United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

March 1997 FORCE STRUCTURE

Potential Exists to

Further Reduce Active

Air Force Personnel

GAO/NSIAD-97-78

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-272601 

March 28, 1997

The Honorable Dirk Kempthorne

Chairman, Subcommittee on Personnel

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Stephen Buyer

Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

This report discusses (1) how the size and composition of the active Air Force has changed

since 1986, (2) whether the Air Force has sufficient numbers of personnel to meet wartime

requirements, and (3) whether there is potential to further reduce the active force that could

result in a more efficient force. Because of your expressed interest and oversight of military

personnel issues, we are addressing this report to you. This report should be useful to your

Committees in their deliberations on the future size and composition of the Air Force. The

report contains a recommendation to the Secretary of the Air Force.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and the Air Force and the

Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on

request.

If you or your staff have any questions on this report, please call me on (202) 512-3504. Major

contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis
Executive Summary

Purpose In 1996, Congress established minimum active duty personnel levels for

each service out of concern that further downsizing would impair the

Department of Defense’s (DOD) ability to support two nearly simultaneous

major regional conflicts (MRC). The Air Force floor is 381,000 active duty

personnel. Since the end of the Cold War, the Air Force has drawn down

its active military forces significantly and plans to reduce the forces to

381,100 during fiscal year 1997. Because of congressional concerns about

active duty personnel levels, GAO analyzed (1) how the size and

composition of the active Air Force has changed since 1986, (2) whether

the Air Force has any shortfalls in meeting its wartime requirements, and

(3) whether there is potential to further reduce the active force. GAO did

not examine the need for the number of fighter wings, bombers, and

intercontinental missiles identified by DOD in its 1993 Bottom-Up Review of

military requirements.

Background The active Air Force is divided between mission and infrastructure forces.

For each of the services, DOD’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review established the

mission force structure needed to conduct two nearly simultaneous MRCs

and implement other elements of the national military strategy. The Air

Force’s planned active mission force will consist of 13 fighter wings, 161

bombers, 500 intercontinental missiles, and the forces that provide direct

combat support in wartime. Mission forces are divided into the following

categories: combat forces; direct support forces; command, control, and

communications of combat forces; intelligence; and space. The

infrastructure force comprises activities that provide support services and

primarily operate from fixed locations. Infrastructure is divided into eight

categories: acquisition management, force management, installation

support, central communications, central logistics, central medical, central

personnel, and central training.

In fiscal year 1996, active Air Force military pay was projected to be

$19.3 billion— $7.3 billion for mission forces and $12.0 billion for

infrastructure forces. The Secretary of Defense has stated that DOD must

significantly reduce its infrastructure in order to modernize its force. In

April 1996, GAO reported that operations and maintenance and the military

personnel appropriations must be reduced if spending for infrastructure

activities is to decline, since they account for 80 percent of infrastructure

funding.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Executive Summary

Results in Brief Between fiscal year 1986 and 1997, the Air Force will reduce its active

military personnel from over 600,000 to 381,100, or by 37 percent. Mission

forces have been reduced at a much greater rate than infrastructure forces

during the last decade. As a result, approximately two-thirds of the Air

Force’s 381,100 active duty personnel are now allocated to infrastructure

functions such as installation support and acquisition. Further, today’s

smaller force has a higher ratio of officers than in 1986.

Potential exists to reduce the active Air Force below the 381,100 minimum

level set by Congress, without adversely affecting the Air Force’s

war-fighting capability. In May 1996, GAO suggested options to consolidate

fighter squadrons which, if implemented, would permit the Air Force to

maintain the same number of aircraft but carry out its missions with fewer

active duty personnel. GAO has also reported that the Air Force could

achieve savings by replacing military personnel in some administrative and

support positions with civilian employees. For fiscal year 1998, the Air

Force plans to seek statutory authority to reduce the active force by about

9,400 below the current minimum. GAO’s analysis shows the majority of

these planned decreases are in infrastructure functions.

Prompted by the Secretary of Defense’s goal to reduce infrastructure to

free funds for force modernization, the Air Force has recently identified a

potential to reduce the active force by as many as 75,000 additional

military personnel beyond fiscal year 1998. The Air Force is reviewing

options for replacing military personnel assigned to infrastructure

functions with civilian employees or contractors that may be able to

perform some functions at less cost than military personnel. The actual

number of active personnel that will ultimately be replaced will depend on

the results of continuing Air Force analysis to determine whether such

substitutions will be organizationally feasible and cost-effective.

The Air Force projects it would have an active wartime shortage of about

19,600 personnel if two MRCs occurred. However, the Air Force does not

need additional active personnel to cover this wartime shortage because it

has identified ways to compensate for the shortage, such as using the

individual ready reserve1

 and hiring private contractors. Moreover, this

shortage would present little risk in carrying out the national military

strategy since it primarily affects forces that would provide operating

support for bases in the United States rather than in the forces that would

deploy to war. GAO agreed that the Air Force’s plans to further reduce

1

The individual ready reserve is a pool of individuals who have already served in active units or the

reserves and have some part of their military service obligation remaining.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Executive Summary

active military personnel would not exacerbate these shortages since the

Air Force plans to replace military personnel with contractors or civilian

employees that support infrastructure activities rather than wartime

operations.

Principal Findings

Mission Forces Were

Reduced at a Greater Rate

Than Infrastructure Forces

Between Fiscal Year 1986

and 1997

Between fiscal year 1986 and 1997, the active Air Force will have

decreased from 608,199 to 381,100, or by 37 percent. GAO’s analysis shows

that mission forces decreased by 122,068, or 47 percent, and infrastructure

forces by 105,031, or 30 percent, as shown in figure 1.

Figure 1: Changes in Active Air Force End Strength

86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

300,000

350,000

400,000

Fiscal year

Number of personnel

Mission Infrastructure

Source: DOD’s Fiscal Year 1997 Future Years Defense Program.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Executive Summary

The Air Force decreased the mission forces primarily by reducing fighter

wings, bombers, and strategic missile forces to the levels specified in the

Bottom-Up Review. Decreases in installation support and central training

accounted for 89 percent of the infrastructure reductions. Despite

significant decreases in installation support, the Air Force still has almost

58,000 military positions in this category. Five other infrastructure

categories—acquisition management, force management, central

communications, central medical, and central personnel experienced

decreases in military personnel ranging from 6 to 44 percent. Central

logistics is the only category that had a net increase of personnel. The

increase occurred primarily because military personnel associated with

the strategic airlift mission were reclassified from mission forces to

central logistics in 1992.

GAO’s analysis shows that officer and enlisted positions in mission forces

were reduced proportionately, but a higher percentage of enlisted

positions were eliminated from the infrastructure category. One reason

this occurred is that the central medical function, which has a high

number of officers and has experienced little change over the past decade,

is classified as infrastructure. The number of medical positions has

remained relatively stable at about 40,000 over the past 10 years.

Wartime Personnel

Shortfalls Identified by the

Air Force Pose Little Risk

to Implementing the

National Military Strategy

The Air Force assesses its ability to satisfy its total wartime personnel

requirements through an exercise called “FORSIZE”.2

 FORSIZE

determines the forces needed to deploy to each MRC, the forces needed for

strategic missions such as airlift and space, and those needed to sustain

base operations in the United States during wartime. Military personnel

requirements determined by FORSIZE include personnel needed to

replace casualties expected to occur during two MRCs. The number of

casualty replacements used in FORSIZE is classified. FORSIZE 95 showed

the Air Force has an active shortage of about 19,600, or 5 percent, of its

wartime requirements.

Air Force officials believe this shortage would not have a serious impact

on their ability to implement the national military strategy since only a

small percentage of the shortage is in the forces that deploy and the

majority of the functional areas plan to use the individual ready reserve,

contractors, and new technologies to offset the shortages. For example,

security police had the largest shortage of 6,903, all of which represents a

2

Requirements for medical personnel were not included because DOD is currently conducting a study

of the services’ wartime medical requirements.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Executive Summary

shortage that would occur when security police who guard bases in

peacetime deploy for wartime operations. Security personnel said they

could work around the shortage by increasing workshifts, closing gates at

some bases, and taking advantage of new sensor technology. Likewise,

transportation had an overall shortage of 3,536, but most of it is in

operating and maintaining transportation at bases in the United States.

FORSIZE does not assess whether Air Force personnel are adequate to

meet the requirements for operations other than war because defense

guidance assumes the forces determined to meet the requirements of two

MRCs can also satisfy the needs of contingency operations. Air Force data

shows that during fiscal years 1995 and 1996, certain types of units that

have been frequently involved in operations other than war exceeded the

Air Force goal of being deployed no more than 120 days per year.

However, a July 1996 Air Force study concluded that the Air Force does

not need to add more units of these types due to contingency operations,

but it must closely manage units that deploy frequently to prevent

excessive use. The Air Force has taken several steps in recent years to

reduce the impact of operations other than war on certain units. For

example, both the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard are now

supporting a greater share of contingency taskings.

