DEFENSE 

BASE CLOSURE 

AND 

REALIGNMENT 

COMMISSION 

1993 

REPORT 

PRESIDENT 

TO THE 
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION 

ARLINGTON, VA 22209 

703-696-0504 

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425 

/ JIM COURTER. CHAIRMAN 

COMMISSIONERS 

CAFT PETER B 

BEVERLY B BYRON 

REBECCAG COX 

GEN H T JOHNSON, USAF (RET) 

ARTHUR LEVITT. JR 

HARRYC MCPHERSON,JR 

ROBERT D STUART. JR 

BOWMAN, USN (RET) 

July 1, 1993 

The President 

The White House 

Washington, D.C. 20500 

Dear Mr. President: 

We are pleased to submit the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission report 

containing the Commission's findings and conclusions based on a review and analysis of the 

recommendations made by the Secretary of Defense, together with the Commission's 

recommendations for closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States. 

The Commission scrutinized thousands of pages of testimony and written documentation. We held 

17 hearings across the United States, visited over 125 military activities, and met with hundreds of 

community representatives. The Commission heard from many expert witnesses, including Members 

of Congress and officials representing the Department of Defense, the General Accounting Office, 

the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Congressional Budget Office. Our hearings, 

deliberations, and records were open to the public. 

Every installation recommended for closure or realignment enjoys a proud history of service to the 

nation. We recognize that closing a base creates economic hardship for communities that have 

offered our nation a priceless service by hosting a military facility. Nevertheless, continuing budget 

constraints mandated by Congress along with changing national security requirements compel the 

United States to reduce and realign its military forces. This report reflects the fiercely independent 

judgment of the Commission's seven members. While not one of our decisions was easy, we are 

convinced our recommendations were not only fair but will strengthen this country's ability to meet 

its domestic and international responsibilities with more limited resources. 

'd Chairman 

Commissioner 

Commissioner 
Major Base Closures and Realignments 

NAS Barbers Point, HI 

NAS Agana, Guam 

2315 

Note: “Major’kloss of at least 300 military/civilian jobs 
1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

Plattsburgh Air Force Base, New York 

Griffiss Air Force Base, New York 

Naval Education and Training Center 

Newport, Rhode Island 

Naval Station Staten Island, New York 

Naval Air Warfare Center - Aircraft 

Division, Trenton, New Jersey 

Defense Clothing Factory 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 

National Capital Region (NCR) Activities 

- Naval Electronics Security 

Systems Engineering Center, 

Washington, DC 

- Bureau Navy Personnel, Arlington 

- Military Manpower Management 

Arlington 

- Naval Air Systems Command, 

Arlington 

- Naval Facilities Engineering 

Command, Alexandria 

- Naval Recruiting Command, 

Arlington 

- Naval Sea Systems Command, 

Arlington 

- Defense Printing Office, Alexandria 

- Security Group Command, 

Potomac, Washington, DC 

- Security Group Station 

and Detachment Potomac, 

Washington, DC 

- Tactical Support Office, Arlington 

Naval Surface Warfare CenterWhite Oak Detachment, Maryland 

Vint Hills Farm, Virginia 

Fort Belvoir, Virginia 

Norfolk Area, Virginia 

- Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk 

- Naval Undersea Warfare Center 

- Naval Electronics Engineering 

- Naval Surface Warfare Center 

Norfolk 

Center Portsmouth 

Virginia Beach 

12. Naval Station Charleston, South Carolina 

Naval Shipyard Charleston, South Carolina 

13. Naval Air Station Cecil Field, Florida 

14. Naval Training Center Orlando, Florida 

Naval Hospital Orlando, Florida 

15. Homestead Air Force Base, Florida 

16. Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, Florida 

17. Naval Station Mobile, Alabama 

18. Naval Air Station Dallas, Texas 

19. Naval Air Station Memphis, Tennessee 

20. Gentile Air Force Station, Ohio 

Defense Electronics Supply Center, Ohio 

21. Newark Air Force Base, Ohio 

22. Naval Air Facility Detroit, Michigan 

23. O’Hare International Airport Air Force 

Reserve Station Chicago, Illinois 

24. Naval Air Station Glenview, Illinois 

25, K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, Michigan 

26. Tooele Army Depot, Utah 

27. San Francisco Bay Area, California 

- Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo 

- Naval Air Station Alameda 

- Naval Aviation Depot Alameda 

- Naval Hospital Oakland 

- Public Works Center, San Francisco 

- Naval Station Treasure Island, 

San Francisco 

28. Presidio of Monterey Annex, California 

29. Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory 

Port Hueneme, California 

30. Marine Corps Air Station 

Tustin, California 

31. March Air Force Base, California 

32. Naval Training Center 

San Diego, California 

Naval Air Station Barbers Point, Hawaii 

Naval Air Station Agana, Guam 
On November 5, 1990, President George Bush 

signed Public Law 101-5 10, which established 

the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission “to provide a fair process that will 

result in the timely closure and realignment of 

military installations inside the United States.” 

Public Law 101-510 (Title XXIX, as amended) 

required the Secretary of Defense to submit a 

list of proposed military base closures and 

realignments to the Commission by March 15, 

1993 (see Appendix A). The statute also 

required the Secretary of Defense to base all 

recommendations on a force-structure plan 

submitted to Congress with the Department’s 

FY 1994 budget request and on selection criteria developed by the Secretary of Defense and 

approved by Congress. 

Upon the Commission’s receipt of the Secretary 

of Defense’s recommendations, PL 101-510 

required the Commission to hold public hearings to discuss the recommendations before it 

made any findings. To change any of the 

Secretary’s recommendations, the law required 

the Commission to find substantial deviation 

from the Secretary’s force-structure plan and the 

final criteria approved by Congress. 

The Commission’s process was a model of 

open government. Its recommendations resulted 

from an independent review of the Secretary of 

Defense’s recommendations, absent political or 

partisan influence. As part of its review and 

analysis process, the Commission solicited 

information from a wide variety of sources. Most 

important, communities were given a seat at 

the table. The Commission held investigative 

hearings, conducted over 125 fact-finding visits 

to activities at each major candidate installation, held 17 regional hearings nationwide to 

hear from affected communities, listened to hundreds of Members of Congress and responded 

to the hundreds of thousands of letters from 

concerned citizens from across the country. The 

Commission staff members maintained an 

active and ongoing dialogue with communities, 

and met throughout the process with community representatives at the Commission offices, 

during base visits, and during regional hearings. 

The Commission also held seven investigative 

hearings in Washington, DC, to question Military Department representatives directly responsible for the Secretary’s recommendations. Several 

defense and base closure experts within the federal 

government, private sector, and academia provided an independent assessment of the baseclosure process ‘and the potential impacts of the 

Secretary of Defense’s recommendations. All of 

the Commission’s hearings and deliberations 

were held in public. Most were broadcast on 

national television (see Appendices F and G). 

Based on the Commission’s review and analysis, alternatives and additions to the Secretary’s 

list were considered and voted upon. On March 

29, 1993, and on May 21, 1993, the Commission voted to add a total of 73 installations 

for further consideration as alternatives and 

additions to the 165 bases recommended for 

closure or realignment by the Secretary of 

Defense (see Appendix E). 

Communities that contributed to our country’s 

national security by hosting a military facility 

for many years should rest assured their pleas 

were heard, and did not go unnoticed. The Commission would also like to reassure communities there can be life after a base is closed. 

However, economic recovery is in large part 

dependent upon a concerted community effort 

to look towards the future. The same dedicated 

effort expended by communities over the last 

several months to save their bases should be 

redirected towards building and implementing 

a reuse plan that will revitalize the community 

and the economy. 

The Department of Defense Office of Economic 

Adjustment (OEA) was established to help communities affected by base closures, as well as 

other defense program changes. The OEAs principal objective is to help the communities 

vii 
~ .. 

Executive Summary 

affected by base closures to maintain or restore 

economic stability. According to an OEA survey, approximately 158,000 new jobs were 

created between 1961 and 1992 to replace nearly 

93,000 jobs lost as a result of base closures. 

The OEA has also been working with 47 communities located near bases recommended for 

closure by the 1988 and 1991 Commissions, 

and has provided $20 million in grants to help 

communities develop reuse plans. 

The commissioners selected for the 1993 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission have diverse backgrounds in public 

service, business, and the military (see Appendix H). In accordance with the base-closure 

statute, four commissioners were nominated 

in consultation with the Speaker of the US. 

House of Representatives and the US. Senate 

Majority Leader, and two commissioners with 

the advice of the House and Senate Minority 

Leaders. The remaining two nominations were 

made independently by the President, who also 

designated one of the eight commissioners to 

serve as the Chairman. 

The Commission staff included experts detailed 

from several government agencies, including the 

Department of Commerce, the Environmental 

Protection Agency, the Federal Aviation Administration, the General Accounting Office, the 

General Services Administration as well as the 

Department of Defense (see Appendix I). Nine 

professional staff members were detailed by the 

General Accounting Office (GAO) to serve fulltime on the Commission’s Review and Analysis 

staff. All detailees fully participated in all phases 

of the review and analysis effort; they verified 

data, visited candidate bases, participated in local hearings, and testified before the Commission at its public hearings. 

Based on the Commission’s review-and-analysis 

and deliberative processes, the Commission recommends to the President 130 bases be closed 

and 45 bases be realigned. These actions will 

result in FY 1994-99 net savings of approximately $3.8 billion after one-time costs of 

approximately $7.43 billion. The savings from 

these actions will total approximately $2.33 billion 

annually. The following list summarizes the 

closure and realignment recommendations of 

the 1993 Commission: 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Initiul Entry Truining/Branch School 

(0) Fort McClellan, AL (major) 

Commodity Oriented 

(R) Fort Monmouth, NJ (major) 

(C) Vint Hill Farms, VA (major) 

Depots 

(R) Anniston Army Depot, AL (minor) 

(0) Letterkenny Army Depot, PA (major) 

(R) Red River Army Depot, TX (major) 

(R) Tooele Army Depot, UT (major) 

CommadCon trol 

Professional Schools 

Changes to Previowly Approved BRAC 

88/91 Recommendutions 

(R) Letterkenny Army Depot, PA (Systems 

Integration Management Activity - East 

remains at Letterkenny Army Depot, PA 

vice Rock Island, IL) (major) 

(R) Presidio of San Francisco, CA (6th Army 

remains at the Presidio of San Francisco 

instead of moving to Fort Carson, CO) 

(major) 

remains at Rock Island, IL instead of 

moving to Redstone Arsenal, AL) (major) 

(R) Pueblo Army Depot, CO (Redirects supply 

mission from Defense Distribution Depot 

Tooele, UT, to new location within the 

Defense Distribution Depot System.) 

(minor) 

(R) Fort Belvoir, VA (major) 

(R) Presidio of Monterey Annex, CA (major) 

(R) Rock Island Arsenal, IL (AMCCOM 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Shipyurds 

(C) Charleston Naval Shipyard, SC (major) 

(C) Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, CA 

(major) 

viii 
Executive Summary 

Operational Air Stations 

(C) Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, CA 

(C) Naval Air Station Barbers Point, HI 

(C) Naval Air Station Cecil Field, FL (major) 

(C) Naval Air Station Agana, GU (major) 

(C) Naval Air Facility Midway Island (minor) 

(major) 

(major) 

Training Air Stations 

(R) Naval Air Station Memphis, TN (major) 

(0) Naval Air Station Meridian, MS (major) 

Reserve Air Stations 

(C) Naval Air Facility Detroit, MI (major) 

(C) Naval Air Facility Martinsburg, WV 

(C) Naval Air Station Dallas, TX (major) 

(C) Naval Air Station Glenview, IL (major) 

(0) Naval Air Station South Weymouth, MA 

(R) Joint Armed Forces Aviation Facility 

(minor) 

(major) 

Johnstown, PA (minor) 

Naval Bases 

(R) Naval Education and Training Center, 

(C) Naval Station Charleston, SC (major) 

(C) Naval Station Mobile, AL (major) 

(C) Naval Station Staten Island, NY (major) 

(0) Naval Submarine Base, New London, CT 

(C) Naval Air Station Alameda, CA (major) 

(C) Naval Station Treasure Island, 

San Francisco, CA (major) 

Newport, RI (major) 

(major) 

Training Centers 

(C) Naval Training Center Orlando, FL 

(C) Naval Training Center San Diego, CA 

(major) 

(major) 

Inventory Control 

(0) Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, PA 

(major) 

Depots 

(C) Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, CA 

(C) Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, VA (major) 

(C) Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, FL 

(major) 

(major) 

Naval Weapons Stations 

(R) Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA 

(minor) 

Technical Centers (SPAWm) 

(C) Naval Air Warfare Center-Aircraft 

Division, Trenton, NJ (major) 

(0) Naval Air Technical Services Facility, 

Philadelphia, PA (minor) 

(C) Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory, 

Port Hueneme, CA (major) 

(R) Naval Electronic Systems Engineering 

Center, St. Inigoes, MD (minor) 

(C) Naval Electronic Security Systems 

Engineering Center, Washington, DC 

(major) 

Engineering Center, Charleston, SC 

(major) 

(C) Navy Radio Transmission Facility, 

Annapolis, MD (minor) 

(C) Navy Radio Transmission Facility, 

Driver, VA (minor) 

(C) Naval Electronic Systems Engineering 

Center, Portsmouth, VA (major) 

(0) Naval Electronic Security Systems 

Technical Centers (NAVSEA) 

(R) Naval Surface Warfare Center-Dahlgren, 

White Oak Detachment, White Oak, MD 

(major) 

(0) Naval Surface Warfare Center-Carderock, 

Annapolis Detachment, Annapolis, MD 

(major) 

(R) Naval Surface Warfare CenterPort Hueneme, Virginia Beach 

Detachment, Virginia Beach, VA (major) 

(R) Naval Undersea Warfare Center-Norfolk 

Detachment, Norfolk, VA (major) 

(C) Planning, Estimating, Repair and 

Alterations (CV), Bremerton, WA (minor) 
Executive Summary 

(C) Planning, Estimating, Repair and 

Alterations (Surface) Atlantic, Norfolk, VA 

(minor) 

Alterations (Surface) Atlantic (HQ), 

Philadelphia, PA (minor) 

(C) Planning, Estimating, Repair and 

Alterations (Surface) Pacific, 

San Francisco, CA (minor) 

Indian Head, MD (minor) 

Planning, and Procurement, Portsmouth, 

NH (minor) 

(C) Planning, Estimating, Repair and 

(C) Sea Automated Data Systems Activity, 

(C) Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, 

Supply Centers 

(0) Naval Supply Center Charleston, SC 

(0) Naval Supply Center Oakland, CA (major) 

(C) Naval Supply Center Pensacola, FL 

Marine Corps Logistics Base 

(major) 

(major) 

(R) Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, CA 

(minor) 

National Capital Region (NCR) Activities 

(R) Bureau of Navy Personnel, Arlington, VA 

(Including the Office of Military 

Manpower Management, Arlington, VA) 

(major) 

(R) Naval Air Systems Command, 

Arlington, VA (major) 

(R) Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 

Alexandria, VA (major) 

(R) Naval Recruiting Command, 

Arlington, VA (major) 

(R) Naval Sea Systems Command, 

Arlington, VA (major) 

(R) Naval Supply Systems Command, 

Arlington, VA (Including Defense 

Printing Office, Alexandria, VA and 

Food Systems Office, Arlington, VA) 

(major) 

(R) Security Group Command, Security 

Group Station, and Security Group 

Detachment, Potomac, Washington, D.C. 

(major) 

(minor) 

(R) Tactical Support Office, Arlington, VA 

Other Bases 

(0) 1st Marine Corps District, Garden City, 

NY (minor) 

(C) Department of Defense Family Housing 

Office, Niagara Falls, NY (minor) 

(C) Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 

Western Engineering Field Division, 

San Bruno, CA (minor) 

(C) Public Works Center San Francisco, CA 

(major) 

Reserve Activities 

NAVAL RESERVE CENTERS AT: 

(C) Gadsden, AL (minor) 

(C) Montgomery, AL (minor) 

(C) Fayetteville, AR (minor) 

(C) Fort Smith, AR (minor) 

(C) Pacific Grove, CA (minor) 

(C) Macon, GA (minor) 

(C) Terre Haute, IN (minor) 

(C) Hutchinson, KS (minor) 

(C) Monroe, LA (minor) 

(C) New Bedford, MA (minor) 

NAVAL RESERVE CENTERS AT: 

(C) Pittsfield, MA (minor) 

(C) Joplin, MO (minor) 

(C) St. Joseph, MO (minor) 

(C) Great Falls, MT (minor) 

(C) Missoula, MT (minor) 

(C) Atlantic City, NJ (minor) 

(C) Perth Amboy, NJ (minor) 

(C) Jamestown, NY (minor) 

(C) Poughkeepsie, NY (minor) 

(C) Altoona, PA (minor) 

(C) Kingsport, TN (minor) 

(C) Memphis, TN (minor) 

(C) Ogden, UT (minor) 

(C) Staunton, VA (minor) 

(C) Parkersburg, WV (minor) 

(C) Chicopee, MA (minor) 

(C) Quincy, MA (minor) 

, 

X 
Executive Summary 

NAVAL RESERVE FACILITIES AT: 

(C) Alexandria, LA (minor) 

(C) Midland, TX (minor) 

NAVYMARINE CORPS 

RESERVE CENTERS AT: 

(C) Fort Wayne, IN (minor) 

(C) Lawrence, MA (minor) 

(0) Billings, MT (minor) 

(C) Abilene, TX (minor) 

READINESS COMMAND REGIONS AT: 

(C) Olathe, KN (Region 18) (minor) 

(C) Scotia, NY (Region 2) (minor) 

(C) Ravenna, OH (Region 5) (minor) 

HOSPITALS 

(0) Naval Hospital Charleston, SC (major) 

(C) Naval Hospital Oakland, CA (major) 

(C) Naval Hospital Orlando, FL (major) 

CHANGES TO PREVIOUSLY APPROVED 

BRAC 88/91 RECOMMENDATIONS 

(R) Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station 

Treasure Island, CA (Retain no facilities, 

dispose vice outlease all property) (minor) 

(Substitute Naval Air Station Miramar 

for Marine Corps Air Station 29 Palms 

as one receiver of Marine Corps Air 

Station Tustin’s assets) (major) 

(R) Naval Electronics Systems Engineering 

Center, San Diego, CA (Consolidate with 

Naval Electronics Systems Engineering 

Center, Vallejo, CA, into available Air 

Force space vice new construction) 

(major) 

Yorktown, VA (Realign to Panama City, 

FL vice Dam Neck, VA) (minor) 

(R) Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility, 

Albuquerque, NM (Retain as a tenant 

of the Air Force) (minor) 

(R) Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA 

(R) Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity, 

DEPARTMENT OF THE 

AIR FORCE 

Large Aircraft 

(R) Griffiss Air Force Base, NY (major) 

(C) K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, MI (major) 

(R) March Air Force Base, CA (major) 

(C) Plattsburgh Air Force Base, NY (major) 

(0) McGuire Air Force Base, NJ (major) 

Small Aircraft 

Air Force Reserve 

(R) Homestead Air Force Base, FL (major) 

(C) O’Hare International Airport Air Force 

Reserve Station, Chicago, IL (major) 

Other Air Force 

(C) Gentile Air Force Station, OH (minor) 

Air Force Depot 

(C) Newark Air Force Base, OH (major) 

(R) Ogden Air Force Logistics Center, 

Hill Air Force Base, UT (minor) 

Changes to Previously Approved BRAC 

88/91 Recommdtions 

(0) Bergstrom Air Force Base, TX 

(Requested redirect rejected) (minor) 

(R) Carswell Air Force Base, TX (Fabrication 

function of the 436th Training Squadron 

redirected from Dyess AFB to Luke AFB, 

maintenance training function redirected 

from Dyess AFB to Hill AFB) (minor) 

(R) Castle Air Force Base, CA (B-52 Combat 

Crew Training redirected from Fairchild 

AFB to Barksdale AFB and KC-135 

Combat Crew Training from Fairchild 

AFB to Altus AFB) (major) 

(R) Chanute Air Force Base, IL (Metals 

Technology and Aircraft Structural 

Maintenance training courses from 

Chanute AFB to Sheppard AFB 

redirected to NAS Memphis) (minor) 

xi 
Executive Summary 

(R) MacDill Air Force Base, Florida (Airfield 

to be operated by the Department of 

Commerce or another federal agency. 

Joint Communications Support Element 

stays at MacDill vice relocating to 

Charleston AFB.) (minor) 

(R) Mather Air Force Base, CA (940th 

Air Refueling Group redirected from 

McClellan AFB to Beale AFB) (minor) 

OH (Retain 121st Air Refueling Wing 

and the 160th Air Refueling Group in 

a cantonment area at Rickenbacker 

AGB instead of Wright-Patterson AFB. 

Rickenbacker AGB does not close.) 

(major) 

(R) Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, 

Defense Logistics Agency 

Inventory Control Points 

Dayton, OH (major) 

Philadelphia, PA (major) 

Philadelphia, PA (major) 

(C) Defense Electronics Supply Center, 

(0) Defense Industrial Supply Center, 

(C) Defense Personnel Support Center, 

Regional Headquartus 

(R) Defense Contract Management District 

Midatlantic, Philadelphia, PA (minor) 

(R) Defense Contract Management District 

Northcentral, Chicago, IL (minor) 

(R) Defense Contract Management District 

West, El Segundo, CA (minor) 

Defense Distribution Depots 

(C) Defense Distribution Depot Oakland, CA 

(C) Defense Distribution Depot Pensacola, FL 

(0) Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, 

(C) Defense Distribution Depot Charleston, 

(C) Defense Distribution Depot Tooele, UT 

(minor) 

(minor) 

PA (minor) 

SC (minor) 

(minor) 

Sewice/Support Activities \ 

(0) Defense Logistics Support Center, 

Battle Creek, MI (major) 

(0) Defense Reutilization and Marketing 

Service, Battle Creek, MI (major) 

(C) Defense Logistics Agency Clothing 

Factory, Philadelphia, PA (major) 

Data Center Consolidation 

Navy Data Processing Centers 

(C) Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, PA 

(C) Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, 

(C) Enlisted Personnel Management Center, 

(C) Facilities Systems Office, Port Hueneme, 

(C) Fleet Industrial Support Center, 

(C) Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME (minor) 

(C) Naval Air Station Key West, FL (minor) 

(C) Naval Air Station Mayport, FL (minor) 

(C) Naval Air Station Oceana, VA (minor) 

(C) Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA 

(minor) 

(C) Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft 

Division, Patuxent River, MD (minor) 

(C) Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons 

Division, China Lake, CA (minor) 

(C) Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons 

Division, Point Mugu, CA (minor) 

(C) Naval Command Control & Ocean 

Surveillance Center, San Diego, CA 

(minor) 

(C) Naval Computer & Telecommunications 

Area Master Station, Atlantic, Norfolk, VA 

(minor) 

(C) Naval Computer & Telecommunications 

Area Master Station, EASTPAC, Pearl 

Harbor, HI (minor) 

(0) Naval Computer Q Telecommunications 

Station, San Diego, CA (minor) 

(minor) 

DC (minor) 

New Orleans, LA (minor) 

CA (minor) 

San Diego, CA (minor) 

xii 
Executive Summary 

(C) Naval Computer & Telecommunications 

(C) Naval Computer & Telecommunications 

(C) Naval Computer & Telecommunications 

(C) Navy Regional Data Automation Center, 

(C) Naval Supply Center, Charleston, SC 

(C) Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, VA (minor) 

(C) Naval Supply Center, Pearl Harbor, HI 

Navy Data Processing Centers 

(C) Naval Supply Center, Puget Sound, WA 

(C) Navy Data Automation Facility, Corpus 

(C) Navy Recruiting Command, Arlington, VA 

(C) Trident Refit Facility, Bangor, WA (minor) 

(C) Trident Refit Facility, Kings Bay, GA 

Station, Washington, DC (minor) 

Station, New Orleans, LA (minor) 

Station, Pensacola, FL (minor) 

San Francisco, CA (minor) 

(minor) 

(minor) 

(minor) 

Christi, TX (minor) 

(minor) 

(minor) 

Marine Corps Data Processing Centers 

(C) Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, 

(C) Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, CA 

(C) Regional Automated Services Center, 

(C) Regional Automated Services Center, 

NC (minor) 

(minor) 

Camp Lejeune, NC (minor) 

Camp Pendleton, CA (minor) 

Air Force Data Processing Centers 

(C) Air Force Military Personnel Center, 

(C) Computer Service Center, San Antonio, 

(C) 7th Communications Group, Pentagon, 

(0) Regional Processing Center, McClellan 

Randolph AFB, TX (minor) 

TX (minor) 

Arlington, VA (minor) 

AFB, CA (minor) 

Defense Logistics Agency Data 

Processing Centers 

(C) Information Processing Center, Battle 

(C) Information Processing Center, Ogden, UT 

(C) Information Processing Center, 

(C) Information Processing Center, 

Creek, MI (minor) 

(minor) 

Philadelphia, PA (minor) 

Richmond, VA (minor) 

Defevlse Infomzation Systm Agency 

(DISA) Data Processing Centers 

(C) Defense Information Technology Service 

Organization, Columbus Annex Dayton, 

OH (minor) 

(C) Defense Information Technology Service 

Organization, Indianapolis Information 

Processing Center, IN (minor) 

Organization, Kansas City Information 

Processing Center, MO (minor) 

(C) Defense Information Technology Services 

Organization, Cleveland, OH (minor) 

(C) Defense Information Technology Service 

LEGEND 

(C) = Installation recommended for closure 

(R) = Installation recommended for realignment 

(0) = Installation recommended to remain open 

xiii 
... 

COVER ................... ,111 LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT ........................ 

MAP OF MAJOR CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS , 

EXECUTIVE SUMMAFCY .................. 

.......................... 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY .......................... 

INITIAL ENTRY TRAININGBRANCH SCHOOL .......... 

......................... ........................ 1-6 

PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS ............... .......................... 

.................. 

....................... 

....................... ......................... 

....................... 1-37 

........................ 

........................ ......................... 1-58 

RESERVE Amn~ ................... ........................... ......................... ........................ 1-62 

.......................... 

DEPAKWENT OF THE A ........................ ....................... IR FORCE ......................... 

.......................... .................... 1-71 

.......................... 

AIR FORCE RESERVE ...................... ........................... 
OTHER AIR FORCE BASES ............................................................................................................. 1-81 

AIR FORCE DEPOTS ........................................................................................................................ 1-81 

CHANGES TO PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BRAC 88/9 1 RECOMMENDATIONS .... 

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY .................................................................................................................. 1-89 

INVENTORY CONTROL POINTS ............. ........................... . l-89 

SERVICE~UPPORT AOMTIES 

REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS ............................................................................................................ 1-95 

DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOTS .... ........ 1-96 

DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY .......................................................................................... 1-100 

NAVY DATA PROCESSING CENTERS .......................... . 1-100 

MARINE Cows DATA PROCESSING CENTERS ........................................................................... 1-101 

AIR FORCE DATA PROCESSING CENTERS ................................................................................... 1-101 

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY DATA PROCESSING CENTERS .................................................... 1 - 1 0 1 

DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY (DISA) DATA PROCESSING CENTERS .............. 1-10 1 

CHAPTER 2 . ISSUES FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION ..... . 2-1 

CHAPTER 3 . BACKGROUND ......................................... ................................................................. 3-1 

HISTORY OF BASE CLOSURE ................................... ....................................... 3-1 

THE 1988 COMMISSION ................................................................................................................. 3-1 

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION .............................................. 3-1 

COMPOSITION OF THE 1993 DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE 

AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION ........................................................................................ 3-2 

KEY PROvIsIONS OF THE hW ........................................................................................................ 3-2 

THE OFFICE OF THE SECRET^ OF DEFENSE (OSD) GUIDANCE TO THE 

MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND DEFENSE AGENCIES ............................................................ 3-2 

CHTERIA 1-4: MILITARY DEPARTMENT AND DEFENSE AGENCY ASSESSMENTS ......................... 3-3 

CRITERIA 1-4: COMMISSION REVIEW ............................................................................................ 3-5 

CRITERIA 5-8: MILITARY DEPARTMENT, DEFENSE AGENCY AND COMMISSION &VIEW 

ADDITIONS TO THE SECRETARY’S LIST FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION .................................... 3-13 

THE ROLE OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) ................................. 

.. 

THE 1993 BASE CLOSURE PROCESS .... 

APPENDIX 

A) ~LIC LAW101-510 ....................................................................... .... A- 1 

B) FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN ..................................................................................................................... B-1 

C) FINAL SELECTION CRITERIA ................................................................................................................ C-1 

E) BASES ADDED BY COMMISSION FR FURTHER CONSIDERATION ...................................................... E- 1 

F) HEXRINGS HELD BY THE COMMISSION ............................................................................................... F-1 

H) COMMISSIONER BIO 

D) SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS D- 1 

G) COMMISSIONER AND STAFF BASE VISITS ........................................................................................... G- 1 

I) STAFF ................................. 

INDEX 
The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission has completed its review and analysis 

of the Secretary of Defense recommendations 

for base closures and realignments, as transmitted to the Commission on March 12, 1993. This 

chapter contains a summary of the Commission’s 

findings and its recommendations for closures 

and realignments. 

Information on each of the Commission’s base 

closure arid realignment decisions is presented 

below. The paragraphs entitled “Secretary of 

Defense Recommendations” and “Secretary of 

Defense Justifications” were taken verbatim from 

the Department of Defense Base Closure and 

Realignment Report dated March 1993. The paragraphs entitled “Community Concerns” provide 

a brief summary of arguments presented to the 

Commission by local communities; they are not 

all-inclusive. Where applicable, substantial 

deviations from the application of the forcestructure plan and final criteria are identified. 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Initial Entry TrainingIBrunch School 

Fort George B. McClellan, Alabama 

Category: Initial Entry TraininglBranch School 

Mission: Chemical and Military Police Centers 

One-time Cost: NIA 

Savings: 1994-99: NIA 

Payback: NIA 

and Schools 

Annual: N/A 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close Fort McClellan. Relocate the U.S. Army 

Chemical and Military Police Schools and the 

Department of Defense Polygraph Institute 

(DODPI) to Fort Leonard Wood, MO. Transfer 

accountability for Pelham Range and other 

required training support facilities, through 

licensing, to the Army National Guard. Retain an 

enclave for the US. Army Reserves. Retain the 

capability for live-agent training at Fort McClellan. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Fort McClellan has the least amount of facilities 

and smallest population of any of the Army’s 

individual entry traininghranch school installations and was accordingly ranked ninth in a 

category of 13 installations. Three of the 13 

installations tied for the thirteenth position and 

were later removed from further consideration 

as a result of a specific capability needed to 

support mission requirements. The tenth installation in this category was not considered for 

closure because it controls airspace, airfields, 

and aviation facilities which represent unique 

assets to the Army. 

Collocation of the chemical, military police, and 

engineer schools provides substantial advantages 

for operational linkages among the three branches. 

These linkages enable the Army to focus on the 

doctrinal and force development of three key 

maneuver support elements. Synergistic advantages of training and professional development 

programs are: coordination, employment and 

removal of obstacles, conduct of river crossing 

operations, internal securityhation assistance 

operations, operations in rear areas or along main 

supply routes, and counter drug operations. The 

missions of the three branches will be more 

effectively integrated. 

Each school develops doctrine, training, leadership, organization, and material products which 

are technical in nature and proponent specific. 

The only place to achieve integration is at the 

combined arms level. Using the opportunity 

to collocate these schools will assure synergistic solutions for current, emerging, and 

future challenges. 

This recommendation is a change to the recommendation made to the 1991 Commission that was 

disapproved. The 199 1 Commission rejected this 

recommendation because it found the Army 

substantially deviated from criteria 1 and 2. Their 

rationale questioned the Army’s decision to maintain the Chemical Decontamination Training 

Facility (CDTF) in caretaker status because 

it could contribute little, if any, to chemical 

1-1 
Chapter I 

defense preparedness and the CDTF could not 

be reactivated quickly. 

The Army’s proposal to close Fort McClellan 

differs in two respects. First, the DODPI will 

relocate to Fort Leonard Wood, MO, instead of 

Fort Huachuca, AZ, and second, the Army will 

retain the capability to continue live-agent training. Subsequent to the 1991 Commission’s 

decision, the Army conducted an in-depth study 

of the value of live-agent training. The study 

affirmed its military value. The Army’s nuclear, 

biological, and chemical readiness training is 

interwoven throughout all training and included 

at all levels of command. Operations in a 

potentially hostile chemical environment are an 

integral part of individual and collective skills 

training, and routinely practiced during unit field 

training exercises. By maintaining the capability 

for chemical live-agent training at Fort McClellan, 

the Army will continue to provide realistic chemical preparedness training. A robust chemical/ 

biological defense is a vital part of a three-pronged 

effort, including arms control and conventional/ 

nuclear deterrence. The Army is the only 

service that conducts live-agent training, and it 

will continue this training. The Air Force has 

indicated its desire to collocate its disaster 

preparedness technical training with the Army’s 

Chemical School at Fort Leonard Wood; the 

Army supports this initiative. 

The Army provides live-agent training not only 

for Army personnel (approximately 4000 

students per year), but also for other Services, 

the State Department, and even foreign countries (approximately 600 sludents per year). This 

training usually involves two days at the CDTF 

while other training is conducted at other 

facilities of the Chemical School. The CDTF 

will remain part of Lhe Chemical School, even 

though it is being operated at another location. 

Although it is feasible to replicate this facility at 

Fort Leonard Wood, maintaining the existing 

facility affords the same capability without any 

additional construction. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community argued separating the live-agent 

training facility from the Chemical School would 

seriously degrade the ability to test chemical 

decontamination doctrine and equipment. Community representatives also questioned the Army’s 

ability to construct a new facility at Fort Leonard 

Wood, and noted even if it could be done, it 

would require up to nine years to accomplish. 

The community also asserted new construction 

costs would be up to five times greater than 

Army estimates. 

The community cited the lower military value 

of other Initial Entry Training/Branch School 

installations and claimed the return on investment for Fort McClellan’s closure was actually 

much lower than the Army analysis showed. In 

addition, the community cited numerous 

reasons for training degradation at Fort Leonard 

Wood, including the inadequacy of smoke ranges, 

the inability to develop joint-service training 

efforts begun at Fort McClellan, and the long 

period of turmoil resulting from the move. Community representatives also questioned the 

DODPI’s ability to conduct research missions at 

Fort Leonard Wood. 

Finally, the community argued this closure would 

produce the highest long-term economic 

impact of this round of the base closure process, because residual property at Fort McClellan 

would not provide offsetting commercial value 

for the community. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found separating the Chemical 

School from the CDTF would negatively impact 

the nation’s chemical-defense capability. There 

was no guarantee the live-agent training 

facility, the CDTF, could be moved, and the 

Commission found it imprudent to jeopardize 

the facility’s existence until such assurance 

could be obtained. 

The Commission validated the military value of 

the installations in this category and found the 

DoD process considered all installations fairly 

and equitably. Fort Leonard Wood had sufficient 

space to conduct smoke training and the other 

training functions found at Fort McClellan, 

as well as additional space to conduct jointtraining activities. The Army’s recent experience 

in relocating two other branch schools was 

significant and could enable the Chemical and 

Military Police Schools to move with minimal 

disruption. 

The Commission found economic impact was 

indeed high in the Anniston, AL area. 

t 

1-2 
Chapter I 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 

4. Therefore, the Commission rejects the 

following recommendation of the Secretary of 

Defense: close Fort McClellan except for Pelham 

Range and other required training support 

facilities to be licensed to the Army National 

Guard, and an enclave to support the US. Army 

Reserves; relocate the Chemical and Military Police 

Schools to Fort Leonard Wood, MO; retain the 

capability for live-agent training at Fort McClellan. 

The Commission does recommend that if the 

Secretary of Defense wants to move the Chemical 

Defense School and Chemical Decontamination 

Training Facility in the future, the Army should 

pursue all of the required permits and certification for the new site prior to the 1995 Base 

Closure process. The Commission finds that this 

recommendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and the final criteria. 

Commodity Oriented 

Fort Monmouth, New Jersey 

Category: Commodity Oriented 

Mission: Provides Facilities and Services 

to All Resident Activities 

One-time Cost: $ 63.6 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ -27.0 million (Cost) 

Payback: 10 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Realign Fort Monmouth. Relocate the headquarters of U.S. Army Communications Electronic 

Command (CECOM) from leased space outside 

Fort Monmouth to Rock Island Arsenal, IL, and 

transfer the Chaplain School to Fort Jackson, 

SC. Consolidate activities to maximize utilization of main post Fort Monmouth. Dispose of 

excess facilities and real property at Evans and 

Charles Woods subposts, as well as main post, 

Fort Monmouth. 

Annual: $ 13.3 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Fort Monmouth ranks fourth out of twelve 

installations in military value. It is a small 

installation with elements located off base in 

costly leased space. Relocating the CECOM Headquarters, an administrative and logistical 

headquarters, from leased facilities located 

outside the main post of Fort Monmouth, NJ, 

to permanent facilities at Rock Island Arsenal, 

IL, allows the Army to terminate a lease of $15 

million per year with additional savings of over 

$8 million per year in locality pay differential 

for the civilian workforce. At the same time, it 

better utilizes the excess space identified at Rock 

Island. Separating the headquarters and administrative function from the research and development aspect of CECOM will not have an 

operational impact. 

Rock Island Arsenal has the infrastructure to 

support and house the headquarters element of 

CECOM. Currently, Rock Island has administrative space to accommodate approximately 

1,000 additional personnel and permanent building 

space that can be renovated to accommodate 

even more personnel. The computer-systems 

center on the arsenal is one of the Army’s 

largest and can accommodate the needs of the 

head quarters . 

The Rock Island community infrastructure can 

accommodate the new residents without the need 

to construct new schools, new water and sewer 

facilities, or other public facilities. There is abundant housing at reasonable costs and excellent 

access to higher education, both at the graduate 

and undergraduate level. 

Fort Jackson trains about one half of the basic 

trainees and is the largest recruit training 

center. It is also the home of the Soldier Support Center, which is relocating from Fort Benjamin Harrison. The report to the 1991 

Commission describing the proposed closure of 

Fort Benjamin Harrison stated the Army planned 

to collocate the Chaplain School with this Center eventually. The transfer of the Chaplain School 

to Fort Jackson benefits not only the Chaplain 

School’s students, but also the large population 

of basic trainees who are beginning a new 

career in the Army, many of whom are separated from their families for the first time. The 

Chaplain School and its staff of chaplains will 

facilitate the trainees’ transition to the Army life. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community argued the Secretary’s proposed 

realignment of CECOM headquarters to Rock 

Island Arsenal split the headquarters from the 

1-3 
Chapter I 

elements it supports (Project Executive Officers 

and the Research and Development Center) and 

reduced overall operational efficiency and 

effectiveness. The CECOM would best be served 

by the consolidation of CECOM elements and 

by taking advantage of recently vacated and renovated facilities by moving onto Fort Monmouth. 

In addition, the community argued it would 

take a considerable capital investment to adjust 

the proposed Rock Island Arsenal warehouse 

facility to accommodate CECOM requirements. 

Movement onto Fort Monmouth would avoid 

the expensive movement and renovation costs 

associated with the move to Rock Island Arsenal. 

Additionally, the community maintained the 

New Jersey/New York area was the east coast 

high-tech center and similar institutions and 

activities would not be available in the Rock 

Island area. 

Lastly, the community argued locality pay should 

not be a cost consideration. They maintained 

Congress created locality pay to offset the wage 

differential between the private and public 

sectors in certain high cost areas. Therefore, they 

argued, using this factor in any consideration 

could penalize an installation when, in fact, it 

was a Congressional driven entitlement. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found there was excess administrative space at both Rock Island Arsenal 

and Fort Monmouth. The excess space at Fort 

Monmouth resulted from the movement of the 

5 13th Military Intelligence Brigade, which is not 

a base realignment action, and the Chaplain 

School. The Commission found both the 

Department of Defense proposal and the community counter-proposal were rational approaches 

to the utilization of the excess administrative 

space. 

The Commission agreed there was a potentially 

negative impact if the technically trained work 

force at CECOM did not move to Rock Island 

Arsenal. 

The Commission noted the Department misstated 

the cost differential between two alternative 

choices. The Commission found the lower 

one-time cost of consolidating activities at Fort 

Monmouth outweighed the long-term savings 

associated with the relocation of CECOM to Rock 

Island Arsenal. The Commission further found 

the Army’s consideration of savings in locality 

pay was an added bonus of the realignment of 

CECOM to Rock Island Arsenal, but was not a 

primary consideration for the recommendation. 

The Commission found locality pay could 

penalize an installation when compared to one 

not entitled to it. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 4. 

Therefore, the Commission rejects the Secretary’s 

recommendation on Fort Monmouth and instead 

adopts the following recommendation: move 

CECOM Headquarters out of the leased space 

and into space at Fort Monmouth vacated by 

the 5 13th Military Intelligence Brigade and the 

Chaplain School, or other suitable space as 

appropriate; relocate the Chaplain School to Fort 

Jackson, SC; consolidate activities to maximize 

utilization of main post Fort Monmouth; and 

dispose of excess facilities and real property at 

Evans and Charles Woods subposts, as well as 

main post Fort Monmouth. The Commission 

finds this recommendation is consistent with 

the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Vint Hill Farms, Virginia 

Category: Commodity Oriented 

Mission: Research, Development, 

and Sustainment of Intelligence 

and Electronic Warfare Equipment 

One-time Cost: $ 72.4 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ -19.0 million (Cost) 

Payback: 8 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close Vint Hill Farms. Relocate the maintenance 

and repair function of the Intelligence Material 

Management Center (IMMC) to Tobyhanna Army 

Depot, PA. Transfer the remaining elements of 

IMMC, the Signal Warfare Directorate, and 

the Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) to Fort 

Monmouth, NJ. 

Annual: $ 19.1 million 

1-4 
Chapter I 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Vint Hill Farms ranked low in military value 

within its category. With the departure of the 

military intelligence battalion and its consolidation at Fort Gordon, GA, Vint Hill Farms is 

underutilized. It was determined that Vint Hill 

Farms could be closed and its functions performed elsewhere. Closure of this installation 

supports the Army’s basing strategy to consolidate 

similar functions and close small installations 

when feasible to do so. Moving its activities to 

Fort Monmouth enhances the synergistic 

effect of research and development for communication electronics and intelligence electronics 

warfare. Collocation at Fort Monmouth also 

facilitates the interaction between the Program 

Managers and Program Executive Officers that 

currently reside at Fort Monmouth, thereby 

creating greater military value in this category. 

Consolidating research and development will 

achieve greater efficiencies in the areas of 

mission, mission overhead, and base operations. 

This allows the Army to reduce costs, giving 

the flexibility to put scarce resources into the 

research and development arena that significantly 

contributes to overall readiness. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community asserted DoD erred in assigning 

a relatively low military value to the installation, 

contending the true value of the installation should 

be based on the missions of the tenant activities. 

Additionally, community representatives argued 

DoD’s claim the post would be underutilized 

following the move of a resident military intelligence battalion was inaccurate. 

The community further argued the realignment 

of the tenant activities could cause serious harm 

to national security. First, sensitive and, in some 

cases, highly-classified work is performed at Vint 

Hill Farms for the intelligence community, mostly 

headquartered in the National Capital Region. 

Relocating to New Jersey would disrupt this close 

working relationship. Second, the quality of the 

work performed is dependent on a superior work 

force. The community estimated approximately 

80 percent of the work force would not move, 

thereby degrading the Army’s and the nation’s 

intelligence capability while replacements were 

hired and trained. 

Finally, the community requested the Commission receive classified briefings on the activities 

and missions conducted at Vint Hill Farms. It 

was stated only by receiving these briefings could 

the true value of the installation, and the 

potential harm to national security, be assessed. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found all installations in the 

category were treated fairly. It also found the 

Secretary had overstated the impact the military intelligence battalion’s relocation would have 

on the post’s capacity. The battalion occupied 

only 7 percent of the facilities on the installation, 

and its move would not cause the installation 

to be grossly underutilized. 

The Commission explored the potential impact 

of the proposed realignments on the agencies 

with whom the Vint Hill Farms activities work. 

The agencies all stated the relocation of the tenants 

would have minimal, or no, impact. The Commission agreed there was a potential impact 

if the work force did not move; however, a 

pool of technologically trained and available 

personnel does exist in the Fort Monmouth area. 

Prudent phasing of the move from Vint Hill 

Farms to Fort Monmouth could overcome any 

personnel shortfalls. 

The Commission also received classified briefings on the activities and missions conducted at 

Vint Hill Farms. During these briefings nothing 

was discovered that would preclude the implementation of the DoD recommendation. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

Vint Hill Farms. Relocate the maintenance and 

repair function of the Intelligence Material 

Management Center (IMMC) to Tobyhanna 

Army Depot, PA. Transfer the remaining 

elements of IMMC, the Intelligence and 

Electronic Warfare Directorate (formerly the 

Signal Warfare Directorate), and the program 

executive officer (PEO) for Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) to Fort Monmouth, NJ. 

1-5 
Chapter I 

Amy Depots 

Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania 

Category: Depots 

Mission: Depot Maintenance 

One-time Cost: $ 23.1 million" 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 42.8 million" 

Payback: 7 years 

"These numbers reflect SIMA-E redirect savings 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Realign Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD) by 

reducing it to a depot activity and placing it 

under the command and control of Tobyhanna 

Army Depot, PA. Relocate the maintenance 

functions and associated workload to other 

depot-maintenance activities, including the 

private sector. Retain the conventional ammunition storage mission and the regional Test 

Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) 

mission. Change the recommendation of the 1991 

Commission regarding Letterkenny as follows: 

instead of sending Systems Integration Management Activity East (SIMA-E) to Rock Island 

Arsenal, Illinois, as recommended by the 1991 

Commission, retain this activity in place. 

Retain the SIMA-E and the Information Processing Center at Letterkenny until the Defense 

Information Systems Agency (DISA) completes 

its review of activities relocated under Defense 

Management Review Decision (DMRD) 918. The 

activities of the depot not associated with the 

remaining mission will be inactivated, transferred 

or otherwise eliminated. Missile maintenance 

workload will not consolidate at Letterkenny, 

as originally planned. However, Depot Systems 

Command will relocate to Rock Island Arsenal, 

where it will consolidate under the Industrial 

Operations Command there, as approved by the 

1991 Commission. 

Annual: $ 13.1 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The decision to realign LEAD was driven by the 

results of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

triennial review of roles and missions in the 

Department of Defense. As part of this review, 

the Chairman chartered the Depot Maintenance 

Consolidation Study. The study identified a 

significant amount of excess depot capacity 

and duplication among the Services. 

1-6 

The Army has concluded the projected ground 

systems and equipment depot maintenance 

workload for fiscal year 1999 is not sufficient 

to maintain all of the ground systems and equipment depots. 

In drawing the conclusion to downsize LEAD, 

the Army considered the following factors: 

relative military value of the depots, the future 

heavy force mix, reduced budget, workforce skills, 

excess capacity, ability of the depots to accommodate new workload levels, the proximity of 

the depots to the heavy forces in the U.S., and 

the resulting savings. 

SIMA-E, which performs computer systems 

design and data management functions for a 

variety of activities, is transferring to the 

Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) in 

1993. Retention keeps this activity focused 

regionally upon the customer. SIMA-West is 

located in St. Louis and supports functions in 

the western portion of the US. DISA advised 

the Army there were no advantages or savings 

from a relocation to Rock Island Arsenal, IL. 

Less than 25% of the work performed by SIMA-E 

is associated with the Industrial Operations 

Command at Rock Island Arsenal. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community argued the consolidation of the 

Joint Missile Maintenance mission at Letterkenny 

Army Depot, as originally recommended by 

Defense Management Review Decision (DMRD) 

918, remains the most sensible and economical 

option available for the interservicing of missile 

workload. The community maintained realigning the missile-maintenance workload to other 

depots would not take advantage of the 

efficiencies gained by interservicing at a single 

site. Also, the community argued existing 

artillery workload should not be transferred to 

another Army depot as originally planned. The 

community cited various factors including a 

partnership arrangement with private industry 

for assembling the Paladin weapon system. 

Additionally, the community believed Depot 

Systems Command (DESCOM) should not relocate to Rock Island Arsenal, IL, as recommended 

by the 1991 Commission, but should remain 

in place at LEAD and form the Industrial 

Operations Command (IOC) from existing 

DESCOM assets thereby saving the cost of 
Chapter I 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 

4. Therefore, the Commission rejects the 

Secretary’s recommendation on Letterkenny Army 

Depot, PA, and instead, adopts the following 

recommendation: Letterkenny Army Depot will 

remain open. Consolidate tactical-missile maintenance at the depot as originally planned by 

the Department of Defense in the Tactical 

Missile Maintenance Consolidation Plan for 

Letterkenny Army Depot, 31 January 1992 

(revised 30 April 1992). Add tactical-missile 

maintenance workload currently being accomplished by the Marine Corps Logistics Base 

Barstow, California, to the consolidation plan. 

Retain artillery workload at Letterkenny. Retain 

the Systems Integration Management ActivityEast (SIMA-E) at Letterkenny Army Depot (change 

to the 1991 Commission recommendation) 

until the Defense Information Systems Agency 

completes its review of activities relocated 

under DMRD 918. Relocate Depot Systems 

Command to Rock Island Arsenal, IL, and 

consolidate with the Armament, Munitions, 

and Chemical Command into the Industrial 

Operations Command, as approved by the 

1991 Commission. The Commission finds this 

recommendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 

Tooele Army Depot, Utah 

Category: Depots 

Mission: Depot Maintenance 

One

-time Cost: $ 73.7 million 

Savings: 1994

-99: $ 107.2 million 

Payback: Immediate 

I 

Annual: $ 51.0 million 

i personnel relocations. The community agreed 

with the Army recommendation SIMA-E should 

remain in place at LEAD until DISA determined 

the best alternative for its future. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS: 

The Commission found the Army treated all its 

depots equally. The Commission also found the 

Army’s process for isolating and eliminating 

excess capacity was a consistent and prudent 

approach toward decreasing the excess capacity 

that existed in the Army’s depot system. 

The Commission carefully considered interservicing of tactical-missile maintenance and 

found the eight defense depots identified by 

the Department of Defense as interservicing 

candidates in the Tactical Missile Maintenance 

Consolidation Plan for Letterkenny Army Depot, 

31 January 1992 (revised 30 April 1992) were 

performing similar work on tactical-missile guidance and control sections and in some instances 

related ground control systems. In addition to 

Letterkenny Army Depot, these eight included 

Anniston Army Depot, AL; Red River Army 

Depot, TX; Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA; Naval 

Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA; Naval 

Aviation Depot Alameda, CA; Naval Aviation 

Depot Norfolk, VA; and Ogden Air Logistics 

Center, Hill AFB, UT. 

The Commission also found the workload originally planned for consolidation at Letterkenny 

had decreased. Some missile systems

-the 

Shillelagh, Land Combat Support System, 

Chaparral, and the ANTSQ-73

-were no longer 

considered viable candidates for transfer because 

they would soon be retired, and a substantial 

portion of the remaining work for potential transfer to Letterkenny was being performed by 

private contractors. Despite all of these interservicing efficiency-reducing factors, a recent 

study by the Army Audit Agency concluded the 

annual recurring savings to be realized from 

tactical-missile consolidation at Letterkenny would 

still be equivalent to savings achieved from the 

proposed Letterkenny realignment, if all missile 

maintenance workload, including that which is 

currently assigned to the private sector, transitions to Letterkenny. 

While the Letterkenny facilities might possibly 

be under-utilized if the tactical

-missile workload 

was consolidated at the depot, retention of the 

current artillery workload could help alleviate 

the problem. Although not included with DOD’s 

original consolidation plan, the transfer of Hawk 

ground control system maintenance from the 

Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, could further reduce costs and improve Letterkenny 

facility utilization rates. 

The Commission found the consolidation of 

tactical-missile maintenance at a single depot 

was a valid plan worthy of implementation in 

order to create efficiencies and reduce costs. 

1-7 
Chapter I 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Realign Tooele Army Depot (TEAD) by reducing 

it to a depot activity and placing it under the 

command and control of Red River Army 

Depot, TX. Retain conventional ammunition 

storage and the chemical-demilitarization 

mission. The depot workload will move to other 

depot-maintenance activities, including the 

private sector. The activities of the depot not 

associated with the remaining mission will 

be inactivated, transferred, or eliminated, as 

appropriate. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The decision to realign TEAD was driven by 

the results of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

triennial review of roles and missions in the 

Department of Defense. As part of this review, 

the Chairman chartered the Depot Maintenance 

Consolidation Study. The study identified a 

significant amount of excess depot capacity 

and duplication among the Services. 

The Army has concluded the projected ground 

systems and equipment depot maintenance workload for fiscal year 1999 is not sufficient to 

maintain all of the ground systems and equipment depots. 

In drawing the conclusion to downsize TEAD, 

the Army considered the following factors: 

relative military value of the depots, the future 

heavy force mix, reduced budget, workforce skills, 

excess capacity, ability of the depots to accommodate new workload levels, the proximity of 

the depots to the heavy forces in the U.S., and 

the resulting savings. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

In October 1992, a nearly $150 million “stateof-the-market” Consolidated Maintenance Facility 

(CMF), designed to accomplish the projected 

wheeled vehicle workload for all services, opened 

at Tooele Army Depot. The community.claimed 

without the interservicing workload of wheeled 

vehicles and related secondary items, the CMF 

would lose the opportunity to operate as 

designed, and the government would lose its 

investment. 

Further, the community maintained closing 

TEAD’s maintenance facilities would send a 

message throughout the Department of Defense 

that investments in efficiencies go unrewarded 

and the least efficient facilities survive. Finally, 

the community stated realigning TEAD would 

produce severe economic impact on the surrounding community. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the Army treated all its 

depots equally. The Commission also found the 

Army’s process for isolating and eliminating 

excess capacity was a consistent and prudent 

approach toward decreasing the excess capacity 

that existed in the Army’s depot system. 

The Commission carefully considered interservicing of tactical wheeled-vehicle maintenance; 

however, the Commission found transferring the 

wheeled-vehicle maintenance workload from all 

Services to TEAD’s CMF was not sufficient to 

bring the capacity utilization of Tooele Army 

Depot to a cost-effective level. Future mission 

requirements would also not be sufficient to 

improve the utilization rate of the CMF to an 

acceptable level. 

The Commission finds the Department of 

Defense should make every attempt to dispose 

of the CMF as an intact, complete, and usable 

facility such that the community has a better 

chance of recovering from the severe economic 

effects that may occur following the realignment 

of the installation. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: realign 

Tooele Army Depot (TEAD) by reducing it to a 

depot activity and placing it under the command and control of Red River Army Depot, 

TX. Retain conventional ammunition storage and 

the chemical demilitarization mission. The 

depot workload will move to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector. 

The activities of the depot not associated with 

the remaining mission will be inactivated, transferred or eliminated, as appropriate. 

1-8 
Chapter I 

,, CommandIControZ 

Fort Belvoir, Virginia 

Category: Command and Control 

Mission: Administrative Center for US. Army 

One-time Cost: $ 11.3 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 49.1 million 

Payback: Immediate 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Realign Fort Belvoir as follows: disestablish the 

Belvoir Research, Development, and Engineering Center (BRDEC), Fort Belvoir, VA. Relocate 

the Supply, Bridging, Counter Mobility, Water 

Purification, and FueULubricant Business Areas 

to the Tank Automotive Research, Development, 

and Engineering Center (TARDEC), Detroit 

Arsenal, MI. Transfer command and control 

of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, 

Electric Power, Remote Mine DetectiodNeutralization, Environmental Controls, and Low Cost/ 

Low Observables Business Areas to the Night 

Vision Electro-Optics Directorate (NVEOD) of 

the Communication and Electronics Research, 

Development, and Engineering Center (CERDEC), 

Fort Belvoir, VA. 

Activities Located in the National Capital Region. 

Annual: $ 13.4 million 

/ 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

In July 1992, the Secretary of the Army requested 

the Army Science Board appoint a panel of members and consultants to conduct a review of the 

Army Material Command Research, Development, 

and Engineering Center (RDEC) business plans. 

Specifically, the Secretary requested the panel 

determine which RDEC capabilities the Army 

can afford. The panel based its findings on an 

objective assessment of the missions, functions, 

business areas, core capabilities, customer needs, 

and major fields of technical endeavor of each 

RDEC measured against at least the following 

criteria to determine which RDEC capabilities 

are essential and affordable: 

- relevance to the Army customer 

- availability from other sources 

- RGsD quality 

- in-house cost and efficiency 

The study identified technical areas to be 

emphasized, deemphasized, or eliminated. Areas 

identified for elimination are tunnel detection, 

materials, marine craft, topographic equipment, 

support equipment, and construction equipment. 

The Army Science Board panel recommended 

the closure of the Belvoir RDEC and dispersal 

of the business areas that were not recommended 

for elimination. 

The relocation of the Supply, Bridging, Counter 

Mobility, Water Purification, and FueVLubricant 

Business Areas to TARDEC is consistent with 

the conclusions of the Army Science Board Study. 

There is a synergy between these functions and 

the mission of building military vehicles. For 

example, the Bridging area requires heavy 

vehicles such as tanks and heavy mobile logistics to move across demountable bridges and 

light spans. Supply, FueV Lubricants and Counter 

Mobility also complement the mission of 

TARDEC. The relocation of the FueVLubricant 

business area as part the DoD Project Reliance 

has commenced. 

The transfer of operational control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, 

Remote Mine DetectiodNeutralization, Environmental Controls, and Low Cost/Low Observables 

Business Areas from the Belvoir RDEC to the 

Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate (NVEOD) 

of the Communication and Electronics Research, 

Development, and Engineering Center (CERDEC), 

also located in the same general area of Fort 

Belvoir, supports the study recommendations, 

while avoiding any additional costs. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community supported the disestablishment 

of the BRDEC and the elimination of the Tunnel 

Detection, Materials, and Support Equipment 

Business Areas. However, the community 

asserted the Marine Craft, Topographic, and 

Construction Equipment Business Areas were 

essential to maintaining the Army’s capabilities 

and readiness and, therefore, should not be eliminated. Accepting this assertion would result in 

the retention of 50 personnel authorizations. 

The community also maintained the relocation 

of the business areas from Fort Belvoir to 

Detroit Arsenal was not cost effective. By transferring command and control of these business 

1-9 
Chapter I 

areas to TARDEC, but leaving them at Fort 

Belvoir, the costs of moving the personnel and 

associated construction costs could be avoided. 

This cost avoidance would pay for the retention 

of the personnel to staff the business areas the 

community recommended retaining. 

Additionally, the community believed the 

proposed realignment cost was $26.2 million, 

not the $11.3 million estimated by the Army. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the Secretary’s plan for 

the disestablishment of the BRDEC, including 

the elimination of the Marine Craft, Construction Equipment and Topographic Equipment 

Business Areas, was reasonable and would 

eliminate duplication of efforts both within the 

Army and among the Services. The Army would 

retain its acquisition capability and would rely 

on commercial enterprises for the actual development of common items. 

The Commission also found the Army’s longterm research, development, and engineering 

effort would be better served by collocation of 

similar activities at Detroit Arsenal, MI. 

The community’s cost estimate appeared to 

include all new construction, which would 

dramatically increase DoD’s estimate. The DoD 

plan was based on renovation of currently existing and vacant facilities at the Detroit Arsenal. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds that the Secretary of 

Defense did not deviate substantially from the 

force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, 

the Commission recommends the following: 

realign Fort Belvoir as follows: disestablish the 

Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering 

Center (BRDEC), Fort Belvoir, VA. Eliminate 

the Tunnel Detection, Materials, Marine Craft, 

Topographic Equipment, Construction Equipment and Support Equipment Business Areas. 

Relocate the Supply, Bridging, Counter Mobility, 

Water Purification, and FueVLubricant Business 

Areas to the Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC), 

Detroit Arsenal, MI. Transfer command and 

control of the Physical Security, Battlefield 

Deception, Electric Power, Remote Mine Detection/ 

Neutralization, Environmental Controls and Low 

Cost/Low Observables Business Areas to the Night 

Vision Electro-Optics Directorate (NVEOD) of 

the Communication and Electronics Research, 

Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC), 

Fort Belvoir, VA. 

Professional Schools 

Presidio of MontereyDresidio 

of Monterey Annex, California 

Category: Professional School 

Mission: Defense Language Institute Foreign 

One-time Cost: $ 3.4 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $’ 74.9 million 

Annual: $ IS. 7 million 

Payback: Immediate 

i 

Language Center 

ARMY RECOMMENDATION TO THE 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Close the Presidio of Monterey (POM) and the 

Presidio of Monterey Annex (part of Fort Ord). 

