? 

Secretary YOUNG. And based on feelings—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. So you can speak with authority 

on that part of it? 

Secretary YOUNG. Based on a feeling that they had well-executed 

a source selection process, I did approve the milestone B that 

would let them move forward and award that contract. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So, again, for purposes of our record here 

today, you believe that—regardless of whether the process was 

good or not, I guess that is going to be in dispute at some point, 

but from your—is it fair to say, then, that in terms of the specifications, that you were satisfied that both competitors were addressing the specifications as you outlined under your authority? Is that 

correct? 

Secretary YOUNG. Both competitors addressed the specifications 

the Air Force issued that have been approved by the JROC. And 

in granting the milestone, I agreed that they were valid specifications. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Fine. Thank you very much. 

I think next will be Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Question to the chairman, I just want to make sure, my colleague from Washington state kind of ran over. That won’t go 

against my time, will it, sir, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. SMITH. I apologize. 

Mr. MILLER. I know the answer anyway. 

And I understand we are going to have a briefing, part of this 

committee, tomorrow, on tanker. 

I do want to comment on my colleague from Missouri, who has 

since left the room. Both competitors in the tanker program were 

American companies—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Time is up. [Laughter.] 

Mr. MILLER. The question I have for you, Mr. Secretary, regarding the Joint Strike Fighter, yesterday there was a defense news 

article where Israel announced that they possibly intend to switch 

its procurement plan from the F–35A to the F–35B short takeoff, 

the short take off and vertical landing (STOVL) version, designed 

for the Marine Corps. 

Israel plans to purchase up to 100 of these fighters. What would 

the impact be to the Marine Corps estimated initial operation capability date of 2012 if in fact Israel changed its procurement plans 

and went with a STOVL version? 

Secretary YOUNG. I don’t think it would be any impact. The Marine initial operational capability (IOC) is very quick. It is based 

on an initial procurement of the first airplanes. My belief is that 

any procurement by other nations, including Israel, would be a little further down the line. It might have an impact further down 

the line on the rate at which the Marine Corps build inventory, but 

not on the IOC. 

19 

Mr. MILLER. Would the additional hundred aircraft added to the 

35B line delay delivery of the 35A? 

Secretary YOUNG. No, sir. I don’t believe that. 

Mr. MILLER. I have a question, and this may be a little bit out 

of line, but there is a concern within the civil engineering support 

agency regarding heat problems with concrete on runways at basing airfields and outlying airfields. What is the Air Force doing in 

regards to making sure that the airbases that these airplanes are 

going to be at will have the appropriate—the Portland Cement apparently, the heat that is generated by the engines creates a problem whereby the runways degrade very quickly. 

Can you speak to that? 

Secretary YOUNG. I can’t. I would rather give you a better answer for the record. I do think that you are correct that the STOVL 

will put some additional loads on the runway materials, and we 

will get you a better answer for the record. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Are you going to provide an answer later on 

that? Is that okay? 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Miller didn’t take all his time, so you 

have extra. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, I am assuming I get Mr. Miller’s time in addition to mine. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Another Washington state guy. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to return to the tanker issue, Secretary Young. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Now your time is up. 

Mr. LARSEN. So I will be as quick as I can. 

And this is less about contractors and more about impact on 

trade policy. You may not have an answer to it, but I think we 

need to—I think committee members and House members need to 

understand this, because the implications of the decisions for U.S. 

trade policy is important. The U.S. Government has determined 

that E.U. subsidies to Airbus are a clear violation of the WTO rules 

and that now is before the WTO. So this is a free trade argument 

against the tanker decision. 

The President himself has said that European nations should 

end subsidies to Airbus and instructed at the time U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Bob Zoellick to ‘‘pursue all options’’ to end 

these subsidies. And one estimate, according to Trade Case, puts 

the European subsidy for the A330 and 340 programs at $5 billion. 

This is for one of the platforms that the Air Force itself selected. 

So while this WTO case is pending now, another branch of the 

same Administration would send a conflicting message by offering 

to the European Union a $35 billion reward for the same planes 

that we say they have illegally subsidized, a 700 percent return on 

investment for European taxpayers. 

So I am wondering if the U.S. case—if the U.S. wins this case 

pending before the WTO, would our government seek retaliatory 

actions if doing so would increase the cost of the tanker that our 

Air Force needs, because they have selected the Airbus tanker? 

20 

And so the Air Force decision, whether or not you had anything 

to do with it, I just want to be sure you understand where I am 

coming from, puts this Administration, our Administration in a potential bind: live with the tanker decision or exercise its rights and 

obligations to enforce trade rules. 

It seems to me the Administration is right now on a collision 

course with itself on this issue. Not as much as Congress having 

to redefine this decision, but the Administration has to define and 

redefine the decision it has made. So where one agency, the USTR, 

at the direction of the President, is arguing that these subsidies are 

illegal, the Air Force now is buying these subsidized aircraft. 

Do you know if the U.S. Air Force agrees with the President’s 

view that these subsidies are illegal? 

Secretary YOUNG. I think I would ask the Air Force, but again, 

that is a different forum and a different set of issues about domestic trade. This was a product proposed to the Defense Department 

and evaluated under a fair and consistent set of ground rules. 

Mr. LARSEN. I understand, but the policy implications go beyond 

the decision that the Air Force makes. The policy decision could 

interfere with our ability, the U.S. government’s ability, the pursue 

trade remedies under the trade rules that we ourselves support. 

I just want to make that point, and I understand where you have 

to come from on that and where you are coming from on that. But 

can you assure the committee that the Airbus’ proposed cost for development of the A330 and the KC–30 has in no way benefitted 

from the very subsidies that the U.S. Government is currently 

suing the European Union over at the WTO? 

Secretary YOUNG. I sought to have that discussion with the Air 

Force to a level of detail. I believe the Air Force technical team has 

looked very carefully. They have cost insight into both proposers. 

And they believe that both proposers proposed their legitimate cost 

and profit and that no one decided to take losses or use corporate 

capital to deliver a product to the Air Force. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Would you yield a moment? 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, for a moment. I have a few more questions, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. For purposes of clarification, under the acquisition part of your title, in answering Mr. Larsen I want to make 

sure that it is clear for the record, do you take into account, or did 

you take into account possible cost variations? Surely the Air Force 

was aware, or you must have been aware, that there is this dispute 

that Mr. Larsen has outlined. Did you take that into account in 

making the decision as to whether or not if there was an adverse 

ruling it would change the cost figures? 

Secretary YOUNG. Because the proposal evaluation teams did not 

have a way to assess that probability or the impact or other things, 

I do not believe it was evaluated in the proposal process, that there 

might be tariffs and penalties through that—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. I am afraid that might turn out 

to be a real flaw. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Chairman. 

21 

Secretary YOUNG. Probably at some risk to myself, I would add 

one comment, and I—the members will hear this, but there is a 

cost difference between both proposals, so there—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I won’t carry it further. That is more of a reason to take into account whether an adverse ruling would play into 

it. 

Mr. Larsen’s time. 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I will just finish up here, 

seeing the red light is on. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is all right. You can take another 

minute. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks. 

In 2002, the Air Force publicly discussed its significant criticism 

of the KC–30 tanker, stating in a release that the KC–30 increase 

in size does not bring with it the commensurate increase in available air refueling offload. And the Air Force went on to say that 

‘‘the aircraft would demand a greater infrastructure investment 

and dramatically limit the aircraft’s ability to operate effectively in 

a worldwide deployment.’’ 

In the six years since that statement, the KC–30 hasn’t gotten 

any smaller and the availability of longer strength in runways 

around the world certainly hasn’t grown. So at what point in the 

process did the KC–30 significant liabilities as a tanker become assets? 

Secretary YOUNG. Those are questions I think the Air Force can 

ask. They were considered in the—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Or can answer. 

Secretary YOUNG. Can answer. Sorry. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You bet. 

Is the answer clear on the question of whether it was taken into 

account? 

Mr. LARSEN. The subsidies? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. It is clear that I don’t have an answer and it 

is clear that we will need to talk to the Air Force more specifically 

about it. That is what I understood the secretary to say, and I am 

satisfied that we will be talking to the Air Force later today and 

tomorrow about that. I appreciate that. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Again, for purposes of the record, Mr. Young, 

I just want to make sure. I am not talking sides in this. I want 

to make sure I have the correct information. 

Am I correct that you answered that to the best of your knowledge the decision did not take into account the possible cost 

changes should there be an adverse ruling on the question of subsidy? 

Secretary YOUNG. That is correct. The proposals were evaluated 

based on what we thought their probable costs would be. 

And one thing I would like to ask the—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Absent that adjudication. 

Secretary YOUNG. Right. I appreciate your help, Mr. Chairman. 

I have asked that question. I didn’t get it in advance of the hearing. If I could, I would submit for the record. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Sure. 

22 

Secretary YOUNG. I do not know whether tariffs or other penalties imposed through that trade process would be allowable 

charges on a contract, so it may not be a cost that can be allowably 

attached. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Maybe you can look into it and get back. 

Secretary YOUNG. We will get you that answer, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I did say to the best of your knowledge. I am 

not trying to put you on the spot so much as I am trying to get 

an answer, because it affects what we do here. 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary YOUNG. It is not clear to me that fines and other such 

penalties are allowable charges on a DOD contract. We will get you 

that answer for the record. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that and appreciate getting the answer for the record. 

I would just say, if it is not allowable under the contract, then 

why do we have trade rules and why are we bringing cases to the 

WTO? We can’t even enforce the trade rules that we have, and that 

is why this is—if we can’t get these penalties—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I understand. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

Secretary YOUNG. I think the answer to that question is, the penalties will be paid by a company if the U.S. Government is successful, but they just can’t be charged to U.S. Government contracts. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, we will find out. 

Thank you. 

Mr. Bartlett is next. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Young, I mentioned the Defense Science Board’s recommendation that you use the fully burdened cost of fuel in your 

programs. Does a fully burdened cost of fuel include the cost for 

extra personnel and equipment, like the helicopters that fly overhead to protect the convoys in delivering fuel to Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Secretary YOUNG. Yes, Congressman. There was a Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) study that sought to assess the delivered cost of fuel. And as you rightly said, some circumstances that 

would include helicopter delivery. It is more costly. And so we are 

seeking, I believe, to apply the burden of cost of fuel on a situationappropriate basis, if you will, to the extent we can. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I understand that that can be as much as $300 

a gallon for diesel in the high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) on the ground? 

Secretary YOUNG. That was not the conclusion of our program 

analysis and evaluation office. I have heard numbers like that. 

They concluded a smaller number. But there is a significant premium when you have to delivery fuel by helicopter to far forward 

deployed ground forces. 

Mr. BARTLETT. As our chairman mentioned, oil this morning was $109 a barrel. Our country uses 22 million barrels a day. That is 

1/4 of all the oil used in the whole world is used in our country. 

DOD uses—our government uses less than 2 percent of that; DOD 

most of what the government uses. 

23 

If there is only one barrel of oil left in our country with your priorities, you would have that barrel of oil. In spite of that, the military is the most responsible entity in our country in addressing energy. Thank you very much for your foresight. 

Fifty-two years ago, the 8th day of this month, M. King Huppert 

predicted that the United States would reach its maximum oil production in 1970. Right on schedule, that happened. In 1979, he predicted that we would be reaching—the world would be reaching its 

maximum oil production, about now. 

Fifty-one years ago, the 14th day of this May, Admiral Hyman 

Rickover gave a speech which may very well be the most insightful 

speech given last century to a group of physicians in St. Paul, Minnesota. In his speech, he mentioned that we were then 100 years 

into the age of oil. He had no idea how long the age of oil would 

last, but he said the length of time it lasted was important in only 

one regard, and that was that the longer it lasted, the more time 

we would have to plan for a transition to non-fossil fuel energy 

sources. 

I just came recently from a political retreat. We had seven breakout sessions. One of them was on neighborhoods. None of them was 

on energy. 

Can you help me understand the denial and the silence on en- ergy when oil is $109 a barrel? 

Secretary YOUNG. Well, Congressman, there are probably several 

things to say. I will try to be quick and consistent with the chairman’s request. 

One, I appreciate you noting the Department’s efforts. We stood 

up a task force, great collaboration amongst the services and Office 

of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on what we are already doing 

in terms of geothermal, wind, solar, and what could be done. 

Secretary England recently had a deputy advisory working group 

with all the Unders and the Vice Chiefs and asked that task force 

to look again at what things the Department could do so we could 

consider that as part of program of memorandum (POM 10). So I 

believe the Department will keep trying to honor your request that 

we be good stewards of energy. 

Within that, you have been a leader in focusing the attention of 

the enterprise on this issue. The price of oil will focus us further 

on it, because I forget what the number is, but it is something, 

roughly $1 billion plus, of impact to the DOD budget correlated 

with a dollar plus increase, $10 increase, in a barrel of oil. 

And so it is consuming department resources and putting pressure on the program. So the prices you all highlight this morning 

are going to redouble the Department’s attention on energy. The 

Secretary has already asked us to do that. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Sestak is next. 

I can’t call you Admiral Sestak while you are for Senator Clinton, 

you know. [Laughter.] 

Mr. SESTAK. I don’t know what to say, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, I had a question. For a while there, there was 

going to be a B–52 standoff jammer. Some people called it the EB– 

52. And I guess now it is kind of called the B–52 core component 

jammer. But this was to be an instrumental part of making sure 

24 

against the fifth generation that even F–22s could survive. What 

happened to it, if it was so key, as the EA–6Bs are now disappearing? 

Secretary YOUNG. I think, as you are probably aware, the Department budget proposal change came forward to terminate that 

effort for costs. The Department is revisiting that effort in light 

of—— 

Mr. SESTAK. So it is a capability that we need? 

Secretary YOUNG [continuing]. Development efforts in the world. 

And I would encourage—I know the committee had sought to hear 

from the Program Analysis and Evaluation Office, and you should 

do that. I think in considering, again, options for investment, they 

would put improving our electronic attack capability near the top 

of the list versus options like buying more tactical aircraft or other 

things. 

Mr. SESTAK. So it is a capability we need? 

Secretary YOUNG. It is a capability we need. 

Mr. SESTAK. And a capability we need for those most demanding 

scenarios, potentially Western Pacific. 

Secretary YOUNG. Absolutely. Including the fifth generation 

fighters. 

Mr. SESTAK. But it is not in the budget. And the—— 

Secretary YOUNG. Portions of it are, as you know, through 

the—— 

Mr. SESTAK [continuing]. Would you say it is kind of on life support right now in the budget? 

Secretary YOUNG. Well, not the EA–18G program, but the other 

capabilities—— 

Mr. SESTAK. Yes, but the G, the Growler, is not an expeditionary 

aircraft, like the EA–6B. And the ace of radar on the F–22 doesn’t 

even come close to the capability that we are talking about. I know 

there are other things there, but the core—would you agree that 

right now this was a core component that was needed for the most 

demanding of scenarios, this standoff jammer, but right now, as the 

A–6Bs go away, that is really on life support and it is the missing 

gap that needs to be addressed? 

Secretary YOUNG. Well, there was an analysis of alternatives 

(AOA) that said we needed a standoff jammer, and I think the Department is constantly doing what you would expect, and that is 

looking at—— 

Mr. SESTAK. Just a simple question. Is it needed for that scenario? 

Secretary YOUNG. The Department is going to review that analysis and see—— 

Mr. SESTAK. But you are not sure if it is needed? 

Secretary YOUNG. I would not say today we absolutely have to 

go put that right back in the budget. 

Mr. SESTAK. Got it. 