Air Force Plans to Reduce

Active Duty Personnel

Below Congressional Floor

in Fiscal Year 1998

The Air Force plans to seek statutory authority to reduce active duty end

strength by about 9,500 to about 371,600 in fiscal year 1998. The National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 allows the Secretary of

Defense to decrease the services’ authorized end strength up to 1 percent

below the floors established by Congress. However, the Air Force’s

planned decrease exceeds this allowance. According to Air Force officials,

reducing the Air Force’s military end strength will not lessen the Air

Force’s war-fighting capability, since the planned decreases are primarily

in infrastructure functions. GAO’s analysis of the planned decreases

indicates that about 8,400 positions, or 88 percent, are in infrastructure

functions and about 1,100, or 12 percent, are in mission forces.

The net decrease in mission forces will occur primarily from the

drawdown of intercontinental ballistic missiles under the first Strategic

Arms Reduction Treaty, and the Air Force’s plans to retire the EF-111

electronic support aircraft in fiscal year 1998. However, the Air Force is

concerned that the Navy may not assume the electronics warfare mission

within the planned time frame, which could delay these planned

reductions.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Executive Summary

The decrease in infrastructure forces includes contracting out or

civilianizing about 2,500 military positions involved in installation support

and communications activities. According to Air Force officials, these

positions do not need to be military because they do not deploy and are

not needed to support overseas rotation needs. The Air Force also plans to

start reducing the number of medical positions to adjust the size of the

medical force to post-Cold War wartime medical requirements. Other

efforts to reduce infrastructure include reducing the number of military

positions in headquarters operations and support activities, such as the

weather service.

Potential Exists to Reduce

Military Personnel Further

Below the Level Planned

for Fiscal Year 1998

The Air Force has not routinely assessed whether all positions need to

remain military. However, three separate initiatives have identified the

potential to replace as many as 75,000 military personnel with less costly

civilian employees or contractors. By reducing its reliance on military

personnel, the Air Force plans to achieve savings that can be used to fund

force modernization.

For example, an ongoing Air Force headquarters-led study has identified

approximately 52,600 active military positions—3,000 officer and 49,600

enlisted—that potentially could be replaced by either contractors or

civilian employees. The study includes all military positions in commercial

activities within the major commands in the United States and selected

overseas locations. A commercial activity can be an entire organization or

part of an organization that provides a product or service obtainable from

a commercial source. To determine the potential for transferring functions

to contractors or civilian employees, the Air Force determined the

universe of personnel in commercial activities and excluded those who are

required to deploy during wartime and those assigned to military-unique

functions, such as headquarters activities and basic military training. The

major commands are currently identifying the positions by base and work

center, and determining which work centers represent good candidates for

formal cost-comparison studies to determine the relative cost savings

associated with using either contractors or civilian employees where

military are no longer essential to their mission. Until this analysis is

completed and approved by Air Force headquarters, the long range plans

for reducing active duty personnel are uncertain.

Another ongoing Air Force study has identified approximately 21,600

military positions in inherently governmental functions that potentially

could be filled by civilian employees. Some functions such as acquisition

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Executive Summary

and contracting are considered inherently governmental and therefore

must be performed by federal employees, but not necessarily by military

personnel. In October 1996, GAO reported the Air Force could convert 6,800

officer positions in career fields such as information and financial

management to civilian positions because it is not essential that they be

filled by military personnel.3

 Such conversions could save $69 million

annually because civilian employees cost less than military personnel on

average. DOD has agreed to develop an approach for making such

conversions. The Secretary of the Air Force stated, however, that

converting military positions to civilian positions runs counter to DOD’s

goal of reducing its civilian workforce and that DOD needs to allow the

services some flexibility to make the most cost-effective use of its

resources.

Other GAO work has identified opportunities to organize mission forces

more efficiently. For example, increasing the size of fighter squadrons

from 18 to 24 aircraft could permit missions to be carried out with fewer

personnel at less cost. Transferring some functions from the active force

to the reserves may also be possible. For example, in September 1996, GAO

reported that one option for restructuring the bomber force would be to

place greater numbers of B-1B bombers in the Air National Guard.4

 The Air

Force is also assessing options to transfer some functions to the reserves.

Recommendation DOD has stated it must reduce infrastructure costs in order to modernize its

force. Several ongoing Air Force studies have identified potential to

replace military personnel with contractors or civilian employees.

Therefore, GAO recommends that, once the ongoing efforts are completed,

the Secretary of the Air Force develop a plan that

• identifies time frames to study whether it is more cost-effective to transfer

commercial activities now performed by military personnel to civilian

employees or private contractors and

• includes time frames to convert military positions in inherently

governmental functions to civilian positions.

3

DOD Force Mix Issues: Converting Some Support Officer Positions to Civilian Status Could Save

Money (GAO/NSIAD-97-15, Oct. 23, 1996).

4

Air Force Bombers: Options to Retire or Restructure the Force Would Reduce Planned Spending

(GAO/NSIAD-96-192, Sept. 30, 1996).

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Executive Summary

Agency Comments DOD generally agreed with the report, fully concurring with two parts of

GAO’s recommendation, and partially concurring with one part. DOD stated

that an existing system already tracks the services’ progress in completing

cost comparison studies and converting positions, so there is no need to

establish an additional system. GAO agreed with DOD and has modified the

recommendation accordingly. DOD also stated that while FORSIZE

identified an active shortage of 19,600 personnel, this shortage can be

satisfied through a variety of sources, including civilians, contractors, and

Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve personnel. GAO agreed with

DOD’s position. GAO’s report reflects that the Air Force has identified

several ways to compensate for these wartime shortages. The Air Force

also provided technical comments on GAO’s draft report, which GAO

considered in preparing the final report. DOD’s comments on a draft of this

report are reprinted in appendix II.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

12

Congressional Actions to Stem Drawdown of Active Duty

Personnel

12

Active Duty Force Consists of Mission and Infrastructure Forces 13

Air Force Processes for Determining Personnel Requirements 14

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 16

Chapter 2 

Mission Forces Are

Being Reduced at a

Faster Rate Than

Infrastructure Forces

18

Mission Forces Will Decrease by Almost Half Between Fiscal

Year 1986 and 1997

18

Infrastructure Forces Are Decreasing at a Slower Rate Than

Mission Forces

20

Officers Now Represent a Larger Portion of the Force 22

Chapter 3 

Military Personnel

Shortages Pose Little

Risk to Implementing

the National Military

Strategy

24

Wartime Personnel Requirements Established by FORSIZE 24

Air Force Wartime Personnel Shortages Pose Little Risk 26

Impact of OOTW on Air Force Personnel Requirements 29

Agency Comments 31

Chapter 4 

Opportunities Exist to

Reduce the Number of

Active Duty Air Force

Personnel

32

Air Force Plans to Reduce Active Duty Personnel Below

Congressional Floor in Fiscal Year 1998

32

Ongoing Air Force Studies Have Identified Potential to Further

Reduce Active Personnel

35

Consolidating Fighter Squadrons Would Reduce Military

Personnel

39

Other Efforts Could Impact Air Force Requirements for Active

Military Personnel

40

Conclusions 41

Recommendation 41

Agency Comments 42

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Contents

Appendixes Appendix I: Categories of Defense Infrastructure 44

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense 46

Appendix III: Major Contributors to This Report 48

Tables Table 1.1: Means Used to Determine Air Force Military Personnel

Authorizations

15

Table 2.1: Changes in Active Duty Personnel by Mission Category 18

Table 2.2: Comparison of Air Force Active Force Structure

Between Fiscal Year 1986 and 1997

19

Table 2.3: Changes in Active Duty Personnel By Infrastructure

Category

20

Table 2.4: Changes in Officer and Enlisted Personnel in Mission

and Infrastructure Forces Between Fiscal Year 1986 and 1997

22

Table 2.5: Positions In Joint Staff/Defense Agencies and Medical

Program as a Percent of Total Active Military Personnel Between

Fiscal Year 1986 and 1997

23

Table 3.1: Projected Active Personnel Wartime Shortages for

Fiscal Year 1997

27

Table 4.1: Comparison of Active Duty End Strength Between

Fiscal Year 1997 and 1998

33

Table 4.2: Military Positions in Commercial Activities That

Potentially Could Be Contracted Out or Filled by Civilian

Employees

36

Table 4.3: Military Positions by Functional Area That Potentially

Could Be Converted to Civilian Positions

38

Figures Figure 1: Changes in Active Air Force End Strength 4

Figure 1.1: Fiscal Year 1996 Funding for Air Force Infrastructure

Activities

14

Figure 3.1: Breakdown of Active Wartime Personnel

Requirements as Determined by FORSIZE 95

26

Figure 3.2: Days on Temporary Duty for Selected Air Combat

Command Units for Fiscal Years 1995 and 1996

30

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

FYDP Future Years Defense Program

GAO General Accounting Office

MRC Major Regional Conflict

OOTW Operations Other Than War

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 1 

Introduction

On the basis on its 1993 Bottom-Up Review, the Department of Defense

(DOD) adopted a strategy of maintaining the capability to fight and win two

nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC), conduct smaller scale

operations such as peacekeeping, and provide overseas presence in

critical regions. The Bottom-Up Review determined that the Air Force

would have 20 fighter wings (13 active and 7 reserve), up to 187 bombers1

(161 active and 26 reserve), and 500 intercontinental ballistic missiles to

implement the strategy. The Bottom-Up Review also concluded the Air

Force should maintain the capability to provide (1) airlift to transport

people and equipment during conflicts, (2) reconnaissance and command

and control aircraft to provide information on the location and disposition

of enemy forces, and (3) aerial refuelers to enhance mission effectiveness

by refueling aircraft during long-range missions. The review did not

specify the number of military personnel required to implement the

national military strategy. However, DOD subsequently determined that the

active components would consist of about 1.4 million active military

personnel, 381,000 of which would be Air Force personnel. By the end of

fiscal year 1997, the Air Force plans to have an active duty force of 381,100

personnel with an associated military pay of $16.8 billion.

