Filed 3/4/21 Bedrosian v. Hadid CA2/5

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

JOHN C. BEDROSIAN et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

MOHAMED HADID et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

B303713

(Los Angeles County 

Super. Ct. No. SC129388)

APPEAL from an order, of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Craig D. Karlan, Judge. Affirmed.

Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks, Lincenberg 

& Rhow, Gary S. Licenberg, Ariel A. Neuman and Shoshana E. 

Bannett for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Roy G. Weatherup and 

Caroline E. Chan; Law Offices of Abdulaziz, Grossbart & 

Rudman, Bruce D. Rudman for Defendants and Appellants.

__________________________
2

Defendants Mohamed Hadid and Strada Vecchia, LLC 

appeal the trial court’s order appointing a receiver to oversee the 

demolition of defendants’ “megamansion.” Although defendants 

agreed in the trial court that the unpermitted structure needed to 

be demolished, they now argue there was no evidence the house

posed a danger to the plaintiffs or that it constituted a public 

nuisance, as the trial court found. They also argue that the order 

included an injunction for the demolition of their property which 

was invalid because the trial court did not order plaintiffs to post 

an injunction bond. We find no error and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs John Bedrosian et al. own homes in Bel Air at the 

bottom of a hillside. Perched above their houses is defendants’

nearly-completed mansion (the Property). Plaintiffs sued 

defendants in 2018 for fraud, nuisance and related claims arising 

from defendants’ unpermitted construction. The City of Los 

Angeles (City) was also named as a defendant with respect to

plaintiffs’ claim for a writ of mandate asking the City to remove 

“all improvements” on the Property. 

The complaint alleged that defendants began construction 

on the megamansion in 2011, and over the next several years, the 

Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety (LADBS) issued 

11 citations for Building Code violations. Despite multiple orders 

to stop the construction, defendants continued to build. In 2014, 

the LADBS revoked defendants’ permits. Plaintiffs alleged the 

Property’s construction created unsafe conditions on the slope 

above their homes, increasing the risk of slope failures and 

mudslides that could cause the Property to topple onto plaintiffs’ 

homes. 

In March 2019, plaintiffs moved for a temporary 
3

restraining order requiring the City to enforce its regulations 

regarding demolition of illegal construction. The trial court held 

multiple evidentiary hearings, and ultimately found that 

“safety—both at the jobsite and for adjoining neighbors—

necessitated” the demolition of certain portions of the structure. 

The pool deck structure and most of the third floor were removed 

pursuant to this order.1 The court ordered plaintiffs to post a 

bond in the amount of $10,000. 

In November 2019, plaintiffs filed an ex parte application

for appointment of a receiver to take possession of the Property to 

demolish the structure down to the foundation. Plaintiffs moved 

under Code of Civil Procedure section 564, subdivision (b)(9)

(Section 564(b)(9)) which provides for the appointment of a 

receiver in a pending proceeding “ ‘where necessary to preserve 

the property or rights of any party.’ ”

2 The trial court conducted a 

site visit, permitted supplemental briefing, and held two 

hearings. At the November 13, 2019 hearing, defendants’ counsel

agreed with plaintiffs that the entire structure needed to be 

1 This order is not the subject of the present appeal.

2 Section 564(b)(9) provides in full, “(b) A receiver may be 

appointed by the court in which an action or proceeding is 

pending, or by a judge of that court, in the following cases:

[¶] . . . [¶]

(9) In all other cases where necessary to preserve the 

property or rights of any party.”

All further undesignated statutory references are to the 

Code of Civil Procedure.
4

demolished down to the foundation slab.3 Defendants’ contractor 

testified that the structure could be demolished safely.4

On December 2, 2019, the trial court granted the

application and appointed a receiver to oversee the demolition of 

the Property. The court ordered that the house be demolished 

down “to the foundation slab” because it was not compliant with 

the Building Code and was a public nuisance. It was undisputed

that several “elements of the foundation were unapproved and 

fail to comply with the Los Angeles Building Code,” and the 

LADBS Chief of Structural Plan Check and Seismic Retrofit 

Divisions had stated that “LADBS measures safety by code 

compliance.” As a result of defendants’ failure “to address the 

slope issues” created by their unpermitted removal of “thousands 

of cubic yards of soil” from the property, the court observed that 

“it is simply unclear whether the remaining soil and slope can be 

relied upon to support the structure at issue, even if the 

foundation had been built as per approved plans.” 