Secretary YOUNG. We need additional electronic attack capability. 

Mr. SESTAK. All right. In that area? Standoff jammer? It is somewhere. 

Secretary YOUNG. To enable the concept of operations with tactical fighters. 

25 

Mr. SESTAK. The second question I had is, I have always been 

struck by the questions that my colleague from Georgia had mentioned, about the F–22 and the need for such a high-end aircraft. 

To some degree, the Navy has always prided itself on being forward deployed, always ready to be the first to go. 

To some degree, you see the Air Force with the argument it 

needs this really compelling aircraft, the F–22, as it goes against 

the most demanding fifth generation, you know, from the Russian 

T–50’s or the Chinese, even the J–12s that are coming. 

Why not the Navy? Strategically, how have we built—if this is 

so needed for that first in, why not the Navy? The reverse is, why 

does the Air Force have it and not the Navy? Or does the Air Force 

need it if the Navy doesn’t? 

Secretary YOUNG. I think, as you know, this answer is—the Navy 

can best address it. From my personal opinion, this goes back to 

things like the A–12. And I believe it is critical for the Navy to 

move forward with Joint Strike Fighter. Joint Strike Fighter does 

put that fifth generation aircraft capability in the hands of the 

Navy. 

Mr. SESTAK. So you don’t need any of the F–20’s? Do you get my 

point? Strategically, it just seems as though we built—we have two 

air forces. One is supposed to be the first in. And the Navy air force 

tries to—you know, goes long range and is the first in. But we 

haven’t given the Navy the capability you say the other service 

needs. It just seems to be a very large missing strategic—— 

Secretary YOUNG [continuing]. If we get Joint Strike Fighter in 

the hands of the Navy and Marine Corps, they do now have that 

capability. 

Mr. SESTAK. To go in first? 

Secretary YOUNG. Right. 

Mr. SESTAK. So then why did we need the F–22? 

Secretary YOUNG. I believe they are very comparable airplanes, 

and we would have to have a classified session to say it. People distinguish the two airplanes, and there are some distinguishing features like the widely publicized super cruise. But the truth is, they 

are both highly capable fifth generation fighters with fewer distinguishing features than people offer. 

Mr. SESTAK. The operations and maintenance funding for the Air 

Force per—I am done. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am sorry. We are out of time. Thank you. 

You can submit the question. 

Mr. Saxton is next. 

Mr. SAXTON. Secretary Young, Mr. Sullivan, you heard me say in 

my opening statement that it seems to me that the amount of resources that you have to spend just simply go across the breadth 

of the needs that we have for various programs, including C–17 

and F–22 and B–52 and JSF, et cetera. 

I would like to ask a question specifically on strategic airlift. 

When our program consisted of—our future program, our contemplated program, consisted of 180 C–17s combined with a fleet 

of modernized, I will say, C–5s, it was the Department of Defense’s 

position that the requirement of this level of capability, reading 

from your words, actually, Mr. Young, was adequate to meet our 

needs within the realm of risk. 

26 

I always disagreed with that, as many other people who are involved in strategic lift arena did. Then the requirement for this 

level of capacity was reexamined during the Nunn-McCurdy review 

of the C–5 reliability and enhancement re-engining program and 

the analysis of—or the Nunn-McCurdy breech I guess forced a decision, my words, that we would not re-engine the 59 C–5As, leaving 

them modernized only partially with the new aeronautic equipment. 

Now the Department, in your testimony, Mr. Young, believes 

that 189 C–17s plus 52 re-engined C–5Bs and Cs and 59 C–5As, 

not re-engined, give us the capability to do strategic lift. 

Let me just ask Mr. Sullivan, have you looked at this, Mr. Sullivan? What do you think of this? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, we are in the process right now—in fact, I believe it is work that has been requested by your subcommittee, to 

look at exactly what you are putting on the table now. So I don’t 

have any information at this point that would be helpful in this 

hearing, but we are planning to brief the committee sometime in 

the next six weeks or so on our findings that we find when we go 

out there. 

Mr. SAXTON. Does it seem reasonable to you that if you take a 

fleet of airplanes and take away a modernization program from 25 

percent of it, more than 25 percent of it, that it would result in the 

same capability as the assumption was under a complete modernized set of almost 200 fully modernized airplanes? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. As I said, I don’t have enough information to be 

intelligent about that now, but I think it does indicate the affordability issues that the Under Secretary is dealing with 

Mr. SAXTON. Well, I agree, and I guess that is the point that I 

am continuing to try to make. 

Secretary YOUNG. Could I offer a comment, sir? 

Mr. SAXTON. Sure. 

Secretary YOUNG. One important piece of that that we should 

bring you is the scenarios that drive the requirement, and those 

scenarios and that requirement is not what the Department needs 

every day. In fact, the Department needs substantially less than 

that every day. And that is why I think the Air Force has made 

a very good decision to move the C–5As into the Guard and Reserve, maintain them at lower capability levels. And then if we 

found ourselves in one of these major combat operations, surge that 

force, maintain it better, spare it and draw on it to meet the requirement. But on a daily basis, we don’t need this requirement. 

Mr. SAXTON. I couldn’t agree more, on a daily basis. But when 

we go to war, we go to war. 

You further justify this assumption by stating that the KC–45 

tanker could be used for lift, and I guess I raise my eyebrows pretty high at that thought, because when we go to war, when we do 

need all our assets—when we go to war, presumably we are going 

to use all our tankers for tanker missions. And so I don’t quite see 

where that gives us additional capacity to enhance the strategic 

airlift fleet that we have when we surge. 

Secretary YOUNG. Well, I think—— 

Mr. SAXTON. Unless we are buying more tankers than we need. 

27 

Secretary YOUNG. The strategic airlift fleet in terms of numbers 

of pails and ton miles of requirement is driven by oversized and 

outsized cargo. And as you rightly say, any tanker does not contribute to the oversize and outsize cargo capability. 

Mr. SAXTON. Okay. I appreciate your problems, by the way. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. Secretary, in our committee’s February 27 letter inviting you 

to testify today, you were asked to articulate your views of the required tactical Air Force structure compared to the programmed 

tactical Air Force structure, and whether you believed the programmed force structure meets the requirements for the national 

military strategy. 

However, from what I can tell this request is missing from your 

statement. Could you tell us why it is missing? 

And second, would you answer the question that we requested 

you testify about? 

Secretary YOUNG. With regard to the tactical Air Force sufficiency? 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Yes, sir, compared to the programmed tactical 

Air Force structure. 

Secretary YOUNG. I believe the Department has submitted a 

budget that provides an appropriate aircraft tactical Air Force 

structure. Changes have been made. As you probably are aware, 

the Navy has bought some additional F–18E/F for a near-term 

need, to make sure they have adequate tactical aircraft. But on the 

whole, it is a very capable force that has been proposed. In fact, 

some of the studies referenced today have determined that the 

DOD program or record force, with F–22s, Joint Strike Fighters 

and the other aircraft, is one of the most capable options before us 

in terms of analysis of different options, like more F–22s. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. So your comments would just rely on what the 

budget proposal has been? Is there any other comment you want 

to make about it regarding your role in it? 

Secretary YOUNG. Other than what I—you know, it is critical to 

stay the course with this process, particular on programs like Joint 

Strike Fighter, because they do bring important fifth generation capability to the Navy and Marine Corps, as well as addressing the 

age of the Air Force’s fleet. 

As you know, JSF is critical to the replacement of F–16s and a 

very large force in the Air Force. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. And the JSF is going to have capabilities also to 

help replace the A–10 Warthogs or Thunderbolt 2s? 

Secretary YOUNG. I would probably like to defer to the Air Force. 

My understanding, subject to their correction, is that the Air Force 

intends to maintain the A–10 force for a period of time. The aircraft has structural life and it fills a niche capability for the Air 

Force that is important to them. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. Are you able to comment on that Mr. 

Sullivan, or not? About the A–10’s? If not, I will defer to the next 

panel on that question. 

Okay. Thank you. 

28 

Also, some of the F–22s, there is a squadron that has already 

been deployed to an Air National Guard unit. Is that correct? 

Secretary YOUNG. I am sorry, sir? 

Mr. MCINTYRE. There is a squadron of F–22s that have already 

been deployed to an Air National Guard unit. Are you aware of 

that? 

Secretary YOUNG. I would have to let the Air Force address that. 

I am not sure. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you both for being here and thank you for 

dealing with issues that are absolutely extraordinary. 

The different types of aircraft, the engines, trade policy, concrete, 

you really deal with very interesting issues, and I want to thank 

the chairman for the way this meeting is being conducted because 

it is really bringing out a lot of very interesting issues and I am 

very grateful. 

I represent the Marine Corps air station at Buford, a joint base, 

and so we are very proud of the squadrons we have there. 

Mr. Secretary, I am concerned, and I share the concern of my colleague from the far north of Wilmington, North Carolina, Congressman McIntyre, and that is that I have two charts. One is from 

the—a reflection of Navy shortfalls. And that possibly by the year 

2017 there would be shortfall of 175 in terms of Strike Fighters. 

The other is even more stark, and that is from the—with the Air 

Force, reflecting a shortfall of 625 in 2020. With an overlay, we are 

obviously dealing with a shortfall of around 750 fighters, which 

could be short in the year 2020. 

Again, I would like to ask what in your view is the ability of 

America to contend with the future forecast threats that we have 

around the world? How can we meet this challenge in the future? 

Secretary YOUNG. I think the Department constantly, and we 

will do so as part of the POM 10 process, is assessing the scenarios 

that are most likely and least likely because some of the least likely scenarios are very dangerous. You have to have the capability 

against both scenarios. 

But we also have shortfalls in capability for the most likely scenarios. Some of those capabilities are in what the Department describes as Phase 0 and Phase 1 operations, the ability to engage 

nations and help them help themselves, training and other things. 

So I think as rightly has been said today, within a budget environment, we are trying to make a set of balanced choices. We believe many of the analyses within the Department say we actually 

have an excess of strike capability. 

We are continuing to modernize our fighter aircraft and our 

strike capability, but I will tell you that a lot of the models of the 

most likely scenarios say we have excesses. Some of the analysis 

you have seen is strictly how many squadrons, how many airplanes 

per squadron or wing or unit. And you assume you fill those gaps. 

But the Nation can’t make decisions, I think, strictly on that 

basis. We need to make decisions based on capabilities that need 

to be bought with the budget resources Congress provides. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

29 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

Mr. Taylor. 

Secretary YOUNG. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes? 

Secretary YOUNG. Could I—because of the importance and interest with Congressman Larsen here, I would—in the electronic age, 

we have been able to get an answer, and my answer from the Department is that WTO rulings cannot be passed along to the Air 

Force or the Department of Defense as a cost on a contract with 

the Department of Defense. 

So if there is a ruling and a penalty, it can’t be passed along to 

us as a cost. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am not sure what that means, though, when 

you say it can’t be passed along as a cost. 

Secretary YOUNG. Well, it means the company—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Oh, the company can’t pass it along as a cost. 

Secretary YOUNG. They will have to pay it. They will have to pay 

whatever is assessed as a fine or tariff—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I see. 

Secretary YOUNG [continuing]. But it cannot be charged back to 

the United States government on a contract. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I see. Thank you. 

Secretary YOUNG. So it would not change the cost of the proposal. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I got it. Excellent. 

Thank you. That is very helpful. 

Secretary YOUNG. Sorry to interrupt, Chairman Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. No. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

It has come to my attention that a number of the B3 aircraft that 

are being used in the counter-IED mission in Iraq have been 

grounded for structural problems. My question is, they are obviously important. So what is the plan to replacing those? Does the 

Navy intend to fix them? Is the Navy looking at alternative aircraft? 

In the few times I have stepped aboard a P–3, I was amazed by 

what appeared to be a large amount of space that really does nothing. It was obviously built for a different era. 

And so my question would be, in your analysis of alternatives, 

what other aircrafts have you looked at? For example, have you 

looked at the C20 Gulfstream? Have you looked at a C–12 to perform that mission? And how quickly can you get something in theater to take the place of the P–3? 

Secretary YOUNG. You may be aware, Mr. Chairman, that a lot 

of work was done on that a few years ago. We had a competition 

and a source selection, and we are in the process of developing the 

multi-mission maritime aircraft, MMA. There were at least two— 

I don’t remember the endgame, but I think at least one of the aircraft you mentioned was a competitor at one stage and dropped 

out. 

At the end, it was two companies, and the winning proposal was 

from Boeing. It is a 737-derived aircraft. It is about halfway or better—the next panel could answer your question—in the development. The Navy is looking at whether we can accelerate MMA procurement, which is always dangerous, accelerating a development 

30 

program, but because of the very issue you have raised, if we could 

accelerate MMA procurement, that could help. 

We will still have to do things to address the very issue you have 

also raised, and that will probably involve service life extension or 

other mods to some of the P–3s we have because of the capability 

they are providing. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Secretary Young, I hate to sound like the cynic I 

am, but I am not so sure you answered my question as far as the 

specific need to address the counter-IED mission that the P–3s 

were performing in Iraq that apparently is either being done on a 

limited basis or not being done at all. And rather than us having 

to come back again for what would be the fifth chapter—first the 

body armor, then the up-armored HMMWVs, then the jammers, 

then the MRAPs, I would sure hate to think that there is something that we need to be doing as a Nation that is not getting done 

in Iraq, like this mission. 

So what is being done to perform that mission? How much of a 

mission drop off have we had with the grounding of the P–3s? 

What is the plan to get us back up to where we were prior to the 

grounding of the P–3s? 

Secretary YOUNG. A piece of this I think I would like to ask to 

be able to talk to you offline and make sure I understand, because 

I am worried about classification issues. But I will tell you Secretary Gates is aggressively trying to increase the number of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, or ISR orbits, that are 

available. 

Some of the things that I think you are talking about, how we 

deal with IEDs, can be assisted by additional ISR orbits from unmanned aircraft. We have brought Joint Stars to bear on this capability, the P–3s. And so I would like to assure you—in fact, there 

is an urgent effort to buy additional Predators and Global Hawks 

in the Department and that we find the issues are frequently, in 

this case, manning the pilots necessary to fly the aircraft and, to 

some extent, ground stations. But we do have aircraft and ground 

stations and we need a bigger pipeline of pilots, which the Air 

Force is working on and can talk to you about. 

I think we are attacking the issue. We can redouble our efforts 

and look at it. To go a lot further starts to want to talk about some 

classified aspects. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Why don’t we do this, if you can get with me. As 

you know, we are not in next week. I became aware of the situation 

prior to Christmas, so this has drug on for at least 2 months, and 

it might have been going on for sometime before I even became 

aware of it. 

So if you or someone from your staff could get with me this week, 

let me know what the mission was prior to the groundings, what 

percentage of that mission is being completed today and what is 

the plan to get back to at least where we were prior to the 

groundings of the P–3. 

Secretary YOUNG. I appreciate the chance to—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. And I appreciate you looking for a long-term solution and trying not to just have a single shot. But in the short 

term, I would certainly hope that no one is needlessly dying or losing limbs because we are trying to save a couple of bucks. 

31 

Secretary YOUNG. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Young, I have a series of questions, too 

many to ask in the brief time that we have. I will give them to you. 

And I would like to have answers to them. 

But unfortunately, part of the question has to be with regard to 

Section 213 of the National Defense Authorization Act I mentioned 

before. 

It directed the Department to ensure, and I am quoting, ‘‘the obligation and expenditure in each fiscal year of sufficient annual 

amounts for the continued development and procurement of the 

two options for the propulsion system of the Joint Strike Fighter. 