Relocate the Defense Language Institute (DLI) 

and contract the foreign-language training with 

a public university which must be able to provide 

this training at or near Fort Huachuca, AZ. This 

recommendation is .contingent upon the 

successful negotiation of a contract by October 

1994. If agreement cannot be met, DLI will 

remain at the Presidio of Monterey. The Army 

would then reevaluate options which might lead 

to another proposal to the 1995 Commission. 

ARMY JUSTIFICATION 

The Defense Language Institute currently has a 

staff and student population of over 4000 

personnel. This institute offers training in over 

20 languages (e.g., Russian, Somali, Swahili, 

Ukrainian). However, it has a high operating 

overhead in both facilities and staff. A new 

approach to the operation of the Institute should 

be considered. 

Contracting foreign language training with an 

existing university-level institution will create 

significant savings in operational overhead, both 

in instructors (many of whom may already be 

on staff at a university) and in administration. 

The high base operations cost at the Presidio of 

Monterey would be avoided. 

1-10 
Chapter I 

Fort Huachuca is the home of the Army Intelligence school. Military intelligence has the largest 

requirement for linguists in all Services. The 

foreign language skill is most often used to 

interact with allies and better understand foreign 

military capability and intentions. Locating military personnel on Fort Huachuca provides 

advantages to both the soldier and the Army. 

First, it enables the Army to care for the needs 

of the soldiers during their formative training. 

It ensures “Soldierization” which is a critical 

factor in the development of all military 

personnel. Finally, it will enable the Army to 

integrate the students into the military intelligence concept during their training. 

Army students in the human intelligence field 

are currently assigned to Fort Huachuca at the 

end of their foreign language training. Soldiers 

can attend the Basic Non-commissioned Officer 

Course (BNCOC) and continue with advanced 

language training or attend the Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course and then 

continue with intermediate language training. 

This would save travel and per diem costs. 

An agreement of this kind is not unique. For example, the University of Virginia at Charlottesville 

is the location of the Judge Advocate General 

School and the University of Syracuse sponsors 

the Army Comptroller graduate education program. 

The Army, as Executive Agent for the Defense 

Language Program, will ensure that the same 

high level of training currently taught at DLI 

will continue. They will continue to serve as 

the technical authority and provide qualitative 

assessment of foreign language training activities. In addition they will also conduct research 

and evaluation on training development 

methodologies, instructional methodologies 

and techniques, computer-based training, computer assisted instruction, and establish or 

approve standards or criteria for language 

training and provide various tests and evaluation 

procedures. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community argued movement of the Defense 

Language Institute posed a serious threat to 

national security during a tumultuous period of 

international affairs. Since the Army never 

conducted a commercial-activities study before 

recommending contract language training, the 

community argued the recommendation was 

illegal. The community argued Fort Huachuca 

had limited water resources, which were in 

litigation, insufficient housing, and other infrastructure problems. 

The community questioned the University of 

Arizona proposal, pointing out no work statement had been provided by the Army, and a 

competitive process had not been performed. 

The actual cost of the proposal would be much 

higher if DLI were replicated by the University. 

The community maintained the Presidio of 

Monterey Annex was oversized. Specifically, the 

DLI required only 803 housing units on the 

Annex, the post exchange and commissary. The 

remainder of the Annex could be excessed. 

Additionally, the community disputed the base 

operations costs for the Presidio of Monterey, 

arguing a consolidated base operations organization between the Naval Postgraduate School 

and the Defense Language Institute would greatly 

reduce costs and ensure the retention of the 

DLI at the Presidio of Monterey. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission confirmed the importance of 

the DLI to the national intelligence effort. The 

DLI has the premiere language training curriculum in the country, and the Commission 

believed a disruption caused by its movement 

would not be in the best interests of national 

security. However, the Commission found 

the actual return on investment for the recommendation depended on extraordinary baseoperations costs, caused in large part by an 

oversized support facility at the Presidio of 

Monterey Annex (Fort Ord). It was apparent 

more efficient methods of base-operations 

support were not explored, specifically a consolidation with the Naval Postgraduate School 

also located in Monterey. In addition, other 

alternatives have not been explored, such as a 

commercial-activities contract with the local 

communities for base-operations support. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from the force-structure 

plan and final criterion 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: retain the 

Presidio of Monterey but dispose of all facilities 

1-11 
Chapter I 

at the Presidio of Monterey Annex except the 

housing, commissary, child care facility, and post 

exchange required to support the Presidio of 

Monterey and Naval Post Graduate School. 

Consolidate base-operations support with the 

Naval Post Graduate School by interservice 

support agreement. The Department of Defense 

will evaluate whether contracted base-operations 

support will provide savings for the Presidio 

of Monterey. The Commission finds this 

recommendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 

Chdnges to PreviousZy Approved BRAC 

88/91 Recommmdutions 

Presidio of San Francisco, California 

Category: Command and Control 

Mission: Coordinates and Provides Base 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 1994-99: $’ -35.9 million (Cost) 

Payback: Never 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Change the recommendation of the 1988 DoD 

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission regarding the Presidio of San Francisco, as 

follows: relocate Headquarters, Sixth U.S. Army 

from Presidio San Francisco to NASA Ames, CA, 

instead of to Fort Carson, CO, as originally 

approved by the Defense Secretary’s BRAC 

Commission in 1988. 

Operations Support for Sixth US. Army 

Annual: $ -6.0 million (Cost) 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The 1988 DoD BRAC Commission recommended 

closing the Presidio of San Francisco. As a 

result of this closure, the Army identified Fort 

Carson, CO, as the receiver of the 6th Army 

Headquarters. Since then, the 1991 Base 

Closure Commission recommended several 

closures and realignments in California that did 

not have the capacity to receive functions or 

personnel in the 1988 process. During its 

capacity analysis, the Army identified available 

space at NASA Ames (formerly Naval Air 

Station Moffett) which could accept the 6th Army 

Headquarters. As part of its analysis, the Army 

determined the military value of retaining the 

headquarters in California is enhanced as it 

provides the best available location necessary 

to exercise the command and control mission 

over all the reserve units within its area of 

responsibility. These reasons are as follow: 

(a) Seventy-five percent of the reserve units 

within Sixth Army’s area of responsibility are located on the West Coast; 

(b) The principal ports of debarkation 

for the West Coast are Seattle, Oakland, 

and Long Beach; 

(c) The West Coast is prime territory for 

military assistance to civil authorities. 

It is the area with the highest probability 

of natural disaster and is an area where 

substantial drug-enforcement missions are 

taking place; 

(d) Timeliness/location is the critical 

element that may separate success from 

failure. 

Additionally, recent experiences with Operation 

Desert Shield/Desert Storm, natural disasters, and 

civil disturbances have pointed out the need to 

keep the headquarters on the West Coast. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community contended moving to NASA 

Ames did not achieve any cost savings. Community representatives argued the annual 

operating costs to locate 6th Army Headquarters 

at NASA Ames or the Presidio were similar. The 

community also stated the Sixth Army would 

have to move twice - first into temporary, then 

into permanent facilities - due to renovation 

requirements at NASA Ames. The requirement 

of two moves provides additional hidden costs. 

In addition, the community asserts NASA Ames 

did not have available family housing on 

base, while family housing at the Presidio of 

San Francisco is plentiful, well built, and economical to maintain. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the command and 

control Sixth US. Army exercises over its 

Reserve Component forces is regional, not site 

specific, encompasses twelve states, and has not 

changed from the 1988 stated mission. The Commission found 58 percent of the Reserve units 

1-12 
and 59 percent of the Reserve personnel Sixth 

US. Army supervises were located in the three 

West Coast states. California contains 38 percent 

of the Reserve units and 38 percent of the 

Reserve personnel. Because of the dispersion of 

the Reserve Component units within Sixth U.S. 

Army’s region, the Commission found communication and travel capability were the foremost 

requirements in determining its location. 

The 1988 Defense Secretary’s Commission on 

Base Realignment and Closure recommended 

the Sixth US. Army move to Fort Carson, CO, 

to place the headquarters on a multimission 

installation out of a high-cost area. The 

proposed change to the 1988 DoD BRAC 

Commission recommendation would keep 

the Sixth U.S. Army in a high cost area; 

however, the Army felt operational necessity 

outweighed the increased steady-state cost. 

The Army felt staying in California would 

enhance the Sixth Army’s ability to exercise 

command and control of all Reserve units 

within its area of responsibility. 

The Commission found there was very little 

difference in the operating costs of staying at 

the Presidio of San Francisco or moving to NASA 

Ames, and cost and turbulence could be avoided 

by not moving. 

The Commission found the Secretary of the 

Interior supports the Sixth U.S. Army remaining at the Presidio of San Francisco as a tenant 

of the National Park Service. The Commission 

found the Secretary of the Interior has stated 

the National Park Service is prepared to begin 

negotiations on the terms of a lease arrangement and common support costs. The Secretary 

of the Interior also stated the Park Service is 

prepared to reach an equitable leasing arrangement that would be competitive with other 

lessors in the area. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 2 and 

4. Therefore, the Commission rejects the 

Secretary’s recommendation on the Presidio of 

San Francisco and instead adopts the following 

recommendation: the 1988 DoD BRAC Commission recommendation will be changed to 

allow only the Sixth U.S. Army Headquarters to 

remain at the Presidio of San Francisco, CA. 

The Department of Interior and the Department 

of the Army should negotiate a lease favorable 

to both departments for the current facilities 

occupied by Sixth U.S. Army Headquarters and 

family housing at the Presidio of San Francisco 

necessary to accommodate the headquarters 

members. If agreement cannot be reached, 

the Commission expects the Army to make a 

subsequent recommendation to the 1995 Commission for the relocation of Sixth U.S. Army 

Headquarters. The Commission further recommends the Defense Commissary Agency and the 

Army and Air Force Exchange System determine the commissary and exchange requirements 

to support Sixth U.S. Army Headquarters based 

on sound business decisions. The Commission 

finds this recommendation is consistent with 

the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois 

Category: Commodity Oriented 

Mission: Production 

One-time Cost: $ -44.1 million (Savings) 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 75.4 million 

Payback: Immediate 

Annual: $ 1.0 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Change the recommendation of the 1991 

Commission regarding Rock Island Arsenal, IL, 

as follows: instead of sending the materiel 

management functions of U.S. Army Armament, 

Munitions, and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) 

to Redstone Arsenal, AL, as recommended by 

the 1991 Base Closure Commission, reorganize 

these functions under Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) with the functions remaining 

in place at Rock Island Arsenal, IL. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Under the Commission’s recommendation in 

199 1, the materiel management functions for 

AMCCOM’s armament and chemical functions 

were to be transferred to Redstone Arsenal for 

merger with U.S. Army Missile Command 

(MICOM). The merger would have created a 

new commodity command to be called the 

Missile, Armament, and Chemical Command 

(MACCOM). This merger allowed one national 

inventory control point (NICP) to be eliminated. 

1-13 
Chapter I 

In December 1992, the Commander of Army 

Materiel Command (AMC) directed the command’s Core Competency Advocates (Logistics 

Power Projection, Acquisition Excellence, 

Technology Generation) review the creation 

of MACCOM to see if there was a more costeffective option to realign Redstone Arsenal. 

These competency advocates recommended 

the AMCCOM’s materiel management functions 

should remain in place as a subset of the NICP 

at TACOM. A closer alignment exists between 

the armaments and chassis functions than 

between armaments and missiles, making the 

reorganization under TACOM more beneficial 

and cost effective for the Army: 

- AMCCOM performs approximately 

$50 million and 500 work years for 

Tank Automotive Command’s research 

and development effort compared to 

only $9 million and 90 workyears for 

Missile Command. 

TACOM versus $0.1 million from MICOM 

for sustainment. 

- AMCCOM and TACOM jointly produce 

all tanks, howitzers, and infantry vehicles. 

AMCCOM and MICOM do not jointly 

produce any weapon systems. 

contractors and universities. 

manage, and sustain common weapon 

systems. 

- AMCCOM and TACOM share common 

business practices. 

- Guns have their fire control sensors and 

computers in the vehicle and require 

extensive joint integration, as AMCCOM 

and TACOM do now. Missiles have their 

sensors and fire control in the missile 

and are easier to mount on a vehicle, 

as MICOM and TACOM do now. 

The Army believes the armament/chemical 

materiel management functions can be fully 

executed from Rock Island Arsenal without 

relocating. There is precedence for geographic 

dispersion of NICP functions. The U.S. Communications-Electronic Command NICP is 

currently performed at three separate sites. 

- AMCCOM receives $29 million from 

- AMCCOM and TACOM use common 

- AMCCOM and TACOM jointly field, 

Retention of this activity at Rock Island Arsenal, 

as a subordinate element of the TACOM NICP, 

avoids the expense of building new facilities at, 

and relocating over 1,000 employees to, Redstone 

Arsenal. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The Huntsville, AL, community believed the 

reasons for moving the armament and chemical 

materiel management functions from the Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command 

(AMCCOM) at Rock Island Arsenal, IL, and consolidating them with the NICP at Redstone 

Arsenal, AL, were just as compelling today as 

they were when recommended by the 1991 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. The Huntsville community claimed the 

projected savings from the 1991 Commission 

recommendation were still valid; therefore, 

leaving the materiel management functions at 

Rock Island Arsenal would not take advantage 

of those savings. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found all commodity-oriented 

installations were treated equally. The Commission determined the compelling argument 

for the redirect of the 1991 Commission recommendation was due to operational considerations 

and the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) 

analysis that found that the materiel management functions were more closely aligned with 

the Tank Automotive Command (TACOM). 

The Commission found the consolidation of 

inventory control points would yield cost efficiencies for both the 1991 Commission recommendation and the 1993 Secretary of Defense 

recommendation and were, therefore, not a 

factor. However, the Commission found implementing this recommendation would avoid 

approximately $70 million in military construction and personnel moving costs while incurring 

no additional costs. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: instead 

of sending the materiel management functions 

1-14 
Chapter I 

of U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical 

Command (AMCCOM) to Redstone Arsenal, AL, 

as recommended by the 1991 Base Closure Commission, reorganize these functions under Tank 

Automotive Command (TACOM) with the functions remaining in place at Rock Island Arsenal, IL. 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Shipyards 

Charleston Naval Ship yard, 

South Carolina 

Category: Naval Shipyard 

Mission: Repair, Maintenance, 

and Overhaul of Navy Ships 

One-time Cost: $ 125.5 million 

Suvings: 1994-99: $ 348.4 million 

Payback: 3 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close the Naval Shipyard (NSY) Charleston 

Annual: $ 90.9 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

NSY Charleston’s capacity is excess to that 

required to support the number of ships in the 

DoD Force Structure Plan. An analysis of naval 

shipyard capacity was performed with a goal of 

reducing excess capacity to the maximum 

extent possible while maintaining the overall 

military value of the remaining shipyards. The 

closure of NSY Charleston, when combined with 

the recommended closure of NSY Mare Island, 

California, results in the maximum reduction 

of excess capacity, and its workload can readily 

be absorbed by the remaining yards. The elimination of another shipyard performing nuclear 

work would reduce this capability below 

the minimum capacity required to support this 

critical area. The closure of NSY Charleston, in 

combination with Mare Island NSY, allows the 

elimination of a greater amount of excess 

capacity while maintaining the overall value of 

the remaining shipyards at a higher military value 

level than that of the current configuration 

of shipyards, Other options either reduced 

capacity below that required to support the 

approved force levels, eliminated specific 

capabilities needed to support mission requirements or resulted in a lower military value for 

this group of activities. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community’s concerns centered on Charleston 

Naval Shipyard’s military value ranking by 

the Navy. It pointed out that Charleston 

ranked higher in military value than did NSY 

Portsmouth and NSY Pearl Harbor. Moreover, 

the community argued that the Navy underestimated NSY Charleston’s military value because 

it failed to consider Charleston’s ability to 

dry-dock four SSN-688 class submarines and 

its ability to perform off-site, short-duration work 

on nuclear ships. The community also criticized 

the Navy’s capacity analysis. It believed the Navy’s 

analysis did not accurately reflect Charleston’s 

nuclear capacity. 

Furthermore, the Charleston community maintained the Navy did not consistently seek to 

maximize military value and minimize excess 

capacity. For example, the community argued 

that closing Mare Island and Norfolk Naval 

Shipyards would leave military value unchanged, 

but would leave less excess capacity than 

would be left by the closures of Mare Island 

and Charleston Naval Shipyards. In another 

scenario, the community stated that closing 

Mare Island and Portsmouth Naval Shipyards 

would yield a higher military value than that 

produced by the closures of Mare Island and 

Charleston Naval Shipyards. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission, in view of the considerable 

excess of shipyard capacity, found that reducing 

excess capacity was a primary consideration. In 

light of the subjective nature of the military 

value determination, the Commission chose to 

view the military value presented by the Navy 

as a gross, rather than a precise, discriminator. 

As such, the Commission sought to eliminate 

as much excess capacity as possible. 

The measurement of shipyard capacity is not 

an exact science, nor is it an easy task. The 

Commission reviewed a number of past shipyard 

capacity studies and determined that the capacity 

study submitted by the Navy for base closure 

was an acceptable indicator of shipyard capacity. 

1-15 
Chapter I 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from criterion 1. Therefore, 

the Commission rejects the Secretary of Defense’s 

recommendation on Charleston and recommends 

the following: close Naval Shipyard Charleston, 

but maintain the option for the 1993 Defense 

Base Closure and Realignment Commission later 

to recommend retention of Charleston Naval 

Shipyard facilities deemed necessary to establish 

or support Naval commands that are retained, 

realigned to, or relocated to Charleston, South 

Carolina. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan 

and final criteria. 

Mare Island Naval Shipyard, California 

Category: Naval Shipyard 

Mission: Repair, Maintenance, and Overhaul 

One-time Cost: $ 397.8 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 544.3 million 

Payback: 4 years 

of Navy Ships 

Annual: $ 206.7 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close the Mare Island Naval Shipyard (NSY). 

Relocate the Combat Systems Technical Schools 

Command activity to Dam Neck, Virginia. 

Relocate one submarine to the Naval Submarine Base, Bangor, Washington. Family housing 

located at Mare Island NSY will be retained as 

necessary to support Naval Weapons Station 

Concord. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The capacity of the Mare Island NSY is excess 

to that required to support the reduced number 

of ships reflected in the DoD Force Structure 

Plan. An analysis of naval shipyard capacity was 

performed with a goal of reducing excess 

capacity to the maximum extent possible while 

maintaining the overall military value of the 

remaining shipyards. Mare Island has the 

lowest military value of those shipyards 

supporting the Pacific Fleet, and its workload 

can be readily absorbed by the remaining yards 

which possess higher military value. The 

closure of Mare Island NSY, in combination 

with the Charleston NSY, allows the elimination 

of a greater amount of excess capacity while 

maintaining the overall value of the remaining 

shipyards at a higher military value level than 

that of the current configuration of shipyards. 

Other options either reduced capacity below that 

required to support the approved force levels, 

eliminated specific capabilities needed to 

support mission requirements or resulted in a 

lower military value for this group of activities. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community claimed the Navy’s military value 

calculation did not consider Mare Island’s unique 

capabilities. For example, the community stated 

Mare Island had the Navy’s only submarine 

construction capability and the only attack 

submarine refueling capability on the West Coast. 

The community felt the Navy’s data call on 

capacity was confusing; it believed ,the data 

call may have overstated Mare Island’s capacity 

relative to those of other shipyards. The community also said the Navy credited the Long 

Beach Naval Shipyard with a nuclear ship repair 

capability that it does not have. Consequently, 

the community argued Mare Island should 

have been ranked third, not seventh, in the Navy’s 

shipyard category. 

The community also argued the cost and impact 

of moving Mare Island’s ocean engineering 

capability was not adequately addressed by the 

Navy. It stated that Mare Island has unique 

nuclear cleanup costs that will only be required 

if the base is closed. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission, in view of the considerable 

excess of shipyard capacity, found that reducing 

excess capacity was a primary consideration. In 

light of the subjective nature of the military 

value determination, the Commission chose to 

view the military value presented by the Navy 

as a gross, rather than a precise, discriminator. 

As such, the Commission sought to eliminate 

as much excess capacity as possible. 

The measurement of shipyard capacity is not 

an exact science, nor is it an easy task. The 

Commission reviewed a number of past shipyard capacity studies and determined that the 

capacity study submitted by the Navy for 

base closure was an acceptable indicator of 

shipyard capacity. 

\ 

1-16 
Chapter I 

When relocating a function from a closing 

shipyard, the Navy should determine the availability of the required capability from another 

DoD entity or the private sector prior to the 

expenditure of resources to recreate the capability at another shipyard. 

The Department of Defense and the United States 

government bear the obligation for all environmental restoration costs, regardless of whether 

a military installation is closed and therefore, 

should not be considered as part of the costs to 

close a base. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria, and therefore, 

the Commission recommends the following: close 

Mare Island Naval Shipyard (NSY). Relocate the 

Combat Systems Technical Schools Command 

activity to Dam Neck, Virginia. Relocate one 

submarine to the Naval Submarine Base, Bangor, 

Washington. Family housing located at Mare 

Island NSY will be retained as necessary to 

support Naval Weapons Station Concord. 

Operational Air Stations 

Marine Corps Air Station 

El Toro, California 

Category: Operational Air Station 

Mission: Support Aviation Operations 

One-time Cost: $ 897.6 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 349.9 million 

Payback: 4 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) El Toro, 

California. Relocate its aircraft along with their 

dedicated personnel, equipment and support to 

Naval Air Station (NAS) Miramar, California and 

MCAS Camp Pendleton, California. 

Annual: $ 148.5 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Naval and Marine air wings are projected to be 

reduced consistent with fleet requirements in 

the DoD Force Structure Plan, creating an 

excess in air station capacity. MCAS El Tor0 is 

recommended for closure since, of the jet bases 

supporting the Pacific Fleet, it has the lowest 

military value, has no expansion possibilities, is 

the subject of serious encroachment and land 

use problems, and has many of its training 

evolutions conducted over private property. 

The redistribution of aviation assets allows the 

relocation of Marine Corps fixed wing and 

helicopter assets to the NAS Miramar, in a manner 

which both eliminates excess capacity and avoids 

the construction of a new aviation facility at 

Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center, 29 

Palms, California. In an associated action the 

squadrons and related activities at NAS Miramar 

will move to NAS Lemoore in order to make 

room for the relocation of the MCAS El Tor0 

squadrons. This closure results in a new configuration of Naval and Marine Corps air 

stations having an increased average military 

value when compared to the current mix of 

air stations in the Pacific Fleet. Finally the 

Department of the Navy will dispose of the land 

and facilities at MCAS El Toro and any proceeds 

will be used to defray base closure expenses. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community expressed concern the closure 

of MCAS El Tor0 would have a significantly 

adverse economic impact on an area already 

affected by other defense cutbacks. It also 

argued that the Navy’s military value ranking of 

MCAS El Tor0 was too low and that the ranking did not reflect the quality performance 

of the units from El Toro. The community 

suggested alternatives to the closure of El Toro; 

it stated that NAS Miramar would be a more 

appropriate candidate for closure because 

NAS Miramar had older facilities and less 

housing than did MCAS El Toro. The community argued that the Navy greatly overstated 

Miramar’s expansion capability citing that 

Miramar had environmental constraints on any 

further development. 

The Twentynine Palms community also suggested 

that the Commission reconsider its 1991 

recommendation to close MCAS Tustin and its 

1993 recommendation to redirect rotary wing 

aircraft from Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat 

Center Twentynine Palms to NAS Miramar. The 

community maintained that those recommendations would cause overwhelming operational 

problems because they would place both rotary 

and fixed wing aircraft at NAS Miramar. 

1-17 
Chapter I 

The Tustin community did not want the Commission to reconsider its 199 1 recommendation 

to close MCAS Tustin; it wanted the 1991 

Commission’s closure decision to remain intact. 

The Tustin community had already invested 

substantially in a base reuse program. It did 

not want to abandon its two-year investment of 

effort and money in the reuse plan. The Tustin 

community also believed better alternatives 

existed to relocate Marine Corps helicopters 

without retaining MCAS Tustin. Specifically, 

it proposed: keeping MCAS El Toro open and 

adding the MCAS Kaneohe Bay fixed wing 

mission there; closing NAS Miramar and relocating its units per the Secretary of Defense’s 

recommendations. It asserted this proposal would 

enhance operational readiness and still allow 

the community to pursue its reuse plan. The Tustin 

community also contended the Commission’s 

decision to reconsider its 199 1 recommendation 

would encourage other communities to ignore 

the finality of the Commission’s actions and would 

encourage communities to resist closures long 

after the final vote of the Commission. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found air and ground encroachment at MCAS El Tor0 precluded future 

mission growth or force structure changes, and 

current mission requirements cause operations 

to be conducted over private property. It also 

found that force-structure reductions have 

created excess capacity at the Navy and Marine 

Corps west coast air stations. Relocation of fixed 

and rotary wing aircraft to NAS Miramar places 

these assets at a base that is relatively free 

of future encroachment, eliminates excess 

capacity, and integrated operations can be 

safely accomplished through careful base and 

flight operations planning. The Commission 

found relocation to NAS Miramar to be operationally advantageous due to close proximity to 

the Marine division at Camp Pendleton, where 

a significant percentage of critical training is 

conducted. 

The Commission also found a sufficient number 

of acres were available at NAS Miramar to 

accommodate the aircraft, personnel, and 

support equipment from MCAS Tustin in spite 

of environmental constraints on development. 

While areas expected to be affected by necessary expansion included critical habitats, 

none were located in quantities sufficient to 

preclude anticipated necessary expansion. It 

further found that acreage expected to be 

developed for the placement of KC-130s was 

constrained such that either adjustment to 

development plans or relocation to MCAS 

Yuma, Arizona, was required. 

The Secretary of Defense suggested a revision 

to his original March 1993 recommendation. 

The Commission found the revised proposal had 

a higher military value and resulted in increased 

savings and should be adopted. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from criteria 1, 2, and 

3. Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: close Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) 

El Toro, California. Relocate its aircraft along 

with their dedicated personnel, equipment and 

support to other naval air stations, primarily, 

Naval Air Station (NAS) Miramar, California, 

and MCAS Camp Pendleton, California. In 

associated action, the squadrons and related 

activities at NAS Miramar will move to other 

naval air stations, primarily NAS Lemoore and 

NAS Fallon in order to make room for the 

relocation of the MCAS El Tor0 squadrons. 

Relocate Marine Corps Reserve Center to NAS 

Miramar. Additionally, change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission, which was to 

close MCAS Tustin and relocate its helicopter 

assets to Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center 

at Twentynine Palms, California, as follows: 

relocate MCAS Tustin helicopter assets to NAS 

North Island, NAS Miramar, or MCAS Camp 

Pendleton, California. The Commission finds 

this recommendation is consistent with the 

force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Naval Air Station Barbers Point, Hawaii 

Category: Operational Air Station 

Mission: Support Naval Aviation Operations 

One-time Cost: $ 897.6 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $349.9 million 

Payback: 4 years 

Annual: $ 148.5 million 

1-18 
Chapter I 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close the Naval Air Station (NAS) Barbers Point 

and relocate its aircraft along with their dedicated 

personnel, equipment and support to Marine 

Corps Air Station (MCAS), Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii 

and NAS Whidbey Island, Washington. Retain the 

family housing as needed for multi-service use. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The NAS Barbers Point is recommended for 

closure because its capacity is excess to that 

required to support the reduced force levels 

contained in the DoD Force Structure Plan. The 

analysis of required capacity supports only one 

naval air station in Hawaii. NAS Barbers Point 

has a lower military value than MCAS Kaneohe 

Bay and its assets can be readily redistributed 

to other existing air stations. By maintaining 

operations at the MCAS, Kaneohe Bay, we 

retained the additional capacity that air station 

provides in supporting ground forces. With the 

uncertainties posed in overseas basing MCAS 

Kaneohe Bay provides the flexibility to support 

future military operations for both Navy and 

Marine Corps and is of greater military value. 

In an associated move the F-18 and CH-46 

squadrons at MCAS Kaneohe Bay will move to 

NAS Miramar to facilitate the relocation of the 

NAS Barbers Point squadrons. Finally the 

Department of the Navy will dispose of the land 

and facilities at NAS Barbers Point and any 

proceeds will be used to defray base closure 

expenses. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The State of Hawaii supports the closure of NAS 

Barbers Point because it is interested in reusing 

the land currently occupied by the Navy. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found retention of the Naval 

Air Reserve Center, in view of force structure 

reductions, was not consistent with operational 

requirements. It also found these reductions 

indicate the need for only one major Naval Air 

Station in Hawaii, and that MCAS Kaneohe Bay, 

with significantly higher military value and no 

ground-encroachment problems, was clearly the 

base warranting retention. The Commission found 

that relocation of many of the Marine Corps air 

assets at Kaneohe Bay which were planned for 

relocation to other air stations, was required to 

make room for the aviation assets from NAS 

Barbers Point. 

The Secretary of Defense suggested a revision 

to his original March 1993 recommendation. 

The Commission found the revised proposal had 

a higher military value and should be adopted. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from the force-structure 

plan and criteria 1 and 2. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: Close 

Naval Air Station (NAS) Barbers Point and 

relocate its aircraft along with their dedicated 

personnel and equipment support to other 

naval air stations, including Marine Corps Air 

Station (MCAS), Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, and NAS 

Whidbey Island, Washington. Disestablish the 

Naval Air Reserve Center. Retain the family 

housing as needed for multi-service use. The 

Commission finds this recommendation is 

consistent with the force-structure plan and 

final criteria. 

Naval Air Station Cecil Field, Florida 

Category: Operational Air Station 

Mission: Support Naval Aviation Operations 

One-time Cost: $ 312.1 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ -1 89.1 million (Cost) 

Payback: 13 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close Naval Air Station, Cecil Field and relocate its aircraft along with dedicated personnel, 

equipment and support to Marine Corps Air 

Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina; Naval Air 

Station, Oceana, Virginia, and Marine Corps Air 

Station, Beaufort, South Carolina. Disposition 

of major tenants is as follows: Marine Corps 

Security Force Company relocates to MCAS 

Cherry Point; Aviation Intermediate Maintenance 

Department relocates to MCAS Cherry Point; 

Air Maintenance Training Group Detachment, 

Fleet Aviation Support Office Training Group 

Atlantic, and Sea Operations Detachment relocate to MCAS Cherry Point and NAS Oceana. 

Annual: $ 48.9 million 

1-19 
Chapter I 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Carrier air wings will be reduced consistent with 

fleet requirements in the DoD Force Structure 

Plan, creating an excess in air station capacity. 

Reducing this excess capacity is complicated by 

the requirement to “bed down” different mixes 

of aircraft at various air stations. In making these 

choices, the outlook for environmental and 

land use issues was significantly important. In 

making the determination for reductions at air 

stations supporting the Atlantic Fleet, NAS Cecil 

Field was selected for closure because it represented the greatest amount of excess capacity 

which could be eliminated with assets most 

readily redistributed to receiving air stations. 

The preponderance of aircraft to be redistributed 

from NAS Cecil Field were F/A-lSs which were 

relocated to two MCAS on the East Coast, Beaufort 

and Cherry Point. These air stations both had 

a higher military value than NAS Cecil Field, 

alleviated concerns with regard to future 

environmental and land use problems and 

dovetail with the recent determination for joint 

military operations of Navy and Marine Corps 

aircraft from carrier decks. Some NAS Cecil Field 

assets are relocating to NAS Oceana, an air 

station with a lower military value, because NAS 

Oceana is the only F-14 air station supporting 

the Atlantic Fleet and had to be retained to 

support military operations of these aircraft. Its 

excess capacity was merely utilized to absorb 

the remaining aircraft from NAS Cecil Field. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community claimed the Navy’s recommendation was flawed because it understated the 

military value of NAS Cecil Field and overstated 

the savings associated with closing NAS Cecil 

Field. The community argued closing NAS Cecil 

Field and relocating its aircraft to MCAS 

Beaufort, MCAS Cherry Point and NAS Oceana 

would be more expensive than leaving NAS Cecil 

Field open. The community focused on Cecil 

Fields greater expansion capability. It stated Cecil 

Field, unlike Cherry Point, Beaufort, and Oceana, 

did not have encroachment problems; furthermore, the community of Jacksonville adopted a 

Land-Use Comprehensive Plan which strictly 

limited the amount of development around 

Cecil Field. The community also argued MCAS 

Beaufort and MCAS Cherry Point had significant 

wetlands contained within their installations 

which limited the expansion of runways. It 

emphasized construction on wetlands would 

require the Navy to create new wetlands to offset the loss of sensitive environmental land and 

the ratio of wetlands use was lower at NAS Cecil 

Field than at either Beaufort or Cherry Point. 

The community also claimed operating costs 

would be lower at NAS Cecil Field than at the 

other air stations because Cecil Field was the 

closest to its training areas. The community stated 

the Navy should have considered these factors 

when assigning its military value ranking to Cecil 

Field and had the Navy done so, it would have 

seen that Cecil Field ranked far above Oceana, 

Beaufort and Cherry Point. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found significant excess capacity 

existed at NAS’ Cecil Field. The Commission 

also found current and potential future air 

encroachment at NAS Cecil Field were overstated by the Navy. The Commission also found 

other east coast air stations had higher priority 

missionsj and NAS Cecil Field was not close 

enough to the Marine Corps Division at Marine 

Corps Base Camp Lejeune, NC to support 

Marine Corps air assets. 

, 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: Close 

Naval Air Station, Cecil Field and relocate its 

aircraft along with dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Marine Corps Air Station, 

Cherry Point, North Carolina; Naval Air Station, 

Oceana, Virginia, and Marine Corps Air Station, 

Beaufort, South Carolina. Disposition of major 

tenants is as follows: Marine Corps Security Force 

Company relocates to MCAS Cherry Point; 

Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Department 

relocates to MCAS Cherry Point; Air Maintenance Training Group Detachment, Fleet Aviation 

Support Office Training Group Atlantic, and Sea 

Operations Detachment relocate to MCAS Cherry 

Point and NAS Oceana. 

1-20 
Chapter I 

Naval Air Station Agana, Guam 

Category: Operational Air Station 

Mission: Support Naval Aviation Operations 

One-time Cost: $ 123.5 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 51.4 million 

Payback: 11 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

None. The Commission added this military 

installation to the list of installations recommended for closure or realignment. 

Annual: $ 21.3 million 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community urged the Commission to 

recommend the closure of NAS Agana. The 

community stated that it wanted to reuse the 

facilities at NAS Agana to expand its civilian 

airport. The community asserted NAS Agana is 

very low in military value; it argued the few 

activities performed at NAS Agana could be 

moved into existing facilities at Andersen Air 

Force Base, and the cost of relocation would be 

far less than the $229 million estimated by GAO. 

The community contended the payback period 

for the closure of NAS Agana would be between 

three and ten years. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found excess land and operations, maintenance, and administrative capacity 

existed at Andersen AFB to allow consolidation 

of the mission, personnel, aircraft, and support 

equipment of NAS Agana at Andersen AFB. 

The Commission found the consolidation was 

economically feasible and due to the elimination 

of duplicate base operating and administrative 

costs, the closure would be paid back in 11 

years. Housing at NAS Agana supports Navy 

commands throughout Guam. The Commission 

also found if this housing were retained at NAS 

Agana, it would not be necessary to build 

replacement bachelor or family housing in the 

area of or on Andersen AFB because the two 

bases are only 15 miles apart. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from the force structure 

plan and final criteria 2 and 3. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

Naval Air Station (NAS) Agana. Move aircraft, 

personnel, and associated equipment to Andersen 

AFB, Guam. Retain housing at NAS Agana 

necessary to support Navy personnel who have 

relocated to Andersen AFB. The Commission 

finds this recommendation is consistent with 

the force structure plan and final criteria. 

Naval Air Facility, Midway Island 

Category: Operational Air Station 

Mission: Support Naval Aviation Operations 

One-time Cost: $ 2.1 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 32.9 million 

Payback: 2 years 

Annual: $ 6.6 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close Naval Air Facility Midway Island. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The 1991 Commission Report, pages 5-19, recommended the elimination of the mission at NAF 

Midway Island and its continued operation 

under a caretaker status. Based on the DoD Force 

Structure Plan, its capacity is excess to that needed 

to support forces in its geographic area. There 

is no operational need for this air facility to 

remain in the inventory even in a caretaker 

status. Therefore, the Navy recommends that 

NAF Midway be closed and appropriate 

disposal action taken. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found no operational reason 

to maintain this facility, even in a caretaker status. 

1-21 
Chapter I 

COMMISSlON RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: Close 

Naval Air Facility Midway Island. 

Training Air Stations 

Naval Air Station Memphis, Tennessee 

Category: Training Air Station 

Mission: Aviation Maintenance and 

Cost to Realign: $ 249 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ -75.9 million (Cost) 

Payback: 10 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Realign Naval Air Station (NAS) Memphis by 

terminating the flying mission and relocating 

its reserve squadrons to Carswell AFB, Texas. 

Relocate the Naval Air Technical Training 

Center to NAS Pensacola, Florida. The Bureau 

of Naval Personnel, currently in Washington, D.C., 

will be relocated to NAS Memphis as part of 

a separate recommendation. 

Operations Training 

Annual: $ 49.7 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Naval aviator requirements are decreasing as a 

result of carrier air wing and fleet reductions 

consistent with the DoD Force Structure Plan. 

The NAS Memphis capacity is excess to that 

required to train the number of student aviators 

required to meet fleet needs. The Navy analyzed 

its training air stations with a goal of reducing 

excess capacity to the maximum extent consistent 

with the decreasing throughput of students. 

Any remaining mix of air stations needed, at a 

minimum, to maintain the overall military value 

of the remaining bases, while allowing continuance of key mission requirements and maximized 

efficiency. These factors included availability of 

training airspace, outlying fields and access to 

over-water training. The inland location of NAS 

Memphis and lack of training airspace make it 

a primary candidate for closure. Its realignment 

combined with the recommended closure of NAS 

Meridian, Mississippi, reduces excess capacity 

while allowing consolidation of naval air 

training around the two air stations with the 

highest military value. The resulting configuration increases the average military value of the 

remaining training air stations and maximizes 

efficiency through restructuring around the two 

hubs, thus increasing the effectiveness of aviation 

training. Relocation of the Naval Air Technical 

Training Center fills excess capacity created by 

the closure of the Naval Aviation Depot and 

the Naval Supply Center at NAS Pensacola. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community stressed NAS Memphis was 

improperly evaluated as a training air station. 

The NAS Memphis primary mission is enlisted 

aviation technical training; pilot training has 

not been conducted for over three decades. 

Moreover, NAS Memphis was evaluated using 

military-value criteria which do not address 

the installation’s main training function. The 

community also stated the amount of military 

construction required to relocatc the Naval Air 

Technical Training Command to Pensacola would 

be double the Navy estimate. The community 

also offered nine alternatives that would save 

money by moving additional functions to 

NAS Memphis in lieu of the recommended 

movement out of NAS Memphis. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the Secretary’s realignment recommendation was consistent with the 

force-structure plan. The Commission found that, 

although the decision to realign NAS Memphis 

was initially premised on Memphis as a training 

air station, other factors justified the decision. 

These factors included the reduction of excess 

training capacity by relocating Naval Air Technical Training Command, Memphis, to NAS 

Pensacola, the achievement of economies of 

personnel and support through the consolidation of enlisted and officer aviation training at 

NAS Pensacola, and the consolidation of reserve 

air assets at Carswell Air Force Base. In addition, 

the Commission found significant cost savings 

could be achieved within a reasonable payback 

period even if military construction costs proved 

to be greater than the Navy’s original estimate. 

The Commission further found that consolidation of the Reserve air assets and Reserve 

Aviation Squadrons would realize economies 

1-22 
Chapter I 

in management and training. By relocating these 

units to Carswell, they would be closer to 

operational areas and could capitalize on these 

in integrating training with operational units. 

In addition, the Commission found that the 

central location of Carswell would enhance 

Reserve contributory support to Navy Airlift. 

The Secretary of Defense suggested a revision 

to March 1993 recommendation. The Commission 

found the revised proposal had higher military 

value and should be adopted. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 

3. Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: realign Naval Air Station, Memphis, 

by terminating the flying mission and relocating 

its reserve squadrons to Carswell, Texas. 

Disestablish the Naval Air Reserve Center, and 

relocate the Marine Corps (Wing) Reserve Center, 

Millington, to Carswell. Relocate the Naval Air 

Technical Training Center to NAS Pensacola, 

Florida. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan 

and final criteria. 

Naval Air Station Meridian, Mississippi 

Category: Training Air Station 

Mission: Jet Pilot Training 

One-time Cost: NIA 

Savings: 1994-99: NIA 

Payback: NIA 

Annual: NIA 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close Naval Air Station (NAS) Meridian. Relocate 

advanced strike training to Naval Air Station 

Kingsville, Texas. Relocate intermediate strike 

training and Naval Technical Training Center 

to NAS Pensacola, Florida. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Projected reductions contained in the Department of Defense Force Structure Plan require 

a substantial decrease in training air station 

capacity. When considering air space and 

facilities of all types of support aviation training, there is about twice the capacity required 

to perform the mission. The training conducted 

at the Naval Air Station, Meridian can be consolidated with similar training at the Naval Air 

Station, Kingsville and the Naval Air Station, 

Pensacola. This results in an economy and 

efficiency of operations which enhances the 

military value of the training and places training aircraft in proximity to over-water air space 

and potential berthing sites for carriers being 

used in training evolutions. Currently, for 

example, pilots training in Meridian fly to the 

Naval Air Station, Pensacola in order to do carrier 

landing training. The closure of Meridian and 

the accompanying closure of the Naval Air 

Station, Memphis, result in centralized aviation 

training functions at bases with a higher average 

military value than that possessed by the training air stations before closure. Both the Naval 

Air Station, Kingsville and the Naval Air Station, 

Pensacola have higher military value than the 

Naval Air Station, Meridian. The consolidation 

of the Naval Technical Training Center with its 

parent command, the Chief of Naval Education 

and Training, will provide for improvement in 

the management and efficiency of the training 

establishment and enhance its military value to 

the Navy. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community claimed the Navy’s military value 

ranking of NAS Meridian was too low. It argued 

Naval training requires primarily “over-ground” 

airspace, but the Navy’s military value matrix 

was heavily weighted for “over-water” airspace. 

Since Meridian has considerable “over-ground” 

airspace but no “over-water” airspace, its military 

value ranking was unfairly diminished. The community also argued the Navy’s training plan failed 

to provide enough capacity to accomplish needed 

strike training and NAS Meridian was essential 

to meet the requirement. The community believed 

the Navy’s inclusion of bases into “complexes” 

was improper because it resulted in a failure to 

consider alternative scenarios for reducing excess 

capacity. The community believed greater cost 

savings would be achieved by closing other air 

stations with greater excess capacity and lower 

military value. 

1-23 
Chapter I 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found excess capacity existed 

in Naval Pilot Training, but it did not exist in 

Naval Strike Pilot Training. The Commission 

found a second full-strike training base was 

required to accommodate the current and future 

pilot training rate (PTR). The Commission 

further found military construction for the T-45, 

the Navy’s new intermediate and advanced strike 

training aircraft, which is complete at NAS 

Kingsville and has begun at NAS Meridian, is 

required at two sites to support future pilot training. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from criteria 1, 2, and 

3. Therefore, the Commission recommends 

the following: Naval Air Station, Meridian 

will remain open. The Commission finds this 

recommendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 

Resme Air- Stations 

Naval Air Facility Detroit, Michigan 

Category: Reserve Air Station 

Mission: Support for Reserve Units 

One-time Cost: $ 11.6 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 44.8 million 

Payback: Immediate 

Annual: $ 10.3 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close Naval Air Facility (NAF), Detroit and 

relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, 

equipment and support to the Naval Air Station 

Jacksonville, Florida and Carswell Air Force Base, 

Fort Worth, TX. The Mt. Clemons, Michigan 

Marine Corps Reserve Center will relocate to 

the Marine Corps Reserve Center, Twin Cities, 

Minnesota. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Naval air forces are being reduced consistent 

with fleet reductions in the DoD Force Structure 

Plan. Projected force levels reflected for both 

active and reserve aviation elements leave the 

Department with significant excess capacity in 

the reserve air station category. Given the greater 

operational activity of active air stations, the 

decision to rely on reserve aviation elements in 

support of active operating forces places a high 

military value on locating reserve aviation 

elements on active operating air bases to the 

extent possible. Closure of NAF Detroit will eliminate excess capacity at the reserve air base with 

the lowest military value and allow relocation 

of most of its assets to the major P-3 active 

force base at NAS Jacksonville. In arriving at 

the recommendation to close NAF Detroit, a 

specific analysis was conducted to ensure that 

there was demographic support for purposes of 

force recruiting in the areas to which the 

reserve aircraft are being relocated. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community argued the recession and high 

local unemployment rates compounded with the 

loss of income generated by both active duty 

and reserve personnel in the local economy 

totaled $50 million. In addition, the local 

community council integrated NAF Detroit 

personnel to such an extent that many community youth services (i.e. youth sport leagues, 

Special Olympics) would suffer a negative impact. 

The community concern suggested that the 

relocation of the Medical and Dental Clinics 

would leave the Midwest devoid of Aviation 

Medical Assets to provide Navy Flight Physicals 

for Reserve Officer Training Programs and the 

Navy Recruiting District offices assigned to 

recruit aviation personnel in the Midwest. In 

addition, the community expressed concern 

regarding the disposition of other tenant 

commands, including the Personnel Support 

Detachment and the Personnel Support Detachment, Cleveland, Ohio. Reserve representatives 

expressed concern about the loss of qualified 

reservists with a resulting loss of readiness, and 

they projected it would take eighteen to sixty 

months to reconstitute reserve squadrons and 

restore readiness at the projected receiver sites. 

The Michigan Air National Guard, the local 

communities, and the Detroit Wayne County 

Metropolitan Airport were all opposed to joint 

use of Selfridge ANG as an air passenger 

terminal. It stated the base infrastructure and 

local heavy industry would not support a 

civilian air cargo operation. Finally, representatives questioned the accuracy of the Navy’s cost 

and savings analysis. 

1-24 
Chapter I 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found demographics at receiver 

locations would effectively support the manning 

of the reserve squadrons and would place them 

closer to operating areas. The Commission also 

found some inconsistencies in COBRA data 

regarding $5.7 million in required military 

construction costs prior to closure. However, 

this cost did not significantly affect savings. In 

addition, tenant activities were not specifically 

addressed in the Secretary’s recommendation. 

However, these activities were all below threshold, 

and parent commands could designate receiver 

sites. Finally, the Commission found closure 

of NAF Detroit significantly reduced excess 

capacity in Reserve Naval Air Stations. This facility 

was rated lowest in military value, so consolidation of its assets at receiver sites resulted in 

an overall improvement in military value. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

Naval Air Facility (NAF), Detroit and relocate 

its aircraft and associated personnel, equipment 

and support to the Naval Air Station Jacksonville, 

Florida or Naval Air Station South Weymouth, 

Massachusetts and Carswell Air Force Base, Fort 

Worth, TX. The Mt. Clemons, Michigan Marine 

Corps Reserve Center will relocate to the Marine 

Corps Reserve Center, Twin Cities, Minnesota. 

Naval Air Facility Martinsburg, 

West Virginia 

Category: Reserve Air Station 

Mission: Support for Reserve Units 

One-time Cost: $27.1 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $70.2 million 

Payback: Immediate 

Annual: $13.1 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

None. The Commission added this military 

installation to the list of installations recommended for closure or realignment. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community asserted that a 1986 Center 

for Naval Analysis (CNA) Study identified 

Martinsburg as one of four sites for location 

of Naval MediudHeavy Airlift (C-130) Squadrons (the others listed were NAS Glenview, 

NAS New Orleans, and NAS Point Magu). It also 

indicated that Martinsburg would be more cost 

efficient to operate both because the Navy would 

be a tenant of the Air National Guard, and 

because of the relative low cost-of-living index 

when compared with other locations. Additionally, 

it stated that current experience with reserve 

recruiting and retention in the Air National Guard 

was indicative of a rich demographic environment that would successfully draw on the greater 

Washington-Baltimore area to supply qualified 

personnel. The community noted its central 

location in Eastern United States, its excellent 

transportation network, good infrastructure, 

and relatively uncrowded airspace were attributes 

that supported the decision to place a C-130 

squadron in Martinsburg, West Virginia. 

Regarding economic impact, they projected at 

least 200 full-time positions and 200 reservists 

positions will be assigned to the Martinsburg 

Facility. The assignment would have a significant 

positive impact on one of the poorest sections 

of West Virginia. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the construction of this 

facility is in the planning stages only. No ground 

has been broken. COBRA runs provided by the 

Navy for Martinsburg were not useable for comparison with similar existing reserve and active 

air stations. The assumption that high Air 

National Guard manning levels are predictors 

of high Naval Reserve manning levels for this 

activity presumes there are adequate numbers 

of qualified naval veterans or civilians with 

aviation background, or that members of the 

West Virginia Air National Guard currently 

awaiting billet assignments would sacrifice 

seniority to request interservice transfers. While 

the CNA study identified Martinsburg as one 

of four sites for location of a Naval Reserve 

Medium/Heavy Airlift squadron, it was conducted 

1-25 
Chapter I 

during a defense build-up. With strategic planning 

incomplete in this era of fiscal constraints, 

construction of new facilities in a category with 

excess capacity does not appear to be a wise 

use of scarce resources. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from criteria 1, 3, 4 and 

5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: close Naval Air Facility, Martinsburg, 

West Virginia. The Commission finds this 

recommendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 

Naval Air Station Dallas, Texas 

Category: Reserve Air Station 

Mission: Support Naval Reserve Aviation Units 

One-time Cost: $ 136.5 million 

Savings: 1994-99 $ -108 million (Cost) 

Payback: 100+ years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close the Naval Air Station (NAS), Dallas and 

relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, 

equipment and support to Carswell Air Force 

Base, Fort Worth, Texas. The following Navy 

and Marine Corps Reserve Centers relocate to 

Carswell Air Force Base: Naval Reserve Center, 

Dallas, Marine Corp Reserve Center, Dallas, 

Marine Corps Reserve Center (Wing) Dallas, 

and REDCOM 11. 

Annual: $ 5.2 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Naval air forces are being reduced consistent 

with the fleet reductions in the DoD Force 

Structure Plan. Projected force levels reflected 

for both active and reserve aviation elements 

leave the Navy with significant excess capacity 

in the reserve air station category. Closure of 

Naval Air Station, Dallas and reconstitution at 

Carswell Air Force Base provides the reserves 

with a significantly superior air base. The 

resulting air station, with Air Force reserve 

squadrons now as tenants, will remove the 

operational difficulties currently experienced 

at the Naval Air Station, Dallas, including flight 

conflicts with the civilian airport. This closure, 

combined with three others in this category, 

results in the maximum reduction of excess 

capacity in reserve air stations while increasing 

the average military value of the remaining bases 

in this category. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community stressed the closure of NAS Dallas 

would detrimentally impact Vought Aircraft 

Company, which used the airport for 45 years 

to test aircraft under a $l/year agreement with 

the City of Dallas. It indicated the Navy’s 

concern over lack of airspace was incorrect 

because the city of Dallas owned all or part 

of two nearby airports so ample airspace was 

available. Furthermore only minor transitory 

problems occasionally occurred. 

Regarding economic impact, the community 

emphasized it would be much greater than the 

Navy estimated, both in Dallas and in Grand 

Prairie. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the proposed realignment of NAS Dallas at Carswell Air Force Base 

(AFB) had merit because it would alleviate 

current air and ground encroachment restrictions. The Commission also found regular 

airlift to southwestern states would increase the 

recruiting area to support current and future 

mission capability of the reserve squadrons 

assigned to NAS Dallas. In addition, the Commission found the Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) supported the proposed relocation to 

Carswell AFB because it was compatible with 

the existing and future Dallas-Forth Worth 

Metropolitan Air Traffic System Plan. The FAA 

indicated the move would result in better service 

to NAS Dallas units at its new site and would 

provide improved procedural efficiency to all 

users. The FAA stated since current air missions 

from NAS Dallas were to the west and southwest, 

the proposed relocation to Carswell AFB would 

shorten mission length and reduce flight costs. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: Close 

the Naval Air Station (NAS), Dallas and relocate 

1-26 
Chapter I 

its aircraft and associated personnel, equipment 

and support to Carswell AFB, Fort Worth, Texas. 

The following Navy and Marine Corps Reserve 

Centers relocate to Carswell: Naval Reserve 

Center, Dallas, Marine Corp Reserve Center, 

Dallas, Marine Corps Reserve Center (Wing) 

Dallas, and REDCOM 11. Carswell AFB, Texas, 

will become a Navy-operated Carswell joint 

reserve center to receive and accommodate the 

reserve units currently there and being relocated 

there by this 1993 Commission. 

Naval Air Station Glenview, Illinois 

Category: Reserve Air Station 

Mission: Support for Reserve Units 

One-time Cost: $ 132.1 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 34.5 million 

Payback: 6 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close the Naval Air Station (NAS), Glenview and 

relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, 

equipment and support to Navy Reserve, 

National Guard and other activities. Family 

housing located at NAS Glenview will be retained 

to meet existing and new requirements of 

the nearby Naval Training Center (NTC), Great 

Lakes. The Recruiting District, Chicago will be 

relocated to NTC Great Lakes. The Marine Corps 

Reserve Center activities will relocate as appropriate to Dam Neck,’Virginia, Green Bay, 

Wisconsin, Stewart Army National Guard 

Facility, New Windsor, New York and NAS, 

Atlanta, Georgia. 

Annual: $ 30.0 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Naval air forces are being reduced consistent 

with the fleet reductions in the DoD ForceStructure Plan. Projected force levels for both 

active and reserve aviation elements leave the 

Department with significant excess capacity in 

the reserve air station category. Closure of NAS 

Glenview eliminates excess capacity at a base 

with a very low military value whose assets can 

be redistributed into more economical and 

efficient operations. This closure, combined 

with three others in this category, results in 

maximum reduction of excess capacity while 

increasing the average military value of the 

remaining reserve air stations. In arriving at the 

recommendation to close NAS Glenview, a 

specific analysis was conducted to ensure that 

there was demographic support for purposes 

of force recruiting in the areas to which the 

reserve aircraft are being relocated. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community contended NAS Glenview demonstrated the ability to recruit and train key reserve 

personnel from the highly skilled workforce of 

the Chicago Metroplex. The community said 

distant relocations proposed for NAS Glenview 

would undoubtedly result in large losses of 

qualified reservists in these units, and they highlighted the loss of joint operations. While local 

officials took a neutral position, other commu-. 

nity representatives questioned the military value 

and excess capacity calculations. It also questioned COBRA model cost and savings analysis 

and identified over $90 million in military 

construction costs to relocate the units. The community leaders pointed out that relocation costs 

of tenant activities were not included in the 

COBRA analysis. It indicated the combined 

closures of this facility along with NAF Detroit 

and NAS Memphis would leave the heartland 

of the United States without an operational 

Naval and Marine Corps Air Reserve presence. 

Another concern of the community was that 

these closures would result in a loss of Navy 

airlift for midwestern reserve units. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found significant efforts had 

been made to upgrade NAS Glenview. However, 

serious ground and air encroachment problems, 

and the lack of adequate accident potential zones 

limited potential expansion at this Reserve Naval 

Air Station. While the Commission recognized 

the loss of reservists due to relocating the reserve 

squadrons, it found the potential for expansion 

at receiver sites would improve overall military 

value of the remaining installations. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

1-27 
Chapter I 

the Naval Air Station (NAS), Glenview and 

relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, 

equipment and support to Navy Reserve, 

National Guard and other activities. Family 

housing located at NAS Glenview will be 

retained to meet existing and new requirements of the nearby Naval Training Center 

(NTC), Great Lakes. The Recruiting District, 

Chicago will be relocated to NTC Great Lakes. 

The Marine Corps Reserve Center activities will 

relocate as appropriate to Dam Neck, Virginia; 

Green Bay, Wisconsin; Stewart Army National 

Guard Facility, New Windsor, New York; and 

NAS Atlanta, Georgia. 

Naval Air Station South Weymouth, 

Massachusetts 

Category: Reserve Air Station 

Mission: Support for Reserve Units 

One-time Cost: NIA 

Savings : N/A 

Payback: N/A 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close Naval Air Station (NAS), South Weymouth 

and relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, 

equipment and support to Naval Air Stations 

Brunswick, Maine, New Orleans, Louisiana, and 

Naval Station Mayport, Florida. The Marine Corps 

Reserve Center activities will relocate to Dam 

Neck, Virginia, Johnstown, Pennsylvania, Camp 

Pendleton, California, and NAS Willow Grove, 

Pennsylvania. 

Annual: N/A 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Naval air forces are being reduced consistent 

with fleet reductions in the DoD Force Structure 

Plan. Projected force levels for both active and 

reserve aviation elements leave the Department 

with significant excess capacity in the reserve 

air station category. The greater operational utility 

of active air stations and the decision to rely on 

reserve aviation elements in support of active 

operating forces place a higher military value 

on locating reserve aviation elements on active 

operating air bases to the extent possible. 

Closure of NAS South Weymouth allows the 

relocation of reserve P-3’s to the major P-3 

active operating base at NAS Brunswick, ME 

and distributes other assets to the active operating base at Mayport, FL and to a reserve air 

station with a higher military value. In arriving 

at the recommendation to close NAS South 

Weymouth, a specific analysis was conducted 

to ensure that there was demographic support 

for purposes of force recruiting in the areas to 

which the reserve aircraft are being relocated. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community stated NAS South Weymouth 

was the only operational Naval Air Reserve 

Activity in the New England/New York area. The 

closure would preclude active participation 

by aviation qualified Naval Reservists in the 

northeastern United States, since reservists are 

geographically connected to the area of their 

domicile and civilian occupations. The community further stated the Navy military value ranked 

NAS South Weymouth third of eight, well above 

NAS Dallas (proposed for realignment), NAS 

Atlanta and NAF Washington. The community 

emphasized the combined highly educated technical workforce and large population of qualified 

veterans in the Boston area support recruitment 

for both the current mission and any expanded 

operational role. The proximity to wetlands and 

community zoning ordinances prevent land 

encroachment on air operations and further 

enhance NAS South Weymouths ability to 

assume expanded missions. 

The community questioned the Navy’s programmed new construction in Martinsburg, West 

Virginia (for a C-130 MediudHeavy Airlift 

Squadron); and Johnstown, Pennsylvania (for a 

Helicopter Squadron). These facilities would 

cost over $55 million, with an additional $50 

million in initial set-up costs. It asserted NAS 

South Weymouth had adequate facilities and a 

trained manpower pool to assume the proposed 

missions for these sites, and indeed has facilities 

and equipment already on board for support of 

the C-130 aircraft. Further, it indicated NAS 

South Weymouth was closer to operating and 

potential threat areas for Anti-Submarine/ 

Anti-Surface Warfare and to carrier battle group 

operations than any other Reserve Naval Air 

Station and most operational bases. 

The community conducted its own independent 

analysis of the certified data provided to the 

1-28 
~~ 

Base Structure Analysis Team and raised serious 

concerns about the validity of costs and savings 

projected by the COBRA models developed by 

the Navy. In addition, it indicated the proposed 

closures of Reserve Naval Air Stations were 

predicated on nine Reserve Maritime Patrol 

Squadrons, not the thirteen Squadrons mandated by the FY93 Defense Authorization Act. It 

questioned the wisdom of such unprecedented 

cuts in view of the fact that both Congress and 

the Department of Defense have not yet defined 

the role of the reserves. 

Regarding the cumulative economic impact, the 

community asserted New England employs only 

13% of the Department of Defense, but had to 

absorb 33% of recent defense cuts. The community argued the closure of additional bases, 

including NAS South Weymouth, would have a 

heavy impact on an economy already struggling 

under the burdens of coping with previous 

defense cuts. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found several inconsistencies 

between the COBRA analysis and data call 

submissions regarding personnel accounting, and 

military construction costs for receiver bases. 

These inconsistencies tended to inflate savings 

and deflate costs in favor of the Secretary’s 

recommendation. Additionally, it appeared demographics for the purposes of force recruiting at 

proposed receiver bases were not considered 

in the relocation of squadrons attached to this 

command. There was no evidence current and 

future mission impacts were considered with 

respect to the retention losses that could result 

if squadrons were relocated several hundred to 

over 3000 miles away from the reservists 

currently assigned billets in these units. Additionally, no plan was proposed to retain incumbent reservists or to expedite recruitment and 

training of replacements. Similarly, impacts on 

contributory support to the active components, 

mission capability and readiness were not 

adequately considered by the Navy. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from the force structure 

plan and criteria 1, 3, 4, and 5. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: Naval 

Air Station, South Weymouth will remain open. 

