UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DEMONDRAY D. MAYO, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

 v.

STATE OF NEVADA; ATTORNEY

GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF

NEVADA, 

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 18-16081

D.C. No. 3:09-cv-00316-MMD-WGC

District of Nevada, Reno

ORDER

Before: W. FLETCHER and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and SESSIONS,*

District Judge.

The petition for panel rehearing is DENIED. Judges W. Fletcher and R.

Nelson vote to DENY the petition for rehearing en banc, and Judge Sessions so

recommends. The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing en banc,

and no judge of the court has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en

banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35. 

The memorandum disposition filed on February 19, 2020, is amended. The

amended memorandum disposition will be filed concurrently with this order. 

FILED

APR 1 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* The Honorable William K. Sessions III, United States District Judge

for the District of Vermont, sitting by designation.
Subsequent petitions for panel rehearing and/or petitions for rehearing en banc may

be filed with respect to the amended memorandum disposition in accordance with

the requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 40 and 35.

2
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DEMONDRAY D. MAYO, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

 v. 

STATE OF NEVADA; ATTORNEY 

GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF 

NEVADA, 

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 18-16081 

D.C. No. 

3:09-cv-00316-MMD-WGC 

AMENDED

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Miranda M. Du, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted January 24, 2020

San Francisco, California

Before: W. FLETCHER and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and SESSIONS,**

District Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable William K. Sessions III, United States District Judge 

for the District of Vermont, sitting by designation.

FILED

APR 1 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 18-16081 

Demondray Mayo appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for writ 

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.§ 2254. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1291 and 2253, and we affirm. 

1. Mayo argues that the Nevada Supreme Court’s determination that his 

guilty plea was knowing and voluntary was contrary to clearly established federal 

law and based on an unreasonable determination of fact. This argument lacks 

merit. 

“A state court’s decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of federal law only 

if it is ‘objectively unreasonable[.]’” Riley v. Payne, 352 F.3d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir. 

2003) (citation omitted). Here, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that Mayo’s 

plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent based on a rational evaluation of the 

evidentiary record. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-243 (1969). At the 

plea canvass, Mayo stated that he was entering the plea freely and voluntarily; he 

also answered multiple other questions suggesting that he understood what was 

occurring. As the state supreme court held, the trial court “had the opportunity to 

observe appellant’s demeanor during the plea canvass.” It also considered that 

Mayo had been involved in directing several important decisions in his case. 

Based on the record, the Nevada Supreme Court’s legal determination that the 

Nevada district court did not abuse its discretion in determining Mayo’s plea was 

knowing and voluntary was not objectively unreasonable.
3 18-16081 

Insofar as the state court’s factual findings are challenged, the “unreasonable 

determination of fact” clause of 28 U.S. § 2254(d) requires that federal courts 

“must be particularly deferential” to state court factual determinations. Lambert v. 

Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 972 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the Nevada Supreme Court 

determined that Mayo’s plea was voluntary and knowing based on multiple facts in 

the record. We find that the Nevada Supreme Court’s findings of fact regarding 

Mayo’s plea are supported by the record and are reasonable.

2. Mayo asks this Court to expand the certificate of appealability (COA) to 

consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In order for this Court to grant 

a certificate of appealability in a post-AEDPA habeas case such as this one, the 

Petitioner must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000). A Petitioner makes such a showing 

(1) if he or she demonstrates that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong;” or (2) the issue 

presented is “adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Id. at 483-

84. Mayo has not made such a showing. 

Mayo does not present clear evidence in the record showing that his attorney 

failed to meet a reasonable level of professional competence even though he did 

not challenge the guilty plea based on intellectual deficits or medication that Mayo 

was taking at the time. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985). In the 
4 18-16081 

absence of clear evidence that Mayo was not able to understand instructions or 

make decisions due to these reasons, counsel’s failure to raise them was not 

necessarily or likely ineffective. 

Additionally, while Mayo claims that he suffered prejudice on account of 

counsel’s failure to raise these issues, he presents sparse evidence that he would 

have changed his plea had counsel acted differently. The State of Nevada had a 

fairly strong case against Mayo; multiple individuals had reported to the police that 

Mayo had admitted to shooting Escoto-Gonzales. Mayo has not shown that he 

made the decision to plead guilty in haste, in a state of confusion, or without 

receiving multiple explanations of its consequences due to the negligence of 

counsel. For these reasons, and in light of the significant deference accorded to a 

state supreme court’s denial of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 

reasonable jurists would likely not find the district court’s denial of Mayo’s Sixth 

Amendment constitutional claim debatable or incorrect. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 

563 U.S. 170, 173 (2011). This Court declines to hear this issue on appeal.

AFFIRMED.