The court concluded that the structure is a “public nuisance 

and a danger to the public” and that “Plaintiffs and other 

3 At the November 13, 2019 hearing, the court said, “It 

sounds like even the defense is in agreement that this has to 

come down. It sounds like what you’re saying is: we’re willing to 

take it down, but we need to wait until we get approval of new 

plans.” Defense counsel responded, “Yes and yes. We believe 

that our retrofit program could work.” 

4 The trial court asked defendants’ contractor, “Do you have 

any question that you could do this safely?” The contractor 

responded, “I would definitely consult a demolition engineer, for 

sure, and we would phase it. . . . It can be done safely, 

absolutely.” 
5

individuals are at a legitimate risk of suffering damage and harm 

to their homes.” The trial court appointed a receiver “to take 

possession, custody, and control” of the Property “for the sole 

purpose of demolishing” the Property, and “to address and 

remedy any and all soil[] and hillside stability issues.” The court 

ordered the receiver to “work with necessary professionals to 

propose a plan to safely complete demolition of the structure on 

the Receivership Property (leaving the foundation slab and 

below-grade piles in place). 

The parties returned for a hearing on December 20, 2019, 

to discuss payment of the receiver’s fees. On January 21, 2020, 

the court entered an amended order adding language about 

payment of the receiver. The parties appeared again on 

January 31, 2020, on defendants’ motion to stay which the trial 

court denied. In February 2020, defendants unsuccessfully 

moved for reconsideration, and then appealed.

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue the trial court erred in authorizing the 

receiver to oversee the demolition of the Property because there 

was no evidence supporting the court’s finding that plaintiffs’

properties were in danger and the appointment order was not 

authorized by statute. Defendants also argue the trial court had 

no authority to appoint a receiver because “any right to abate the 

alleged nuisance had not been established at trial.” Lastly, 

defendants argue the trial court abused its discretion in not 

requiring a bond under Code of Civil Procedure section 529, 

subdivision (a) (Section 529(a)).

1. Substantial Evidence of Danger

Defendants first contend there was insufficient evidence 

the Property posed a danger to plaintiffs necessary to support 
6

either the issuance of an injunction or the appointment of a 

receiver. We observe pointedly that the opening brief recites only 

the evidence in defendants’ favor and omits evidence supporting 

the court’s order. “When a party challenges on appeal the 

sufficiency of evidence, the party must discuss all the evidence 

supporting the court’s ruling or the party waives the point.” 

(Gombiner v. Swartz (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1374; see Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(c).) Here, defendants purport to 

attack the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the trial 

court’s finding of danger but do so without a fair recitation of all 

the evidence, favorable and unfavorable to them. We deem the 

contention waived.

Defendants’ argument also fails on the merits. It is 

undisputed that the structure’s foundation was built according to 

plans that were never submitted or approved by the City. It was 

further undisputed that the foundation violated several Building 

Code provisions. Foremost was that certain columns and beams 

had insufficient rebar. The LADBS Chief of Structural Plan 

Check and Seismic Retrofit Divisions, Shahen Akelyan, testified 

that LADBS measures safety by compliance with the Building 

Code. 

Akelyan also testified that structure’s Building Code 

violations compromised its ability to withstand an earthquake. 

Based on information provided by the structural engineer 

responsible for the project, LADBS concluded “the existing 

piles/columns are not adequate and could not support the 

structure.” As a result, and because any effort to bring the 

structure into compliance would “severely compromise the 

integrity and safety of the existing structure,” LADBS 
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determined the structure needed to be demolished to the 

foundation slab. 

Finally, a geotechnical engineer expressed the opinion that

in case of “a severe storm and/or significant seismic event, 

substantial amounts of earth material could fall rapidly onto the 

properties below, resulting in property damage and/or the 

potential for life-threatening injuries to those in its path,” and “if 

the entire structure is demolished (with the exception of the 

below-grade piles) it would significantly increase the feasibility of 

stabilization of the currently unsafe hillside . . . .” 

