UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 22-cv-21685-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

PRIMERICA LIFE INSURANCE 

COMPANY,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

XAVIER JOHNSON, et al., 

Defendant. 

________________________________/ 

ORDER GRANTING CROSS-CLAIMANT’S RULE 60(B) MOTION

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the Motion to Re-Open Case and Seek Relief from 

Stay, ECF No. [23] (“Motion”), filed by Cross-Claimant Arnold Lloyd. The Court has carefully 

reviewed the Motion, the record in this case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted. 

I. BACKGROUND

This interpleader action was brought by Primerica Life Insurance Company (“Primerica”) 

for a judicial determination as to the proper recipient of the proceeds from an insurance policy that 

covered the life of Andreae Lloyd. See generally ECF No. [1]. On or about December 8, 2021, 

Ms. Lloyd was found deceased by stab wounds. Id. ¶ 10. Xavier Johnson, the primary beneficiary 

on Ms. Lloyd’s policy, awaits trial for her murder in Miami-Dade County. Id. ¶¶ 8, 12. Ms. Lloyd’s 

father, Arnold Lloyd, is the contingent beneficiary on Ms. Lloyd’s life insurance policy. Id. ¶ 8. 

Primerica properly served Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Johnson with its Complaint for Interpleader. See 

ECF Nos. [5], [6]. 

On July 5, 2022, Mr. Lloyd filed an Answer to Primerica’s Complaint and a Crossclaim

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against Mr. Johnson, asserting that Mr. Johnson’s killing of Ms. Lloyd precludes him from 

receiving her life insurance proceeds under Fla. Stat. § 732.802. ECF No. [11]. As the contingent 

beneficiary, Mr. Lloyd asserts that he is entitled to the insurance proceeds. Id. ¶ 44.

Mr. Johnson, who is currently awaiting trial for Ms. Lloyd’s murder in State Court, has not 

made an appearance in this case. On July 18, 2022, the Clerk entered a default against him. ECF 

No. [16]. On July 26, 2022, the Court issued an Order on Default Judgment Procedure, in which 

the Court warned Mr. Johnson that failure to move to set aside the Clerk’s default will result in a 

default final judgment against him. ECF No. [17] at 2.

Following the Clerk’s entry of default against Mr. Johnson, Mr. Lloyd filed a Supplement 

to his Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. [18], arguing that Mr. Johnson’s default provided 

an additional reason for the Court to enter judgment in Mr. Lloyd’s favor.

On August 11, 2022, the Court entered its Order Staying Case. ECF No. [22]. The Court 

agreed with Mr. Lloyd that, “[n]ormally, the effect of the Clerk’s entry of a default against a 

defendant is that the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations are deemed to be admitted.” Id. 

(quoting Tyco Fire & Sec., LLC v. Alcocer, 218 F. App’x 860, 863 (11th Cir. 2007)). However, 

“due to the ongoing criminal proceeding against Xavier Johnson,” and the possibility that he could 

not have “meaningfully answered Primerica’s Complaint without compromising his Fifth 

Amendment rights,” the Court decided to stay this case pending the outcome of the criminal 

proceeding against Mr. Johnson. ECF No. [22] at 3.

In the instant motion, Mr. Lloyd seeks reconsideration of the Court’s decision to stay this

case. See generally ECF No. [23]. 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for reconsideration is “an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly.” 

Burger King Corp. v. Ashland Equities, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2002). “The 

burden is upon the movant to establish the extraordinary circumstances supporting 

reconsideration.” Saint Croix Club of Naples, Inc. v. QBE Ins. Corp., No. 2:07-cv-00468-JLQ, 

2009 WL 10670066, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 15, 2009).

A motion for reconsideration must clearly “set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing 

nature to demonstrate to the Court the reason to reverse its prior decision.” Am. Ass’n of People 

with Disabilities v. Hood, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1339, 1340 (M.D. Fla. 2003). As such, a court 

will not reconsider its prior ruling without a showing of “clear and obvious error where the 

‘interests of justice’ demand correction.” Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, Inc., No. 

6:11-cv-1637, 2013 WL 425827, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2013) (quoting Am. Home Assurance 

Co. v. Glenn Estess & Assoc., 763 F.2d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir. 1985)). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Rule 60(b) Reconsideration

In his Motion, Mr. Lloyd has successfully “set forth . . . law of a strongly convincing nature 

to demonstrate to the Court” that reconsideration is necessary. Am. Ass’n of People with 

Disabilities, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 1339. Specifically, he has demonstrated that the potential Fifth 

Amendment issue in this case is not an adequate basis for the Court to issue a stay. See ECF No. 

[23] at 4.

In its prior Order, the Court concluded that Johnson’s pending trial for Ms. Lloyd’s murder 

constitutes a special circumstance that requires a stay in the interests of justice. In general, default 

judgments “are seen with disfavor because of the strong policy of determining cases on their 

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Case No. 22-cv-21685-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

merits.” Florida Physician’s Ins. Co., Inc. v. Ehlers, 8 F.3d 780, 783 (11th Cir. 1993). Given the 

Fifth Amendment implications of the present case, and the fact that the outcome of the criminal 

proceeding against Johnson could conclusively determine the proper recipient of the insurance 

proceeds, the Court concluded that the interest of justice favored a stay of this case rather than a

final default judgment. ECF No. [22] at 3. 

However, as Mr. Lloyd correctly points out, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “the blanket 

assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination is an inadequate basis for the issuance of a 

stay.” S.E.C. v. Wright, 261 F. App’x 259, 263 (11th Cir. 2008).

The Court finds persuasive the decision of American General Life Insurance Company v. 