The Commission finds this recommendation is 

consistent with the force-structure plan and 

final criteria. 

NavaVMarine Corps Air Facility 

(Joint Aviation Facility) 

Johnstown, Pennsylvania 

Category: Reserve Air Station 

Mission: Support for Reserve Units 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 15-20 million 

(Construction Avoidance) 

Annual: N/A 

$ 20 million (Start Up Costs Avoidance) 

Payback: NIA 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

None. The Commission added t is military 

installation to the list of installations recommended for closure or realignment. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community expressed concern regarding the 

proposed cessation of construction of a NavaV 

Marine Corps air facility at the Joint Aviation 

Facility in Johnstown, PA. The community indicated the facility had strong Congressional support. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found construction costs for 

the Navy/Marine Corps addition to the Joint 

Aviation Facility at Johnstown, PA, were 

projected at $15-20 million with an additional 

$20 million in one-time start-up costs. The Commission found construction of the Navy/Marine 

Corps facility was scheduled for FY 1994 with 

occupancy planned for FY 1996. The Commission found the nearby reserve center in Ebensburg 

could house administrative units, and significant excess capacity exists in Naval/Marine 

Corps reserve air stations. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from criteria 4 and 5. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: close (halt construction of) the NavaV 

1-29 
.- 

Chapter I 

Marine Corps air facility (Joint Aviation Facility) Johnstown, Pennsylvania. The Commission 

finds this recommendation is consistent with 

the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

NuvaZ Buses 

Naval Education and Training Center 

Newport, Rhode Island 

Category: Naval Base 

Mission: Support Homeported Ships 

One-time Cost: $13.8 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $7.94 million 

Annual: $ 4.26 million 

Payback: 5 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Realign the Naval Education and Training Center 

(NETC) Newport and terminate the Center’s 

mission to berth ships. Relocate the ships to 

Naval Station Mayport, Florida and Naval 

Station Norfolk, Virginia. Piers, waterfront 

facilities and related property shall be retained 

by NETC Newport. The Education and Training 

Center will remain to satisfy its education and 

training mission. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The piers and maintenance activity associated 

with NETC Newport are excess to the capacity 

required to support the DoD Force Structure 

Plan. A comprehensive analysis of naval station 

berthing capacity was performed with a goal 

of reducing excess capacity to the maximum 

extent possible while maintaining the overall 

military value of the remaining naval stations. 

To provide berthing to support the projected 

force structure, the resulting mix of naval 

stations was configured to satisfy specific 

mission requirements, including: 100 percent 

aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one SSN/ 

SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet 

concentrations. NETC Newport currently berths 

five ships which can be absorbed at other 

homeports with a higher military value. This 

realignment, combined with other recommended 

closures and realignments in the Atlantic Fleet, 

results in the maximum reduction of excess 

capacity while increasing the average military 

value of the remaining Atlantic Fleet bases. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community argued the Navy underrated 

Newport’s military value. The community also 

questioned the Navy’s estimated savings associated with this realignment, expressing belief that 

the Navy’s analysis created a false sense of savings 

because it did not fully examine the costs of 

moving ships and maintaining real property. 

Moreover, the relocation of ships would not 

reduce excess capacity or operational costs 

because Newport would still retain its piers. The 

community also argued the impact on Reserve 

Training in the Northeast was significant, and 

the economic impact of the realignment was 

underestimated. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the capacity to homeport 

ships at Newport is excess to that required to 

support the DoD force structure. The Commission also found closure would account for a 

relatively small job loss in this employment area 

and would result in savings. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: realign 

the Naval Education and Training Center (NETC) 

Newport and terminate the Center’s mission to 

berth ships. Relocate the ships to Naval Station 

Mayport, Florida and Naval Station Norfolk, 

Virginia. Piers, waterfront facilities and related 

property shall be retained by NETC Newport. 

The Education and Training Center will remain 

to satisfy its education and training mission. 

Naval Station Charleston, 

Category: Naval Base 

Mission: Support Homeported Ships 

One-time Cost: $ 186.36 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 146.67 million 

Payback: 5 years 

South Carolina 

Annual: $ 69.78 million 

1-30 
Chapter I 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close Naval Station (NS), Charleston and relocate assigned ships to Naval Stations, Norfolk, 

Virginia; Mayport, Florida; Pascagoula, Mississippi; 

Ingleside, Texas and Submarine Base, Kings Bay, 

Georgia. Appropriate personnel, equipment 

and support, to include the drydock, will be 

relocated with the ships. Disposition of major 

tenants is as follows: Planning, Estimating, Repair 

and Alterations (PERA) relocates to Portsmouth, 

Virginia; the Naval Investigative Service Regional 

Office disestablishes; Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity, Charleston disestablishes, and 

the Naval Reserve Center and REDCOM 7 relocate 

to leased space in the Charleston area; Fleet 

and Mine Warfare Training Center relocates to 

Naval Station Ingleside, Fleet Training Center 

Mayport, and Fleet Training Center Norfolk; 

Submarine Training Facility Charleston disestablishes. Family housing located within the Charleston 

Navy complex will be retained as necessary to 

support the nearby Naval Weapons Station 

Charleston. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The piers and maintenance activity at NS 

Charleston are excess to the capacity required 

to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess 

capacity to the maximum extent while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining 

naval stations. To provide berthing to support 

projected force structure, the resulting mix of 

naval stations was configured to satisfy specific 

mission requirements, including: 100 percent 

aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one 

SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and 

maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet 

concentrations as part of the solution. The berths 

at the NS Charleston are excess to Navy requirements. The relocation of the 21 ships currently 

based at NS Charleston will allow the closure 

of this naval base and eliminate almost half of 

the excess berthing capacity in bases supporting 

the Atlantic Fleet. This closure, combined with 

other recommended closures and realignments 

in the Atlantic Fleet, results in the maximum 

reduction of excess capacity while increasing 

average military value of the remaining Atlantic 

Fleet Bases. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community stated the Navy underrated 

Charleston’s military value. It believed the haste 

of the Navy’s process resulted in inaccurate and 

incomplete responses to the Navy’s military value 

matrix questions. The community also believed 

the Navy underestimated the costs of relocating 

its activities to Naval Station Kings Bay and 

Naval Station Ingleside. The community further 

asserted the ability to obtain the necessary 

environmental permits for Mine Warfare training in the Gulf of Mexico was questionable. The 

community also stated the closure of the Naval 

Station and other facilities in Charleston would 

have a devastating economic impact on the area. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the capacity to homeport 

ships and submarines in Charleston is excess to 

that required to support the DoD force structure. 

The Commission also found when combined 

with other Charleston closures, such as the closure 

of the Charleston Naval Shipyard, the closure of 

Naval Station Charleston would account for a 

significant job loss in this employment area; 

however, closure will result in substantial savings. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 1. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Station (NS), Charleston but 

maintain the option for the 1993 Defense Base 

Closure and Realignment Commission later to 

recommend the retention of Naval Station, 

Charleston facilities that are deemed necessary 

to establish or support naval commands that 

are retained at, realigned to, or relocated to 

Charleston, South Carolina. The Commission 

finds this recommendation is consistent with 

the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

1-31 
Chapter I 

Naval Station Mobile, Alabama 

Category: Naval Base 

Mission: Support Nomeported Ships 

One-time Cost: $ 4.88 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 66.83 million 

Payback: 2 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close Naval Station, Mobile and relocate assigned 

ships to Naval Stations Pascagoula, Mississippi, 

and Ingleside, Texas, along with dedicated personnel, equipment and appropriate other support. 

Annual: $ 8.43 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The berths at Naval Station, Mobile are excess 

to the capacity required to support the DoD 

Force Structure Plan. A comprehensive analysis 

of naval station berthing capacity was performed 

with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the 

maximum extent possible while maintaining the 

overall military value of the remaining naval 

stations. To provide berthing to support the 

projected force structure, the resulting mix of 

naval stations were configured to satisfy specific 

mission requirements, including: 100 percent 

aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one 

SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and 

maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet 

concentrations as part of the solution. The ships 

based at Naval Station Mobile can be relocated 

to other naval bases which have a higher military value. This realignment, combined with other 

recommended closures and realignments in 

the Atlantic Fleet, results in the maximum 

reduction of excess capacity while increasing 

the average military value of the remaining 

Atlantic Fleet bases. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community argued the Navy’s military value 

ranking was inaccurate. The community stated 

the Navy did not give adequate consideration 

to the role Naval Station (NAVSTA) Mobile plays 

in training reserves. The community also felt 

the Navy did not correctly compare NAVSTA 

Mobile to NAVSTA Pascagoula. The community 

claimed Mobile was superior to Pascagoula in 

the areas of navigation, safety, quality of life 

and the Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity. 

It believed the Navy greatly overestimated the 

savings associated with the closure of the base. 

The community also noted its strong state 

and local support for the facility and argued 

the closure of NAVSTA Mobile would have a 

serious and adverse effect on the community. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the capacity to homeport 

ships at Mobile is excess to that required to 

support the DoD force structure. The Commission also found closure would account for a 

relatively small job loss in this employment area 

and would result in savings. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

Naval Station, Mobile and relocate assigned ships 

to Naval Stations Pascagoula, Mississippi, and 

Ingleside, Texas, along with dedicated personnel, 

equipment and appropriate other support. 

Naval Station Staten Island, New York 

Category: Naval Base 

Mission: Support Homeported Ships 

One-time Cost: $ -16.15 million (Savings) 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 298.92 million 

Payback: Immediate 

Annual: $ 42.64 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close Naval Station Staten Island. Relocate its 

ships along with their dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Stations, Norfolk, 

Virginia and Mayport, Florida. Disposition of 

minor tenants is as follows: Ship Intermediate 

Maintenance Activity, New York relocates to Earle, 

New Jersey and Norfolk, Virginia; Recruiting 

District, New York disestablishes; Supervisor of 

Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP), 

Brooklyn Detachment disestablishes. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The berthing capacity of Naval Station Staten 

Island is excess to the capacity required 

1-32 
Chapter I 

to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing 

capacity was performed with the goal of reducing 

excess capacity to the maximum extent possible 

while maintaining the overall military value of 

the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing 

to support projected force structure, the resulting 

mix of naval stations was configured to satisfy 

specific mission requirements, including: 100 

percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; 

ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; 

one SSNISSBN unique base complex per fleet; 

and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego 

fleet concentrations. The ships currently berthed 

at Naval Station Staten Island can be relocated 

to bases with higher military value. This closure, 

combined with other recommended closures and 

realignments in the Atlantic Fleet, results in the 

maximum reduction of excess capacity while 

increasing the average military value of the 

remaining Atlantic Fleet bases. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community argued the Navy’s analytical 

process was not sound because it contained many 

procedural errors, analytical inconsistencies and 

inflated values for certain capabilities. The community also challenged the soundness of the 

Navy’s megaport concept. It believed closing 

Naval Station (NAVSTA) Staten Island would 

pose operational problems because New York is 

four to five days closer to potential conflicts 

than ports in the Gulf of Mexico. The community claimed the closure of NAVSTA Staten Island 

would create a loss of significant training opportunity for Naval Reservists, particularly in light 

of other planned closures in the Northeast. The 

community felt the Navy did not adequately 

consider the adverse economic impact the 

closure of NAVSTA Staten Island would have 

on the New York Harbor industrial base, especially 

private shipyards. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the capacity to homeport 

ships at Naval Station Staten Island is excess to 

that required to support the DoD force structure. 

The Commission also found closure would 

account for a relatively small job loss in this 

employment area and would result in substantial 

savings. The Secretary suggested a correction or 

revision to his March 1993 recommendation. 

The Commission found that the revised proposal 

had a higher military value and should be adopted. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 2. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: close Naval Station Staten Island. 

Relocate its ships along with their dedicated 

personnel, equipment and support to Naval 

Stations, Norfolk, Virginia and Mayport, Florida. 

Disposition of minor tenants is as follows: Ship 

Intermediate Maintenance Activity, New York 

relocates to Earle, New Jersey and Norfolk, 

Virginia; Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP), Brooklyn Detachment disestablishes. Retain family housing located 

at Naval Station, Staten Island, as necessary to support Naval Weapons Station, Earle, New Jersey. 

The Commission finds this recommendation 

is consistent with the force-structure plan and 

final criteria. 

Naval Submarine Base New London, 

Connecticut 

Category: Naval Base 

Mission: Support Homeported Submarine 

One-time Cost: NIA 

Savings: 1994-99: NIA 

Payback: NIA 

Annual: NIA 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Realign Naval Submarine Base (NSB), New 

London by terminating its mission to homeport 

ships. Relocate berthed ships, their personnel, 

associated equipment and other support to the 

Submarine Base, Kings Bay, Georgia and the Naval 

Station, Norfolk, Virginia. This relocation is to 

include a floating drydock. Piers, waterfront 

facilities, and related property shall be retained 

by the Navy at New London, Connecticut. The 

Nuclear Submarine Support Facility, a major 

tenant, relocates to Kings Bay, Georgia and 

Norfolk, Virginia; and another major tenant, the 

Nuclear Power Training Unit, disestablishes. 

1-33 
Chapter I 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Naval Submarine Base, New London’s capacity 

is excess to that required to support the number 

of ships reflected in the DoD Force Structure 

Plan. A comprehensive analysis of naval station 

berthing capacity was performed with a goal 

of reducing excess capacity to the maximum 

extent possible while maintaining the overall 

military value of the remaining naval stations. 

To provide berthing to support the projected 

force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations 

was configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier 

berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQDapproved berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base 

complex per fleet; and maintenance of the 

Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations. With 

a reduction in ships, the Navy requires one 

submarine base per Fleet. In view of the capacity 

at the Submarine Base, Kings Bay and the Naval 

Station, Norfolk, the submarines based at New 

London can be relocated to activities with a 

higher military value. The education and training 

missions being performed at the Submarine 

Base, New London will continue to be performed 

there and the Navy will retain piers, waterfront 

facilities and related property. This realignment, 

combined with other recommended closures and 

realignments in the Atlantic Fleet, results in the 

maximum reduction of excess capacity while 

increasing the average military value of the 

remaining Atlantic Fleet bases. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community claimed the Navy’s proposal to 

realign New London did not reduce excess 

capacity. Instead, it only duplicated existing 

resources elsewhere and therefore wasted the 

taxpayers’ money. The community also questioned 

the Navy’s configuration analysis. The Navy’s 

analysis required that (1) Norfolk be a part of 

any solution and (2) there be only one SSBN/ 

SSN unique base per fleet. The community 

claimed these rules led the Navy to exclude New 

London automatically from any solution. The 

community argued the Navy’s analysis thus 

appeared to be used to justify its previous 

judgment to exclude New London. The community questioned the strategic gain and increase 

in military value resulting from the realignment 

of New London, since military value did not 

appear to be a part of the Navy’s configuration 

analysis, The community proposed an alternate 

plan involving retaining submarines that would 

ostensibly save $1.2 billion. The community also 

stated the economic effect of the realignment 

would be grave because the New London area 

is heavily dependent on defense industries. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the Secretary of Defense’s 

recommendation to terminate Naval Submarine 

Base (SUBBASE) New London’s mission to 

homeport submarines calls for substantial military construction (MILCON) at SUBBASE King’s 

Bay and Naval Station Norfolk to replace capabilities and facilities that exist in New London. 

The Commission further found the Navy’s analysis 

was very sensitive to one-time costs due to the 

sizeable MILCON, particularly in view of what 

costs the Navy deemed appropriate to consider. 

Just prior to final deliberations, the Chairman 

of the Navy’s Base Structure Evaluation Committee reported to the Commission that the Navy 

was not likely ever to move attack submarines 

to Kings Bay. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 2, 4, 

and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends 

the following: Naval Submarine Base, New London 

remains open and does not realign. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Naval Air Station Alameda, California 

Category: Naval Base 

Mission:Support of Aviation Activities, 

Ajloat Units, and Other Activities 

One-time Cost: $ 193.69 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ -72.1 7 million (Cost) 

Payback: 10 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close Naval Air Station (NAS), Alameda, California 

and relocate its aircraft along with the dedicated personnel, equipment and support to NASA 

Ames/Moffett Field, California and NAS North 

Island. In addition, those ships currently berthed 

Annual: $ 41.69 million 

1-34 
Chapter I 

at NAS Alameda will be relocated to the Fleet 

concentrations at San Diego and BangorIPuget 

Sound/Everett. Disposition of major tenants is 

as follows: Navy Regional Data Automation Center, 

San Francisco realigns to NAS North Island; Ship 

Intermediate Maintenance Department disestablishes; the Naval Air Reserve Center and the 

Marine Corps Reserve Center relocate to leased 

space at NASA/Ames. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The projected carrier air wing reductions in the 

DoD Force Structure Plan require a significant 

decrease in air station and naval station capacity. 

NAS Alameda is recommended for closure as it 

has the lowest military value of those air stations 

supporting the Pacific Fleet. Given the number 

of aircraft “bedded down” at the air station, it 

has greatest amount of excess capacity. Also, 

given the need to eliminate excess ship berthing, 

its capacity is not required to meet force levels, 

since no more than five carrier berths are required 

on the West Coast; three at the fleet concentration in San Diego and two at BangorRuget Sound/ 

Everett. Both the limited aircraft (primarily 

reserve) and ship assets at NAS Alameda can be 

readily absorbed at bases with a higher military 

value. This closure results in an increased average 

military value of both the remaining air stations 

and naval stations in the Pacific Fleet. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community believed the Navy penalized NAS 

Alameda’s military value ranking because the 

Navy evaluated Alameda as a naval air station 

when its capabilities more closely resemble those 

of a naval station. The community criticized the 

Navy’s plan to build at NAVSTA Everett and 

NAS North Island to replace existing capabilities 

at NAS Alameda; it said the Navy underestimated the costs of closing at Alameda and 

rebuilding elsewhere. The community also 

asserted that both Everett and North Island 

required dredging and building nuclear carrier 

piers and that the licensing and environmental 

procedures are difficult. The community argued 

that even if this costly construction were completed, Everett would not have a contiguous 

airfield while NAS Alameda does, asserting the 

presence of a contiguous airfield creates a 

synergism among the facilities at Alameda. 

By contrast, the absence of a contiguous airfield 

would pose potentially significant operational 

problems at Everett. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the aircraft beddown 

capacity and ship berthing at NAS Alameda is 

excess to that required to support the DoD force 

structure. The Commission also found NAS 

Alameda had the lowest military value as a 

Naval Air Station in the Pacific fleet. While its 

military value as a Naval Station is relatively 

high, its primary purpose is the homeporting of 

nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and there is 

sufficient carrier berthing capacity in San Diego, 

Puget Sound, and Everett. Substantial military 

construction (MILCON) is occurring at Naval 

Station, Everett, Washington, and Naval Air 

Station North Island, California, to replace a 

portion of the nuclear aircraft carrier berthing 

capacity that exists at Alameda. These MILCON 

projects are being accomplished separate from 

the base closure process and will ultimately 

result in the Navy’s ability to homeport aircraft 

carriers at a reduced cost. 

In a letter dated June 1, 1993, the Chief of Naval 

Operations advised the Commission that the 

original Secretary of Defense recommendation 

to close Naval Air Station Alameda did not fully 

distinguish between active duty aviation assets 

and tenant reserved aviation assets. That distinction is made clear in the Commission 

recommendation. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

Naval Air Station (NAS), Alameda, California 

and relocate its aircraft along with the dedicated 

personnel, equipment and support to NAS North 

Island. In addition, those ships currently berthed 

at NAS Alameda will be relocated to the Fleet 

concentrations at San Diego and BangodPuget 

SounaEverett. Disposition of major tenants is 

as follows: Reserve aviation assets relocate to 

NASA ArneslMoffett Field, California, NAS 

Whidbey Island, and NAS Willow Grove; Navy 

Regional Data Automation Center, San Francisco 

1-35 
Chapter I 

realigns to NAS North Island; Ship Intermediate 

Maintenance Department disestablishes; the Naval 

Air Reserve Center and the Marine Corps Reserve 

Center relocate to leased space at NASMAmes. 

Naval Station Treasure Island, 

Category: Naval Base 

Mission: Maintain and Operate Facilities 

and Support Tenant Activities 

One-time Cost: $ 30.95 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 123.0 million 

Payback: 3 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close Naval Station, Treasure Island and relocate 

personnel, as appropriate to the Naval Station, 

San Diego, California; Naval Amphibious Base, 

Little Creek, Virginia; Naval Training Center, 

Great Lakes, Illinois and various Naval Reserve 

sites in California. Major tenants are impacted 

as follows: Naval Reserve Center San Francisco 

relocates to the NavaVMarine Corps Reserve 

Center, Alameda, California and REDCOM 20 

relocates to the Naval Reserve Center, San Bruno, 

California. Naval Technical Training Center 

relocates to Fleet Training Center San Diego, 

Naval Amphibious School, Little Creek and 

Naval Training Center Great Lakes. 

California 

Annual: $ 44.48 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The DoD Force Structure Plan supports a decrease 

in naval station capacity. Naval Station, Treasure 

Island has a relatively low military value and 

its capacity is not required to support Navy 

requirements. The naval bases to which its 

activities will be relocated have higher military 

value to the Navy than does this naval station. 

A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing 

capacity was performed with a goal of reducing 

excess capacity to the maximum extent possible 

while maintaining the overall military value of 

the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing 

to support the projected force structure, the 

resulting mix of naval stations was configured 

to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each 

fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved 

berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex 

per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and 

San Diego fleet concentrations. This closure, combined with other recommended closures and 

realignments in the Pacific Fleet, reduces 

excess capacity while increasing the average 

military value of the remaining Pacific Fleet bases. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community argued the closure of Naval 

Station (NAVSTA) Treasure Island, along with 

the other proposed Bay Area closures, would 

destroy the strategic infrastructure of the San 

Francisco area. It pointed out NAVSTA Treasure 

Island had a new fire fighting school that was 

environmentally sound and was the only one of 

its kind on the West Coast. It was also the site 

of over 1,000 family housing units and other 

support services the military retirement community depended upon heavily, particularly in light 

of the closure of the Presidio of San Francisco. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the capacity to homeport 

ships at Naval Station Treasure Island was excess 

to that required to support the DoD force structure. Further, the Commission found the primary 

purposes of NAVSTA Treasure Island are to 

provide military family housing, some training 

and other support for shipboard personnel and 

dependents in the San Francisco Bay area. In 

view of the recommendations to close NAS 

Alameda, these facilities are not required. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

Naval Station, Treasure Island and relocate 

personnel, as appropriate to the Naval Station, 

San Diego, California; Naval Amphibious Base, 

Little Creek, Virginia; Naval Training Center, 

Great Lakes, Illinois and various Naval Reserve 

sites in California. Major tenants are impacted 

as follows: Naval Reserve Center San Francisco 

relocates to the NavaVMarine Corps Reserve 

Center, Alameda, California and REDCOM 20 

relocates to the Naval Reserve Center, San Bruno, 

1-36 
Chapter I 

California. Naval Technical Training Center 

relocates to Fleet Training Center San Diego, 

Naval Amphibious School, Little Creek and 

Naval Training Center Great Lakes. 

Naval Training Centers 

Naval Training Center Orlando, Florida 

Category: Naval Training Center 

Mission: Training of Officer and 

One-time Cost: $ 374 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ -83.5 million (cost) 

Payback: 9 years 

(These costfigures include the cost to close NTC 

San Diego.) 

Enlisted Personnel 

nnual: $ 75.8 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close the Naval Training Center (NTC), Orlando, 

and relocate certain personnel, equipment and 

support to NTC Great Lakes and other locations, consistent with DoD training requirements. 

Disposition of major tenants is as follows: 

Recruit Training Command relocates to NTC 

Great Lakes; the Nuclear Power School and the 

Nuclear “A” School relocate to the Submarine 

School at the Naval Submarine Base (NSB), 

New London; Personnel Support Detachment 

relocates to NTC Great Lakes; Service School 

Command relocates to Great Lakes; Naval 

Dental Clinic relocates to Great Lakes; Naval 

Education and Training Program Management 

Support Activity disestablishes. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The 1991 Commission rejected the recommendation to close NTC Orlando due to prohibitive 

closure costs. This recommendation encompasses 

the additional closure of NTC San Diego and 

proposes significantly reduced closure costs by 

taking advantage of facilities made available 

by the recommended realignment of NSB 

New London. Projected manpower reductions 

contained in the DoD Force Structure Plan 

require a substantial decrease in naval force 

structure. As a result of projected manpower 

levels the Navy has two to three times the capacity 

required, as measured by a variety of indicators, 

to perform the recruit training function. The 

closure of the NTC Orlando removes excess 

capacity and relocates training to a naval 

training center with a higher military value 

and results in an efficient collocation of the 

Submarine School, the Nuclear Power School 

and the Nuclear “A” School at the NSB, New 

London. The resulting consolidation at the NTC 

Great Lakes not only results in the highest 

possible military value for this group of military activities but also is the most economical 

alignment for the processing of personnel into 

the Navy. In addition, NTC Orlando has equipment and facilities which are more readily 

relocated to another naval training center. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The Orlando community argued the Navy’s goal 

to eliminate the greatest amount of excess 

capacity while maintaining and/or improving 

overall military value did not necessarily generate the most cost-effective option. The community 

also maintained the various COBRA alternatives 

it generated showed a net present value for 

NTC Orlando 2-4 times greater than the Navy’s 

recommendation. The community claimed the 

climate affects utility costs, impacts training 

routines and student morale; however, the Navy 

did not consider climate a relevant training factor. 

The Orlando community also maintained the 

Navy’s military-value questionnaire was flawed 

because it did not accurately evaluate the training 

center’s capability. The community emphasized 

the questions asked were not relevant and there 

were more negative than positive responses to 

the questions. Further, the community added 

that NTC Orlando’s military value was incorrectly judged to be lower than NTC Great Lakes 

and utility costs and cost of operations were 

not included in the military value calculations. 

The community also stressed the Navy did not 

know the true cost of relocating or replicating 

NTC Great Lakes’s engineering “hot-plant’’ trainers 

but still justified its decision in large part on 

the prohibitive cost of moving or rebuilding 

these trainers. As an example, the community 

mentioned training simulators could be used 

to replace “hot-plant” trainers at a fraction 

of the cost of the “hot plants”. 

1-37 
Chapter I 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the Secretary’s closure 

recommendation was consistent with forcestructure plan. Closure of NTC Orlando would 

contribute to the elimination of excess training 

capacity which is 2-3 times greater than the 

projected requirement. The Commission accepted 

the Navy’s argument that consolidation of naval 

training at a single training site allows DoD to 

generate savings through the reduction of 

overhead expenses and the elimination of 

redundant training staff. Consolidation of naval 

training at NTC Orlando would have required 

a substantial capital investment which the 

Commission questioned whether an acceptable 

return on investment could be realized. The Commission found relocation or replacement of NTC 

Great Lakes engineering propulsion systems 

(“hot plants”) at another NTC would result in 

an extended period when training could not be 

effectively conducted. In addition, the Commission found NTC Great Lakes provides facilities 

and personnel support for numerous tenants 

and regional reserve units which could not be 

economically replaced. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

the Naval Training Center (NTC) , Orlando, and 

relocate certain personnel, equipment, and 

support to NTC Great Lakes and other locations, consistent with DoD training requirements. 

Disposition of major tenants is as follows: 

Recruit Training Command relocates to NTC 

Great Lakes; the Nuclear Power School and the 

Nuclear “A School relocate to the Submarine 

School at the Naval Submarine Base (NSB), 

New London; Personnel Support Detachment 

relocates to NTC Great Lakes; Service School 

Command relocates to Great Lakes; Naval Dental 

Clinic relocates to Great Lakes; Naval Education 

and Training Program Management Support 

Activity disestablishes. 

Naval Training Center San Diego, 

California 

Category: Naval Training Center 

Mission: Training of Officer and 

One-time Cost: $ 374 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ -83.5 Million (Cost) 

Annual: $ 75.8 million 

Payback: 9 years 

(These cost figures also include the cost to close 

NTC Orlando.) 

Enlisted Personnel 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close the Naval Training Center (NTC), San Diego, 

and relocate certain personnel, equipment, 

and support to NTC Great Lakes, and other 

locations, consistent with training requirements. 

Disposition of major tenants is as follows: 

Recruit Training Command relocates to NTC, 

Great Lakes; Branch Medical Clinic relocates to 

Submarine Base, San Diego; Naval Recruiting 

District relocates to Naval Air Station, North 

Island; Service School Command (Electronic 

Warfare) relocates to Naval Training Center, Great 

Lakes; Service School Command (Surface) 

relocates to NTC Great Lakes; the remainder of 

the Service School Command relocates to NTC 

Great Lakes, Naval Air Station Pensacola, and 

Fleet Training Center, San Diego. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Projected manpower reductions contained in the 

DoD Force Structure Plan require a substantial 

decrease in naval force structure capacity. As a 

result of projected manpower levels, the Navy 

has two to three times the capacity required, as 

measured by a variety of indicators, to perform 

the recruit training function. The closure of NTC 

San Diego removes unneeded excess capacity 

and results in the realignment of training to a 

training center with a higher military value. The 

resulting consolidation at NTC Great Lakes not 

only results in the highest possible military value 

but also is the most economical alignment for 

the processing of personnel into the Navy. In 

addition, NTC San Diego has equipment and 

facilities which can more readily be relocated to 

another naval training center. 

1-38 
Chapter I 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community argued NTC San Diego would 

be the best option for single-site naval training 

for several reasons. First, San Diego is collocated 

with the fleet. This allows for more cost-efficient 

training because it permits quick filling of 

vacant training billets and greater interaction 

between operational training units. Furthermore, 

consolidating naval training at NTC San Diego 

would eliminate the need for large, recurring 

transportation costs, since 88% of NTC San 

Diego’s instructors come from San Diego-based 

units. Retaining naval training in a fleetconcentration area would also produce a higher 

quality of life for NTC personnel, since fewer 

sailors would have to be separated from their 

families. Reduced family separation increases 

retention rates which, in turn, lowers training 

costs. The community also stated NTC San Diego 

had the capacity and land space to accept 

additional naval training with minimal military 

construction. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the Secretary’s closure 

recommendations were consistent with projected 

force-structure reductions. Closure of NTC San 

Diego would contribute to the elimination of 

excess training capacity, which is two to three 

times greater than the projected requirement. 

The Commission accepts the Navy’s argument 

consolidation of naval training at a single training 

site allows DoD to generate savings through 

the reduction of overhead expenses and the 

elimination of redundant training staff. The 

Commission found NTC San Diego possesses 

less available land to absorb training requirements than the Navy’s two other training centers 

and would be severely constrained during 

periods of mobilization or surge. 

The Secretary of Defense suggested a revision 

to his original March 1993 recommendation. 

The Commission found the revised proposal had 

a higher military value and should be adopted. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from criteria 1 and 2. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: Close Naval Training Center (NTC), 

San Diego. Relocate certain personnel, equipment 

and support to NTC Great Lakes, and other 

locations, consistent with training requirements. 

Disposition of major tenants is as follows: 

Recruit Training Command relocates to NTC, 

Great Lakes; Branch Medical Clinic relocates to 

Submarine Base, San Diego; Naval Recruiting 

District relocates to Naval Air Station North 

Island; Service School Command (Electronic 

Warfare) relocates to Naval Training Center, Great 

Lakes; Service School Command (Surface) 

relocates to NTC Great Lakes; the remainder of 

the Service School Command relocates to NTC 

Great Lakes, Naval Air Station Pensacola, and 

the Fleet Training Center, San Diego. The cogeneration plant and the bachelor quarters 

and adjacent non-appropriated fund activities 

(marinas) located aboard NTC San Diego property 

will be retained by the Navy to support other 

naval activities in the San Diego area. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Naval Aviution Depots 

Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, 

California 

Category: Naval Aviation Depot 

Mission: Aviation Depot Level Maintenance 

One-time Cost: $ 171 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 11 6 million 

Payback: 5 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Close Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), Alameda 

and relocate repair capability as necessary to 

other depot maintenance activities. This relocation 

may include personnel, equipment and support. 

The depot workload will move to other depot 

maintenance activities, including the private sector. 

Annual: $ 78 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Naval Aviation Depot, Alameda is recommended 

for closure because its capacity is excess to that 

required to support the DoD Force Structure 

Plan. Projected reductions require an almost 

50 percent reduction in capacity in the Navy 

aviation depots. In determining the mix of aviation depots which would achieve the maximum 

1-39 
Chapter I 

reduction in excess capacity, the Navy determined that there must be at least one aviation 

depot at a fleet concentration on each coast. 

The work performed at Naval Aviation Depot, 

Alameda can be performed at other aviation 

maintenance activities, including the private 

sector. The closure of NADEP Alameda will 

reduce excess capacity in this category and 

maintain or increase the average military value 

of the remaining depots. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community asserted NADEP Alameda had 

several unique capabilities and capacities, 

including significant engineering and technical 

support and extensive synergy with the aircraft 

carriers berthed at NAS Alameda. Community 

representatives stated these and other uncredited special skills and equipment should have 

given them a much higher military value than 

the one determined by the Navy. In addition, 

several of the NADEP’s facilities are new and 

environmentally sound. Further, they noted 

that NADEP Alameda has an extremely diverse 

work force. 

The community feels the Navy COBRA analysis 

did not provide a sufficient estimate of the 

number or extent of real costs in closing their 

operations. It believed the costs to close NADEP 

Alameda were the greatest, while they asserted 

NADEP Jacksonville was the easiest and least 

expensive NADEP to close. It also noted Alameda 

had the Navy’s largest amount of missile work. 

Finally, Alameda had been selected to provide 

maintenance services to a large amount of Army 

equipment that could be placed in Oakland, 

California as part of a proposed prepositioning plan. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found excess capacity in the 

depot category indicated that three NADEPs 

should be closed. In evaluating combinations 

of open and closed NADEPs, the closure of 

Alameda resulted in less disruption, and lower 

costs. The combination of other NADEPs selected 

to remaining open provided a better overall 

savings, military value and reduction of excess 

capacity. 

The Commission found NADEP Alameda had 

many new, environmentally sound facilities, a 

very diverse workforce, a number of unique 

capabilities, and provided a valuable synergy 

with local Navy activities. The Commission also 

found NADEP Alameda had higher military value 

than credited by the Navy. Nevertheless, NADEP 

Alameda is the most expensive NADEP in terms 

of overall rates, and its operations can easily be 

absorbed by the remaining NADEPs. The 

requirement for a West Coast NADEP is more 

appropriately met by NADEP North Island 

due to its collocation with the San Diego 

Megaport and lower overall rates. 

NADEP Alameda was dependant on the continued operation of the Naval Air Station Alameda. 

Without it, the NADEP would incur the extra 

operating costs associated with the required 

airfield. Due to the Commission’s recommendation to close NAS Alameda, NADEP Alameda 

will lose its tenant status and ability to operate 

cost competitively. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), Alameda and 

relocate repair capability as necessary to other 

depot maintenance activities. This relocation may 

include personnel, equipment and support. 

The depot workload will move to other depot 

maintenance activities, including the private sector. 

Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, 

Virginia 

Category: Naval Aviation Depot 

Mission: Depot Level Aviation Maintenance 

One-time Cost: $ 226 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 158 million 

Payback: 5 years 

Annual: $ 108 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), Norfolk 

and relocate repair capability as necessary to 

other depot maintenance activities. This relocation may include personnel, equipment and 

support. The Depot workload will move to other 

depot maintenance activities, including the 

private sector. 

1-40 
Chapter I 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk is recommended 

for closure because its capacity is excess to that 

required to support the DoD Force Structure 

Plan. Projected reductions require an almost 

50 percent reduction in capacity in the Navy 

aviation depots. In determining the mix of aviation depots which would achieve the maximum 

reduction in excess capacity, the Navy determined that there must be at least one aviation 

depot at a fleet concentration on each coast. 

The work performed at NADEP, Norfolk can 

be performed at other aviation maintenance 

activities, including the private sector. While 

the military value of the Naval Aviation Depot, 

Norfolk was not substantially less than that of 

the Naval Aviation Depots at Cherry Point and 

Jacksonville, those NADEPs possess unique 

features and capabilities which required their 

retention. The closure of NADEP Norfolk will 

reduce excess capacity in this category and maintain or increase the average military value of 

the remaining depots. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community stressed NADEP Norfolk’s 

military value score did not properly credit its 

assets and capabilities. Also, with the concentration of air and sea assets in the Norfolk area, 

the community argued having a NADEP in 

Norfolk provided a valuable synergy which 

resulted in cost and service efficiencies. The 

community claimed NADEP Norfolk had the 

lowest labor costs compared to its counterparts, 

and the very high rate used by the Navy was 

incorrect. In addition, community representatives challenged the Navy’s justification that 

NADEP Norfolk was chosen instead of Cherry 

Point because NADEP Cherry Point had unique 

composite capabilities. Finally, the community 

asserted closing three NADEP’s would eliminate 

too much of the Navy’s in-house capacity; 

therefore, a maximum of two NADEPs should 

be closed. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found excess capacity in the 

depot category which indicated three NADEPS 

should be closed. The Commission agreed with 

the Navy’s military judgement that one NADEP 

must be maintained on each coast. The Commission evaluated scenarios which corrected the 

high rates used by the Navy. 

It also considered the results of other management decisions which would have unfairly 

disadvantaged NADEP Norfolk’s comparison 

to other NADEPS. Even after cost adjustments, 

an objective evaluation and, given the Navy’s 

requirement for a NADEP on each coast, the Commission found the closure of NADEP Norfolk 

resulted in less disruption and lower costs. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), Norfolk and 

relocate repair capability as necessary to other 

depot maintenance activities. This relocation may 

include personnel, equipment and support. The 

Depot workload will move to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector. 

Naval Aviation Depot 

Pensacola, Florida 

Category: Naval Aviation Depot 

Mission: Depot Level Aviation Maintenance 

One-time Cost: $ 214 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $71 million 

Payback: 5 years 

Annual: $ 51 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola (NADEP), 

and relocate repair capability as necessary to 

other depot maintenance activities. This relocation may include personnel, equipment and 

support. The Depot workload will move to 

other depot maintenance activities, including the 

private sector. The dynamic component and 

rotor blade repair facility will remain in place. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola is recommended 

for closure because its capacity is excess to that 

required to support the DoD Force Structure 

Plan. Projected reductions require an almost 

1-41 
Chapter I 

50 percent reduction in capacity in the Navy 

aviation depots. In determining the mix of aviation depots which would achieve the maximum 

reduction in excess capacity the Navy determined that there must be at least one aviation 

depot at a fleet concentration on each coast. 

The work performed at Naval Aviation Depot, 

Pensacola can be performed at other aviation 

maintenance activities, including the private 

sector. The closure of NADEP Alameda will 

reduce excess capacity in this category and 

maintain or increase the average military value 

of the remaining depots. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community suggested the process to determine 

NADEP Pensacola’s military value was flawed 

and deserved a much higher value. It noted closing 

NADEP Pensacola would be a major loss to the 

Navy. It has an extremely diverse workforce, 

performs a high level of interservice work, and 

has skills in the repair and maintenance of 

rotary-wing aircraft and dynamic components. 

Its current configuration is already able to handle 

the new V-22 Osprey. In addition, they asserted 

no other facility could absorb their workload 

without new construction, especially for a whirl 

tower to handle the largest helicopter’s blades. 

The community proposed all of the Navy’s rotarywing workload be moved to Pensacola. This 

scenario, according to their estimates, would 

provide more savings for the Navy. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found NADEP Pensacola’s military value should have been higher due to its 

high level of interservice work, special skills 

and equipment, unique capabilities for doing 

rotary wing work, and diverse workforce. 

The Commission evaluated the unique capabilities of NADEP Pensacola in a variety of 

scenarios to quantify the cost and disruption of 

closing NADEP Pensacola. The Commission 

evaluation noted the need for construction at 

the receiving facilities in order to accommodate 

Pensacola’s workload and unique equipment. 

However, the construction cost was not excessive, 

and did not significantly degrade the potential 

savings derived from closing the NADEP. 

The Commission also found the cost to construct a new whirl tower and to accommodate 

Pensacola’s dynamic component workload at 

NADEP Cherry Point or Corpus Christi Army 

Depot, was far less than the costs associated 

with keeping these activities at Pensacola. 

Therefore, the Commission found it was more 

economical and cost effective to close NADEP 

Pensacola completely. 

In evaluating various closure scenarios, the Commission found closing NADEP Pensacola resulted 

in less disruption and lower costs. The combination of other NADEPs remaining open provided 

a better overall savings, military value and excess 

capacity reduction. 

The Commission found that the Navy considered 

interservicing possibilities when analyzing base 

closure costs. The Navy intended to interservice 

some of its rotary wing work from NADEP 

Pensacola to the Corpus Christi Army Depot, 

and to transfer work it was doing on Air Force 

helicopters to NADEP Cherry Point. The Commission analyzed projected rotary wing workload 

forecasts and found excess capacity existed 

at both the Corpus Christi and Cherry Point 

Depots. Accordingly, the Commission agreed with 

the Navy plan to interservice H-60 and H-1 

rotary wing workload to Corpus Christi Army 

Depot under a depot maintenance interservicing 

agreement. The Commission also agreed transferring the H-2, H-3 and H-53 rotary wing 

workload to NADEP Cherry Point was sound 

policy. This plan would increase facility utilization rates and contribute to reduced overall 

hourly operating costs for both of the receiving 

depots. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from criteria 4 and 5. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: close the Naval Aviation Depot at 

Pensacola, and relocate repair and maintenance 

capabilities for H-1 and H-60 helicopters to 

Corpus Christi Army Depot, and the remaining 

repair and maintenance activities to the NADEP 

at Cherry Point. This relocation will include 

the personnel and equipment needed to accommodate the new work. In addition, the Commission recommends that the whirl tower and 

1-42 
Chapter I 

dynamic component facility be moved to Cherry 

Point Navy or Corpus Christi Army Depots or 

the private sector, in lieu of the Navy’s plan to 

retain these operations in a stand-alone facility 

at NADEP Pensacola. The Commission finds this 

recommendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 

Navd Inventory Controol Points 

Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, 

Category: Inventory Control Point 

Mission: Naval Aviation Logis tical Support 

One-time Cost: NIA 

Savings: NIA 

Payback: NIA 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close the Aviation Supply Office (ASO), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and relocate necessary 

personnel, equipment and support to the Ship 

Parts Control Center (SPCC), Mechanicsburg, 

Pennsylvania. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The reductions in the DoD Force Structure Plan 

equate to a significant workload reduction for 

the Navy’s inventory control points. Since there 

is excess capacity in this category the Navy 

decided to consolidate their two inventory 

control points at one location. A companion 

consideration was the relocation of the Naval 

Supply Systems Command from its present 

location in leased space in the National Capital 

Region, to a location at which it could be collocated with major subordinate organizations. This 

major consolidation of a headquarters with its 

operational components can be accomplished 

at SPCC, Mechanicsburg with a minimum of 

construction and rehabilitation. The end result 

is a significantly more efficient and economical 

organization. 

Pennsylvania 

Annual: NIA 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The Philadelphia community claimed the military value assessment for AS0 Philadelphia 

focused on the installation and geography 

instead of on the intellectual capacity and 

experience of the managers. In addition, the 

community maintained the ASO’s management 

efficiency, which amounted to just 5% of material 

cost, was not considered in the service analysis. 

The community also emphasized savings were 

overstated because they did not reflect the cost 

of operating the ASO. 

The community pointed out AS0 Philadelphia 

was a model of innovation and cost-saving techniques, and movement would require years to 

train a new work force to accomplish the same 

results. The community also stated that a consolidation of other activities in Philadelphia at 

the AS0 compound would save $350 million. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the savings to be realized 

by moving the Naval Aviation Supply Office were 

exaggerated since the AS0 Compound in North 

Philadelphia would remain open even after AS0 

departed, and the facility’s operating costs were 

not included in the cost analysis. The Commission 

did not find a significant synergy from collocating the AS0 with the SPCC in Mechanicsburg, 

Pennsylvania. The cumulative economic impact 

on Philadelphia was also found to be severe, 

with no appreciable savings to the Department 

of Defense. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 4, 5, 6. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: the Naval Aviation Supply Office, 

Philadelphia, PA, remains open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent 

with the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Technical Centers (SPAWAR) 

Naval Air Warfare Center-Aircraft 

Division, Trenton, New Jersey 

Category: Technical Center 

Mission: Research, Development, Testing, 

and Evaluation Support 

One-time Cost: $97.0 million 

Savings: 1994-1999: $31 .O million 

Annual: $ 19.3 million 

Payback: 11 years 

1-43 
Chapter I 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close the Aircraft Division of the Naval Air 

Warfare Center (NAWC) Trenton, New Jersey, 

and relocate appropriate functions, personnel, 

equipment and support to the Arnold Engineering 

Development Center, Tullahoma, Tennessee, and 

the Naval Air Warfare Center, Patuxent River, 

Maryland. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

This technical center is recommended for closure 

because its capacity is excess to that required 

by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess 

capacity in this category based on a comparison 

of budgeted workload during the period 1986- 

1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. A 

review of the Navy budget displays a clear 

decline in the period 1995-1999. As the work 

declines, the excess capacity increases thereby 

requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. 

The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant 

excess capacity as these technical centers were 

established and sized to support significantly 

higher naval force levels and require resource 

levels greatly in excess of those projected.if all 

resources are to be fully employed. Given this 

excess capacity and the imbalance with force 

and resource levels, it is imperative to realign 

and compress wherever possible so that the 

remaining technical centers will have the greater 

military value to the Department of the Navy. 

The closure of the Trenton Detachment completes a realignment of NAWCs approved by 

the 199 1 Defense Base Closure and Realignment 

Commission, with continuing reductions in forces 

being supported and in resource levels. Further 

consolidations are required so that we may have 

the most efficient and economic operation. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community argued Arnold Engineering 

Development Center (AEDC) does not have the 

capacity to assume NAWC’s workload. The community questioned the ability of AEDC and 

Patuxent River to handle the increased workload 

resulting from the 199 1 base closure decision 

to move work out of Trenton. The community 

also pointed to the private sector’s increasing 

interest in getting out of the testing business, 

directing their work to DoD, and making it more 

difficult for AEDC to handle the workload. The 

community also asserted AEDC receives a 

substantial subsidy from the Tennessee Valley 

Authority; should this subsidy be rescinded, the 

cost for AEDC to do business would increase 

significantly. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found that, unlike many of 

the facilities looked at during the process, 

the NAWC at Trenton was fully utilized. The 

Commission also found there is some risk the 

receiving facilities would not be able to handle 

the increased workload. However, privatesector capability offsets this potential risk. In 

sum, the Commission found receiving installations, and the private sector, could accommodate 

the workload from NAWC, Trenton. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria and, therefore, 

the Commission adopts the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Close 

the Aircraft Division of the Naval Air Warfare 

Center (NAWC) Trenton, New Jersey, and relocate 

appropriate functions, personnel, equipment and 

support to the Arnold Engineering Development 

Center, Tullahoma, Tennessee, and the Naval 

Air Warfare Center, Patuxent River, Maryland. 

Naval Air Technical Services Facility 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 

Category: Technical Center 

Mission: Technical Publication Support 

One-time Cost: NIA 

Savings: NIA 

Payback: NIA 

Annual: NIA 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close the Naval Air Technical Services Facility, 

Philadelphia and relocate certain personnel, 

equipment and support to the new Naval Air 

Systems Command Headquarters, Patuxent 

River, Maryland. 

1-44 
Chapter I 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Projected reductions in the DoD Force Structure 

Plan results in a decrease in required technical 

center capacity. Budget levels and the number 

of operating forces being supported by technical centers continue to decline. The technical 

centers throughout the Department of the Navy 

currently have significant excess capacity as these 

technical centers were established and sized to 

support significantly higher force levels and 

require resource levels greatly in excess of those 

projected. Given this excess capacity and the 

imbalance with force and resource levels, it 

is imperative to realign and consolidate wherever 

possible so that the remaining technical centers 

will have the greater military value to the DoD. 

Closure of the Technical Services Facility eliminates .excess capacity and allows the consolidation 

of necessary functions at the new headquarters 

concentration for the Naval Air Systems Command producing economies and efficiencies in 

the management of assigned functions. This 

consolidation will also incorporate the Depot 

Operation Center and the Aviation Maintenance 

Office currently at Patuxent River. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community noted NATSF and the Aviation 

Supply Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, have 

developed a synergistic relationship in putting 

logistics and technical documentation together. 

The community cited the potential for establishing at the facility a central DoD technical 

publications organization. Such an organization 

could eliminate duplicate workload among 

the Services and, thus, save money. Further, 

the community claimed that by remaining in 

Philadelphia along with other interservice 

organizations, NATSF would maintain a high 

degree of perceived impartiality. In contrast, 

moving to NAS Patuxent River would make 

NATSF appear to be a Navy organization. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found DoD had not adequately 

addressed the true costs and potential savings 

of the proposed action. The Commission found 

after segregating this action into a discreet set 

of numbers, the one-time cost of $22 million, 

coupled with a steady state savings of only $800 

thousand, made this an economically unsound 

recommendation. Additionally, the Commission 

found compelling the potential cost savings and 

reduction in workload among the Services of 

establishing a joint organization under the 

auspices of NATSF. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 

4. Therefore, the Commission adopts the following 

recommendation: the Naval Technical Services 

Facility, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, remains open. 

The Commission finds this recommendation 

is consistent with the force-structure plan and 

final criteria. 

Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory 

Port Hueneme, California 

Category: Technical Center 

Mission: Facility Engineering Studies 

One-time Cost: $ 27.0 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $7.4 million. 

Payback: 8 years 

Annual: $37.3 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close this technical center and realign necessary 

functions, personnel, equipment, and support 

at the Construction Battalion Center, Port 

Hueneme, California. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory (NCEL) is 

recommended for closure because its capacity 

is excess to that required by the DoD Force 

Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this 

category based on a comparison of budgeted 

workload during the period 1986-1995 and the 

FY 1995 budgeted workload. A review of the 

Navy budget displays a clear decline in the 

period 1995-1999. Thus, as the work declines, 

the excess capacity increases thereby requiring 

a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the 

Navy currently have significant excess capacity 

as these technical centers were established and 

sized to support significantly higher naval force 

1-45 
Chapter I 

levels and require resource levels greatly in 

excess of those projected if all resources are to 

be fully employed. Given this excess capacity 

and the imbalance with force and resource levels, 

it is imperative to realign and compress wherever 

possible so that the remaining technical centers 

will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy. The Department of the Navy 

will dispose of this property and any proceeds 

will be used to defray base closure expenses. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the required engineering 

service mission areas of NCEL can be performed 

at Construction Battalion Center (CBC) Port 

Hueneme, CA. The move achieved savings in 

facility operations costs and personnel reductions by using common support provided by 

CBC Port Hueneme and also provides a 32-acre 

waterfront property for reuse. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria, and therefore, 

the Commission recommends the following: Close 

Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory (NCEL), Port 

Hueneme, CA, and realign necessary functions, 

personnel, equipment, and support at the 

Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, 

California. 

Naval Electronic Centers 

Charleston, South Carolina; 

Portsmouth, Virginia; St. Inigoes, 

Maryland; and Washington, D.C. 

Category: Technical Center 

Mission: In-Service Engineering 

One-time Cost: $ 44.4 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 32.3 million 

Payback: 11 years 

Annual: $ 11.1 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close Naval Electronics Systems Engineering 

Center (NESEC) St. Inigoes, Maryland, disestablish NESEC Charleston, South Carolina and Naval 

Electronics Security Systems Engineering Center 

(NESSEC), Washington, DC. Consolidate the 

Centers into an East Coast NESEC at Portsmouth, 

Virginia. The ATC/ACLS facility at St. Inigoes 

and the Aegis Radio Room Laboratory will 

remain in place and will be transferred to 

Naval Air Systems Command. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

This recommendation was rejected by the 1991 

DoD Base Closure and Realignment Commission. 

In doing so, the Commission stated that DoD 

had failed to explore other alternative sites and 

had failed to address asserted problems at Portsmouth with testing of radars and communication equipment. Several new factors contributed 

to the renewal of this recommendation. 

The DoD Force Structure Plan shows a significant further decrease in force structure from 

that in 1991, giving rise to additional excess 

capacity. The facilities at St. Inigoes, Maryland, 

once NESEC St. Inigoes relocates to Portsmouth, 

would be available to support the major relocation to the Patuxent River complex of the Naval 

Air Systems Command and several of its subordinate organizations. This move results in both 

substantial organizational efficiencies and economies and is a significant element of the Navy’s 

compliance with the DoD policy to move 

activities out of leased space in the National 

Capital Region (NCR) DoD owned facilities. The 

Portsmouth consolidation includes NESSEC 

Washington, DC, resulting in an additional 

relocation from leased space in the NCR into 

DoD owned facilities. The Portsmouth consolidation also achieves a major reduction in 

excess capacity for these activities and with this 

consolidation in Portsmouth, the Navy Management Support Office can be consolidated at this 

Center. Without the Portsmouth consolidation, 

the benefits resulting from the synergy of consolidating the three centers would not be realized, 

and the reduction in excess capacity would be 

adversely impacted. 

1-46 
Chapter I 

The Portsmouth consolidation utilizes, as the 

magnet site for this consolidation, the installation 

with the highest military value of all activities 

in the cluster. A review of the certified data call 

responses indicates that one of the reasons for 

this military value rating is NESEC Portsmouth‘s 

current capability to perform a broad range of 

testing functions on a wide variety of communications and radar systems, including the 

Submarine Broadcast System, Relocatable Overthe-Horizon Radar, Tactical Secure Voice, and 

the AN/SLQ-32(V) 1/2/3/4/5. At its Fleet 

Engineering Support Center is a completely 

integrated shipboard communications system 

that contains a sample of every communications 

receiver, transmitter, data link and ancillary 

terminal hardware in the LF through UHF 

frequency range. The radar systems testing 

capability is enhanced by the AN/SSQ-74(V) 

Radar and Communications Signal Simulator 

with its associated antenna farm. These capabilities, particularly when joined with those of 

the other activities in this consolidation, gives 

the Navy a most formidable technical center 

which, because of the consolidation, will be able 

to function more economically and efficiently 

than these activities could if separate. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

CHARLESTON 

The community contended the closure of NESEC 

Charleston and other bases in Charleston would 

have a disastrous economic impact on the community. The Charleston area has already lost 

employment due to retrenchment at Naval Shipyard Charleston and expects further losses due 

to cutbacks at the Polaris Missile Facility, 

Atlantic (POMFLANT). The community emphasized the closure of the NESEC alone would 

result in the direct and indirect loss of 3,776 

jobs, or 1.6% of employment base. All of the 

proposed base closures in the Charleston area 

would negatively impact approximately 15% of 

the employment base. It argued that statewide, 

South Carolina stood to be hit harder than 

any other state relative to its population. South 

Carolina would lose one-third of all military 

jobs and one-sixth of all the civilian positions 

in this round of base closures. 

PORTSMOUTH 

The community indicated electro-magnetic 

interference was not a problem. It claimed the 

NESEC needs to remain in the Norfolk area. 

ST. INlGOES 

The community contended the military value 

grade for Naval Electronics Systems Engineering 

Activity (NESEA) St. Inigoes was understated 

because of miscalculations in the technical, 

facilities, manpower and location categories. Also 

the community claimed they did not get credit 

for area quality of life capabilities and pointed 

out NESEA St. Inigoes had a unique combination of facilities suited to its mission that would 

not be available at Portsmouth. Accordingly, they 

asserted there would be a high loss of skilled 

personnel who would not relocate, resulting in 

a significantly reduced Navy capability. It also 

stated that concerns about the consolidation 

expressed by the 1991 Commission were not 

addressed by the Navy in 1993. The community also expressed concern about the sharply 

increased unemployment in St. Mary’s County, 

Maryland, associated with the closure of NESEA, 

St. Inigoes that would take place if the NCR 

relocation does not backfill through the transfer 

of Naval Air System Command to NAS Patuxent 

River, MD. 

WASHINGTON 

There were not formal expressions from the 

community. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission fully supports the Navy’s effort 

to consolidate the Naval Electronics Systems 

Engineering Centers and Activities. However, 

the Commission found that while NESEC 

Portsmouth is not responsible for electromagnetic interference (EMI) problems, the EM1 

situation in Portsmouth is of sufficient concern 

that it should not be the East Coast Electronics 

Center. Furthermore, the cost of renovating and 

building facilities at St. Julien’s Creek was found 

to be unacceptably high. The Commission found 

the most economical solution providing a relatively EM1 free environment is the consolidation 

1-47 
-- 

Chapter I 

of the NESECs and NESEA at Charleston, South 

Carolina. Finally the cumulative economic impact 

resulting from Commission recommendations to 

close multiple Charleston Naval facilities would 

be severe. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 2, 5 

and 6. Therefore, the Commission recommends 

the following: Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center (NESEC), Charleston remains 

open and becomes the new East Coast lead 

facility. The Commission provides for the 

retention of Charleston Naval Station and 

Naval Shipyard facilities that are deemed 

necessary to establish or support this East 

Coast NESEC. NESSEC, Washington closes and 

moves to NESEC, Charleston. NESEC, Portsmouth 

closes and moves to NESEC, Charleston, except 

for a detachment of fewer than 60 people. 

NESEA, St. Inigoes closes and moves to NESEC, 

Charleston. Module Maintenance Facility moves 

from Charleston Naval Shipyard to NESEC 

Charleston. The ATCIACLS facility, the Aegis 

Radio Room Laboratory, Identify Friend or Foe, 

Light Airborne Multipurpose System (LAMPS), 

and special warfare joint program support 

at St. Inigoes will remain in place and will be 

transferred to Naval Air Systems Command. The 

Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Navy Radio Transmission Facility 

Annapolis, Maryland 

Category: Telecommunications Activity 

Mission: Naval Telecommunications 

Onetime Cost: $ -0.5 million (Savings) 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 6.025 million 

Payback: Immediate 

Annual: $ 137 thousand 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Disestablish the Navy Radio Transmission Facility 

(NRTF), Annapolis. The Navy shall retain the 

real property on which this facility resides. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

This action is recommended to eliminate redundancy in geographic coverage in Naval telecommunications. Projected reductions contained in 

the DoD Force Structure Plan support a decrease 

in telecommunications capacity. South-Atlantic 

VLF communications coverage is duplicated by 

the NRTF Annapolis and NCTS Puerto Rico, 

and the Mid-Atlantic VLF by NRTF Annapolis 

and NRTF Cutler, Maine. Since both the Puerto 

Rico and the Maine facilities also are the sole 

coverage for another geographic area, and since 

NRTF Annapolis is not, it could be disestablished 

without eliminating coverage. The property on 

which this activity has been sited will be 

retained by the Navy to support educational 

requirements at the Naval Academy. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community argued the NRTF Annapolis 

signal was more dependable than NRTF Cutler, 

Maine. The community believed the work of 

NRTF Annapolis could be done with substantially fewer people than are used presently creating 

a greater cost savings. This cost savings would 

allow the Navy to maintain the radio facility. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the transmission coverage 

of NRTF Annapolis created a redundancy in 

the area covered. The primary facility, NRTF 

Cutler, Maine, was essential to the geographic 

configuration of the Naval telecommunications 

mission. The Commission found NRTF Annapolis 

could be eliminated with no loss of transmission coverage. The retained land would be 

utilized by the U.S. Naval Academy to support 

educational requirements. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: disestablish the Navy Radio Transmission Facility 

Annapolis, Maryland. The Navy shall retain the 

real property on which this facility resides. 

1-48 
Chapter I 

Navy Radio Transmission Facility 

Category: Telecommunications Activity 

Mission: Naval Telecommunications 

One-time Cost: $478 thousand 

Savings: 1994-99: $9.821 million 

Payback: Immediate 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close the Navy Radio Transmission Facility 

(NRTF), Driver. 

Driver, Virginia 

Annual: $2.06 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

This closure is recommended to eliminate redundancy in geographic coverage in Naval telecommunications. Projected reductions contained in 

the DoD Force Structure Plan support a decrease 

in telecommunications capacity. Mid-Atlantic 

high frequency communications coverage is 

duplicated by NRTF Driver and NRTF Saddle 

Branch, Florida. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the coverage provided 

by NRTF Driver was redundant to the coverage 

provided by NRTF Saddle Branch. The primary 

facility, NRTF Saddle Branch, was essential to 

the geographic configuration of the Naval 

telecommunications mission. The Commission 

found NRTF Driver could be eliminated without 

loss of transmission coverage. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: Close 

the Navy Radio Transmission Facility (NRTF), 

Driver, Virginia. 

Technical Centevs (NAVSEA) 

Naval Surface Warfare CenterDahlgren, White Oak Detachment, 

White Oak, Maryland 

Category: Technical Center 

Mission: Research, Development, Testing, 

and Evaluation Support 

One-time Cost: $ 74.6 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ -33.2 million (Cost) 

Payback: 9 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Disestablish the White Oak Detachment of 

the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), 

(Dahlgren), located at White Oak, Maryland. 