We conclude substantial evidence supported the court’s 

express findings that the Property posed a danger to plaintiffs’ 

properties because the structure could fail in an earthquake or 

storm and fall on the homes below. 

2. The Trial Court Was Authorized to Appoint a 

Receiver and Acted within its Discretion in Doing So

Under Section 564(b)(9), the trial court may appoint a 

receiver “where necessary to preserve the property or rights of 

any party.” A “receiver has, under the control of the court, power 

to bring and defend actions in his own name, as receiver; to take 

and keep possession of the property, to receive rents, collect 

debts, to compound for and compromise the same, to make 

transfers, and generally to do such acts respecting the property 

as the court may authorize.” (§ 568.)

Defendants argue in their opening brief that the 

appointment order was unauthorized because it was issued 

before a final judgment. They cite as authority section 564(b)(3).

5

5 Section 564(b)(3) provides:
8

In their Respondents’ Brief, plaintiffs remind defendants that the 

trial court appointed the receiver under a different section, one 

that does not require a judgment. The trial court’s minute order 

states, “Under Code of Civil Procedure section 564, subdivision 

(b)(9), the Court is empowered to appoint a receiver ‘where 

necessary to preserve the property or rights of any party.’ The 

burden is on the moving party to establish the statutory grounds 

for appointment of a receiver. The Court finds that Plaintiffs 

have met their burden and have established a statutory basis for 

the appointment of a receiver under Code of Civil Procedure 

section 564, subdivision (b)(9).” 

In their reply brief, defendants shift their argument to the 

statute under which the trial court appointed the receiver, 

Section 564(b)(9). Defendants contend the trial court acted 

without authority because Section 564(b)(9) only authorizes the 

appointment of a receiver where necessary to preserve “legally 

established rights” or rights “established at trial.” Defendants 

cite no authority for this proposition. More fundamentally, 

defendants’ argument is contrary to the statute’s express 

language which broadly authorizes the appointment of a receiver 

when “an action or proceeding is pending.” (§ 564, subd. (b).)

Having concluded that the trial court had the authority to 

appoint a receiver when it did, we review the court’s order under 

the abuse of discretion standard of review. (City of Sierra Madre 

“A receiver may be appointed by the court in which an 

action or proceeding is pending, or by a judge of that court, in the 

following cases: 

[¶]

(3) After judgment, to carry the judgment into effect.”
9

v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 648, 657.) 

Whether to appoint a receiver is “addressed to the sound 

discretion of the court, exercised upon all the facts [citation], and 

where a finding, based upon conflicting evidence, is to the effect 

that danger is threatened to property or funds, and the 

appointment of a receiver is made, it is seldom that the reviewing 

court will hold that the lower tribunal has been guilty of an abuse 

of the discretion confided to it. [Citation.]” (Breedlove v. J.W. & 

E.M. Breedlove Excavating Co. (1942) 56 Cal.App.2d 141, 143.)

More expressively, “considerable deference” is afforded to 

“court decisions that are drastic enough to extinguish an owner’s 

interest in property” and to decisions regarding “the demolition of 

substandard structures that pose a substantial health and safety 

risk.” (City of Santa Monica v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 905, 

930.) We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in 

appointing a receiver. The facts that we have already described 

— the real danger as found by the court — support the trial 

court’s exercise of its discretion to appoint the receiver.

3. The Trial Court had the Authority to Order Nuisance

Abatement

Defendants argue the trial court had no authority to order 

the receiver to abate the alleged nuisance because the existence 

of a nuisance is a question of fact that “can only be determined by 

a jury.” According to defendants, the “denial of a trial by jury to 

which a litigant is entitled constitutes a miscarriage of justice 

and requires reversal of the judgment.” 