In your written testimony and then your commentary, you say 

that the Department ‘‘will ensure that in each fiscal year where 

funds are appropriated, there is obligation and expenditure of sufficient amounts.’’ 

Now, do you believe this answer is consistent with the intent of 

Congress to take the actions necessary to develop and procure the 

two options for the Joint Strike Fighter? 

The reason I am asking the question is, I am not trying to trick 

you. I am not trying to get in an argument. I am very, very concerned that Congress be obeyed by the executive. I don’t want to 

go into a long dissertation about signing statements and unitary 

Presidencies and imperial—the progress of the imperial Presidency. 

Some people seem to think we are electing a king. I don’t want to 

pursue that today. 

But I will tell you, I will pursue up to and including contempt 

if I have to the Defense Authorization Bill being obeyed. I have got 

my copy of the Constitution in my satchel, which I carry with me, 

and believe me, I read it. And until somebody takes my place or 

the place of all the members here in the legislature, when we put 

a bill through, absent a veto, by God the executive is going to obey 

it. 

And so I don’t—I want to know how you interpret your phrase 

in terms of what the Congress requires? Because you don’t have 

this in your budget material. 

Understand, I am not trying to be combative with you. I am defending the principal of congressional authority here. And I am not 

asking you to comment on whether you think it is a good policy or 

not. 

Secretary YOUNG. Yes, sir. 

The Department’s reading the law in a literal manner, so we are 

obligated in expending the fiscal year 2008 funds Congress provided, which does do exactly what you said, make progress toward 

having a second engine source. 

The 2009 budget, as you know, does not have those funds. And 

it is within the prerogative of the President to make those financial 

choices about—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. It is not. It is not her prerogative. He has no 

prerogative. His prerogative is to obey the law. 

There are no funds in there. It is required to have them. Is it 

the Secretary’s position that he will not obey the law? 

Secretary YOUNG. It definitely is not the Secretary’s position. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Then why aren’t the funds in there? 

32 

Secretary YOUNG. Again, I believe that literal reading says we 

will obligate and expend. So obviously, if Congress appropriates 

funds, authorizes and appropriates funds in fiscal year 2009, we 

will continue to execute the second engine source. It is not as clear, 

given other constraints on the President in terms of things that 

had to be bought for the Nation that the law mandates that he 

budget for that program at the expense of other capabilities. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Then your position is, and the secretary’s position, is that so long—that you are going to do this only 

so long as the Congress appropriates the funds. 

Secretary YOUNG. Well, the law requires us to obligate and expend the funds, and we will certainly obey the law. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So even though we have ordered you to do it, 

then you are saying, well, provided you give us the money. Is that 

fair? 

Secretary YOUNG. I think that is the choices that are made this 

year in the President’s budget. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. I will take that as—— 

Secretary YOUNG [continuing]. We will have to revisit. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. 

This next may be a policy question. In our February 27 letter inviting you here, we asked you to articulate the views required of 

tactical air force structure compared to the programmed tactical air 

force structure and whether you believed the programmed force 

structure meets the requirement of the national military strategy. 

I don’t think—are you going to send us an addendum? I realize 

that could be a rather theoretical construct, and that might not 

have been appropriate for your testimony. 

Secretary YOUNG. I am not the perfect requirement source. I 

would, you know, as I commented earlier, I believe that the force 

structure that is in the President’s budget, many in that—we will 

conduct additional analysis on POM 10. I will offer you a longer answer for the record. 

The short answer is indeed we actually in the Department frequently conclude we have significant strike capability and could 

take risk in these spaces relative to the other needs we have in the 

Department. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is a good short answer, but if you could 

elaborate on it in an addendum, I would be appreciative. 

Secretary YOUNG. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Did you want to speak, Mr. Sullivan? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. I would like to comment that Mr. Wilson’s 

questions, as well as your own now, that are around all of this F– 

22, F–35 force structure issues, you know, this may be stating the 

obvious, I am not sure, but one of the problems I think that the 

Under Secretary has and the Department of Defense has and I 

guess the Nation has is that the F–22 is too expensive and the 

Joint Strike Fighter is struggling through development right now. 

One of the problems that I think they have with funding the alternate engine program is because there are other priorities that 

have cropped up on the Joint Strike Fighter program because they 

have been struggling with the design of that aircraft. 

The management reserves that have been depleted over the past 

year mostly have been because of inefficiencies in manufacturing. 

33 

All of the problems that you get when you have an unstable design 

going forward. 

They really can’t afford to fund anything else right now. They are 

trying to take are of short-term funding risk, and in the long term 

that may exacerbate more of the problems we have with the tac air 

force structure, because a Joint Strike Fighter could be looking at 

further delays in the future. That was a point in our written statement. 

Meanwhile, the F–22, the Under Secretary here has affordability 

to think about. The warfighters have a requirement and a need, 

but it tends to be unconstrained by budgetary considerations. So 

when the Department has to begin to prioritize and they have to 

constrain themselves with what is available in the budget, these 

are very difficult decisions that are more or less forced on the Department because most of these programs tend to get out of control. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is an excellent summary. And I can see 

Mr. Young sitting there saying please don’t help me anymore. 

Mr. Young, do you want to go into—that fits in the context of Mr. 

Sullivan’s testimony, when he spoke about the $600 million spent 

too quickly. This gets to a question I was going to ask. And also 

the cost schedule continues to degrade. And that was actually the 

last question I was going to ask in this series, and I will submit 

the others to you. 

In that context, in consideration of what Mr. Sullivan just said, 

is that part of the difficulty that you are experiencing in terms of 

budget? 

Secretary YOUNG. I really appreciate the chance to comment. I 

definitely agree with the latter comment about the unconstrained 

requirements process, you know, that forces us to work within a 

budget. And that is my request to the team. I want us to work 

within a budget, because if I have to take money from some other 

place, that denies capability in another area to finish something I 

promised to do for a cost. 

We are trying very hard to deliver Joint Strike Fighter within 

the budget. We have had some challenges. The company has not 

met schedules in the past. We have made choices and continue to 

manage. All the Members of this committee are familiar with these 

issues and programs, and I want to make sure I give you the right 

impression. 

This is a well-managed, well-run program that is working to delivery cutting edge fighter capability. We do believe we will have 

to put a modest amount of additional funds in the program to finish system development and demonstration (SDD). But we are—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. But you are deleting two test aircraft. 

Secretary YOUNG. Pardon me? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You are deleting two test aircraft. 

Secretary YOUNG. And there is a—we could have a good discussion about that. You know, there was an original test program that 

didn’t consider all the things we really needed to see. As we have 

gotten more mature in the program and more mature in the capabilities the aircraft delivers, the program team built a very solid 

test plan. That test plan said we did not need to buy the two mission systems aircraft because we would offload some of those testing events onto ground test facilities, onto what they call a cat bird, 

34 

but it is a flying simulator aircraft of a JSF that has the radar and 

other systems onboard. And as you know, flight testing on the actual aircraft is very expensive. 

I believe these were valid and pragmatic choices by the Joint 

Strike Fighter to try to manage within their resources, delete these 

mission systems aircraft, conduct those tests with ground systems 

or this aircraft simulator and use the other aircraft for what they 

call flight sciences or the actually flight testing and envelope expansion. 

So people criticize it, but the truth is it is a more thoughtful and 

balanced test program that we believe we can execute. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Sullivan. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I was out to Lockheed Martin this past summer, 

and at that time I sat down and talked with the Program Executive Officer (PEO), General Davis, and Lockheed Martin officials, 

and got kind of a top level briefing on what they are doing to try 

to make this risk reduction program work. 

And I would agree that they have worked very hard and have 

been very diligent, and the plan, you know, they believe they have 

a very sustainable plan that they can work. 

However, having said that, we have been here before. We have 

seen this movie before. In fact, if you look at the F–22 program, 

F–22 program kept a lower management reserve than Joint Strike 

Fighter did, got in trouble with it and started the same sort of 

things that they are doing on the F–35 today. 

So looking—and I would also, I guess, submit that when you look 

at the director of testing and evaluation, when you look at the Cost 

Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) analysis, when you look at 

analysis from the Defense Contract Management Agency and the 

systems engineering group within the Pentagon itself, I think most 

of them disagreed with going forward with this plan because of 

that risk. 

I think everybody in the test community and in systems engineering—it is very fearful when you see test resources beginning 

to degrade to make up for problems that you are encountering now. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You say problems. We are talking about 

variants here, right? You are talking about the short takeoff and 

vertical landing variant and the aircraft carrier variant, right? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, what about the idea that you stop 

where you are? Is that variant—I mean, is it—we have got three 

variants. Maybe this expense has—what if the laws of physics 

aren’t working the way you would like them to? I mean, we have 

already had two tests where it didn’t work. I am told, well, you are 

going to add covering or something. You know, there are all kinds 

of engineering activity. But what if it isn’t working? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. My comment on that is maybe not—I am not an 

expert on it, but looking at the programmatics on this, like the way 

that we have, I would say this program is far enough along, these 

variants, this is a program that is going to create these aircraft and 

the aircraft will eventually be able to perform, very similar to the 

F–22 and what it went through. 

I think the point that we are trying to make is that the program 

is looking at some really tough times coming up. 

35 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I mean, you know, when you take two articles out 

of the test program, when you—when you degrade the test points, 

when you look at, you know, they talk about build up points and 

then end points for the test program, they have gone in, in an attempt to make the test program more efficient and get rid of 

redundancies that they think are not necessary, which they are 

making judgments on that and they are dealing with risks, but 

they have got I believe around I am going to say 800 flight tests 

out of a 5,000 flight test program. I am not sure if I have that 

right. But they have reduced the test program quite a bit and they 

have taken two resources out of there. 

You know, one of the articles that they have taken out is one of 

the carrier variants. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. They will have one test article now for carrier 

variants. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I don’t want to pursue it further right at the 

moment, but we are going to—we will do it through staff. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. But as I said, we have seen this movie before. 

That is what everyone is looking at, is there could be much more 

additional time and cost increase as a result. 

Secretary YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I will try to be concise, but I 

do want to highlight, there are differences between F–22 and JSF. 

We have 13 aircraft in the test program. That is a significantly 

greater number than F–22 had. 

One of the early versions of the test plan had as many as 7,000 

sorties, but it wasn’t well defined. One of the more recent ones had 

5,700 sorties. There are 5,500 in the so-called MCRR, mid-course 

risk reduction program, and then there is a new version of the test 

plan already in work that adds back 50 sorties. 

The team of experts is trying hard to get this right and balanced. 

The test communities complaints and concerns are about losing 

test assets, but not necessarily so much about whether we are—I 

mean, we have to check the box on test points and mission systems 

and the plan does that. 

We also have operational testing and evaluation (OT&E) aircraft 

that are wired with instrumentation and could be brought into the 

test program if necessary. But I would echo what he said. There 

is no doubt in my mind this Nation can build a fighter and build 

this fighter. We have got to work our way through some problems 

and not overemphasize the problems. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If I accept all of that, and I accept the logic 

of it, then you should have the competitive engine in there also. 

They should. I mean, if I accept the logic of what you have just 

said, following all through those things in order to have the complete program, to make it work, we should not be budget driven. 

This should be mission driven. I mean mission driven in terms of 

legislative policy. 

Believe me, I came to this with no prejudices, honest, I did not. 

Secretary YOUNG. I am well aware of that, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And I think everybody can see how I conduct 

this subcommittee. I am not trying to push something or someone 

36 

over something else. I have been convinced of this, and you just 

made an excellent case to me for having the competitive engine. 

And it seems to me the only reason it is not in there is people 

are worried about the money. And if that is the case, believe me, 

compared to what you are just talking about, it is chicken feed. 

And I wouldn’t mind arguing that we should put in more money 

if you want to increase the test capabilities, because I will tell you, 

my instructions on this, and then I want to get to Mr. Larsen, he 

has a follow up, has to do with the Presidential helicopter. I will 

draw you a parallel. 

That is a complete mess. It has gotten in—proportions beyond— 

that is unbelievable to anybody that is trying to look at it in any 

kind of rational sense. Talk about lousing up testing and all the 

rest of it. And if it takes more money to do the test properly—now, 

if your testimony is that the mid-course risk reduction is a sensible 

thing to do and that is what you are testifying to, then that is 

okay. I will accept that. But—— 

Secretary YOUNG. We continue to revisit and we will—we have 

added back some sorties to that plan. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. But, you know, go back to the secretary 

and tell him, stop fighting. The Congress wants the second engine, 

and they are backing you up on most everything else, and I think 

we will probably do it here, too. But let’s not get trapped in falling 

short on what we need to do if we are going to go ahead with it. 

Secretary YOUNG. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And so your final point is, is these two 

variants that you are working on right now, need to go forward? 

Secretary YOUNG. On the Joint Strike Fighter? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. 

Secretary YOUNG. Absolutely, sir. And the progress is very good 

on these. 

There were people that said a year and a half ago, we could not 

possibly have STOVL ready to fly this calendar year. It will be 

ready to fly in the—mode this summer. And we have got to address 

the blade issue that you have rightly raised, but we expect to fly 

it in the STOVL mode in December. 

You know, people—sometimes the glass can be half empty and 

sometimes glass can be half full. It depends on where you want to 

be. But on the whole, the program is executing well. It definitely 

has technical challenges ahead of it, but we are going to go attack 

those every day. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I will tell you, though, one more thing. This 

is going to effect what happens to the F–22, because I—we just 

can’t, there is not enough money. Now, I want to finance things differently. I will simply mention again. If we don’t get a capital budget, then you are going to run into this problem over and over and 

over and over again. It is going to get worse and worse and worse. 

Secretary YOUNG. I would—can I reemphasize, though, when the 

process of our own budget process, and with all due respect, sir, the 

Hill process, takes a billion dollars out of a reasonably well-programmed plan that needs that money, it shouldn’t be a surprise to 

all of us that at the back end we need some of that billion dollars 

back to finish the program. 

37 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I don’t dispute that, but that is why we don’t 

want to get into waste, like that helicopter. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think that is an excellent point that you are 

making, about trying to find different ways to finance this. Because 

really, this program is in a position where really the risk reduction 

plan they put in place is to avoid additional costs right now. They 

are really trying to avoid an over-target baseline, and the reason 

they are doing that is because they will get killed in the funding 

process and politically if they have to declare that or admit to 

something like that at this point in the program. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I will finish with this, Mr. Young. 

You were inches from a clean getaway before your last statement. I agree with you, you might have to go back and add money 

in in order to make the picture complete. Isn’t that essentially 

what you are saying, that we need to take that into account? 

Secretary YOUNG. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Good. Then take into account that you need 

that money for the competitive engine. Go back and add it in. 

See, I am a reasonable guy. 

Secretary YOUNG. I definitely have that message, Mr. Chairman, 

but I think I had that message before I got here, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Larsen, and then we will go to the second panel. 

Do we want to take a break? Is there a vote right now? We may 

have to vote. 

So Mr. Larsen, and then we will go to the second panel and try 

to get started as quick as we can because apparently there is a vote 

coming up, or a series of votes. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And just to be quick, 

here, I just want to say I appreciate Secretary Young getting back 

so expeditiously with an answer. 

It still begs a couple of things, a couple of questions. First off is 

that someone will carry those costs, so it is still incumbent upon 

the Congress to determine who that is going to be and the impacts 

of that. 

The second, I don’t want your answer to deflect from the bigger 

issue I am trying to raise, and that is that we do have a trade case 

at WTO. We say these subsidies are illegal, and the Air Force is 

buying an airplane built with subsidies that the President himself 

says are illegal. This could blow up the very argument that we use 

at the WTO. 