Relocate its functions, personnel, equipment 

and support to NSWC-Dahlgren, Virginia. The 

property and facilities at White Oak will be 

retained for use by the Navy so that it may, 

among other things, relocate the Naval Sea 

Systems (NAVSEA) Command from leased 

space in Arlington, Virginia. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

This technical center is recommended for closure 

because its capacity is excess to that required 

by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess 

capacity in this category based on a comparison 

of budgeted workload during the period 1986- 

1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. 

A review of the Navy budget displays a clear 

decline in the period 1995-1999. As the work 

declines, the excess capacity increases thereby 

requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. 

The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess 

capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher 

naval force levels and require resource levels 

greatly in excess of those projected if all 

resources are to be fully employed. Given this 

excess capacity and the imbalance with force 

and resource levels, it is imperative to realign 

and compress wherever possible so that the 

remaining technical centers will have the greater 

military value to the Department of the Navy. 

Annual: $ 21.9 million 

1-49 
Chapter I \+* 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the consolidation of 

personnel and functions contained in this 

recommendation makes sense from an operational perspective. The Commission also found 

the driving factor behind this planned action is 

not predicated upon, nor dependent upon, other 

actions within the National Capital Region. 

The Secretary suggested a revision to his March 

1993 recommendation. The Commission found 

that the revised proposal had a higher military 

value and should be adopted. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds that the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from the force structure 

and final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish the 

White Oak Detachment of the Naval Surface 

Warfare Center (NSWC), (Dahlgren), located at 

White Oak, MD. Relocate its functions, personnel, 

equipment, and support to NSWC-Dahlgren, VA, 

NSWC-Indian Head, Indian Head, MD, and 

NSWC-Dahlgren, Coastal Systems Station, 

Panama City, FL. The property and facilities at 

White Oak will be retained for use by the Navy 

so that it may, among other things, relocate the 

Naval Sea Systems (NAVSEA) Command from 

leased space in Arlington, VA. The Commission 

finds this recommendation is consistent with 

the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Naval Surface Warfare CenterCarderock, Annapolis Detachment, 

Annapolis, Maryland 

Category: Technical Center 

Mission: Research, Development, Testing, 

And Evaluation Support 

One-time Cost: NIA 

Savings: NIA 

Payback: N/A 

Annual: NIA 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Disestablish the Naval Surface Warfare Center 

(NSWC)-Carderock, Annapolis Detachment, 

Annapolis, Maryland, and relocate the necessary 

functions, personnel, equipment and support 

to the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC)- 

Carderock, Philadelphia Detachment, Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania, and N SWC-Carderock, Bethesda, 

Maryland. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

This technical center is recommended for 

disestablishment because its capacity is excess 

to that required by the DoD Force Structure 

Plan. There is excess capacity in this category 

based on a comparison of budgeted workload 

during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 

budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget 

displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. 

Thus, as the work declines, the excess capacity 

increases thereby requiring a reduction in 

facilities and personnel. The technical centers 

throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these 

technical centers were established and sized to 

support significantly higher naval force levels 

and require resource levels greatly in excess of 

those projected if all resources are to be fully 

employed. Given this excess capacity and the 

imbalance with force and resource levels, it is 

imperative to realign and compress wherever 

possible so that the remaining technical centers 

will have the greater military value to the 

Department of the Navy. 

COMMUNIN CONCERNS 

The Annapolis community stressed in 1991 the 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission found NSWC Annapolis essential to 

current and future mission requirements. The 

community noted the site facilities were acknowledged to be superior by the 1991 Commission. 

The community also highlighted the high 

retention rates among an extremely educated 

and experienced staff. It also emphasized the 

Navy’s analysis of excess capacity was global 

and not specific to the work done at NSWC 

Annapolis. The community maintained the 

1-50 
Chapter I 

services provided by NSWC Annapolis were 

essential regardless of downsizing, and it would 

be expensive and time-consuming to replicate 

the facility’s services elsewhere. The community 

also objected to the Navy’s plan to implement this 

realignment proposal since it would require engineers to commute to Annapolis, Maryland, from 

their new offices in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 

and Bethesda, Maryland in order to conduct 

routine on-going research and development. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the DoD recommendation overstated the potential savings from the 

proposed action by not taking into account added 

costs and inefficiencies, resulting from having 

engineering personnel separated from their 

test facility. Additionally, one of the primary 

motives of this recommendation appears to be 

reduction in personnel. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 4 and 

5 and, therefore, adopts the following recommendation: the Naval Surface Warfare Center, 

Annapolis, MD, remains open and is not 

disestablished. The Commission finds this 

recommendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 

Naval Surface Warfare CenterPort Hueneme, Virginia Beach 

Detachment, Virginia Beach, 

Virginia 

Category: Technical Center 

Mission: Technical Support of Shipboard Systems 

One-time Cost: $ 2.0 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 8.1 million 

Payback: 3 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Disestablish the Virginia-Beach Detachment of 

the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme 

and relocate its functions, personnel, equipment 

and support to the Fleet Combat Training Center, 

Dam Neck, Virginia. 

Annual: $ 6.9 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

This technical center is recommended for 

disestablishment because its capacity is excess 

to that required by the DoD Force Structure 

Plan. There is excess capacity in this category 

based on a comparison of budgeted workload 

during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 

budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget 

displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. 

As the work declines, the excess capacity 

increases thereby requiring a reduction in 

facilities and personnel. The technical centers 

throughout the Department of the Navy 

currently have significant excess capacity as these 

technical centers were established and sized to 

support significantly higher naval force levels 

and require resource levels greatly in excess of 

those projected if all resources are to be fully 

employed. Given this excess capacity and the 

imbalance with force and resource levels, it is 

imperative to realign and compress wherever 

possible so that the remaining technical centers 

will have the greater military value to the 

Department of the Navy. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community argued relocating the Virginia 

Beach Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare 

Center, Port Hueneme, to the Fleet Combat Training 

Center, Dam Neck, Virginia, would destroy 

in-service engineering workload synergies 

created by the 1991 Defense Base Closure’s 

realignment of the Virginia Beach Detachment 

of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port 

Hueneme, to FCDSSA Dam Neck. Further, the 

community pointed out the irrationality of moving 

the Virginia Beach Detachment of the Naval 

Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, away 

from a similar in-service engineering function 

to the Fleet Combat Training Center Atlantic, 

Dam Neck, Virginia, which is a training function. 

The community also contended the 1993 Defense 

Base Closure Commission’s estimated savings 

reflect planned personnel reductions, not 

reductions in overhead costs. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the proposed disestablishment involved a minimal physical 

relocation. The proposed move to a larger base 

1-51 
=+- _. Chapter I 

would allow the Navy to gain some operational 

efficiencies not otherwise achievable. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria, and therefore 

the Commission adopts the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: disestablish 

the Virginia Beach Detachment of the Naval 

Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, and 

relocate its functions, personnel, equipment, 

and support to the Fleet Combat Training 

Center, Dam Neck, Virginia. 

Naval Undersea Warfare CenterNorfolk Detachment , Norfolk, 

Virginia 

Category: Technical Center 

Mission: In-service engineering in support 

of underwater vehicles 

One-time Cost: $ 18.0 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 6.0 million 

Payback: 6 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Disestablish the Norfolk Detachment of the 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport, Rhode 

Island, and relocate its functions, personnel, 

equipment and support to the Naval Undersea 

Warfare Center (NUWC), Newport, Rhode Island. 

Annual: $ 5.0 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

This technical center is recommended for closure 

because its capacity is excess to that required 

by the approved DoD Force Structure Plan. There 

is excess capacity in this category based on a 

comparison of budgeted workload during the 

period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted 

workload. A review of the Navy budget displays 

a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. Thus, 

as the work declines, the excess capacity 

increases thereby requiring a reduction in 

facilities and personnel. The technical centers 

throughout the Department of the Navy 

currently have significant excess capacity as 

these technical centers were established and sized 

to support significantly higher naval force levels 

and require resource levels greatly in excess of 

those projected if all resources are to be fully 

employed. Given this excess capacity and the 

imbalance with force and resource levels, it is 

imperative to realign and compress wherever 

possible so that the remaining technical centers 

will have the greater military value to the 

Department of the Navy. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community believed the Navy understated 

the Warfare Center’s military value ranking by 

not fully considering the installation’s wide range 

of engineering and logistics services. The community stated in-service engineering facilities 

should be located near fleet customers to be 

responsive. By moving the Center’s activities to 

Newport, Rhode Island, the Navy would be 

moving those services farther away from the 

customers. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the Navy had understated the costs associated with the proposed 

closure of NUWC Norfolk in two areas. First, 

transportation costs associated with the proposed 

relocation of activities had been underestimated. 

Second, the cost to the Navy of getting out of 

its current lease in Norfolk had not been 

adequately stated. The Commission also found the 

activities in Newport and Norfolk were organizationally linked, and increased efficiencies and 

synergy would be gained from their collocation. This increase in the operational 

functioning of the combined organization outweighs the costs associated with the closure 

of the Norfolk facility, and the resulting 

relocation to Newport. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, the 

Commission adopts the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: disestablish 

the Norfolk Detachment of the Naval Undersea 

Warfare Center, Newport, Rhode Island, and 

relocate its functions, personnel, equipment and 

support to the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, 

Newport, Rhode Island. 

1-52 
Chapter I 

Planning, Engineering for Repair 

and Alteration Centers (PERA) 

Category: Technical Centers 

Mission: Ship Repair Planning 

PERA (CV) 

One-time Cost: $ 6.3 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ -4.46 million (Cost) 

Annual: $ 0.74 million 

Payback: I7 years 

PERA (All others cmnbined) 

One-time Cost: $ 8.9 million 

Savings: $ 1.2 million 

Payback: 7 years 

Annual: $ 2.3 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Disestablish the following four technical centers 

and relocate necessary functions, personnel, 

equipment, and support at the Supervisor of 

Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, San Diego, 

California, Portsmouth, Virginia and Newport 

News, Virginia: 

(PERA)- (CV) , Bremerton, Washington, 

(PEFL4)-(Surface) Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia, 

(PERA)-(Surface) Pacific, San Francisco, 

(PERA)-(Surface) (HQ), Philadelphia, 

California, 

Pennsylvania. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

These technical centers are recommended for 

disestablishment because their capacity is excess 

to that required by the DoD Force Structure 

Plan. There is excess capacity in this category 

based on a comparison of budgeted workload 

during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 

budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget 

displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. 

Thus, as the work declines, the excess capacity 

increases thereby requiring a reduction in 

facilities and personnel. The technical centers 

throughout the Department of the Navy 

currently have significant excess capacity as 

these technical centers were established and 

sized to support significantly higher naval force 

levels and require resource levels greatly in 

excess of those projected if all resources are to 

be fully employed. Given this excess capacity 

and the imbalance with force and resource 

levels, it is imperative to realign and compress 

wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value 

to the Department of the Navy. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

(PERA Surface, Philadelphia) 

The community stated the Navy’s study of PERA 

Philadelphia was fundamentally flawed because 

the community alleged the Navy did not use 

certified data. Furthermore, the community 

claimed the Navy’s proposal could not realize 

real savings in either personnel or monetary terms 

because the projected elimination of positions 

could not actually occur. The community also 

stated the Navy did not consider an alternative 

proposal from the community that would save 

$16 million. 

(PERA CV, Bremerton) 

The community stated the mission of PERA (CV) 

was substantially different from both PERA 

(Surface) and Supervisor of Shipbuilding. It 

noted the move of PERA (CV) would not breakeven for seventeen years-the longest break-even 

period of any naval activity recommended for 

closure or realignment. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

In the case of PERA (HQ) Philadelphia, the Commission found the Navy’s recommendation was 

based on certified data, and the personnel 

reductions proposed by the Navy were reasonable. The consolidation proposed for the PERA 

centers allows for efficiencies of collocation. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: disestablish the following four technical centers 

and relocate necessary functions, personnel, 

equipment, and support at the Supervisor 

of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, San 

Diego, California, Portsmouth, Virginia and 

Newport News, Virginia: 

1-53 
Chapter I 

(PERA)-( CV) , Bremerton, Washington, 

(PEW)-(Surface) Atlantic, Norfolk, 

@ERA)-(Surface) Pacific, San Francisco, 

(PERA)-(Surface) (HQ), Philadelphia, 

Virginia, 

California, 

Pennsylvania, 

Sea Automated Data Systems Activity 

Indian Head, Maryland 

Category: Technical Center 

Mission: Data Automation Support 

One-time Cost: $ -0.1 million (Savings) 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 0.1 million 

Payback: 6 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Disestablish the Sea Automated Data Systems 

Activity (SEAADSA) and relocate necessary functions, personnel, equipment, and support at Naval 

Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Indian Head, 

Maryland. 

Annual: $ 0.5 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

This technical center is recommended for 

disestablishment because its capacity is excess 

to that required by the DoD Force-Structure 

Plan. There is excess capacity in this category 

based on a comparison of budgeted workload 

during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 

budget workload. A review of the Navy budget 

displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. 

Thus, as the work declines, the excess capacity 

increases thereby requiring a reduction in 

facilities and personnel. The technical centers 

throughout the Department of the Navy 

currently have significant excess capacity as these 

technical centers were established and sized to 

support significantly higher naval force levels 

and require resource levels greatly in excess of 

those projected if all resources are to be fully 

employed. Given this excess capacity and the 

imbalance with force and resource levels, it is 

imperative to realign and compress wherever 

possible so that the remaining technical centers 

will have the greater military value to the 

Department of the Navy. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found there was excess capacity in the Technical Center base category. 

Considering the need to realign and consolidate these facilities wherever possible, and 

considering the feasibility of consolidating this 

facility in particular, the Commission found it 

was in the best interests of the Navy to disestablish 

SEAADSA Indian Head, MD. The proposed 

action is primarily organizational. The onetime costs of the proposed action are negligible, 

and the disestablishment of SEAADSA pays 

for itself almost immediately. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission adopts the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Disestablish 

the Sea Automated Data Systems Activity 

(SEAADSA) and relocate necessary functions, 

personnel, equipment, and support at Naval 

Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Indian Head, 

Maryland. 

Submarine Maintenance, 

Engineering, Planning and 

Procurement, Portsmouth, 

New Hampshire 

Category: Technical Center 

Mission: Ship Repair Planning 

One-time Cost: $ 1.2 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 8.7 million 

Payback: 3 years 

Annual: $ 2.6 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Disestablish the Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning and Procurement (SUBMEPP), 

New Hampshire, and relocate the necessary 

functions, personnel, equipment, and support 

at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery, Maine. 

1-54 
Chapter I 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

This technical center is recommended for 

disestablishment because its capacity is excess 

to that required by the DoD Force Structure 

Plan. There is excess capacity in this category 

based on a comparison of budgeted workload 

during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 

budget workload. A review of the Navy budget 

displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. 

Thus, as the work declines, the excess capacity 

increases thereby requiring a reduction in 

facilities and personnel. The technical centers 

throughout the Department of the Navy 

currently have significant excess capacity as 

these technical centers were established and sized 

to support significantly higher naval force 

levels and require resource levels greatly in 

excess of those projected if all resources are to 

be fully employed. Given this excess capacity 

and the imbalance with force and resource 

levels, it is imperative to realign and compress 

wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value 

to the Department of the Navy. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The employees expressed concern that, as a part 

of the shipyard, SUBMEPP might be forced to 

raise their man-day rate, thereby decreasing their 

ability to serve the fleet. It also noted they are 

expected to represent the customers of the shipyard, and might not be viewed as an honest 

broker if not established as a tenant command 

of the shipyard. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the Navy decision was 

based on sound data. Once moved to the shipyard, the former SUBMEPP would remain 

under the jurisdiction of the Naval Sea Systems 

Command, which could determine the most 

effective management organization. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: 

disestablish the Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning and Procurement (SUBMEPP) , 

New Hampshire, and relocate the necessary functions, personnel, equipment, and support at 

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery, Maine. 

Naval Supply Centus 

Fleet and Industrial Supply 

Center (Naval Supply Center) 

Charleston, South Carolina 

Category: Supply Center 

Mission: Supply Support 

One-time Cost: $ 9 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 23.2 million 

Annual: $ 10.6 million 

Payback: Immediate 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Disestablish the Fleet and Industrial Supply 

Center (Naval Supply Center) Charleston. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply 

Center) Charleston’s capacity is excess to the 

requirements of the DoD Force Structure Plan. 

The principal customers of Fleet and Industrial 

Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Charleston, 

the Charleston Naval Shipyard and the Naval 

Station Charleston, have been recommended for 

closure. The workload of Fleet and Industrial 

Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Charleston 

will move with its customer’s workload to 

receiving bases. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The Charleston community asserted a large number 

of people will still be needed to support contracting throughout the Southeast as well as 

various supply functions in the Charleston area. 

The community also pointed out that the retention of the quality jobs at FISC Charleston would 

help to mitigate the cumulative economic impact of the recommended closure of multiple 

activities in the Charleston area. The community further emphasized the cumulative economic 

impact on Charleston will be even greater when 

combined with the significant drawdowns that 

have already occurred since 1989. 

1-55 
11. 

Chapter I f 

The community viewed the amount of shipping 

required to move materials to Norfolk as unrealistically low. The community also suggested that 

Cheatham Annex be closed instead of the Fleet 

and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply 

Center), Charleston because it had a lower 

military value. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found that despite the closure 

of Charleston’s Shipyard and Naval Station, there 

still remains sufficient workload to justify the 

existence of a supply presence in the Charleston 

area, in the form of a downsized FISC to support Navy requirements in the region now served 

by FISC Charleston. FISC Charleston has been 

the major contracting office for Navy and other 

Government agencies in the Southeastern United 

States and has an expertise in this area which 

could be retained in the downsized FISC. The 

total closure of FISC Charleston would leave 

that area, including the Weapons Station and 

the Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center, 

without contract and supply support that FISC 

did provide. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 1. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: partially disestablish Naval Supply 

Center (NSC) Charleston, South Carolina, and 

retain the facilities and personnel appropriate 

for the continued support of Navy activities 

in the Charleston, South Carolina area. The 

Commission finds this recommendation is 

consistent with the force-structure plan and 

final criteria. 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center 

(Naval Supply Center) 

Oakland, California 

Category: Supply Center 

Mission: Supply Support 

One=time Cost: NIA 

Savings: NIA 

Payback: NIA 

Annual: NIA 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center 

(Naval Supply Center) Oakland, including the 

Naval Supply Depot, Point Molate, and relocate 

two supply ships to the Fleet and Industrial 

Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), San Diego. 

The Office of the Military Sealift Command, 

Pacific Division, relocates to leased space in the 

Oakland area. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center’s (Naval Supply 

Center), Oakland, capacity is excess to the 

requirements of the DoD Force Structure Plan. 

The principal customers of Fleet and Industrial 

Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Oakland; 

Naval Aviation Depot, Alameda; Naval Hospital, 

Oakland; Mare Island Naval Shipyard and 

Naval Station Treasure Island have also been 

recommended for closure. The workload of Fleet 

and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply 

Center) Oakland will move with its customers 

to other locations. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The Oakland community argued the Fleet and 

Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), 

Oakland, is located at a major transportation 

hub on the west coast that uniquely offers access 

to air, rail, land, and sea transportation ports. 

The community added the Fleet and Industrial 

Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), Oakland, 

has legal authority to negotiate a lease with the 

Port of Oakland for the port to construct a 

new container facility on Fleet and Industrial 

Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), Oakland, 

property. It pointed out the lease payments would 

support Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval 

Supply Center) operations and the Navy still 

has reversion rights in contingency situations, 

which are statutorily protected. 

The Oakland community argued the Oakland 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center’s (Naval Supply 

Center) major customers were not local. The 

center’s major customers were the ships located 

throughout the Western Pacific commands. 

1-56 
Chapter I 

The community further argued the Fleet and 

Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), 

Oakland, also acted as a naval station and was 

the primary berthing site for ships officially 

homeported at Naval Weapons Station, Concord, 

CA. In addition, Fleet and Industrial Supply 

Center (Naval Supply Center), Oakland, had 

many tenants and not all costs were identified 

to relocate these tenants. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the Secretary of Defense 

based his recommendation to close the Fleet 

and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply 

Center), Oakland on the excess capacity found 

in the overall capability at the Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers. 

The primary customers of the Center are not 

local. The ships and shore commands found in 

the Mid- and Western Pacific rely extensively 

on FISC Oakland for supply support. While many 

of the Center’s local customers are being closed, 

this workload is only a small part of the 

business base, thus justifying retention of FISC 

Oakland. 

The Commission found the Fleet and Industrial 

Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), Oakland 

was ideally located on the west coast in a major 

transportation hub offering major access to air, 

rail, land, and sea transportation ports which 

greatly enhances it military value. 

The Commission also found that the quality, 

and often minority, jobs retained at FISC 

Oakland helped to mitigate the cumulative economic impacts of other Bay Area commands 

recommended for closure. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from criteria 1, 3 and 

6. Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: Naval Supply Center (NSC) Oakland, 

California, remains open. The Commission finds 

this recommendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center 

(Naval Supply Center) 

Pensacola, Florida 

Category: Supply Center 

Mission: Logistics Support for the Naval Aviation 

One-time Cost: $7.9 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $29.06 million 

Annual: $ 6.7 million 

Payback: 0 years 

Depot Pensacola 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Disestablish the Naval Supply Center (NSC) 

Pensacola. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

NSC Pensacola’s capacity is excess to the 

requirements of the DoD Force Structure Plan. 

The principal customer of NSC Pensacola, the 

Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, is also recommended for closure. The workload of NSC 

Pensacola will move with its customers’ workload to receiving bases. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community stated that personnel from the 

local commands’ supply departments were transferred to what is now Fleet and Industrial 

Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), Pensacola, 

in order to partially staff that organization. Therefore, savings would be substantially less than 

perceived by the Navy, even if NADEP Pensacola 

were closed because the remaining activities could 

require the logistics support of the Fleet and 

Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center). 

It was also a concern of the community if NADEP 

Pensacola remained open, all supply support 

for this activity would have to come from NADEP 

Jacksonville, which it perceives to be inadequate 

support. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the Fleet and Industrial 

Supply Center’s (Naval Supply Center) primary 

customer at Pensacola is the Naval Aviation 

1-57 
Chapter I 

Depot. The Commission found that since the 

Naval Aviation Depot is recommended by the 

Commission for closure, the workload requirement would diminish significantly and excess 

capacity would result. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: disestablish the Naval Supply Center (NSC), Pensacola. 

National Capital Regional (NCR) 

Activities 

National Capital Regional (NCR) 

Activities 

Category: National Capital Region 

Mission: Personnel 

One-time Cost: $ 427 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ -66 million (Cost) 

Annual: $ 110 million 

Payback: 2-1 4 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Realign Navy National Capital Region activities 

and relocate them as follows: 

Naval Air Systems Command 

to Naval Air Station 

Patuxent River, Maryland 

Naval Supply Systems Command 

(Including Food Service System 

Office, and Defense Printing 

Management Systems Office) 

to Ship Parts Control Center 

Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania 

Bureau of Naval Personnel 

(Including Office of Military 

Manpower Management) to 

Naval Air Station 

Memphis, Tennessee 

Naval Recruiting Command 

to Naval Training Center 

Great Lakes, Illinois 

Naval Security Group Command 

(Including Security Group Station 

and Security Group Detachment, 

Potomac) to National Security Agency 

Fort Meade, Maryland 

Tactical Support Office to 

I Commander-in-Chief 

Atlantic Fleet 

Norfolk, Virginia 

Relocate the following National Capital Region 

activities from leased space to Govemment-owned 

space within the NCR, to include the Navy Annex, Arlington, Virginia; Washington Navy Yard, 

Washington, D.C.; 3801 Nebraska Avenue, Washington, D.C.; Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; or the White 

Oak facility, Silver Spring, Maryland: 

Naval Sea Systems Command 

Naval Facilities Engineering Command 

Space and Naval Warfare Systems 

Office of the General Counsel 

Office of the Judge Advocate General 

Navy Field Support Activity 

Office of the Secretary of the Navy 

Legislative Affairs 

Program Appraisal 

Comptroller 

Inspector General 

Information 

Command 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 

Office of Civilian Manpower Management 

International Programs Office 

Combined Civilian Personnel Office 

Navy Regional Contracting Center 

Naval Criminal Investigative Service 

Naval Audit Service 

Strategic Systems Programs Office 

Office of Naval Research 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff 

(Installations & Logistics), 

U.S. Marine Corps 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff 

(Manpower & Reserve Affairs), 

U.S. Marine Corps 

Marine Corps Systems Command 

(Clarendon Office) 

1-58 
Chapter I 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The State of Virginia, and Arlington County in 

particular, argued they would suffer an unfair 

and disproportionate share of job losses from 

the recommended NCR actions. The community also challenged the COBRA cost savings 

estimated for these recommendations. It asserted 

the military construction (MILCON) and travel 

costs were understated at receiver locations, 

present and future lease costs for current office 

space were overstated, and the elimination of 

personnel associated with these realignments and 

relocations relied on unsubstantiated expectations. Further, the community asserted all 

required personnel reductions could be made 

in place. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found cost savings produced 

through realigning NCR activities were substantial. 

The Commission found significant military value 

in the consolidation of NCR missions at receiver 

locations. With respect to various unsolicited 

and revocable lease and sale offers for buildings 

in Northern Virginia presently occupied by Navy 

tenants, the Commission did not have the information or expertise to evaluate properly whether 

the “offers” provided the best value to the government or if they met the Navy’s requirements. 

Moreover, the Commission was not the appropriate entity to accept or reject the proposals. 

If, after careful scrutiny of these or other 

proposals, the Navy wishes to seek purchase of 

these or any facilities, it can submit a recommended change concerning these NCR activities 

to the 1995 Commission. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission found the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: 

Realign Navy National Capital Region 

activities and relocate them as follows: 

Naval Air Systems Command to 

Naval Air Station 

Patuxent River, Maryland 

Naval Supply Systems Command 

(Including Food Service System 

Office, and Defense Printing 

Management Systems Office) 

to Ship Parts Control Center 

Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania 

Bureau of Naval Personnel 

(Including Office of Military 

Manpower Management) to 

Naval Air Station 

Memphis, Tennessee 

Naval Recruiting Command 

to Naval Training Center 

Great Lakes, Illinois 

Naval Security Group Command 

(Including Security Group Station 

and Security Group Detachment, 

Potomac) to National Security Agency 

Fort Meade, Maryland 

Tactical Support Office 

to Commander-in-Chief 

Atlantic Fleet 

Norfolk, Virginia 

Relocate the following National Capital 

Region activities from leased space to 

Government-owned space within the 

NCR, to include the Navy Annex, 

Arlington, Virginia; Washington Navy 

Yard, Washington, D.C.; 3801 Nebraska 

Avenue, Washington, D.C.; Marine Corps 

Combat Development Command, Quantico, 

Virginia; or the White Oak facility, Silver 

Spring, Maryland: 

Naval Sea Systems Command 

Naval Facilities Engineering Command 

Space and Naval Warfare Systems 

Office of the General Counsel 

Office of the Judge Advocate General 

Navy Field Support Activity 

Office of the Secretary of the Navy 

Legislative Affairs 

Program Appraisal 

Comptroller 

Inspector General 

Information 

Command 

1-59 
Chapter L h I 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 

Office of Civilian Manpower Management 

International Programs Office 

Combined Civilian Personnel Office 

Navy Regional Contracting Center 

Naval Criminal Investigative Service 

Naval Audit Service 

Strategic Systems Programs Office 

fice of Naval Research 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff 

(Installations 6s Logistics), 

U.S. Marine Corps 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff 

(Manpower Q Reserve Affairs), 

US. Marine Corps 

(Clarendon Office) 

Marine Corps Systems Command 

Other Naval Bases 

1st Marine Corps District 

Garden City, New York 

Category: Administrative Activity 

Mission: Recruiting Support 

One-time Cost: $ N/A 

Savings: 1994-99: $ N/A 

Payback: N/A 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close the 1st Marine District, Garden City, New 

York and relocate necessary personnel, equipment and support to the Defense Distribution 

Region East, New Cumberland, Pennsylvania. 

The Defense Contract Management Area Office, 

a present tenant in the facility occupied by this 

activity as its host, will remain in place and 

assume responsibility for this facility. The Marine 

Corps Reserve Center, Garden City will relocate to Fort Hamilton, New York. 

Annual: $ N/A 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The reductions in force structure require a 

reduction of capacity in administrative activities. Consolidation of this activity into a joint 

services organization will enhance its ability 

to discharge its mission most effectively and 

economically. 

COMMUNIN CONCERNS 

The community opposed the relocation of the 

First Marine Corps District to New Cumberland, 

Pennsylvania. Citing the long history of Marine 

service in Garden City, the community asserted 

the Marines were an integral part of the community. The Marine Corps supported relocation 

of this recruiting support activity to Pennsylvania 

to locate it more centrally within the nine-state 

area it services. However, relocation of the 

Marine Corps Reserve Activity to Fort Hamilton, 

Brooklyn, New York, would not be cost effective since Fort Hamilton does not have adequate 

facilities. The community suggested an alternative to collocate with an existing reserve facility 

within a reasonable commuting distance from 

Garden City, or become a tenant of the Defense 

Contract Management Area Office. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found military construction 

would be required at Fort Hamilton, New York, 

to accommodate the relocation of the Marine 

Corps Reserve Center. The Commission found 

this additional military construction was neither 

cost effective nor necessary from a military 

perspective. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 

4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: the 1st Marine Corps District, Garden 

City, New York, will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

DoD Family Housing and Family 

Housing Office, Niagara Falls, 

New York 

Category: Miscellaneous Other Support Activities 

Mission: To provide housing for military personnel 

One-time Cost: $ .1 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 7.9 million 

Annual: $ 1.5 million 

Payback: Immediate 

1-60 
Chapter I 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close the DoD Family Housing Office and the 

11 1 housing units it administers. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The force reductions in the DOD Force Structure Plan require reduction of support activities 

as well. This activity administers housing units 

which are old and substandard and expensive 

to maintain. These housing units are occupied 

by military personnel performing recruiting duties in the local area. The number of recruiting 

personnel will be drawing down, and those that 

remain will be able to find adequate housing 

on the local economy. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found these 11 1 substandard 

units provide housing for about one-third of 

the military assigned independent duty in western 

New York State. This activity services 18 small 

commands in an area where affordable housing 

is available in the local economy. Repair costs 

to bring these structures up to standards would 

not be economical. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

the DoD Family Housing Office and the 111 

housing units it administers. 

Naval Facilities Engineering Command 

Western Engineering Field Division 

San Bruno, California 

Category: Naval Facilities Engineering Command 

Mission: Facility Engineering Support 

One-time Cost: $ .8 million 

Savings: 1994-99 $ .2 million 

Annual: $ 1.3 million 

Payback: 6 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Realign the Western Engineering Field Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command 

(NAVFAC), San Bruno, California. Retain in place 

necessary personnel, equipment and support 

as a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 

Engineering Field Activity under the management of the Southwestern Field Division, 

NAVFAC, San Diego, California. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The reduction in the force structure in the DoD 

Force Structure Plan and the closure of major 

naval activities in the San Francisco Bay area 

requires the realignment of this activity. The 

activity’s capacity to handle NAVFAC’s considerable responsibilities in dealing with environmental 

matters arising out of the 1993 round of base 

closures will remain in the same geographic area. 

The activity presently has such capacity. Retaining it for this purpose is a more economical 

and efficient alternative than relocating it to San 

Diego and then handling on-site problems on a 

travel status. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the Western Engineering Field Division provides support to commands 

in the San Francisco Bay area recommended 

by the Commission for closure. Retaining a 

portion of the organization to provide environmental services during the closure process would 

facilitate the provision of these important 

services to those naval activities. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: realign 

the Western Engineering Field Division, Naval 

Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) , 

San Bruno, California. Retain in place necessary 

personnel, equipment and support as a Base 

1-61 
Chapter I 

Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Engineering 

Field Activity under the management of the 

southwestern Field Division, NAVFAC, San Diego, 

California. 

Navy Public Works Center, 

San Francisco, California 

Category : Pub li c Wo r ks Center 

Mission: Public Works Support 

One-time Cost: $37.5 million 

Savings: 1994-99 $ 25.7 million 

Annual: $ 33.9 million 

Payback: 2 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Disestablish the Public Works Center (PWC) 

San Francisco. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

PWC San Francisco’s capacity is excess to that 

required by the DoD Force Structure Plan, and 

due to other Navy closures and realignments, 

its principal customer base has been eliminated. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community claimed the Naval Public Works 

Center in San Francisco provided a greater 

number of family housing units than any other 

Navy location. The Navy Public Works Center 

operates over 7,000 family housing units in the 

Bay area, many of which were new. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found PWC San Francisco provides family housing, utilities, transportation, 

maintenance, engineering, and planning services 

to Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Coast Guard, and 

DOD commands in the San Francisco Bay Area. 

Because its primary customers in the Bay area 

are being recommended for closure, PWC San 

Francisco can also be closed and the customers 

that remain can receive the necessary services, 

including family housing, from reconstituted 

public works departments. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, 

1-62 

the Commission recommends the following: 

disestablish the Public Works Center (PWC) 

San Francisco. 

Resme Activities 

Navymarine Corps Reserve Centers 

Category: Reserve Centers 

Mission: Support Reserve Activities 

One-time Cost: $ 3.2 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 57.1 million 

Annual: $ 13.6 million 

Payback: N/A 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close the following Reserve Centers: 

Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Centers at: 

Fort Wayne, Indiana 

Billings, Montana 

Abilene, Texas 

4 Naval Reserve Centers at: 

Gadsden, Alabama 

Montgomery, Alabama 

Fayetteville, Arkansas 

Fort Smith, Arkansas 

Pacific Grove, California 

Macon, Georgia 

Terre Haute, Indiana 

Hutchinson, Kansas 

Monroe, Louisiana 

New Bedford, Massachusetts 

Pittsfield, Massachusetts 

Joplin, Missouri 

St. Joseph, Missouri 

Great Falls, Montana 

Missoula, Montana 

Atlantic City, New Jersey 

Perth Amboy, New Jersey 

Jamestown, New York 

Poughkeepsie, New York 

Altoona, Pennsylvania 

Kingsport, Tennessee 

Memphis, Tennessee 

Ogden, Utah 

Staunton, Virginia 

Parkersburg, West Virginia 

Naval Reserve Facility at: 

Alexandria, Louisiana 

Midland, Texas 
Chapter I 

Readiness Command Districts at: 

Olathe, Kansas (REDCOM 18) 

Scotia, New York (REDCOM 2) 

Ravenna, Ohio (REDCOM 5) 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The DOD Force Structure Plan requires the 

reduction of reserve assets as it does active 

duty assets. These Reserve Centers are being 

closed because their capacity is excess to the 

projected Navy/Marine Corps requirements. 

In arriving at the recommendation to close the 

Reserve Centers, specific analysis was conducted 

to ensure that there was either an alternate 

location available to accommodate the affected 

reserve population (e.g., realign with an existing reserve center), or demographic support for 

purposes of force recruiting in the areas to which 

units were being relocated. This specific analysis, 

conducted through the COBRA model, supports 

these closures. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

Various communities expressed concerns about 

these closures since no provision appeared to 

have made to allow for reservists assigned to 

continue to drill. The communities indicated 

these activities were below threshold, and 

closure would result in reservists having 

nowhere within a reasonable commuting 

distance to drill. The communities also argued 

the Navy should have explored consolidation 

possibilities at some of these sites rather than 

closures. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found that while data calls did 

not directly assess the mission of these activities, the analysis was nevertheless consistent. 

When recurring logistics costs for reservists who 

commute outside a reasonable distance to drill 

were included in the COBRA, it produced no 

significant change in return on investment. A 

Reserve Force comprehensive facilities review 

with projected repair costs, supported the 

Secretary’s recommendation; even though it did 

not address specific shortfalls in space requirements for vehicles, controlled equipage, trainers, and other special use spaces. A nation-wide 

scatter diagram of reserve drill population by 

activity preserved a surface reserve presence in 

all geographic locations of the nation. The proposal minimized diSruption in reserve training, 

and contributory support to the active components, while producing cost efficiencies and 

enhancing the overall military value of remaining reserve centers. 

However, the Commission found variance in the 

case of Naval and Marine Corps Reserve 

Center, Billings, Montana. The Marine Corps 

Reserve indicated it would not be able to man 

its units if they were forced to compete for 

recruits at the Armed Forces Reserve Center in 

Helena where the Navy is consolidating its reserves. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from criterion 4. Therefore, 

the Commission recommends the following: close 

the following Reserve Centers: 

Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Centers at: 

Fort Wayne, Indiana 

Abilene, Texas 

Naval Reserve Centers at: 

Gadsden, Alabama 

Montgomery, Alabama 

Fayetteville, Arkansas 

Fort Smith, Arkansas 

Pacific Grove, California 

Macon, Georgia 

Terre Haute, Indiana 

Hutchinson, Kansas 

Monroe, Louisiana 

New Bedford, Massachusetts 

Pittsfield, Massachusetts 

Joplin, Missouri 

St Joseph, Missouri 

Great Falls, Montana 

Missoula, Montana 

Atlantic City, New Jersey 

Perth Amboy, New Jersey 

Jamestown, New York 

Poughkeepsie, New York 

Altoona, Pennsylvania 

Kingsport, Tennessee 

Memphis, Tennessee 

Ogden, Utah 

Staunton, Virginia 

Parkersburg, West Virginia 

1-63 
Chapter I 

Naval Reserve Facilities at: 

Alexandria, Louisiana 

Midland, Texas 

Readiness Command Districts at: 

Olathe, Kansas (REDCOM 18) 

Scotia, New York (REDCOM 2) 

Ravenna, Ohio (REDCOM 5) 

The Commission finds this recommendation 

is consistent with the force-structure plan and 

final criteria. 

NavyA4urine Corps Reserve Centers 

Navy and Marine Corps Reserve 

Naval Reserve Center at Chicopee, 

Center at Lawrence, Massachusetts 

Massachusetts and Quincy, 

Massachusetts 

Category: Reserve Centers 

Mission: Support for Reserve Activities 

One-time Cost: $ 20.7 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 19.4 million 

Payback: 1 UOe years 

Annual: $ .415 million 

SECRETARY DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION 

None. The Commission added these military 

installations to the list of installations recommended for closure or realignment. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

All four communities involved expressed 

support for this consolidation recognizing the 

economies to be realized by combining command and support structures at an existing base 

with messing and berthing facilities. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found upon further analysis 

consolidation of these three Reserve Centers 

would not deviate substantially from the force 

structure plan and the final selection criteria. 

Consolidation of these activities at the existing 

facilities at Naval Air Station (NAS) South 

Weymouth, would preserve reserve unit manning 

levels by keeping a drill site within reasonable 

commuting distance of the reservists it supports. 

In addition, consolidation would reduce 

overhead costs for three separate facilities, 

associated messing and berthing costs for 

assigned reservists, and dispose of three older 

facilities. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 2 and 

3. Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: close Navy and Marine Corps Reserve 

Center, Lawrence, Massachusetts; close Naval 

Reserve Center, Chicopee, Massachusetts; 

and close Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, 

Massachusetts; and consolidate these activities 

at existing facilities at NAS South Weymouth, 

Massachusetts. The Commission finds this 

recommendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 

Hospitak 

Naval Hospital 

Category: Medical Activity 

Mission: Provide Health Care 

One-time Cost: NIA 

Savings: NIA 

Payback: NIA 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close the Naval Hospital, Charleston and relocate 

certain military and civilian personnel to other 

Naval Hospitals. 

Charleston, South Carolina 

Annual: NIA 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Naval Hospitals are situated and their size determined for location near operating forces whose 

personnel will require medical support in numbers significant enough to mandate a medical 

facility as large as a hospital. Given the extensive 

use of CHAMPUS, any Naval Hospital closure 

must be predicated upon the elimination of the 

operating forces which created a demand for 

the presence of a Naval Hospital in the first 

instance. As a result of the closure of the Charleston 

Naval Station, the Charleston Naval Shipyard 

and the supporting Supply Center and Public 

Works Center, the active duty personnel previously supported by the Naval Hospital, Charleston, are no longer in the area to be supported. 

1-64 
Chapter I 

Closure of the Naval Hospital follows the 

closure of these activities supporting these 

operating forces. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The Charleston community expressed great 

concern regarding health-care for eligible 

beneficiaries remaining in the Charleston area 

if the Charleston Naval Hospital closes. The community argued that if all of the proposed Navy 

reductions and closures in Charleston were 

approved by the Commission, there would still 

be a significant number of active-duty military 

personnel in the Charleston area requiring medical 

care. The large number of eligible retirees and 

dependents would also benefit from the retention of Naval Hospital Charleston. The community argued that should the Naval Hospital, 

Charleston, close, the eligible retired beneficiary 

population, including those eligible for Medicare, in the greater Charleston area would 

be faced with additional and unanticipated 

medical expenses, particularly in obtaining 

prescriptions. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found that if the recommended 

closure of the Charleston Naval Station and Shipyard is approved, the active-duty population 

supported by the Naval Hospital, Charleston, 

will be greatly reduced. However, the Commission 

found that DoD based their recommendation 

for the closure of the Naval Hospital, Charleston, 

on changes to mission assignment and not 

on the requirement to serve the active-duty and 

eligible beneficiary population found in the 

Charleston area. 

The Commission found that even with the 

recommended closure of the Naval Station, 

Charleston and the Naval Shipyard there will 

still be a substantial number of active duty personnel and eligible beneficiaries in the Charleston 

area requiring access to health care facilities. 

Additionally, the Commission found that 

Naval Hospital, Charleston, supported eligible 

beneficiaries from the Myrtle Beach AFB, MCAS 

Beaufort, Charleston AFB, and elsewhere in the 

metropolitan Charleston area. In addition, 

Naval Hospital, Charleston, treats patients 

who return to the United States on military 

MEDEVACs flights from Europe. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 

criteria 6. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: the Naval Hospital, Charleston, South Carolina, remains open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent 

with the force structure plan and final criteria. 

Naval Hospital, Oakland, California 

Category: Medical Activity 

Mission: Provide Health Care 

One-time Cost: $ 57.6 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 51.6 million 

Payback: 3 years 

Annual: $ 41.5 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close the Naval Hospital, Oakland and relocate 

certain military and civilian personnel to other 

Naval hospitals, and certain military personnel 

to the Naval Air Stations at Lemoore and Whidbey 

Island. The Deployable Medical Unit, Northwest Region, will relocate to Naval Hospital, 

Bremerton, Washington. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Naval Hospitals are situated and their size determined for location near operating forces whose 

personnel will require medical support in numbers significant enough to mandate a medical 

facility as large as a hospital. Given the extensive 

use of CHAMPUS, any Naval Hospital closure 

must be predicated upon the elimination of the 

operating forces which created a demand for 

the presence of a Naval Hospital in the first 

instance. In the San Francisco Bay area, the 

Naval Air Station, Alameda, Naval Shipyard, Mare 

Island and the supporting Public Works Center 

and Supply Center are being recommended for 

closure. Given the elimination of these operating 

force activities, closure of the Naval Hospital, 

Oakland is indicated as the military personnel 

previously supported are no longer in the area. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The Oakland community argued plans had been 

made for the Navy to take over Letterman Army 

Hospital at the Presidio of San Francisco, and 

this was a very low-cost way to maintain a needed 

1-65 
Chapter I 

Navy facility. The community also argued the 

Naval Hospital Oakland would be needed to 

support Navy activities in Alameda as well as 

other DoD-eligible beneficiaries in the Bay Area. 

The community expressed great concern regarding 

health care for the eligible beneficiary population remaining in the Oakland area should the 

Naval Hospital close. The community also argued they felt a replacement hospital should be 

built due to the advanced age.of the current 

Navy Hospital at Oakland. The CHAMPUS-eligible beneficiaries were concerned about the 

possible increase in cost of medical care should 

they be required to use CHAMPUS or Medicare 

instead of a DoD medical treatment facility. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found since the primary military 

installations in the Bay Area were recommended 

for closure (with the exception of Naval Supply 

Center Oakland, a primarily civilian command 

activity), Naval Hospital Oakland would no longer 

be required. This finding is in keeping with the 

DoD policy of providing primary hospital care 

in support of only active duty populations. The 

Commission further found the medical needs 

of retirees could be met at the extensive number of civilian, Veterans’ Administration, or military medical facilities within a reasonable distance. 

Additionally, the Commission found the current Navy Hospital in Oakland was expensive 

to operate and maintain due to its advanced 

age. Investigation by the Commission found that 

extensive repairs would be essential to bring it 

up to seismic stabilization standards as well as 

acceptable medical standards. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

the Naval Hospital, Oakland and relocate 

certain military and civilian personnel to other 

Naval hospitals, and certain military personnel 

to the Naval Air Stations at Lemoore and Whidbey 

Island. The Deployable Medical Unit, Northwest Region, will relocate to Naval Hospital, 

Bremerton, Washington. 

Naval Hospital, Orlando, Florida 

Category: Medical Activity 

Mission: Provide Health Care 

One-time Cost: $ 51.2 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ -31.0 (Cost) 

Payback: 13 years 

Annual: $ 8.1 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close the Naval Hospital, Orlando and relocate 

certain military and civilian personnel to other 

Naval Hospitals. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Naval hospitals are situated and their size 

determined for location near operating forces 

whose personnel will require medical support 

in numbers significant enough to mandate a 

medical facility as large as a hospital. Given the 

extensive use of CHAMPUS, any naval hospital 

closure must be predicated upon the elimination of the forces which created a demand for 

the presence of a naval hospital in the first 

instance. The Naval Training Center, Orlando 

which was supported by the Naval Hospital, 

Orlando is being recommended for closure. 

Accordingly, the operating force support previously provided by the Naval Hospital, Orlando 

is no longer required and closure follows the 

decision to close the Naval Training Center. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The Orlando community expressed great concern 

over health care for the eligible beneficiaries 

remaining in the Orlando area should the 

Naval Hospital close. The Orlando community 

argued the Naval Hospital, Orlando served approximately 45,000 more patients annually than the 

Naval Hospital, Great Lakes and operated at a 

more efficient level. This efficiency resulted in 

an annual $8 million saving at Orlando Naval 

Hospital. The community suggested even with 

the large number of retirees who receive health 

care in the Orlando area, the Naval Hospital, 

Orlando, provided a CHAMPUS savings estimated at $51 million. 

1-66 
Chapter I 

The community also stated the Orlando Naval 

Hospital was capable of incorporating the additional training requirements with no additional 

military construction. The Orlando community 

stressed the Naval Hospital Great Lakes was 

currently operating at 25% of capacity and 

would require significant construction if this 

capacity were to be expanded. The community 

also argued there was asbestos found throughout the Naval Hospital facility at Great Lakes 

that would make any expansion both difficult 

and expensive. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the active duty population supported by the Naval Hospital, Orlando, 

will be greatly reduced with the recommended 

closure of the Orlando Naval Training Center. 

The Commission found acceptable the Navy’s 

argument military hospitals are intended to 

support active-duty personnel and should not 

be retained in cases when the active-duty population is reduced below levels necessary to 

warrant a military hospital. In addition, the 

Commission found it would be less expensive 

to provide health care to DoD eligible beneficiaries through CHAMPUS than by an active-duty 

Navy hospital due to the availability of local 

civilian health care organizations and the competitive atmosphere among health-care providers 

in the Orlando area. The transfer of Naval 

Hospital, Orlando, medical personnel to other 

military installations will increase the availability 

of medical care at those receiving locations, which 

in turn will partially offset the predicted increase in CHAMPUS costs in the Orlando area. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

the Naval Hospital, Orlando and relocate 

certain military and civilian personnel to other 

Naval Hospitals. 

Changes to Previously Approved BRAC 

88/91 Recomnzendations 

Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station 

Treasure Island, San Francisco, 

California 

Category: Naval Shipyard 

Mission: Repair, Maintenance, 

and Overhaul of Navy Ships 

Cost to Redirect: NIA 

Savings: NIA 

Payback: NIA 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Permit the Navy to dispose of this facility in 

any lawful manner, including outleasing. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The 1991 Commission Report, at page 5-18, 

recommended closing the Hunters Point Annex 

and outleasing the entire property, with provisions for continued occupancy of space for 

Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and 

Repair; Planning Engineering for Repair, and 

Alterations Detachment; and a ContractorOperated test facility. 

Force level reductions consistent with the DoD 

Force Structure Plan remove any long-term need 

to retain all of this facility for emergent requirements. The recommended closure of the major 

naval installations in this geographic area 

terminates any requirement for these facilities. 

The limitation of disposal authority to outleasing 

unnecessarily restricts the Navy’s ability to 

dispose of this property in a timely and lawful 

manner. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Annual: NIA 

u 

1-67 
Chapter I 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the Navy’s 1991 request, 

and the 199 1 Commission’s subsequent recommendation to outlease Hunters Point Annex 

unnecessarily inhibits the Navy’s ability to 

dispose of this property. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: permit 

the Navy to dispose of Hunters Point Annex to 

Naval Station Treasure Island, California, in any 

lawful manner, including outleasing. 

Marine Corps Air Station 

Tustin, California 

Category: Operational Air Station 

Mission: Support Naval Aviation Operations 

One-time Cost: $ 897.6 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 349.9 million 

Payback: 4 years 

Annual: $ 148.5 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of installations recommended 

for closure or realignment. MCAS Tustin was 

recommended for closure in 199 1, with its aviation assets to relocate to MCAGCC Twentynine 

Palms or Camp Pendleton or both. In 1993 MCAS 

Tustin’s aviation assets were recommended by 

the Secretary of Defense for redirection to NAS 

Miramar and MCAS Camp Pendleton. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community did not want the Commission 

to reconsider its 1991 recommendation to close 

MCAS Tustin; it wanted the 1991 Commission’s 

closure decision to remain intact. The community had already invested substantially in a base 

reuse program. It did not want to abandon its 

two-year investment of effort and money in the 

reuse plan. The community also believed better 

alternatives existed to relocate Marine Corps 

helicopters without retaining MCAS Tustin. 

Specifically, it proposed: keeping MCAS El Tor0 

open and adding the MCAS Kaneohe Bay fixed 

wing mission there; closing NAS Miramar and 

relocating its units per the Secretary of Defense’s 

recommendations. The community asserted this 

proposal would enhance operational readiness 

and still allow the community to pursue its 

reuse plan. The community also contended the 

Commission’s decision to reconsider its 199 1 

recommendation would encourage other communities to ignore the finality of the Commission’s 

actions and would encourage communities to 

resist closures long after the final vote of the 

Commission. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found a sufficient number 

of acres were available at NAS Miramar to 

accommodate the aircraft, personnel, and support 

equipment from MCAS Tustin in spite of environmental constraints on development. While 

areas expected to be affected by necessary 

expansion included critical habitats, none were 

located in quantities sufficient to preclude 

anticipated necessary expansion. The Commission also found relocation to NAS Miramar 

to be operationally advantageous due to close 

proximity to the Marine division at Camp 

Pendleton, where a significant percentage of critical training is conducted. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS 

See Marine Corps Air Station El Toro. 

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering 

Center (NESEC) 

San Diego, California and 

NESEC Vallejo, California 

Category: Naval Technical Center 

Mission: Electronic In-Service Engineering 

One-time Cost: $ 914 thousand 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 2.5 million 

Payback: 3 years 

Annual: $ 0.65 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Change the receiving location of the Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center (NESEC) 

San Diego, California and the NESEC Vallejo, 

California to be Air Force Plant #19 in San Diego 

vice new construction at Point Loma, San Diego, 

California. 

1-68 
Chapter I 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

This is a change from the 1991 Commission 

action which called for closure of NESEC San 

Diego and relocation to Point Loma to form 

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center (NCCOSC). Air Force Plant #19 

was operated by a contractor as an Air Force 

Government-Owned-Contractor-Owned and 

NESEC San Diego subleased space. Now the 

contractor has left and Air Force offered to transfer 

Plant 19 without reimbursement. Rehabilitation 

can be accomplished within the estimates 

of the BRAC 91 recommendations for both 

relocating NESECs and avoiding the serious 

environmental concerns attendant to new construction at Point Loma. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The Vallejo community contended the Navy’s 

estimates to refurbish Air Force Plant #19 are 

understated. Specifically, the community argued 

the Navy’s military construction estimates do 

not include the cost of building or refurbishing 

a remote facility to conduct radiological work, 

the cost of disassembling and reassembling the 

extensive computer systems, and the cost of hiring 

and training employees to replace those who 

are not willing to relocate. In addition, the 

community stated the anticipated savings were 

being extracted from a larger personnel elimination than was advertised by the Navy in 1991. 

The community provided documentation 

supporting their claim that cost to execute the 

DoD redirect would exceed Navy estimates. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the Navy’s cost estimate 

to refurbish Air Force Plant #19 was reasonable 

and closely reflected the cost to execute DoD’s 

recommendation. In addition, the Commission 

found the Navy should realize operation 

efficiencies through the consolidation of both 

NESEC San Diego and NESEC Vallejo at AFP #19. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: change 

the receiving location of the Naval Electronic 

Systems Engineering Center (NESEC) San Diego, 

California, and the NESEC Vallejo, California 

to be Air Force Plant #19 in San Diego vice 

new construction at Point Loma, San Diego, 

California. 

Naval Surface Warfare Center - 

Pt. Hueneme, Virgina Beach, Virgina 

(Naval Mine Warfare Engineering 

Activity, Yorktown, Virginia) 

Category: Technical Center 

Mission: Support Mine Warfare In-Service 

One-time Cost: $7.5 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $3.2 million 

Payback: 9 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Relocate the Naval Mine Warfare Engineering 

Activity (now the Naval Surface Warfare CenterPort Hueneme, Yorktown Detachment) to the 

Naval Surface Warfare Center-Dahlgren, Coastal 

Systems Station, Panama City, Florida. 

Engineering 

Annual: $1.1 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

In the 1991 Commission Report, the Naval Mine 

Warfare Engineering Activity (NMWEA), 

Yorktown, Virginia, was recommended for closure and realignment to facilities under the control 

of the Chief of Naval Education and Training at 

Dam Neck, Virginia. The realignment has been 

accomplished through organizational changes and 

NMWEA is now the Yorktown Detachment of 

the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Port Hueneme. 

However, after BRAC 91, the needs of the educational and training community were such that 

the Dam Neck space is no longer available. Therefore, as part of BRAC 93 process, alternative 

receiving sites were explored. Because of the 

advisability of consolidating activities performing similar functions, and since the Naval 

Surface Warfare Center-Dahlgren, Coastal Systems 

Station, Panama City, Florida, has significant 

responsibilities in mine warfare RQD, COBRA 

data was requested. Because of the advantages 

of collocating this mine warfare engineering 

activity with another facility having substantial 

responsibilities in the same fields, and because 

1-69 
Chapter I 

it is less expensive than the BRAC 91 relocation 

to Dam Neck, Virginia, the Navy recommends 

that the receiving site for this activity be revised 

to Naval Surface Warfare Center-Dahlgren, 

Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, Florida, 

in lieu of Dam Neck, Virginia. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The east coast mine warfare community could 

be consolidated in the Yorktown, Dam Neck, 

Little Creek area. The community pointed out 

the Panama City, Florida, facility consists of many, 

small buildings instead of the single facility where 

employees currently work in the Yorktown area. 

The community also noted there were few mine 

warfare experts in the Panama City area. The 

potential loss of these experts could be devastating to the programs, especially in light of the 

increasing mine warfare role in low-intensity 

conflict scenarios. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found that space planned for 

use at Dam Neck by Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity was no longer available. The 

projected potential savings and synergy of collocating like missions in the newly proposed 

receiver site at Panama City, Florida, outweigh 

the potential loss of expert personnel. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: relocate the 

Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity (now 

the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Port Hueneme, 

Yorktown Detachment) to the Naval Surface 

Warfare Center-Dahlgren, Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, Florida. 

Navy Weapons Evaluation Facility, 

Category: Technical Center 

Mission: Coordinate with Sandia Laboratory, 

Department Of Energy 

One-time Cost: NIA 

Savings: NIA 

Payback: NIA 

Albuquerque, New Mexico 

Annual: NIA 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Permit a small detachment of the Weapons 

Division to remain after the closure of the 

Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility (NWEF) 

in order to provide liaison with the Sandia 

Laboratory of the Department of Energy. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

This recommendation was originally intended 

as an exception to the 1991 recommendation 

to close NWEF Albuquerque, but was not included in the specific DoD recommendations. The 

Navy has a continuing need for a detachment 

to provide liaison with the Sandia Laboratory 

and other agencies involved in nuclear programs 

in that geographic area. The detachment would 

remain as a tenant of Kirtland Air Force Base. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Secretary’s recommendation to close Naval 

Weapons Evaluation Facility, Albuquerque 

reduces unnecessary infrastructure, however 

there is a continuing need for a detachment to 

provide liaison with Sandia Laboratory and other 

agencies involved in nuclear programs in that 

geographical area. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: permit 

a small detachment of the Weapons Division to 

remain after the closure of the Naval Weapons 

Evaluation Facility (NWEF), Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, in order to provide liaison with the 

Sandia Laboratory of the Department of Energy. 

1-70 
Chapter I 

DEPARTMENT OF 

THE AIR FORCE 

Large Aircruft 

Griffiss Air Force Base, New York 

Category: Large Aircraft 

Mission: Bomberllanker 

One-time Cost: $120.8 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $61.8 million 

Payback: 6 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Griffiss AFB, New York, is recommended for 

realignment. The 416th Bomb Wing will inactivate. The B-52H aircraft will transfer to Minot 

AFB, North Dakota, and Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. 

The KC- 135 aircraft from Griffiss AFB will transfer 

to Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota. The 485th 

Engineering Installation Group at Griffiss AFB 

will relocate to Hill AFB, Utah. 

The Northeast Air Defense Sector will remain at 

Griffiss in a cantonment area pending the outcome of a NORAD sector consolidation study. 

If the sector remains it will be transferred to 

the Air National Guard (ANG). Rome Laboratory will remain at Griffiss AFB in its existing 

facilities as a stand-alone Air Force laboratory. 

A minimum essential airfield will be maintained 

and operated by a contractor on an “as needed, 

on call” basis. The ANG will maintain and 

operate necessary facilities to support mobility/ 

contingencyhraining of the 10th Infantry (Light) 

Division located at Fort Drum, New York, and 

operate them when needed. Only the stand-alone 

laboratory and the ANG mission will remain. 

Annual: $39.2 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The Air Force has four more large aircraft bases 

than needed to support the number of bombers, 

tankers, and airlift assets in the DoD Force 

Structure Plan. When all eight DoD criteria are 

applied, Griffiss AFB ranked low compared to 

the other large aircraft bases. Based on this analysis, the application of all eight DoD selection 

criteria, and excess capacity which results from 

reduced force structure, Griffiss AFB is recommended for realignment. 

The Air Force plans to establish a large air mobility base in the Northeast to support the new 

Major Regional Contingency (MRC) strategy. 

Griffiss AFB was evaluated specifically as the 

location for this wing, along with other bases 

that met the geographical criteria and were available for this mission: McGuire AFB, New Jersey 

and Plattsburgh AFB, New York. Piattsburgh AFB 

ranked best in capability to support the air 

mobility wing due to its geographical location, 

attributes and base loading capacity. Principal 

mobility attributes include aircraft parking space 

(for 70-80 tankedairlift aircraft), fuel hydrants 

and fuel supply/storage capacity, along with 

present and future encroachment and airspace 

considerations. , 

The Rome Laboratory has a large civilian work 

force and is located in adequate facilities that 

can be separated from the rest of Griffiss AFB. 

It does not need to be closed or realigned as a 

result of the reductions in the rest of the base. 

All large aircraft bases were considered equally 

in a process that conformed to the Defense Base 

Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public 

Law 101-510), as amended, and the Department of Defense (DoD) guidance. Each base was 

evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific 

to Air Force bases and missions. Extensive data, 

gathered to support the evaluation of each base 

under each criterion was reviewed by the Base 

Closure Executive Group (Executive Group), a 

group of seven general officers and six Senior 

Executive Service career civilians appointed by 

the Secretary of the Air Force. The decision to 

realign Griffiss AFB was made by the Secretary 

of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force 

Chief of Staff and in consultation with the 

Executive Group. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The Griffiss AFB community believed the Air 

Force should have selected Griffiss AFB as the 

East Coast Mobility Base rather than Plattsburgh 

AFB. The community believed some of the 

information the Air Force used in selecting the 

East Coast Mobility Base was erroneous, and if 

the Air Force knew the facts, it would have 

selected Griffiss AFB. Community officials 

addressed parking capacity; petroleum, oils, and 

1-71 
Chapter I 

lubricants storage; numbers and types of 

hydrants; and airfield infrastructure at Griffiss 

AFB. Also addressed were ground and air 

encroachment problems at Plattsburgh AFB. The 

community presented information asserting it 

would be less expensive to establish Griffiss AFB 

than to establish Plattsburgh AFB as the East 

Coast Mobility Base. 