Defendants have not been denied a trial on the nuisance 

claim. As defendants point out in their opening brief, a trial date 

had, in fact, been scheduled in this action. The trial court’s 

finding that the Property constitutes a public nuisance was a 
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preliminary finding based on the evidence presented at this 

interim stage of the proceedings. “The trial court’s order on a 

request for a preliminary injunction ‘reflects nothing more than 

the superior court’s evaluation of the controversy on the record 

before it at the time of its ruling; it is not an adjudication of the 

ultimate merits of the dispute.’ ” (See People v. Uber

Technologies, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 266, 303–304.) Even if 

the trial court erred in finding the Property an actual nuisance —

although this is hard to imagine—we would find no reversible 

error as the court’s order was also supported on the undisputed 

fact that the Property was not code-compliant and created a 

serious danger to persons and property.

4. Defendants Both Forfeited and Waived the Argument 

that an Injunction Bond Was Required

Defendants argue the trial court abused its discretion in 

failing to require a bond under Section 529, subdivision (a)

(Section 529(a)). That section broadly states that the trial court 

must require an undertaking when granting an injunction.6 

Defendants treat the injunctive portion of the receivership order 

6 Section 529(a) provides: “On granting an injunction, the 

court or judge must require an undertaking on the part of the 

applicant to the effect that the applicant will pay to the party 

enjoined any damages, not exceeding an amount to be specified, 

the party may sustain by reason of the injunction, if the court 

finally decides that the applicant was not entitled to the 

injunction. Within five days after the service of the injunction, 

the person enjoined may object to the undertaking. If the court 

determines that the applicant's undertaking is insufficient and a 

sufficient undertaking is not filed within the time required by 

statute, the order granting the injunction must be dissolved.”
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as a separate order for demolition, and argue it was a mandatory 

injunction. In defendants’ view, this injunction is “null and void” 

because no bond was ordered.

7 The demolition order, to be sure,

is part of the order appointing the receiver. We will assume but 

not decide that Section 529(a) applies because the order 

essentially grants a mandatory injunction. Nevertheless, we 

agree with plaintiffs that defendants both forfeited and waived 

their argument that a bond is required by failing to raise it in the 

trial court, and conceding the Property had to be demolished, 

leaving nothing to bond.

Upon granting a preliminary injunction, a court must 

require the applicant to post an undertaking to protect the 

enjoined party. (§ 529(a).) The undertaking must be in an 

amount sufficient to pay the enjoined party “any damages . . . [it] 

may sustain by reason of the injunction, if the court finally 

decides that the applicant was not entitled to the injunction.” 

(Ibid.) Ordinarily, a preliminary injunction cannot take effect 

until the applicant provides such an undertaking. (See City of 

South San Francisco v. Cypress Lawn Cemetery Assn. (1992) 

11 Cal.App.4th 916, 920.) The Section 529(a) bond requirement 

7 Defendants also argued that the order was automatically 

stayed because it contained a mandatory injunction. (See 9 

Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2020), Appeal § 270.) Defendants 

filed a petition for writ of supersedeas in this court requesting a 

stay. We denied the writ on March 20, 2020, and the Supreme 

Court denied a petition for review on June 10, 2020. The focus of 

the opening and reply briefs on appeal is on the trial court’s 

failure to require a bond, not that the order is automatically 

stayed. The parties do not tell us whether the property has been 

demolished or if the trial in this case has been re-scheduled or 

completed.
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may be waived or forfeited by the party to be enjoined. (See 

Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 

729, 744 (Smith).) Waiver is the express relinquishment of a 

known right, whereas forfeiture is the failure to object or invoke a 

right. (See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880, fn. 1.)

Defendants do not dispute that they failed to address the 

requirement of a bond with the trial court, either in the papers 

they filed in opposition to the application or during oral argument 

at the two hearings or in their motion for reconsideration. They 

also acknowledge Smith’s holding that the bond requirement may 

be forfeited, but urge us not to follow Smith. Defendants contend 

Smith is “inconsistent” with three cases: Neumann v. Moretti 

(1905) 146 Cal. 31 (Neumann), Griffin v. Lima (1954) 

124 Cal.App.2d 697 (Griffin), and ABBA Rubber Co. v. Seaquist 

(1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1 (ABBA). 

In Smith, the doctor-plaintiff sought a preliminary 

injunction that his status at a hospital be restored until his 

lawsuit was decided. (Smith, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 738.) 