That is not an issue for AT&L to deal with, not an issue for 

USAF to deal with. But it certainly kicks it upstairs, over and 

above the SECDEF’s head, into the White House, and it is a problem. It is a serious problem that we now face as a result of this 

Air Force decision. 

So it may not be your problem to resolve, and I appreciate that, 

but the problem has got to get resolved. It could undermine us at 

the WTO, not just on this case but on future cases, and that is a 

big dang deal for this Congress to deal with. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

We have some more questions, if I could submit them to you and 

perhaps Mr. Sullivan as well, I would be appreciative if you could 

38 

get back to us as fast as you can. It will help us to make our recommendations, and I assure you we will read them. You won’t be 

going through the motions. We pay close attention to what you say 

and for good reason. We respect both of you and are very, very appreciative of your participation and the manner in which it is conducted. We trust both of you. 

Secretary YOUNG. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You are dismissed. 

Here is the deal. We think there is going to be a vote call, probably a procedural vote. So while we reserve our right to criticize 

everybody who appears in front of us for their bureaucratic byzantine methodology of dealing with life, of course the Congress conducts itself similarly. 

We apparently have an utterly meaningless vote, which will 

cause us all to rush over to the floor. So probably the—let me see 

if it is going to be just one vote. So maybe it makes more sense 

for us to run over there right now and cast that vote and come 

right back. 

They haven’t called the vote. Let’s get started. 

The second panel is going to focus on a couple of issues, a range 

of aviation programs in the Navy and Air Force. Two issues of particular interest to our subcommittee is the Air Force inventory 

shortfalls and the Combat Search and Rescue Helicopter (CSAR– 

X). 

Air Force leadership is indicating previous testimony of the high 

operational tempo of the past 17 months in the Balkans and Southwest Asia has taken its toll on the service life of the aircraft. And 

that might indicate a shortfall in desired tactical aircraft inventory. 

And if the production of the F–35 is delayed or procurement numbers are fewer than the 80 per year that was envisioned, the gap 

could come sooner and become larger. 

And the search and rescue program has been delayed because of 

disputes over the contract award and two protests that were sustained by the GAO. So the search and rescue program is 2 years 

behind schedule and once again is in source selection. And this was 

Air Force’s No. 2 acquisition priority after the airborne tanker program, which is maybe also going to get stalled again. 

So the rescue helicopters intended to replace the Air Force fleet 

of 101 aging HH60G rescue helicopters. So we hope to explore that. 

And I will ask Mr. Taylor if he had any remarks in this particular stage of the panel? 

We will go ahead, he doesn’t have any. 

Welcome to everyone. 

Rather than go through lengthy introductions, because of the 

time period to get started, why don’t I start with you, Mr. 

Balderson. 

You are a Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Naval Air 

Programs, and maybe it is best we start with you and go down the 

line. 

Mr. BALDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I appreciate all of you coming here and give 

you my fond aloha. 

39 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM M. BALDERSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, AIR PRORGAMS, DEPARTMENT 

OF DEFENSE 

Mr. BALDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished 

Members of the subcommittees. 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss Navy and Marine Corps aviation programs. 

I do have a written statement that I will respectfully submit for 

the record. 

Out of respect for the committee’s time, I will limit my opening 

remarks to—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Without objection. Sorry. 

Mr. BALDERSON. Out of respect for the committee’s time, I will 

limit my opening remarks to just the two following points. 

First, the Department of the Navy’s acquisition team continues 

to work aggressively to identify efficiencies in the development, 

testing and procurement of the products and services we provide to 

the fleet. The fiscal year 2009 budget request reflects considerable 

effort in identifying affordable solutions for the Department’s aviation programs and we are striving to address the Navy Marine 

Corps warfighting needs in the most cost effective way possible. 

Second, the fiscal year 2009 President’s budget request is a balance between sustaining our fleet of legacy aircraft while also recapitalizing with newer, more capable and more reliable aircraft. 

Our proposed plan procures 206 aircraft and continues development of the F–35, the E2D, the P–8A, the CH–53K and a number 

of other critical recapitalization programs. 

Mr. Chairman, I will conclude by thanking these subcommittees 

for your outstanding support. The great efforts of our men and 

women in theater today and tomorrow will reflect a return on your 

investment in them and in the systems they take to the fight. 

Once again, thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Balderson and Admiral 

Myers can be found in the Appendix on page 71.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much. 

Admiral Myers. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. ALLEN G. MYERS, DIRECTOR, AIR 

WARFARE, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral MYERS. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you 

to discuss the Department of Navy’s fiscal year 2009 aviation programs. 

I am delighted to share this time with my colleagues from the 

Department of Navy, the Marine Corps and the Air Force to convey 

the critical needs of naval aviation in our armed forces. 

The Navy has been fully engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) for the last six and 

a half years and we are prepared to continue that same level of 

operational tempo as long as it is required. 

The remarkable performance of our sailors and marines could not 

have been possible without this committee’s tireless devotion and 

significant contributions not only to our Navy but our Nation as a 

whole. For that, we are truly grateful. 

40 

Naval aviation continues to play a major role in providing tailored effects in support of support of operations OEF and OIF, as 

well as our broader global war on terror. The ability of naval aviation to shape strategic, operational and tactical environments is reflected by the substantive return on your investment in our people, 

our combat readiness and our refined spectrum of critical 

warfighting capabilities. 

Also, these investments in surveillance, command and control 

and persistent strike, among others, ensures that our tactical aircraft can operate effectively from aircraft carriers that exploit the 

vast maneuver space provided by the sea. 

These Navy aviation programs comprise both platforms and 

weapons, directly underpin our Navy strategic plan and directly 

support our new maritime strategy. The fiscal year 2009 President’s budget maintains the trends of balancing conventional and 

irregular warfare aviation capabilities, reduces excess capacity and 

achieves technological superiority through cost wise investments 

and recapitalization, sustainment and modernization programs. 

The adjustments reflected in the budget maintain sufficient capacity to meet global needs and warfighting requirements. It manages the overlap with joint capabilities and preserves our 

warfighting relevance through 2024. 

Fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013 department’s fiscal 

year budget request procures 1,094 aircraft and concentrates on 

resourcing capabilities that generate critical maritime and joint effects. Today the Navy aviation stands ready with the agility, the 

flexibility and the confidence to support your Navy and to do what 

no other navy in the world can do: execute a maritime strategy 

that is second to none. 

An example of our agility and flexibility this past year was never 

more evident than when our FA–18 Hornets increased projected 

power to shore in Operation Enduring Freedom when our Air Force 

F–15s were grounded. We are out and about doing the essential 

missions of the nation. But as Admiral Roughead said 2 weeks ago 

in his first posture hearing, our operations come at a cost. 

Fiscal realities and operational strain on our aircraft contribute 

to the moderate risks that we assume. The recent P–3 groundings 

are but one example of the operational strain. The new multi-mission maritime aircraft will recapitalize on the aging P–3s and our 

maritime patrol anti-submarine warfare capabilities. The current 

FA–18 Hornets are needed to mitigate the 2017 strike fighter 

shortfall. 

The 2009 budget and its associated force structure plans will 

meet our current challenges with a moderate degree of risk. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today 

and thank you for your support for our naval aviation, our fleet 

which defends our great Nation today and tomorrow. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Myers, and Mr. 

Balderson can be found in the Appendix on page 71.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

General Trautman. 

41 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. GEORGE J. TRAUTMAN, III, DEPUTY 

COMMANDANT FOR AVIATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS 

General TRAUTMAN. Chairman Abercrombie, Chairman Taylor, 

Ranking Member Bartlett and distinguished members of the subcommittees, it is a privilege for me to appear before you today to 

discuss the 2009 budget submission as it relates to Marine Corps 

aviation. 

The Marine Corps is operating at its highest operational tempo 

in decades. We are flying our aircraft hard, deploying our marines 

often and doing our best to take care of families who are growing 

tired under the strain of the operational pace we are required to 

maintain. 

However, the magnificent men and women who serve our Corps 

continue to meet every challenge that comes their way. As we 

speak, the aviation combat element of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit is preparing to deploy with a force of 3,400 marines 

headed to Afghanistan. 

When combined with forces already in Iraq, and those that are 

rotated through the Pacific, this year will see us reach a new peak 

with 68 percent of our squadrons either deployed or preparing to 

deploy. 

The many accomplishments of Marine aviation over the past year 

are a direct reflection of the extraordinary dedication to duty and 

tireless pursuit of mission accomplishment that is the hallmark of 

your Corps of Marines. I know that I speak for each of them when 

I thank you today for your equally tireless and dedicated support 

to those who must serve in harms’ way. 

Each and every day, your marines are working hard to maximize 

the investments you have made in our aviation platforms and systems. As just one of the most recent examples, the MV–22 made 

its combat debut in Iraq over 5 months ago and the squadron has 

now flown over 3,000 hours, carried over 14,000 passengers and 

moved more than a million pounds of cargo while maintaining mission readiness rates that have exceeded our expectations. 

The ability of the Osprey to fly farther and faster and to move 

more marines and equipment around the Al Anbar battle space 

without refueling than any other platform in history has provided 

our warriors a significantly increased combat capability that is 

most appreciated by us all. 

My respect for the accomplishments of the men and women who 

comprise Marine aviation past and present is only exceeded by my 

confidence that with your continued support we are properly poised 

to meet our future challenges. 

I would like to take this opportunity to extend, for the record, a 

job well done to all the brave warriors defending this great Nation 

both at home and abroad. No finer fighting force has ever been assembled, equipped and trained. 

Thank you for this opportunity to speak with you today, and I 

look forward to answering any questions that you may have. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Trautman can be found in 

the Appendix on page 98.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, General. 

General Hoffman. 

42 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DONALD HOFFMAN, MILITARY DEPUTY, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR 

FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman and members, I appreciate 

being here today. 

I would first like to say on behalf of Ms. Payton, who you originally requested to be here, she sends her regrets. The last week or 

two have been pretty busy for her and she has two other committee 

engagements today as well. 

I would only like to make one comment, and that has to do with 

what was discussed in the first panel there, and that is on WTO. 

There are suits in the WTO and there are countersuits in the 

WTO, so the acquisition strategy required both vendors to clearly 

state in their proposals that no matter what the outcome of the 

WTO decision, that neither one of them—neither one of them— 

would pass on a claim to the government and to the taxpayer. 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Hoffman and General 

Darnell can be found in the Appendix on page 113.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much. 

And General Darnell. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DANIEL J. DARNELL, DEPUTY CHIEF 

OF STAFF, AIR, SPACE AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS, 

PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General DARNELL. Chairman Abercrombie, Chairman Taylor, 

Ranking Member Bartlett, thank you for the opportunity to speak 

here today. 

Your Air Force is actively engaged around the world and we 

greatly appreciate your continued support of our nation’s airspace 

and cyberspace forces. 

The United States Air Force has been engaged in continuous 

combat operations for over 17 years. Your Air Force is the most 

battle tested in our history and every day your airmen find innovative ways to accomplish their mission more effectively and more efficiently. 

Your airmen are dedicated to the defense of this Nation and have 

committed themselves to go to the ends of the earth, to the most 

dangerous or austere locations, in our nation’s hour of need or in 

the world’s moment of despair. 

If tonight, tomorrow or 20 years from now America calls, we will 

go. And we will provide strategic deterrence, global vigilance, global reach and global power. 

America faces a dangerous and uncertain future because our enemies do not sit idly by. Instead, adversaries both declared and potential continue to develop and field new and better means to 

threaten our nation, our interests and stability around the world. 

At the same time, the average age of our air and space craft continue to rise and our ability to overcome future threats diminish. 

The United States of America depends on airspace and cyberspace power to an extent which is unprecedented in history. Your 

Air Force is already engaged today to secure the tomorrow, but we 

cannot rest on the laurels of our current dominance. 

43 

Our Nation must invest today to ensure dominance of today’s airspace and cyberspace. 

Once again, I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today 

and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Darnell and General 

Hoffman can be found in the Appendix on page 113.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Bartlett, Mr. Taylor and I decided to defer to you out of respect for your insight and your perspective. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you mentioning the requirements for search and rescue. 

Indeed, the Navy has three requirements—I am sorry, four requirements, actually, for helicopters, that the 60 is really challenged to meet. One of those is search and rescue. It does not hold 

enough fuel. It cannot go far enough or stay there long enough for 

really effective search and rescue. 

The second is medical evacuation. Again, the amount of fuel and 

its dwell time is limited. And in addition to that, it just isn’t big 

enough to provide a meaningful airborne emergency room. 

A third mission is the mine countermeasures mission, and as you 

know the towing characteristics of the 60 limit its effectiveness 

there. 

And a fourth mission, which we usually don’t talk about, but I 

think it may be the most important of the missions, and that is the 

mission package change off on the LCS. The whole concept of the 

LCS I had thought at the beginning was that it could change from 

one mission package to another at sea. 

Now without a medium lift helicopter, we just can’t do that, and 

the LCS is going to have to leave the fight and steam to port and 

change mission packages, and then return to the fight, and it may 

be absent the fight for a week if it takes three days to steam to 

port and a day to change the mission package. 

Admiral Myers, I wanted to follow up something said by the 

Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) at last Thursday’s hearing. You 

and I have discussed the importance of the Navy’s helicopter force 

structure and the need for a robust medium lift helicopter in the 

fleet. You were kind enough to brief members of this committee in 

October, shortly after you took command of N88, of the Navy’s 

vertical lift programs. 

In that closed briefing, several of us expressed our strong concern 

with the Navy’s ability to meet current and future requirements 

with the current mix of helicopters. And the four missions I just 

mentioned were really critical there. 

I recommended for some time the Navy should invest in a robust 

heavy-medium lift helicopter that will provide significantly greater 

capability than the 860 alone at far lost cost than the super heavy 

MH–53 variants, which are several years off, as you know. 

Last week, CNO Roughead told our committee that Fleet Forces 

Command is currently conducting a study to determine whether 

the Navy has a need for a medium lift helicopter to meet current 

and emerging requirements. 

I want to first applaud you and Admiral Roughead for the way 

it appears you have dealt with the committee’s concerns on this 

matter. It is to your credit that the Navy is examining this often 

44 

overlooked but critical part of its force structure, that is helicopters. 

Could you tell us when the results of this study will be made 

available to the committee? To the extent you can, please elaborate 

on the nature and scope of the study and any other specifics you 

can provide. Can you assure the committee that this is a broad, 

across-the-enterprise analysis? Is the Navy conducting the study 

in-house, or is it being done under outside contract? 

Admiral MYERS. Mr. Bartlett, first of all, let me thank you for 

your continued interest in the Navy’s helicopter programs. 

If you don’t mind, sir, can I start from the beginning of your first 

question and work my way down to Admiral Roughead’s testimony. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

Admiral MYERS. That would be terrific. 

First of all, the search and rescue requirement, it satisfies what 

the Navy needs, and that is 170 miles is the distance that the Navy 

requires for search and rescue helicopters. And as we have discussed, and I know you already know, Representative Bartlett, the 

860 fits on our cruisers and our destroyers and our LCS platforms. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Admiral, if I can interrupt for just a moment, it 

is my understanding that in preliminary tests, the 60 has failed 

two of these mission requirements. Is that not correct? 

Admiral MYERS. No, sir, that is not entirely correct. I think the 

two areas you are referring to are the ferrings and the ferring 

orienter, which was part of my discussion to this panel last October 

and also the electrodes on the Oasis towing device. Those were two 

areas that we were having difficulties, and that is what I reported 

to the committee. 

