SECOND DIVISION June 26, 2007

No. 1-06- 1994 SURES TAFF, INC ., ) Appe al fro m the ) Ci rcu i t Cou rt of Pl ai ntif f -Ap pel l an t, ) Co o k C o un t y. v. ) ) AZ TECA FOO DS, INC ., ) Ho no r ab le ) Jo hn B. Gr og an, Defe ndan t-Appell ee. ) Judg e Pres i di ng. JU STI CESO UT H del

i v er ed th e op i n i on of th e c our t: Plai nti f f , Su res taf f , In c. ( Sures taf

f ), a ppe als f rom an orde r of the ci rcu i t cou rt of Cook County wh

ic h en tered judgm

ent on a j ury v

erdict i n f avor of def

endan t, Azteca Foods, I nc. ( Az t ec a)
. By s pe cia l int er r o ga t o ry, t he jur y fo un d t ha t t he pa r t ies ha d a gr ee d S ur es t aff w o uld pr ovid e wo rk er s’ co mpensa t ion bene fits fo r it s loa ned e mployees who wer e injure d at Azt eca 's jobsi tes. This ap pea l arises fro m the fo llowing fac t s: O n Febr uar y 20, 200 3, Ro dr igo Mina's hand
wa s c rus he d w hile h e w as t rying t o r emo ve t o r t illas fr o m a c o nve yo rbe lt at Az t ec a' s p lan t in Chicag o. At t he t ime of t he ac cident , Mina w as e mployed by S ur est aff, a t empo ra ry emplo yment agency , which provided l abor to Azteca pursuan t t o an oral agreem

ent. It was undis

puted that under the W

orkers’ Compens ation Act (Act) (820 I LCS 305/1(a)(4) (West 2004)), Surest aff was the “l oani ng em ploy er,” and Azteca was

the “b orro win

g em ploy er.” It was further undi sputed that Mi na's i nj uri es w ere a

com pen sab l e i nj ury und er the Act, and Surestaf f pai d the bene f i ts. Surestaff la ter file d sui

t pursuant to section 1(a)(4) of the A ct seekin g reim bursem ent from Azteca1-06-1994

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on t he bas is tha t it w as p rimarily li able as t he bo rr ow ing emplo yer. Azt eca re spo nded by raising th e af f i rm ati v e def ense , w h i ch i s c on tai n ed i n th e s am e s ec ti on of th e A ct, th at a n “ ag re em en t to t he co nt r ar y” ha d b ee n e nt er ed int o by t he pa r t ies in t ha t Su r es t aff o r ally a gr ee d t o be r es po nsib le f or the worke

rs’ com pen sati on coverage

f or the tem

porary workers whi ch i t provi ded. The so le issue a t t rial was whet her Azt eca co uld es t ablish the exist ence of a n “agr eement to the contrary” by

whi ch Surestaff

's ri ght to reim

bursem ent had b een wai

ved. The parti es dis agreed as to how t o phrase the af fi rmati ve def ense i n the j ury i

nstructions an

d the special in terro gator y. Ov

er Surestaff

’s obj ection, the f

oll owing n onpatter n j ury i

nstruction was provi

ded, wh i ch re ad s i n re l ev an t pa rt: “In t his case t he de fendant has a sser t ed t he affirmat ive defens e t hat Su re st aff and Azt eca Fo od s, I nc. made a n agr eement that Surestaff would pay

workers' compensation b enef its to injured
wor kersen ti tl ed to b en ef i ts th at w er e l oan ed b y Su re staf f , In c. to Az t ec a F o o ds , I nc . T he de fen da nt ha s t he bu r de n o f pr o ving t his af f i rm ati ve def en se.” The jury re t ur ned a ver dict in favor of Azt eca and fo und by sp ecial inte rr og at or y that t he parties h ad agreed Surestaff

would provide workers’ compen sation b enef its f or its loane d
em ploye es i nj ured a t Aztec a’s

j obsi tes. On ap pea l, Su re st aff is req ues t ing t hat t he mat t er be r emande d fo r a new t rial beca use t he tria l court m i si nterpreted s ection 1(a

)(4) of the A ct, whi ch l ed to the issu

ance of i nc orrect j ury instr uct ions a nd a s pec ial inter ro gat or y. Su re st aff arg ues t hat t he jur y shou ld have d et er mined t he1-06-1994