Congressional Actions

to Stem Drawdown of

Active Duty Personnel

In 1996, Congress established minimum active duty personnel levels for

each military service as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 1996. The Air Force floor was set at 381,000. In creating the

floors, Congress sought to ensure that (1) the services had enough

personnel to carry out the national military strategy and (2) the drawdown

of active forces was over to avoid future recruiting and retention

problems. Finally, Congress believed that this level force would allow the

services to manage the effects of high operations and personnel tempo.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 retained the

floor, but allowed the Secretary of Defense the flexibility in certain

circumstances to decrease personnel by 1 percent of the floor. For the Air

Force, this means the number of active duty personnel cannot drop below

377,200. The legislation requires the services to obtain statutory authority

for decreases below the 1-percent threshold.

1

The Bottom-Up Review determined the Air Force would have 184 bombers, but DOD has

subsequently increased the number to 187.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Active Duty Force

Consists of Mission

and Infrastructure

Forces

Over the last several years, DOD has categorized its planned forces and

funding as either mission or infrastructure. Air Force mission forces

consist of the fighter wings, bombers, and intercontinental missiles (as

defined in the Bottom-Up Review) and the forces that provide direct

combat support; intelligence; space support; and command, control and

communications in wartime. Activities that provide support to the mission

forces and primarily operate from fixed locations are classified as

infrastructure forces. Infrastructure is divided into the following eight

categories: acquisition management, force management, installation

support, central communications, central logistics, central medical, central

personnel, and central training. These categories are described in

appendix I. Approximately 140,000, or 36 percent, of the active Air Force

personnel are currently categorized as mission forces and 241,000, or

64 percent, are in infrastructure activities.

The Secretary of Defense wants to reduce and streamline infrastructure to

achieve savings to modernize the force. In April 1996, we reported that

operations and maintenance and the military personnel appropriations

must be reduced if spending for infrastructure activities is to decline, since

they account for 80 percent of infrastructure funding.2

 In fiscal year 1996,

the Air Force spent about $28 billion of its $73 billion total budget on

infrastructure activities. As shown in figure 1.1, about 83 percent of the Air

Force’s direct infrastructure costs are funded by two

appropriations—military personnel and operations and maintenance.

2

Defense Infrastructure: Budget Estimates for 1996-2001 Offer Little Savings for Modernization

(GAO/NSIAD-96-131, Apr. 4, 1996).

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Figure 1.1: Fiscal Year 1996 Funding for Air Force Infrastructure Activities

Dollars in billions

Military personnel

Operations & maintenance

RDT&E

Family housing

Procurement

Military construction

$12

$11.2

$2.5

$1.1

$0.7

$0.6

(43%)

(40%)

(9%)

(4%)

(2%)

(2%)

a

aResearch, development, test, and evaluation.

Source: Fiscal Year 1997 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

One of the Air Force’s major initiatives to generate savings for weapons

modernization is to study the potential to contract out infrastructure

functions. In deciding whether a function can be transferred to

contractors, the Air Force compares the relative cost of using civilian

employees and private contractors to perform the same function. DOD data

on cost comparisons completed between fiscal year 1978 and 1994

indicates that shifting work to contractors has reduced annual operating

cost on average by 31 percent. Our initial work on another assignment

indicates that such savings may not be as high as estimated by DOD, but

that some savings do result.

Air Force Processes

for Determining

Personnel

Requirements

The Air Force uses a variety of methods to determine personnel

requirements. These processes identify requirements as a function of

workload or level of service based on assigned missions. The various

methods include Air Force staffing standards for positions common

throughout the Air Force such as security police; command staffing

standards for functions unique to a particular command such as pilot

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 1 

Introduction

training; a computer-generated model for aircraft maintenance positions;

and crew ratios for each type of aircraft in the inventory. The Air Force

does not have total control over the allocation of its personnel. For

example, legislation and DOD directives establish ceilings on headquarters

positions and mandate the number of positions that the Air Force must fill

on the joint staff, and in unified commands and defense agencies. Table 1.1

shows the processes the Air Force uses to develop the number of active

military positions required and the number of positions mandated by the

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and legislation.

Table 1.1: Means Used to Determine

Air Force Military Personnel

Authorizations

Category Positions Percent

Air Force standardsa 152,831 43

Command standardsb 69,171 20

Logistics composite model 36,895 10

Headquarters 26,650 8

Staffing patternc 22,773 6

Crew ratiosd 13,755 4

Joint Staffs, defense and other federal agencies 16,837 5

Other processes 14,387 4

Totale 353,299 100

aIncludes positions covered by approved variances to Air Force standards, Air Force standards

awaiting approval and being revalidated, and Air Force directed requirements at wing level or

below.

bIncludes positions covered by approved variances to major command standards, major

command standards awaiting approval and major command directed requirements at wing level

or below.

cPositions primarily in the Systems Program Offices where personnel requirements vary

depending on system development and production.

dNumber of crews authorized per aircraft, missile and space system.

eStudents, patients, prisoners, and personnel transferring between assignments account for the

difference between this total and the total number of authorized active military positions.

Source: Air Force data.

Mandated Personnel

Requirements

The requirements for some military positions are determined either by

directives or legislation rather than by the Air Force. For example, the

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 restricts the

Secretary of Defense from reducing military medical personnel unless DOD

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 1 

Introduction

certifies that the number of people being reduced is excess to current and

projected needs and does not increase the cost of services provided under

the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services. Also,

the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 gave the

Secretary of Defense the authority to determine the number of joint officer

positions. An April 1981 memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of

Defense states that DOD cannot increase or decrease resources that

support the National Foreign Intelligence Program without approval from

the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Likewise, a

December 1989 memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense

stated that the number of military positions within the Special Operations

Command will not be adjusted unless directed by the Deputy Secretary of

Defense.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

Because of congressional concerns about active duty personnel levels, we

assessed (1) how the size and composition of the active Air Force has

changed since 1986, (2) whether the Air Force has any shortages in

meeting its wartime requirements, and (3) whether there is potential to

reduce the active force further. We did not examine the need for the

number of fighter wings, bombers, and intercontinental missiles identified

by DOD’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review.

We interviewed officials and reviewed documents at OSD and Air Force

headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Air Combat Command, Norfolk, Virginia;

Air Force Materiel Command, Dayton, Ohio; and Air Education and

Training Command, San Antonio, Texas.

To determine how the size and composition of the active force has

changed, we analyzed data contained in the fiscal year 1997 FYDP and

historical FYDPs. The FYDP displays the allocation of resources by programs

and activities known as program elements. We used the mapping scheme

developed by DOD’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation to identify

mission and infrastructure program elements. We then compared the

changes in active personnel by mission and infrastructure categories

between fiscal year 1986 and 1997. We used fiscal year 1986 as a starting

point because it represented the peak in the number of active duty

personnel, preceding the post-Cold War drawdown. We obtained data on

the number of active military positions that are determined by legislation

or directives, but did not assess how the requirements for these positions

were determined.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 1 

Introduction

To determine if the Air Force has wartime personnel shortages, we

analyzed the results of the Air Force FORSIZE 95 exercise. To determine if

the shortages identified by FORSIZE affected the Air Force ability to carry

out the national military strategy, we interviewed Air Force headquarters

functional managers to determine whether the shortages were in the

forces that deploy to theaters of operation or in forces that sustain

operations at bases in the United States. We also discussed their plans to

resolve the shortages. Since FORSIZE did not analyze wartime

requirements for medical personnel, we obtained data on wartime

requirements from the Air Force Office of the Surgeon General.

To assess the potential to further reduce the active force, we analyzed the

military personnel reductions planned in fiscal year 1998. Our analysis was

based on the Air Force’s fiscal year 1998 Budget Estimate Submission

provided to OSD. In addition, we reviewed Air Force efforts to identify

opportunities to replace military personnel with contractor and civilian

personnel. Since these efforts have not been completed, our analysis was

limited to reviewing the methodology for identifying potential positions

and the plans for approving which positions will be studied or converted.

In addition, we used our prior work to identify opportunities to more

efficiently organize the active force.

We conducted our review from November 1995 through December 1996 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 2 

Mission Forces Are Being Reduced at a

Faster Rate Than Infrastructure Forces

Between fiscal year 1986 and 1997,1 the Air Force will reduce its active

military personnel from 608,199 to 381,100, or by 37 percent. During this

time, mission forces will be reduced at a much greater rate than

infrastructure forces—47 percent compared to 30 percent. The Air Force

reduced active military personnel primarily by (1) implementing the force

structure reductions in accordance with the Bottom-Up Review,

(2) closing bases, (3) transferring some missions to the reserves, and

(4) reorganizing major commands and headquarters activities. Our

analysis also indicated that the 1997 active duty Air Force will have a

higher percentage of officers compared with the percentage in 1986.