Since then, the contractor, Concurrent Technology Corporation, 

or Sea Stars, has worked with the Navy and has ironed out essentially all the ferring and ferring orienter difficulties. They have redesigned it on the 860 so that it is towing adequately right now. 

As a matter of fact, it starts operational tests later this month. 

And in terms of the electrodes with the aft corrosion we were 

seeing between 2 and 8 hours, and we were trying to get that to 

about 20 hours, we are still working with the company, EDO, and 

have about another year before that goes into an operational test. 

So we think that we are progressing well in both of the areas of 

difficulty that I talked about last October. 

Sir, does that answer your question on those two specific items? 

And then I can go on to the other items. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, thank you. Go on. 

Admiral MYERS. I mentioned that 170 miles is adequate for the 

Navy’s use for search and rescue and that also that same platform 

serves as a Medivac to move an individual off the ship if the ship 

is not in port, out at sea. We think that it is sized big enough. It 

is as big as we need and as big as our requirements dictate. And 

it also fits and can be hangared in our cruisers, destroyers and our 

littoral combat ships. And we think that that is very important. 

Sir, you mentioned mine countermeasure missions. There are 

five airborne mine counter-missions that the SH–60 Sierra will 

take on, and the first one, which is I mentioned a minute ago, begins operational tests later this month, is the ASQ–20. And we 

have had—we are at about the right towing limit and it has sucVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:29 Mar 03, 2009 Jkt 043685 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-128\43685.TXT HAS1 PsN: LINDA
45 

ceeded in going through the development tests, so it meets the parameters, we think, that is required to go into operational tests. 

The mission package change on the LCS, you said that you were 

surprised that they could not be done at sea. That is scheduled to 

be done in port. The con op is for the combatant commander and 

the component commander to have the flexibility with missions and 

mission packages that he can arrange them in the theatre how and 

where required. 

We are going to purchase 55 LCSs and of those 55 LCSs, we are 

going to have a mix of mission packages, 24 mission modules for 

mine countermeasure, 16 for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and 16 

for ASUW. So the mission packages can be moved from one LCS 

to another, but that is required to be done in port. 

We don’t think it is a viable con op to do that at sea. When you 

say leave the fight, we think during a fight is not the appropriate 

time to be trying to change a mission package, that we would want 

to be postured going into the—zero and then the more advanced 

stages of any kind of tension in a designated theatre. 

So what we have given is the theatre commander or the combatant commander and his component commander the full flexibility 

with a mix of helicopters and mission package to tailor those LCSs 

for his environment. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, the decision to neck down to the 

one platform was made on a business basis before 9/11. We suspect 

that the Navy is valiantly doing a very good job now of defending 

the difficult to defend, and there is no argument but what the presence of a medium lift helicopter would greatly increase our capabilities in the four mission areas that I developed. 

And I remember very well, sir, when the LCS was first pitched 

to this committee. It was to be a change off at sea, to be very 

versatile, so that if the nature of the figure, the change, that you 

could change the mission packages very quickly at sea. 

Now since we do not have a helicopter capability to do that, we 

somehow are arguing that it is okay to leave the fight and steam 

to port to change the mission package. 

We appreciate very much the fact that you are taking a look at 

this medium lift helicopter and its desirability in the Navy and we 

are looking forward to the results of that study. 

When will the study results be made available to the committee? 

Admiral MYERS. Sir, the study that you are referring to is the 

Navy heavy lift helo con ops, and that was done—started last summer. Actually, I think it began just before the summer. And we 

thought that it was going to be completed last fall, in November. 

When I talked to you in October, to your committee, sir, we anticipated that it was going to be a month or so before that con op was 

complete. 

I am told that it has been delayed because it quite frankly needs 

some more work, and it will not be available until next fall. That 

is the timeline that fleet forces command is on, as I am informed. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Admiral Myers. 

Thank you, Mr. Bartlett, for conducting the Sea Power Subcommittee meeting. Now you won’t have to go to that. 

Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Gentlemen, I appreciate you sticking around. 

46 

I had asked the previous questions about the P–3, Admiral 

Myers, and I was wondering if perhaps you were the right one to 

answer that. 

I am curious on a number of things. No. 1, what is being done 

to restore that capability in Iraq right now? 

Second question is, as you are looking for the replacement, the 

737 just strikes me as a significantly larger airframe and with electronics being downsized significantly since the invention of the P– 

3, why do you need a significantly larger airframe to do that? And 

what other options, if any, is the Navy pursuing? 

And it kind of goes—no, it very much goes to the point that Mr. 

Bartlett has been making, that we have the world’s finest military. 

We also have the world’s most energy intensive military, which in 

itself becomes a vulnerability. Is replacing a P–3 with a large 

frame, like a 737, is that doing anything to reduce our vulnerability 

to having our fuel cut off? 

Admiral MYERS. Sir, let me, if I could, start with a rundown on 

the P–3 and what we are—sort of the status of where we are, the 

impact overseas, and then our mitigation efforts, which will include 

the P8 and why we think that is the most capable platform. 

For status on the P–3s, sir, as I know you are aware, last December we issued a grounding notice on 39 P–3 Sea Orions. That represents about 25 percent of our 160 aircraft fleet of P–3s and it 

was—these aircraft were grounded based on analysis backed up by 

visual confirmation of cracking in a part of the wing that we had 

not anticipated up until this point. 

So those aircraft made up a percentage of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) in Central Command (CENTCOM) 

with their full mission video capability and, sir, if I could take for 

record the exact percentage and the mitigation efforts that the 

combatant commander used, I think that is beyond the classification level of this hearing. But we are prepared to answer that in 

a separate forum. 

The Navy, when we discovered these cracks, set out on a threeprong approach to try to mitigate the impacts. First was a nonmaterial approach, which was to maximize training in simulators 

and to use our current aircraft down to the final hour before they 

were put into a depot status or put in line to go to one of our three 

depots for extended maintenance. 

Second, we accelerated our fatigue life management program so 

that we would make sure that we finish this analysis of this area 

of the wing so that we would be able to scope out exactly what we 

thought the recovery process would entail. 

The recovery of these 39 aircraft is going to be about 2 years before we get them back to the fleet, some as early as about 18 

months from now and some are going to be a little bit later. Just 

to give you an idea, 10 of those aircraft were overseas deployed, 17 

were in depots, and the remainder were back here in some kind of 

a training status. 

The reason it takes longer than some of our previous airframes 

bulletins or wing cracks is because we did not have the abundance 

of the material, the planks, that were required for this part of the 

wing, so we have had to go out and talk to Universal Alloy and 

Alcoa, to make sure that we get the right extrusion material, and 

47 

then take that and have that extrusion material milled. And then 

once it is milled, then get it to the depot. 

So all of that takes time, and we factored that in. And we are 

also looking very closely at efforts to maximize the depot throughput once the material in the form of plans is received and we can 

start to put those in the aircraft. 

We are also looking at replacing the outer wing boxes and working with Lockheed Martin. So we sort of have a dual-pronged approach, depending on the condition of the wings. 

Additionally, for a third way to try to mitigate the risk was to 

look at ways that we could advance some of the in particular the 

ASW capability of the P8, the follow-on aircraft, as early as possible. That aircraft was scheduled to IOC in 2013. So we are looking at the possibility of advancing some of the ASW capability as 

early as 15 months so that we can start to bring those aircraft into 

the fleet earlier, and then that would also mitigate some of the 

shortfalls of the P–3s as we get to the 2012 time frame. 

We selected the P8 based on the capability that it offered. We 

needed an aircraft that would travel, that would go a distance and 

be able to loiter in accordance with our fleet requirement and with 

major combat ops. So in the competition and the selection, that was 

the best capability and that is what we are using as an existing 

derivative of the 737. And we expect to take the—top open up our 

first squadron in the 2012 time frame, as long as we can accelerate 

it with about the 15-month forward profile that we hope to execute. 

Mr. TAYLOR. A quick follow up, and again, you don’t have to get 

terribly detailed, but I am curious. So the selection criteria was, 

No.1, the ability to loiter? Or was it volume? Was it—walk me 

through that determination. 

Admiral MYERS. If you don’t mind, Chairman Taylor, I am going 

to ask Mr. Balderson, who is part of the selection criteria team, to 

expand on that. But what I was addressing is the capability that 

was required is a big driver as to why that platform. You asked 

why the size and the capacity, and it is the capability that it offers. 

Mr. BALDERSON. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Young alluded to this earlier. There were two competitors. He didn’t remember the exact 

number. There were two competitors for this requirement. Boeing 

proposed a 737 derivative and Lockheed Martin proposed what 

they call the Orion 21, which was essentially a next-generation P– 

3. And in terms of outer mold lines, very similar to the P–3 aircraft. 

I will tell you, it was a very, very close competition. Both aircraft 

were very capable. The evaluation criteria were pretty much the 

standard criteria, but in the technical area, ability to loiter, range, 

payload, time on station, and those sorts of things were key factors, 

as I recall. This goes back almost five years now, to the development contract. And then of course there were the other factors that 

we normally look at. 

Another advantage to the 737, as I recall, in the source selection, 

although not perhaps a discriminator, was the worldwide support 

system that the 737 has. 

So essentially, two very similar class airplanes competed, very 

close competition, and the 737 won on a best value competition. 

48 

Mr. TAYLOR. Going back to the P–3 wing boxes in Iraq, how soon 

should I expect an answer on restoring that capability that went 

down in December? 

Admiral MYERS. Sir, we should be able to turn that around in 

a matter of days. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Obviously, you heard the vote go off. I will try 

and ask you a couple of questions, if you could just answer briefly, 

and I will submit some to you. And again, I assure you that your 

answers will be reviewed closely to help us make a recommendation. 

General Darnell, let me ask you, on the search and rescue helicopter, is the HH60G, the modification budget in 2009 and in the 

projection, is it fully funded to meet the requirements? 

General DARNELL. Mr. Chairman, if you are talking about the 

HH60 and the retrofit system associated with that, yes, it is. 

In 2008 we had a congressional add of—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. My understanding is, it is supposed to last an 

additional two years now. Is that right? 

General DARNELL. Yes, sir. We are putting $99 million in upgrades into the fleet in 2008. The crew has improved data link capability, improved multifunction displays for flying. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Do you think you can do it? 

General DARNELL. I am sorry? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Do you think you can do it? 

General DARNELL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You would fly that helicopter? 

General DARNELL. With these improvements, yes, sir, we can. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Would you fly it? 

General DARNELL. Yes, sir. I would. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The life extension programs, I am not quite 

sure what that means, like for the F–15E and the Golden Eagles. 

The life extension program, again, are they fully funded for 2009 

and the future years? 

General DARNELL. Sir, we are partially funded in some areas. 

Structurally, I think in the F–15 program, that is probably the 

most important question, and the answer I owe you most. We are 

going to do a teardown of our aircraft. As you are well aware, we 

had a recent in-flight break up of an aircraft about 5 months ago. 

We are going to do a complete teardown of an aircraft and then we 

are also going to do a—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Do you have confidence in it? In this program, 

in this life extension program? 

General DARNELL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Because I am depending, in the recommendations I make in my subcommittee, I am dependent on what you tell 

me. I am not going to fly them. I am not going to tear them down. 

I am not going to have to put people under my jurisdiction in them. 

Are you confident you can do this? 

General DARNELL. We are confident, Mr. Chairman. We have 177 

aircraft that we are going to extend out to 2025. Our confidence, 

however, will be based somewhat on this structural teardown and 

fatigue testing that we will be doing in the next 12 months. 

49 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Do you understand why I am asking? 

General DARNELL. Oh, yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I don’t want to just say, well, we gave them 

the money, and then it doesn’t work. 

General DARNELL. Right. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If you think that this life extension program 

can’t work, you have to come and tell us. 

General DARNELL. We will. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. In other words, there is not a right and wrong 

answer in the sense of I am demanding you do something that 

can’t be done. 

General DARNELL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If it can’t be done, we need to know. Is that 

a fair—— 

General DARNELL. It certainly is, yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Let me ask you, then, General Trautman, 

about the Venoms and the Vipers. Now, the Navy’s statement includes the procurement objective of 180 Vipers and 100 Venom helicopters, right? 

General TRAUTMAN. That is right, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Do these quantities have to increase as you 

evaluate the impact of increasing the end-strength? In other words, 

if we are able to move the end-strength up in the Marine Corps, 

does that 180 and that 100 turn out to be right? Do you have confidence in these two helicopters? 

General TRAUTMAN. I have a great deal of confidence in these 

two helicopters. As you know—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What about the numbers? 

General TRAUTMAN. The numbers are the program of record, 100 

and 180, as you described. The commandant grow the force to 202K 

will increase by two Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 

(HMLA) and two—well, just two HMLA squadrons for purposes of 

this discussion. 

And so we are assessing how many additional helicopters we 

may need on the—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. So we might be looking at increasing the expenditures there, right? 

General TRAUTMAN. We will probably in the out years have to do 

that, yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Balderson, you folks taking into account 

this kind of change in the end-strength of the Army and the Marine Corps in terms of equipment needs? 

Mr. BALDERSON. Yes, sir. Absolutely. We are working very closely 

with the Marine Corps in the case of the 202K and of course in the 

Navy too in terms of emerging requirements. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am asking the question, Mr. Balderson, excuse me, don’t think I am being argumentative when I break in. 

It is because of the time frame and I don’t want to hold you after 

we leave here, after we close this down. 

I am concerned with the supplemental budget, that F–22 is the 

same thing. I don’t want to see this stuff appearing in a supplemental budget like it is an emergency we didn’t know about. If we 

are going to increase the end-strength of the Army and the Marine 

Corps, we need to take into account in the regular budgeting procVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:29 Mar 03, 2009 Jkt 043685 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-128\43685.TXT HAS1 PsN: LINDA
50 

ess—when I say we, I mean the Congress certainly needs to, and 

we need to get your recommendations, as to what it will take to 

do that. 

Is that fair? 

Mr. BALDERSON. Yes, sir. I would just, from an acquisition standpoint, I would just comment that when we submit a regular budget 

and a supplemental, we take both into account in our acquisition 

plans. We would not submit a budget and a supplemental that 

added up, couldn’t be executed by the industrial base. 

So with respect to H1 and other programs, we have taken all this 

into account. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I understand that. Believe me. The reason I 

don’t want this kind of stuff to get into the supplementals, you 

never know when a supplemental is going to come. You never know 

when it is going to get heard. You never know when it is going to 

get passed. And you don’t know what else is going to get jammed 

into. That is the reason, at least as far as I am concerned, in making recommendations to Mr. Skelton, to the subcommittee and to 

the whole committee and on to the appropriators and so on, I don’t 

want to fool around with getting politics into the readiness factor 

with regard to—especially when it comes to the end-strength build 

up. 

General Trautman, you see what I am driving at? 

General TRAUTMAN. Oh, yes, sir, I do. And we have the 2009 

budget is—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If you guys become dependent on supplemental budgets, you are going to be in huge trouble. 

General TRAUTMAN. There is nothing about the supplemental 

that will impact this particular discussion, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. 

General TRAUTMAN. It will be a POM 10 deliberation to decide 

how and when we can go beyond the program of record of 180 and 

100. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. But you understand my concern. There has 

been a tendency lately to say, well, the supplemental budget will 

take up this stuff, especially when it comes to procurement and acquisition, and I think it is a terrible strategy, if you will. It is a 

terrible budgeting strategy. It is going to hurt you. 

Admiral Myers, you may have to answer this further on. Your 

statement says the Navy is working the Air Force on jamming 

transmitters and has leveraged previous work completed as part of 

the B–52 standoff jammer, the SOJ program, which has now been 

cancelled. 