The community was also very concerned that 

in realigning Griffiss AFB at this time, DoD could 

be positioning itself to close one of its tenants, 

the Rome Laboratory, in the near future. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

As a B-52 bomber base, the Commission found 

even though Griffiss AFB rated high in criteria 

1, 2, and 3, other bomber bases rated higher in 

overall military value. The Commission found 

Barksdale AFB rated very high as a B-52 base, 

and the Air Force had selected Barksdale AFB 

to be the B-52 combat crew training base. Minot 

AFB, which the Commission rated high as a 

B-52 bomber base, also had additional military 

value as a missile field. The Commission rated 

Griffiss AFB very high as a tanker base in criteria 1, 2, and 3, but other installations, including Fairchild AFB and Grand Forks AFB, had 

higher overall military value. The Air Force 

announced the selection of Fairchild AFB and 

Grand Forks AFB as major receiver sites for 

tankers. Fairchild AFB had increased overall 

military value because it hosts the Air Force 

Survival School and Grand Forks AFB had the 

additional military value of a missile field. 

The Commission requested that the Air Force 

comment on the community concern that in 

realigning Griffiss AFB at this time, DoD 

appears to be positioning itself to close the Rome 

Laboratory in the near future. In a May 7, 1993 

letter to the Commission, Mr. James Boatright, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 

Installations, stated “the Air Force has no plans 

to close or relocate the Rome Laboratory within 

the next five years.” 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: Griffiss 

AFB, New York, is recommended for realignment. The 416th Bomb Wing will inactivate. 

The B-52H aircraft will transfer to Minot AFB, 

North Dakota, and Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. 

The KC-135 aircraft from Griffiss AFB will transfer 

to Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota. The 485th 

Engineering Installation Group at Griffiss AFB 

will relocate to Hill AFB, Utah. The Northeast 

Air Defense Sector will remain at Griffiss AFB 

in a cantonment area pending the outcome of 

a NORAD sector consolidation study. If the sector 

remains it will be transferred to the Air 

National Guard (ANG). Rome Laboratory will 

remain at Griffiss AFB in its existing facilities as 

a stand-alone Air Force laboratory. A minimum 

essential airfield will be maintained and operated by a contractor on an “as needed, on call” 

basis. The ANG will maintain and operate necessary facilities to support mobility/contingency/ 

training of the 10th Infantry (Light) Division 

located at Fort Drum, New York, and operate 

them when needed. Only the stand-alone laboratory and the ANG mission will remain. 

K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, Michigan 

Category: Large Aircrajt 

Mission: Bomber 

One-time Cost: $143.6 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $1 67.3 million 

Payback: 4 years 

Annual: $62.4 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

K.I. Sawyer AFB, Michigan, is recommended for 

closure. The 410th Wing will inactivate. B-52H 

aircraft will transfer to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. 

The Air Force will retire its B-52G aircraft 

instead of implementing the previous Base 

Closure Commission recommendation to transfer those aircraft from Castle AFB, California, 

to K.I. Sawyer AFB. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

There are several factors which resulted in the 

above recommendation. The Air Force has four 

more large aircraft bases than are needed to 

support the number of bombers, tankers, and 

airlift assets in the DoD Force Structure Plan. 

The Air Force must maintain Minuteman 111 

basing flexibility due to uncertainty with 

1-72 
Chapter I 

respect to START 11. This requires the retention 

of the ballistic missile fields at Malmstrom AFB, 

Grand Forks AFB, Minot AFB, and F.E. Warren 

AFB. It is more economical to retain a bomber/ 

missile base that must remain open for missiles 

than to maintain a bomber-only base. Therefore, based on the facts that K.I. Sawyer AFB 

does not support ballistic missile operations, that 

when all eight DoD criteria are applied K.I. Sawyer 

AFB ranks low, and that there is excess large 

aircraft base capacity, K.I. Sawyer AFB is recommended for closure. 

All large aircraft bases were considered equally 

in a process that conformed to the Defense Base 

Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public 

Law 101-510), as amended, and the Department of Defense (DoD) guidance. Each base was 

evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific 

to Air Force bases and missions. Extensive data 

gathered to support the evaluation of each base 

under each criterion was reviewed by the Base 

Closure Executive Group (Executive Group), a 

group of seven general officers and six Senior 

Executive Service career civilians appointed by 

the Secretary of the Air Force. The decision to 

close K.I. Sawyer AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air 

Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with 

the Executive Group. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community argued the Air Force did not 

compare large and small aircraft bases. If it had, 

the Air Force would have realized K.I. Sawyer 

AFB would make an outstanding base for the 

future because access to airspace in the Upper 

Peninsula region is unencumbered, and the base 

is strategically located for deployment to potential trouble spots around the globe. The community also challenged the Air Force decision 

to keep bomber bases with missile fields open 

instead of bomber-only bases such as K.I. 

Sawyer AFB. The community said this decision 

potentially hurts the survivability of two legs of 

the triad, and K.I. Sawyer AFB should remain 

open as a bomber base to increase the targeting 

problem of a potential adversary. 

The community was also very concerned about 

the potential unemployment in the region if K.I. 

Sawyer AFB closed. The unemployment figures 

in the community were projected to be approximately 24%, which could devastate the local 

economy. Also, the community argued the 

Secretary of Defense did not consider the 

cumulative economic impact to the region, 

including the closure of Wurtsmith AFB, 

Michigan, in the 1991 round of base closures, 

and Kincheloe AFB, Michigan, in an earlier round 

of base closures. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found K.I. Sawyer AFB did 

not rate as high in criteria 1, 2, and 3 as other 

B-52 bases. The Commission found Barksdale 

AFB rated very high as a B-52 base, and the 

Secretary of the Air Force selected Barksdale 

AFB to be the B-52 combat crew training base. 

Minot AFB, which the Commission rated relatively high as a B-52 base, also had the additional military value of a missile field. As a small 

aircraft base, the Commission evaluated K.I. 

Sawyer AFB in criteria 1, 2, and 3 and found it 

had a rating lower than all other small-aircraft 

bases. As a tanker base, the Commission rated 

K.I. Sawyer AFB moderately high in Criteria 1, 

2, and 3, but other installations, including 

Fairchild AFB and Grand Forks AFB, had higher 

overall military value. Fairchild AFB had the 

Air Force Survival School and a higher onetime cost to close and Grand Forks AFB had 

the additional military value of a missile field. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: K.I. 

Sawyer AFB, Michigan, is recommended for 

closure. The 410th Wing will inactivate. B-52H 

aircraft will transfer to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. The Air Force will retire its B-52G aircraft 

instead of implementing the previous Base 

Closure Commission recommendation to transfer those aircraft from Castle AFB, California, 

to K.I. Sawyer AFB. 

1-73 
Chapter I 

March Air Force Base, California 

Category: Large Aircraft 

Mission: Tanker 

One-time Cost: $134.8 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $53.8 million 

Payback: 2 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

March AFB, California, is recommended for 

realignment. The 22nd Air Refueling Wing will 

inactivate. The KC-10 (Active and Associate 

Reserve) aircraft will be relocated to Travis AFB, 

California. The Southwest Air Defense Sector 

will remain at March in a cantonment area 

pending the outcome of a NORAD sector consolidation study. If the sector remains it will be 

transferred to the Air National Guard (ANG). 

The 445th Airlift Wing Air Force Reserve 

(AFRES), 452nd Air Refueling Wing (AFRES), 

163rd Reconnaissance Group (ANG) (becomes 

an Air Refueling Group), the Air Force Audit 

Agency, and the Media Center (from Norton 

AFB, California) will remain and the base will 

convert to a reserve base. Additionally, the Army 

Corps of Engineers Unit, the US Customs 

Aviation Operation Center West, and the Drug 

Enforcement Agency aviation unit will remain. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

There are several factors which resulted in the 

above recommendation. First, the Air Force has 

four more large aircraft bases than needed to 

support the number of bombers, tankers, and 

airlift assets in the DoD Force Structure Plan. 

Also, when all eight DoD criteria were applied 

to the large aircraft bases, March AFB ranked 

low. The Air Force plans to establish a large air 

mobility base (KC-10, C-5 and C-141 aircraft) 

on the west coast. When bases in the region 

(Beale AFB, California; Fairchild AFB, Washington; March AFB, California; McChord AFB, 

Washington; Malmstrom AFB, Montana; Travis 

AFB, California) were analyzed for this mission, 

Travis AFB ranked highest. March AFB currently 

requires a large active duty component to 

support a relatively small active duty force 

structure. The conversion of March AFB to a 

reserve base achieves substantial savings and 

Annual: $46.9 million 

the benefit of a large recruiting population for 

the Air Force Reserve is retained. 

All large aircraft bases were considered equally 

in a process that conformed to the Defense Base 

Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public 

Law 101-510), as amended, and the Department of Defense (DoD) guidance. Each base was 

evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria 

and a large number of subelements specific to 

Air Force bases and missions. Extensive data, 

gathered to support the evaluation of each base 

under each criterion was reviewed by the Base 

Closure Executive Group (Executive Group), a 

group of seven general officers and six Senior 

Executive Service career civilians appointed by 

the Secretary of the Air Force. The decision to 

realign March AFB was made by the Secretary 

of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force 

Chief of Staff and in consultation with the 

Executive Group. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community argued March AFB should 

remain an active-duty base because of its strategic 

location and its importance to the defense of 

the U.S. Further, the community maintained the 

base was a vital onload point for US Marines in 

support of Operation Just Cause, Operation Desert 

ShieldDesert Storm, and Operation Restore Hope. 

The community also argued future Marine Corps 

rapid deployment requirements would not be 

met with only a reserve capability at March AFB. 

Further, the community pointed out there has 

been approximately $200M in construction at 

the base in the past few years. The community 

also noted the Air Force incorrectly graded 

numerous subelements that were used in evaluating the large aircraft bases. The community 

noted further that the base has a modern, stateof-the-art hydrant refueling system. The community also took issue with the CHAMPUS 

savings in the COBRA model, maintaining there 

were higher costs, not savings, which reduced 

the overall savings anticipated by the realignment. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found March AFB, California, 

ranked low in military value due to its location 

in a highly congested airspace environment. While 

the base has been used as the onload point for 

1-74 
Chapter I 

U.S. Marine deployments, the realignment of 

active-duty resources would not restrict future 

use of the base for airlift of the Marine forces. 

The majority of military construction (MILCON) 

funds expended at March AFB recently has been 

for the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard 

facilities which will continue to be needed. In 

addition, other MILCON funds have been 

expended for organizational realignments from 

the 1988 base closure actions. (These organizations would also be remaining at March AFB.) 

The Commission found no significant disparity 

in the CHAMPUS documentation. While the 

Commission agrees some grading errors may have 

been made in the Air Force report, the adjustments to those color grades did not materially 

change the overall rating of March AFB. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: March 

AFB, California, is recommended for realignment. 

The 22nd Air Refueling Wing will inactivate. 

The KC-10 (Active and Associate Reserve) aircraft will be relocated to Travis AFB, California. 

The Southwest Air Defense Sector will remain 

at March in a cantonment area pending the outcome of a NORAD sector consolidation study. 

If the sector remains it will be transferred to 

the Air National Guard (ANG). The 445th 

Airlift Wing Air Force Reserve (AFRES), 452nd 

Air Refueling Wing (AFRES), 163rd Reconnaissance Group (ANG) (becomes an Air Refueling 

Group), the Air Force Audit Agency, and the 

Media Center (from Norton AFB, California) will 

remain and the base will convert to a reserve 

base. Additionally, the Army Corps of Engineers 

Unit, the US Customs Aviation Operation 

Center West, and the Drug Enforcement Agency 

aviation unit will remain at March. 

McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey 

Category: Large Aircraft 

Mission: AirliJt 

One-time Cost: NIA 

Savings: I994-99: N/A 

Annual: NIA 

Payback: NIA 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Realign McGuire AFB, NJ. The 438th Airlift Wing 

will inactivate. Most of the C-141s will transfer 

to Plattsburgh AFB, NY. Fourteen C-141s will 

remain and transfer to the Air Force Reserve. 

The 514th Airlift Wing Air Force Reserve 

(AFRES), the 170th Air Refueling Group Air 

National Guard (ANG), and the 108th Air 

Refueling Wing (ANG) will remain and the base 

will convert to a Reserve base. The 913th Airlift 

Group (AFRES) will relocate from Willow Grove 

Naval Air Station, PA, to McGuire AFB. The Air 

Force Reserve will operate the base. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The Air Force has four more large aircraft bases 

than are needed to support the number of bombers, 

tankers, and airlift assets in the DOD force structure plan. McGuire ranked low when compared 

to other bases in its category and when it was 

compared specifically with other airlift bases. 

The Air Force plans to establish a large mobility 

wing base in the Northeast United States to support 

the new Major Regional Contingency (MRC) 

strategy. McGuire AFB, Griffiss AFB, New York 

and Plattsburgh AFB, New York were evaluated 

specifically as possible locations for this wing 

since all met the geographical criteria. Plattsburgh 

AFB ranked best in capability to support the air 

mobility wing due to its location, attributes, and 

base loading capacity. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community argued McGuire AFB’s capability 

to support the mobility wing was better than 

that of Plattsburgh AFB, and McGuire AFB proved 

its capability during Operation Desert Shield/ 

Desert Storm. The community also argued 

McGuire was strategically located to reach 

Europe with fully loaded C-141s without 

refueling. They also asserted Plattsburgh AFB 

could not support the fuel requirements generated by Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm 

or a similar contingency operation because of 

the limited capability for fuel resupply during 

the winter months. The community noted 

McGuire could accommodate the mobility wing 

assets for less cost than Plattsburgh AFB. 

1-75 
Chapter I 

Further, the community argued McGuire AFB 

was incorrectly downgraded for ground and 

airspace encroachment, and training was not 

encumbered as indicated by the Air Force. Other 

concerns raised by the community included 

encroachment of the accident potential zone 

at Plattsburgh AFB. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found McGuire AFB’s training 

limitations were successfully managed. A new 

air mobility wing would be able to meet its 

total mission requirements based at McGuire 

AFB. DoD did not adequately consider the military 

value of McGuire AFB in its assessment of the 

extent of the impact of airspace problems and 

the base’s contribution during Operation Desert 

ShieldDesert Storm or potential similar contingency operations. Further, the cost to realign 

McGuire was understated in the Air Force report. 

While an increase in civil aviation is very likely 

to occur, the increased mission activity could 

be accommodated with continued airspace 

management by the Federal Aviation Administration. Also, although there were sufficient 

alternatives for providing fuel to Plattsburgh AFB 

in the wintertime, the fuel delivery costs were 

approximately 5.6 times more expensive annually at Plattsburgh AFB than at McGuire AFB. 

This increased cost of fuel delivery at Plattsburgh 

AFB, not originally considered in cost computations, makes the base a more attractive 

closure option than realigning McGuire. In 

addition, McGuire AFB is closer to customers 

of the military airlift system, prospective contingency onload points, and is in the heart of 

the northeast surface transportation systems. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 2, 3, 

and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends 

the following: retain McGuire AFB as an active 

installation. The 438th and 514th Airlift Wings, 

the 170th Air Refueling Group (ANG) and the 

108th Air Refueling Wing (ANG) will remain at 

McGuire AFB. Move the 19 KC-10 aircraft from 

Barksdale AFB to McGuire AFB. Move the requisite 

number of KC-135 aircraft to establish the east 

coast mobility base at McGuire AFB. The C-130 

9 13th Airlift Group (AFRES) remains at Willow 

Grove NAS, PA. The Commission finds this 

recommendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 

Plattsburgh Air Force Base, New York 

Category: Large Aircraft 

Mission: Tanker 

One-time Cost: $131.2 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $1 3 7.1 million 

Payback: 3 years 

Annual: $56.6 million 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

None. The Commission added this military 

installation to the list of installations recommended for closure or realignment. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The opposing community argued that McGuire 

AFB had the capability to support the mobility 

wing better than Plattsburgh and McGuire AFB 

had proven its capability during Operation Desert 

Shield/Desert Storm. McGuire is strategically 

located to reach Europe with fully loaded C141s without refueling. Opposing communities 

also argued Plattsburgh AFB could not support 

the fuel requirements generated by Operation 

Desert ShieWDesert Storm or a similar contingency operation because of the limited capability for fuel resupply during the winter months. 

The McGuire community also noted McGuire 

AFB could accommodate the mobility wing 

assets for less cost than it would take at 

Plattsburgh AFB. The opposing communities also 

pointed out the Air Force had failed to properly 

recognize significant ground encroachment at 

Plattsburgh AFB. The -Plattsburgh community 

disputed the relative importance of the fuel 

resupply issue, arguing the base could be 

refueled anytime, although there had been no 

previous requirement to do so. Additionally, 

the Plattsburgh community disputed the relative 

importance of ground encroachment and argued 

Plattsburgh was being judged on a double standard regarding the encroachment. The Plattsburgh 

community stressed the importance of their 

superior ramp space and superb quality of life. 

1-76 
Chapter I 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found Plattsburgh AFB had a 

relatively small active duty force structure 

supported by a large installation and support 

organization. Also, the base can be closed with 

relatively low costs with high returns for a short 

payback period. Plattsburgh AFB is located some 

distance from normal airlift customers and onload 

points, increasing the cost of annual operations. 

Further, annual fuel resupply to Plattsburgh AFB 

to support the proposed east coast mobility wing 

were estimated at $1 1.8M, approximately 460% 

higher than at McGuire AFB. The Air Force’s 

Air Installation Compatible Use Zone (AICUZ) 

program, a voluntary program for communities, provides guidelines for land development 

near Air Force installations for public safety. 

There was concern with the continued commercial development in the North Accident 

Potential Zone I1 (APZ 11). Though the Air Force 

has a very good accident record, a large airlift/ 

tanker aircraft accident in this area could be 

catastrophic. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 2 and 

4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: close Plattsburgh AFB and redistribute 

assets as appropriate. The Commission finds this 

recommendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 

Small Aircruft 

Homestead Air Force Base, Florida 

Category: Small Aircraft 

Mission: Power Projection, F-16 

One-time Cost: $42.1 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $357.5 million 

Puyback: Immediate 

Annual: $71 .O million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Homestead AFB, Florida, is recommended for 

closure. The 31st Fighter Wing will inactivate. 

All F-16s from the 31st Fighter Wing will remain 

temporarily assigned to Moody AFB, Georgia, 

and Shaw AFB, South Carolina. The InterAmerican Air Forces Academy will move to 

Lackland AFB, Texas. The Air Force Water 

Survival School will be temporarily located at 

Tyndall AFB, Florida. Future disposition of the 

Water Survival School is dependent upon 

efforts to consolidate its functions with the US 

Navy. The 301st Rescue Squadron, Air Force 

Reserve (AFRES) will move to Patrick AFB, 

Florida. The 482nd Fighter Wing (AFRES) will 

move to MacDill AFB, Florida and convert to 

KC-135Rs. The NORAD alert activity will move 

to an alternate location. The 726th Air Control 

Squadron will relocate to Shaw AFB. The Naval 

Security Group will consolidate with other US 

Navy units. All DoD activities and facilities 

including family housing, the hospital, commissary, and base exchange facilities will close. 

All essential cleanup and restoration activities 

associated with Hurricane Andrew will continue 

until completed. If Homestead AFB resumes 

operations as a civilian airport, the NORAD alert 

facility may be rebuilt in a cantonment area. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

There were several factors which resulted in the 

closure recommendation. First, the Air Force 

has one more small aircraft base than is required 

to support the fighter aircraft in the DoD Force 

Structure Plan. When the data were evaluated 

against all eight of the DoD selection criteria, 

Homestead AFB ranked low relative to the other 

bases in the small aircraft subcategory. While 

Homestead AFB’s ranking rests on the combined 

results of applying the eight DoD selection 

criteria, one stood out: the excessive cost to 

rebuild Homestead, while other small aircraft 

bases required little or no new investment. 

The cost to close Homestead AFB is low, especially when measured against the high cost of 

reconstruction, and the long-term savings are 

substantial. 

All small aircraft bases were considered equally 

in a process that conformed to the Defense Base 

Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public 

Law 101-510), as amended, and the Department 

of Defense (DOD) guidance. Bases were evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and 

a large number of subelements specific to Air 

Force bases and missions. Data were collected 

and the criteria and subelements of the criteria 

applied by the Base Closure Executive Group 

(Executive Group), a group of seven general 

1-77 
Chapter I 

officers and six Senior Executive Service 

career civilians appointed by the Secretary of 

the Air Force. The decision to close Homestead 

AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force 

with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and 

in consultation with the Executive Group. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community highlighted the military value 

of Homestead’s proximity to Cuba, both as a 

deterrent to possible aggression and for staging 

combat and contingency operations in the 

southern region and against Cuba. The community described the situation where Hurricane 

Andrew effectively closed Homestead in August 

1992, when base personnel evacuated and did 

not return. Damage caused by Hurricane 

Andrew denied the local region time to adjust 

to normal base closure actions during a time of 

severe economic devastation. The community 

disagreed with the Department of Defense 

assessment of 1% economic impact on the area. 

The community believed the Air Force understated costs for moving the 482d Fighter Wing 

to MacDill as part of Homestead’s cost to close. 

The community agreed the cost to fully restore 

Homestead was excessive, but supplemental 

appropriations for rebuilding the base would 

adequately cover the cost of building a reserve 

cantonment area, allowing the return of both 

reserve units, the Water Survival School, and 

the alert facility. These funds were held in 

abeyance by the Air Force pending the 1993 

base-closure decisions and were not considered 

in Homestead’s scenario cost comparisons. The 

community also argued that base-operating costs 

associated with reopening MacDill Air Force Base, 

Florida, operated by the 482d Fighter Wing, 

were not factored in Homestead’s cost to close 

and would exceed operating costs of a cantonment area. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the military value of 

Homestead AFB’s location was indeed high, due 

to its strategic location, but this did not justify 

rebuilding the base to its previous capabilities. 

The Commission found the community erred 

in its cost-saving analysis by mixing operations 

and maintenance funds with military construction funds, the supplemental allocation funds 

combined with savings from not moving the 

units were sufficient to rebuild facilities for the 

Air Force Reserve’s 482d Fighter Wing, the North 

American Air Defense alert detachment, and the 

Water Survival School. When combined with 

savings from military construction cost avoidance for rebuilding the 31st Fighter Wing facilities at Homestead, the 301st Rescue Squadron 

facilities could also be rebuilt. The Commission’s 

cost analysis showed more savings for rebuilding facilities to house F-16 aircraft, not KC135R aircraft, because support facilities for 

KC-135Rs would be approximately $29,600,000 

more than rebuilding facilities for F-16s. 

The Commission found rebuilding the Water 

Survival School facilities at Homestead AFB was 

affordable, but reestablishing that unit would 

necessitate reopening Homestead as an active 

duty air force base with attendant increased 

requirements for facilities to house and support 

active-duty military personnel, actions which were 

not cost effective. 

The Commission found rebuilding the 301st 

Rescue Squadron facilities was affordable, and 

the Air Force could enhance combat mission 

integration and effectiveness by collocating these 

two synergistic reserve component combat units. 

The Commission found the Space Shuttle support mission the unit currently performs is 

secondary to its primary tasking, and current 

Space Shuttle mission requirements for the unit 

could be supported from Homestead AFB. 

The Commission found the Air Force did not 

include operating costs for opening MacDill AFB 

in its closing-cost analysis and thus overestimated savings from closing Homestead AFB. 

The Commission also found, although the 

projected employment loss was only 1% of the 

Miami-Hialeah Metropolitan Statistical Area, the 

actual economic impact was concentrated in the 

less densely populated South Dade County where 

damage from Hurricane Andrew was more concentrated and where Homestead AFB is located. 

The economic impact from this closure to South 

Dade County was 6.5%. 

Finally, the Commission found that it would be 

more economical for Dade County to operate 

Homestead AFB as a civil airport with the Air 

Force Reserve units as tenants on the base. 

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Chapter I 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 3, 4 

and 6. Therefore, the Commission recommends 

the following: realign Homestead AFB with the 

following actions. Inactivate the 3 1st Fighter 

Wing; all F-16s from the 31st Fighter Wing 

will remain temporarily assigned to Moody AFB, 

Georgia, and Shaw AFB, South Carolina; move 

the Inter-American Air Forces Academy to 

Lackland AFB, Texas; temporarily relocate the 

Air Force Water Survival School to Tyndall AFB, 

Florida. Future disposition of the Water 

Survival School is dependent upon efforts to 

consolidate its functions with the Navy. Relocate the 726th Air Control Squadron to Shaw 

AFB. Consolidate the Naval Security Group with 

other US Navy units. Close all DoD activities 

and facilities, including family housing, the 

hospital, commissary, and base-exchange facilities. All essential cleanup and restoration 

activities associated with Hurricane Andrew 

will be completed. The 482d F-16 Fighter 

Wing (AFRES) and the 301st Rescue Squadron 

(AFRES) and the North American Air Defense 

alert activity will remain in cantonment areas. 

The Commission finds this recommendation 

is consistent with the force-structure plan and 

final criteria. 

Air Force Reserve 

O’Hare International Airport Air 

Force Reserve Station, Illinois 

Category: Large Aircraft 

Mission: Aid$ and Tanker 

One-time Cost: NIA 

Savings: 1994-99: NIA 

Annual: NIA 

Payback: N/A 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close O’Hare ARS as proposed by the City of 

Chicago and relocate the assigned Air Reserve 

Component (ARC) units to the Greater Rockford 

Airport, or another location acceptable to the 

Secretary of the Air Force, provided the City 

can demonstrate that it has the financing in place 

to cover the full cost of replacing facilities, moving, and environmental cleanup, without any 

cost whatsoever to the federal government and 

that the closurelrealignment must begin by July 

1995 and be completed by July 1997. Chicago 

would also have to fund the full cost of relocating the Army Reserve activity, or leave it in 

place. If these conditions are not met, the units 

should remain at O’Hare International Airport. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

O’Hare Reserve Station is in the Northwest 

corner of O’Hare International Airport, enjoying immediate access to two runways. Two ARC 

units are based there: the 928th Airlift Group 

(Air Force Reserve), with C-130s; and the 126th 

Air Refueling Wing (Air National Guard), with 

KC-135s. An Army Reserve Center is located 

adjacent to the base. In addition, a large 

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) activity currently 

occupies a government owned, recently renovated office building on the base; however, DLA 

is recommending disestablishment of this activity to other locations as part of the 1993 base 

closure process. 

In a 1991 land exchange agreement, intended 

to resolve all real property issues between the 

Air Force and the City of Chicago at O’Hare 

International Airport, the City specifically agreed 

that it would seek no more land from the O’Hare 

ARS. The Air Force has advised the City that 

the ARC units are adequately housed at O’Hare, 

and there is no basis for moving them. There 

are no savings from moving; only costs. To 

justify this realignment under the DoD Base 

Closure Selection Criteria, all costs of closure1 

realignment would have to be funded entirely 

outside the federal government. (For example, 

no DoD or FAA funds). The relocation site would 

have to meet all operating requirements, such 

as runway length and freedom from noiserelated operating limitations, and be close enough 

to Chicago that the units would not suffer 

major loss of personnel. The day-to-day operating costs at the relocation site would have to 

compare favorably with those at O’Hare International Airport. 

The City proposes that the ARC units move to 

Greater Rockford Airport, 55 miles northwest 

of O’Hare International Airport. Virtually no 

facilities for the units exist at Rockford, so an 

entirely new base would have to be constructed. 

The airfield is constrained on two sides by the 

1-79 
Chapter I ~ 

Rock River and flood plain. At least one runway 

will have to be extended for KC-135 operations. 

There appear to be noise and other environmental problems to resolve before a final determination of siting feasibility can be made. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

Some community groups supported the realignment of O’Hare ARS, while others opposed it; 

however, all involved wanted the units to stay 

in Illinois. The opposition groups claimed the 

unit combat effectiveness would be adversely 

impacted by loss of personnel and a diminished 

recruiting population base outside the Chicago 

metropolitan area. The opposition groups 

argued the City of Chicago had no financial 

plan and had not determined costs to rebuild 

replacement facilities for the reserve units. 

Furthermore, assurances were initially made to 

avoid costs to DoD, but not to the federal 

government. The opposition also argued costs 

to relocate were excessive because there were 

no other runways in Illinois long enough to 

handle the KC-135 aircraft and the proposed 

site at the Greater Rockford Airport currently 

had no unit facilities, 

The groups supporting the O’Hare ARS realignment believed other sites would provide adequate 

populations for recruiting. The groups also 

claimed moving the units to a less-congested 

location would increase training opportunities 

and allow for future unit expansion. The current use of the airport land as a military installation is inefficient, and the realignment of the 

base would allow economic development, increase the number of jobs, and improve airport 

efficiency. The City of Chicago asserted the time 

constraints were unrealistic and the Secretary 

of Defense recommendation should be changed 

to allow completion of the move by 1999 as the 

statute allows. The supporting organizations 

claimed no Department of Defense funds would 

be spent for unit relocations, but federal funds 

could be spent for normal civil aviation improvements to facilitate the transfer. In addition, the 

groups claimed federal policy promoting conversion of military bases to civil aviation was 

relevant in this situation. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found although the units were 

adequately housed at O’Hare Air Reserve Station, 

the community’s desire to move the units 

undermines the typical community-base support 

relationship found at other bases, and could be 

detrimental to future mission accomplishments. 

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of 

Defense that the relocation must be at no cost 

to the federal government and that financial plans 

must include the receiving community’s contributions toward this relocation. The Commission found flyq operations were impeded during 

adverse weather due to basing on the world’s 

busiest airport. Additionally, local visual flight 

training was conducted at remote fields due to 

traffic congestion at Chicago O’Hare. The Commission found all military construction was halted 

at O’Hare ARS in response to closure actions 

thus affecting maintenance of the base and 

potentially affecting flying operations, if the Air 

Force subsequently rejects relocation sites. The 

Commission found there would be a smaller 

population base from which to recruit, likely 

impacting unit manning. These additional costs 

to replace personnel would not be recoverable 

from the City of Chicago, but should not 

significantly impact unit combat capability. 

The Commission found the City of Chicago did 

not plan for moving the Army Reserve activity 

adjacent to the base, but must include that unit 

in future expansion proposals. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 2 and 

4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: close O’Hare ARS as proposed by the 

City of Chicago and relocate the assigned Air 

Reserve Component (ARC) units to the Greater 

Rockford Airport, or another location acceptable to the Secretary of the Air Force (in consultation and agreement with the receiving 

location), provided the City of Chicago can 

demonstrate that it has the financing in place 

to cover the full cost of replacing facilities 

(except for FAA grants for airport planning and 

1-80 
Chapter I 

development that would otherwise be eligible 

for federal financial assistance to serve the needs 

of civil aviation at the receiving location), environmental impact analyses, moving, and any 

added costs of environmental cleanup resulting 

from higher standards or a faster schedule than 

DoD would be obliged to meet if the base did 

not close, without any cost whatsoever to the 

federal government, and further provided that 

the closurelrealignment must begin by July 1995 

and be completed by July 1998. Chicago would 

also have to fund the cost of relocating the Army 

Reserve activity, or leave it in place. If these 

conditions are not met, the units should remain 

at O’Hare International Airport. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with 

the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Other Air Force Bases 

Gentile Air Force Station 

Dayton, Ohio 

Category: Air Force Station 

Mission: Principal and host organization is the 

Defense Electronics Supply Center. In addition 

there are over 20 tenant activities. 

One-Time Cost: NIA 

Savings: 1994-99: NIA 

Payback: NIA 

Annual: NIA 

SECRETARYOFDEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

None. The Commission added this military 

installation to the list of installations recommended for closure or realignment. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community was primarily interested in 

retaining the Defense Electronics Supply 

Center (DESC) as the host on Gentile AFS. It 

argued keeping DESC at Gentile AFS was more 

cost effective than relocating the mission to 

Columbus, Ohio, as recommended by DoD. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found closing the Defense 

Electronics Supply Center and relocating it at 

the Defense Construction Supply Center, along 

with most of the other Gentile Air Force Station 

tenants, streamlined operations and cut cost. 

However, the Defense Switching Network will 

remain as the sole tenant of Gentile Air Force 

Station, with the possibility of being phased out 

within three to four years. The Commission did 

not ascertain costs associated with closure of 

Gentile AFS. The closure would be relatively 

inexpensive because Gentile is a small installation, owned by the Air Force (Wright Patterson 

AFB), which would be vacant except for the 

automatic switching center. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 1. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: close Gentile Air Force Station, 

Dayton, Ohio, except for space required to 

operate the Defense Switching Network. The 

Commission finds this recommendation is 

consistent with the force-structure plan and 

final criteria. 

Air Force Depots 

Newark Air Force Base, Ohio 

Category: Depot 

Mission: Aerospace Guidance and 

One-time Cost: $ 31.3 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $-I 7.1 million (cost) 

Payback: 8 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Newark AFB, Ohio, is recommended for closure. 

The Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center 

(AGMC) depot will be closed; some workload 

will move to other depot maintenance activities 

including the private sector. We anticipate that 

most will be privatized in place. 

Metrology Center 

Annual: $ 3.8 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Due to significant reductions in force structure, 

the Air Force has an excess depot maintenance 

capacity of at least 8.7 million Direct Product 

Actual Hours (DPAH). When all eight criteria 

1-81 
Chapter I 

Chcrnges to Previously Approved BRAC 

88/91 Recommendations 

Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas 

Category: Air Force Reserve 

Mission: Power Projection 

One-time Cost: NIA 

Savings: 1994-99: NIA 

Payback: NIA 

Annual: NIA 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Bergstrom AFB as follows: The 

704th Fighter Squadron (AFRES) with its F-16 

aircraft and the 924th Fighter Group (AFRES) 

support units will move to Carswell AFB, Texas 

and the cantonment area at Bergstrom AFB will 

close. The Regional Corrosion Control Facility 

at Bergstrom AFB will be closed by September 

30, 1994, unless a civilian air port authority 

elects to assume the responsibility for operating 

and maintaining the facility before that date. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The 1991 Commission recommended the closure 

of Bergstrom AFB. The AFRES was to remain in 

a cantonment area. In reviewing AFRES plans 

for Bergstrom AFB, the Air Force found that 

considerable savings could be realized by realigning the Bergstrom AFRES units and aircraft to 

the Carswell AFB cantonment area. This realignment will result in savings in Military Construction (MILCON) funds, reduced manpower costs, 

and will not significantly impact unit readiness. 

The original 199 1 realignment recommendation 

cost $12.5 million in MILCON to construct a 

cantonment area at Bergstrom AFB. Based on 

the best estimates available at this time, the cost 

of this change is $5.8 million in MILCON, for a 

projected savings of $6.7 million. This action 

will also result in net manpower savings. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community believed the F- 16 reserve squadron and its support units should remain in a 

cantonment area on Bergstrom AFB which will 

be operated by the city of Austin as a municipal 

airport. Austin city officials pointed out the 1991 

Base Closure and Realignment Commission 

Report clearly states: “the Air Force Reserves 

units shall remain in the Bergstrom cantonment 

area if the base is converted to a civilian 

airport, and if no decision is made by June 1993, 

the Reserve units will be redistributed.” On May 

1, 1993, the citizens of Austin overwhelmingly 

approved a $400 million bond referendum to 

relocate the municipal airport to Bergstrom AFB; 

therefore, the city argued, the Air Force is committed to leaving the reserve units at Bergstrom. 

In a report dated May 26, 1993, the community also suggested that a more sensible decision would be to not only retain the reserve 

units at Bergstrom, but to move the Air Force 

reserve units from Carswell AFB to Bergstrom. 

The community contended this decision would 

improve operational readiness, result in significant MILCON savings ($57 million), provide 

vastly superior facilities with expansion room, 

and alleviate air-space congestion in the DallasFort Worth area. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the Air Force was resolute 

in its recommendation to move the 704th Fighter 

Squadron (AFRES) with its F-16 aircraft and 

the 924th Fighter Group (AFRES) support units 

to Carswell AFB, Texas and to close the Bergstrom 

cantonment area despite any commitments it 

may have made in 1991. The Air Force believes 

current circumstances have overtaken the 199 1 

plan to leave these AFRES units at Bergstrom. 

The Commission also found that the City Council 

of Austin has formally adopted five resolutions 

since July 1990 indicating the city’s commitment to reuse Bergstrom AFB as its municipal 

airport. On May 1, 1993 the citizens of Austin 

voted for a bond proposition in the amount of 

$400 million to finance moving its municipal 

airport. The Air Force does not appear to have 

considered the Austin community’s long-term 

commitment to move its municipal airport to 

Bergstrom AFB. 

The Commission found the Air Force learned 

the details of the Navy’s proposal to move a 

large number of reserve aircraft to Carswell 

1-83 
Chapter I 

after it decided to recommend that the Bergstrom 

reserve units move to Carswell. The Commission was concerned the Air Force failed to 

consider the recruiting problems that may exist 

by moving approximately ten thousand reservists to the Fort Worth area. Competition among 

the services to recruit qualified technicians will 

no doubt have an adverse affect on the readiness of these units. Training plans require three 

to five years for a new affiliate to meet the military services and FAA performance standards. 

The Commission also had concerns with locating 186 aircraft in an area that has groundencroachment problems and is in a high density 

aircraft traffic pattern. 

The Commission found the Secretary of Defense 

recommendation concerning the Regional 

Corrosion Control Facility (RCCF) was consistent with the selection criteria. If closure is 

required because the civilian airport authority 

does not elect to assume responsibility for 

operating and maintaining the RCCF, the 

Department of Defense should insure that all 

reusable equipment and resources from that 

facility are relocated to the extent economical 

and practicable. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from the force-structure 

plan and final criteria 1, 2, and 4. Therefore, 

the Commission recommends the following: 

Bergstrom cantonment area will remain open 

and the 704th Fighter Squadron (AFRES) with 

its F-16 aircraft and the 924th Fighter Group 

(AFRES) support units remain at the Bergstrom 

cantonment area until at least the end of 1996. 

Close or relocate the Regional Corrosion Control Facility at Bergstrom by September 30, 1994, 

unless a civilian airport authority assumes the 

responsibility for operating and maintaining the 

facility before that date. The Commission finds 

this recommendation is consistent with the force 

structure plan and final criteria. 

Carswell Air Force Base, Texas 

Category: Air Force Reserve 

Mission: Power Projection 

One-time Cost: $ 0.3 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 1.8 million 

Payback: N/A 

Annual: NIA 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Carswell AFB as follows: Transfer the fabrication function of the 436th Training 

Squadron (formerly 436th Strategic Training 

Squadron) to Luke AFB, Arizona and the maintenance training function to Hill AFB, Utah. The 

remaining functions of the 436th Training Squadron will still relocate to Dyess AFB, Texas. Final 

disposition of the base exchange and commissary will depend on the outcome of the Congressionally mandated base exchange and 

commissary test program. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The 1991 Commission recommended that the 

436th Training Squadron be relocated to Dyess 

AFB as a whole. The proposed action will result 

in more streamlined and efficient training operations. Transferring the fabrication function to 

Luke AFB will avoid duplicating this function 

within Air Combat Command. The Hill AFB 

move will ensure that maintenance training is 

provided in a more efficient manner. 

The original 1991 realignment cost was $1.8 

million in Military Construction (MILCON). The 

cost for this redirect is $0.3 million MILCON, 

for a projected savings of $1.5 million MILCON. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community viewed the Secretary of Defense’s 

1993 recommendation to establish Carswell as 

a joint, master reserve/guard base as a win-win 

situation that would complement its redevelopment-authority efforts. The community stated 

the proposed expansion of the cantonment area 

would not be a problem, since most of the development being considered by the community is 

south of the expanded cantonment area. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the proposed actions 

involving Dyess, Luke and Hill AFB would result 

in more streamlined and efficient DoD training 

operations and avoid duplication of training. 

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Chapter I 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: transfer 

the fabrication function of the 436th Training 

Squadron (formerly 436th Strategic Training 

Squadron) to Luke AFB, Arizona and the maintenance training function to Hill AFB, Utah. The 

remaining functions of the 436th Training Squadron will still relocate to Dyess AFB, Texas. 

Final disposition of the base exchange and commissary will depend on the outcome of the 

Congressionally mandated base exchange and 

commissary test program. 

Castle AFB, California 

Category: 1991 Closure 

Mission: NIA 

One-time Cost: $59.5 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $78.7 million 

Payback: NIA 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Change the recommendation of the 1991 

Commission regarding Castle AFB as follows: 

Redirect the B-52 and KC-135 Combat Crew 

Training mission from Fairchild AFB, Washington to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana (B-52) and Altus 

AFB, Oklahoma (KC-135). 

Annual: N/A 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The force structure upon which the 1991 Commission based its recommendations has changed 

and B-52 force structure is being reduced. The 

Air Force currently plans to base a large number of B-52s at two locations, with Barksdale 

AFB serving as the hub for B-52 operations and 

training. Similarly, training for mobility operations is being centralized at Altus AFB. This 

redirect will reduce the number of training sites 

and improve efficiency of operations. 

The original 1991 realignment recommendation 

cost $78.7 million in Military Construction 

(MILCON). The estimated cost for this redirect 

to Barksdale and Altus AFBs is $59.5 million in 

MILCON, for a projected savings of $19.2 million. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the recommended 

force-structure changes would result in a large 

number of B-52s at Barksdale AFB. Additionally, Air Mobility Training, to include KC-l35s, 

is being consolidated at Altus AFB. This action 

would improve efficiency of training and military operations. 

The original 199 1 realignment recommendation 

cost was $78.7M in MILCON. The estimated 

cost for this 1993 recommendation is $59.5M 

in MILCON for a projected savings of $19.2M. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: redirect 

the B-52 and KC-135 Combat Crew Training 

mission from Fairchild AFB, Washington to 

Barksdale AFB, Louisiana (B-52) and Altus AFB, 

0 klahoma (KC- 135). 

Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois 

Category: 1988 Closure 

Mission: NIA 

One-time Cost: $1 6.4 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $1 7.5 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

As part of the closure of Chanute AFB, Illinois, 

the Air Force recommends consolidating its 16 

Metals Technology, Non-Destructive Inspection, 

and Aircraft Structural Maintenance training 

courses with the Navy at Naval Air Station (NAS) 

Memphis, Tennessee, and then move with the 

Navy when NAS Memphis closes. The 1991 Base 

Closure Commission recommended that these 

courses, along with 36 other courses, be transferred to Sheppard AFB, Texas. 

Payback: N/A 

1-85 
Chapter I 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

On March 31, 1992, the DoD Inspector General 

recommended that the Air Force consolidate and 

collocate its 16 metals training courses with the 

Navy. There will be no Military Construction 

(MILCON) costs associated with temporarily 

relocating the specified training courses to NAS 

Memphis. This is considerably less than the $17.5 

million in MILCON cost to relocate these courses 

to Sheppard AFB. As this training is now scheduled to move when NAS Memphis closes, the 

Air Force and Navy will ~7ork to achieve a cost 

effective approach until a more permanent site 

is found. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

No formal community concerns were expressed. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found there were no MILCON 

costs associated with temporarily relocating the 

specified training courses to NAS Memphis. The 

Commission did find, however, the Navy had 

initially indicated a cost of $16.4 million to 

relocate this training to NAS Pensacola, Florida. 

The Commission found the training was originally scheduled to move when NAS Memphis 

closes and, therefore, the Air Force and Navy 

could work to achieve a more cost-effective 

approach to insure the efficiencies involved in 

Joint Service training are realized. Collocation 

of these courses with the Navy would achieve 

efficiencies and savings. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from the force structure 

plan and final criterion 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: as part of 

the closure of Chanute AFB, Illinois, consolidate the Air Force’s 16 Metals Technology, NonDestructive Inspection, and Aircraft Structural 

Maintenance training courses with the Navy at 

Naval Air Station (NAS) Memphis, Tennessee, 

and then move them with the Navy to NAS 

Pensacola, Florida. The Commission finds this 

recommendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 

Category: Major Headquarters 

Mission: Headquarters USSOCOM 

One-time Cost: NIA 

Savings: 1994-99: $25.6 million 

Payback: Immediate 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

and USCENTCOM 

Annual: NIA 

RECOMMENDATION 

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding MacDill AFB as follows: The 

Air Force Reserve (AFRES) will temporarily 

operate the airfield as a reserve base, not open 

to civil use, until it can be converted to a civil 

airport. This will accommodate the recommended 

reassignment of the 482nd Fighter Wing (AFRES) 

from Homestead AFB to MacDill AFB and its 

conversion to KC-135 tankers. The Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) will 

not be transferred to Charleston AFB, South 

Carolina as recommended in 1991, but, instead, 

will remain at MacDill AFB. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The 1991 Commission recommended a realignment and partial closure of MacDill AFB. Its 

F-16 training mission has been relocated to Luke 

AFB, Arizona, and the JCSE was to be relocated 

to Charleston AFB. Two unified commands, 

Headquarters Central Command and Headquarters Special Operations Command, were left 

in place. The airfield was to close. 

Several events since 1991 have made a change 

to the Commission action appropriate. The closure 

of Homestead AFB requires the relocation 

of the 482nd Fighter Wing (AFRES). The best 

location for this unit, when converted to KC135s, is MacDill AFB. The National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 

aircraft element has relocated from Miami International Airport to MacDill AFB and would like 

to remain permanently. NOAA is prepared to 

pay a fair share of the cost of airport operations. 

The AFRES’s temporary operation of the airfield 

will have reduced operating hours and services. 

1-86 
Chapter I 

The 1991 Commission noted a number of deficiencies of MacDill AFB as a fighter base: “pressure 

on air space, training areas, and low level 

routes ... not located near Army units that will 

offer joint training opportunities.. . [and]. . . ground 

encroachment.” These are largely inapplicable 

to an AFRES tanker operation. 

Encroachment remains a problem, but the reduced 

number of flights and the increased compatibility of both tanker and NOAA aircraft with the 

predominant types of aircraft using Tampa 

International Airport make this viable. As an 

interim ReserveINOAA airfield, use will be 

modest, and it will not be open to large-scale 

use by other military units. 

The original 199 1 realignment recommendation 

cost for the JCSE relocation was $25.6 million 

in MILCON. Retaining the JCSE at MacDill AFB 

avoids this cost. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community argued the requirement for 

United States Central Command and United States 

Special Operations Command to have access to 

an operational runway would not be met if the 

482nd Fighter Wing was returned to Homestead Air Force Base, Florida. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the cost to move the 

Joint Communication Support Element (JCSE) 

to Charleston AFB, SC, is $25.6 million. 

Retaining the unit at MacDill avoids this cost. 

MacDill AFB is host to several tenant units that 

require the use of an operational airfield, 

including the JCSE, United States Special 

Operations Command, United States Central 

Command, and the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration. The City of Tampa 

has stated it has no need for the excess property at MacDill and, therefore, has no plans to 

assume its operation. The Department of Commerce (DOC), specifically the National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration, has requested 

a no-cost transfer of the MacDill airfield to DOC 

control. The Secretary of Defense has indicated 

approval of the request, and it has been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from criteria 1, 3, and 

4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: retain the Joint Communication 

Support Element at MacDill as long as the 

airfield is non-DoD operated. Operation of the 

airfield at MacDill will be taken over by the 

Department of Commerce or another Federal 

agency. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan 

and final criteria. 

Mather Air Force Base, California 

Category: 1988 closure 

Mission: NIA 

One-time Cost: $12.5 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $33.7 million 

Payback: Immediate 

Annual: NIA 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Change the recommendation of the 1991 

Commission regarding Mather AFB as follows: 

Redirect the 940th Air Refueling Group (AFRES) 

with its KC-135 aircraft to Beale AFB, California 

vice McClellan AFB, California. Because of the 

rapidly approaching closure of Mather AFB, the 

940th will temporarily relocate to McClellan AFB, 

while awaiting permanent beddown at Beale AFB. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

Moving the 940th Air Refueling Group (AFRES) 

to Beale AFB is more cost effective. 

The original 1991 realignment cost was $33.7 

million in Military Construction (MILCON). 

The estimated cost for this redirect is $12.5 

million in MILCON, for a projected savings of 

$2 1.2 million. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

1-87 
Chapter I 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The 1988 Department of Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommended 

the closure of the 323rd Flying Training Wing 

Hospital and the retention of the 940th Air 

Refueling Group at Mather AFB, CA. The 1991 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended the realignment of the 

940th Air Refueling Group from Mather AFB to 

McClellan AFB, California, and recommended 

the 323rd Flying Training Wing Hospital 

remain open as an annex to McClellan AFB, 

CA. The 1993 Secretary of Defense recommendation changed the realignment location for the 

940th from McClellan AFB, California, to Beale 

AFB, California. The proposal to redirect the 

940th ARG to Beale AFB, California would save 

$21.2M in MILCON. Even with the temporary 

facilities construction costs ($l.lM) and termination costs ($3M) at McClellan, the savings 

are substantial enough to support the Secretary’s 

recommendation. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: redirect the 940th Air Refueling Group (AFRES) 

with its KC-135 aircraft to Beale AFB, California 

vice McClellan AFB, California. Because of the 

rapidly approaching closure of Mather AFB, the 

940th will temporarily relocate to McClellan AFB, 

while awaiting permanent beddown at Beale AFB. 

Rickenbacker Air National 

Category: 1991 Closure 

Mission: Tanker 

One-time Cost: $8 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $18.2 million 

Payback: NIA 

Guard Base, Ohio 

Annual: NIA 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Rickenbacker ANGB as 

follows: The 121st Air Refueling Wing (ANG) 

and the 160th Air Refueling Group (ANG) will 

move into a cantonment area on the present 

Rickenbacker ANGB, and operate as a tenant of 

the Rickenbacker Port Authority (RPA) on RPAs 

airport. The 907th Airlift Group (AFRES) 

will realign to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio as 

originally recommended. The 4950th Test Wing 

will still move to Edwards AFB, California. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The 1991 Commission recommended closing 

Rickenbacker ANGB, and realigning the 121st 

Air Refueling Wing (ANG), the 160th Air Refueling Group (ANG) and the 907th Airlift Group 

(AFRES) to Wright-Patterson AFB. These units 

were to occupy facilities being vacated by the 

4950th Test Wing, which will move to Edwards 

AFB to consolidate test units. 

The airfield at Rickenbacker is no longer a 

military responsibility, having been transferred 

by long term lease to the RPA in 1992. It will 

be conveyed in fee under the public benefit 

authority of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 

when environmental restoration is complete. The 

State of Ohio has proposed that under current 

circumstances, more money could be saved by 

leaving the ANG tanker units at Rickenbacker 

ANGB than by moving it to Wright-Patterson 

AFB. The Air Force has carefully examined his 

analysis and concluded that it is correct. The 

current analysis is less costly than the original 

estimate of moving both Rickenbacker ANGB 

units to Wright-Patterson AFB, primarily 

because of the State’s later burden-sharing 

proposal to lower the ANGS long-term operating costs at Rickenbacker. 

In a related force structure move, in order to 

fully utilize the facilities at Wright-Patterson AFB, 

the Air Force recommends that the 178th Fighter 

Group move from the Springfield Municipal 

Airport, Ohio, to Wright-Patterson AFB, about 

30 miles away. This unit will fit into the available facilities with little construction. The move 

will save approximately $1.1 million in base 

operating support annually based on economies 

of consolidating some ANG functions with AFRES 

and active Air Force functions at WrightPatterson. Since the unit moves only a short 

distance, retention of current personnel should 

not be a problem. 

1-88 
Chapter I 

The 4950th will still move to Edwards AFB, 

California from Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, to 

take advantage of the enhanced military value 

through the efficiency of consolidating test assets. 

The original 1991 realignment cost was $37.9 

million in Military Construction (MILCON). The 

cost for this redirect is $26.2 million in MILCON, 

for a projected savings of $11.7 million. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The Rickenbacker airfield, no longer a military 

responsibility, was transferred by long-term lease 

to the Rickenbacker Port Authority in 1992. The 

State of Ohio showed cost savings by leaving 

the ANG tanker units in a cantonment area at 

Rickenbacker ANGB instead of moving them to 

Wright-Patterson AFB. The community argued 

the move of the 178th from Springfield to WPAFB 

was not cost-effective and jeopardized unit military value. In addition to the cost savings realized 

by not moving to WPAFB, the community 

asserted significant impacts on recruitment and 

retention were avoided. By moving to WPAFB, 

which already has a National Guard recruiting 

shortfall, the community believed the move would 

result in personnel problems. The community 

also argued moving the ANG units from 

Rickenbacker to Wright-Patterson would impact 

military readiness because the facilities could 

not accommodate the units properly. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found moving the ANG units 

from Rickenbacker ANGB to Wright-Patterson 

AFB was no longer cost effective. The Secretary 

of Defense recommendation in 1991 to realign 

Rickenbacker units to Wright-Patterson AFB was 

estimated to cost $49.6 million. This figure 

included $2 1 million in one-time moving costs. 

In contrast, the total cost to remain at 

Rickenbacker in a cantonment area, as recommended by the Secretary of Defense in 1993, is 

estimated at $32.2 million. When compared to 

the cost of realignment, a $17.4 million savings 

could be realized by retaining the Air National 

Guard at Rickenbacker. 

Additionally, in a related move suggested by 

the Secretary of Defense, analysis showed it 

was not cost effective to move the units at 

Springfield to Wright-Patterson AFB or to move 

the 178th from Springfield to WPAFB. The USAF 

performed a detailed site survey in April 1993, 

and, on May 4, 1993, provided the preliminary 

results. The site survey showed the USAF 

MILCON projections for construction of facilities at WPAFB for the 178th FG were significantly erroneous. Initially, in the March 1993 

recommendations to the Commission, DoD 

estimated the cost to move and beddown the 

178th Fighter Group from Springfield ANGB to 

WPAFB was $3 million. The updated estimate 

revealed a $35 million cost to beddown the 178th 

at WPAFB. Overall, the data showed a cost of 

$26.61M to move the 178th in contrast to an 

earlier stated savings of $14.39M which made 

such a related move uneconomical. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: the 12 1st 

Air Refueling Wing (ANG) and the 160th Air 

Refueling Group (ANG) will move into a 

cantonment area on the present Rickenbacker 

ANGB, and operate as a tenant of the 

Rickenbacker Port Authority (RPA) on RPA’s 

airport. The 907th Airlift Group (AFRES) will 

realign to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio as originally recommended. The 4950th Test Wing will 

still move to Edwards AFB, California. There is 

no recommendation by the Secretary of Defense 

or the Commission to move the 178th Fighter 

Group; it will stay at Springfield Municipal 

Airport, Ohio. 

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY 

Inventory Control Points 

Defense Electronics Supply Center 

Gentile AFS, Ohio 

Category: Inventory Control Point 

Mission: Provide wholesale support of 

One-time Cost: $ 101.2 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ -47.6 million (cost) 

Payback: 10 years 

military services with electronic type items 

Annual: $ 23.8 million 

1-89 
Chapter I 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close the Defense Electronics Supply Center 

(DESC) (Gentile AFS), Dayton, Ohio, and relocate its mission to the Defense Construction 

Supply Center (DCSC), Columbus, Ohio. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

DESC is one of four hardware Inventory Control 

Points (ICPs). It is currently the host at Gentile 

Air Force Station in Dayton, Ohio. The only 

other tenant at Gentile AFS is the Defense Switching Network (DSN). The base has a large number of warehouses (vacant since the depot closed 

in the mid-seventies) which require extensive 

renovation before they could be used as administrative office space. The Agency has no plans 

to re-open the Depot at this location. 

The hardware ICPs are all similar in missions, 

organizations, personnel skills and common 

automated management systems. The ICP 

Concept of Operations which takes into account 

the DoD Force Structure Plan, indicates that 

consolidation of ICPs can reduce the cost of 

operations by eliminating redundant overhead 

operations. The Consumable Item Transfer will 

be completed in FY 94 and consolidation can 

begin after that transfer has been completed. 

Consolidating DESC and DCSC at both Columbus and Dayton was considered. The Columbus 

location provided the best overall payback and 

could allow for the complete closure of Gentile 

Air Force Station, Dayton, Ohio. DCSC currently 

has approval for construction of a 700,000 square 

foot office building which should be completed 

in FY 96. This building will provide adequate 

space for expansion of the ICP. As a result of 

the closure of DESC, Gentile Air Force Station 

will be excess to Air Force needs. The Air Force 

will dispose of it in accordance with existing 

policy and procedure. It is the intent of the Air 

Force that the only other activity, a Defense 

Switching Network terminal, phase out within 

the time frame of the DESC closure. If the 

terminal is not phased out during this period, 

it will remain as a stand alone facility. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community contended Gentile Air Force 

Station should remain open and DESC should 

not move to Columbus, Ohio. The community 

asserted they had empty warehouses which could 

be converted into administrative use. Rather than 

construct a new building at Columbus which 

would cost $89M, the hardware center at 

Columbus could be moved to Gentile, utilizing 

existing space and combining two activities. 

The community argued such a move could be 

accomplished at a lower cost than the DoD 

and DLA proposal to move DESC to DCSC at 

Columbus, Ohio. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found the consolidation of Inventory Control Points was a rational approach 

to increase management efficiencies. Further, the 

Commission found moving DESC to DCSC 

allowed for both the closing of Gentile Air 

Force Station and future expansion at DCSC if 

required. In addition, the Commission found 

the cost data supports the Secretary’s proposal 

to merge DESC with the DCSC in Columbus, 

Ohio. Although the costs used by the Secretary 

varied and were debatable, the estimates did 

not affect the validity of the recommendations. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria and, therefore, 

that the Commission adopt the following 

recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: 

close the Defense Electronics Supply Center 

(DESC) (Gentile AFS), Dayton, Ohio, and relocate 

its mission to the Defense Construction Supply 

Center (DCSC), Columbus, Ohio. 

Defense Industrial Supply Center 

L 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 

Category: Inventory Control Point 

Mission: Provide wholesale support of 

One-time Cost: NIA 

Savings: 1994-99: NIA 

Payback: NIA 

military services with industrial type items 

Annual: NIA 

1-90 
Chapter I 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Relocate the Defense Industrial Supply Center 

(DISC), a hardware Inventory Control Point (ICP), 

located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to New 

Cumberland, Pennsylvania. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

DISC is a tenant of the Navy’s Aviation Supply 

Office (ASO) located in Philadelphia. With the 

Navy decision to close AS0 during BRAC 93, 

DISC must either be relocated or remain 

behind and assume responsibility for the base. 

The Executive Group considered options where 

square footage or buildable acres existed. Also, 

only locations where ICPs currently exist were 

considered. 

Collocation with DCSC, DESC and DGSC were 

also considered. DGSC has buildable acres but 

no space available. DESC has warehouse space 

and DCSC will have administrative space in 1997. 

However, with the recommended closures of 

DESC and realignment with DCSC, the additional move of DISC to DCSC was considered 

too risky. Scenarios were run splitting DISC 

among the remaining hardware centers and 

splitting DISC between DCSC and DGSC. Both 

options were considered too risky because 

proposed moves split managed items to multiple 

locations. 

Locating DISC at Defense Distribution Region 

East, a DLA activity located at New Cumberland, 

Pennsylvania, and the presence of three ICPs 

and major DLA facilities in the area will create 

significant opportunities for savings and efficiencies in the future. The relocation of DISC 

to New Cumberland provides the best payback 

for DoD. The relocation allows the Navy to close 

and dispose of ASO. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community argued moving DISC, the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC), and AS0 

out of Philadelphia, and closing the Defense 

Clothing Factory could impact more than 9,000 

jobs and would be economically devastating to 

the community. The community contended DISC 

and AS0 should remain together and DPSC 

should be moved to the AS0 facility, resulting 

in the closure of the DPSC installation. This 

scenario, they asserted, would also provide more 

cost savings and would be less disruptive than 

moving DPSC and DISC to New Cumberland, 

as proposed by DoD and DLA. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found moving DISC from Philadelphia would create a negative cumulative economic impact on Philadelphia. The Commission 

also found the Secretary’s recommendation did 

not yield the greatest savings commensurate with 

no mission degradation. Further, the Commission found the most cost-effective option was 

for DISC to remain in place. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 4, 5, 

and 6. Therefore, the Commission recommends 

the following: the Defense Industrial Supply 

Center remains open and located within the 

Aviation Supply Office compound in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The Commission finds this 

recommendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 

Defense Personnel Support Center 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 

Category: Inventory Control Point 

Mission: Provide food, clothing and textiles, 

medicines, and medical equipment to 

military personnel and their eligible 

dependents worldwide 

Cost to close: $ 45.9 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 6.5 million 

Annual: $ 26.1 million 

Payback: 7 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close the Defense Personnel Support Center 

(DPSC), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and relocate 

its mission to the Defense Distribution Region 

East, New Cumberland, Pennsylvania. Close the 

Defense Clothing Factory, relocate the personnel 

supporting the flag mission, and use existing 

commercial sources to procure the Clothing 

Factory products. 