Mission Forces Will

Decrease by Almost

Half Between Fiscal

Year 1986 and 1997

Between fiscal year 1986 and 1997, the Air Force will reduce its mission

forces from approximately 262,000 to 140,000, or by 47 percent, as shown

in table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Changes in Active Duty

Personnel by Mission Category Fiscal year

Category 1986 1997 Change

Percentage

of change

Combat forces 112,096 61,119 (50,977) (45)

Direct combat support 102,149 46,200 (55,949) (55)

Command, control, and

communication

20,223 9,169 (11,054) (55)

Intelligence 17,976 18,752 776 4

Research, development, test,

and evaluation

5,637 84 ( 5,553) (99)

Space 3,095 3,892 797 26

Other defense missions 837 729 (108) (13)

Total 262,013 139,945 (122,068) (47)

Source: Our analysis of DOD’s FYDP data.

The decrease in combat forces primarily resulted from implementing the

Bottom-Up Review force structure, which significantly reduced the

1

The fiscal year 1986 total represents the actual number of active military personnel assigned at the

end of the fiscal year, whereas the fiscal year 1997 figure represents the authorized number of military

personnel.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 2 

Mission Forces Are Being Reduced at a

Faster Rate Than Infrastructure Forces

number of fighter wings, bombers, and intercontinental missiles. Table 2.2

compares the force structure between fiscal year 1986 and 1997.

Table 2.2: Comparison of Air Force

Active Force Structure Between Fiscal

Year 1986 and 1997

Fiscal year

Category 1986 1997 Change

Fighter wings 25 13 (12)

Bombers 315 126 (189)

Intercontinental missiles 1,009 580 (429)

The Air Force reduced the number of fighter wings by retiring the F-4 and

F-111 aircraft and transferring the F-15s required for the air defense of the

United States as well as some close air support aircraft (A-10s) to the

reserves. The Air Force reduced the bomber force by retiring the FB-111s

and many B-52’s. Finally, the Air Force reduced the missile force by

eliminating the Minuteman II intercontinental ballistic missiles and the

ground launched cruise missiles.

The decrease in direct combat support forces resulted primarily from

transferring some airlift and refueling missions to the reserves and retiring

some electronic warfare aircraft (RF-4Gs) and reconnaissance aircraft

(TR-1s). In addition, some of the decrease resulted when the strategic

airlift function was moved to the central logistics infrastructure category.

The number of military personnel in command, control, and

communications positions was reduced by abolishing the Air Force

Communications Command. In addition, the increase in technologies such

as automation and digital communications allowed the Air Force to assign

fewer people to operate and maintain needed capability.

The decrease in research, development, test, and evaluation primarily

resulted from a change in the way these personnel are categorized. Prior

to 1988, about 5,600 positions in acquisition and command support were

included in the mission forces under the research, development, test, and

evaluation activity. However, in 1988 the majority of these positions were

moved to the acquisition infrastructure category when the Air Force

merged two commands to form the Air Force Materiel Command.

The remaining two mission categories, intelligence and space, gained

personnel. While there were decreases in some intelligence functions such

as the retirement of the SR-71, they were offset by increases resulting from

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 2 

Mission Forces Are Being Reduced at a

Faster Rate Than Infrastructure Forces

the creation of the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office in 1994.2 The

increase in space forces resulted primarily because some activities that

were categorized as acquisition and direct support were transferred to

space.

Infrastructure Forces

Are Decreasing at a

Slower Rate Than

Mission Forces

Between fiscal year 1986 and 1997, the Air Force will reduce the number

of active personnel in infrastructure functions from approximately 346,000

to 241,000, or by 30 percent. Significant decreases occurred in all

infrastructure forces except acquisition, central medical, and central

logistics as shown in table 2.3.

Table 2.3: Changes in Active Duty

Personnel by Infrastructure Category Fiscal year

Category 1986 1997 Change

Percentage

of change

Acquisition management 10,196 9,569 (627) (6)

Force management 34,016 25,280 (8,736) (26)

Installation support 107,523 57,918 (49,605) (46)

Central communications 21,260 16,931 (4,329) (20)

Central logistics 12,315 25,174 12,859 104

Central medical 41,380 40,639 (741) (2)

Central personnel 21,762 12,283 (9,479) (44)

Central training 97,734 53,372 (44,362) (45)

Resource adjustmentsa (11)

Total 346,186 241,155 (105,031) (30)

aA means to account for the difference between programmed and actual personnel levels. A

negative value indicates that overstaffing is projected for the last day of the fiscal year.

Source: Our analysis of DOD’s FYDP data.

The greatest number of personnel decreases occurred in installation

support and central training activities. The decline in installation support

was caused primarily by the closure of 20 active air bases by the Secretary

of Defense’s Base Closure Commission in 1988 and the Base Closure and

Realignment Commission in 1991 and 1993. The Air Force also contracted

some base operations, which reduced the number of military personnel in

installation support.

2

The Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office was created to unify airborne reconnaissance

architectures and enhance the acquisition of manned and unmanned airborne assets and associated

ground systems.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 2 

Mission Forces Are Being Reduced at a

Faster Rate Than Infrastructure Forces

The decrease in central training was related primarily to the decreases in

mission force structure. For example, the decrease in the number of wings

and bombers resulted in about a 6,700 decline in the number of

undergraduate pilot and navigator training positions and about an 8,500

decrease in weapons systems training positions. Likewise, the decrease in

the number of strategic forces reduced training requirements by about

2,400 positions. The overall decrease in the number of active personnel

caused a decline of approximately 11,300 positions in general skill level

training and about 4,900 positions in recruit training units. Approximately

another 4,000 positions were eliminated from contracting for base

operations at training bases.

The primary reasons for the decreases in the other categories are

described as follows:

• Acquisition management—This category experienced a net decrease of

627 military positions. However, in 1988 the Air Force transferred about

5,600 positions from the mission research, development, test, and

evaluation category into acquisition. Since 1988, the number of military

personnel in the acquisition has declined by about 5,800.

• Force management—The decreases occurred in the weather service,

servicewide support, and from consolidation of various headquarters. For

example, the Strategic Air Command, the Tactical Air Command, and the

Military Airlift Command were combined to form the Air Combat

Command and the Air Mobility Command; the Air Force Systems

Command and the Air Force Logistics Command were combined to form

the Air Force Materiel Command.

• Central communications—Approximately 3,900 of the decrease occurred

because the smaller number of fighter wings and bombers required fewer

air traffic control personnel.

• Central medical—The number of personnel in central medical has not

decreased significantly. OSD and the services are currently assessing

post-Cold War medical requirements. OSD is currently updating a 1994

study that will provide new estimates of wartime medical demands.

However, the scheduled March 1996 completion has been delayed because

OSD and the services advocate using different assumptions and

methodologies for factors such as population-at-risk and casualty

replacements, which affect overall medical requirements.

• Central personnel—The decrease resulted primarily because the smaller

force has reduced the number of permanent change-of-station moves,

accessions, and training requirements, which has reduced the number of

people in transit.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 2 

Mission Forces Are Being Reduced at a

Faster Rate Than Infrastructure Forces

Central logistics is the only infrastructure category that had a net increase

of personnel. The increase resulted from a change in the way personnel

associated with strategic airlift are categorized. Prior to 1992, airlift

personnel were counted as direct support mission forces. However, they

were moved to the central logistics category in fiscal year 1992 when the

U.S. Transportation Command assumed responsibility for management of

air transportation in peacetime.

Officers Now

Represent a Larger

Portion of the Force

Between fiscal year 1986 and 1997, enlisted personnel will be reduced by

39 percent and officers by 32 percent. Our analysis shows a proportionate

decline in officer and enlisted personnel in mission forces, but a higher

percentage decrease of enlisted personnel in infrastructure activities as

shown in table 2.4.

Table 2.4: Changes in Officer and

Enlisted Personnel in Mission and

Infrastructure Forces Between Fiscal

Year 1986 and 1997

Mission forces Infrastructure forces

Officers Enlisted Officers Enlisted

FY86 42,283 219,730 66,765 274,936

FY97 21,517 118,428 52,928 188,227

Percent Change (49) (46) (21) (33)

Source: Our analysis of DOD’s FYDP data.

According to Air Force officials, one reason for the smaller percentage

decrease of officers versus enlisted personnel in infrastructure functions

can be attributed to the disproportionate reduction of enlisted in base

operations support where major decreases have occurred. Generally, there

has been one officer for every 10 enlisted positions in this category.

However, our analysis of this category showed that between fiscal year

1986 and 1997, the Air Force eliminated 46,349 enlisted and 3,256 officer

positions or 15 enlisted positions for every officer position eliminated.

Another reason for the smaller percentage decrease is that medical and

joint/DOD positions, which have a high number of officers, are classified as

infrastructure. As shown in table 2.5, the number of medical positions has

remained relatively stable and the number of joint positions has decreased

by 20 percent between fiscal year 1986 and 1997 while the active force as a

whole declined by 37 percent. As a result, these positions have increased

from 8 percent of the active force in fiscal year 1986 to 13 percent in fiscal

year 1997 as shown in table 2.5.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 2 

Mission Forces Are Being Reduced at a

Faster Rate Than Infrastructure Forces

Table 2.5: Positions in Joint

Staff/Defense Agencies and Medical

Program as a Percent of Total Active

Military Personnel Between Fiscal Year

1986 and 1997

Fiscal year

1986 1997

Joint/defense agencies 9,301 7,508

Medical 41,380 40,639

Total 50,681 48,147

Total active force 608,199 381,100

Percent joint, defense agencies, and medical of total active

force

8 13

Source: Our analysis of Air Force data.