Jones. No. 08-0211-WS-B, 2008 WL 4949847 (S.D. Ala, Nov. 13, 2008). That case dealt with 

circumstances similar to those presented here. In an interpleader action for life insurance proceeds, 

the primary beneficiary was accused of killing the insured. Id. at *1. Alabama law, like Florida’s

law, prohibits a potential beneficiary from receiving life insurance proceeds if the beneficiary 

unlawfully caused the insured’s death. Id. In Jones, the primary beneficiary moved to stay the civil 

proceedings pending resolution of her criminal case, to safeguard her Fifth Amendment privilege 

against self-incrimination. Id. at *4. Relying on Eleventh Circuit law, the Jones court reasoned that 

the “Fifth Amendment concerns, taken in isolation, do not compel a stay[.]” Id. at *5. Rather, the 

court considered the Fifth Amendment implication as one reason among three that, in combination, 

warranted a stay. Id. The other reasons were “the interests of efficiency and judicial economy,”

i.e., the possibility of avoiding a civil trial as to the cause of the insured’s death, and the opposing 

party’s consent to the stay. Id.

Here, the additional reasons for a stay noted by the Jones court are not present. “[T]he 

interests of efficiency and judicial economy” do not favor a stay in this case because Mr. Johnson 

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has defaulted, and the Court will not need to hold a trial to determine the cause of Ms. Lloyd’s 

death. See infra Part B. And unlike Jones, the opposing claimant here opposes a stay.

Staying this case based solely on the potential Fifth Amendment implications that Mr. 

Johnson could face is not appropriate. The Court therefore reopens the case and reconsiders Mr. 

Lloyd’s Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. [20], which it construes as a 

Motion for Final Default Judgment. See Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1331 (11th Cir. 

2014) (holding that a “so-called ‘motion for judgment on the pleadings’” was in fact a “motion for 

an entry of default judgment”); Columbus Life Ins. Co v. Allen, No. 13-cv-1612, 2015 WL 

12696200, at *1 (S.D. Fla., Apr. 23, 2015) (“While Ms. Allen has styled her Motion as a Motion 

for Summary Judgment, it is actually a motion for default judgment.”). 

B. Final Default Judgment

Although interpleader actions normally involve two or more claimants to a fund, “defaults 

d[o] not make the interpleader action inappropriate but merely expedite[] its conclusion by 

obviating the normal second stage” of determining which party is entitled to the fund. New York 

Life Ins. Co. v. Connecticut Dev. Auth., 700 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1983). “Clearly, if all but one 

named interpleader defendants defaulted, the remaining defendant would be entitled to the fund.” 

Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Eason, 736 F.2d 130, 133 n.4 (4th Cir. 1984); see also State Farm 

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wagnon, 959 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1992) (“A default judgment entered against 

a claimant in an interpleader action terminates that party’s interest in the fund at issue.”); Metro. 

Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, No. 18-cv-81402-BLOOM, 2019 WL 917430, at *2 (S.D. Fla., Feb. 25, 

2019) (“[B]y failing to answer or otherwise defend its stake in the interpleader claim, [a defendant] 

forfeits any claim of entitlement that [he] might have asserted.”); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McDowell,

No. 18-cv-20618-RNS, ECF No. [50] at 3 (S.D. Fla., Jan. 9, 2019) (“In an interpleader action in 

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Case No. 22-cv-21685-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

which all but one named interpleader defendants has defaulted, the remaining defendant is entitled 

to the res.”) (quotation marks omitted).

Here, Primerica’s interpleader Complaint sets forth the adverse claims of Mr. Lloyd and 

Mr. Johnson to Ms. Lloyd’s life insurance proceeds. See ECF No. [1] ¶¶ 8, 10, 12, 14, 15; see also 

State v. Johnson, Case No. F-21-021165 (11th Jud. Cir. Fla.).1 Mr. Lloyd has answered the 

Complaint and set forth his claim to the proceeds based on Fla. Stat. § 732.802(3), which prohibits 

an insured’s killer from receiving the insured life insurance benefits. ECF No. [11]. Mr. Johnson 

has not made an appearance, despite having been properly served, ECF No. [5], and despite the 

Court’s warnings that failure to answer Primerica’s Complaint would result in a default judgment 

against him. See ECF Nos. [13], [17]. Due to his default, Mr. Johnson has forfeited his claim to 

the interpleaded funds. As the lone remaining and non-defaulting party, Mr. Lloyd “is entitled to 

the res.” Valley Forge Life Ins. Co. v. Rockmore, No. 7:07-cv-0063, 2008 WL 1805450, at *1 

(M.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 2008).

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Mr. Lloyd’s Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No. [23], is GRANTED.

2. This case is REOPENED.

3. Mr. Lloyd’s Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. [18], is construed 

as a Motion for Final Default Judgment and it is GRANTED.

4. Mr. Lloyd is entitled to the net proceeds of Andrea Lloyd’s life insurance policy, which 

Primerica paid into the Registry of the Court. See ECF Nos. [24], [25].

1 The Court takes judicial notice of the docket and filings in Mr. Johnson’s criminal case, which were cited 

in the Complaint. ECF No. [1] ¶ 12; see also Universal Express, Inc. v. U.S. SEC, 177 F. App’x 52, 53 

(11th Cir. 2006) (courts may take judicial notice of public records, such as a complaint filed in another 

court).

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Case No. 22-cv-21685-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

5. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to disburse the interpleaded funds – $157,413.20 –

plus any accused interest, to Mr. Lloyd’s counsel.

6. Final judgment will be entered upon disbursement of the interpleaded funds. 

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on September 2, 2022.

_________________________________

BETH BLOOM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to: 

Counsel of Record

Xavier Johnson

Jail Number 210160724

c/o Turner Guilford Knight Correctional Center

7000 Northwest 41st Street

Miami, FL 33166

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