Now, do you believe you will be able to fill the gap that the B– 

52 SOJ program was going to fulfill? 

Admiral MYERS. Mr. Chairman, that is a great question. The 

Navy has remained committed to the Growler program. And as you 

know, we will retire our expeditionary capability starting in 2010, 

ending in 2012. First Growlers arrive to the fleet this May and we 

will have a full operational capability (FOC) and be out of the EA– 

6 business in the fiscal year 2013 time frame. 

In the meantime, we are committed to try to do the follow-on replacement for the ALQ–99 with the next gen jammer, and that 

process begins this spring with an analysis of alternatives. 

51 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. In other words, you can’t tell me whether you 

can fill the gap, right? 

Admiral MYERS. The Navy is going to—the Navy is doing everything it can on our end, yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am sure you are. That is all. I mean, it is 

not a—I am not trying to test anybody. It is not a contest. 

The answer is, as I understand you, then, that you are not sure 

at this point. You are going to do your best. Well, we will follow 

up. It is too much to answer right now. 

Mr. LoBiondo, do you have a question? I think we have about six 

or seven minutes. 

So I will send the rest of my questions on to you, if that is okay. 

Admiral MYERS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Because I don’t want to hold you after this. 

This will be the last question, Frank. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank the panel for being here. It is very helpful. 

I have some very serious concerns about the fighter inventory 

shortfall in the Air Force in general and in the Air National Guard 

in particular. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Excuse me, Frank. Did you vote already? 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Yes, I did. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. I will tell you what. I have got about 

two minutes. I would like to go and vote. Can you close the hearing 

down—— 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Sure. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. For me, afterwards—— 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Sure. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. In the spirit of bipartisan friendship? 

Mr. LOBIONDO. I would be honored. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Gentlemen, I am very grateful to you. Please 

don’t think I am trying to short you. I think by the time this comes 

back and we go all over it again, I am not making good use of your 

time, and I would rather send the questions on, okay? And I am 

very appreciative. 

Thanks, Frank. 

Mr. LOBIONDO [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A little bit unusual situation, but we will take it. I appreciate the 

chairman’s indulgence to just get into a couple of questions. 

I understand that the Air Force is attempting to fill the gap with 

the so-called Golden Eagles or the F–15C and D models with the 

service life extension program. A couple of questions surrounding 

this. Is the Golden Eagle fully funded in the 2008 budget? 

General DARNELL. Mr. LoBiondo, it is partially funded. But our 

intent over at the Palm is to have it fully funded and to take 177 

airplanes to 2025. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. What roles will the Golden Eagles fill with the 

Air Force? What are your plans there? 

General DARNELL. It will continue to provide air superiority. The 

assumption is, with those 177, that we have our program of record 

by 1,763 F–35 and the assumption was also made we would have 

381 F–22s. 

52 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Will they be a part of the Air National Guard for 

the Air Sovereignty Alert Mission? 

General DARNELL. That is the plan, yes, sir. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. That is the plan? 

General DARNELL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Do we have any idea how the Golden Eagles are 

going to be allocated for the various Air Sovereignty Alert Missions? 

General DARNELL. Are you talking about by location? 

Mr. LOBIONDO. By location. 

General DARNELL. Sir, we may. I don’t have any insight into 

that. I can get back to you on that. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. I have a particular concern, representing the 

177th, with our strategic location and with what is happening with 

our F–16s and the ability to be able to continue that mission. 

One last question. Do you feel the various service life extension 

programs of the fourth generation fighters will be sufficient to 

bridge the gap between the F–22 and the F–35? 

General DARNELL. Sir, our current plans carry the F–16 out into 

2024 and the F–15E beyond 2030. That is the plan. We have confidence that we can make that work efficiently and effectively. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Because that is where some questions come in of 

how the Air Force is figuring versus the reality of what we are 

doing today. 

If you could get back to me, I would appreciate that very much. 

I thank you for being here. 

This hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 11, 2008 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 11, 2008 

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE 

RECORD 

MARCH 11, 2008 

(157) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Admiral Myers, you mention in your statement that the Navy 

is working with the Air Force on jamming transmitters, and has leveraged previous 

work completed as part of the B–52 Stand-Off Jammer (SOJ) program, which has 

now been canceled. Do you believe that the EA–18G will be able to fill the gap that 

the B–52 SOJ program was intended to fill? 

Admiral MYERS. The EA–18G was developed to replace the EA–6B in the carrier 

air wing. The Navy is executing its program of record and divesting its expeditionary EA–6B squadrons in accordance with the EA–6B service MOA signed by the 

USN, USMC, and USAF in 2004. The EA–18G is not designed nor was it intended 

to replace the B–52 SOJ. The USAF is investigating a scaled down version of the 

SOJ that it refers to as the B–52 Core Component Jammer (CCJ). The Navy has 

leveraged off the previous work that the Air Force conducted in the early stages of 

the B–52 SOJ and has applied it toward technology maturation. This will conceptually ensure that the EA–18G with its Next Generation Jammer will become an 

essential part of the system of systems to counter enemy electro-magnetic capabilities. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. We noted in your statement that there is a significant increase 

in Class A flight mishaps in FY 2008 compared to this time last year, and that you 

see no trends in causal factors at this time, but that Navy leadership has addressed 

a message to every Naval aviator emphasizing a—‘‘back to basics’’ operational risk 

management initiative. Please expand on what this ‘‘back to basics’’ message is, and 

how you believe this will help to lower the number of Class A mishaps. 

Admiral MYERS. Thus far in FY 2008, we have had 10 Class ‘‘A’’ flight mishaps 

resulting in five fatalities and 11 lost aircraft, which when annualized at our current rate (20 mishaps) is above the norm for the past 10 years (average of 16.5 Class 

A flight mishaps per year). The causal factors for the Class A’s cross the full spectrum of Naval Aviation mishap characterizations including G-induced Loss Of Consciousness (G–LOC), mid-air collisions, material failure, bird strike, several instances of Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT), and loss of situational awareness. 

As part of the ongoing effort to arrest the rising mishap rate we have taken the 

following action: 

• Commander Naval Air Training Command directed a Professional Excellence 

Standdown on 17 March. 

• Commander Naval Air Forces (CNAF) took the following actions: 

Æ Sent a ‘‘Personal For’’ message on 16 February to Naval Aviation’s Commanders, Commodores, Carrier Air Wing Commanders, Commanding Officers, and Officers in Charge reemphasizing the importance of getting back to 

the basics of naval aviation. 

Æ Sent a ‘‘Focus on Safety—Back to Basics’’ message on 25 February for all of 

Commander Naval Air Forces commands to reiterate the importance and 

focus on safety and the founding principles of Naval Aviation—‘‘Aviate, Navigate and Communicate.’’ Commander Naval Air Forces reiterated his direction to refocus our aircrew and stick to our proven Tactics, Techniques and 

Procedures (TTPs), Naval Aviation Training and Operations Procedures 

Standardization (NATOPS), Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and 

other guidance to ensure safe mission accomplishment. 

Æ Intend to direct a ‘‘strategic human factors review’’ at the unit level for a 

comprehensive look at basic aviation skills training and aircrew performance 

and aptitude. Details are being finalized and will be presented at the O–6 

Commanders Conference in April. CNAF will begin the review shortly after 

the conference and follow up with actionable feedback prior to the end of 

May. 

Æ Developing a Strategic Communications Plan to ensure CNAF message regarding operational excellence is understood at every level. The plan is currently in initial draft. 

158 

Specifically, the Back to Basics message was provided for an awareness of the ongoing problem of basic mistakes made. The Commander Naval Air Forces wants 

every aviator to be aware of the issue and that each individual is responsible for 

leading Naval Aviation to excellence. By itself the message will do little however, 

it is part of the larger drumbeat, the other measures included above, that continues 

in the effort to keep the leadership focused and informed. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Balderson, you mention in your statement that, with respect to a competitive JSF engine program, ‘‘projected savings from not doing competition outweigh the investment and sustainment costs.’’ We also understand the 

Department of Defense has budget pressures and believes that there are higher priority needs, but given the importance of the JSF to address that Navy’s strike fighter shortfall, how do you view the benefits of competition including better engine performance, improved reliability, increased contractor responsiveness, a more robust 

industrial base, and improved operational readiness of a two-engine JSF propulsion 

program? 

Mr. BALDERSON. The conclusions of all three 2007 Congressionally-directed engine 

studies are supportive of competition in general, but do not obviate the Department’s initial findings that the expected savings from competition do not outweigh 

the investment costs. The Department agrees that cited non-financial benefits have 

merit. Affordability is also a consideration for the Department. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You mentioned in your statement that the B–52 Stand-off 

Jammer program was canceled in December 2005, which ‘‘jeopardized the ability of 

the Air Force to meet stand-off jamming requirements by 2012.’’ You mention that 

as a result of this, that the Air Force proposed the core component jammer program, 

but that is it unfunded to date. Will that Air Force be able to meet stand-off jamming requirements by 2012? If not, how will the Air Force compensate for this lack 

of capability? 

General DARNELL. The AF will be unable to achieve a stand-off jamming capability prior to 2012; however, we are still exploring the stand-off jamming mission 

through tech maturation efforts and possible FY10 program funding efforts. 

That being said, our mitigation plan includes the fielding of a stand-in jammer 

and decoy capability (MALD–J/MALD), the use of stealth capabilities (F–22/F–35), 

and the development of CONOPS to incorporate these capabilities. MALD is on 

schedule for fielding in FY10, but is contingent upon Congressionally deferred PBO8 

War Consumable funds being replaced in the FY08 GWOT Supplemental. MALD– 

J is scheduled for fielding by FY 2012. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. We note that your Class A mishap rate is 12 as compared to 

10 at this time last year, and that like that Navy, you have also instituted a ‘‘backto-basics’’ approach with a hard look at risk assessment techniques. Please further 

describe this approach and how you believe it may help to alleviate the rising Class 

A mishap rate. 

General DARNELL. AF Safety has asked commanders at all levels to step up emphasis on a back-to-basics approach—a hard relook at our risk assessment techniques, to ensure our Airmen understand that rules and tech data are the life blood 

of doing things the right way. This approach emphasizes and evaluates Airmen’s adherence to established normal and emergency procedures, checklist discipline, and 

general book knowledge and expertise. 

This approach reviews and emphasizes better and appropriate decision-making at 

all levels during normal and time-critical scenarios for our operations and maintenance Airmen. Our Airmen must be able to accurately and swiftly consider the risks 

of their activities, weigh whether the mission goals warrant the risk, assess whether 

risk mitigation factors are viable and in place, and make sound and solid decisions 

about whether to proceed or halt the activity. If needed, appropriate levels of command must decide to accept—or not accept—the risk. This applies whether patrolling the skies and streets of Baghdad, working the flight line at home station, or 

playing on the lake during spring break. 

Human factors continue to dominate our mishap causal factors, consistently accounting for 67% of the last 11-years’ mishaps. Specific areas include adherence to 

procedural guidance, channelized attention, procedural error, and decision-making 

during operations. These observations are also consistent with similar observations 

across the aviation industry, and apply to all of our aircraft types. Experience has 

shown that human factors mishaps can be prevented through continued training 

and emphasis on the ‘‘basics’’. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The GAO recommends revisiting JSF’s mid-course risk reduction plan which has removed two test aircraft, streamlined staffing, and proposes 

to use test assets more efficiently. Also, the GAO recommended that the JSF program revise its cost estimate. Do you agree with these recommendations? 

159 

Secretary YOUNG. The Mid-Course Risk Reduction (MCRR) plan is a cost effective 

approach to managing the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program within the budget 

and with manageable risk. I approved the MCRR plan with the knowledge that we 

would monitor the effects and risks to the program. MCRR makes enhanced use of 

extensive ground test facilities and a flying test bed to accomplish many test points. 

Further, the two test aircraft removed were flying qualities aircraft, not avionics 

and mission systems test aircraft. MCRR decisions did not significantly increase 

testing and actually helped reduce the flight testing workload through the efficient 

use of other test assets. The Department established metrics to evaluate contractor 

Management Reserve replenishment and use, manufacturing line progress, and developmental testing progress and impacts. The metrics are updated monthly and I 

am prepared to adjust the program’s assets if MCRR has a negative impact in any 

of these areas. 

The Department is updating the JSF cost estimate through a joint Service team 

being led by the Department’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group. The update will 

be used to support the Department’s FY 2010 budget process. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You mention that a decision must be made on F–22 production 

by November to avoid increased costs. What will be the increased costs if the decision is made when the new Administration takes office after January 2009? 

General HOFFMAN. Unless additional aircraft buys are authorized by November 

2008, the F–22 production line will begin to shut down. While the last aircraft delivery is scheduled for December 2011, the vendor base for subcomponents completes 

deliveries as early as late 2008. The cost impact due to a production line break 

would depend on the duration of that break. Once suppliers begin their shutdown 

activities, the highly-skilled workforce currently working on the F–22 will begin to 

transition to other programs. Some components will require redesign and any new 

suppliers will have to be qualified to deal with increasing diminishing manufacturing sources. If the new Administration elects to add Advanced Procurement for 

additional F–22s to the FY10 PB, the production break will be at least 11 months. 

There is an on-going RAND study to determine the costs and feasibility of restarting 

F–22 production after plant shutdown (Estimated Completion Date: May 08). 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Secretary, you noted in your prepared statement that the 

Department did not direct the Cost Analysis and Improvement group to update 

their analysis of a one and two engine JSF program last year and that there have 

been no significant changes to the program that would have resulted in any changes 

to their findings. Given the fact that there were two F135 engine test failures in 

the past year, both associated with the first-to-need STOVL variant, and the F136 

engine has progressed an additional year after the Congress authorized and appropriated and additional $480 million last year, wouldn’t an evaluation of costs, schedule, and performance reveal changes in the value of a competitive engine program 

to some degree since last year? 

Secretary YOUNG. The Department strongly supports the many advantages that 

competition provides. However, an F–35 competitive engine program would cost an 

additional $1.4 billion to complete development and $1.7 billion, through Fiscal Year 

2015, to establish production. In a constrained budget environment, the funds required for a competitive engine program must compete with other priorities as the 

Department seeks to provide the best taxpayer value in submitting the Defense 

budget. The Department will review all aspects of the F–35 program, to include the 

F135 engine and the F136 engine, as it prepares the FY 2010 budget for submission, 

and will continue to obligate and expend the funds appropriated by Congress as authorized. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The Secretary of Defense, testifying before this committee on 

February 6th of this year, stated that he would review the development and procurement of a competitive F–35 engine in light of recent F135 engine test failures. 

Has he completed that review? If so, what did he conclude? 

Secretary YOUNG. The Department acknowledges risks associated with a single 

source provider of the F–35 propulsion system but believes the risks are manageable. The Department is reviewing the F135 engine program as a precursor to releasing funds for the six F–35 Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing aircraft in the 

FY 2008 Low Rate Initial Production Lot 2 contract. The Department will review 

all aspects of the F–35, to include the F135 and the competitive F136 engine, during 

the FY 2010 budget process. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Secretary Young, In your written testimony, you state that the 

Department believes that the C–17 production line should not be kept open; however, the Department removed $217.6 million that was to be used for production line 

shutdown from its FY 2009 budget submission. Additionally, OSD Comptroller officials have stated that the Department intends to leave the shutdown decision to the 

next Administration. Can you explain the difference in your written testimony comVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:29 Mar 03, 2009 Jkt 043685 PO 00000 Frm 00163 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-128\43685.TXT HAS1 PsN: LINDA
160 

pared to the actual actions of the Department regarding the C–17 production line 

shutdown decision? 