In November 1995, DOD’s Office of the Inspector General reported that

although the services have reduced the number of active duty personnel,

there has not been a corresponding decrease in the number of positions

that must be filled on the Joint Staff and in defense agencies. The report

noted that the services must still give priority to joint staffing, with a

substantially smaller resource pool. Finally, the Inspector General found

that no standard methodology or criteria are used to determine and

validate personnel requirements for positions on the Joint Staff or in

defense agencies. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

1997 requires us to review DOD’s actions in response to the Inspector

General’s report.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 3 

Military Personnel Shortages Pose Little

Risk to Implementing the National Military

Strategy

The Air Force uses the FORSIZE exercise to estimate total wartime

personnel requirements. FORSIZE 95 identified an active wartime shortage

of 19,585 personnel. However, the Air Force believes this shortage has

little impact on their ability to implement the national military strategy

because the shortfall is primarily in forces that sustain base operations in

the United States during wartime, and the Air Force has identified

alternatives for satisfying these shortages. FORSIZE 95 did not analyze

medical requirements. However, a separate study of medical requirements

concluded that the Air Force has more active duty medical personnel than

needed for wartime.

FORSIZE does not consider operations other than war (OOTW). Air Force

officials stated that defense guidance assumes that the existing force

requirements developed for the two MRCs can satisfy the needs of

contingency operations without posing additional requirements. Air Force

data shows that during fiscal years 1995 and 1996, certain types of units

exceeded the Air Force goal of being deployed no more than 120 days per

year. However, a July 1996 Air Force study concluded that the Air Force

does not need to increase its military personnel requirements because of

contingency operations, but it has to closely manage units that deploy

frequently. The Air Force has taken several steps in recent years to reduce

the impact of OOTWs on certain units.

Wartime Personnel

Requirements

Established by

FORSIZE

FORSIZE estimates the number of active and reserve forces and civilians

needed to (1) deploy to support two MRCs, (2) support strategic missions

such as airlift and space, and (3) sustain base operations during wartime.

The initial exercise was in 1988; subsequent exercises were conducted in

1994 and 1995. There were no exercises in 1989 through 1993 because of

the changing world environment, numerous Air Force command

reorganizations, and the Persian Gulf War. FORSIZE 95 did not estimate

medical requirements since OSD is conducting a separate study on these

requirements. FORSIZE 95, which was completed in February 1996,

projects wartime requirements for fiscal year 1997.

As a starting point for FORSIZE, the Air Force develops a Time Phased

Force Deployment List to deploy all 20 active and reserve fighter wings

and bombers required by the Bottom-Up Review. In addition, FORSIZE

determines requirements for personnel needed to operate at three

additional bare bases (airfields with no supporting infrastructure) and to

replace casualties (personnel that are killed or wounded and cannot return

to duty). Air Force officials stated that the requirement for the bare bases

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 3 

Military Personnel Shortages Pose Little

Risk to Implementing the National Military

Strategy

is based on the Air Force’s experience during the Gulf War and other past

operations.

The number of aviator positions included in FORSIZE is based on the crew

ratio established for each aircraft in the Air Force’s inventory. A crew ratio

is the number of aircrews authorized per aircraft and is established to

enable the Air Force to meet expected wartime sortie rates. For example,

the current crew ratio for the F-15C is 1.25, which means that 1.25 pilots

are authorized for each F-15C in the active inventory. Air Force officials

noted that the actual sortie rates during the Gulf War were higher than

could have been flown under the Air Force’s funded crew ratios and that

additional pilots from units that had not deployed were therefore used. On

the basis of this experience, the Air Force has increased the crew ratio for

some aircraft, increased aircraft spares, and plans to use additional pilots

from the schools to achieve higher sortie rates. Air Force officials noted

that it is not economically feasible to increase the crew ratios beyond

current levels because they would have to buy additional aircraft and

spares in order to keep all crews properly trained.

Personnel requirements for strategic and sustainment forces are

determined at base level for 36 functional areas such as security police,

transportation, and munitions. In determining these requirements,

FORSIZE assumes that functions currently performed by military

personnel will stay military. These base level assessments are intended to

ensure that the Air Force has sufficient personnel at bases in the United

States and overseas to (1) protect and maintain bases, (2) re-supply

deploying forces, and (3) provide support to families of Air Force

personnel who deploy to war and those that remain at their locations.

FORSIZE then compares these requirements with authorized personnel by

functional areas to determine if the Air Force has enough personnel to

carry out missions specified in defense guidance.

On the basis of FORSIZE 95, the Air Force concluded that it requires

364,324 active military personnel to meet its wartime requirements (not

including medical). FORSIZE did not consider whether some functions

that do not deploy could be met with other than military personnel such as

civilian employees or contractors. As shown in figure 3.1, the forces that

deploy make-up approximately one-third of the Air Force’s active military

personnel requirements; strategic and sustainment forces account for the

remaining two-thirds.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 3 

Military Personnel Shortages Pose Little

Risk to Implementing the National Military

Strategy

Figure 3.1: Breakdown of Active Wartime Personnel Requirements as Determined by FORSIZE 95

Deployed

Strategic

Sustainment

116,148

129,410

118,766

(32%)

(36%)

(33%)

The wartime personnel requirements estimated during FORSIZE include

requirements to replace casualties. This number is classified but is based

on two key elements. First, the population-at-risk is determined by an Air

Force threat model. The population-at-risk includes the day-to-day

casualty stream of personnel within the two theaters of operation who are

expected to be killed in action, wounded in action, and otherwise disabled

by disease or non-battle injuries. Second, casualty rates for each career

field are established based on their proximity to the war zone. The closer

the career field is to the war zone, the higher the casualty rate. For

example, maintenance personnel on the flight line have a higher casualty

rate than maintenance personnel working in a rear area.

Air Force Wartime

Personnel Shortages

Pose Little Risk

FORSIZE 95 identified a net active shortage of 19,585 personnel needed to

meet wartime requirements. According to Air Force officials the shortage

poses little risk to carry out the two MRC strategy because (1) it is

predominantly in the forces that sustain base operations in the United

States and not in the deploying forces and (2) other alternatives exist to

cover most of the shortfall.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 3 

Military Personnel Shortages Pose Little

Risk to Implementing the National Military

Strategy

Security police, transportation, intelligence, maintenance, and munitions

account for approximately 16,300, or 83 percent, of the Air Force’s total

shortage (see table 3.1). The remaining shortage occurred in 10 other

functional areas.

Table 3.1: Projected Active Personnel

Wartime Shortages for Fiscal Year

1997 Functional area Shortage

Percentage

of shortage

Security police 6,903 33

Transportation 3,536 17

Intelligence 2,048 10

Munitions 1,982 9

Maintenance 1,843 9

Other functional areas 4,539 22

Total—functional areas with shortages 20,851 100

Functional areas where personnel are in excess to

requirements

(1,266)

Net shortage 19,585

Source: FORSIZE 95.

According to Air Force officials, all of the shortages, except munitions, are

associated with requirements for sustaining forces. The munitions

shortage exists because the Air Force has a shortage of military personnel

in the bomb assembly and bomb loading specialties for the bomber force.

In September 1996, we reported that the Air Force cannot meet its

war-fighting requirement to support the full complement of B-1B and

B-52H bombers allocated to regional commanders due to these personnel

shortages.1

 The Air Staff has tasked the Air Combat Command to develop

a plan and identify funding requirements to eliminate the shortages using

active or reserve personnel or a combination of both.

According to Air Force officials, the security police shortage would occur

in the sustaining force when some security police personnel guarding

bases in the United States deployed to theaters of operation during

wartime. Such deployment would create a shortage of security personnel

to guard bases in the United States. Air Force security police personnel

told us they could work around the shortfall by increasing workshifts,

closing some gates at bases, and taking advantage of new sensor

1

Air Force Bombers: Options to Retire or Restructure the Force Would Reduce Planned Spending

(GAO/NSIAD-96-192, Sept. 30, 1996).

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 3 

Military Personnel Shortages Pose Little

Risk to Implementing the National Military

Strategy

technology. In addition, one official noted that the Air Force could also

contract for part-time security personnel.

The transportation shortfall relates primarily to personnel that operate and

maintain base motor pools in the United States. According to

transportation officials, the individual ready reserve2

 could be used to

offset some of the shortage.

According to a maintenance official, the maintenance shortfall represents

only 2 percent of total maintenance requirements and is spread throughout

a number of career fields, including jet engines, guidance and control,

avionics systems, fabrication and parachute, and aircraft metal and

technology. Maintenance officials told us that, because the maintenance

shortfall is so small and would not impact mission readiness, they have no

plans to examine alternatives to cover it.

Few of the 10 remaining functional areas, which included such functions

as comptroller, fuels, judge advocate, and weather, have significant

shortages. Most have a shortage that ranges between 2 and 4 percent of

their wartime requirement. According to Air Force officials, these

shortages will be covered primarily by using the individual ready reserve

and other management actions.

