In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-1265

KHOR CHIN LIM,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

COURTCALL INC., et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 11-C-748—Rudolph T. Randa, Judge.

SUBMITTED MAY 18, 2012—DECIDED JUNE 19, 2012

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and BAUER and

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge. The complaint in this suit

alleged that Courtcall, which gives notices to litigants;

fellow tenants in the apartment building where plaintiff

lives in Madison, Wisconsin; a local police officer; the

Dane County District Attorney’s Office; the Governor of

Wisconsin; and a former Prime Minister of Singapore;

all have conspired to ruin plaintiff’s life. The district
2 No. 12-1265

court dismissed this suit as fantastical. 2011 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 135733 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 17, 2011). Observing that

plaintiff had recently bombarded the court with

frivolous suits, the judge invoked the court’s power to

protect itself and the defendants from abuse of process.

Plaintiff had 30 days to appeal but took almost 90. On

February 3, 2012, he filed a motion under Fed. R. App.

P. 4(a)(6), which provides:

The district court may reopen the time to file an

appeal for a period of 14 days after the date when

its order to reopen is entered, but only if all the

following conditions are satisfied:

(A) the court finds that the moving party did

not receive notice under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 77(d) of the entry of the judgment

or order sought to be appealed within 21 days

after entry;

(B) the motion is filed within 180 days after

the judgment or order is entered or within

14 days after the moving party receives

notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

77(d) of the entry, whichever is earlier; and

(C) the court finds that no party would be

prejudiced.

28 U.S.C. §2107(c) contains similar language; for simplicity we refer to the rule without cross-referencing

the statute. Plaintiff told the judge that he was out of

the country between November 17, 2011, and January 27,

2012, and, until he opened the mail following his return,
No. 12-1265 3

did not realize that the court had dismissed this case.

Without discussing what it means to “receive notice,” the

court reopened the time for appeal.

We ordered a limited remand so that the judge could

consider both the meaning of “receive notice” and whether

plaintiff’s factual representation was honest—for in

another case plaintiff asserted that he had not learned of

the very same judgment until February 16, 2012. We

observed that “one of these representations must be

false. Perhaps both are false.” Khor Chin Lim v. Courtcall

Inc., No. 12-1265 (7th Cir. Apr. 24, 2012) (nonprecedential

order). The inconsistency had led the district judge to

deny plaintiff’s motion under Rule 4(a)(6) in the other

case, which we dismissed. Khor Chin Lim v. Staples Inc.,

No. 12-1405 (7th Cir. Apr. 24, 2012) (nonprecedential

disposition). The fate of this appeal remained to be decided.

On remand, the judge concluded that plaintiff was

truthful in asserting that he was out of the country until

January 27, 2012, and learned about the adverse judgment only after his return. But the judge revoked his

order under Rule 4(a)(6), concluding not only that it

does not matter when a litigant opens his mail, but also

that it does not matter whether the litigant receives a copy

of the judgment at all. Here is the reasoning: (1) Rule

4(a)(6)(A) conditions reopening on a judicial finding

that the litigant “did not receive notice under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the entry of the judgment or order sought to be appealed within 21 days

after entry”; (2) Rule 77(d)(1) provides that, immediately
4 No. 12-1265

after entering a judgment, the clerk “must serve notice

of the entry, as provided in Rule 5(b), on each party who

is not in default”; (3) Rule 5(b)(2)(C) in turn provides

that service by mail is complete on mailing. It follows,

the judge thought, that a litigant “receives” notice of

judgment as soon as the clerk mails it.

We directed the parties to file memoranda discussing

how we should proceed in light of the district

court’s order. Four groups of appellees filed separate

memoranda; all four contend that the district judge’s

most recent order is correct and that we should dismiss

the appeal. Plaintiff did not follow our instruction to

file a memorandum. But he did file a motion to recuse

all three judges of the panel. He contends that the orders

we entered in this case and in Staples show that we are

biased against him. This contention is frivolous. Adverse

decisions do not establish bias or even hint at bias. See

Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994). Plaintiff’s

motion is denied.

Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) does not mesh perfectly with

Civil Rules 5(b) and 77(d). Rule 4(a)(6) talks of “receipt”

of a document under Rule 77(d); but Rules 77(d) and 5(b)

concern “service” rather than receipt. The committee

notes to Rule 4(a)(6) show that it is designed to allow a

district judge to reopen the time for appeal if notice of

the judgment does not arrive—whether the fault lies

with the clerk or the Postal Service. The district court’s

most recent decision would prevent the rule from

serving that function.

The committee note to the 2005 amendment, which

added the phrase on which the district judge relied,
No. 12-1265 5

shows that reference to “notice under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 77(d)” tells us what kind of notice

Rule 4(a)(6) is talking about: the notice that the district

clerk must give under Rule 77(d). Until 2005 notice

from another litigant (written or oral) could prevent a

litigant from obtaining extra time, even if the clerk never

sent notice (or the mail went awry). The new language

means that only notice under Rule 77 suffices. By

saying that service is complete on mailing, Rule 5(b)(2)(C)

tells us that the clerk’s task is accomplished when the

mail is turned over to the Postal Service; the clerk need

not obtain a return receipt. This rule for what it means

to “serve” a document does not tell us that service

equals receipt; otherwise Rule 4(a)(6)(A) would have

said “the court finds that the clerk did not serve notice

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the entry

of the judgment” rather than “the court finds that the

moving party did not receive notice under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the entry of the judgment”.

Other courts of appeals share our view that a document is not “received” under Rule 4(a)(6) until it arrives

at the litigant’s address. See, e.g., Williams v. Washington

Convention Center Authority, 481 F.3d 856 (D.C. Cir. 2007);

Poole v. Family Court of New Castle County, 368 F.3d 263 (3d

Cir. 2004). As far as we can tell, no court of appeals

has accepted the district court’s conclusion that a document is “received” for the purpose of Rule 4(a)(6) the

instant it is “served” under Rules 5(b) and 77(d).

But our conclusion that a document is “received” when

delivered to the proper address does not assist plaintiff.
6 No. 12-1265

When he came home on January 27, the judgment was

waiting for him. It had been both served by the clerk

and delivered by the Postal Service. Plaintiff does not

offer any reason to doubt that it arrived within 21 days

of the judgment’s entry. Instead he contends that a document is not “received” until the envelope is opened and

the contents read. He does not furnish any support for

that proposition (recall that he failed to comply

with our order to file a memorandum of law), and we

could not find any. Delivery to the address on file (the

litigant’s, or the litigant’s lawyer’s if the litigant is represented by counsel) is the normal meaning of receipt in

law. No authority of which we are aware holds that a

litigant may defer “receipt” of a document by failing to

open the envelope containing it. Quite the contrary, this

circuit recently rejected just such a contention. See Ho

v. Donovan, 569 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2009). Neither the text

of Rule 4(a)(6), nor anything in the committee notes,

suggests that “receive” has an unusual meaning.

Plaintiff could have asked the Postal Service, or a

friend, to forward his mail. He could have furnished

the district court with an address where mail would

reach him while he was abroad, or the name and

address of an agent who would receive mail on his

behalf and relay it to him. He could have checked the

district court’s electronic docket, which is available from

anywhere in the world. (Plaintiff told the district court

that it was by checking the electronic docket, known as

PACER, that he discovered the judgment in Staples.)

Each of these options would have protected his opportunity to appeal, but he chose none of them.
No. 12-1265 7

The time to appeal is limited by statute, see 28 U.S.C.

§2107, and this limit is jurisdictional. See Bowles v.

Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007). The judiciary is not entitled

to add time just because a litigant fails to open or read

his mail—or for any other extra-statutory reason. The

district court therefore properly revoked the earlier

order that had reopened the time for appeal, and this

appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

6-19-12