Secretary YOUNG. The Department maintains a disciplined approach in analyzing 

capability requirements through the Joint Capabilities Integration Development 

System and validated through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) then determines force structure requirements 

to provide the capabilities needed to meet the National Military Strategy. In the last 

QDR, multiple studies indicated that we need to procure fifth generation aircraft to 

address advanced aircraft and surface-to-air missile threats. The DoD program contains a robust mix of fifth generation F–22s and F–35s in quantities sufficient to 

prevail against a range of potential foes. The QDR also balances those force structure requirements within a comprehensive budget plan and I believe the tactical air 

force structure programmed in the FY 2009 budget submission will provide a very 

capable force and meet the requirements for the National Military Strategy. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Secretary Young, You may be aware that the 2005 MCS is considered incomplete in its analysis and recommendations by the GAO and many in 

Congress because: It did not take into account the end strength increases of 92,000 

personnel for the Army and Marine Corps; it did not consider any mobility requirements of the Army’s Future Combat System and Modularity concept of employment; 

it did not consider the fact that the Army Manned-Ground Vehicle is too large to 

be transported by a C–130 aircraft; it did not consider the 159% over-utilization rate 

of the current fleet of C–17 aircraft; it did not consider the use of C–17s in multiuse roles for which the C–17 is being used extensively in current operations; and, 

it did not have or use historical mobility forces operational data in its analysis to 

verify actual mobility requirements and operations. Did you account for all these 

factors when determining whether or not to keep the C–17 production line open? 

Secretary YOUNG. The Department believes that the Mobility Capabilities Study 

(MCS) 2005 provides a sound basis for strategic airlift planning. In response to your 

specific issues with the report, I would note the following: The Department has 

studied the effects of the ground troop end strength increases, and concluded that, 

because these ground forces increases did not change the overall wartime defense 

strategy, there was no change in peak strategic airlift demand. The movement of 

Army heavy equipment is largely made by pre-positioning or via sealift. Again, the 

Department does not anticipate that the timing and quantity of any required air 

movement of these types of assets will drive an increase in the peak airlift demand. 

Our analysis indicates that the over utilization of C–17s is actually 106 percent. If 

the fleet continues to fly at this rate throughout its service life, we would need to 

recapitalize the fleet somewhat sooner. However, over history our airlift fleet is underutilized. Modest over utilization of the fleet for a few years will likely be balanced by periods of underutilization. The Department did examine multi-use roles 

of the C–17 in MCS 2005, including direct delivery, intra-theater missions, and tactical operations. Historical. analysis was used for the study where it was appropriate to do so. Overall, however, the scenarios envisioned in the MCS were much 

more demanding than the actual operations that mobility forces have historically 

flown. Indeed, the scenarios used in MCS, and the closely spaced timing of these 

scenarios, may very well overstate the airlift requirement. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Secretary Young, We understand your written testimony to be 

inaccurate in describing what the 2005 MCS stated about the Department’s required 

C–5 inventory to meet strategic airlift requirements. Your testimony states that the 

2005 MCS concluded that a ‘‘fleet of 112 modernized C–5s, provided sufficient strategic airlift capacity’’ when it actuality, the 2005 MCS states that a fleet of ‘‘112 

modernized and reliability improved C–5s’’ meets the Department’s airlift and strategic airlift requirements. Can you explain why the ‘‘reliability improved’’ phrase 

was excluded from your written testimony when referencing 2005 MCS findings and 

recommendations? Given the fact that only 52 of the Air Force’s 111-aircraft C–5 

fleet will receive the reliability enhancement and re-engining program, do you view 

the reduced availability of the remaining 59 C–5 aircraft problematic in meeting the 

Department’s airlift requirements and how does this factor into your opinion to close 

the C–17 production line? 

Secretary YOUNG. The Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS) 2005 findings are based 

on total fleet capability. With minor exceptions, the C–17s and C–5s are fungible 

assets. The MCS recommendations for 180 C–17s and 112 modernized and reliability improved C–5s is but one combination of strategic airlift that meets the projected demand. Since the completion of the MCS, 10 additional C–17s have been appropriated by Congress. Subsequent analysis performed in support of the C–5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP) Nunn-McCurdy process 

identified total organic oversized and outsized airlift fleet capacity at 33.95 Million 

Ton Miles per Day (MTM/D), as informed by the MCS analysis. That analysis also 

161 

shows that 189 C–17s (one of the 190 is committed to NATO) and 111 C–5s (including 52 RERP’d C–5s) meet the JROC-validated requirement during surge operations 

with acceptable risk and that no other alternative provided greater capability at less 

cost. I would also point out that the programmed fleet represents a significant improvement over our current fleet, since we currently have taken delivery of only 171 

C–17s and none of the C–5 fleet has been RERP’d. At this time, I do not believe 

that the entire C–5 fleet needs to be RERP’d to meet our strategy. However, the 

option of completing RERP on the remaining C–5As in the future is a potential 

source of additional airlift capacity should the strategy change in such a way as to 

demand more airlift. Further, there is great potential to get more operational utility 

from the C–5 aircraft through increasing spares and maintenance relative to the 

levels planned under the assignment of these aircraft to Reserve units. Finally, as 

part of the C–5 decision, the Air Force was directed to pursue Lean Six Sigma efforts to aid C–5 maintenance and operations, potentially yielding even greater airlift 

capacity. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The Navy’s statement includes the current UH–1Y/AH–1Z procurement objective of 180 AH–1Zs and 100 UH–1Ys. Do you expect the quantities 

of helicopters to increase as you evaluate the impact of increasing the Marine Corps 

end strength of 202,000? If so, by how many helicopters? 

General TRAUTMAN. The Marine Corps has requested the H–1 Upgrades Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) Program of Record to increase to 226 AH–1Zs and 180 

UH–1Ys in order to support the USMC end strength increase to 202K. The request 

is supported by Marine Requirements Oversight Council Decision Memorandums 

44–2007 dtd 29 May 07 and 51–2007 dtd 9 Jul 07. 

Documentation reflecting the increased quantities will be revised in time to support the Full Rate Production decision review scheduled for the fourth quarter 

FY08. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Secretary, in our February 27th letter to you inviting you 

to testify here today, we asked that you articulated views of the required tactical 

air force structure compared to the programmed tactical air force structure and 

whether you believe the programmed force structure meets requirements for the National Military Strategy. However, we noted that this request is missing from your 

statement. Could you comment on this for the subcommittees? 

Secretary YOUNG. The Department maintains a disciplined approach in analyzing 

capability requirements through the Joint Capabilities Integration Development 

System and validated through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) then determines force structure requirements 

to provide the capabilities needed to meet the National Military Strategy. In the last 

QDR, multiple studies indicated that we need to procure fifth generation aircraft to 

address advanced aircraft and surface-to-air missile threats. The DoD program contains a robust mix of fifth generation F–22s and F–35s in quantities sufficient to 

prevail against a range of potential foes. The QDR also balances those force structure requirements within a comprehensive budget plan and I believe the tactical air 

force structure programmed in the FY 2009 budget submission will provide a very 

capable force and meet the requirements for the National Military Strategy. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Secretary, as you know, section 213 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 directed the Department to ensure the ‘‘obligation and expenditure in each fiscal year of sufficient annual amounts for the continued development and procurement of two options for the propulsion system for the 

Joint Strike Fighter.’’ However, you state in your written testimony that the Department will ‘‘ensure that in each fiscal year where funds are appropriated there is obligation and expenditure of sufficient amounts.’’ Do you believe this answer is consistent with the intent of Congress to take the actions necessary to develop and procure two options for the Joint Strike Fighter’s propulsion system? How does the 

OSD General Counsel view the Department’s conformance with section 213 by not 

including funds in the budget request for a competitive JSF engine? 

Secretary YOUNG. The President’s annual budget request recommends for congressional consideration such measures as the President shall judge necessary and expedient. The Department will comply with section 213 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. We will ensure that, in each fiscal year for which 

funds are appropriated for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, sufficient 

amounts are obligated and expended for continued development and procurement of 

two options for the JSF propulsion system. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You mentioned in your opening statement that the Department assessed the risks of the mid-course risk reduction plan, including the deletion 

of two test aircraft, as manageable since LRIP aircraft could be used if test validation and verification efficiencies were not realized. Will these aircraft be effective 

for the test mission if they are not specifically constructed with the test wiring and 

162 

other systems necessary to most efficient capture test data? Additionally, do you see 

force structure problems in using LRIP aircraft for test missions rather than operational missions? 

Secretary YOUNG. A select number of early low rate initial production aircraft will 

be instrumented with requisite test wiring and other systems similar to that of our 

developmental test aircraft. The instrumentation included in these select aircraft 

was a requirement of the operational test community to assist them in proper evaluation of the F–35 during Initial Operational Test and Evaluation. We do not anticipate creating any force structure issues by using one of twenty Operational Test aircraft for a short duration while finishing developmental testing prior to commencement of operational testing. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You mention in your statement that four additional F–22A aircraft to be requested in the FY 2009 supplemental ‘‘will provide production line 

flexibility.’’ At a current production rate of 20 aircraft per year, this appears to be 

only two and a half moths of production. How do you believe this will provide production line flexibility? 

Secretary YOUNG. The Department is working with the Air Force to determine the 

necessary actions required to keep the F–22A production line viable so that a new 

Administration, as it looks at the Defense budget and priorities, can make the decision to expand or not to expand the F–22A force. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. We understand the supplemental budget request will include 

four F–22As, but this would amount to only two and a half months of production 

at the current rate of 20 aircraft per year. How will these four additional F–22s 

keep the production line open as you state in your testimony? 

General HOFFMAN. The supplemental extends production by two to three months 

by continuing the fabrication of parts at the supplier level. Once the parts necessary 

for the four aircraft are finished, those suppliers will shut down. A production break 

will ensue until the new administration chooses to procure additional F–22As. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. We understand that the Department of Defense won’t budget 

for a competitive JSF engine due to higher priority funding needs. What is the Air 

Force opinion of whether the benefits of the competitive engine program outweigh 

the costs? 

General HOFFMAN. The Air Force continues to believe the risks associated with 

a single source engine supplier are manageable and do not outweigh the investment 

required to fund a competitive alternate engine. However, the Air Force and Navy 

are executing the $480M appropriated by Congress in the 2008 budget to continue 

development. We completed the Critical Design Review for the alternate engine in 

February 2008 and we have completed over 300 hours of engine testing for the conventional takeoff and landing aircraft. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. We understand that the Air Force has expressed a concern 

about a fighter inventory shortfall potentially beginning in the 2017 timeframe, but 

that includes service life extension programs for the A–10, F–15E and the 177 F– 

15C/Ds (so called ‘‘Golden Eagles’’). Are life extension programs for these aircraft 

fully funded in the FY 2009 budget request and in the future years defense program? 

General DARNELL. The A–10 has a two-fold approach to extend its service life to 

16,000 hours. First, an intensive aircraft inspection is accomplished at 8,000 hours 

to strengthen or replace key structural components. Thereafter, aircraft undergo a 

structural service inspection every 2,000 hours. Second, the A–10 wing replacement 

program is replacing existing thin-skin wings with new thick-skin wings. The wings 

program is currently funded to replace 228 of 242 thin-skin wings. There are 14 

wings and 3 spares on the FY09 unfunded requirements list. 

The F–15 does not have an official Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) nor 

is one programmed; however, aircraft receive extensive inspections at depot every 

6 years. The 2 Nov 07 mishap led to a thorough evaluation of previous F–15 fatigue 

testing. The evaluation has recommended a complete aircraft teardown, full-scale fatigue test, and other safety modifications. This testing will require FY09 and future 

years funding which is not currently identified. 

163 

1GAO, Joint Strike Fighter: Impact of Recent Decisions on Program Risks, GAO–08–569T 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008). 2GAO, Joint Strike Fighter: Recent Decisions by DOD Add to Program Risks, GAO–08–388 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008. 

Failure modes discovered during the full-scale fatigue test could potentially lead to 

a SLEP requirement. From inspections following the mishap, nine aircraft were discovered to have longeron cracks. Five of these will undergo longeron replacement, 

while four will be retired due to their existing near-term retirement date. Recurring 

longeron inspection criteria is being developed for all F–15A–D aircraft. The F–15 

is the next aircraft to be assessed by the Fleet Viability Board (FVB). The FVB will 

forecast operational health and structural viability of the F–15C/D for the next 20+ 

years. The FVB independent technical assessment will inform sustainment and retirement decisions. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. We note that the CSAR–X program has undergone a two-year 

delay due to GAO protests. Based on this delay, we understand that the 101 HH– 

60Gs will be required to last an additional two years. Is the HH–60G modification 

budget in FY 2009 and in the FYDP fully funded to meet CSAR requirements? 

General DARNELL. HH–60G funding is sufficient to meet current requirements; 

however, additional outyear funding may be required if CSAR–X is further delayed. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE AND MR. TAYLOR 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. and Mr. TAYLOR. 1. Engine Competition—Do you believe lifecycle savings comparable to the past F100 and F110 competition axe achievable for 

the JSF? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. It was a pleasure appearing before your subcommittees on March 

11, 2008 to discuss the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).1 This is our response. Our recent 

report on the JSF provides more details on these and other related issues.2

Our analysis shows that it is reasonable to assume that competitive pressures 

would yield enough financial savings to offset the costs associated with ensuring 

competition, given the current number of engines to be procured, length of the program, and expected costs to operate and support the engines. We believe it is reasonable to assume at least this much savings (9 to 11 percent) based on past analysis of actual data from past competitions, including the F–16 engine competition. 

While we did not do a detailed comparison between the JSF and F–16 engine competitions, we believe the JSF competitive engine program with the proper structure 

and attention, and up-front investments, may achieve life-cycle savings rates similar 

to the F–16 competitive engine program. Additionally, there are a number of nonfinancial benefits that may result from competition, including better performance, 

increased reliability, and improved contractor responsiveness, that should be taken 

into strong consideration. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. and Mr. TAYLOR. 2. JSF Plans and Use of Management Reserves (a) How did the program deplete reserves and why are additional funds necessary? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The Joint Strike Fighter program used its management reserves 

much faster than expected to pay for development cost increases and schedule 

delays, which were the consequences of the late release of engineering drawings, 

manufacturing taking longer than planned, and late delivery of parts from suppliers. These in turn contributed to continuing cost and schedule impacts in the 

manufacture of development test aircraft, including extensive and inefficient out-ofstation work and delays in the manufacturing schedule. By mid-2007, the aircraft 

development contract had completed one-half of the amount of work scheduled, but 

had expended two-thirds of the budget, depleting a large portion of the reserves. 

Figure 1 shows how management reserves totaling almost $1.5 billion were applied 

since the major restructuring of the program in 2004. 

164 

3GAO, Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain, GAO–07–360 (Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007). 4GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Systems, GAO–08–467SP (Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2008). 