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factual issue of whet her t here was an "ag reement t o t he cont rary" as o ppo sed t o t he tr ial cou rt ’s inst ruc t io n t ha t if t he jur y fo un d t he pa r t ies ha d e nt er ed int o an ag r ee men t t ha t Su r es t aff w o uld pa y th e w orker s'

com pen sa ti on b en ef i ts to i ts l oan ed em pl oy ee s, th en A zte ca h ad pr ov en i ts affir mat ive de fen se . Su r es t aff c o nt en ds t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t sho uld ha ve inst ruc t ed t he jur y t ha t in order to avoid l

i abi l i ty, A zteca had to prove: “Surestaff

, in contracting wi

th the defen

dant, has m

ade an ag re em en t to th e c on

tra ry, a gr ee i n g to w ai v e i ts r i gh t to
re i m b ur se men t f rom A zte ca f or a n y wor kerscom pen sa ti on b en ef i ts pai d out by

Surestaff .” The determi

nation of proper jury i

nstructions rests wi

th the sound di scretion of the tri al
cou rt, a nd asa c ourt of

rev i ew wewi l l not d i stu rb such a d eterm i na ti on a bs en t a c l ea r ab us e of di scre tion
. Sti f t v. Li zzadro , 3 62 I ll. App. 3d 1 019 , 1 025 -2 6 ( 200 5) . N onp at t er n jury inst ru ct ions
m ust b e i m partial statem en ts of l aw that are s i

m pl e, bri ef , and f ree f rom a rgum en t. Lew is v. Jones , 157 Ill. App. 3d 32 7, 33 2 (19 87). A new trial wil l be granted base d on a t rial court ’s refusa l to provide a s

uggested jury

in struction only

when the refusa

l a mounts to a serious prej udi ce to a pa rty’ s ri ght to a f ai r tri al
. St ift , 362 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 1026. A s to sta tutor y i n ter pr eta ti on , i t i s w el l estab l i sh ed th at a co ur t lo o ks t o t he w o rd s o f a statut e, and if t he st at ut o ry lang ua ge is c lea r , it mus t be giv en effe ct wit ho ut ut ilizing o t he rt o o ls of i nterpretati on. County of Knox ex rel . Master son v. The Highl ands, L.L.C. , 188 Ill . 2d 546, 556 (1999). Section 1(a

)(4) of the A

ct provi des, i

n rel eva nt part: “Where an emplo yer o per at ing und er and s ubject t o t he1-06-1994

- 4 - provisi ons of thi s Act loans an em ploy ee to anot her such

em ploy er and suc h l oane d em ploye e su stai

ns a com pen sab l e ac ciden

tal i nj ury in the em ploy me nt of such borrowing em

ploy er and where such bor rowi ng em pl oyer d oesnot provi deor pa

y the be ne f i ts or pa yment s d ue su ch inju r ed emp lo yee , su ch lo an ing emp lo yer is li abl e to pr ovide

or pay al l b enef its or pay me nts due such

in jured
em pl oyeeun de r thi s A ct a nd asto such

em pl oyeethe l i ab i l i ty of
su ch lo an ing an d b o rr o win g e mplo yer s is jo int an d s ev er al, provided that such loaning employer is in the absence of agreement to t he contrary ent itled t o r ece ive fro m such bo rr ow ing employer full reimburse ment fo r a ll sums paid o r incu rr ed p ur sua nt t o t his par agr aph t og et her wit h re aso nable at t or neys’ fees and expenses *** .” (Emphasi s added.) 8 20 ILCS 305/ 1(a)( 4) (West 2004)
. We inte rp re t ed t his sect ion o f the Act in Ch an ey v. Ye tter M an

uf ac turi ng Co. , 31 5 I ll. App. 3d 8 23 ( 200 0) , a nd exp lained t hat “with r esp ect t o a n injured employee , t he liabili t y of t he loaning a nd bo rr ow ing emplo yers is jo int and seve ra l; as bet wee n employer s, t he bo rr ow ing employer is primar ily

liable and t he loa ning emplo yer [ is] se co ndar ily liable, t he lat t er being
re qui re d to p ay

on l y wh en th e b orro wi

n g em pl oy er f ai l s to do s o, a

n d i s th en en ti tl ed to reim bursem ent from the borrowing em

ploy er.” Chan

ey , 315 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 826-27. We f

urther
ex pl ai ne d tha t “[t]he loani

ng e m ploye r’sri ght to rei

m bur sem en t, howev er, may be w

aived by an1-06-1994

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agreement between the respective empl oyers .” (Em phasi s ad ded.) Chan

ey , 315 Ill . App. 3d at 827 ; s eealso Corr

uga ted Metal s, I nc . v . In dus tri al Com m i ss i on , 184 Ill . App. 3d 549, 554 (1989) (w her e t he ap pellat e co ur t fou nd t hat unde r t he Wo rk er s’ Co mpensa t ion Act t he r ight of t he loaning e mployer t o be re imbursed by the bo rr ow ing emplo yer may be wa ived by an ag re ement between the e m ploye rs). In For t De arb orn

