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44–585 PDF 2009

S. Hrg. 110–749 

PLANNING FOR POST-CATASTROPHE HOUSING 

NEEDS: HAS FEMA DEVELOPED AN EFFECTIVE 

STRATEGY FOR HOUSING LARGE NUMBERS 

OF CITIZENS DISPLACED BY DISASTER? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 30, 2008 

Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana, Chairman 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

DONNY WILLIAMS, Staff Director 

APRILLE RAABE, Minority Staff Director 

KELSEY STROUD, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statement: Page 

Senator Landrieu .............................................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 30, 2008 

Admiral Harvey E. Johnson, Jr., Deputy Administrator, U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ............. 6 

David Garratt, Acting Director of Recovery Efforts, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ............................... 18 

Jan C. Opper, Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Disaster Policy and 

Management, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ............ 18 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Garratt, David: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 18 

Joint prepared statement with Admiral Johnson .......................................... 27 

Johnson, Admiral Harvey E., Jr.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Joint prepared statement with Mr. Garrett ................................................... 27 

Opper, Jan C.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 37 

APPENDIX 

Chart entitled ‘‘FEMA National Disaster Housing Strategy,’’ submitted by 

Senator Landrieu ................................................................................................. 40 

Prepared statements submitted for the Record from: 

Kirk H. Tate, CPM, Chief Executive Officer, Orion Real Estate Services, 

Houston, Texas .............................................................................................. 41 

National Association of Realtors ..................................................................... 47 

Questions and responses submitted for the Record from: 

Admiral Johnson and Mr. Garrett .................................................................. 51 

Mr. Opper .......................................................................................................... 73 

(1) 

PLANNING FOR POST-CATASTROPHE 

HOUSING NEEDS: HAS FEMA DEVELOPED 

AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY FOR HOUSING 

LARGE NUMBERS OF CITIZENS DISPLACED 

BY DISASTER? 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 30, 2008 

U.S. SENATE,

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:06 p.m., in 

room SD–562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Mary 

Landrieu, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senator Landrieu. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANDRIEU 

Senator LANDRIEU. Good afternoon. I would like to call the Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery hearing on Planning for Post-Catastrophe Housing Needs to order. This is the first Subcommittee 

hearing of our housing investigation of FEMA’s handling of the 

post-Katrina and post-Rita Hurricanes aftermath. 

I would like to begin with an opening statement, and then I will 

introduce our panelists. We have two panels today. I will introduce 

them in just a moment, but I would like to open with a statement 

expressing where we are and what the importance of this meeting 

is today. 

Today, as I said, is the first hearing of the Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery investigation of national disaster housing programs. 

On February 13, 2008, the Senate provided this Subcommittee a 

supplemental budget to fund this bipartisan investigation. The request and subsequent approval for the investigations were brought 

about by a series of problems that emerged in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

FEMA’s housing efforts in the aftermath of the storm failed to 

meet, in my view, the desperate needs of the survivors of the 

storm, making it clear to the Nation that this agency had no real 

plan for how to house tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of 

people in the aftermath of a catastrophic disaster. 

The rush decision to use travel trailers as the preliminary means 

of housing is of great concern to this Subcommittee. The discovery 

of alarmingly high formaldehyde levels in these trailers subseVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:25 Mar 31, 2009 Jkt 044585 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\44585.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
2 

quently underscored FEMA’s inability to provide safe choices to 

house survivors of these catastrophes. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, as I have said many times and as 

the record will show, was the most destructive natural disaster in 

our Nation’s history. Over 1,500 people lost their lives. Ninety 

thousand square miles of land was impacted, and entire coastal 

towns and large portions of substantial cities in Mississippi and 

Louisiana were destroyed. The storms sent over a million fleeing 

from the Gulf Coast area. 

The housing crisis created by the storms was unprecedented; it 

destroyed over 300,000 homes, and resutled in billions of dollars in 

damage to public infrastructure. Evacuees—as we remember only 

3 years from the end of this next month, August 29, 2005—were 

forced from their homes and had to take shelter wherever it was 

available, whether it was with family or friends or whether it was 

in a football stadium or whether it was on a highway overpass. 

Some sat in these situations for days before buses to Houston, Little Rock, Shreveport, Jackson, Baton Rouge, or other places became 

available. 

Many were flown to places or bused to places where they had no 

family, no friends, no jobs, no connections to the lives that they 

were living only a few days before. 

This catastrophe presented a clear challenge to the people of the 

United States, to our nonprofit system, and to all levels of government. With the impacted States completely overwhelmed and local 

governments overwhelmed, the Federal Government was called 

upon to fulfill its Stafford Act obligations to respond, and it was 

clear that this would take time and new solutions to rebuild the 

damaged housing stock. Creativity and bold action would need to 

be the order of the day. Unfortunately, in my view—and I think 

our Subcommittee will find this out—it was not to be found. 

In this environment, FEMA’s decision was to use travel trailers. 

They began ordering manufactured housing almost immediately, 

eventually resulting in 140,000 travel trailers and mobile homes in 

the Gulf Coast area. Group sites at great expense were set up all 

over the region. Many homeowners lived in trailers in their driveways while they made repairs, and some of that is still going on. 

As the recovery effort continued, the situation on the ground 

made it clear that FEMA was not ready for this housing challenge. 

It was evident that the agency did not have a plan in place for a 

housing catastrophe of this magnitude. Consistent delays, poor coordination, problems with maintenance, and a seeming lack of leadership sent a message to the Nation that it was not working, and 

we must be better prepared for the next catastrophe. 

So Congress acted. Congress drafted legislation. Before I was 

even a Member of this Subcommittee, Congress drafted legislation 

aimed at getting this situation under control and giving some direction to this agency that, in the view not just of Congress, not just 

of the Governors, but in the view of many in the Nation, had failed. 