Management reserves are budgeted funds set aside for unanticipated development 

challenges and for known and unknown cost risks. Maintaining an adequate level 

of reserves throughout system development is prudent. At development start, the 

JSF program budgeted reserves at 10 percent of contract value and expected to 

draw on them at about the same rate as contract execution. This proved insufficient 

as the design and manufacturing problems noted above decreased management reserves to about $400 million in 2007, less than half the amount officials believed 

necessary to complete the remaining 6 years of development. Moving forward, the 

program faced significant manufacturing and software integration challenges, costly 

flight testing, and $950 million in other known cost risks. This presented the program with a likely untenable contract overrun in 2008 if no action was taken. Officials decided not to request more funding, and instead adopted a mid-course plan 

that reduced test assets and made other changes in order to replenish reserves to 

about $1 billion-the amount officials believe will be needed to complete development 

in October 2013. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. and Mr. TAYLOR. (b) What could have been done to prevent, 

or at least mitigate, the setbacks in design and manufacturing that precipitated the 

depletion of management reserves? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The JSF started system development before requisite technologies 

were ready, started manufacturing test aircraft before designs were stable, and 

moved to production before flight tests had adequately demonstrated that the aircraft design meets performance and operational suitability requirements. We previously reported that the JSF acquisition strategy incorporated excessive overlap in 

development and production, posing substantial risks for cost overruns, schedule 

slips, and late delivery of promised capabilities to the warfighter.3 The outcome was 

a cascading effect from late engineering drawings, numerous changes to drawings, 

late standup of suppliers, parts shortages, and delayed, inefficient manufacturing 

with substantial out-of-station work. 

We find much the same behavior, and poor outcomes, in many major defense programs that do not adequately follow evolutionary, knowledge-based acquisition practices. Our recent assessment of 72 weapon systems found that none of them proceeded through system development meeting the best practices standards for mature technologies, stable designs, or mature manufacturing processes by critical 

junctures of the program.4 Figure 2 is a notional illustration, relevant to the JSF 

and other major weapon systems. It shows the negative cost and schedule impacts 

from a highly concurrent acquisition strategy that proceeds without requisite knowlVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:29 Mar 03, 2009 Jkt 043685 PO 00000 Frm 00168 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-128\43685.TXT HAS1 PsN: LINDA

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5 Rand Corporation, Test and Evaluation Trends and Costs for Aircraft and Guided Weapons 

(Santa Monica, California, 2004). 

edge and compares it with an acquisition strategy with less concurrency that captures key design and manufacturing data before production begins. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. and Mr. TAYLOR. (c) What do you see as the benefits and/or 

risks associated with DOD’s decision to go ahead and implement its Mid-Course 

Risk Reduction Plan? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The mid-course plan may relieve short-term funding pressures but 

at the cost of increased future risks to cost and schedule. Adequate management reserves throughout the development period are essential to handle new and unforeseen problems. Replenishing them likely avoided a cost overrun this year. However, 

we believe it likely that DOD will need to eventually restructure and add more 

money and time to development, a critical issue that should be addressed now rather than one or two years from now. 

The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, and officials from other prominent 

defense offices perceived the plan as too risky because it does not provide adequate 

resources for development testing or resolve systemic problems that depleted management reserves. With reduced capacity and fewer flights, the time to complete development effectively will get more and more compressed, affecting the planned 

start of operational testing in 2012 and production decisions in 2013. The midcourse plan’s reduction of test resources will likely result in design and performance 

problems not being found until late in development during operational testing and 

after considerable numbers of aircraft have been ordered. This would likely make 

fixes more expensive, requiring retrofit of already-built aircraft, and delays getting 

aircraft to the warfighter. 

We also note that the mid-course plan to reduce flight tests relies more on computer modeling and simulation and laboratories. However, the specific details on exactly how this will be done have not been finalized. The Rand Corporation reported 

in a study on testing and evaluation that modeling is not a substitute for flight testing.5 Rand found that even in performance areas that are well understood, it is not 

unusual for flight testing to uncover problems that were not apparent in simulations. Examples include flight effects on the wing of the F/A–18E/F and buffeting 

of stores externally carried by various aircraft. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. and Mr. TAYLOR. 3. JSF Cost Estimate—Can you shed further 

light on your concerns with the program’s cost estimate? What is the basis for your 

concerns? 


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166 

6GAO–08–388. Appendix II provides a detailed analysis of our concerns about the reliability 

of the program office cost estimate. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. In our latest report on the JSF, we determined that the official 

program cost estimate is not reliable when judged against best practice standards 

used in the federal government and industry.6 Specifically, the program cost estimate (1) is not comprehensive because it does not include all applicable costs, including $6.8 billion for the alternate engine program; (2) is not accurate because 

some of its assumptions are overly optimistic and not supportable—such as applying 

a weight growth factor only half as large as historical experience on similar aircraft—and because the data system relied upon by the prime contractor and the program office to report and manage JSF costs and schedule is deficient; (3) is not well 

documented in that it does not sufficiently identify to cost analysts the primary 

methods, calculations, results, rationales and assumptions, and data sources used 

to generate cost estimates; and (4) is not credible according to three independent 

defense offices who all have concluded that program cost estimates are understated 

by as much as $38 billion and that the development schedule is likely to slip from 

12 to 27 months. 

We were concerned that, despite these findings and all the significant events and 

changes that have occurred since the start of system development in 2001, DOD did 

not intend to accomplish another fully documented, independent total program 

lifecycle cost estimate for another 6 years. Because of the size of this acquisition, 

its impact on our and allied tactical air forces, and the unreliability of the current 

estimate, we recommended that an immediate new and independent cost estimate 

and an uncertainty analysis be done to more firmly establish funding requirements 

needed to complete development and to provide more confidence in the fidelity of 

the procurement cost estimate as production ramps up. DOD concurred and said 

that a new comprehensive and independent estimate is underway but did not believe an uncertainty analysis was needed. 

Although the new JSF Selected Acquisition Report, dated December 2007, indicates that development and procurement costs have remained relatively stable from 

the prior year, we continue to believe that costs will increase significantly in the 

future, perhaps with the new comprehensive estimate being readied for the fiscal 

year 2010 budget cycle. The design and manufacturing problems that gave rise to 

cost and schedule increases and depleted management reserves will continue to 

exert pressure. The program does not expect a quick turnaround in production line 

efficiency with cost pressures persisting well into 2009. 

There are other indicators that acquisition costs will substantially increase from 

what is now being reported to Congress. Specifically: 

• DOD has identified billions of dollars in unfunded requirements that are not 

in the program office estimate, including additional tooling and procurement 

price hikes. 

• A new manufacturing schedule indicates continued degradation in the schedule 

and further extends times for first flights. 

• Both the aircraft and engine development contracts have persistent, substantial 

cost variances that cost analysts believe are too large and too late in the program to resolve without adding to budget. 

• As discussed above, officials at three defense organizations independent of the 

JSF program office stand by their assessments that the program office’s cost estimate is significantly understated and the current schedule unlikely to be 

achieved. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. and Mr. TAYLOR. 4. JSF Challenges—With 90 percent of its 

planned investment remaining, what are some additional concerns and risks for the 

program is it moves forward? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Only about halfway through its planned development period, the 

JSF is in its most challenging phase as it seeks to finalize three designs, mature 

manufacturing processes, conduct flight tests, and ramp up production toward a 

full-rate production decision in 2013. The JSF program’s acquisition strategy includes significant challenges to achieve projected cost and schedule goals. The program has begun procurement but not yet demonstrated that the aircraft design is 

mature, can be manufactured efficiently, and can be delivered on time. The flight 

test program has just begun, and there is always risk of problems surfacing and 

causing further delays. The degree of concurrency between development and production in the JSF program’s acquisition strategy poses significant risks of cost and 

schedule overruns and late delivery of promised capabilities to the warfighter: 

Specific challenges: 

167 

7GAO, Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated Investment Strategy, (GAO–07– 

415 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 2007). 

• Keeper aircraft affordable. From its outset, the JSF goal was to develop and 

field an affordable, highly common family of strike aircraft. Rising prices and 

somewhat lower commonality than expected raise concerns that the United 

States and its allies may not be able to buy as many aircraft as currently 

planned. Rising prices erode buying power, likely resulting in reduced quantities and delaying the delivery of promised capabilities to the warfighter. Average unit procurement costs are up 27 percent since a major restructuring in 

2004 and up 51 percent since the start of system development in October 2001. 

• Annual funding reguirements. The program places an unprecedented demand 

on the defense budget for an average of about $11 billion a year for the next 

two decades-with attendant funding risk should political, economic or military 

conditions change. The JSF will have to annually compete with other defense 

and nondefense priorities for the shrinking discretionary federal dollar. To complete the acquisition program as currently planned, JSF will require about $269 

billion from 2008 through 2034. Annual funding requirements for procurement 

increase rapidly as production ramps up to the full-rate production decision expected in October 2013. During the peak years of production, JSF procurement 

funding requirements are expected to average about $12.5 billion per year for 

the 12-year period spanning fiscal years 2012–2023. The program is so large 

that even small cost increases have significant budget consequences. 

• Operating and support costs. Once fielded, the maintenance and operation of 

the JSF fleets will require large annual outlays. Assuming the current operating and support cost estimate, the quantities now planned, and an expected 

8,000hour service life for each aircraft fielded over time, DOD would incur outlays of nearly $29 billion annually. DOD sharply increased its projection of JSF 

operating and support costs compared to previous estimates. The December 

2007 SAR projected operating and support costs for all three variants at $764.1 

billion, up from $650.3 billion in the last year, and more than double the $346.7 

billion amount shown in the December 2005 SAR. The operating cost per flying 

hour for the JSF conventional takeoff and landing variant is now estimated to 

be greater than current flying hour cost for the F–16, one of the legacy aircraft 

to be replaced. 

• Containing weight growth. Weight growth early in the program was the most 

significant factor causing a $10 billion cost increase and an 18-month extension 

in development. As designs continue to mature and flight testing intensifies, 

maintaining weight within limits to meet warfighter capability requirements 

will pose a continuing challenge to cost, schedule, and performance goals. Aircraft weight generally continues to increase during the balance of the development period; an OSD official told us that half of all weight growth during the 

development effort can be typically expected after first flight but prior to initial 

operational capability, and that additional small but persistent weight increases 

can be expected during the aircraft’s service life. First flight of a 

productionrepresentative JSF has not yet occurred, and weight is running very 

close to the limits as evaluated by engineering analyses and trend extrapolation. 

• Unsettled quantities and mix of aircraft. The current JSF program shows a 

total of 680 aircraft to be procured by the Department of the Navy, but the allocation between the carrier variant and the short take off and landing variant 

has not been officially established. We observe that the Navy and Marine Corps 

have somewhat divergent views on the quantities, intended employment, and 

basing of JSF aircraft. The Navy wants the Marine Corps to buy some carrier 

variants and continue to man some of its carrier-based squadrons. The Marine 

Corps, however, wants to have a future strike force composed solely of the short 

take-off and landing variant and has established a requirement for 420 aircraft. 

During conflicts, the Marines plan to forward deploy JSFs to support the expeditionary ground forces. 

Navy and Marine Corps officials expressed concerns whether they can afford the 

quantities now planned at peak production rates. Officials told us last year that 

buying the JSF at the current planned rate—requiring a ramp-up to 50 by fiscal 

year 2015—will be difficult to achieve and to afford, particularly if costs increase 

and schedules slip. Officials told us that a maximum of 35 per year was probably 

affordable, given budget plans at that time.7

168 

We look forward to our continuing work with your staffs on this extremely important and challenging program. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER 

Mr. MILLER. It is my understanding that the Air Force (AF) Civil Engineering 

Support Agency predicts the heat signature of JSF operations, which is substantially higher than for any other aircraft in the inventory, will result in accelerated 

deterioration of airfield pavements at main operating bases, dual use commercial 

military airfields, such as Eglin AFB FL, and expeditionary airfields like those supporting the global war on terrorism. In addition to premature pavement failures, potentially, this could result in high instances of foreign object damage hazard to aircraft operations. Given the timing of beddown activities at Eglin AFB, what action 

is being taken that DoD develop a joint pavement solution to this situation? 

Secretary YOUNG. The F–35 Program Office has been addressing the issue of heat 

generated by the F–35 Integrated Power Package (IPP), roll posts, and main engine 

for several years. Early in development, the program collected full scale F–135 engine data to better understand the external environment associated with Short 

Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) operations. In late 2007, one third sub-scale 

model test of the IPP was performed in the Lockheed Martin hot gas lab in which 

the IPP exhaust temperatures and velocities were quantified to better understand 

the impacts to the primary operating surfaces (concrete, asphalt, AM–2, ship steel 

and non-skid). Our initial assessment concluded it is possible that IPP and engine 

exhaust may be high enough to cause damage to these surfaces. We will continue 

to assess the impact of the F–35 on these operating surfaces as we begin flight test 

of the STOVL airplane later this summer. 

In the interim, we are working with the Services to develop mitigation plans 

should flight test show additional actions are required. One change already implemented for flight test is a software modification which prevents the IPP from entering one of the modes which could potentially damage asphalt. We are evaluating the 

acceptability of this particular mode for production airplanes. 

The largest concern is the temperatures created by the main engine during 

vertical landings. We are working with the Air Force Civil Engineering Support 

Agency, Naval Facilities Command, Office of Naval Research, and Air Force Research Laboratory on a joint pavement initiative to develop an improved heat resistant concrete. If successful, this initiative would develop a solution to mitigate the 

damage to concrete at bases such as Eglin Air Force Base, the first F–35 Integrated 

Training Center, where pilots learn to execute F–35B vertical takeoffs and landings 

from concrete pads. Additional initiatives are looking at new coatings for expeditionary field matting and a more heat resistant non-skid surface for shipboard operations. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO 

Mr. LOBIONDO. In the event the F–22A buy remains at the current planned level 

of 183 planes, what is the plan for the 177 Golden Eagles? Will they remain in the 

USAF or will they be turned over to the Air National Guard for the Air Sovereignty 

Alert mission? 

General DARNELL. If the F–22A buy remains at the current programmed level the 

Air Force will have to reassess the number of F–15Cs to keep in order to provide 

the required COCOM support to the National Military Strategy. The ability of the 

Air Force to reduce the F–15C fleet to 177 Golden Eagles was predicated on a procurement of greater than 183 F–22As. The F–15C Golden Eagle fleet will be used 

to supplement the F–22As and will likely be called upon to forward deploy to support any type of large force conflict. Additional F–15Cs will need to remain in the 

inventory to provide the necessary force structure for the Air National Guard to perform their Air Sovereignty Alert mission. How the Golden Eagles are employed and 

by whom will be a function of the Total Force management practices. Through force 

management, the Air Force will closely monitor the service life and fleet health of 

its air defense-capable platforms to ensure support to ASA and expeditionary demands. Also we are continuing to study second and third order effects of the recent 

structural issues encountered by the F–15 aircraft to assess the impact to future 

fighter force structure. 

169 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ELLSWORTH 

Mr. ELLSWORTH. The Navy in September 2000 designated the ALQ–214 Integrated Defense Countermeasures (IDECMP as a core system requiring organic depot 

maintenance capability under Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 2462. The system is currently supported by contractorprovided maintenance. The committee understands 

the total cost to stand up organic capability is $17.6 million but the Navy has not 

included any funding for this capability in its budget request. What is the Navy’s 

plan for establishing organic depot maintenance capability for the IDECM system 

as required by law? 

Mr. BALDERSON. The ALQ–214 program began in 1995. The maintenance concept 

at the program start was Organizational to Depot, with the contractor performing 

as depot. The system was designated as Core in September of 2000. The Core logistics capabilities statute (10 U.S. C. § 2464) requires establishment of organic depot 

capability by IOC + 4 years. The system reached Initial Operational Capability 

(IOC) September 2004. The Depot Source of Repair (DSOR) analysis, completed in 

March 2007, resulted in selection of Naval Warfare Center Crane, Indiana, as the 

depot. The Navy continues working to identify funding resources for an organic 

depot capability. Due to fiscal constraints the requirement (approximately $17.6M) 

remains unfunded at this point. 

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