In nine functional areas, authorized personnel exceeded requirements by

1,266 but the Air Force did not reallocate any of these positions to

functional areas with shortages. For example, the education and training

functional area had an excess of 244 personnel, but senior Air Force

officials decided not to reallocate these positions until ongoing training

initiatives have been completed. Likewise, there was an excess of 302

personnel in communications, but no action was taken because the career

field is being merged with information management, which showed a

shortage. According to an Air Force official, another reason the Air Force

decided not to reallocate personnel is because the ongoing Quadrennial

Defense Review may change the current national military strategy, which

could change the Air Force’s active requirements and the need to

reallocate personnel.

2

The individual ready reserve is a pool of individuals who have already served in active units or in the

reserves and have some part of their military service obligation remaining.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 3 

Military Personnel Shortages Pose Little

Risk to Implementing the National Military

Strategy

Active Military Medical

Personnel Exceed Wartime

Requirements

OSD and Air Force analyses indicate the Air Force has more active duty

medical personnel than needed for wartime requirements, but they have

not yet agreed on the actual number of personnel to be reduced. A 1994

OSD study concluded that the number of medical positions within the

services exceeded projected wartime requirements. This study is currently

being updated because of the services’ concerns regarding the

assumptions made to treat casualties and maintain peacetime operational

readiness and training. However, a separate Air Force analysis showed the

Air Force has about 5,900 active military medical personnel who are

excess to projected wartime requirements. The Air Force expects that the

ongoing OSD study will recommend reductions in medical personnel, so the

Air Force plans to reduce the number of medical personnel in fiscal years

1998 through 2003.

Impact of OOTW on

Air Force Personnel

Requirements

The Air Force does not assess personnel requirements for OOTWs under

FORSIZE. According to Air Force officials, defense guidance assumes that

the existing force requirements developed for the two MRCs can

accomplish OOTW deployments without posing additional requirements.

Nonetheless, headquarters Air Force and Air Combat Command officials

are concerned about the high operations tempo OOTWs have on certain

units, and believe the Air Force must closely manage its OOTW taskings to

ensure certain units are not used excessively.

Due to growing concern about the impact of OOTWs, the Air Combat

Command sponsored a study of fiscal year 1994 deployment taskings. The

study concluded that the Air Force did not need to increase personnel

levels due to contingency operations, but noted that some functional areas

were more impacted by contingency deployments than others. The study

also concluded that commands and installations need to place more

emphasis on accuracy and completeness of data reported for deployment

requirements and actual deployments to promote a fairer distribution of

taskings throughout units and across commands.

Air Force data shows that, with the exception of one type of unit in the Air

Force Special Operations Command, most units that exceeded the Air

Force goal of being deployed no more than 120 days per year are in the Air

Combat Command. Figure 3.2 shows the Air Combat Command units that

exceeded the 120-day goal in 1995 and 1996.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 3 

Military Personnel Shortages Pose Little

Risk to Implementing the National Military

Strategy

Figure 3.2: Days on Temporary Duty for Selected Air Combat Command Units for Fiscal Years 1995 and 1996

A/OA-10 AWACCS EC-130E F-15C/D F-16HTS F-16L HC-130 RC-135RJ U-2

0

50

100

150

200

Aircraft type

Days

1995 1996 Air Force standard

Source: Air Force data.

To reduce the impact of OOTWs on certain units, the Air Force has

implemented a policy to balance the workload throughout the Air Force,

reduce taskings where appropriate, and make more use of reserve forces.

For example, in 1995, the Air Combat Command chose not to send

A/OA—10 aircraft to fiscal year 1996 National Training and Joint

Readiness Training Centers exercises in order to reduce temporary travel

for these units. The Air Force has also activated associate reserve

squadrons3

 for KC-135 refueling and E-3 Airborne Warning and Control

System aircraft. Additionally, both the Air Force Reserve and the Air

National Guard are now supporting a greater share of OOTW and other

contingency taskings and have increased their participation in Joint Chief

3

Air Force Reserve units that are collocated with active Air Force units that fly and maintain active

aircraft.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 3 

Military Personnel Shortages Pose Little

Risk to Implementing the National Military

Strategy

of Staff-sponsored exercises. This has been possible primarily due to the

Air Force success in encouraging reservists to volunteer for such duty.

Agency Comments DOD stated that although FORSIZE identified an active shortage of 19,600

personnel, this shortage could be addressed with a variety of sources,

including technology, civilians, contractors, and Air National Guard and

Air Force Reserve personnel. We agreed with DOD’s position. Our report

reflects that the Air Force has identified several ways to compensate for

these wartime shortages.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 4 

Opportunities Exist to Reduce the Number

of Active Duty Air Force Personnel

Potential exists to reduce the number of active duty Air Force personnel

significantly below the congressional floor of 381,000. In fiscal year 1998,

the Air Force plans to seek statutory authority to reduce the number of

active duty personnel to about 371,600 or 9,400 below the current floor. In

addition, a preliminary air staff review of its infrastructure force has

identified a potential to reduce the active force by as much as 75,000

beyond fiscal year 1998 by contracting out some functions now performed

by military personnel and converting some military positions to civilian.

Our prior work indicates that savings can occur by contracting out

functions in lieu of using military personnel, and significant opportunities

exist to convert military positions to less costly civilian positions.

Some opportunities may also exist to reduce mission forces. Our prior

work has shown the Air Force could reduce active personnel requirements

by increasing the size of its fighter squadrons and transferring some

bombers to the reserves. In addition, several ongoing defense studies such

the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study and the Quadrennial Defense Review

could affect the Air Force’s future active duty personnel requirements.

Air Force Plans to

Reduce Active Duty

Personnel Below

Congressional Floor

in Fiscal Year 1998

On the basis of the Air Force’s fiscal year 1998 budget proposal provided

to OSD, the Air Force plans to seek statutory authority to reduce its active

military end strength to about 371,600 or 9,400 below the current

congressional floor. Air Force officials stated the planned personnel

reductions will not lessen the Air Force’s war-fighting capability, since

they are primarily in infrastructure-related functions. Our analysis of the

planned decrease shows that 1,125, or 12 percent, are in mission forces

and 8,415, or 88 percent, are in infrastructure forces as shown in table 4.1.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 4 

Opportunities Exist to Reduce the Number

of Active Duty Air Force Personnel

Table 4.1: Comparison of Active Duty

End Strength Between Fiscal Year

1997 and 1998

Fiscal year

Category 1997 1998 Change Percent

Mission Forces 139,945 138,820 (1,125) 12

Infrastructure

Acquisition 9,569 8,529 (1,040)

Force management 25,280 24,551 ( 729)

Installation support 57,918 54,846 (3,072)

Central communications 16,931 15,807 (1,124)

Central logistics 25,174 26,218 1,044

Central medical 40,639 40,135 ( 504)

Central personnel 12,283 11,056 (1,227)

Central training 53,372 51,862 (1,510)

Resource adjustments (11) (264) (253)

Subtotal infrastructure 241,155 232,740 (8,415) 88

Total 381,100 371,560 (9,540) 100

Source: Our analysis of DOD’ FYDP and Air Force data.

The planned decrease in mission forces results primarily from three

initiatives. First, the final drawdown of intercontinental ballistic missiles

under the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty will reduce mission forces

by 1,014 personnel. Second, the Air Force plans to retire the EF-111

electronic support aircraft in fiscal year 1998, which would reduce active

military personnel by 525. However, the Air Force is concerned the Navy

may not assume the electronics warfare mission within the planned time

frame, which could delay these planned reductions. Finally, the Air Force

plans to retire 8 C-130 aircraft, which will eliminate 360 positions. This

reduction is based on a Joint Staff study that showed the Air Force has

excess intra-theater airlift capacity.

The decreases in mission forces are largely offset by increases related to

funding six additional B-1B bombers for training and combat operations

from the reconstitution reserve,1

 activating an unmanned aerial vehicle

squadron, and adding one Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

(E-8) and one Rivet Joint (RC-135). Air Force officials noted the additional

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System and Rivet Joint aircraft will

help alleviate the high personnel tempo in these units.

1

Aircraft stored or on a ramp that are planned for return to operating forces in the event of

mobilization or replacement.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 4 

Opportunities Exist to Reduce the Number

of Active Duty Air Force Personnel

The planned infrastructure decreases are based primarily on the Air

Force’s plans to either have civilian employees or contractors perform

installation support and communication functions now performed by

about 2,500 military personnel. The Air Force determined that these

positions do not require military personnel because they do not deploy and

are needed to support overseas rotation. Therefore, it plans to study the

cost-effectiveness of contracting out the function or using civilian

employees.

The planned decrease in installation support also includes 360 positions

providing base operating support at Howard Air Force Base in Panama.

The Air Force assumes that all military personnel will withdraw from

Panama after the United States turns control of the Panama Canal over to

Panama in 1999. However, the State Department has recently announced

an effort to study the possibility of keeping some U.S. military personnel in

Panama after the transfer, which may impact the Air Force’s plans.

The decrease in central medical personnel represents the start of an effort

to align peacetime staffing with wartime requirements. A study by the

Office of the Air Force Surgeon General showed the Air Force only needed

86 percent of its projected fiscal year 1999 medical personnel to meet

wartime medical needs. The Air Force has programmed a 4.5-percent

reduction (1,748 personnel) through fiscal year 2003. According to Air

Force officials, it will take up to 12 years to eliminate the remaining

positions to minimize personnel turbulence and impact on peacetime

patient care. An Air Force official stated that even though the OSD study on

post-Cold War medical requirements has not been completed, officials in

the Office of the Air Force Surgeon General believe the study will

recommend that the services reduce the number of medical personnel.