Ca rtag e C o. ex

rel . Ch ub b & Son , In c. v . Rooks Tr

an sf er C o. , 13 6 I ll. Ap p. 3d 37 1 (198 5), the p l ai ntif f , a loani ng e m ploye r, broug ht an action ag ai

nst the de f

endan t, a borrowi ng e m ploye r, see ki ng to rec over a

mounts p aid to a worker’ s com pen sati on cl ai man t. Fort Dear born , 1 36 I ll. App. 3d a t 374 . T he t rial co ur t ent er ed s ummary judg ment in t he bo rr ow ing
em ploy er’s f avor based upon a c ontract between the parti es whi ch provided, i

n rel evan t part , that the l oan i ng em pl oyer woul d i nd em ni f y the bor rowi ng em pl oyer a gai ns t al l da mag esan d l oss on account of in

jury of any of i ts loaned em

ploy ees i n perf ormi ng an y of the servi ces or duties, as provi ded i n the con tract. Fort Dea

rborn , 1 36 I ll. App. 3d a t 374 . We re ject ed t he loa ning employer ’s claim tha t beca use t he ag re ement did no t spe cify that liabil ity und er t he Act was being sh i f ted, i t di d not con sti

tute a wai ver of i ts right to rei

m bur sem en t. Fort Dea

rborn , 136 Ill . App. 3d at 37 4. The loaning e mployer in Fort Dea rborn ci ted Lachona v. I ndust rial Comm ’n , 87 Ill . 2d 208 (1981), and Alb ert Mojonnier, I nc. v. I ndust rial Comm ’n , 4 1 I ll. 2d 1 28 ( 196 8) for t he propo si tion that an agreem

ent to t he contrary, wi

thin the me ani

ng of the A

ct, must expressl

y ref er to the A ct i

n orde r to be ef f ecti ve . Fort Dea

rborn , 13 6 I ll. A pp . 3d at 37 4. We r eje ct ed t his
ar gument beca use while the agr eement which wa s held t o be binding in Lacho na did sp ecify the1-06-1994

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Act, the su

prem e court does

not requ i re su ch spe ci f i ci ty. Fort Dea

rborn , 136 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 374. We fur t her re co gnized t hat while the sup re me co ur t in Mojonn ie rdisag re ed w ith t he bo rr ow ing
em ploy er's argum

ent that an adverti si

ng ci rcular prom

ot in g the loan in g em ploy er’s i nsuran ce cov erag e a n d b on di n g s tru ctu recon sti tute d a n ef f ec ti v e a gr eemen t, the c our

t di d n ot i n di ca te wh at degre e of

particul ari ty woul d be

ne eded to properl

y wai ve the re i m bur sem en t requi rem en t. Fort Dea rborn , 13 6 I l l . A

pp . 3d at 3 74 . We ul

ti mate l y af f i rm ed th e tr i al cou rt aft er co ncluding that t he l oani ng em ploy er was not entitl ed to r ei

mb ursem ent from the borrowing em

ploy er be caus e the

agree men t in dem ni f i ed th e b orrowi

ng e m ploye r. Fort Dea

rborn , 136 Ill . App. 3d at 376. Turni

ng to t he i

nstant case, we f

in d that t he trial

court properly

in structed t he j ury that an “agreemen

t t o t he contrar y” constituted an agreement by wh ich Surest aff agreed t o pay worke rs'
com pen sa ti on b en ef i ts to i n j ur ed wor kerswh o we reen ti tl ed to b en ef i ts th at i t l oan ed out to Azt eca . T he t rial co ur t 's inst ru ct ions w er e co nsist ent wit h t he pr eviou sly cited cas es, and w e find no basis to co ncl

ude that the parties were requi red to refer to the Act or any spec if ic la nguage contained therein i

n order for the jury to fi

nd there was an agreement to the cont rary. The case la w and a pl

ai n readi ng of the statut e support t he trial court 's concl

usi on that if

there was an oral agreem ent whereb

y Surestaff

agreed to pay the workers' compen sation b enef

its f or its loane d
em pl oy ee s, th en th er e w as

an “ ag re em en t to th e c on

tra ry,” wh i ch wai v ed i ts r i gh t to
re imbursement as a matt er of law . A sp ecific re fere nce in t he pa rt ies' ag re ement t o t he Act or t he ph ras e “ wai ve r of the righ t to rei m bu rs em en t ” w oul d b e i de al f or determ i ni ng i nte nt, bu t i t i s n ot requi red i n orde r f or a tri er of

f act to determ

i ne whethe r there wasan agree men t to t he contrar y .1-06-1994

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For t hese reasons, we f

i nd th e tri al court did not err i

n i ts appl i cation of section 1(a)(4 ) of th

e A ct. Accordin gly , the judgm

ent of the ci

rcuit court o f Cook County i s af fi rmed. Af f i rmed. HOF FM AN and HA LL , JJ., c oncu

r.