1-9 I 
Chapter I 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

DPSC is the host of this Army-permitted activity in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The installation also houses the Clothing Factory, the Defense 

Contract Management District (DCMD) Midatlantic, and other tenants with approximately 

800 personnel. The decision to close the Clothing 

Factory is based on the premise that clothing 

requirements for the armed forces can be fulfilled cost effectively by commercial manufacturers, without compromising quality or delivery 

lead time. DPSC was not reviewed as part of 

the ICP category since it manages a much smaller 

number of items which have a significantly higher 

dollar value than the hardware ICPs. The activity has no administrative space available, but 

does have a small number of buildable acres. 

Environmental problems at DPSC would make 

building or extensive renovations impossible for 

some time in the future. 

With the movement of DCMD Midatlantic and 

the Clothing Factory out of DPSC, the Working 

Group examined options to either utilize the 

base as a receiver or move DPSC to another 

location. Scenarios were built so that activities 

moved to locations where excess space had been 

identified. DISC, currently a tenant at AS0 which 

is recommended for closure by the Navy, was 

considered for possible realignment to DPSC. A 

scenario which realigned DPSC to AS0 where 

DLA would assume responsibility for the base 

was analyzed. Another, which split the three 

commodities at DPSC between DGSC and DCSC 

was also examined. 

The distribution depot at New Cumberland has 

available buildable acres. Additionally, another 

recommendation moves DISC, a hardware ICP 

from Philadelphia to New Cumberland. This 

allows several activities to be consolidated. The 

presence of three ICPs and major DLA facilities 

in the area will create significant opportunities 

for savings and efficiencies in the future. As a 

result of the closure of DPSC, the property will 

be excess to Army needs. The Army will dispose of it in accordance with existing policy 

and procedure. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community argued moving DPSC out of 

south Philadelphia would severely impact the 

livelihood of the south Philadelphia merchants, 

who rely on DPSC personnel for their business. 

The community also contended moving the 

Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC), the 

Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) and 

the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) out of Philadelphia and closing the Defense Clothing 

Factory could impact more than 9,000 jobs and 

would be economically devastating to the community. The community believed DISC and AS0 

should remain together and DPSC should be 

moved to the AS0 facility, resulting in the 

closure of the DPSC installation. This scenario, 

they argued, would also provide more cost savings 

and would be less disruptive than moving DPSC 

and DISC to New Cumberland, as proposed by 

DoD and DLA. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The commission found relocating DPSC out of 

Philadelphia would result in a significant loss 

of trained workers who would be difficult to 

replace. The Commission also found this move 

would have an adverse economic impact on 

Philadelphia. The Commission found the 

Secretary’s recommendation did not yield the 

greatest savings commensurate with no mission 

degradation. The Commission also found the 

AS0 installation had enough excess capacity to 

accommodate the present tenants, AS0 and DISC, 

as well as DPSC. The Commission found this to 

be the most cost effective option. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 

4, 5, and 6. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: relocate the Defense Personnel Support Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 

to the Aviation Supply Office compound in North 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The Commission finds 

this recommendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 

1-92 
Chapter I 

SewiceKuppori Activities 

Defense Clothing Factory 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 

Category: ServicelSupport Activity 

Mission: Surge capacity to support 

mobilization requirements, production 

of small lots and special sizes requirements, 

and production of hand-embroidered flags 

One-time Cost: $ 19.2 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 75.3 million 

Payback: 2 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Close the Defense Personnel Support Center 

(DPSC), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and 

relocate its mission to the Defense Distribution 

Region East, New Cumberland, Pennsylvania. 

Close the Defense Clothing Factory, relocate the 

personnel supporting the flag mission, and use 

existing commercial sources to procure the Clothing Factory products. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

DPSC is the host of this Army-permitted activity in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The installation also houses the Clothing Factory, the Defense 

Contract Management District Mid-Atlantic 

(DCMDM), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and other 

tenants with approximately 800 personnel. The 

decision to close the Clothing Factory is based 

on the premise that clothing requirements for 

the armed forces can be fulfilled cost effectively 

by commercial manufacturers, without compromising quality or delivery lead time. DPSC was 

not reviewed as part of the Inventory Control 

Point (ICP) category because it manages a much 

smaller number of items which have a significantly higher dollar value than the hardware 

ICPs. The activity has no administrative space 

available, but does have a small number of buildable acres. Environmental problems at DPSC 

would make building or extensive renovations 

impossible for some time in the future. 

Annual: $ 15.5 million 

With the movement of DCMD Mid-Atlantic and 

the Clothing Factory out of DPSC, the Working 

Group examined options to either utilize the 

base as a receiver or move DPSC to another 

location. Scenarios were built so that activities 

were moved to locations where excess space had 

been identified. The Defense Industrial Supply 

Center (DISC), currently a tenant at the Aviation Supply Office (ASO), which is recommended 

for closure by the Navy, was considered for 

possible realignment to DPSC. A scenario which 

realigned DPSC to ASO, in which DLA would 

assume responsibility for the base, was analyzed. 

Another option, which split the three commodities 

at DPSC between the Defense General Supply 

Center (DGSC), Richmond, Virginia, and the 

Defense Construction Supply Center (DCSC), 

Columbus, Ohio, was also examined. 

The distribution depot at New Cumberland has 

available buildable acres. Additionally, another 

recommendation moves DISC, a hardware ICP, 

from Philadelphia to New Cumberland. This 

allows several activities to be consolidated. The 

presence of three ICPs and major Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) facilities in the area will 

create significant opportunities for savings and 

efficiencies in the future. As a result of the 

closure of DPSC, the property will be excess to 

Army needs. The Army will dispose of it in 

accordance with existing policy and procedure. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community noted the clothing factory 

employees represented approximately 10 percent of the people employed in the apparel trade 

in the eight-county Philadelphia metropolitan 

statistical area. It pointed out the employees are 

primarily minorities and many have worked for 

years in the Clothing Factory. It argued it would 

be difficult for the Factory employees to find 

jobs in their trade if the Factory closes. It also 

argued the Clothing Factory has taken on a new 

mission as an evaluation and demonstration site 

for new apparel technologies. 

1-93 
Chapter I 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

Although the Commission considered whether 

the Clothing Factory could remain as a standalone activity at the Defense Personnel Support 

Center, the Commission found the Clothing 

Factory’s mission could be accommodated 

far more economically by commercial manufacturers without compromising quality or 

delivery. The cost data supported the Secretary’s 

recommendation. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds that the Secretary of 

Defense did not deviate substantially from the 

force-structure plan and final criteria, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following 

recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: 

Close the Defense Clothing Factory, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, relocate the personnel supporting the flag mission, and use existing 

commercial sources to procure the Clothing 

Factory products. 

Defense Logistics Services Center 

Defense Reutilization and Marketing 

Service Battle Creek, Michigan 

Category: ServiceISupport Activity 

Mission: DLSC - Manages and operates 

DRMS - Responsible for DoD’s excess 

One-time Cost: NIA 

Savings: 1994-99: NIA 

Payback: NIA 

the federal catalog system. 

personal property program 

Annual: NIA 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Disestablish the Defense Logistics Services Center (DLSC), Battle Creek, Michigan, and collocate its mission with the Defense Construction 

Supply Center (DCSC), Columbus, Ohio. 

Relocate the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS), Battle Creek, Michigan, to 

the Defense Construction Supply Center (DCSC), 

Columbus, Ohio. DCSC will provide all necessary support services for the relocated personnel. Two separate functional areas, Logistics 

Information Management and Logistics lnformation Distribution, will be assigned to the DLA 

Inventory Control Point (ICP) to accommodate 

the operational mission areas now performed 

by DLSC. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

With the implementation of DMRD 918, “Defense 

Information Infrastructure Resource Plan,” the 

responsibility for Central Design Activity (CDA) 

and Information Processing Centers (IPC) were 

assigned to the Defense Information Technology 

Service Organization. As a result of the realignment the continued need of DLSC as a stand 

alone organization was evaluated. By consolidating functions at a DLA ICP, all support services can be performed by the receiving activity. 

Some of the functions currently being performed 

by DLSC NATO Codification personnel can be 

distributed among the remaining DLA hardware 

centers, thereby consolidating similar functions. 

This relocation also places HQ DRMS Battle 

Creek, Michigan, and Operations East, Columbus, Ohio, with a DLA Inventory Control. Point 

to facilitate overall materiel management. Savings result from moving DLSC and DRMS from 

GSA-leased space. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The community argued the DLA cost savings 

were substantially overstated primarily because 

most of the personnel the Defense Logistics 

Agency claimed would be eliminated by relocating DRMS and disestablishing DLSC could 

actually be eliminated even if the activities 

remained where they were. The community 

realized the cost of the GSA lease for the DLSCI 

DRMS facility would be saved if the two organizations were relocated. However, they contended the government would continue to incur 

part of the lease cost because the General Services Administration would be required to maintain the empty office space in the Battle Creek 

Federal building if the activities moved. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found DLSC and DRMS were 

independent activities with little synergism to 

be gained from being located with DCSC. In 

1-94 
Chapter I 

addition the Commission found economic hardships could occur in Battle Creek, Michigan, by 

relocating DLSC and DRMS. Further, the Commission found the value of existing personnel 

efficiencies could not be measured. Also, the 

cost efficiencies were negligible when the overall cost to the taxpayer was considered. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 4. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: the Defense Logistics Services Center 

and Defense Reutilization and Marketing 

Service remain open and located in Battle 

Creek, Michigan. The Commission finds this 

recommendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 

Regional Headquarters 

Defense Contract Management 

District Midatlantic, 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and 

District Northcentral, 

Chicago, Illinois 

Defense Contract Management 

Category: Regional 

Mission: Perform contract administration 

services for DoD organizations and 

other U.S. Government agencies 

One-time Cost: $ 16.1 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 74.1 million 

Payback: 2 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Disestablish Defense Contract Management 

District Midatlantic (DCMDM) and Defense 

Contract Management District Northcentral 

(DCMDN), and relocate the missions to DCMD 

Northeast, DCMD South, and DCMD West. 

Annual: $ 17.5 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The Defense Contract Management Districts perform operational support and management oversight of 105 Defense Contract Management Area 

Operations (DCMAOs) and Defense Plant Representative Offices (DPROs). Since the establishment of the DCMDs a number of DCMAOs 

and DPROs have been disestablished, thereby 

reducing the span of control responsibility of 

the five DCMDs. Based on the assumptions 

derived from the DoD Force Structure Plan, it 

is anticipated the DCMD span of control will 

not increase in future years. This allows for the 

reconfiguration of the DCMDs by realigning 

responsibility for the operational activities, thereby 

reducing the number of headquarters facilities 

which perform operational support and management oversight. All plant and area operations would continue to be under geographically 

aligned Districts. The Military Value analysis 

resulted in the recommendation to disestablish 

the Midatlantic and Northcentral activities and 

relocate their missions to the three remaining 

districts. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

The Philadelphia community argued DCMD 

Midatlantic should not be closed because the 

facility was the most cost-effective and efficient 

of the five district offices. The Chicago community argued the Defense Logistics Agency was 

spending $12 million to rehabilitate the building occupied by the Northcentral District office 

at the same time it was recommending closing 

its district office. Both organizations believed 

their work force was superior to those of the 

other districts. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found consolidating the DCMDs 

from five to three was a reasonable approach to 

increasing management efficiencies. The Commission also found the quantity and complexity 

of the assigned workloads, geographical location; and other factors analyzed supported the 

Secretary’s recommendation. Once the consolidation is completed, DLA will realize a $17.5 

million per year steady-state savings with no 

mission degradation. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

1-95 
Chapter I 

Commission recommends the following: 

disestablish Defense Contract Management 

District Midatlantic (DCMDM) and Defense 

Contract Management District Northcentral 

(DCMDN), and relocate the missions to DCMD 

Northeast, DCMD South, and DCMD West. 

Defense Contract Management 

District West 

El Segundo, California 

Category: Regional 

Mission: Perform contract administration 

services for DoD organizations and 

other US. Government agencies 

One-time Cost: $ 12.5 million 

Suvings: 1994-99: $ -5.1 million (Cost) 

Payback: 9 years 

Annuul: $ 4.4 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Relocate the Defense Contract Management District 

West (DCMD West), El Segundo, California, to 

Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Los Angeles, CA. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The DCMD West is currently located in GSAleased administrative space in El Segundo, CA. 

Significant savings will result by moving the 

organization from GSA space to a building on 

Government property at Long Beach Naval 

Shipyard, CA. A number of available DoD properties were considered as potential relocation 

sites. The Naval Shipyard was selected because 

it does not involve the payment of Personnel 

Change of Station (PCS) costs. This move may 

require new construction to provide a building 

to receive the DCMD West. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found it was cost effective for 

DCMD West to move- from leased spaced to 

DoD-owned property. Further, DoD was considering new construction at the Long Beach 

Naval Shipyard for DCMD West and the Commission found it questionable to construct new 

facilities given the apparent abundance of available buildings on DoD installations or other federally owned buildings. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 2. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: relocate the Defense Contract Management District, El Segundo, California, to Long 

Beach Naval Shipyard, Los Angeles, California, 

or space obtained from exchange of land for 

space between the Navy and the Port Authority/City of Long Beach. The Commission finds 

this recommendation is consistent with the force 

structure plan and final criteria. 

Defense Distribution Depots 

Defense Distribution Depot 

Charleston, South Carolina 

Category: Distribution depots 

Mission: Receive, store, and issue wholesale 

and retail (service owned) material in 

support of the Armed Forces 

One-time Cost: $ 12.6 million 

Savings: 1994-1 999: $ -9.4 million (Cost) 

Payback: 26 years 

Annual: $ 1.1 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Disestablish Defense Distribution Depot Charleston, South Carolina (DDCS), and relocate the 

mission to Defense Distribution Depot Jacksonville, Florida (DDJF). Slow moving and/or inactive material remaining at DDCS at the time of 

the realignment will be relocated to available. 

storage space within the DoD Distribution System. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The decision to realign DDCS was driven by 

the Navy’s decision to close several naval activities in Charleston, SC, eliminating DDCS’s 

customer base. The loss of customer base along 

with sufficient storage space in the DoD distribution system drove the disestablishment. DDCS 

1-96 
Chapter I 

rated 6 out of 29 in the military value matrix. 

All depots rated lower than DDCS are collocated with their primary customer, a maintenance depot. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission recommended the partial 

disestablishment of the Naval Supply Center and 

the closure of Naval Station Charleston, South 

Carolina. The Commission found these naval 

installations to be the principal customers of 

the Defense Distribution Depot Charleston. With 

no major customers, the need for the distribution depot will be eliminated. Further, the Commission found closing this depot would reduce 

the overall excess capacity in the defense distribution depot system. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish 

Defense Distribution Depot Charleston, SC 

(DDCS), and relocate the mission to Defense 

Distribution Depot Jacksonville, FL (DDJF). Slow 

moving and/or inactive material remaining at 

DDCS at the time of the realignment will be 

relocated to available storage space within the 

DoD Distribution System. 

Defense Distribution Depot 

Letterkenny, Pennsylvania 

Category: Distribution depots 

Mission:Receive, store, and issue wholesale 

and retail (service owned) material in 

support of the Armed Forces 

One-time Cost: N/A 

Savings: 1994-99: NIA 

Payback: NIA 

Annual: NIA 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Disestablish Defense Distribution Depot 

Letterkenny, Pennsylvania (DDLP), and relocate 

the depot’s functions and materiel to Defense 

Distribution Depot Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania 

(DDTP), Defense Distribution Depot Anniston, 

Alabama, and Defense Distribution Depot 

Red River, Texas (DDRT). Active consumable 

items will be moved to Defense Depot New 

Cumberland, Pennsylvania, and Defense Depot 

Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. Any remaining 

materiel will be placed in available storage 

space within the DoD Distribution System. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The decision to disestablish DDLP was driven 

by the Army decision to realign the Letterkenny 

Army Depot and consolidate its depot maintenance functions with those existing at Tobyhanna 

Army Depot, Pennsylvania, Anniston Army 

Depot, Alabama, and Red River Army Depot, 

Texas. Realignment of DDLP’s primary customer 

and substandard facilities drive the decision to 

relocate the distribution mission to DDRT. DDLP 

rated 25 out of 29 in the military value matrix. 

All depots rated lower than DDLP are collocated with their primary customer, a maintenance depot. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission recommended Letterkenny 

Army Depot not be realigned and its maintenance function be retained. Accordingly, the 

Commission found the Defense Distribution 

Depot Letterkenny, which provides principal 

support to the Letterkenny Army Depot, is 

required. 

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Chapter I 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 1. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: the Defense Distribution Depot 

Letterkenny, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, 

remains open. The Commission finds this 

recommendation to be consistent with the 

force structure plan and final criteria. 

Defense Distribution Depot 

Oakland, California 

Category: Distribution depot 

Mission: Receive, store, and issue wholesale 

and retail (service owned) material in 

support of the Armed Forces 

One-time Cost: $ 15.0 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 17.3 million 

Payback: 5 years 

Annual: $ 10.0 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Disestablish Defense Distribution Depot Oakland, 

California (DDOC), and relocate the primary 

mission to Defense Distribution Depot Tracy, 

CA (DDTC), Defense Distribution Depot Sharpe, 

CA (DDSC), and Defense Distribution Depot San 

Diego, CA (DDDC). Slow moving or inactive 

materiel remaining at DDOC at the time of 

closure will be relocated to other available 

storage space within the DoD Distribution System. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The decision to realign DDOC was driven by 

the Navy’s decision to close Oakland Navy Base 

and Naval Air Station Alameda, CA. The closure 

of the Navy Supply Center at Oakland (fleet 

support) and the Naval Aviation Depot at Alameda 

removed the customer base from Oakland. This 

closure along with substandard facilities contributed to the decision to realign the distribution mission out of Oakland. DDOC rated 14 

out of 29 in the military value matrix. Except 

for two depots, all depots rated lower than DDOC 

are collocated with a maintenance depot. The 

other two depots exceed Oakland’s throughput 

capacity and storage space. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission recommended closing Naval 

Air Station Alameda, California, Naval Aviation 

Depot Alameda, California, and Naval Station 

Treasure Island, California. The Commission 

found these naval installations to be the principal customers of the Defense Distribution 

Depot Oakland. Because of the loss of the principal customers, the need for the distribution 

depot was eliminated. Further, the Commission 

found closing this depot would reduce the overall 

excess capacity in the Defense Distribution 

Depot system. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: 

disestablish Defense Distribution Depot Oakland, 

CA (DDOC), and relocate the primary mission 

to Defense Distribution Depot Tracy, CA (DDTC), 

Defense Distribution Depot Sharpe, CA (DDSC), 

and Defense Distribution Depot San Diego, CA 

(DDDC). Slow moving or inactive materiel 

remaining at DDOC at the time of closure will 

be relocated to other available storage space within 

the DoD Distribution System. 

Defense Distribution Depot 

Pensacola, Florida 

Category: Distribution depots 

Mission: Receive, store, and issue wholesale 

und retail (service owned) material in 

support of the Armed Forces 

One-time Cost: !$ 2.2 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 3.1 million 

Payback: 5 years 

Annual: $ 1.5 million 

1-98 
Chapter I 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Disestablish Defense Distribution Depot 

Pensacola, Florida (DDPF), and relocate the mission to Defense Distribution Depot Jacksonville, 

FL (DDJF). Slow moving and/or inactive material 

remaining at DDPF at the time of the disestablishment will be relocated to available storage 

space within the DoD Distribution System. 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The decision to disestablish DDPF was driven 

by the Navy’s decision to close the Naval Supply Center and Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, 

FL. These closures eliminated DDPF’s customer 

base. The loss of customer base along with sufficient storage space in the DoD distribution 

system drove the disestablishment. DDPF rated 

10 out of 29 in the military value matrix. All 

depots rated lower than DDPF are collocated 

with their primary customer, a maintenance depot. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission recommended closing the 

Naval Supply Center and Naval Aviation Depot 

at Pensacola. The Commission found these 

installations to be the principal customers of 

Defense Distribution Depot Pensacola. Because 

of the loss of the principal customers, the need 

for the distribution depot was eliminated. The 

Commission also found closing this distribution 

depot was consistent with efficient management 

and would reduce the overall excess capacity in 

the Defense Distribution Depot system. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish 

Defense Distribution Depot Pensacola, FL (DDPF), 

and relocate the mission to Defense Distribution 

Depot Jacksonville, FL (DDJF). Slow moving and/ 

or inactive material remaining at DDPF at the 

time of the disestablishment will be relocated 

to available storage space within the DoD Distribution System. 

Defense Distribution Depot 

Category: Distribution depots 

Mission:Receive, store, and issue wholesale 

and retail (service owned) material in 

support of the Armed Forces 

Tooele, Utah 

One-time Cost: $ 39.7 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ -19.2 million (Cost) 

Payback: 11 years 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Disestablish Defense Distribution Depot Tooele, 

Utah (DDTU). Relocate the depot’s functions/ 

materiel to Defense Distribution Depot Red River, 

Texas (DDRT). Any remaining material will be 

placed in available space in the DoD Distribution System. 

Annual: $ 5.6 million 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

The decision to disestablish DDTU was driven 

by the Army decision to realign Tooele Army 

Depot and consolidate its depot maintenance 

functions with‘those existing at Red River Army 

Depot. The realignment of DDTU’s primary customer and the substandard facilities drive the 

decision to disestablish DDTU and relocate its 

functions and materiel to DDRT. DDTU rated 

18 out of 29 in the military value matrix. With 

the exception of one depot (Columbus, Ohio), 

lower rated depots are collocated with their 

primary customer, a maintenance depot. The 

Columbus depot has almost twice the storage 

capacity and four times the issue throughput 

capacity as DDTU. 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

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Chapter I 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission recommended realigning the 

Tooele Army Depot and consolidating its maintenance functions with those at Red River Army 

Depot. Because the Tooele Army Depot was the 

principal customer of Defense Distribution 

Depot Tooele, the distribution depot is no longer 

required. Also, the Commission found closing 

this Distribution Depot would reduce the overall excess capacity in the Defense Distribution 

Depot system. Further, the Commission found 

the 1988 Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended the relocation of the 

Pueblo Army Depot, Colorado supply mission 

to Tooele Army Depot, Utah. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 2. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish Defense Distribution Depot 

Tooele, Utah (DDTU). Relocate the depot’s functiondmateriel to Defense Distribution Depot Red 

River, Texas (DDRT). Any remaining material 

will be placed in available space in the DoD 

Distribution System. Change the recommendation of the 1988 Commission regarding Pueblo 

Army Depot, CO, as follows: instead of sending 

the supply mission to Tooele Army Depot, UT, 

as recommended by the 1988 Commission, 

relocate the mission to a location to be determined by the Defense Logistics Agency. The 

Commission finds this recommendation is 

consistent with the force structure plan and 

final criteria. 

DEFENSE TNFORMATION SYSTEMS 

AGENCY (DISA) 

Category: Defense Information Systems 

Mission: Non-combat Data Processing 

One-time Cost: $ 316 million 

Savings: 1994-99: $ 401 million 

Payback: 5 years 

Agency (DlSA) 

Annual: $ 212 million 

SECRETARYOFDEFENSE 

RECOMMENDATION 

Execute a DoD-wide Data Center Consolidation 

Plan that disestablishes 44 major data processing centers (DPCs) by consolidating their information processing workload into fifteen 

standardized, automated “megacenters” located 

in existing DoD facilities. 

The 44 DPCs recommended for disestablishment 

are located at the following DoD installations: 

Nuvy Sites 

NCTS San Diego, CA 

NSC Puget Sound, WA 

NSC Norfolk, VA 

NAWC AD Patuxent River, MD 

NAWC WD Point Mugu, CA 

NSC Pearl Harbor, HI 

NAS Whidbey Island, WA 

TRF Kings Bay, GA 

NAS Key West, FL 

NAS Oceana, VA 

NCTAMSLANT Norfolk, VA 

NCTS New Orleans, LA 

CRUITCOM Arlington, VA 

NARDAC San Francisco, CA 

NCCOSC San Diego, CA 

NSC Charleston, SC 

AS0 Philadelphia, PA 

NCTS Pensacola, FL 

NAWC WD China Lake, CA 

FISC San Diego, CA 

FACSO Port Hueneme, CA 

TRF Bangor, WA 

NAS Brunswick, ME 

NAS Mayport, FL 

EPMAC New Orleans, LA 

BUPERS Washington, DC 

NCTS Washington, DC 

NCTAMS EASTPAC Pearl Harbor, HI 

NAVDAF Corpus Christi, TX 

1-100 
Chapter I 

Marine Corps Sites 

MCAS Cherry Point, NC 

RASC Camp Pendleton, CA 

RASC Camp Lejeune, NC 

MCAS El Toro, CA 

Air Force Sites 

CPSC San Antonio, TX 

FMPC Randolph AFB, TX 

7th CG, Pentagon, VA 

RPC McClellan AFB, CA 

Defense Logistics Agency Sites 

IPC Battle Creek, MI 

IPC Philadelphia, PA 

IPC Ogden, UT 

IPC Richmond, VA 

Defense Information Systems Agency Sites 

DITSO Indianapolis IPC, IN 

DITSO Columbus Annex (Dayton), OH 

DITSO Kansas City IPC, MO 

Recommended Megacenter Locations 

Columbus, Ohio 

Ogden, Utah 

San Antonio, Texas 

Rock Island, Illinois 

Montgomery, Alabama 

Denver, Colorado 

Warner-Robins, Georgia 

Huntsville, Alabama 

Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania 

Dayton, Ohio 

St. Louis, Missouri 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 

Jacksonville, Florida 

Chambersburg, Pennsylvania 

Cleveland, Ohio 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 

A DPC is an organizationally defined set of dedicated personnel, computer hardware, computer 

software, telecommunications, and environmentally conditioned facilities the primary function 

of which is to provide computer processing support for customers. The DPCs to be closed were 

transferred from the Military Departments and 

Defense Agencies to the Defense Information 

Systems Agency (DISA) under the guidelines of 

Defense Management Report Decision (DMRD) 

918. Rapid consolidation of these facilities 

is necessary to accommodate a significant 

portion of the DMRD 918 budget savings totaling $4.5 billion while continuing to support 

the mission and functions of DoD at the 

required service levels. 

Consolidation of DPCs is one of several cost 

saving initiatives underway within DISA. Best 

industry practice in the private sector has 

established the viability and desirability of 

this approach. It will position DoD to more 

efficiently support common data processing 

requirements across Services by leveraging 

information technology and resource investments 

to meet multiple needs. In the long term, it will 

increase the Military Departments’ and Defense 

Agencies’ access to state-of-the-art technology 

while requiring fewer investments to support 

similar Service needs. This is an aggressive plan 

that will ultimately position DoD to support 

business improvement initiatives, downsizing, 

and streamlining through the efficient use and 

deployment of technology. DISA has undertaken 

an extensive evaluation of candidate megacenters 

to ensure the facilities, security, and ongoing 

operations will support an efficient and flexible 

Defense Information Infrastructure capable 

of meeting the requirements of the Defense 

community. 

During the evaluation process the IPC at 

McClellan Air Force Base rated high enough to 

be selected as a megacenter site. However, with 

the Air Force’s recommendation to close 

McClellan Air Force Base the McClellan IPC was 

removed from further consideration. 

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Chapter I 

COMMUNITY CONCERNS 

Communities questioned DoD’s selection process 

and the accuracy of collected data. Specifically, 

they questioned the requirement that a 

megacenter candidate have raised floors of at 

least 18 inches and the reason DoD did not 

take into account a facility’s efficiency. Several 

communities contended erroneous data misrepresented their facilities’ physical condition, floor 

space, security arrangement, communication 

bandwidth, or regional operations cost. Communities also questioned the statistical methodology used to rate the data on each site. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS 

The Commission found errors and inconsistencies among the data on the 35 sites, which 

affected the relative ranking of the megacenters. 

Corrections in the total power capacity of 

Resource Management Business Activity, Cleveland, Ohio, changed its rank to below the threshold for becoming a megacenter. 

The Commission also found the security of 

future megacenter sites to be a central issue. 

Security was a key concern of the Secretary of 

Defense, and the communities questioned the 

security rating of individual sites and scoring 

methodology. Analysis showed the initial security ratings of a few megacenter candidates were 

inaccurate. Corrections were made, but these 

changes did not impact the final megacenter 

selection list. 

The Commission agreed with the Secretary that 

the 18 inch floor requirement for conditioned 

space was a valid criterion for megacenter 

candidates, as it ensures space for potential 

growth. The Commission used a statistically 

robust methodology to determine the overall 

ranking of the various sites. These efforts led to 

Multifunction Information Processing Activity San 

Diego, California, being added to the list of 

recommended megacenter sites. 

DoD’s initial analysis ranked Regional Processing Center, McClellan Air Force Base, high enough 

to be considered a megacenter candidate. However, RPC McClellan was excluded from the DoD 

recommended megacenter sites because DISA 

assume.d DoD would recommend closing 

McClellan Air Force Base, the RPC’s host. But 

neither DoD nor the Commission recommended 

closing McClellan AFB. Therefore, RPC McClellan 

should remain open. 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 2 and 

3. Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: disestablish the 43 DISA information 

processing centers listed below: 

Navy Sites 

NSC Charleston, SC 

NSC Puget Sound, WA 

NSC Norfolk, VA 

NAWC AD Patuxent River, MD 

NAWC WD Point Mugu, CA 

NSC Pearl Harbor, HI 

NAS Whidbey Island, WA 

TRF Kings Bay, GA 

NAS Key West, FL 

NAS Oceana, VA 

NCTAMSLANT Norfolk, VA 

NCTS New Orleans, LA 

CRUITCOM Arlington, VA 

NARDAC San Francisco, CA 

NCCOSC San Diego, CA 

AS0 Philadelphia, PA 

NCTS Pensacola, FL 

NAWC WD China Lake, CA 

FISC San Diego, CA 

FACSO Port Hueneme, CA 

TRF Bangor, WA 

NAS Brunswick, ME 

NAS Mayport, FL 

EPMAC New Orleans, LA 

BUPERS Washington, DC 

NCTS Washington, DC 

NCTAMS EASTPAC Pearl Harbor, HI 

NAVDAF Corpus Christi, TX 

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Chapter I 

Marine Corps Sites 

MCAS Cherry Point, NC 

RASC Camp Pendleton, CA 

RASC Camp Lejeune, NC 

MCAS El Toro, CA 

Air Force Sites 

CPSC San Antonio, TX 

AFMPC Randolph AFB, TX 

7th CG, Pentagon, VA 

Defense Logistics Agency Sites 

IPC Battle Creek, MI 

IPC Philadelphia, PA 

IPC Ogden, UT 

IPC Richmond, VA 

Defense Information Systems Agency Sites 

DITSO Indianapolis IPC, IN 

DITSO Columbus Annex (Dayton), OH 

RMBA Cleveland, OH 

DITSO Kansas City IPC, MO 

Consolidate the information processing center 

workload at the following 16 megacenters: 

Recommended Megacenter Locations 

Columbus, Ohio 

Ogden, Utah 

San Antonio, Texas 

Rock Island, Illinois 

Montgomery, Alabama 

Denver, Colorado 

Warner-Robins, Georgia 

Huntsville, Alabama 

Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania 

Dayton, Ohio 

St. Louis, Missouri 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 

Jacksonville, Florida 

Chambersburg, Pennsylvania 

San Diego, California 

Sacramento,California 

The Commission finds this recommendation 

is consistent with the force

-structure plan and 

final criteria. 

1-103 
Several issues which surfaced during the 

Commission’s review and analysis process were 

particularly noteworthy. While the Commission 

is specifically charged with transmitting its recommendations for military base closures and 

realignments to the President, the Commission 

believes it can offer valuable insight and guidance regarding the base closure process based 

upon its intimate involvement and first-hand 

experience. The Commission believes it would 

be remiss if it were to forego the opportunity to 

share its concerns. 

Interservicing 

The Department of Defense has been attempting 

for approximately 20 years without significant 

success to interservice depot maintenance 

workload. In his testimony before the Commission in March, 1993, the Secretary of Defense 

stated DoD did not have adequate time to 

address the interservicing issue or to compile 

the necessary data to submit recommendations 

to the 1993 Commission. However, the Secretary indicated he would welcome any Commission actions which would result in increased 

interservicing of DoD commodities. 

Committed to streamlining depot maintenance 

workload to achieve maximum efficiencies, the 

Commission determined the following five commodities should be reviewed for interservicing 

potential: wheeled vehicles, rotary-wing aircraft, 

tactical missiles, and ground communications; 

the fifth, fixed-wing aircraft, was ultimately 

deferred from further analysis due to a lack of 

reliable or comparable cost and capacity data. 

The results of the Commission’s review are 

presented in Chapter One of this Report. 

The Commission’s recommendations to consolidate depot maintenance workload through 

interservicing represent only an initial attempt 

at achieving cost savings. The efficiencies to 

be realized from interservicing dictate DoD 

conduct an exhaustive review and present its 

recommendations/actions during the 1995 round 

of the base closure process. The Commission 

strongly supports a joint organization responsible for assigning workloads to the DoD’s maintenance depots. Joint oversight could mandate 

cost effective interservicing actions circumventing Services’ parochial interests. DoD must 

create strong incentives for the Services to pursue interservicing. Additionally, any future consideration of interservicing must include a 

comprehensive review of private-sector capability. 

Depot Capacity 

Although the Commission took actions to make 

recommendations regarding the reduction of 

unnecessary depot activities and capabilities, the 

Commission fully recognizes there clearly 

remains excess capacity within the DoD depot 

system. Interservicing, as addressed in a separate 

issue within this chapter, and consolidation can 

go a long way in reducing excess depot capacity 

while realizing certain synergies and costeffectiveness relating economies of scale generally 

attendant to consolidation. Historically, each 

Service has preferred to remain in control of its 

own depot systems; however, the shrinking 

defense budget and attendant downsizing of the 

Department simply will not allow this scheme 

to continue. Therefore, the Commission recommends the Secretary of Defense consider during 

his bottom-up review of the Department, a single 

defense depot system with a joint responsibility. All DoD maintenance depots should come 

under the direct command and control of a single 

joint Services organization. The organization 

should have the authority to assign workloads 

between depots or private sector as appropriate 

and implement uniform procedures for measuring 

and evaluating depot performance. Accordingly, 

the Commission further recommends the Secretary impose a moratorium on further depot 

expansion relative to the purchase of new properties and the construction of new facilities 

until such time as the bottom-up review can 

determine the overall capacity requirements 

within the DoD depot system. 

2-1 
Chapter 2 

Private Sector Capability 

The Secretary of Defense, in his recommendations to the 1993 Commission, did not address 

the issue of domestic private-sector capability 

to “rightsize” the overall DoD depot infrastructure. However, the issue of private-sector 

capability was a recurring theme during the 

Commission’s deliberations. The Commission felt 

the domestic private sector could provide a 

potentially cost-effective option to DoD’s in-house 

capability for repairing and maintaining its equipment, which should be exploited for potential 

economies. A shift to the private sector for maintenance services may also have a positive 

impact on maintaining the nation’s industrial 

base. By downsizing DoD’s in-house maintenance 

capability to the minimum necessary, operational 

requirements may be met in the most costeffective manner through a different mix of public 

and private industrial support. Therefore, the 

Commission strongly recommends the Secretary 

of Defense address the private-sector capability, 

within the context of an integrated national 

industrial philosophy, in his recommendations 

for the 1995 round of base closures. In so 

doing, the Secretary must recognize he will meet 

an understandable bias of the various service 

depots against private sector contracting because 

of their own need to maintain volume as their 

workload shrinks. 

Implementation of the 

Commission’s Recommendations 

The Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) in 

the Department of Defense assists local communities’ economic transition following military 

base closures and realignments. Despite statistics showing local communities often thrive 

after base closures with OEA assistance, environmental study and cleanup requirements have 

resulted in a slowdown in the disposal process, 

causing local communities to report severe 

delays in land reuse. A delay in beginning the 

reuse process leads to deteriorating facilities, 

loss of community benefits, waning fiscal and 

human resources, and may be the largest single 

impediment to affected communities successfully transitioning their local economies. 

During the 1993 investigative hearings, the 

Commission heard testimony from affected 

communities and several reuse groups regarding recommendations on improving the propertydisposal process. The groups offered a 

comprehensive array of integrated recommendations to expedite the disposal and conversion 

process. These included strengthening and 

coordinating the federal role through a single 

DoD “reuse czar” to oversee the propertydisposal implementation authority and responsibility vested in the Military Departments. 

Additionally, these groups recommended DoD 

foster a truly community-oriented disposal 

attitude with “community-friendly” policies 

relative to creative real estate marketing techniques, 

credit sales, interim civilian use through leases, 

and parcelization of uncontaminated lands. These 

proposals can ensure an early transfer to and 

use by affected communities. The Commission 

endorses such recommendations and, in 

particular, believes an accountable Assistant 

Secretary of Defense-level “reuse czar” with control 

of departmental reuse funds would entice 

communities to initiate reuse planning and 

implementation. 

Another related issue involves the Air Force Base 

Disposal Agency and the coordination between 

the Agency, the OEA, and the local communities. The Air Force Base Disposal Agency was 

established in 1991 to serve as the Air Force’s 

federal real-property-disposal agent. They provide integrated management for Air Force bases 

scheduled for closure and serve as a liaison 

between reuse planners and local communities 

prior to a closure. After the base-closure process, the Agency works with state and local 

reuse commissions to develop viable reuse plans 

that minimize the economic impact of base 

closures. However, the Agency’s work is independent of the OEA. In fact, the former Director 

of the Agency, Colonel David M. Cannan, in 

testimony before the Commission, urged that a 

“‘formal liaison’ between the Agency, the OEA, 

and the local community planners begin immediately upon approval of a base closure.” 

The Commission encourages DoD and Congressional oversight committees to solicit comments 

from impacted communities on regulatory 

changes to facilitate base disposal. Congressional 

committees with statutory jurisdiction should 

hold hearings and streamline the disposal 

process, through legislation if necessary. 

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The Commission also believes Colonel Cannan’s 

recommendations should be implemented to help 

reduce costs and improve service to affected 

communities. The Army and Navy should also 

look to replicate the Air Force system to facilitate and expedite base disposal to fully assist 

community recovery efforts. The work of the 

Service’s disposal agencies should be functionally supervised by the DoD “reuse czar” so as to 

assure process coordination. 

Leases 

The Commission’s review of Department of 

Defense leases shows a significant amount of 

operation and maintenance funds spent annually for leased office space. With the downsizing 

of the Military Services, excess capacity in 

administrative space is being created on military bases, often in close proximity to the leased 

space. For example, the Army currently leases 

office space in San Antonio, TX, while excess 

capacity exists in government-owned administrative space at San Antonio’s Fort Sam Houston. The Commission suggests DoD direct the 

Services to include a separate category for leased 

facilities during the 1995 process to ensure a 

bottom-up review of all leased space. 

The Commission believes DoD should review 

its current leases to determine whether or not 

excess government-owned administrative space 

could be used instead of leased office space. A 

review of leased facilities must cross service 

boundaries to ensure leases are minimized and 

use of space on military installations is maximized. The Commission endorses efforts like 

the Army’s public-private development plans for 

the Fort Belvoir Engineer Proving Ground (EPG). 

This initiative, authorized by Congress in 1989, 

permits the Army to trade development rights 

on the EPG in return for sufficient administrative space also on the EPG at no capital 

construction cost to the government. 

The Commission further recommends the 

Department of Defense, in its bottom-up review 

of this area, examine all options surrounding 

the ownership-versus-lease issue as it relates to 

DoD facilities. Conventional wisdom appears to 

suggest ownership of facilities by the Department of Defense is more economical and beneficial to military readiness than leasing due to 

potentially significant savings in operations and 

maintenance funds. However, ownership does 

not come without attendant costs, and there 

may be instances where leased space is a better 

option, especially for short-term requirements. 

Modem business practice recognizes there should 

be a capital usage charge for facilities that are 

“owned” to avoid a bias against leasing, which 

often provides greater future flexibility. 

Finally, during its review and analysis the Commission discovered what appeared to be DoD’s 

leasing of space from GSA at premium rates 

above the going commercial rates for like areas. 

The Commission thinks there may be fertile 

ground to pursue potential anomalies in lease 

rates as indicated in the foregoing, along with 

anomalies in the overall accounting systems of 

lease-versus-own space comparisons that could 

help avoid using flawed data. 

Defense Finance and Accounting 

Service (DFAS) 

The 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended DoD submit a 

consolidation plan of the Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service (DFAS) to the 1993 Commission. DFAS developed a plan for locating a 

consolidated work force based on a site selection process known as the “Opportunity for 

Economic Growth (OEG). The OEG solicited 

proposals from communities which addressed 

specific mandatory and preferred requirements 

in the following major categories: cost to the 

Department of Defense, site and office characteristics, and community characteristics. In 

December, 1992, DoD announced that it had 

chosen the top 20 contenders in the competition to select new locations for further consolidated finance-and-accounting centers. The 

selected communities were among 112 sites from 

33 states which submitted 216 proposals. The 

final winners of the competition were to be 

announced in the Secretary of Defense’s base 

closure and realignment recommendations 

submitted to the Commission on or before 

March 15, 1993. 

The DFAS consolidation was not forwarded to 

the Commission as part of the Secretary’s 1993 

recommendations because the Secretary of 

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Defense did not believe the OEG was sound 

public policy. On March 30, 1993, the Commission formally requested DoD provide the 

OEG study, the process used to determine the 

winners, and the results of the competition by 

April 9, 1993. The Secretary responded to the 

Commission’s request in a June 7, 1993, letter, 

but by that time, the Commission was statutorily 

precluded from considering the DFAS consolidation plan. (The Commission is required to 

publish in the Federal Register proposed additions to the Secretary’s list 30 days before it 

submits its Report to the President.) In his June 

7, 1993, letter, the Secretary of Defense stated 

his reasons ,for rejecting the original DFAS siteselection process. The Secretary further stated 

he had directed a new site-selection process and 

if this new process required recommending 

installation closures or realignments, the 

Department would submit them to the Defense 

Base Closure and Realignment Commission 

during the 1995 round of base closures. While 

the 1993 Commission accepts the Secretary’s new 

direction, we recommend he take into consideration the significant investment of time and 

resources the top 20 contenders have already 

made to this DFAS proposal. 

Medical Treatment Facilities 

The 199 1 Commission recommended DoD confer 

with Congress regarding health-care policies and 

report in time for the 1993 Base Closure and 

Realignment Commission to consider the issue 

of hospital closures. Section 722 of the DoD 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 1993 requires DoD to report on alternative means of continuing to provide accessible 

health care with respect to each closure and 

realignment. It was not readily apparent DoD 

met this requirement in its recommendations to 

the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment 

Commission. 

During an April 5, 1993, Commission hearing, 

the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Health Affairs stated military hospitals were 

operating at only one-half of normal in-patient 

loads, and there was sufficient capacity to meet 

any readiness requirement as defined in the 

Defense Planning Guidance. If this excess 

capacity of in-patient loads truly exists, DoD 

has the opportunity and the responsibility to 

improve health care operations and cost effectiveness by aggressively taking necessary actions 

to restructure them into a truly joint-service medical team and system. The Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Health Affairs should continue to 

increase emphasis and focus efforts to improve 

health care operations and cost effectiveness by: 

resources, specified geographic areas 

and regions across military departments. 

(2) Closing medical treatment facilities 

operating at less than cost-effective 

levels, given the patient load and 

the cost of medical care in the 

catchment area. 

Departments and into other Service 

facilities as necessary to increase the 

capability and usage of existing 

facilities and operating beds. 

(4) Creating health care programs that 

operate on a competitive cost basis 

to support all beneficiaries. 

(5) Upgrading substandard facilities 

that are still required. 

(1) Examining the consolidation of 

(3) Moving assets across Military 

The Commission again urges DoD to review its 

policy of closing military hospitals when bases 

with active-duty populations served by those 

hospitals are closed. DoD has the obligation to 

ensure medical benefits are provided to all 

eligible beneficiaries, and it should do so at the 

lowest cost to taxpayers. 

During the 1993 base closure and realignment 

process, it was discovered that considerable funding had been identified for extensive renovation and improvement of an existing medical 

center. This may be inappropriate at a time 

when excess operating beds are available in the 

military health-care system. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs needs to 

take a strong, active role in identifying possible 

military medical facility consolidations and/or 

closures prior to any capital expenditures. 

Innovative concepts should also be considered 

in other areas, such as formalized agreements 

with Veterans Administration hospitals (which 

will be increasingly under-utilized) or privatesector hospitals. An example of this concept is 

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a “hospital without walls,” where military doctors practice at Veterans Administration and/or 

private sector hospitals, and do not require a 

military medical facility. 

In meeting its obligation to provide health 

care services to both active duty and retiree populations, DoD should pursue the lowest-cost 

option to the taxpayer (i.e., not necessarily the 

least-cost-option to DoD). This may include the 

closure and consolidation of facilities on active 

Service installations. The Commission understands DoD policy is to maintain hospitals and 

clinics to support active-duty populations. The 

Commission feels it is incumbent upon the 

Department of Defense to plan in concert with 

the appropriate government agencies, including 

the Veterans Administration, as well as privatesector health-care providers, to ensure availability 

of necessary health care for veterans and their 

dependents, keeping in mind the Administration’s 

expected new medical program. 

Cumulative Economic Impact 

The Department of Defense measured community economic impact by reviewing the direct 

and indirect effect on employment at closing, 

realigning, and receiving locations. In addition, 

DoD also calculated the cumulative economic 

impact if more than one base was affected within a given area. Additionally, effects of commission decisions from 1988 and 1991 base closures 

were factored into this cumulative economic 

analysis. The economic area was defined by 

DoD as the area where most installation 

employees lived and where most of the economic (or employment) impacts would occur. 

The economic area was either the county where 

the installation was located, a Metropolitan 

Statistical Area (MSA). 

The cumulative economic impact estimates 

led to the establishment by DoD of threshold 

criteria to justify removing a base from the proposed closure list. For example, the Secretary 

of Defense reversed an Air Force recommendation to close McClellan Air Force Base, CA 

because the economic impact, for this and 

other actions, was five percent or greater, and 

the employment population of the impacted 

community was 500,000 or more. 

Although DoD provided reasons for creating this 

standard, the Commission believed, and the 

General Accounting Office (GAO) concurred in 

its April 15 report, that this standard was 

arbitrary and discriminatory. The Commission 

was unable to validate why these exact figures 

of five percent and 500,000 were chosen as 

discriminators. Additionally, economic impact 

was just one of the eight criteria. The first four 

military-value criteria were required to be given 

priority consideration. To remove a base as a 

closure or realignment candidate based solely 

on cumulative economic impact in isolation of 

the military value criteria could be inconsistent 

with DoD’s and the Commission’s mandate. 

Therefore, in future base-closure recommendations, the Commission recommends the Secretary of Defense make clear that cumulative 

economic impact alone is insufficient cause for 

removing a base with inadequate military value 

from consideration for closure or realignment. 

Economic impact should be given weight only 

when analyzing candidate bases with comparable, sufficient military value. The Commission recommends, in assessing cumulative impact, 

clarifying and standardizing geographic areas of 

measurement. 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

In 199 1, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended the realignment 

of the US. Army Corps of Engineers, eliminating 

a number of division and district management 

headquarters. The Commission’s 199 1 Report 

recommended the realignment to begin in July, 

1992 and to conform to the 1991 Corps of Engineers Reorgunizution Study, unless Congress passed 

an alternative plan before that date. 

However, Congress believed the Commission had 

not given appropriate consideration to the Corps’ 

realignment proposal. Therefore, in the fall of 

199 1, Congress retroactively removed the Corps 

from the Commission’s jurisdiction. Although the 

Corps of Engineers announced in November, 

1992, the approval of the Secretary of the Army’s 

reorganization plan for its headquarters and field 

structures, the Secretary of Defense placed the 

reorganization on hold. 

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The Commission is concerned sufficient emphasis 

is not being placed on the Corps of Engineers 

reorganization as a result of Congressional 

pressure and resistance. Both the 1991 and 

1992 reorganization proposals were estimated 

to result in significant savings to the Department of Defense; however, these reorganizations 

and savings have not been realized. 

The Commission encourages the Secretary of 

Defense to act promptly to approve a reorganization plan so significant savings can be realized 

and unnecessary facilities can be closed. 

Classified Programs 

Several bases recommended for closure or 

realignment by the Secretary of Defense in both 

1991 and 1993 conducted classified missions 

or activities. While the merits of such programs 

were not issues for the Commission’s consideration, the Commission had to be made aware of 

the existence of such activities in order to fully 

assess closure and realignment implications. 

Therefore, the Commission believes the Department of Defense should maintain an audit trail 

of the discussions conducted during its recommendation process regarding classified missions. 

While it may not be necessary to provide to the 

Commission the minutes of these discussions, 

the Commission must be assured appropriate 

agencies participated in the decision-making 

process, e.g., service intelligence agencies and 

the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Command, Control, Communications, and 

Intelligence. Furthermore, if a DoD agency 

provides classified support to a non-DoD 

organization, it is imperative DoD coordinate 

with that agency prior to making its final recommendation. The responsible Service and the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense should 

enhance oversight in this area. 

Measures of Merit 

During its review and analysis of depot issues, 

the Commission discovered the measures of merit 

tended toward facility results which perhaps 

were not always the best measures for such activities. Results can be a snapshot measurement 

of a constantly moving target affected by any 

number of factors. The Commission suggests the 

measure of facility capacity would be a better 

representation of overall excess capacity within 

the DoD depot system. 

Additionally, the Commission noted during its 

analysis the Department measured productivity, generally speaking, in man-day rates, which 

some argue is an improper measure due to 

regional variations in man-day costs. The Commission suggests perhaps the cost of performance, 

and reliable measurements thereof, is a leveling, 

more reflective measure of ’merit for productivity. Therefore, the Commission suggests DoD 

pursue this or a like approach for reasonableness and appropriateness during future 

base-closure exercises. 

The Commission noted several instances 

during the Services’ data-call process where 

information that was passed from installationlevel to Service and Secretariat-level seemed 

to become less reliable. It is easy to see how 

unwitting human errors of omission, commission, and display differences can occur as information is passed through channels. To avoid 

this during future rounds, the Commission suggests base commanders. and field respondents 

providing raw data and information to higher 

headquarters be allowed to review the overall 

input in its final format before it is sent by the 

respective Service to the Commission. 

Community Preference 

Consideration 

In the base closure and realignment process, it 

is a rare occasion when a local community 

actively petitions the Department of Defense to 

consider a military installation for closure or 

realignment. For this reason, Section 2924 of 

Public Law 101-510 directs the Secretary of 

Defense to “...take such steps as are necessary 

to assure that special consideration and emphasis is given to any official statement from a unit 

of general local government adjacent to or within 

a military installation requesting the closure or 

realignment of such installation.” 

The clear intent of Congress is for the Secretary 

of Defense to provide added emphasis to any 

request by a local government for the closure 

or realignment of a Department of Defense 

installation. However, the decision to close or 

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realign a military installation must be based 

on the force-structure plan and the final criteria 

established by the Department of Defense. Due 

to the nature of the military and its national 

mission, the force-structure plan and military 

operational missions may not allow the Department of Defense to accommodate a local 

government’s request for closure or realignment. 

The Borough of Marcus Hook, PA, petitioned 

both the 1991 and 1993 Defense Base Closure 

and Realignment Commissions to close the 

Marcus Hook U.S. Army Reserve Center because 

the Army and local community have been 

unable to reach any agreement, and the community would like to obtain the property for 

development. 

Because of this example, the Commission is 

concerned the Secretary of Defense may not be 

placing sufficient emphasis on a local 

government’s request for closure or realignment 

of an installation. Therefore, the Commission 

recommends the Secretary of Defense place 

special emphasis on all local government 

requests for closure or realignment of installations. 

With regard to the Borough of Marcus Hook 

request, the Commission urges the Department 

of Army to negotiate in good faith with the 

Department of Navy and the Borough the possible 

transfer of the Marcus Hook activities to the 

Philadelphia Naval Shipyard to accommodate 

this below-threshold request. 

Environmental Cleanup Cost 

DoD’s guidance to the Services provides direction on the use of environmental costs in the 

BRAC process. This guidance states that the 

Services are not to consider environmental 

restoration (cleanup) costs in the cost of closure, 

since DoD is obligated to clean up bases 

regardless of whether they close or remain open. 

While it is true that all bases will be cleaned 

up, it doesn’t follow that the restoration costs 

at a given base will remain the same if that base 

closes. Subsequent to the 199 1 Commission, 

there have been new laws passed, intended to 

facilitate reuse of closing bases that impose unique 

environmental requirements on closing bases. 

These laws require the acceleration of investigatory work, and documentation on the 

presence of uncontaminated land at closing 

bases. As a result of these requirements, restoration costs can be incurred at closing bases 

that are not incurred at active bases. Additionally, it is possible that a given base’s cleanup 

may need to be more extensive if that base closes, 

given possible changes in land uses. This can 

result in significant increased cleanup costs at 

closing bases. Because of the potential for 

increased environmental restoration costs at 

closing bases, it is requested the Secretary of 

Defense consider incremental environmental 

restoration costs at closing bases in his recommendations to the 1995 Commission. 

Unexploded Ordnance at Fort 

Monroe, Virginia 

The Commission has concerns with the Army’s 

approach in considering unexploded ordnance 

at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and by implication at 

all Army facilities. Unexploded ordnance at Fort 

Monroe was raised as an impediment to closure 

of this facility due to potentially high cleanup 

costs when the base is turned over to the State 

of Virginia. An implication was made that the 

base is safe for military personnel and their families but would not be safe if civilians took over 

ownership of the base. In the Commission’s opinion, there is an uncertainty over Fort Monroe 

due to an inadequate assessment of the extent 

and threat of unexploded ordnance. The Commission recommends the Army comprehensively 

investigate the extent of unexploded ordnance 

and ensure public health and the environment 

are protected from current and potential future 

exposure to unexploded ordnance at Fort 

Monroe and other Army facilities containing 

unexploded ordnance. The Commission requests 

the Secretary of Defense provide information 

on the status of this request to the 1995 

Commission. 

Rightsizing DoD - Service 

Initiatives 

Although the legislative history of base closure 

seems replete with statutes limiting just what 

the Department of Defense can do without 

Congressional approval, the Services do have 

some latitude to independently downsize by 

closing down relatively small installations. Since 

the first base-closure process of 1988, the 

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Services have, upon their own initiatives, taken 

a number of these smaller actions that do not 

break the threshold of the Defense Base 

Closure and Realignment Act. 

At present the Army has underway 22 separate 

initiatives to close, realign, or transfer facilities 

which when implemented will result in perannum savings of approximately $67 million. 

Since 1988 the Navy has disposed of 14 

domestic and 29 overseas activities and installations with a very conservative estimate of 

over $70 million. Just since the 1991 baseclosure round, the Air Force has begun, and 

in some cases completed, the inactivation and 

consolidation of 12 major commands into 8. 

Additionally, 12 air divisions and 5 communications divisions were inactivated, and 25 wings 

were eliminated. 

The Commission applauds these independent 

efforts and charges the Secretary of Defense to 

continue to encourage the Services in their 

ongoing efforts in this area. 

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HISTORY OF BASE CLOSURE 

Many military installations were closed to 

reduce military overhead in the early 1960’s, 

and hundreds were closed in the early 1970’s 

after the end of the Vietnam War. Members of 

Congress, eager to protect the interests of their 

constituents, enacted Section 2687 of Title 10, 

United States Code. This statute required the 

Department of Defense to notify Congress 

if an installation became a closure or realignment candidate. This law also subjected 

proposed closure actions to time-consuming 

environmental evaluations which effectively 

halted base closures. 

As a result, in the late 1980’s, as the forcestructure steadily declined, the base structure 

became bloated. Readiness was threatened as 

the Services struggled to pay the operating costs 

of unneeded bases. The Secretary of Defense, in 

close cooperation with Congress, proposed a 

base closure law to close obsolete military bases 

and bring the base structure in line with the 

declining force structure. 

The 1988 Commission 

Public Law 100-526, enacted in October 1988, 

created the Secretary of Defense’s Commission 

on Base Realignment and Closure. The law 

charged the Commission with recommending 

installations for closure or realignment based 

on an independent study of the domestic military base structure. The 1988 Commission 

recommended the closure of 86 military and 

the realignment of 59 others with an estimated 

savings of $693.6 million annually. 

Despite the accomplishments of the 1988 DoD 

Commission, additional base closures were 

necessary with the declining force-structure 

brought on by the end of the Cold War. Since 

the 1988 Commission charter expired by this 

time, the Executive Branch attempted to propose further reductions on its own. In 1990, 

Secretary of Defense Cheney announced 

additional base closures and realignments. 

Congress protested the Secretary’s proposals 

were politically influenced. To overcome the 

potential stalemate and to ensure a fair process, 

Congress created an independent five-year 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment 

Commission with the passage of Public Law 

(PL) 101-510 under Title XXIX. 

The Defazse Base Closure 

und Realignment Commission 

Congress created the Defense Base Closure 

and Realignment Commission “to provide a fair 

process that will result in the timely closure and 

realignment of military installations inside the 

United States”. Lawmakers intended this Commission to be a model of open government. Unlike 

the 1988 DoD Commission, PL 101-510 required 

the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 

Commission to conduct public hearings on the 

Secretary of Defense’s list of closures and 

realignments and on any proposed changes to 

those recommendations. In addition, its records 

were open to public scrutiny. 

Procedurally, the 1988 DoD Commission and 

the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 

Commission differ substantially. The 1988 Commission, working for the Secretary of Defense, 

generated its own list of recommended closures 

and realignments. Under the new law, the 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission independently reviews and analyzes the 

Secretary of Defense’s recommendations and 

submits its findings directly to the President. 

To insure an independent process, the law 

requires the General Accounting Office (GAO) 

to provide a detailed analysis of the Secretary 

of Defense’s recommendations and selection 

process to the Commission. The GAO also 

assists the Commission in its analysis of the 

Secretary’s recommendations. 

PL 101-510, as amended, provides for the 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to meet in 1991, 1993, and 1995. In 

199 1, the Commission recommended 34 base 

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closures and 48 realignments, with estimated 

FY 1992-97 net savings of $2.3 billion and 

recurring savings of $1.5 billion annually after 

one-time costs of $4.1 billion. 

Using lessons learned from the 1991 round 

of base closures, Congress amended the 

Commission’s statute in 1992 to provide a more 

deliberate, auditable, and accountable process 

for future base-closure rounds. The legislative 

changes are annotated in italics in Public Law 

101-510, as amended, contained in Appendix A. 

Composition of the 1993 Defense Base 

CZosure and Realignment Commission 

The Commissioners chosen to serve in the 1993 

round of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission have diverse backgrounds 

in public service, business, and the military. 

In accordance with the enacting statute, four 

commissioners were nominated in consultation 

with the US. House of Representatives and the 

U.S. Senate Majority Leader, and two with the 

advice of the House and Senate Minority Leaders. The two remaining nominations were made 

independently by the President. 

The Commission staff was drawn from divergent backgrounds encompassing government, law, 

academia, and the military. In addition to those 

hired directly by the Commission, other staff 

were detailed from the Department of Defense, 

the General Accounting Office, the Department 

of Commerce, the Environmental Protection 

Agency, the Federal Aviation Administration, 

and the General Services Administration. The 

expertise provided by the detailees from these 

diverse government agencies contributed significantly to the Commission’s independent review 

and analysis effort. 

The Commission’s review and analysis staff was 

divided into four teams - Army, Navy, Air Force, 

and Interagency Issues. A direct-hire civilian 

managed each of the teams in accordance with 

the amended law which also limits the number 

of Department of Defense detailees on each 

team to two. 

THE 1993 BASE CLOSURE 

PROCESS 

Key Provisions of the Law 

Public Law 101-510 requires the Secretary of 

Defense to submit a list of proposed military 

base closures and realignments to the Commission by March 15, 1993. (see Appendix A) 

In accordance with the statute, these recommendations must be based upon a forcestructure plan submitted to Congress with the 

Department of Defense budget request for 

Fiscal Year 1994, and upon final criteria 

developed by the Secretary of Defense and 

approved by Congress. For the 1993 Commission process, the Secretary of Defense announced 

in December, 1992, that the final criteria would 

be identical to those used during the 1991 base 

closure round. 