Thus, these officials believe it is prudent to start reducing the number of

medical personnel now. The need for such reductions must be certified by

the Secretary of Defense under 10 U.S.C. 129c.

The decrease in central personnel represents a decline in the number of

personnel in transit. An Air Force official stated that the smaller force has

reduced the number of permanent change-of-station moves, accessions,

and training requirements, which reduces the number of people in transit.

The changes in force management are caused primarily by decreases in

the number of positions in the Air Weather Service, support to the Defense

Finance and Accounting Service, and headquarters activities.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 4 

Opportunities Exist to Reduce the Number

of Active Duty Air Force Personnel

Finally, the decrease in acquisition and the increase in central logistics are

due to the transfer of base operations functions at test centers from the

acquisition category to central logistics. Congress has directed DOD to

prepare a plan to reduce the number of military and civilian personnel

involved in acquisition by 25 percent over a period of 5 years beginning in

fiscal year 1996. Air Force officials stated that they have not programmed

this additional decrease because OSD and the services have not agreed on

the definition of the acquisition workforce nor the baseline for measuring

the reductions.

Ongoing Air Force

Studies Have

Identified Potential to

Further Reduce

Active Personnel

The Air Force has not yet fully assessed the potential for substituting less

costly civilian employees or contractors for some of the active duty

personnel currently assigned to infrastructure activities. In the past, the

Air Force has not periodically reviewed all of its positions to determine

whether they must be filled by military personnel. However, the Air Force

has recently begun an effort to identify such savings to help fund force

modernization. Three ongoing Air Force studies have identified the

potential for eliminating a significant number of active duty personnel.

Two studies involve the potential to contract out commercial activity

functions now being performed by military and civilian personnel and

another involves the potential for converting military positions in

inherently governmental functions to civilian positions. The Air Force’s

ability to reduce the number of military positions identified in the ongoing

studies could be constrained by DOD goals for reducing civilian positions.

DOD Directive 1100.4 requires the services to staff positions civilian

personnel unless the services deem that positions must be filled by

military personnel for one or more of the following reasons, including

combat readiness, legal requirements, rotation, security, training, and

discipline. In addition, Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76

classifies government activities as either inherently governmental

functions or commercial activities. Inherently governmental

functions—those intimately related to the public interest such as fund

control—must be done by federal employees. A commercial activity can

be an entire organization or part of an organization that provides a product

or service obtainable from a commercial source. Commercial activities

include functions such as vehicle and facilities maintenance, automated

data processing, and administrative support. Circular A-76 sets forth the

procedures for agencies to study whether the functions could be done

more economically by contractors.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 4 

Opportunities Exist to Reduce the Number

of Active Duty Air Force Personnel

Potential Exists to

Contract or Use Civilian

Employees for Some

Commercial Activities Now

Performed by Military

Personnel

An ongoing Air Force study has identified about 52,600 active military

positions allocated to functions that could potentially be performed by

contractors or civilian employees.2

 These positions have tentatively been

identified as not military essential because their personnel do not deploy,

support the rotation of forces to overseas bases and operations, or

perform unique military missions or functions. The Air Force study is

scheduled to be completed by the end of April 1997.

The functional areas under review consist of all military positions in

commercial activities within the Air Force’s major commands in the

continental United States and some overseas locations. The Air Force has

about 160,400 military positions in commercial activities. The Air Force

has deemed that 82,700 of these positions must be filled by military

personnel because they would deploy during wartime; about another

25,100 of these positions are in military-unique functions such as

headquarters activities, recruiting, basic military training, and those

personnel needed to maintain an overseas rotation base. Once these

positions were eliminated from consideration, the Air Force was left with

about 52,600 military in commercial activities that could be studied for

possible conversion, as shown in table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Military Positions in

Commercial Activities That Potentially

Could Be Contracted Out or Filled by

Civilian Employees

Function Officer Enlisted Total Percent

Logistics 541 24,885 25,426 48

Communications 1,348 14,257 15,605 30

Personnel 320 4,850 5,170 10

Civil engineering 327 3,261 3,588 7

All others 456 2,334 2,790 5

Total 2,992 49,587 52,579 100

Percent 6 94 100.0

Source: Air Force data.

To further assess the potential to contract out or use civilian employees

for these positions, the Air Staff has provided each major command with

the number of positions within their respective commands that are

candidates for conversion. Each command is currently identifying the

positions by base and organization to determine how many functions

could be studied further to determine the relative cost savings associated

with replacing military personnel with either contractors or civilian

2

The study also identified about 55,000 civilian positions that could be potentially replaced by

contractor personnel.

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 4 

Opportunities Exist to Reduce the Number

of Active Duty Air Force Personnel

employees. The major commands are also required to identify barriers to

contracting and recommend ways to overcome them. For example,

current Air Force procedure exempts such units from being studied as

candidates for conversion, if some personnel in the unit are expected to

deploy. Air Staff officials noted the major commands may be able to

identify ways around this problem in some cases, such as reorganizing

units or transferring functions between bases.

In a November 1996 letter to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the

Air Force stated that DOD’s existing civilian workyear policy needs to be

modified so the Air Force can achieve savings by replacing military

personnel assigned to positions that are not military essential with

civilians. The letter noted that the Air Force’s experience has shown that

40 percent of the cost comparison studies performed since 1979

determined that an in-house civilian workforce was more cost-effective

than contractors. When a function that was predominantly performed by

military personnel remains in-house, the Air Force may have to increase

the number of civilian employees, which runs counter to DOD’s efforts to

reduce its civilian workforce. For example, the maintenance training

function at Altus Air Force Base was performed by 1,444 personnel, of

whom 1,401 were military and 43 were civilian employees. The cost

comparison showed that an in-house civilian workforce would be more

cost-effective than using the private sector. Thus, the Air Force had to

increase the number of civilian employees by 692 in order to achieve the

projected savings. The Secretary of the Air Force stated that the goals for

civilian downsizing pose a disincentive for accomplishing work in the least

costly manner and that some consideration should be given to relaxing

civilian downsizing goals in such cases.

The Air Force is also conducting a study to determine if there are

opportunities to consolidate its 126 precision measurement electronic

laboratories and have the work performed by civilian employees or

contractors. There are about 1,200 military personnel in 50 labs in the

active force, and the remaining labs are operated by contractors or are in

the guard and reserve forces. These personnel are not included in the

universe of military positions in commercial activities that could

potentially be performed by civilian employees or contractors. According

to an Air Force official, the preliminary study results indicate that the Air

Force could consolidate from 126 to around 50 labs. This official noted

that the final report, scheduled to be issued in April 1997, will contain a

plan to consolidate the labs as well as for conducting cost comparison

studies.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 4 

Opportunities Exist to Reduce the Number

of Active Duty Air Force Personnel

Potential Exists to Convert

Some Military Positions

That Involve Inherently

Governmental Functions

to Civilian Positions

The Air Force reviewed all military positions in inherently governmental

functions to determine if military personnel are required. Military

personnel were considered necessary if the position deployed, supported

overseas rotation, was required by law, or was in a unique military

function such as the honor guard or recruiting. On the basis of this criteria,

the Air Force identified approximately 21,600 military positions that are

not military essential and can potentially be converted to civilian positions

as shown in table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Military Positions by

Functional Area That Potentially Could

Be Converted to Civilian Positions

Function Officer Enlisted Total Percent

Operations 1,779 8,600 10,379 48

Acquisition 5,341 529 5,870 27

Intelligence 219 1,121 1,340 6

Civil engineering 0 1,304 1,304 6

Other 409 2,287 2,696 13

Total 7,748 13,841 21,589 100

Percent 36 64 100

Source: Air Force data.

Air Force officials told us they were preparing a briefing for senior Air

Force leadership on the issues concerning military to civilian conversions.

These officials stated that some of the major commands believe that many

of the positions should remain military. For example, the Air Force

Materiel Command believes all the acquisition positions should remain

military because military personnel assigned to these positions bring

operational and flightline experience, which is invaluable to developing

new systems. However, we believe there is a good basis for studying the

potential to replace some military personnel assigned to acquisition

functions with civilian employees. According to DOD’s fiscal year 1997 FYDP,

41 percent of the Air Force’s acquisition workforce is military while only

12 percent of the Army’s is military. An Air Force official stated that the

senior Air Force leadership will decide which, if any, positions will be

converted from military to civilian. This official stated that no date has

been set for the briefing.

In October 1996, we reported that the Air Force could save $69 million by

converting 6,800 officer positions in such fields as acquisition and financial

management to civilian positions because they are not military essential.3

3

DOD Force Mix Issues: Converting Some Support Officer Positions to Civilian Status Could Save

Money (GAO/NSIAD-97-15, Oct. 23, 1996).