The plaintiff argued in his application that a bond was 

“unnecessary.” (Ibid.) The defendant did not respond to this 

argument or mention the bond requirement in its opposition 

papers. (Ibid.) In the order granting the preliminary injunction, 

the trial court stated only that no injunction bond was ordered to 

be posted. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal concluded that by waiting 

to raise the issue until after the notice of appeal was filed, the 

defendant forfeited the right to a bond. (Id. at pp. 748–749.)

Here, defendants had multiple opportunities to ask the 

court to require an injunction bond including at two hearings post 

the trial court’s order appointing the receiver: the December 20, 

2019 hearing on payment of the receiver, and January 31, 2020 
13

hearing on defendants’ motion to stay. As in Smith, defendants

did not address the issue in the trial court, but waited until four

months after plaintiffs had applied for a receiver before raising 

the issue in its writ petition filed with this court.

8 By failing to 

assert the lack of a bond in a timely fashion, defendants have 

forfeited the issue. In words that could have been written with 

the present case in mind, the Smith court held: “[W]e are 

disinclined to allow parties to achieve a greater benefit by saving 

the injunction bond issue for appeal when it could have been 

dealt with more efficiently in the lower court with much less 

detriment to the party who obtained the injunction. Addressing 

the issue on appeal would encourage ‘sandbagging.’ ” (Smith, 

supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 748–749.)

In addition to forfeiture, plaintiffs also argue the closely

related concept of waiver—defendants affirmatively agreed in the 

trial court that demolition was necessary, and did not dispute the 

evidence that the Property was more valuable with the structure 

removed.

9 In their reply, defendants do not respond to plaintiffs’ 

8 Defendants did, however, address other bonds, for example, 

offering to post an undertaking under section 917.5 if the trial 

court stayed the proceedings pending appeal. 

9 At the November 20, 2019 hearing, counsel for the bank 

that provided the construction loan asserted that “the value of 

the property as is—because we have a non-conforming structure 

on the property that we just cannot turn around and sell, for 

obvious reasons—is the same $8,000,000 value of the land, less 

the cost to completely demolish the structure, as well as pull the 

piles out of the ground, the slab, as well, in order to create a 

sellable piece of property.” Defense counsel did not dispute this.
14

argument that this concession constituted a waiver and 

essentially told the trial court there was nothing to bond.

Defendants’ acknowledgement that demolition was 

necessary confirms that they failed to raise the issue of a bond for 

tactical reasons. To the extent defendants might incur additional 

costs in the demolition conducted under the receiver’s 

supervision, they have not cited to anything in the record 

showing that any amounts would be more than nominal. Under 

these circumstances, we conclude defendants elected not to raise 

the issue of a bond, thereby waiving the bond requirement. (See 

City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1940) 15 Cal.2d 16, 23 

[finding waiver where the parties both stipulated to entry of an 

injunction and then one party waited a year before moving to 

dissolve the injunction for lack of a bond].)

Nor are we persuaded by defendants’ broad argument that 

Smith should not be followed “because its reasoning is 

inconsistent with the mandatory language of [] section 529(a), as 

well as being inconsistent with [] Neumann [], Griffin [], and [] 

ABBA.” Neither Neumann nor Griffin addresses forfeiture or 

waiver. (Neumann, supra, 146 Cal. 31; Griffin, supra, 

124 Cal.App.2d at pp. 698–700.) We agree with the Smith court

that ABBA, which also did not address forfeiture, stands only for 

“the narrow proposition that an appellate court will not find as a 

matter of law that a restrained party waives its statutory right to 

a bond by failing to affirmatively request it when neither the 

moving party nor the court has raised the topic prior to the trial 

court’s ruling.” (Smith, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 744.) An 

appellate court may not be required to find waiver in every case 

where an “injunction bond” is not mentioned in the trial court, 
15

but here the record shows that defendants forfeited, and 

affirmatively waived, a bond.

DISPOSITION

The order appointing a receiver to, among other things

oversee the demolition of appellants’ property is affirmed.

Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal. 

RUBIN, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

MOOR, J.

KIM, J.