The Secretary of Defense based the forcestructure plan on an assessment of the probable 

threats to national security during the six-year 

period beginning, in this case, 1994, as well as 

the anticipated levels of funding that would be 

available for national defense (see Appendix B). 

The final criteria cover a broad range of 

military, fiscal, and environmental considerations. 

The first four criteria, which relate to military 

value, were given priority consideration. The 

remaining four criteria which address infrastructure, environmental, and economic impacts, are 

important factors that may mitigate against the 

military value criteria (see Appendix C). 

The law requires the Commission to hold 

public hearings on the Secretary of Defense’s 

base closure and realignment recommendations and on any changes proposed by the 

Commission to those recommendations. The 

Commission must report its findings to the 

President by July 1, 1993, based on its review 

and analysis of the Secretary of Defense’s 

recommendations. To change any of the 

Secretary’s recommendations, the Commission 

must find that the Secretary deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and final 

selection criteria. 

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Once the President receives the Commission’s 

final report, he has until July 15 to approve or 

disapprove the recommendations. If approved, 

the report is sent to the Congress which then 

has 45 legislative days to reject the report by a 

joint resolution of disapproval or the report becomes law. If the President disapproves the 

Commission’s recommendations in whole or in 

part, he must transmit to the Commission and 

the Congress his reasons for disapproval. The 

Commission then has until August 15 to submit a revised list of recommendations to the 

President. At that point, the President either 

forwards the revised list to Congress by September 1, or the 1993 base closure process is 

terminated with no action taken to close or 

realign bases. The law prohibits Congress from 

making any amendments to the recommendations, thereby requiring an “all-or-nothing” 

acceptance of the recommendations. 

The Ofice oJ the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD) Guidance to the Militury 

Departments and Defatse Agencies 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 

provided policy guidance to the Services and 

Defense Agencies specifying procedures to ensure compliance with the base-closure law. The 

OSD issued several memoranda establishing 

policy, procedures, authorities, and responsibilities for the Military Departments and 

Defense Agencies in the selection of bases 

for realignment and closure, including the 

following requirements: studies must be based 

on the January, 1994, force-structure plan and 

the same eight final criteria used in 1991; all 

installations must be considered equally; comprehensive record-keeping, internal-control, and 

certification policies and systems for data 

requirements and sources definition, justification of data changes, and verification of 

accuracy must be implemented; installations 

must be grouped into appropriate categories 

and subcategories based on missions, capabilities, or affiliates; excess capacity must be determined; and, the “Cost of Base Realignment 

Actions” (COBRA) model must be used to calculate costs, savings, and return on investment 

of proposed closures and realignments. 

Criteria 1 - 4: Military Department 

and Defense Agency Assessments 

THE ARMY PROCESS 

The Army established the Total Army Basing 

Study (TABS) Group of 10 full-time Army Staff 

members to make recommendations for potential base closures and realignments to the Army 

Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army. 

TABS employed a two-phased process to make 

recommendations on base closures and realignments. First, the TABS Group arranged installations into 11 categories based on the primary 

mission, and then analyzed the military 

value of each installation within its category. 

Military value was based on five measures 

of merit - mission essentiality, mission suitability, operational efficiency, quality of life, 

and expandability. 

From this analysis, the TABS Group identified 

its candidates for further study. Next, the TABS 

Group developed closure and realignment 

alternatives which they subjected to a cycle of 

analysis based on feasibility, affordability, 

socioeconomic impacts, environmental impacts, 

and the subjective pros and cons of each alternative. Finally, the TABS Group used these 

assessments to determine its recommendations 

which were ultimately delivered to the Acting 

Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief 

of Staff who forwarded the recommendations 

to the Secretary of Defense. 

THE NAVY PROCESS 

The Navy established an eight-member Base 

Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) to formulate closure and realignment recommendations, with the Base Structure Analysis Team 

(BSAT) providing support to the Committee. 

The analysis process began by categorizing 

installations according to the support they 

provided to Navy and Marine Corps operational forces: personnel, weapon systems and 

material support, and shore support. These three 

categories were further divided into subcategories and subelements. The analysis began 

with numerous data calls to installations to 

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determine excess capacity and military value. 

Military value was based on the assessment 

criteria of readiness, facilities, mobilization 

capability, and cost and manpower implications. 

The BSEC then developed closure and realignment scenarios using a computer model designed 

to achieve the maximum reduction of excess 

capacity and, to the maximum extent practicable, achieve an average military value equal 

to or greater than all installations currently in 

that subcategory. Finally, the BSEC applied military judgment to the results achieved with the 

computer model to develop a final scenario. 

Once the BSEC developed candidate bases for 

closure or realignment, they evaluated them 

against final criteria five through eight. The 

final Navy recommendations were submitted 

to the Chief of Naval Operations, who, in his 

capacity as Acting Secretary of the Navy and 

with the advice of the Commandant of the 

Marine Corps, nominated bases to the Secretary 

of Defense for closure or realignment. 

THE AIR FORCE PROCESS 

The Air Force appointed a Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) comprised of seven general 

officers and six Senior Executive Service-level 

civilian personnel to implement the baseclosure law and the OSD guidance regarding 

base closures and realignments. 

Based on data received from questionnaires, the 

Air Force performed capacity analyses on 99 

bases and on-site surveys at 48 installations to 

evaluate the ability of each base to accommodate increased force-structure. 

Next, the Air Force categorized bases according 

to their mission followed with an excesscapacity analysis to identify beddown opportunities for activities and aircraft that would 

relocate. Next, the BCEG developed a colorcoded rating scale for approximately 160 

subelements in order to examine specific data 

points related to the eight final selection criteria; “green” indicated a base was more desirable 

for retention, “red” was least desirable, and 

“yellow” was between the two. 

For each category under consideration, the BCEG 

discussed the options and voted by secret 

ballot on closure and realignment recommendations. The BCEG then briefed the Acting 

Secretary of the Air Force who nominated the 

selected bases to the Secretary of Defense. 

THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY (DLA) 

PROCESS 

The Director of the Defense Logistics Agency 

(DLA) established a Base Realignment and 

Closure (BRAC) Executive Group comprised of 

both executive-level civilian and military 

personnel and a BRAC Working Group of fulltime members and support staff from specific 

DLA technical areas. The BRAC Working Group 

collected data that had been analyzed and certified, developed and evaluated recommendations 

for Executive Group consideration, conducted 

sensitivity analyses, and compiled documentation to support the final DLA recommendations. 

The Working Group categorized activities based 

on general DLA missions and functions, in four 

categories: regional headquarters, distribution 

depots, inventory control points, and service/ 

support activities. Excess capacity was evaluated through a series of questions to determine 

the physical space and throughput capacity 

available and used at each location. Their 

evaluation also considered projections for 

drawdowns in the force-structure plan, changes 

in basing and effectiveness, and initiatives 

expected to improve DLA operational efficiency 

and effectiveness. 

The Executive Group next analyzed military value 

to determine the relative ranking of an activity 

compared to other installations in the same 

category, and then developed weighted measures 

of merit - mission essentiality, mission suitability, operational efficiencies, and expandability 

- to complete their analysis of military value. 

Using the excess capacity and military value evaluations, the Executive Group identified potential 

candidates for closure or realignment. From these 

candidates, scenarios and alternative options were 

evaluated against the force-structure plan, as well 

as the COBRA model, to assess costs, savings, 

and return on investment. After the Executive 

Group considered the impacts of the scenarios, 

recommendations were made to the Director of 

the DLA for realignment or closure. 

3-4 
Chapter 3 

THE DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS 

AGENCY (DISA) PROCESS 

The Director of the Defense Information Technology Services Office (DITSO) established the 

Defense Data Center Consolidation (DDCC) team 

to begin the consolidation of data processing 

centers under the base closure and realignment 

process. The DDCC team used the significant 

amount of work already performed by the 

Services to consolidate Service/Agency data 

processing centers into larger, more efficient 

“megacenters.” The DDCC team developed a site 

selection process to identify existing sites with 

the greatest potential to serve as megacenters. 

The DDCC team, with the assistance of experts 

from various Defense Agencies and the Services, 

judged the relative merits of megacenter candidates using the criteria categories of facilities, 

security, and operations, and through data 

obtained from questionnaires and site visits to 

megacenter candidates. Of the 36 megacenter 

candidates scored, 15 were recommended in rank 

order as megacenter sites. The number of sites 

required was determined by first calculating the 

total processing workload requirements of those 

sites being consolidated, and then distributing 

the requirements beginning with the top-ranked 

site, until all the requirements were satisfied. 

An analysis was performed to determine how 

much the site ranking order depended on the 

weights assigned to each criterion and the 

inclusion or exclusion of a specific criterion. 

Criteria 1 - 4: Commission Review 

The Commission set up four teams within its 

Department of Review and Analysis - one team 

to review each respective Service application of 

the military value criteria to the base closure 

process, and an Interagency team which reviewed 

the Defense Agencies’ application of the military value criteria to the base closure process. 

The Interagency team also reviewed criteria five 

through eight for all of the Services and 

Defense Agencies. Each team analyzed its Service’s 

methodology to ensure general compliance with 

the law, to confirm accuracy of data, and to 

determine if base-specific recommendations were 

properly offered by the Secretary of Defense. 

In accordance with PL 101-510, all of the 

information used by the Secretary of Defense 

to prepare recommendations must be sent to 

Congress, the Commission, and the Comptroller General. Within the Commission, each team 

began its review and analysis with an examination of the documents provided by the Services. 

First they determined whether the recommendations were based on the force-structure plan 

and eight criteria, and whether all bases were 

considered equally. Next, the teams considered 

if categories, subcategories and base exclusions 

were reasonable. 

Each of the teams reviewed the process the 

Service used to assess military value, as well as 

the reasonableness of the data they used. Each 

team examined the capacity analyses performed 

by the Service and highlighted installation 

categories that required additional scrutiny. 

Specific data analyses included a review of the 

COBRA input data and military construction cost 

estimates, as well as the capacity of receiver 

installations to accept missions. 

Throughout the review and analysis process, the 

Commission staff maintained an active and 

ongoing dialogue with the communities who 

made significant contributions to the entire 

process. Staff members also accompanied Commissioners on base visits, attended regional 

hearings, and visited closure and realignment 

candidates and receiving installations. 

UNIQUE CHALLENGES CONSIDERED BY 

THE COMMISSION 

The Commission addressed several unique 

challenges presented by each of the Services’ 

implementation of the base closure and realignment process. 

ARMY 

Based mainly on a comparative review of 

facility requirements and available assets, the 

Commission believed the Army may not 

have taken a sufficiently close look at excess 

capacity within its infrastructure. Therefore, 

the Commissioners voted to study additional 

bases for further consideration as closure or 

realignment candidates. 

3-5 
Chapter 3 

NAVY 

The Commission shared the concerns of the 

General Accounting Office that the Navy’s 

process could result in the closure of bases 

with higher military value scores than those 

recommended to remain open. Therefore, the 

Commissioners voted to study additional bases 

for further consideration as closure or realignment candidates in part because the computer 

model used to assess alternative scenarios was 

designed to maximize the reduction of excess 

capacity, and then to evaluate average military 

value. The Commission performed a thorough 

and exhaustive review to ensure the evaluation 

process used to determine whether the bases 

recommended for closure or realignment 

conformed to the force-structure plan and 

selection criteria. 

AIR FORCE 

Because a lack of documentation made it difficult, to verify the Base Closure Executive Group’s 

(BCEG) rationale for closure and realignment 

decisions, the Commission’s Air Force team 

conducted an independent analysis of criteria 

I, 2, and 3. The study was performed to 

validate Air Force base operational groupings, 

and to analyze a base’s ability to support other 

missions that were not rated by the BCEG. 

The Commission staff reviewed the Air Force 

questionnaires to determine which questions were 

relevant to operational military value within each 

mission area. Questions chosen for inclusion in 

the staff‘s independent analysis focused on 

operational areas for generating training sorties 

(e.g. fuel, ramp space, and weather) as well as 

the training airspace and ranges to support training once airborne. Next, the staff scored and 

analyzed the bases in four mission areas: airlift, 

bomber, fighter, and tanker. The staff then 

determined score values and a point score for 

each question response. The scoring and analysis of questionnaire data for operational aspects 

provided relative values among bases across a 

wide spectrum of mission aspects, rating more 

question responses than the BCEG. The staff 

then performed a base-by-base comparative analysis and scored all bases claiming a mission 

capability for the mission areas in question. 

This analysis provided Commissioners with 

alternatives to the Air Force’s more subjective 

~~ 

and less quantifiable ranking methodology. 

The analysis was provided to supplement, not 

replace, the Air Force methodology. The analysis was not a stand-alone or sole determinant 

in the Commission’s closure and realignment 

decisions. 

DEFENSE MAINTENANCE DEPOTS 

In the past, the Military Departments developed 

depot maintenance capabilities to suit their own 

mission needs. Recently, a Joint Chiefs of Staff 

UCS) Depot Maintenance Consolidation Study 

determined defense depots collectively have 25 

to 50 percent more capacity than necessary. The 

estimated depot excess capacity would be even 

higher if certain private sector capabilities were 

included in the analysis. 

The Departments’ attempts to eliminate duplicative depot operations in Service-controlled 

depots have been largely unsuccessful. The 

Commission found that similar work was 

conducted at multiple locations primarily as a 

result of the Services’ parochial interests. For 

example, the Commission found: (1) tactical missile maintenance activities were performed at 

nine locations; (2) wheeled vehicle maintenance 

was performed at three locations; (3) rotary wing 

maintenance activities at three locations; and 

(4) ground communications maintenance at four 

sites. These inefficiencies could be avoided 

through interservicing of like commodities. 

The total cost of depot-level repair programs 

exceeds $13 billion, but only two percent of 

the total is expended through interservicing 

arrangements. The JCS study estimated DoD could 

save between $2 billion and $9 billion over the 

next 10 years if unneeded depots were closed 

and similar workloads were consolidated. 

In December, 1992, the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense directed the Services to develop integrated base closure and realignment recommendations, taking full advantage of all possible 

interservicing options. According to OSD officials, the Services decided there was insufficient 

time to consider all possible interservicing 

options and, instead, attempted to eliminate 

excess depot capacity within Service boundaries. 

Consequently, the Secretary of Defense suggested 

the Commission examine the interservicing 

possibilities. 

3-6 
Chapter 3 

The Commission analyzed and evaluated the 

potential for increased interservicing of rotarywing aircraft, wheeled vehicles, tactical missiles, 

and ground-communications and electronics 

systems workloads. Private sector capability was 

not assessed. The interservicing categories were 

selected from a matrix of duplicate repair functions included in the JCS study, from potential 

savings estimated by the Defense Depot Maintenance Council, and from suggestions made to 

the Commissioners during initial site visits. 

The Commission analyzed depot capacity within 

the Navy and Air Force fixed-wing depot structure. However, no attempt was made by the 

Commission to analyze fixed-wing interservicing 

due to a wide range of problems and a lack of 

reliable comparative information. 

Potential interservicing arrangements for the 

rotary-wing aircraft, wheeled vehicles, tactical 

missiles, and ground communications and 

electronics-system commodities were analyzed 

by analyzing comparative information and 

visiting potentially-impacted depots. Additionally, information was analyzed regarding: unique 

depot maintenance functions, related military 

value, investment in depot plant and equipment, depot capacity, projected workload 

and utilization rates, operating costs per hour, 

and cost per unit. 

AIRSPACE 

In evaluating airspace, the Commission received 

expert analysis support from a full-time Federal 

Aviation Administration detailee who reviewed 

criterion 2 which specifically addressed the 

availability and condition of associated airspace 

at both the existing and potential receiving 

locations. 

The detailee served as the liaison for the 

Commission with the FAA Washington headquarters, regional offices, and field facilities. 

Specific matters addressed included air traffic 

control operational, procedural, and equipment 

issues; military and civil airspace; and, airport 

and air and ground encroachment. 

The FAA detailee provided valuable assistance 

by obtaining and reviewing data and information including current air traffic control services, 

aeronautical charts and publications, growth trend 

statistics, information on civil airports near military airfields, information on civil and military 

facilities and equipment, and planned or 

proposed airspace expansions. 

Additionally, airport and airspace data submitted by the Services relative to recommendations regarding a military airfield were reviewed, 

verified, and validated. Data prepared by the 

Commission such as aeronautical charts depicting military and civil airports, special military 

use airspace, training areashoutes, and the 

structure of the national airspacdroute system 

were discussed and reviewed for accuracy 

and completeness. 

The detailee and members of the Interagency 

Issues, Air Force, and Navy teams prepared 

and reviewed detailed and consistent airspace 

briefing maps for each base. These maps were 

developed to clearly depict ground encroachment, the airspace structure around military 

and civil airports, and the availability and 

accessibility of military special use airspace and 

training areas. Examples of the maps prepared 

are on the following pages and show ground 

encroachment at Plattsburgh AFB, the airspace 

structure around militarykivil airports in Southern 

California, and the availability and accessibility 

to military special use airspace and training 

areas on the East Coast from Virginia to Florida. 

3-7 
: ..... .! . ,' ... ..,I, '''2 ,---. ! ......... ......... ............ ?. :,. . >i., , x. . 0 

*.a \?. , ;': .......... <" 

Shopping 

Malls 
Chapter 3 

Criteria 5 - 8: Military Dqm-tmmt, 

Defense Agency and Commission Review 

While the first four selection criteria assessed 

military value and were given priority consideration, the remaining criteria were also applied 

in base closure and realignment evaluations. 

Because these criteria were not driven by 

military considerations specific to a Service, the 

Commission’s Interagency Issues team evaluated 

criteria application across all Services to ensure 

process uniformity and compliance with the 

legal requirement to evaluate recommendations 

based on the final selection criteria. 

CRITERION 5: RETURN ON INVESTMENT 

As prescribed by OSD policy guidance, the Cost 

of Base Realignment Action (COBRA) model was 

used by the Services and Defense Agencies to 

calculate costs, savings, net present value, and 

return on investment for base closure and 

realignment actions. Return on investment was 

the expected payback period in years for each 

proposed base closure or realignment. COBRA 

input data consisted of standard factors, which 

generally remained constant, and basekcenario 

factors which were unique. Standard factor 

examples included civilian pay, national median 

home price, discount rates, and costs per mile 

of moving personnel and equipment. Examples 

of basehcenario factors included the number 

of authorized personnel at a base, the size of 

the base, the number of personnel moving, 

and construction costs required by the move. 

The output data was used by each of the 

Services and Defense Agencies in their decisionmaking process. 

All of the COBRA runs used by the Services 

and Defense Agencies in formulating their 

recommendations were provided to the Commission with the Secretary’s list. Other 

COBRA runs were submitted by the Services 

and Defense Agencies by request from the 

Commission. Review of the data by the Commission continued throughout the Commission’s 

evaluation process. 

CRITERION 6: ECONOMIC IMPACT 

OSD policy guidance instructed Services to measure community economic impact including 

the direct and indirect effect on employment 

at closing, realigning, and receiving locations. 

To estimate indirect job losses in the communities (the economic area), indirect employment 

multipliers developed by the DoD Office of 

Economic Adjustment (OEA) were used in 

conjunction with direct job loss. Based on the 

size of the community affected and the type of 

personnel located at the installation, the multipliers were conservatively developed to reflect 

the worst-case scenario, and were affirmed 

by the Department of Commerce Bureau of 

Economic Analysis. Indirect employment 

losses resulted from base contracts to local businesses, as well as spending by DoD personnel 

in the local community for housing, utilities, 

and services. 

Each of the Services provided direct-employment 

figures which included proposed personnel 

changes for military and civilians (including 

contractor personnel employed on the base or 

in the immediate vicinity) and military trainees 

at each base. Manpower changes directly associated with changes in the force structure were 

excluded from the economic analysis. 

If more than one closing or realigning base was 

located in the same economic area, regardless 

of Service, OSD calculated the cumulative 

impact of all the proposed actions on a community. Employment impacts resulting from 

the 1988 and 1991 base-closure process were 

also included in the cumulative-impact calculations by including personnel losses scheduled 

to occur in the future as a result of past 

base-closure actions. The July 1992 Bureau of 

Labor Statistics employment data captured job 

losses which had already occurred due to 

previous base closures. 

The Commission’s Review and Analysis 

Interagency Issues team, with the assistance of 

Department of Commerce economists, validated 

3-1 1 
Chapter 3 

the methodology used by the Services. The 

Services generally complied with the OSD 

guidance to estimate economic impact. Verification of the data and methodology was 

accomplished by confirming DOD personnel 

impacts, documenting indirect employment 

multipliers, reviewing the process used to 

select impacted communities (economic area), 

validating employment levels within the community, and documenting calculations used to 

estimate installation and cumulative economic 

impacts. The Commission also made independent employment impact assessments, with the 

assistance of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and collected additional 

economic data for the 31 major bases included 

in the Secretary’s recommendations. 

CRITERION 7: COMMUNITY 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

Absent specific policy guidance from OSD 

regarding criterion seven, “the ability of both 

the existing and potential receiving communities’ infrastructure to support forces, missions, 

and personnel”, the Services took varied 

approaches in their evaluations. 

Common community infrastructure factors evaluated included housing, health care, education, 

transportation, and recreation. The Army and 

Defense Logistics Agency compiled military value 

assessments, which included community infrastructure components for each installation 

eligible for closure and realignment. The Navy 

and Air Force collected data pursuant to this 

criterion in community infrastructure data calls 

for each installation eligible for closure and 

realignment. Neither the Air Force nor DLA 

specifically addressed community infrastructure 

in their analyses of impacts from specific 

recommendations. 

The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) 

activities are generally small tenants on larger 

military installations. Therefore, DISA concluded 

its consolidation would not have significant 

community infrastructure impact since an 

entire base community would not be affected 

by a small tenant’s dislocation. 

In conclusion, while little direction was given 

to the Services by OSD, the Services did evaluate community infrastructure in their decisionmaking process in compliance with this criterion. 

CRITERION 8: ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 

OSD guidance required a summary statement 

and status for each of the services’ recommendations which addressed: threatened or 

endangered species, wetlands, historical and 

archeological sites, pollution control, hazardous materialdwastes, land use and airspace 

implications, and programmed environmental 

costs/cost avoidances. Each Service had a 

different perspective when they considered the 

relationship between closure and realignment 

actions and the seven environmental attributes. 

Although each Service and the Defense Logistics 

Agency, provided environmental summaries 

for eligible installations, the Army and the Air 

Force did not address programmed costskost 

avoidances. The Army’s recommendation report 

and installation summaries provided inconsistent information regarding this attribute. 

In response to questions from the Commission, 

the Army stated they did not use this attribute 

in return on investment calculations. The Air 

Force was unable to document that these costs 

were considered. 

OSD’s guidance was sufficiently general to 

allow the Services to apply varied perspectives 

to the environmental attributes. The documentation provided by the Navy and DLA addressed 

all seven environmental attributes found in the 

OSD policy guidance. While the Army and 

the Air Force base closure decisions did not 

consider programmed environmental costskost 

avoidance, each fully addressed the remaining 

six attributes. It is reasonable to believe that 

a more complete evaluation of this attribute 

would generally not have altered their 

recommendations. 

The Commission did not agree with the Army’s 

position that the high cost of environmental 

cleanup precluded their recommending the 

closure of Fort Monroe, Virginia. The Commission does not support the implication that Fort 

3-12 
Chapter 3 

Monroe real estate is environmentally safe enough 

for Army soldiers but will not be safe enough 

for the Commonwealth of Virginia if the 

installation was returned to the state. 

ADDITIONS TO THE SECRETARY’S LIST 

FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION 

During the Commission’s review and analysis 

process, several concurrent activities provided 

information to the Commission. First, the 

Commission thoroughly analyzed all of the 

information used by the Secretary of Defense to 

prepare the recommendations. The Commission 

also held seven investigative hearings in 

Washington, DC, where Military Department 

representatives directly responsible for the 

Secretary’s recommendations testified to the 

Commission. Several defense and base closure 

experts within the federal government, private 

sector, and academia testified about the specifics of the base-closure process and the potential impacts of the Secretary of Defense’s 

recommendations. The Commissioners and 

staff members also conducted over 125 factfinding visits to activities at each major installation recommended by the Secretary of Defense 

and considered by the Commission for closure 

or realignment, held 17 regional hearings to hear 

directly from communities nationwide, heard 

from hundreds of Members of Congress who 

testified before the Commission, and received 

over a quarter of a million letters from concerned citizens across the country. Additionally, the Commission received input from the 

General Accounting Office, as required by the 

base-closure statute, which included a. report 

containing its evaluation of DoD’s selection 

process. 

Based on the information gathered and the 

analyses performed, alternatives and further 

additions to the Secretary’s list were considered. 

To perform a thorough analysis and consider 

all reasonable options, the Commissioners voted 

on March 29 and on May 21 to add a total of 

73 installations for further consideration as 

alternatives and additions to the 165 bases 

recommended for closure or realignment by 

the Secretary of Defense (see Appendix E). 

As required by law, the Commission published 

the required notice in the Federal Register 

to inform communities that their bases were 

under consideration by the Commission for possible closure or realignment. Public hearings were 

held for each of the installations the Commission added for consideration and each major 

base was visited by at least one Commissioner. 

THE ROLE OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING 

OFFICE (GAO) 

Under Public Law 101-510, as amended, GAO 

evaluated DoD’s selection process, provided the 

Commission and Congress a report containing 

their detailed analysis of the process, and 

assisted the Commission in its review and analysis 

of the Secretary of Defense’s recommendations. 

Nine professional staff members were detailed 

by the GAO to serve full-time on the 

Commission’s Review and Analysis teams. The 

GAO detailees participated fully in each phase 

of the review and analysis effort. They verified 

data, visited candidate bases, participated in 

local hearings, and testified before the Commission at its public hearings. Additionally, GAO 

field personnel visited bases to gather information first-hand and verify data solicited by 

the Commission. 

GAO reported to Congress and the Commission that the Services’ selection process was 

reasonable, and the Secretary of Defense’s recommendations appropriate, even though some 

were singled out for additional review. GAO 

was concerned the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD) did not exercise strong leadership in providing oversight of the military 

Services and Defense Agencies during the process, and had generally ignored governmentwide cost implications. 

The GAO reported that the Army’s methodology and decision-making process used to evaluate 

and recommend installations for closure or 

realignment complied with legislation, was 

well documented, and generally supported by 

accurate data and appeared reasonable. 

3-13 
Chapter 3 

While the GAO report agreed with the Army’s 

selection methodology, the GAO took exception with the Army’s decision to retain Fort 

Monroe, Virginia. The GAO report also noted 

the Secretary of Defense’s action to remove the 

Army’s recommendation to close the Presidio 

of Monterey, California, because intelligence 

community concerns generated conflicting points 

of view within DoD on this issue. The GAO 

also questioned the cost and savings projections 

raised questions of this recommendation. 

The GAO concluded the Navy process was 

well documented. However, GAO noted senior 

military and civilian officials’ judgements 

and assumptions were part of the decisionmaking process, and several reasonable questions could be raised about some of the final 

recomrnenda tions. 

Although the Air Force process appeared reasonable and the data used generally accurate, 

the GAO found the process difficult to verify 

and noted some judgements which were not 

clearly documented. In some cases, Air Force 

decisions could not be verified using existing 

documentation. 

The GAO certified the accuracy and completeness of data and found the Defense Logistics 

Agency’s selection process complied with statutory requirements, although some estimated cost 

savings appeared questionable. 

Finally, GAO reported the Defense Information 

Systems Agency (DISA) process and implementation was generally sound. The GAO concluded 

the approach DISA used to select megacenter 

sites were reasonable. 

3-14 
What follows is a copy of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101- 

510). In italics are the subsequent changes made by Congress in the Fiscal Years 1992/1993 Department of Defense Authorization Bill (P.L. 102-311) and the Fiscal Year 1993 Department of Defense 

Authorization Bill (P.L. 102-484). 

TITLE XXIX - DEFENSE BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS 

Defense Base 

Closure and 

Realignment 

Act of 1990. 

10 USC 2687 

note. 

in 

10 USC 2687 

note. 

as 

PART A-Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission 

SEC. 2901. SHORT TITLE AND PURPOSE 

(a) Short Title. - This part may be cited as the “Defense Base Closure 

and Realignment Act of 1990”. 

(b) Purpose. - The purpose of this part is to provide a fair process that will result 

the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States. 

SEC. 2902. THE COMMISSION 

(a) Establishment. - There is established an independent commission to be known 

the “Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission”. 

(b) Duties. - The Commission shall carry out the duties specified for it in this 

part. 

appointed by the President, by and with the advise and consent of the Senate. 

the Commission - 

(c) Appointment. - (l)(A) The Commission shall be composed of eight members 

(B) The President shall transmit to the Senate the nominations for appointment to 

(i) by no later than January 3, 1991, in the case of members of the Commission 

whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 102nd Congress; 

(ii) by no later than January 25, 1993, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 103rd Congress; and 

(iii) by no later than January 3, 1995, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 104th Congress. 

“(C) If the President does not transmit to Congress the nominationsfor appointment to the 

Commission on or before the date specified for 1993 in clause (ii) of subparagraph (B) or for 

1995 in clause (iii) of such subparagraph, the process by which military installations may be 

selectedfor closure or realignment under this purt with respect to that year shall be terminated”. 

(2) In selecting individuals for nominations for appointments to the Commission, 

the President should consult with - 

(A) the Speaker of the House of Representatives concerning the appointment of 

two members; 

(B) the majority leader of the Senate concerning the appointment of two members; 

(C) the minority leader of the House of Representatives concerning the appoint- 

(D) the minority leader of the Senate concerning the appointment of one member. 

President. 

ment of one member; and 

A- 1 
Appendix A 

(3) At the time the President nominates individuals for appointment to the Commission for each session of Congress referred to in paragraph (l)(B), the President 

shall designate one such individual who shall serve as Chairman of the Commission. 

(d) Terms. - (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), each member of the Commission shall serve until the adjournment of Congress sine die for the session during 

which the member was appointed to the Commission. 

(2) The Chairman of the Commission shall serve until the confirmation of a successor. 

(el Meetings. - (1) The Commission shall meet only during calendar years 1991, 

1993, and 1995. 

(2)(A) Each meeting of the Commission, other than meetings in which classified 

information is to be discussed, shall be open to the public. 

(B) All the proceedings, information, and deliberations of the Commission shall be 

open, upon request, to the following: 

(i) The Chairman and the ranking minority party member of the Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability, and Support of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, or such other members of the Subcommittee designated by 

such Chairman or ranking minority party member. 

(ii) The Chairman and the ranking minority party member of the Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities of the Committee on Armed Services of 

the House of Representatives, or such other members of the Subcommittee designated by such Chairman or ranking minority party member. 

(iii) The Chairmen and ranking minority party members of the Subcommittees on Military Construction of the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 

and of the House of Representatives, or such other members of the Subcommittees designated by such Chairmen or ranking minority party members. 

(0 Vacancies. - A vacancy in the Commission shall be filled in the same manner 

as the original appointment, but the individual appointed to fill the vacancy shall 

serve only for the unexpired portion of the term for which the individual’s predecessor was appointed. 

(g) Pay and Travel Expenses. - (1)(A) Each member, other than the Chairman, 

shall be paid at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the minimum annual rate of 

basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, 

United States Code, for each day (including travel time) during which the member is 

engaged in the actual performance of duties vested in the Commission. 

(B) The Chairman shall be paid for each day referred to in subparagraph (A) at a 

rate equal to the daily equivalent of the minimum annual rate of basic pay payable for 

level I11 of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States Code. 

(2) Members shall receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with sections 5702 and 5703 of title 5, United States Code, 

(h) Director of Staff. - (1) The Commission shall, without regard to section 

5311(b) of title 5, United States Code, appoint a Director who has not served on 

active duty in the Armed Forces or as a civilian employee of the Department of 

Defense during the one-year period preceding the date of such appointment. 

(2) The Director shall be paid at the rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the 

Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code. 

(i) Staff. - (1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (31, the Director, with the approval of 

the Commission, may appoint and fix the pay of additional personnel. 

(2) The Director may make such appointments without regard to the provisions of 

title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and 

any personnel so appointed may be paid without regard to the provisions of chapter 

51 and subchapter I11 of chapter 53 of that title relating to classification and General 

Schedule pay rates, except that an individual so appointed may not receive pay in 

Public 

Information. 

A-2 
Appendix A 

excess of the annual rate of basic pay payable for GS-18 of the General Schedule. 

(3)(A) Not more than one-third of the personnel employed by or detailed to the 

Commission may be on detail from the Department of Defense. 

“(B)(i) Not more than one-fifth of the professional analysts of the Commission staff may 

be persons detailed from the Department of Defense to the Commission. 

“(ii) No person detailed from the Department of Defense to the Commission may be 

assigned as the lead professional analyst with respect to a military department or defense 

agency. 

“(C) A person may not be detailedfrom the Department of Defense to the Commission if, 

within 12 months before the detail is to begin, that person participated personally and 

substantially in any matter within the Department of Defense concerning the preparation of 

recommendations for closures or realignments of military installations. 

“(D) No member of the Armed Forces, and no officer or employee of the Department of 

Defense, may - 

“(i) prepare any report concerning the effectiveness, fitness, or efliciency of the perfor- mance on the staff of the Commission of any person detailed from the Department of Defense 

to that stafl; 

“(ii) review the preparation of such a report; or 

“(iii) approve or disapprove such a report.”; and 

(4) Upon request of the Director, the head of any Federal department or agency 

may detail any of the personnel of that department or agency to the Commission to 

assist the Commission in carrying out its duties under this part. 

(5) The Comptroller General of the United States shall provide assistance, including the detailing of employees, to the Commission in accordance with an agreement 

entered into with the Commission. 

“(6) The following restrictions relating to the personnel of the Commission shall apply 

during 1992 and 1994: 

“(A) There may not be more than 15 persons on the staff at any one time. 

“(B) The staff may perform only such functions as are necessary to prepare for the 

transition to new membership on the Commission in the following year. 

“(C) No member of the Armed Forces and no employee of the Department of Defense may 

serve on the staff.”. 

(j) Other Authority. - (1) The Commission may procure by contract, to the extent 

funds are available, the temporary or intermittent services of experts or consultants 

pursuant to section 3109 of title 5, United States Code. 

(2) The Commission may lease space and acquire personal property to the extent 

funds are available. 

(k) Funding. - (1) There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission 

such funds as are necessary to carry out its duties under this part. Such funds shall 

remain available until expended. 

(2) If no funds are appropriated to the Commission by the end of the second 

session of the lOlst Congress, the Secretary of Defense may transfer, for fiscal year 

1991, to the Commission funds from the Department of Defense Base Closure Account established by section 207 of Public Law 100-526. Such funds shall remain 

available until expended. 

(1) Termination. - The Commission shall terminate on December 31, 1995. 

“(m) Prohibition Against Restricting Communications. - Section 1034 of title 10, 

United States Code, shall apply with respect to communications with the Commission. ”. 

10 USC 2687 SEC. 2903. PROCEDURE FOR MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BASE 

note. CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS 

(a) Force-Structure Plan. - (1) As part of the budget justification documents 

submitted to Congress in support of the budget for the Department of Defense for 

A-3 
Appendix A 

Federal 

Register, 

publication. 

Federal 

Register, 

publication. 

Federal 

Register, 

publication. 

each of the fiscal years 1992, 1994, and 1996, the Secretary shall include a forcestructure plan for the Armed Forces based on an assessment by the Secretary of the 

probable threats to the national security during the six-year period beginning with 

the fiscal year for which the budget request is made and of the anticipated levels of 

funding that will be available for national defense purposes during such period. 

(2) Such plan shall include, without any reference (directly or indirectly) to military installations inside the United States that may be closed or realigned under such 

plan - 

(A) a description of the assessment referred to in paragraph (1); 

(B) a description (i) of the anticipated force structure during and at the end of 

such period for each military department (with specifications of the number and 

type of units in the active and reserve forces of each such department), and (ii) 

of the units that will need to be forward based (with a justification thereof) 

during and at the end of each such period; and 

(C) a description of the anticipated implementation of such force-structure 

plan. 

(3) The Secretary shall also transmit a copy of each such force-structure plan to the 

Commission. 

(b) Selection Criteria. -(1) The Secretary shall, by no later than December 31, 1990, 

publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees 

the criteria proposed to be used by the Department of Defense in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States 

under this part. The Secretary shall provide an opportunity for public comment on 

the proposed criteria for a period of at least 30 days and shall include notice of that 

opportunity in the publication required under the preceding sentence. 

(2)(A) The Secretary shall, by no later than February 15, 1991, publish in the Federal 

Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees the final criteria to be 

used in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part. Except as provided in subparagraph 

(B), such criteria shall be the final criteria to be used, making such recommendations 

unless disapproved by a joint resolution of Congress enacted on or before March 15, 

1991. 

(B) The Secretary may amend such criteria, but such amendments may not become 

effective until they have been published in the Federal Register, opened to public 

comment for at least 30 days, and then transmitted to the congressional defense 

committees in final form by no later than “january 15” of the year concerned. Such 

amended criteria shall be the final criteria to be used, along with the force-structure 

plan referred to in subsection (a), in making such recommendations unless disapproved by a joint resolution of Congress enacted on or before “February 15” of the 

year concerned. 

(c) DoD Recommendations. - (1) The Secretary may, by no later than April 15, 1991, 

“March 15, 1993 and March 15, 1995,” publish in the Federal Register and transmit 

to the congressional defense committees and to the Commission a list of the military 

installations inside the United States that the Secretary recommends for closure or 

realignment on the basis of the force-structure plan and the final criteria referred to in 

subsection (b)(2) that are applicable to the year concerned. 

(2) The Secretary shall include, with the list of recommendations published and 

transmitted pursuant to paragraph (11, a summary of the selection process that resulted in the recommendation for each installation, including a justification for each 

recommendation. 

(3) In considering military installations for closure or realignment, the Secretary 

shall consider all military installations inside the United States equally without regard 

to whether the installation has been previously considered or proposed for closure or 

A-4 
Appendix A 

realignment by the Department. 

“(4) In addition to making all information used by the Secretary to prepare the recommendations under this subsection available to Congress (including any committee or member 

of Congress), the Secretary shall also make such information available to the Commission 

and the Comptroller General of the United States.”; and 

“(5) (A) Each person referred to in subparagraph (B), when submitting information to the 

Secretary of Defense or the Commission concerning the closure or realignment of a military 

installation, shall certify that such information is accurate and complete to the best of that 

person’s knowledge and belief. 

“(B) Subparagraph (A) applies to the following persons: 

“(i) The Secretaries of the military departments. 

“(ii) The heads of the Defense Agencies. 

“(iii) Each person who is in a position the duties of which include personal and substantial 

involvement in the preparation and submission of information and recommendations concerning the closure or realignment of military installations, as designated in regulations 

which the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe, regulations which the Secretary of each 

military department shall prescribe for personnel within that military department, or regulations which the head of each Defense Agency shall prescribe for personnel within that Defense Agency. 

“(6) In the case of any information provided to the Commission by a person described in 

paragraph (5)(B), the Commission shall submit that information to the Senate and the House 

of Representatives to be made available to the Members of the House concerned in accordance with the rules of that House. The information shall be submitted to the Senate and the 

House of Representatives within 24 hours after the submission of the information to the 

Commission. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations to ensure the compliance of 

the Commission with this paragraph”. 

(d) Review and Recommendations by the Commission. - (1) After receiving the 

recommendations from the Secretary pursuant to subsection (c) for any year, the 

Commission shall conduct public hearings on the recommendations. 

(2)(A) The Commission shall, by no later than July 1 of each year in which the 

Secretary transmits recommendations to it pursuant to subsection (c), transmit to the 

President a report containing the Commission’s findings and conclusions based on a 

review and analysis of the recommendations made by the Secretary, together with the 

Commission’s recommendations for closures and realignments of military installations inside the United States. 

(B) “Subject to subparagraph (C), in making” its recommendations, the Commission 

may make changes in any of the recommendations made by the Secretary if the 

Commission determines that the Secretary deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria referred to in subsection (c)(l) in making recommendations. 

“(C) In the case of a change described in subparagraph (D) in the recommendations made 

by the Secretary, the Commission may make the change only if the Commission - 

“(i) makes the determination required by subparagraph (B); 

“(ii) determines that the change is consistent with the force-structure plan and final 

criteria referred to in subsection (c) (1); 

“(iii) publishes a notice of the proposed change in the Federal Register not less than 30 

days before transmitting its recommendations to the President pursuant to paragraph (2); 

and 

Public 

information. 

Reports. 

“(iv) conducts public hearings on the proposed change. 

“(D) Subparagraph (C) shall apply to a change by the Commission in the Secretary’s 

“6) add a military installation to the list of military installations recommended by the 

recommendations that would - 

A-5 
Appendix A 

Reports. 

Reports. 

Secretary fou closure; 

“(ii) add u military installation to the list of military installations recommended by the 

Secretary for realignment; or 

“(iii) increase the extent of a realignment of a particular military installation recommended by the Secretary. ”. 

(3) The Commission shall explain and justify in its report submitted to the President pursuant to paragraph (2) any recommendation made by the Commission that is 

different from the recommendations made by the Secretary pursuant to subsection 

(c). The Commission shall transmit a copy of such report to the congressional defense 

committees on the same date on which it transmits its recommendations to the 

President under paragraph (2). 

(4) After July 1 of each year in which the Commission transmits recommendations 

to the President under this subsection, the Commission shall promptly provide, upon 

request, to any Member of Congress information used by the Commission in making 

its recommendations. 

(5) The Comptroller General of the United States shall - 

(A) assist the Commission, to the extent requested, in the Commission’s review and analysis of the recommendations made by the Secretary pursuant to 

subsection (C); and 

(B) by no later than April 15 of each year in which the Secretary makes such 

recommendations, transmit to the Congress and to the Commission a report 

containing a detailed analysis of the Secretary’s recommendations and selection 

process. 

(e) Review by the President. - (1) The President shall, by no later than July 15 of 

each year in which the Commission makes recommendations under subsection (d), 

transmit to the Commission and to the Congress a report containing the President’s 

approval or disapproval of the Commission’s recommendations. 

(2) If the President approves all the recommendations of the Commission, the 

President shall transmit a copy of such recommendations to the Congress, together 

with a certification of such approval. 

(3) If the President disapproves the recommendations of the Commission, in whole 

or in part, the President shall transmit to the Commission and the Congress the 

reasons for that disapproval. The Commission shall then transmit to the President, by 

no later than August 15 of the year concerned, a revised list of recommendations for 

the closure and realignment of military installations. 

(4) If the President approves all of the revised recommendations of the Commission transmitted to the President under paragraph (3), the President shall transmit a 

copy of such revised recommendations to the Congress, together with a certification 

of such approval. 

(5) If the President does not transmit to the Congress an approval and certification 

described in paragraph (2) or (4) by September 1 of any year in which the Commission has transmitted recommendations to the President under this part, the process 

by which military installations may be selected for closure or realignment under this 

part with respect to that year shall be terminated. 

10 USC 2687 SEC. 2904. CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY 1N.STALLATIONS 

note. 

. 

(a) In General. - Subject to subsection (b), the Secretary shall - 

(1) close all military installations recommended for closure by the Commission in each report transmitted to the Congress by the President pursuant to 

section 2903(e); 

(2) realign all military installations recommended for realignment by such 

Commission in each such report; 

(3) initiate all such closures and realignments no later than two years after the 

A-6 
Appendix A 

. 

date on which the President transmits a report to the Congress pursuant to section 

2903(e) containing the recommendations for such closures or realignments; and 

(4) complete all such closures and realignments no later than the end of the 

six-year period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the 

report pursuant to section 2903(e) containing the recommendations for such 

closures or realignments. 

(b) Congressional Disapproval. - (1) The Secretary may not carry out any closure 

or realignment recommended by the Commission in a report transmitted from the 

President pursuant to section 2903(e) if a joint resolution is enacted, in accordance 

with the provisions of section 2908, disapproving such recommendations of the Commission before the earlier of - 

(A) the end of the 45-day period beginning on the date on which the Presi- 

(B) the adjournment of Congress sine die for the session during which such 

(2) For purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection and subsections (a) and (c) of 

section 2908, the days on which either House of Congress is not in session because of 

adjournment of more than three days to a day certain shall be excluded in the 

computation of a period. 

10 USC 2687 SEC. 2905. IMPLEMENTATION 

note. 

part, the Secretary may - 

dent transmits such report; or 

report is transmitted. 

(a) In General. - (1) In closing or realigning any military installation under this 

(A) take such actions as may be necessary to close or realign any military 

installation, including the acquisition of such land, the construction of such 

replacement facilities, the performance of such activities, and the conduct of 

such advance planning and design as may be required to transfer functions from 

a military installation being closed or realigned to another military installation, 

and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the 

Department of Defense for use in planning and design, minor construction, or 

operation and maintenance; 

Community (B) provide - 

action programs. (i) economic adjustment assistance to any community located near a military installation being closed or realigned, and 

(ii) community planning assistance to any community located near a military installation to which functions will be transferred as a result of the 

closure or realignment of a military installation, 

if the Secretary of Defense determines that the financial resources available to 

the community (by grant or otherwise) for such purposes are inadequate, and 

may use for such purposes funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the 

Department of Defense for economic adjustment assistance or community planning assistance; 

(C) carry out activities for the purposes of environmental restoration and 

mitigation at any such installation, and ‘Shall” use for such purposes funds in the 

Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense. The amendments 

made by this subsection shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. 

(D) provide outplacement assistance to civilian employees employed by the 

Department of Defense at military installations being closed or realigned, and 

may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the 

Department of Defense for outplacement assistance to employees; and 

(E) reimburse other Federal agencies for actions performed at the request of 

the Secretary with respect to any such closure or realignment, and may use for 

such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of 

Environmental 

protection. 

A-7 
Appendix A 

Defense and available for such purpose. 

Environmental 

protection. 

(2) In carrying out any closure or realignment under this part, the Secretary shall 

ensure that environmental restoration of any property made excess to the needs of the 

Department of Defense as a result of such closure or realignment be carried out as 

soon as possible with funds available for such purpose. 

(b) Management and Disposal of Property. - (1) The Administrator of General 

Services shall delegate to the Secretary of Defense, with respect to excess and surplus 

real property and facilities located at a military installation closed or realigned under 

this part - 

(A) the authority of the Administrator to utilize excess property under section 202 

of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 USC 483); 

(B) the authority of the Administrator to dispose of surplus property under 

section 203 of that Act (40 USC 484); 

(C) the authority of the Administrator to grant approvals and make determinations under section 13(g) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (50 USC App. 

1622(g)); and 

(D) the authority of the Administrator to determine the availability of excess 

or surplus real property for wildlife conservation purposes in accordance with 

the Act of May 19, 1948 (16 USC 66713). 

(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (C), the Secretary of Defense shall exercise the 

authority delegated to the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (1) in accordance with - 

(i) all regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act governing 

the utilization of excess property and the disposal of surplus property under the 

Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949; and 

(ii) all regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act governing 

the conveyance and disposal of property under section 13(g) of the Surplus 

Property Act of 1944 (50 USC App. 1622(g)). 

(B) The Secretary, after consulting with the Administrator of General Services, may 

issue regulations that are necessary to carry out the delegation of authority required 

by paragraph (1). 

(C) The authority required to be delegated by paragraph (1) to the Secretary by the 

Administrator of General Services shall not include the authority to prescribe general 

policies and methods for utilizing excess property and disposing of surplus property. 

(D) The Secretary of Defense may transfer real property or facilities located at a 

military installation to be closed or realigned under this part, with or without reimbursement, to a military department or other entity (including a nonappropriated 

fund instrumentality) within the Department of Defense or the Coast Guard. 

(E) Before any action may be taken with respect to the disposal of any surplus real 

property or facility located at any military installation to be closed or realigned under 

this part, the Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Governor of the State and the 

heads of the local governments concerned for the purpose of considering any plan for 

the use of such property by the local community concerned. 

(c) Applicability of National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. - (1) The 

provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 USC 4321 et seq.) 

shall not apply to the actions of the President, the Commission, and, except as 

provided in paragraph (21, the Department of Defense in carrying out this part. 

(2)(A) The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 shall 

apply to actions of the Department of Defense under this part (i) during the process 

of property disposal, and (ii) during the process of relocating functions from a military installation being closed or realigned to another military installation after the 

receiving installation has been selected but before the functions are relocated. 

(B) In applying the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to 

the processes referred to in subparagraph (A), the Secretary of Defense and the SecreA-8 
Appendix A 

tary of the military departments concerned shall not have to consider - 

recommended for closure or realignment by the Commission; 

been selected as the receiving installation; or 

(i) the need for closing or realigning the military installation which has been 

(ii) the need for transferring functions to any military installation which has 

(iii) military installations alternative to those recommended or selected. 

(3) A civil action for judicial review, with respect to any requirement of the 

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to the extent such Act is applicable under 

paragraph (2), of any act or failure to act by the Department of Defense during the 

closing, realigning, or relocating of functions referred to in clauses (i) and (ii) of 

paragraph (2)(A), may not be brought more than 60 days after the date of such act or 

failure to act. 

(d) Waiver. - The Secretary of Defense may close or realign military installations 

under this part without regard to - 

(1) any provision of law restricting the use of funds for closing or realigning 

(2) sections 2662 and 2687 of title 10, United States Code. 

military installations included in any appropriations or authorization Act; and 

10 USC 2687 SEC. 2906. ACCOUNT 

note. (a) In General. - (1) There is hereby established on the books of the Treasury an 

account to be known as the “Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990” 

which shall be administered by the Secretary as a single account. 

(2) There shall be deposited into the Account - 

(A) funds authorized for and appropriated to the Account; 

(B) any funds that the Secretary may, subject to approval in an appropriation 

Act, transfer to the Account from funds appropriated to the Department of 

Defense for any purpose, except that such funds may be transferred only after 

the date on which the Secretary transmits written notice of, and justification for, 

such transfer to the congressional defense committees; and 

(C) proceeds received from the transfer or disposal of any property at a 

military installation closed or realigned under this part. 

(b) Use of Funds. - (1) The Secretary may use the funds in the Account only for 

the purposes described in section 2905(a). 

(2) When a decision is made to use funds in the Account to carry out a construction project under section 2905(a) and the cost of the project will exceed the maximum amount authorized by law for a minor military construction project, the Secretary shall notify in writing the congressional defense committees of the nature of, and 

justification for, the project and the amount of expenditures for such project. Any 

such construction project may be carried out without regard to section 2802(a) of 

title 10, United States Code. 

(c) Reports. - (1) No later than 60 days after the end of each fiscal year in which 

the Secretary carries out activities under this part, the Secretary shall transmit a report 

to the congressional defense committees of the amount and nature of the deposits 

into, and the expenditures from, the Account during such fiscal year and of the 

amount and nature of other expenditures made pursuant to section 2905(a) during 

such fiscal year. 

“(d) Account Exclusive Source of Funds for Environmental Restoration Projects. - 

Except for funds deposited into the Account under subsection (a), funds appropriated to the 

Department of Defense may not be usedfor purposes described in section 2905(a)(l)(C). The 

prohibition in this subsection shall expire upon the termination of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a closure or realignment under this part.”. 

(2) Unobligated funds which remain in the Account after the termination of the 

Commission shall be held in the Account until transferred by law after the congresA-9 

I 
Appendix A 

sional defense committees receive the report transmitted under paragraph (3). 

(3) No later than 60 days after the termination of the Commission, the Secretary 

shall transmit to the congressional defense committees a report containing an accounting of - 

(A) all the funds deposited into and expended from the Account or otherwise 

(B) any amount remaining in the Account. 

expended under this part; and 

10 USC 2687 SEC. 2907. REPORTS 

note. As part of the budget request for fiscal year 1993 and for each fiscal year thereafter 

for the Department of Defense, the Secretary shall transmit to the congressional 

defense committees of Congress - 

(1) a schedule of the closure and realignment actions to be carried out under 

this part in the fiscal year for which the request is made and an estimate of the 

total expenditures required and cost savings to be achieved by each such closure 

and realignment and of the time period in which these savings are to be achieved 

in each case, together with the Secretary’s assessment of the environmental effects of such actions; and 

(2) a description of the military installations, including those under construction and those planned for construction, to which functions are to be transferred 

as a result of such closures and realignments, together with the Secretary’s assessment of the environmental effects of such transfers. 

“Report on Environmental Restoration Costs for Installations to be Closed Under 1990 

Base Closure Law. - (1) Each year, at the same time the President submits to Congress the 

budget for afiscal year (pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code), the 

Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the funding neededfor thefiscal 

year for which the budget is submitted, and for each of the followingfour fiscal years, for 

environmental restoration activities at each military installation described in paragraph 

(21, set forth separately by fiscal year for each military installation. 

(2) The report required under paragraph (1) shall cover each military installation 

which is to be closed pursuant to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 

1990 (part A of title XXIX of Public Law 101-510). 

10 USC 2687 SEC. 2908. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF COMMISSION REPORT 

note. (a) Terms of the Resolution. - For purposes of section 2904(b), the term “joint 

resolution” means only a joint resolution which is introduced within the 10-day 

period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report to the 

Congress under section 2903(e), and - 

(1) which does not have a preamble; 

(2) the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: “That Congress 

disapproves the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 

Commission as submitted by the President on -”, the blank space being filled 

in with the appropriate date; and 

(3) the title of which is as follows: “Joint resolution disapproving the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.”. 

(b) Referral. - A resolution described in subsection (a> that is introduced in the 

House of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the 

House of Representatives. A resolution described in subsection (a) introduced in the 

Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. 

(c) Discharge. - If the committee to which a resolution described in subsection (a) 

is referred has not reported such a resolution (or an identical resolution) by the end 

of the 20-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the 

report to the Congress under section 2903(e), such committee shall be, at the end of 

such period, discharged from further consideration of such resolution, and such 

A-10 
Appendix A 

resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved. 

(d) Consideration. - (1) On or after the third day after the date on which the 

committee to which such a resolution is referred has reported, or has been discharged 

(under subsection (c)) from further consideration of, such a resolution, it is in order 

(even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any 

Member of the respective House to move to proceed to the consideration of 

“the resolution. A member may make the motion only on the day after the calendar day 

on which the Member announces to the House concerned the Member’s intention to make the 

motion, except that, in the case of the House of Representatives, the motion may be made 

without such prior announcement $ the motion is made by direction of the committee to 

which the resolution was referred.”. 

The motion is highly privileged in the House of Representatives and is privileged 

in the Senate and is not debatable. The motion is, not subject to amendment, or to a 

motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. 

A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to 

shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is 

agreed to, the respective House shall immediately proceed to consideration of the 

joint resolution without intervening motion, order, or other business, and the resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the respective House until disposed of. 

(2) Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 2 hours, which shall be divided 

equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. An amendment to 

the resolution is not in order. A motion further to limit debate is in order and not 

debatable. A motion to postpone, or a .motion to proceed to the consideration of other 

business, or a motion to recommit the resolution is not in order. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to is not in order. 

(3) Immediately following the conclusion of the debate on a resolution described 

in subsection (a) and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested 

in accordance with the rules of the appropriate House, the vote on final passage of the 

resolution shall occur. 

(4) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules 

of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, to the procedure 

relating to a resolution described in subsection (a) shall be decided without debate. 

(e) Consideration by Other House. - (1) If, before the passage by one House of a 

resolution of that House described in subsection (a), that House received from the 

other House a resolution described in subsection (a), then the following procedures 

shall apply: 

(A) The resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committee 

and may not be considered in the House receiving it except in the case of final 

passage as provided in subparagraph (B)(ii). 

(B) With respect to a resolution described in subsection (a) of the House 

receiving the resolution- 

(i) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no resolution had 

(ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the resolution of the other House. 

(2) Upon disposition of the resolution received from the.other House, it shall no 

longer be in order to consider the resolution that originated in the receiving House. 

(f) Rules of the Senate and House. - This section is enacted by Congress - 

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such it is deemed a part of the rules of each House, 

respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that 

House in the case of a resolution described in subsection (a), and it supersedes other 

rules only to the extent that it its inconsistent with such rules; and 

been received from the other House; but 

A-1 1 
Appendix A 

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the 

rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same 

manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House. 

10 USC 2687 SEC. 2909. RESTRICTION ON OTHER BASE CLOSURE AUTHORITY 

note. (a) In General. - Except as provided in subsection (c), during the period beginning 

on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 1995, this part 

shall be the exclusive authority for selecting for closure or realignment, or for carrying 

out any closure or realignment of, a military installation inside the United States. 

(b) Restriction. - Except as provided in subsection (c), none of the funds available 

to the Department of Defense may be used, other than under this part, during the 

period specified in subsection (a) - 

(1) to identify, through any transmittal to the Congress or through any other 

public announcement or notification, any military installation inside the United 

States as an installation to be closed or realigned or as an installation under 

consideration for closure or realignment; or 

(2) to carry out any closure or realignment of a military installation inside the 

United States. 

(c) Exception. - Nothing in this part affects the authority of the Secretary to carry 

(1) closures and realignments under title I1 of Public Law 100-526; and 

(2) closures and realignments to which section 2687 of title 10, United States 

Code, is not applicable, including closures and realignments carried out for 

reasons of national security or a military emergency referred to in subsection (c) 

of such section. 

As used in this part: 

out - 

10 USC 2687 SEC. 2910. DEFINITIONS 

note. 

(1) The term “Account” means the Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990 established by section 2906(a)( 1). 

(2) The term “congressional defense committees” means the Committees on 

Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and of the 

House of Representatives. 

(3) The term “Commission” means the Commission established by section 2902. 

(4) The term “military installation” means a base, camp, post, station, yard, 

center, homeport facility for any ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of 

the Department of Defense, including any leased facility. 

“Such term does not include any facility used primarily for civil works, rivers and 

harbors projects, flood control, or other projects not under the primary jurisdiction or 

control of the Department of Defense.”. 

The amendment made by paragraph (4) shall take effect as of November 5, 1990, 

and shall apply as if it had been included in section 2910(4) of the Defense Base 

Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 on that date,”. 

(5) The term “realignment” includes any action which both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions but does not include a reduction 

in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding 

levels, or skill imbalances. 

(6) The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Defense. 

(7) The term “United States” means the 50 States, the District of Columbia, 

the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, 

and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States. 

SEC. 2911. CLARIFYING AMENDMENT 

Section 2687(e)(1) of title 10, United States Code, is amended - 

A-12 
Appendix A 

(1) by inserting “homeport facility for any ship,” after “center,”; and 

(2) by striking out “under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department” and inserting in lieu thereof “under the jurisdiction of the Department 

of Defense, including any leased facility,”. 

PART B-Other Provisions Relating to Defense Base Closures and Realignments 

10 USC 2687 SEC. 2921. CLOSURE OF FOREIGN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS 

note. (a) Sense of Congress. - It is the sense of the Congress that - 

(1) the termination of military operations by the United States at military 

installations outside the United States should be accomplished at the discretion 

of the Secretary of Defense at the earliest opportunity; 

(2) in providing for such termination, the Secretary of Defense should take 

steps to ensure that the United States receives, through direct payment or otherwise, consideration equal to the fair market value of the improvements made by 

the United States at facilities that will be released to host countries; 

(3) the Secretary of Defense, acting through the military component commands or the sub-unified commands to the combatant commands, should be the 

lead official in negotiations relating to determining and receiving such consideration; and 

(4) the determination of the fair market value of such improvements released 

to host countries in whole or in part by the United States should be handled on 

a facility-by-facility basis. 

(b) Residual Value. - (1) For each installation outside the United States at which 

military operations were being carried out by the United States on October 1, 1990, 

the Secretary of Defense shall transmit, by no later than June 1, 1991, an estimate of 

the fair market value, as of January 1, 1991, of the improvements made by the United 

States at facilities at each such installation. 

(2) For purposes of this section: 

(A) The term “fair market value of the improvements” means the value of 

improvements determined by the Secretary on the basis of their highest use. 

(B) The term “improvements” includes new construction of facilities and 

all additions, improvements, modifications, or renovations made to existing 

facilities or to real property, without regard to whether they were carried out 

with appropriated or nonappropriated funds. 

(c) Establishment of Special Account. - (1) There is established on the books of 

the Treasury a special account to be known as the “Department of Defense Overseas 

Military Facility Investment Recovery Account”. Any amounts paid to the United 

States, pursuant to any treaty, status of forces agreement, or other international agreement to which the United States is a party, for the residual value of real property or 

improvements to real property used by civilian or military personnel of the Department of Defense shall be deposited into such account. 

(2) Money deposited in the Department of Defense Overseas Military Facility Investment Recovery Account shall be available to the Secretary of Defense for payment, 

as provided in appropriation Acts, of costs incurred by the Department of Defense in 

connection with facility maintenance and repair and environmental restoration at 

military installations in the United States. Funds in the Account shall remain available 

until expended. 

