COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Humphreys, Kelsey and Senior Judge Overton 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

DARIUS LEROY COLLINS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 1907-04-1 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 OCTOBER 4, 2005 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 

Dean W. Sword, Jr., Judge 

 Stephen B. Plott (Collins & Plott, PLC, on brief), for appellant. 

 Deana A. Malek, Assistant Attorney General (Judith Williams 

Jagdmann, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Darius Leroy Collins appeals convictions of armed statutory burglary in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-90 and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1. 

Collins contends the evidence was insufficient to prove he intended to commit a robbery when he 

entered the victim’s residence. We disagree, and affirm. 

BACKGROUND

 “On appeal, ‘we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Archer v. Commonwealth, 

26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (citation omitted). 

 The evidence proved that Robert Block responded to a knock on his door and, when he 

opened the door, he saw Collins. Collins stuck his head inside Block’s apartment, looked 

around, asked for Josh, and left. Moments later, there was another knock on the door. When 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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Block opened the door, Collins pointed a firearm at Block, pushed his way into the apartment 

and stated, “Get the fuck down.” Kurt Keady was visiting Block, and Keady and Block 

disarmed Collins. 

 Collins testified that he went to Block’s apartment with Scott Davis because Davis owed 

Block money. Collins testified that Davis and Block conversed in the outside foyer of Block’s 

apartment and that Block went inside his apartment, returning a short time later with a pistol. 

Collins testified that Block hit him with the pistol. Collins denied entering Block’s apartment. 

 Collins was charged with armed statutory burglary, two counts of attempted robbery, and 

three counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. At the conclusion of the 

evidence, the trial judge dismissed the two counts of attempted robbery and the related firearm 

charges. The trial judge stated the evidence was “just not quite sufficient to prove an attempt to 

rob because I could just as easily hypothesize that [Collins] was going to [commit] murder . . . or 

some other thing that qualifies under the statutory burglary charge.” 

ANALYSIS

 Collins argues the evidence was insufficient to convict him of statutory burglary, 

reasoning that, because the evidence was insufficient to prove a specific intent to rob as required 

for attempted robbery, the evidence was also insufficient to prove the armed statutory burglary 

charge.1

 For the reasons that follow, we disagree. 

Code § 18.2-90 provides in part: 

If any person in the nighttime enters without breaking or in the 

daytime breaks and enters or enters and conceals himself in a 

dwelling house . . . with intent to commit murder, rape, robbery or 

arson in violation of §§ 18.2-77, 18.2-79 or § 18.2-80, he shall be 

deemed guilty of statutory burglary, which offense shall be a Class 

3 felony. However, if such person was armed with a deadly 

 1

 Collins contends the armed burglary charge was based upon his unlawful entry into the 

apartment with the intent to commit a robbery. 
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weapon at the time of such entry, he shall be guilty of a Class 2 

felony. 

“‘[W]hether the required intent exists is generally a question for the trier of fact.’” 

Haywood v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 562, 565-66, 458 S.E.2d 606, 608 (1995) (citation 

omitted). 

When an unlawful entry is made into the dwelling of another, the 

presumption is that the entry is made for an unlawful purpose. The 

specific purpose, meaning specific intent, with which such an entry 

is made may be inferred from the surrounding facts and 

circumstances. Thus, the [trier of fact] was entitled to draw on all 

the circumstances shown by the evidence to determine what [the 

defendant’s] intent actually was when he entered the apartment. 

Scott v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 519, 524, 323 S.E.2d 572, 575 (1984) (internal citations 

omitted). 

[A] person often acts with two or more criminal intentions. A 

person may commit a crime with more than one purpose, and the 

fact that the act is done with two or more specific objectives does 

not mean that the Commonwealth has failed to prove the specific 

intent to commit the charged crime. Thus, when the 

Commonwealth proves beyond a reasonable doubt that an accused 

has committed a criminal act with both a primary and a secondary 

purpose in mind, both or either of which purposes are criminal, the 

Commonwealth has met its burden of proving the element of 

specific intent. 

Hughes v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 510, 530-31, 446 S.E.2d 451, 463 (1994) (en banc)

(Coleman, J., concurring). 

Collins was indicted for unlawfully entering Block’s residence “with the intent to commit 

robbery or a felony, in violation of Code § 18.2-90.” Although the trial judge determined there 

was insufficient evidence to support the attempted robbery charges, he found that Collins had 

“some criminal responsibility” for unlawfully entering Block’s apartment while armed with a 

firearm. Collins entered Block’s residence, pointed a firearm at Block, and ordered Block and 

Keady to get down. Instead of complying with Collins’ command, Block and Keady fought 
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back. The determination of Collins’ intent when he unlawfully entered Block’s apartment was a 

question for the trier of fact. There was sufficient evidence for the trial judge to infer that 

Collins’ specific intent when he unlawfully entered the apartment with a firearm was to commit 

one of the felonies enumerated in Code § 18.2-90, such as murder. Accordingly, we affirm 

Collins’ convictions for armed statutory burglary in violation of Code § 18.2-90 and the related 

use of a firearm in the commission of a felony in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1. 

Affirmed.