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 4 

Opportunities Exist to Reduce the Number

of Active Duty Air Force Personnel

We found that civilian employees cost between $1,261 and $15,731 less

annually than military personnel depending on the grade and rank. In

October 1994, we reported that similar opportunities exist for converting

enlisted support positions to civilian employees.4

 Both of our reports

noted that a number of impediments exist to military to civilian

conversions. For example, guidance provides commanders with wide

latitude in justifying the use of military personnel, and local commanders

are perceived to prefer military rather than civilian employees in certain

positions. Nonetheless, we noted these barriers can be overcome with

active participation of senior managers. DOD concurred with our reports

and agreed to convene a panel of senior managers within OSD, the joint

staff, and the military services to examine the issue of military to civilian

conversions. An OSD official stated that the issues concerning military to

civilian conversions will be addressed as part of the Quadrennial Defense

Review.

Consolidating Fighter

Squadrons Would

Reduce Military

Personnel

Until recently, Air Force fighter wings were predominantly organized in

three squadrons of 24 aircraft. However, the Air Force has decided to

reduce its squadron size to 18, which also reduced its wing size to 54. This

change in unit size increased the number of wings and squadrons to more

than would have been needed had the squadron size stayed at 24.

In May 1996, we reported that the Air Force’s arguments for using smaller

squadrons do not justify the additional cost.5

 Air Force officials maintain

that more squadrons are needed to provide the Air Force flexibility to

respond to numerous potential conflicts across the globe. Although the Air

Force considers smaller fighter squadrons beneficial, it had not performed

any analysis to justify its decision. We developed several options for

consolidating the fighter force that would permit the Air Force to maintain

the same number of aircraft but carry out its missions with fewer active

duty personnel. Our options could eliminate between two and seven

squadrons, and also eliminate a wing and/or fighter base and reduce

operating costs up to $115 million annually.

4

DOD Force Mix Issues: Greater Reliance on Civilians in Support Roles Could Provide Significant

Benefits (GAO/NSIAD-95-5, Oct. 19, 1994).

5

Air Force Aircraft: Consolidating Fighter Squadrons Could Reduce Costs (GAO/NSIAD-96-82, May 6,

1996).

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 4 

Opportunities Exist to Reduce the Number

of Active Duty Air Force Personnel

Other Efforts Could

Impact Air Force

Requirements for

Active Military

Personnel

The Air Force’s requirements for active duty personnel could also be

affected by several ongoing initiatives and studies. These include an Air

Force study of the active/reserve force mix, DOD’s Deep Attack Weapons

Mix Study, and the Quadrennial Defense Review required by the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997.

The Air Force is assessing options to transfer some functions now

performed by the active force to the reserves. The Air Force plans to

examine changes to the mix of active to reserve forces after the

Quadrennial Defense Review is completed. Moreover, in our

September 1996 report on DOD’s bomber force, we reported one option for

restructuring the bomber force would be to place more B-1Bs in the Air

National Guard.6

 This option would reduce the cost to maintain DOD’s

bomber force while maintaining DOD’s force of 95 B-1Bs. In 1993, DOD

reported to Congress that placing B-1Bs in the Air National Guard would

result in no loss of war-fighting capability.

A major benefit of transferring bombers to the reserve component is that

reserve units have traditionally been less expensive to operate than their

active duty counterparts. These savings are attributed to two factors. First,

DOD expects that an Air National Guard squadron will require fewer flying

hours than an active squadron because Air National Guard units are able

to recruit more experienced pilots who require less frequent training to

maintain their proficiency. Personnel costs are the second major factor

that account for the Air National Guard’s lower cost. In comparison with

active squadrons that consist primarily of active duty military personnel,

Air National Guard units rely heavily on less-costly civilians and part-time

Guard personnel.

In addition, DOD’s ongoing Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study could change

DOD’s requirements for fighters and bombers, which would impact Air

Force military personnel requirements. The Commission on Roles and

Missions recommended that DOD conduct a DOD-wide cost-effectiveness

study to determine the appropriate number and mix of deep attack

capabilities currently fielded and under development by all the services.

The first part of the study, which was to be completed in late 1996, was

expected to analyze weapons mix requirements for DOD’s planned force

structure in 1998, 2006, and 2014 and determine the impact of force

structure changes on the weapon systems mix. As of February 1997, OSD

was reviewing the results of this first phase and had not made the results

6

Air Force Bombers: Option to Retire or Restructure the Force Would Reduce Planned Spending

(GAO/NSIAD-96-192, Sept. 30, 1996).

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 4 

Opportunities Exist to Reduce the Number

of Active Duty Air Force Personnel

public. The second part of the study will analyze trade-offs among

elements of the force structure, such as bombers and tactical aircraft, for

the same years and is to be completed in early 1997. The study should

provide DOD with an opportunity to identify options to reduce some of its

extensive ground attack capabilities, which could impact requirements for

active duty personnel.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 requires the

Secretary of Defense to conduct a quadrennial review of the defense

program. The first review, now underway, is scheduled to be completed in

May 1997. It will examine defense strategy, force structure, force

modernization and infrastructure and develop a defense strategy to the

year 2005. The legislation also established a National Defense Panel to

provide an independent assessment of DOD’s quadrennial review as well as

to develop alternative force structures that could meet anticipated threats

to the national security of the United States. The results of these studies

could also impact the number of active duty military personnel.

Conclusions Potential exists to replace active military personnel with contractors or

civilian employees. These potential reductions should not impact the Air

Force’s ability to implement the national military strategy, since they are in

the infrastructure forces rather than in the forces that deploy during

wartime. The actual number of active military positions that could be

eliminated depends on the results of several ongoing initiatives as well as

senior Air Force leadership commitment to reduce infrastructure to fund

force modernization. We believe that it is important for the Air Force to

move as quickly as possible to complete its studies and make the

conversions to contractor and civilian employees in view of the recurring

savings that could be achieved. Developing a plan and time frames for

such cost comparisons and conversions would permit the Air Force

leadership to monitor efforts to reduce infrastructure.

Recommendation DOD has stated it must reduce infrastructure costs in order to modernize its

force. Several ongoing Air Force studies have identified potential to

replace military personnel with contractors or civilian employees.

Therefore, we recommend that, once the ongoing studies are completed,

the Secretary of the Air Force develop a plan that

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Chapter 4 

Opportunities Exist to Reduce the Number

of Active Duty Air Force Personnel

• identifies time frames to study whether it is more cost-effective to transfer

commercial activities now performed by military personnel to civilian

employees or private contractors and

• includes time frames to convert military positions in inherently

governmental functions to civilian positions.

Agency Comments DOD fully concurred with two parts of our recommendation and partially

concurred with one part. DOD stated that an existing system already tracks

the services’ progress in completing cost comparison studies and

converting positions, so there is no need to establish an additional system.

We agreed with DOD and have modified the recommendation accordingly.

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Appendix I 

Categories of Defense Infrastructure

Acquisition management consists of all program elements that support

program management, program offices, and production support, including

acquisition headquarters, science and technology, and test and evaluation

resources. This category includes earlier levels of research and

development, including basic research, exploratory development, and

advanced development.

Force management consists of all programs that provide funding for

personnel for the management and operation of all the major military

command headquarters activities. Force management also includes

program elements that provide resources for defensewide departmental

headquarters, management of international programs, support to other

defense organizations and federal government agencies, security

investigative services, public affairs activities, and criminal and judicial

activities.

Installation support consists of activities that furnish personnel to provide

facilities from which defense forces operate. Activities include

construction planning and design, real property maintenance, base

operating support, real estate management for active and reserve bases,

family housing and bachelor housing, supply operations, base closure

activities and environmental programs.

Central communications consists of programs that manage all aspects of

the command, control and communications infrastructure for DOD

facilities, information support services, mapping and charting products,

and security support. This category also includes program elements that

provide nontactical telephone services, the General Defense Intelligence

Program and cryptological activities, the Global Positioning System, and

support of air traffic control facilities.

Central logistics consists of programs that provide support to centrally

managed logistics organizations, including management of material,

operation of supply systems, maintenance activities, material

transportation, base operations and support, communications, and minor

construction.

Central medical consists of programs that furnish personnel that provide

medical care to active duty military personnel, dependent, and retirees.

Activities provide for all patient care, except for that provided by medical

units that are part of direct support units. Activities include medical

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Appendix I 

Categories of Defense Infrastructure

training, management of the medical system, and support of medical

installations.

Central personnel consists of all programs that provide recruiting of new

personnel and the management and support of dependent schools;

community, youth, and family centers; and child development activities.

Other programs supporting personnel include permanent change of station

costs, personnel in transient, veterans education assistance and other

miscellaneous personnel support activities.

Central training consists of program elements that provide resources for

virtually all non unit training, including training for new personnel,

aviation and flight training, military academies, officer training corps,

other college commissioning programs, and officer and enlisted training

schools.

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 42.

Now on p. 31.

Now on p. 42.

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Janet St. Laurent, Assistant Director

Michael Kennedy, Evaluator-in-Charge

Irene Robertson, Senior Evaluator

Norfolk Field Office George Morse, Senior Evaluator

Bonita Anderson, Evaluator

(701078) Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-97-78 Force Structure
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.

Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the

following address, accompanied by a check or money order

made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when

necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address

are discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 6015

Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015

or visit:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 

or by using fax number (301) 258-4066, or TDD (301) 413-0006.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any

list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a

touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on

how to obtain these lists.

For information on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET,

send an e-mail message with "info" in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

or visit GAO’s World Wide Web Home Page at:

http://www.gao.gov

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Rate

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. G100