SEC. 2922. MODIFICATION OF THE CONTENT OF BIANNUAL REPORT OF 

TARY FACILITIES 

THE COMMISSION ON ALTERNATIVE UTILIZATION OF MILI- 

(a) Uses of Facilities. - Section 2819(b) of the National Defense Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law 100-456; 102 Stat. 2119; 10 USC 2391 note) is 

A-13 

I 
Appendix A 

10 USC 2391 

note. 

10 USC 2687 

note. 

10 USC 2687 

note. 

amended - 

(1) in paragraph (2), by striking out “minimum security facilities for nonviolent prisoners” and inserting in lieu thereof “Federal confinement or correctional 

facilities including shock incarceration facilities”; 

(2) by striking out “and” at the end of paragraph (3); 

(3) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and 

(4) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph (4): 

“(4) identify those facilities, or parts of facilities, that could be effectively 

utilized or renovated to meet the needs of States and local jurisdictions for 

confinement or correctional facilities; and”. 

(b) Effective Date. - The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect 

with respect to the first report required to be submitted under section 2819 the 

National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, after September 30, 1990. 

SEC. 2923. FUNDING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AT MILITARY 

INSTALLATIONS SCHEDULED FOR CLOSURE INSIDE THE UNITED 

STATES 

(a) Authorization of Appropriations. - There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense Base Closure Account for fiscal year 1991, in 

addition to any other funds authorized to be appropriated to that account for that 

fiscal year, the sum of $100,000,000. Amounts appropriated to that account pursuant 

to the preceding sentence shall be available only for activities for the purpose of 

environmental restoration at military installations closed or realigned under title I1 of 

Public Law 100-526, as authorized under section 204(a)(3) of that title. 

(b) Exclusive Source of Funding. - (1) Section 207 of Public Law 100-526 is amended 

by adding at the end the following: 

“(b) Base Closure Account to be Exclusive Source of Funds for Environmental 

Restoration Projects. - No funds appropriated to the Department of Defense may be 

used for purposes described in section 204(a)(3) except funds that have been authorized for and appropriated to the Account. The prohibition in the preceding sentence 

expires upon the termination of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a closure 

or realignment under this title.”. 

(2) The amendment made by paragraph (1) does not apply with respect to the 

availability of funds appropriated before the date of the enactment of this Act. 

(c) Task Force Report. - (1) No later than 12 months after the date of the enactment 

of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report containing the 

findings and recommendations of the task force established under paragraph (2) 

concerning - 

(A) ways to improve interagency coordination, within existing laws, regulations, and administrative policies, of environmental response actions at military 

installations (or portions of installations) that are being closed, or are scheduled 

to be closed, pursuant to title I1 of the Defense Authorization Amendments and 

Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526); and 

(B) ways to consolidate and streamline, within existing laws and regulations, 

the practices, policies, and administrative procedures of relevant Federal and 

State agencies with respect to such environmental response actions so as to 

enable those actions to be carried out more expeditiously. 

(2) There is hereby established an environmental response task force to make the 

findings and recommendations, and to prepare the report, required by paragraph (1). 

The task force shall consist of the following (or their designees): 

(A) The Secretary of Defense, who shall be chairman of the task force. 

(B) The Attorney General. 

(C) The Administrator of the General Services Administration. 

A- 14 
Appendix A 

(D) The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. 

(E) The Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army. 

(F) A representative of a State environmental protection agency, appointed by 

(G) A representative of a State Attorney general’s office, appointed by the 

(H) A representative of a public-interest environmental organization, appointed 

the head of the National Governors Association. 

head of the National Association of Attorney Generals. 

by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

10 USC 2687 SEC. 2924. COMMUNITY PREFERENCE CONSIDERATION IN 

note. CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS 

In any process of selecting any military installation inside the United States for 

closure or realignment, the Secretary of Defense shall take such steps as are necessary 

to assure that special consideration and emphasis is given to any official statement 

from a unit of general local government adjacent to or within a military installation 

requesting the closure or realignment of such installation. 

SEC. 2925, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION 

(a) Norton Air Force Base. - (1) Consistent with the recommendations of the 

Commission on Base Realignment and Closure, the Secretary of the Air Force may not 

relocate, until after September 30, 1995, any of the functions that were being carried 

out at the ballistics missile office at Norton Air Force Base, California, on the date on 

which the Secretary of Defense transmitted a report to the Committees on Armed 

Services of the Senate and House of Representatives as described in section 202(a)(l) 

of Public Law 100-526. 

(2) This subsection shall take effect as of the date on which the report referred to 

in subsection (a) was transmitted to such Committees. 

(b) General Directive. - Consistent with the requirements of section 201 of Public 

Law 100-526, the Secretary of Defense shall direct each of the Secretaries of the 

military departments to take all actions necessary to carry out the recommendations 

of the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure and to take no action that is 

inconsistent with such recommendations. 

10 USC 2687 SEC. 2926. CONTRACTS FOR CERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL 

note. RESTORATION ACTIVITIES 

(a) Establishment of Model Program. - Not later than 90 days after the date of 

enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall establish a model program to 

improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the base closure environmental restoration 

program. 

(b) Administrator of Program. - The Secretary shall designate the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Environment as the Administrator of the model program 

referred to in subsection (a). The 

Deputy Assistant Secretary shall report to the Secretary of Defense through the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. 

(c) Applicability. - This section shall apply to environmental restoration activities 

at installations selected by the Secretary pursuant to the provisions of subsection 

(d)(l). 

(d) Program Requirements. - In carrying out the model program, the Secretary of 

Defense shall: 

(1) Designate for the model program two installations under his jurisdiction 

that have been designated for closure pursuant to the Defense Authorization 

Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526) and 

for which preliminary assessments, site inspections, and Environmental Impact 

Statements required by law or regulation have been completed. The Secretary 

Reports. 

A-15 
Appendix A 

shall designate only those installations which have satisfied the requirements of 

section 204 of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and 

Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526). 

(2) Compile a prequalification list of prospective contractors for solicitation 

and negotiation in accordance with the procedures set forth in title IX of the 

Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (Public Law 92-582; 40 USC 

541 et seq., as amended). Such contractors shall satisfy all applicable statutory 

and regulatory requirements. In addition, the contractor selected for one of the 

two installations under this program shall indemnify the Federal Government 

against all liabilities, claims, penalties, costs, and damages caused by (A) the 

contractor’s breach of any term or provision of the contract; and (B) any negligent or willful act or omission of the contractor, its employees, or its subcontractors in the performance of the contract. 

(3) Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, solicit proposals 

from qualified contractors for response action (as defined under section 101 of 

the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 

1980 (42 USC 9601)) at the installations designated under paragraph (1). Such 

solicitations and proposals shall include the following: 

(A) Proposals to perform response action. Such proposals shall include 

provisions for receiving the necessary authorizations or approvals of the 

response action by appropriate Federal, State, or local agencies. 

(B) To the maximum extent possible, provisions offered by single prime 

contractors to perform all phases of the response action, using performance 

specifications supplied by the Secretary of Defense and including any safeguards the Secretary deems essential to avoid conflict of interest. 

(4) Evaluate bids on the basis of price and other evaluation criteria. 

(5) Subject to the availability of authorized and appropriated funds to the 

Department of Defense, make contract awards for response action within 120 

days after the solicitation of proposals pursuant to paragraph (3) for the response 

action, or within 120 days after receipt of the necessary authorizations or approvals of the response action by appropriate Federal, State, or local agencies, 

whichever is later. 

(e) Application of Section 120 of CERCLA. - Activities of the model program 

shall be carried out subject to, and in a manner consistent with, section 120 (relating 

to Federal facilities) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 

and Liability Act of 1980 (42 USC 9620). 

(f) Expedited Agreements. - The Secretary shall, with the concurrence of the 

Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, assure compliance with all 

applicable Federal statutes and regulations and, in addition, take all reasonable and 

appropriate measures to expedite all necessary administrative decisions, agreements, 

and concurrences. 

(g) Report. - The Secretary of Defense shall include a description of the progress 

made during the preceding fiscal year in implementing and accomplishing the goals 

of this section within the annual report to Congress required by section 2706 of title 

10, United States Code. 

(h) Applicability of Existing Law. - Nothing in this section affects or modifies, in 

any way, the obligations or liability of any person under other Federal or State law, 

including common law, with respect to the disposal or release of hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants as defined under section 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 USC 

9601). 

A-16 
This appendix is taken verbatim from Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment 

Report, March 1993. 

Background 

Public Law 101-510 requires the Secretary of 

Defense to submit to the Congress and to the 

Commission a force structure plan for fiscal years 

1994 through 1999. The Secretary submitted 

the plan to Congress and to the Commission on 

March 12, 1993. 

The force structure plan which follows incorporates an assessment by the Secretary of 

the probable threats to the national security 

during the fiscal year 1994 through 1999 

period, and takes into account the anticipated 

levels of funding for this period. The plan 

comprises three sections: 

The military threat assessment, 

The need for overseas basing, and 

The force structure, including the 

implementation plan. 

The force structure plan is classified SECRET. 

What follows is the UNCLASSIFIED version 

of the plan. 

Section I: Military Threat 

Assessment 

The vital interests of the United States will be 

threatened by regional crises between historic 

antagonists, such as North and South Korea, 

India and Pakistan, and the Middle East/Persian 

Gulf states. Also, the collapse of political order 

as a result of ethnic enmities in areas such as 

Somalia and the former Yugoslavia will prompt 

international efforts to contain violence, halt the 

loss of life and the destruction of property, and 

re-establish civil society. The future world military situation will be characterized by regional 

actors with modern destructive weaponry, 

including chemical and biological weapons, 

modern ballistic missiles, and, in some cases, 

nuclear weapons. The acceleration of regional 

strife caused by frustrated ethnic and nationalistic aspirations will increase the pressure on 

the United States to contribute military forces 

to international peacekeeping/enforcement and 

humanitarian relief efforts. 

The United States faces three types of conflict 

in the coming years: deliberate attacks on 

U.S. allies or vital interests; the escalation of 

regional conflicts that eventually threaten 

U.S. allies or vital interests; and conflicts that 

do not directly threaten vital interests, but whose 

costs in lives of innocents demand an international response in which the United States will 

play a leading role. 

Across the Atlantic 

The Balkans and parts of the former Soviet Union 

will be a source of major crises in the coming 

years, as political-ethnic-religious antagonism 

weaken fragile post-Cold War institutions. These 

countries may resort to arms to protect narrow 

political-ethnic interests or maximize their power 

vis-a-vis their rivals. The presence of vast stores 

of conventional weapons and ammunition greatly 

increases the potential for these local conflicts 

to spread. Meanwhile, European NATO allies 

will continue to grapple with shaping an evolving regional security framework capable of 

crisis management and conflict prevention, 

as well as responding to out-of-area contingencies. These countries will develop closer 

relations with the central East European 

countries of Poland, the Czech and Slovak 

Republics, and Hungary, but they will be reluctant to admit the republics of the former Soviet 

Union into a formal collective defense arrangement. Attempts by these former Soviet republics to transform into democratic states with 

market economies and stable national boundaries may prove too difficult or too costly and 

could result in a reassertion of authoritarianism, 

economic collapse, and civil war. Unsettled civilmilitary relations, unstable relations between 

Russia and Ukraine, and retention of significant 

numbers of nuclear weapons even after the 

B- 1 
Appendix B ~ 

implementation of START 11, the continuation 

of other strategic programs, and relatively indiscriminate arms sales will remain troubling 

aspects of the Commonwealth of Independent 

States. 

In the Middle East, competition for political 

influence and natural resources (i.e., water and 

oil), along with weak economies, Islamic fundamentalism, and demographic pressures will 

contribute to deteriorating living standards and 

encourage social unrest. The requirement for 

the United States to maintain a major role 

in Persian Gulf security arrangements will not 

diminish for the foreseeable future. 

The major threat of military aggression or subversion in the Persian Gulf region may well 

emanate from Iran. Iran will find its principal 

leverage in subversion and propaganda, and in 

threats and military posturing below the threshold 

that would precipitate U.S. intervention. 

Iraq will continue to be a major concern for 

the region and the world. By the turn of the 

century, Iraq could pose a renewed regional threat 

depending on what sanctions remain in place 

and what success Iraq has in circumventing them. 

Iraq continues to constitute a residual threat 

to some Gulf states, particularly Kuwait. Its military capabilities to threaten other Gulf Arab 

states will grow. These states will nevertheless 

continue to depend largely on the U.S. deterrent to forestall a renewed Iraqi drive for 

regional dominance. 

A prolonged stalemate in the Middle East peace 

process may lead to further violence and threats 

to U.S. allies and interests, perhaps accelerating 

the popularity of anti-Western and Islamic radical 

movements. 

Across the Pacific 

The security environment in most of Asia risks 

becoming unstable as nations reorient their 

defense policies to adapt to the end of the 

Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet empire, 

the breakup of the former Soviet Union, and 

the lessons of the Persian Gulf War. Political 

and economic pressures upon Communist or 

authoritarian regimes may lead to greater instability and violence. Virtually every nation will 

base its strategic calculations on the premise 

of a declining U.S. military presence. The lesser 

nations of Asia will become increasingly 

concerned about security in areas characterized 

by national rivalries. 

Our most active regional security concern in 

Asia remains the military threat posed by North 

Korea to our treaty ally, the Republic of Korea. 

Our concerns are intensified by North Korea’s 

efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction 

and delivery systems. 

China’s military modernization efforts of the last 

two decades will produce a smaller but more 

capable military with modern combat aircraft, 

including the Su-27FLANKER. China will also 

have aerial refueling and airborne warning and 

control aircraft before the end of the decade. 

The Chinese Navy will have significantly 

improved air defense missile capabilities, antiship 

missiles, long-range cruise missiles (120 km 

range), and a new submarine-launched cruise 

missile. By the end of the decade China also 

will have improved its strategic nuclear forces. 

Japan’s major security concerns will focus 

primarily on the potential emergence of a 

reunified Korea armed with nuclear weapons, 

on the expanding Chinese naval threat, and on 

the possibility of a nationalistic Russia. 

In South Asia, the principal threat to U.S. 

security will remain the potential of renewed 

conflict between India and Pakistan. While the 

conventional capabilities of both countries probably will be eroded by severe budget pressures, 

internal security obligations, and the loss of 

Superpower benefactors, India and Pakistan 

will still have nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. 

The Rest oj the World 

This broad characterization covers regions not 

addressed above and is not intended to either 

diminish or denigrate the importance of U.S. 

interests, friends, and allies in areas beyond 

Europe and the Pacific. 

In Latin America, democratic foundations 

remain unstable and the democratization process will remain vulnerable to a wide variety 

of influences and factors that could easily derail 

it. Virtually every country in the region will be 

victimized by drug-associated violence and crime. 

B-2 
Appendix B 

Over the next few years, the capabilities of 

almost all of the militaries in the region will 

remain static or decline despite planned or 

ongoing measures to upgrade or modernize 

existing inventories or restructure. A single exception may be Chile, which may see- some force 

structure improvements through the mid- 1990s. 

In Africa, chronic instability, insurgency, and 

civil war will continue throughout the continent. Two major kinds of security issues will 

dominate US. relations with the region: noncombatant evacuation and conflict resolution. 

Operations most likely to draw the US. military into the continent include disaster relief, 

humanitarian assistance, international peacekeeping, and logistic support for allied military 

operations. Further, conflict resolution efforts 

will test the growing reputation of the United 

States for negotiation and mediation. 

Direct threats to U.S. allies or vital interests 

that would require a significant military response 

in the near future are those posed by North 

Korea, Iran, and Iraq. More numerous, however, are those regional conflicts that would 

quickly escalate to threaten vital U.S. interests 

in Southeastern Europe, Asia, the Middle East, 

Africa, and Latin America. These conflicts would 

not require military responses on the order of 

DESERT STORM, but they would pose unique 

demands on the ability of U.S. Armed Forces to 

maintain stability and provide the environment 

for political solutions. Finally, there will be 

a large number of contingencies in which the 

sheer magnitude of human suffering and moral 

outrage demands a U.S. response, probably in 

concert with the United Nations. The current 

number of international crises is unlikely to 

diminish before the end of this decade, as 

many regions of the world continue to suffer 

the ravages of failed economic programs and 

nationalistic violence. 

Section 11: Justification for 

Overseas Basing 

As we reduce forward-presence forces globally, 

we nevertheless will continue to emphasize 

the fundamental roles of forward-presence 

forces essential to deterring aggression, fostering alliance relationships, bolstering regional 

stability, and protecting U.S. interests abroad. 

Forward-presence activities such as forward 

basing, rotational and periodic deployments, 

exercises and port visits, military-to-military 

contacts, security assistance, combatting terrorism, combatting narcotrafficking, and protecting American citizens in crisis areas will remain 

central to our stability and U.S. influence will 

be promoted through emerging forwardpresence operations. These include roles for the 

military in the war on drugs and in providing 

humanitarian assistance. 

Over the past 45 years, the day-to-day presence 

of U.S. forces in regions vital to U.S. national 

interest has been key to averting crises and 

preventing war. Our forces throughout the 

world show our commitment, lend credibility 

to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and 

provide crisis-response capability while promoting 

U.S. influence and access. Although the numbers of U.S. forces stationed overseas will 

be reduced, the credibility of our capability 

and intent to respond to crisis will continue to 

depend on judicious forward presence. Forward 

presence is also vital to the maintenance of the 

system of collective defense by which the United 

States works with its friends and allies to protect our security interests, while reducing the 

burdens of defense spending and unnecessary 

arms competition. 

Atlantic Forces 

US. interests in the Atlantic Regions, including 

Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, 

Africa and Southwest Asia, require continuing 

commitment. There will be forces, forward 

stationed and rotational, with the capability for 

rapid reinforcement from within the Atlantic 

region and from the United States and the means 

to support deployment of larger forces when 

needed. 

The end of the Cold War has significantly 

reduced the requirement to station U.S. forces 

in Europe. Yet, the security of the United States 

remains linked to that of Europe, and our 

continued support of the Atlantic Alliance is 

crucial. Our stake in long-term European security and stability, as well as enduring economic, 

cultural, and geopolitical interests require a continued commitment of U.S. military strength. 

B-3 
Appendix B 

Our forward presence forces in Europe must be 

sized, designed, and postured to preserve an 

active and influential role in the Atlantic Alliance and in the future security framework on 

the continent. The remaining force of 1 Army 

Corps with 2 divisions and 3(+) Air Force Fighter 

Wing Equivalents (FWE) is a direct response 

to the uncertainty and instability that remains 

in this region. In addition, maritime forces 

committed to Europe will be one Carrier Battle 

Group (CVBG) and one Amphibious Ready Group 

(ARGMEU(S0C)). These forward-deployed forces 

provide an explicit commitment to the security 

and stability of Europe, and pre-positioned 

equipment provides an infrastructure for 

CONUS-based forces should the need arise in 

Europe or elsewhere. 

The U.S. response to the Iraqi invasion of 

Kuwait was built on the foundation of previous U.S. presence in the region. Air, ground, 

and maritime deployments, coupled with 

pre-position, combined exercises, security 

assistance, and infrastructure, as well as European and regional enroute strategic airlift 

infrastructure, enhanced the crisis-response 

force buildup. Future presence in Southwest 

Asia will be defined by ongoing bilateral negotiations with the governments of the Gulf 

Cooperative Council. Our commitment will be 

reinforced by pre-positioned equipment, access 

agreements, bilateral planning, periodic deployments and exercises, visits by senior officials 

and security assistance. 

Puci$c Forces 

U.S. interests in the Pacific, including Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, require a 

continuing commitment. Because the forces 

of potential adversaries in the Pacific are different than the Atlantic, and due to the maritime 

character of the area, U.S. military forces in this 

vast region of major importance differ from those 

in the Atlantic arena. As Asia continues its 

economic and political development, U.S. 

forward presence will continue to serve as a 

stabilizing influence and a restraint to potential 

regional aggression and rearmament. 

Forward presence forces will be principally 

maritime, with half of the projected carrier and 

amphibious force oriented toward this area 

including one CVBG, ARC, and Marine Expeditionary Force forward-based in this region. 

The improving military capability of South 

Korea has enabled our Army forces to be trimmed 

to less than a division. One Air Force FWE 

in South Korea and 1(+) FWE in Japan are 

to be forward-based in this region. In addition, 

presence in both Alaska and Hawaii will be 

maintained. 

Elsewhue in the World 

In the less-predictable yet increasingly important other regions of the globe, the United States 

seeks to preserve its access to foreign markets 

and resources, mediate the traumas of economic 

and social strife, deter regional aggressors, and 

promote the regional stability necessary for 

progress and prosperity. From Latin America to 

sub-Saharan Africa to the far-flung islands of 

the world’s oceans, American military men and 

women contribute daily to the unsung tasks of 

nation-building, security assistance, and quiet 

diplomacy that protect and extend our political 

goodwill and access to foreign markets. Such 

access becomes increasingly critical in an era 

of reduced forward presence, when forces 

deploying from the United States are more 

than ever dependent on enroute and hostnation support to ensure timely response to 

distant crises. In the future, maintaining 

forward presence through combined planning 

and exercises, pre-positioning and service agreements, and combined warfighting doctrine and 

interoperability could spell the difference 

between success or failure in defending vital 

regional interests. 

Contingency Forces 

The U.S strategy for the come-as-you-are 

arena of spontaneous, often unpredictable 

crises requires fully trained, highly ready forces 

that are rapidly deliverable and initially selfsufficient. Therefore, such forces must be drawn 

primarily from the active force structure and 

tailored into highly effective joint task forces 

that capitalize on the unique capabilities of each 

Service and the special operations forces. In this 

regard, the ClNC must have the opportunity 

to select from a broad spectrum of capabilities 

such as: airborne, air assault, light infantry, and 

B-4 
Appendix B 

rapidly deliverable heavy forces from the Army; 

the entire range of fighter, fighter-bomber, and 

long range conventional bomber forces provided 

by the Air Force; carrier-based naval air power, 

the striking capability of surface combatants, 

and the covert capabilities of attack submarines 

from the Navy; the amphibious combat power 

of the Marine Corps, particularly when access 

ashore is contested, which includes on-station 

MEU(S0C) and Maritime Pre-positioning Ships; 

and the unique capabilities of the special 

operations forces. Additionally, certain reserve 

units must be maintained at high readiness 

to assist and augment responding active units. 

Reserve forces perform much of the lift and other 

vital missions from the outset of any contingency operation. In regions where no U.S. forward presence exists, these contingency forces 

are the tip of the spear, first into action, and 

followed as required by heavier forces and longterm sustainment. 

Section 111: The Force Structure 

and Implementation Plan 

FY 92 FY 95 FY 97 ~ 

ARMY DIVISIONS 

Active 14 12 12 

Reserve(Cadre1 lO(0) 60) 60-1 

Active 3 33 

Reserve 1 1 1 

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 13 12 12 

TRAINING CARRIER 1 1 1 

CARRIER AIR WINGS 

Active 12 11 11 

Reserve 2 22 

BATTLE FORCE SHIPS 466 427 425 

AIR FORCE FIGHTERS 

Active 1,248 1,098 1,098 

Reserve 816 810 810 

AIR FORCE BOMBERS 242 176 184 

MARINE CORPS DIVISIONS 

DoD Personnel 

(End Strength in thousands) 

FY 92 FY 95 FY 97 ~~ ~ 

ACTIVE DUTY 

Army 610 538 522 

Navy 542 490 489 

Marine Corps 185 170 159 

Air Force 470 409 400 

TOTAL 1,807 1,607 1,570 

RESERVES 1,114 911 907 

CIVILIANS 1,006 904 884 

- -- 

B-5 
Military Value Return on Investment 

(given priority consideration) 

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational 

readiness of the Department of Defense’s 

total force. 

5. The extent and timing of potential costs 

and savings, including the number of 

years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, 

for the savings to exceed the costs. 

2. The availability and condition of land, Impacts facilities, and associated airspace at 

both the existing and potential 

receiving locations. 

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, 

mobilization, and future total force 

requirements at both the existing 

and potential receiving locations. 

4. The cost and manpower implications. 

6. The economic impact on communities. 

7. The ability of both the existing and 

potential receiving communities’ 

infrastructure to support forces, 

missions and personnel. 

8. The environmental impact. 

c- 1 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Initial Entry TrainingA3ranch School 

Commodity Oriented 

Fort McClellan, AL 

Fort Monmouth, NJ 

Vint Hill Farms, VA 

Amy Depots 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA 

Tooele Army Depot, UT 

CommandKontrol 

Fort Belvoir, VA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Shipyards 

Charleston Naval Shipyard, SC 

Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, CA 

Operational Air Stations 

Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, CA 

Naval Air Station Barbers Point, HI 

Naval Air Station Cecil Field, FL 

Naval Air Station, Midway Island 

Training Air Stations 

Naval Air Station Meridian, MS 

Naval Air Station Memphis, TN 

East Coast Naval Bases 

Naval Education and Training Center, 

Naval Station Charleston, SC 

Naval Station Mobile, AL 

Naval Station Staten Island, NY 

Naval Submarine Base, New London, CT 

Newport, RI 

LOSURE AND 

DATIONS 

West Coast Naval Bases 

Naval Air Station Alameda, CA 

Naval Station Treasure Island, 

San Francisco, CA 

Training Centers 

Naval Training Center Orlando, FL 

Naval Training Center San Diego, CA 

Navy Depots 

Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, CA 

Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, VA 

Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, FL 

Inventory Control 

Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, PA 

Technical Centers (SPAWm) 

Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory, 

Naval Air Technical Services Facility, 

Naval Air Warfare Center - Aircraft Division, 

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, 

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, 

Naval Electronic Security Systems 

Navy Radio Transmission Facility, 

Navy Radio Transmission Facility, Driver, VA 

Port Hueneme, CA 

Philadelphia, PA 

Trenton, NJ 

Charleston, SC 

St. Inigoes, MD 

Engineering Center, Washington, D.C. 

Annapolis, MD 

Technical Centers (NAVSEA) 

Naval Surface Warfare Center - Carderock, 

Annapolis Detachment, Annapolis, MD 

Naval Surface Warfare Center - Dahlgren, 

White Oak Detachment, White Oak, MD 

Naval Surface Warfare Center - 

Port Hueneme, Virginia Beach 

Detachment, Virginia Beach, VA 
Appendix D 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center - 

Norfolk Detachment, Norfolk, VA 

Planning, Estimating, Repair and 

Alterations (CV), Bremerton, WA 

Planning, Estimating, Repair and 

Alterations (Surface) Atlantic, Norfolk, VA 

Planning, Estimating, Repair and Alterations 

(Surface) Atlantic (HQ), Philadelphia, PA 

Planning, Estimating, Repair and Alterations 

(Surface) Pacific, San Francisco, CA 

Sea Automated Data Systems Activity, 

Indian Head, MD 

Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, 

Planning, and Procurement, 

Portsmouth. NH 

Reserve Air Stations 

Naval Air Facility Detroit, MI 

Naval Air Station Dallas, TX 

Naval Air Station Glenview, IL 

Naval Air Station South Weymouth, MA 

Supply Centers 

Naval Supply Center Charleston, SC 

Naval Supply Center Oakland, CA 

Naval Supply Center Pensacola, FL 

NCR Activities 

Bureau of Navy Personnel, Arlington, VA 

(Including the Office of Military Manpower 

Management, Arlington, VA) 

Naval Air Systems Command, Arlington, VA 

Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 

Naval Recruiting Command, Arlington, VA 

Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, VA 

Naval Supply Systems Command, Arlington, 

VA (Including Defenseprinting Office, 

Alexandria, VA and Food Systems Office, 

Arlington, VA) 

Station, and Security Group Detachment, 

Potomac, Washington, D. C. 

Alexandria, VA 

Security Group Command, Security Group 

Tactical Support Office, Arlington, VA 

Other Bases 

1st Marine Corps District, Garden City, NY 

Department of Defense Family Housing Office, 

Niagara Falls, NY 

Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 

Western Engineering Field Division, 

San Bruno, CA 

Public Works Center San Francisco, CA 

Reserve Activities 

Naval Reserve Centers at: 

Gadsden, AL 

Montgomery, AL 

Fayetteville, AK 

Fort Smith, AK 

Pacific Grove, CA 

Macon, GA 

Terre Haute, IN 

Hutchinson, KN 

Monroe, LA 

New Bedford, MA 

Pittsfield, MA 

Joplin, MS 

St. Joseph, MO 

Great Falls, MT 

Missoula, MT 

Atlantic City, NJ 

Perth Amboy, NJ 

Jamestown, NY 

Poughkeepsie, NY 

Altoona, PA 

Kingsport, TN 

Memphis, TN 

Ogden, UT 

Staunton, VA 

Parkersburg, WV 

Naval Reserve Facilities at: 

Alexandria, LA 

Midland, TX 

Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Centers at: 

Fort Wayne, IN 

Billings, MT 

Abilene, TX 

Readiness Command Regions at: 

Olathe, KN (Region 18) 

Scotia, NY (Region 2) 

Ravenna, OH (Region 5) 

Hospitals 

Naval Hospital Charleston, SC 

Naval Hospital Oakland, CA 

Naval Hospital Orlando, FL 

D-2 
~ ~~~ 

Appendix-D 

DEPARTMENT OF THE 

AIR FORCE 

Lurge Aircraft 

Griffiss Air Force Base, NY 

K.1. Sawyer Air Force Base, MI 

March Air Force Base, CA 

McGuire Air Force Base, NJ 

Smll Airmuft 

Homestead Air Force Base, FL 

Air Force Reserve 

O’Hare International Airport Air Force 

Reserve Station, Chicago, IL 

Air Force Depots 

Newark Air Force Base, OH 

Defense Logistics Agency 

Inventory Control Points 

Defense Electronics Supply Center, 

Defense Industrial Supply Center, 

Defense Personnel Support Center, 

Dayton, OH 

Philadelphia PA 

Philadelphia, PA 

SewicelSupport Activities 

Defense Logistics Agency Clothing Factory, 

Defense Logistics Service Center, 

Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service, 

Philadelphia, PA 

Battle Creek, MI 

Battle Creek, MI 

Regional Headquurters 

Defense Contract Management District 

Defense Contract Management District 

Defense Contract Management District West, 

Midatlantic, Philadelphia, PA 

Northcentral, Chicago, IL 

El Segundo, CA 

Defense Distribution Depots 

Defense Distribution Depot Charleston, SC 

Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, PA 

Defense Distribution Depot Oakland, CA 

Defense Distribution Depot Pensacola, FL 

Defense Distribution Depot Tooele, UT 

Defense Information 

Systems Agency 

Navy Datu Processing Centers 

Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, PA 

Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, DC 

Enlisted Personnel Management Center, 

Facilities Systems Office, Port Hueneme, CA 

Fleet Industrial Support Center, 

Naval Air Station, Brunswick, MN 

Naval Air Station, Key West, FL 

Naval Air Station, Mayport, FL 

Naval Air Station, Oceana, VA 

Naval Air Station, Whidbey Island, WA 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

Patuxent River, MD 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, 

China Lake, CA 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, 

Point Mugu, CA 

Naval Command Control & Ocean 

Surveillance Center, San Diego, CA 

Naval Computer & Telecommunications 

Area Master Station, Atlantic, Norfolk, VA 

Naval Computer & Telecommunications Area 

Master Station, EASTPAC, Pearl Harbor, HI 

Naval Computer & Telecommunications 

Station, San Diego, CA 

Naval Computer & Telecommunications 

Station, New Orleans, LA 

Naval Computer & Telecommunications 

Station, Pensacola, FL 

Naval Computer & Telecommunications 

Station, Washington, DC 

Navy Data Automation Facility, 

Corpus Christi, TX 

Navy Recruiting Command, Arlington, VA 

Navy Regional Data Automation Center, 

Naval Supply Center, Charleston, SC 

Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, VA 

Naval Supply Center, Pearl Harbor, HI 

Naval Supply Center, Puget Sound, WA 

Trident Refit Facility, Bangor, WA 

Trident Refit Facility, Kings Bay, GA 

New Orleans, LA 

San Diego, CA 

San Francisco, CA 

D-3 
Appendix D 

Marine Corps Data Processing Centers 

Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, NC 

Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, CA 

Regional Automated Services Center, 

Regional Automated Services Center, 

Camp Lejeune, NC 

Camp Pendleton, CA 

Air Force Data Processing Centers 

Air Force Military Personnel Center, 

Computer Service Center, San Antonio, TX 

Regional Processing Center, McClellan AFB, CA 

7th Communications Group, Pentagon, 

Randolph AFB, TX 

Arlington, VA 

Defense Logistics Agency Data 

Processing Centers 

Information Processing Center, Battle Creek, MI 

Information Processing Center, Ogden, UT 

Information Processing Center, 

Information Processing Center, Richmond, VA 

Philadelphia, PA 

Defense Information Systems Agency 

(DISA) Data Processing Centers 

Defense Information Technology Service 

Defense Information Technology Service 

Organization, Columbus Annex Dayton, OH 

Organization, Indianapolis Information 

Processing Center, IN 

Organization, Kansas City Information 

Processing Center, MO 

Defense Information Technology Service 

Changes to Previously Approved 

BRAC 88/91 Recommendations 

Bergstrom Air Force Base, TX (704th Fighter 

Squadron and 924th Fighter Group 

redirected from Bergstrom AFB to 

Carswell AFB cantonment area) 

Carswell Air Force Base, TX (Fabrication 

function of the 436th Training Squadron 

redirected from Dyess AFB to Luke AFB, 

maintenance training function redirected 

from Dyess AFB to Hill AFB) 

Castle Air Force Base, CA (B-52 Combat Crew 

Training redirected from Fairchild AFB to 

Barksdale AFB and KC-135 Combat Crew 

Training from Fairchild AFB to Altus AFB) 

Chanute Air Force Base, 1L (Metals Technology and Aircraft Structural Maintenance 

training courses from Chanute AFB to 

Sheppard AFB redirected to NAS Memphis) 

Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure 

Island, CA (Retain no facilities, dispose vice 

outlease all property) 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA (Systems Integration Management Activity - East remains at 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA vice Rock 

Island, IL) 

not close. 482nd Fighter Wing (AFRES) 

is reassigned from Homestead AFB and 

operates the airfield. Joint Communications 

Support Element stays at MacDill AFB vice 

relocating to Charleston AFB) 

Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA 

(Substitute Naval Air Station Miramar for 

Marine Corps Air Station 29 Palms as 

one receiver of Marine Corps Air Station 

Tustin’s assets) 

Refueling Group redirectedfrom McClellan 

AFB to Beale AFB) 

Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center, 

San Diego, CA (Consolidate with Naval 

Electronics Systems Engineering Center, 

Vallejo, CA, into available Air Force space 

vice new construction) 

Yorktown, VA (Realign to Panama City, 

FL vice Dam Neck, VA) 

Albuquerque, NM (Retain as a tenant 

of the Air Force) 

Presidio of San Francisco, CA (6th Army 

relocates to NASA Ames, CA vice Fort 

Carson, CO) 

Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, OH 

(Retain 121st Air Refueling Wing and the 

160th Air Refueling Group in a cantonment 

area at Rickenbacker AGB instead of 

Wright- Patterson AFB. Rickenbacker 

AGB does not close) 

Rock Island Arsenal, IL (AMCCOM remains 

at Rock Island, IL instead of moving to 

Redstone Arsenal, AL) 

MacDill Air Force Base, FL (Airfield does 

Mather Air Force Base, CA (940th Air 

Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity, 

Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility, 

D-4 
BASES FOR 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Anniston Army Depot, AL 

Red River Army Depot, TX 

Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA 

Army Information Processing Center 

Army Information Processing Center 

Defense Distribution Depot Red River, TX 

Defense Distribution Depot Anniston, AL 

Fort Gillem, GA 

Fort Lee, VA 

Fort McPherson, GA 

Fort Monroe, VA 

Marcus Hook U.S. Army Reserve Center, PA 

Presidio of Monterey & Annex, CA 

Chambersburg, PA 

Huntsville, AL 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Defense Distribution Depot Albany, GA 

Defense Distribution Depot Barstow, CA 

Defense Distribution Depot Cherry Point, NC 

Defense Distribution Depot Jacksonville, FL 

Defense Distribution Depot Norfolk, VA 

Defense Distribution Depot San Diego, CA 

Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC 

Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA 

Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA 

Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, CA 

Naval Air Facility Johnstown, PA 

Naval Air Facility Martinsburg, WV 

Naval Air Station Agana, Guam 

Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX 

Naval Air Station Memphis, TN 

Naval Air Station Miramar, CA 

Naval Air Station Oceana, VA 

Naval Aviation Depot Cherry Point, NC 

Naval Aviation Depot Jacksonville, FL 

Naval Aviation Depot North Island, CA 

Naval Electronics Systems Engineering 

i 

Center Portsmouth, VA 

Naval Hospital Beaufort, SC 

Naval Hospital Corpus Christi, TX 

Naval Hospital Great Lakes, IL 

Naval Hospital Millington, TN 

Naval Ordnance Station Louisville, KY 

NavaVMarine Corps Reserve Center 

Naval Reserve Center Chicopee, MA 

Naval Reserve Center Quincy, MA 

Naval Shipyard Norfolk, VA 

Naval Shipyard Long Beach, CA 

Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, MWNH 

Naval Station Everett, WA 

Naval Station Ingleside, TX 

Naval Station Pascagoula, MS 

Naval Training Center Great Lakes, IL 

Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA 

Ships Parts Control Center 

Lawrence, MA 

Mechanicsburg, PA 

.DEPARTMENT OF THE 

AIR FORCE 

Plattsburgh Air Force Base, NY 

Fairchild Air Force Base, WA 

Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND 

Tinker Air Force Base, OK 

McClellan Air Force Base, CA 

Kelly Air Force Base, TX 

Warner-Robins Air Force Base, GA 

Gentile Air Force Station, OH 

Ogden Air Logistics Center 

Hill Air Force Base, UT 

Defense Distribution Depot 

McClellan Air Force Base, CA 

Defense Distribution Depot 

Oklahoma City, OK 

Defense Distribution Depot 

San Antonio, TX 

Defense Distribution Depot 

Warner-Robins, GA 

E- 1 
Appendix E 

Regional Processing Center 

Kelly Air Force Base, TX 

Regional Processing Center 

Tinker Air Force Base, OK 

Regional Processing Center 

Warner-Robins Air Force Base, GA 

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY 

Defense Contract Management District 

Defense Construction Supply Center 

Northeast, MA 

Columbus, OH 

DEFENSE INFORMATION 

SYSTEMS AGENCY 

Defense Information Technology Services 

Organization Cleveland Information 

Processing Center, OH 

Defense Information Technology Services 

Organization Columbus Information 

Processing Center, OH 

Defense Information Technology Services 

Organization Denver Information 

Processing Center, CO 

E-2 
Washington, D.C. Hearings 

March 15, 1993 

Presentation of the Secretary’s 

2 118 Rayburn House Office Building 

Recommendations 

March 16, 1993 

Policy and Methodology in the 

22 12 Rayburn House Office Building 

Secretary’s Recommendations 

March 22, 1993 

Environmental Issues, Methodology, 

and Policy 

334 Cannon House Office Building 

. March 29, 1993 

Base Closure Account and Execution, 

Budget Impact and Public Policy 

G50 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

April 5, 1993 

Strategic Defense/Chemical Issues, 

Military Family/Retiree Issues 

1100 Longworth House Office Building 

April 12, 1993 

Economic Issues 

1100 Longworth House Office Building 

April 19, 1993 

Presentation of GAO’s Analysis of the 

Secretary’s Recommendations and Selection 

Process for Closures and Realignments 

G50 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

May 21, 1993 

Commission DeliberationsNote on 

Additions to the Secretary’s List 

for Further Consideration 

1100 Longworth House Office Building 

June 14-16, 1993 

Congressional Testimony on Military 

216 Hart Senate Office Building 

Facility Closures and Realignments 

June 17-18, 1993 

Commission Deliberations 

325 Russell Senate Office Building 

216 Hart Senate Office Building 

June 23-27, 1993 

Commission Final Deliberations 

216 Hart Senate Office Building 

2167 Rayburn House Office Building 

G50 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

Regional Hearings 

April 20-21, 1993 

Mid-Atlantic Regional Hearing 

Gunston Arts Center 

April 25-26, 1993 

Oakland, CA Regional Hearing 

Henry J. Kaiser Convention Center 

April 27, 1993 

San Diego, CA Regional Hearing 

Holiday Inn on the Bay 

May 1-2, 1993 

Charleston, SC Regional Hearing 

Gaillard Municipal Auditorium 

May 3, 1993 

Orlando, FL Regional Hearing 

Orlando Expo Center 

May 4, 1993 

Birmingham, AL Regional Hearing 

Boutwell Municipal Auditorium 

F- 1 
Appendix F 

May 9-10, 1993 

Newark, NJ Regional Hearing 

Symphony Hall 

May 11, 1993 

Boston, MA Regional Hearing 

Gardner Auditorium 

May 12, 1993 

Detroit, MI Regional Hearing 

McGregor Memorial Conference Center 

June 1, 1993 

Columbus, OH Regional Hearing 

Whitehall Civic Center 

June 2, 1993 

Grand Forks, ND Regional Hearing 

University of North Dakota 

June 3, 1993 

San Diego, CA Regional Hearing 

Holiday Inn on the Bay 

June 4, 1993 

Spokane, WA Regional Hearing 

City Council Chambers 

June 6, 1993 

Corpus Christi, TX Regional Hearing 

Bayfront Plaza Convention Center 

June 8-9, 1993 

Atlanta, GA Regional Hearing 

Russell Federal Building 

June 11, 1993 

Norfolk, VA Regional Hearing 

Chrysler Hall 

June 12, 1993 

Boston, MA Regional Hearing 

Gardner Auditorium F-2 

, 
, 

ARMY 

Anniston Army Depot, AL 

Corpus Christi Army Depot, TX 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA 

Red River Army Depot, TX 

Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA 

Tooele Army Depot, UT 

Fort Gillem, GA 

Fort Huachuca, AZ 

Fort Lee, VA 

Fort Leonard Wood, h4D ty1f3 

Fort McClellan, AL 

Fort McPherson, GA 

Fort Monroe, VA 

Fort Monmouth, NJ 

Vint Hill Farms, VA 

Marcus Hook U.S. Army Reserve Center, PA 

Presidio of Monterey Annex 

Presidio of Monterey AnnedFort Ord, CA 

University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 

NAVY 

Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, PA 

Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station 

Treasure Island, San Francisco, CA 

Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center, 

29 Palms, CA 

Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC 

Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, CA 

Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA 

Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA 

Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, CA 

Naval Air Station Alameda, CA 

Naval Air Station Cecil Field, FL 

Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX 

Naval Air Station Dallas, TX 

Naval Air Station Glenview, IL 

Naval Air Station Memphis, TN 

Naval Air Station Meridian, MS 

Naval Air Station Miramar, CA 

Naval Air Station Oceana, VA 

Naval Air Station South Weymouth, MA 

Naval Air Facility Detroit, MI 

Naval Air Facility Martinsburg, WV 

Naval Air Warfare Center-Aircraft Division, 

Patuxent River, MD 

NavaI Air Warfare Center-Aircraft Division, 

Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, CA 

Naval Aviation Depot Cherry Point, NC 

Naval Aviation Depot Jacksonville, FL 

Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, VA 

Naval Aviation Depot North Island, CA 

Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, FL 

Naval Education and Training Center, 

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center 

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center 

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center 

Naval Hospital Beaufort, SC 

Naval Hospital Corpus Christi, TX 

Naval Hospital Great Lakes, IL 

Naval Hospital Millington, TN 

Naval Hospital Oakland, CA 

Naval Hospital Orlando, FL 

Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA 

Navy Radio Transmission Facility, 

Trenton, NJ 

Newport, RI 

Portsmouth, VA 

St. Inigoes, MD 

San Diego, CA 

AnnaDolis. MD 

Naval 

Naval 

Naval 

Naval 

Naval 

Naval 

Naval 

Naval 

Naval 

Naval 

Naval 

Naval 

Shipyard Charleston, SC 

Shipyard Long Beach, CA 

Shipyard Mare Island, Vallejo, CA 

Shipyard Norfolk, VA 

Shipyard Portsmouth, ME/NH 

Station Charleston, SC 

Station Ingleside, TX 

Station Everett, WA 

Station Mayport, FL 

Station Mobile, AL 

Station Pascagoula, MS 

Station Treasure Island 

San Francisco, CA 

Naval Station Staten Island, NY 

Naval Submarine Base, New London, CT 

Naval Supply Center Oakland, CA 

Naval Supply Center Pensacola, FL 

Naval Surface Warfare Center (Dahlgren) 

White Oak Detachment, White Oak, MD 

Naval Surface Warfare Center-Carderock, 

Annapolis Detachment, Annapolis, MD 

Naval Training Center Great Lakes, IL 
Appendix G 

Naval Training Center Orlando, FL 

Naval Training Center San Diego, CA 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport, RI 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Norfolk 

Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA 

Planning, Engineering for Repair and 

Detachment, Norfolk, VA 

Alterations (Surface) Pacific 

San Francisco, CA 

Public Works Center San Francisco, CA 

Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, WA 

Ships Parts Control Center 

Submarine Base New London, CT 

Submarine Base Kings Bay, GA 

Mechanicsburg, PA 

AIR FORCE 

Carswell Air Force Base, TX 

Fairchild Air Force Base, WA 

Gentile Air Force Station, OH 

Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND 

Greater Rockford Airport, Rockford, IL 

Griffiss Air Force Base, NY 

Homestead Air Force Base, FL 

Kelly Air Force Base, TX 

K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, MI 

Plattsburgh Air Force Base, NY 

MacDill Air Force Base, FL 

March Air Force Base, CA 

McClellan Air Force Base, CA 

McGuire Air Force Base, NJ 

Newark Air Force Base, OH 

Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill 

O’Hare International Airport Air Force 

Tinker Air Force Base, OK 

Travis Air Force Base, CA 

Warner-Robins Air Force Base, GA 

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH 

Air Force Base, UT 

Reserve Station, Chicago, IL 

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY 

Defense Construction Supply Center 

Defense Contract Management District 

Defense Distribution Depot Albany, GA 

Defense Distribution Depot Barstow, CA 

Defense Distribution Depot Cherry Point, NC 

Defense Distribution Depot Jacksonville, FL 

Columbus, OH 

Northeast, Boston, MA 

Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, PA k 

Defense Distribution Depot McClellan 

Defense Distribution Depot Norfolk, VA 

Defense Distribution Depot Oklahoma City, OK 

Defense Distribution Depot Red River, TX 

Defense Distribution Depot San Antonio, TX 

Defense Distribution Depot San Diego, CA 

Defense Distribution Depot Warner-Robins, GA 

Defense Electronics Supply Center, Dayton, OH 

Defense Industrial Supply Center, PA 

Defense Logistics Service Center 

Defense Logistics Agency Clothing Factory 

Defense Personnel Support Center 

Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service 

Air Force Base, CA 

Battle Creek, MI 

Philadelphia, PA 

Philadelphia, PA 

Battle Creek, MI 

DEFENSE INFORMATION 

SYSTEMS AGENCY 

Army Information Processing Center 

Computer Services Center, San Antonio, TX 

Defense Information Technology Services 

Organization, Columbus Information 

Processing Center, OH 

Defense Information Technology Services 

Organization, Cleveland Information 

Processing Center, OH 

Regional Processing Center 

Kelly Air Force Base, TX 

Regional Processing Center 

Tinker Air Force Base, OK 

Regional Processing Center 

Warner-Robins Air Force Base, GA 

Seventh Communications Group 

Pentagon, Washington, DC 

Chambersburg, PA 

\ 

G-2 
Jim Courter has been Chairman of the Defense 

Base Closure and Realignment Commission since 

1991. Prior to that, he represented the 12th 

district of New Jersey in the U.S. House of 

Representatives from 1979 until 1991. While 

in Congress, Congressman Courter chaired the 

House Military Reform Caucus and served on 

the following subcommittees of the House Armed 

Services Committee: Military Installations and 

Facilities, Procurement and Military Nuclear 

Systems, and Research and Development. In 1987, 

he was appointed to the joint select committee 

charged with investigating the diversion of funds 

to the Nicaraguan democratic opposition in 

the “Iran-Contra Affair.” Chairman Courter is 

senior partner of the law firm he founded, 

Courter, Kobert, Laufer, Purcell, and Cohen, 

in Hackettstown, New Jersey. 

Peter B. Bowman is Vice President for Quality 

facturing company in Newburyport, Massachusetts. A career naval officer, Mr. Bowman 

attended the U.S. Naval Nuclear Power School 

and the Naval Submarine School. He served 

aboard three separate nuclear submarines and 

later at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard. After tours 

at the Naval Sea Systems Command and Mare 

Island Naval Shipyard and 30 years service, he 

retired in 1990 as the Shipyard Commander at 

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. Mr. Bowman was 

an instructor for the Center for Naval Analysis 

at the Naval Postgraduate School from 1990 

through 1991. 

Beverly B. Byron was a member of the U.S. 

House of Representatives representing the 

6th District of Maryland from 1979 until 

January 1993. While in Congress, she served as 

Chairman of the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee of the House Armed 

Services Committee. In this capacity, Congresswoman Byron directed Congressional oversight 

for 42 percent of the U.S. defense budget and 

played a key role in overseeing the drawdown 

of U.S. forces overseas. She also served on the 

Research and Development Subcommittee. From 

, Assurance for Gould, Inc., a diversified manu1983 until 1986, Mrs. Byron chaired the House 

Special Panel on Arms Control and Disarmament and served from 1980 until 1987 on the 

US. Air Force Academy Board of Visitors. 

Rebecca G. Cox is Vice President for Government Affairs for Continental Airlines. Mrs. Cox 

formerly served as Assistant to the President 

and Director of the Office of Public Liaison for 

President Ronald Reagan. Concurrently, she 

served as Chairman of the Interagency Committee for Women’s Business Enterprise. Prior 

to her service in The White House, Mrs. Cox 

was Assistant Secretary for Government Affairs 

at the Department of Transportation. She had 

previously served at the Department of Transportation as Counselor to the Secretary. Mrs. 

Cox began her career in the U.S. Senate, where 

she was Chief of Staff to Senator Ted Stevens. 

General Hansford T. Johnson, U.S. Air Force 

(Retired) served in the Air Force for 33 years 

and was Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Transportation Command and of the Air Mobility 

Command, leading these commands in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. During his 

career, he served in South Vietnam, commanded 

the 22nd Bombardment Wing, was Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Operations of the Strategic Air Command, Vice Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Air 

Forces, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the 

US. Central Command and Director of the Joint 

Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Johnson 

is now Chief of Staff of the United Services 

Automobile Association. 

Harry C. McPherson, Jr., is a partner in the 

law firm of Vemer, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson 

and Hand in Washington, D.C. He served as 

Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs and later as Assistant Secretary 

of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. 

He then served as Special Counsel to President 

Lyndon B. Johnson. Mr. McPherson served in 

the US. Air Force and was President of the 

Federal City Council. He was General Counsel 

for the John F. Kennedy Center for the 

H- 1 
Appendix H 

Performing Arts from 1977 until 1991 and is 

currently Vice Chairman of the U.S. International Trade and Cultural Center Commission. 

Robert D. Stuart, Jr., was U.S. Ambassador to 

Norway from 1984 to 1989 after serving as President, Chief Executive Officer, and Chairman of 

The Quaker Oats Company. Ambassador Stuart 

is President of Conway Farms, a real estate 

development company. He is also a Director of 

the Atlantic Council, the Washington Center and 

the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Previously, he was President of the Council 

of American Ambassadors and Vice Chairman 

of the Illinois Commission on the Future of Public 

Service. He served in the U.S. Army in Europe 

during World War 11. He also served as a Commissioner on the Defense Base Closure and 

Realignment Commission in 199 1. 

H-2 
Matthew P. Behrmann 

Staff Director 

Col Wayne Purser, USAF 

Senior Military Executive 

Benton L. Borden 

Director of Review and Analysis 

Edward A. Brown I11 

Army Team Leader 

S. Alexander Yellin 

Navy Team Leader 

Francis A. Cirillo, Jr. 

Air Force Team Leader 

Robert Cook 

Interagency Team Leader 

Caroline Cimons 

Director of Administration 

Sheila C. Cheston 

General Counsel 

Mary Ann Hook 

Deputy General Counsel 

Thomas Houston 

Director of Communications 

James P. Gallagher 

Director of Congressional Affairs 

Tobias G. Messitt 

Executive Secretariat 

James K. Phillips 

Director of Information Services 

and Public Affairs 

PROFESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF 

Catherine M. Anderson 

Jacqueline Grace Arends 

Jennifer Nuber Atkin 

Hugh Bale 

Virginia S. Bauhan 

William E. Berl 

William F. Bley2 

Joseph C. Bohan' 

James Boucher3 

Jeffrey C. Buhl 

H. Donald Campbell2 

Jeffrey A. Campbell 

Francis X. Cantwell 

Jill C. Champagne 

Christine K. Cimko 

David F. Combs2 

Lynn M. Conforti 

Duffy D. Crane 

CDR Gregory S. Cruze, USN' 

Richard A. DiCamillo' 

MAJ Kurt B. Dittmer, USAF' 

LTC Brian J. Duffy, USA' 

William D. Duhnke 111 

Charles T. Durgin 

David S. Epstein' 

MAJ Gary L. Evans, USA' 

Edward J. Foley 

Barbara A. Gannon2 

Kara M. Gerhardt 

James K. Goldfarb 

John A. Graham 

Renee Hammill 

Penney M. Harwel12 

David K. Henry3 

Roger P. Houck 

Robert G. Howarth 

Lawrence Burton Jackson 

Roy B. Karadbi12 

Mitchell B. Karpman2 

Robert C. Keltie, Jr. 

John Kemmerer4 

Paul D. Kennington 

M. Glenn Knoepfle2 

Mary Ellen Kraus5 

Marni Langbert 

Lt Col Jeffrey A. Miller, USAF' 

Gregory S. Nixon2 

Jeffrey L. Patterson, Esq. 

Daniel E. Quaresma 

Mark L. Randolph 

LTCOL R. G. Richardella, USMC' 

Howard A. Salter 

Michele T. Sisak 

Daniel Smith 

Sean K. Trench 

Althnett Turner 

Mary E. Woodward 

1 Detailee from the Department of Defense 

2 Detailee from the General Accounting Office 

3 Detailee from the Department of Commerce 

4 Detailee from the Environmental Protection Agency 

5 Detailee from the Federal Aviation Administration 

I- 1 
1st Marine Corps District 

Garden City, New York ........................... 1-60 

A 

Anniston Army Depot, Alabama ................ 

Aviation Supply Office 

B 

C 

Carswell Air Force Base, Texas ........................ 1-84 

Castle Air Force Base, California ...................... 1-85 

Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois .......... Charleston Naval Shipyard, South Carolina .... . l-15 

D 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania ...................... 1-43 

Bergstrom Ar Force Base, Texas 

.... 1-85 

Defense Clothing Factory 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania ...................... 1-93 

Defense Contract Management District 

Midatlantic, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania ... . l-95 

Defense Contract Management District 

Northcentral, Chicago, Illinois ................. 1-95 

Defense Contract Management District 

West El Segundo, California .................... 1-96 

Defense Distribution Depot 

Charleston, South Carolina ...................... 1-96 

Defense Distribution Depot 

Letterkenny, Pennsylvania ...................... . l-97 

Defense Distribution Depot 

Oakland, California ........................ 

Defense Distribution Depot 

Pensacola, Florida .................................. .1-98 

Defense Distribution Depot 

Tooele, Utah .................. ................ 1-99 

Defense Electronics Supply Ce 

Gentile Air Force Station, 

Defense Industrial Supply Center 

1-98 

............ 1-89 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania ..................... .1-90 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania ...................... 1-9 1 

Battle Creek, Michigan .................... 

Office, Niagara Falls, New York ....... 

Defense Loptics Services Center .......... 

Defense Personnel Support Center 

Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service 

DoD Family Housing and Family Housing 

F 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval 

Center), Charleston, South Carolina ......... 1-55 

Supply Center), Oakland, California ....... . l-56 

Supply Center), Pensacola, Florida .......... .1-57 

Fort Belvoir, Virginia ........................................ 1-9 

Fort George B. McClellan, Alabama ................... 1 - 1 

Fort Monmouth, New Jersey ............................ 1-3 

G 

Gentile Air Force Station, Dayton, Ohio .......... 1-81 

Griffiss Air Force Base, New York .................... 1-71 

H 

Homestead Air Force Base, Florida .................. 1-77 

Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station 

Treasure Island, San Francisco, California .. 1-67 

K 

L 

M 

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida . March Air Force Base, California ........ 

Marine Corps hr Station, El Toro, California.. .l-17 

Marine Corps Loptics Base 

Barstow, California. 

Mather Air Force Base, Cali 

McGuire Air Force Base, N 

K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, Michigan 

Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania ...... 

Mare Island Naval Shipyard, California ............ 1- 16 

Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, California ... . l-68 

N 

National Capital Regional (NCR) Activities ..... . l-58 

Naval Air Facility, Detroit, Michigan 

Naval Air Facility, Martinsburg, Wes 

Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam.. .... 

Naval Air Station, Alameda, Califo 

Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, 

Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, F1 

Naval Air Facility, Midway Island ........ 
Index 

Naval Air Station, Dallas, Texas 1-26 

Naval Air Station, Glenview, Illinois ............... . l-27 

Naval Air Station, Memphis, Tennessee ........... 1-22 

Naval Air Station, Meridian, Mississippi ........... 1-23 

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth 

Massachusetts ..... .... 1-28 

Naval Air Technical Se 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania ...................... 1-44 

Naval Air Warfare Center-Aircraft Division 

Trenton, New Jersey.. ............................. . l-43 

Naval Aviation Depot 

Naval Aviation Depot, Norfolk, Virgnia .. .l-7, 1-40 

Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, Florida ......... 1-41 

Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory 

Port Hueneme, California ........................ 1-45 

Naval Education and Training Center 

Newport, Rhode Island ........................... 1-30 

Naval Electronic Centers, Charleston 

South Carolina ....................................... .1-46 

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center 

(NESEC), San Diego, California and 

NESEC Vallejo, California ....................... 1-68 

Western Engineering Field Division 

San Bruno, California . 

Naval Hospital, Charleston, 

Naval Hospital, Oakland, California 

Naval Hospital, Orlando, F1 

Naval Reserve Center at Chicopee Massachusetts 

and Quincy, Massachusetts ...................... 1-64 

Naval Station, Charleston, South Carolina ...... .l-30 

Naval Station, Mobile, Alabama ...................... 1-32 

Naval Station, Staten Island, New York 

Naval Station, Treasure Island, Californ 

Naval Submarine Base 

Naval Surface Warfare CenterNaval Surface Warfare CenterAlameda, California ......... .......... 1-7, 1-39 

Naval Facilities Engineering Command 

New London, Connecticut ...... ...... 1-33 

Pt. Hueneme, Virginia ............................. 1-69 

Carderock, Annapolis Detachment 

Annapolis, Maryland ............................... 1-50 

Dahlgren, White Oak Detachment 

White Oak, Maryland .............................. 1-49 

Port Hueneme, Virginia Beach Detachment, 

Naval Training Center Orlando, Florida ......... . l-37 

Naval Training Center San Diego, California ... . l-38 

Virgnia Beach, Virginia ........ 1-51 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center- i 

Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, California 

Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center at 

Navy Public Works Center 

Navy Radio Transmission Facility 

Navy Radio Transmission Facility 

Navy Weapons Evaluation Facility 

Norfolk Detachment, Norfolk, Virgnia ..... 1-52 

Lawrence, Massachusetts ..... 1-64 

San Francisco, California ......................... 1-62 

Annapolis, Maryland ............................... 1-48 

Driver, Virgnia ....................................... 1-49 

Albuquerque, New Mexico ...................... 1-70 

Navyhlarine Corps Reserve Centers.. .... 

0 

Newark Air Force Base, Ohio ................ 

Ogden Air Logstics Center, Hill AFB, Utah 

OHare International Airport Ar Force 

P 

Reserve Station, Illinois .............. 1-79 

Planning, Engneering for Repair and 

Alteration Centers (PERA) ....................... 1-53 

Plattsburgh Air Force Base, New York 1-76 

Presidio of MontereyRresidio of \ Monterey Annex, California . . 1-10 

Presidio of San Francisco, California ................ 1-12 

Pueblo Army Depot, Colorado ..... 1-100 

R 

Rckenbacker Air National Guard Base, Ohio .. . l-88 

Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois ............................ 1- 13 

S 

Sea Automated Data Systems Activity 

Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, 

Planning and Procurement 

Portsmouth, New Hampshire .................. 1-54 

Red River Army Depot, Texas ........................... 1-7 

Indian Head, Maryland 1-54 

T 

Tobyhanna Army Depot, a .............. 1-7 

Tooele Army Depot, Uta 1-7 

V 

Vint Hill Farms, Virgnia . . 1-4