And on October 4, 2006, the President signed into law the resulting 

bill, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act 

(PKEMRA). 

The overarching purpose of this bill was to ensure that a Federal 

response, like the one we had in Hurricane Katrina, would never 

3 

1The chart referred to appears in the Appendix on page 40. 

happen again. A direct result of the Katrina-created housing catastrophe was the requirement that FEMA develop and implement a 

disaster housing plan within 270 days of the bill’s passage—not 15 

days, not 60 days, not even 90 days—270 days FEMA had to get 

this plan together. 

As you can see on this chart,1 the FEMA National Disaster 

Housing Strategy, which is also included in this packet, the due 

date for this strategy was July 1, 2007. As I have said, FEMA was 

required by law to submit the strategy to Congress. FEMA did not 

submit this strategy until 10 days ago. 

As you can see from the charts we have put up here, the Subcommittee has direct oversight jurisdiction of this strategy, and as 

part of our investigation we are going to find out why this was late; 

and as for the report that was submitted, does it actually meet the 

requirements of the law? 

I believe, based on my initial review, the strategy fails to do 

what is required by the law. The fact that FEMA had 20 months 

to come up with an innovative and effective plan and still missed 

the mark is absolutely unacceptable. I fear that we are no better 

prepared today than we were 3 years ago when Hurricanes Katrina 

and Rita struck unmercifully on the Gulf Coast. 

I would like to share briefly some of the Subcommittee’s analysis. 

First, the strategy fails to meet the legal requirements of 

PKEMRA. Of nine required improvements to FEMA’s Disaster 

Housing Strategy, FEMA passed off six of them to a yet-to-beformed entity called the ‘‘Disaster Housing Task Force.’’ In fact, 

FEMA passed over one dozen of the most critical planning duties 

to this non-existent task force. FEMA was instructed to make and 

implement a plan, not hand this job off to an entity that has yet 

to be formed. And let me repeat: FEMA was instructed by a law 

passed by Congress and signed by the President to make and implement a plan, not hand the job off to an entity that is not yet 

formed. 

It has been almost 3 years since Hurricane Katrina, and that 

raises several questions. Why did it take FEMA 20 months to come 

up with this? What new and creative approaches does this strategy 

offer? FEMA openly admits the strategy is not a plan, so what is 

the difference between a strategy and a plan? And how could a 

strategy operate without one? 

Last, are we more prepared today than we were 3 years ago in 

the event of a catastrophic disaster, whether it is caused by a hurricane or an earthquake? We just had a reminder of that in Los 

Angeles yesterday. And we could only think of other situations that 

could occur where hundreds of thousands or millions of people are 

without housing. And we do not have a plan. I don’t know if we 

have a strategy. And we don’t even yet have a task force, it seems, 

according to what FEMA has presented. 

As everyone knows, the use of trailers as interim housing in the 

aftermath of Hurricane Katrina was pretty much a failure. Trailer 

residents were exposed to formaldehyde that threatens their 

health. Not reported and undocumented because we have not been 

able to receive this information yet, despite our requests, is the 

4 

number of fires and explosions that occurred in these trailers, 

which will be the subject of another hearing for me at some time 

in the future. 

I know FEMA includes trailers in the strategy as a last resort 

to be used only when requested by States during catastrophes and 

for short periods, not just the past 6 months. My problem with this 

strategy is since it outlines no other options, we are going to get 

to the last resort pretty quickly. And I have serious problems with 

this part of the plan. The strategy’s lack of detailed plans, programs, roles, and responsibilities leaves the American people at 

risk for future catastrophes. 

For those of you that are tired of hearing about Hurricane 

Katrina and Rita, I can most certainly understand why. I am actually tired of saying those names myself. And I am even more tired 

of going home to Louisiana and still seeing people that have been 

displaced, victims living under overpasses, having to fight for 18 

months for 3,000—only 3,000—housing vouchers that took us 2 

years to fight this Administration to get, because we cannot afford 

to send even the most vulnerable people a voucher to live in a decent place. So their choice is either live in a trailer with formaldehyde or under an overpass. I think America can do better. 

What is worse is this problem which was discovered during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For the rest of the country, it could happen to you. Again, an earthquake in Los Angeles yesterday, we are 

blessed that the damage was relatively minimal. What is going to 

happen if we have a major earthquake in this country and hundreds of thousands of people are displaced from their homes? We 

do not even have a task force organized to come up with a plan, 

let alone have come up with one. 

The lack of a plan should not imply a lack of effort on Congress’ 

part, and let me say on behalf of my colleagues, both Democrats 

and Republicans, I don’t know what more Congress could do. I 

don’t know what more Congress can do. They have had hearing 

after hearing, documents submitted, laws drafted, laws passed, 

deadlines set. This is not a blame of Members of Congress, Republican or Democrat. This problem falls squarely, Admiral Johnson, 

at your feet and the leadership of FEMA and the Administration. 

The strategy takes pains to place a higher burden for preparation 

on individuals. That is one of the things in the strategy that we 

received, as if the individuals themselves did not do a good job or 

swim fast enough out of their homes. I think we all agree that people can be more prepared, people should be more prepared, and, in 

fact, people should have an evacuation strategy. But, again, I will 

remind you that in this disaster, just like in the next one that will 

occur, people will say after it happens, ‘‘This has never happened 

here before. We have never had this kind of water before. We have 

never had an earthquake before.’’ 

It is your job to recognize that people will not normally know 

that they are in a danger zone, and when disaster strikes, the government must be able to act swiftly and boldly. And, yes, we do 

have to encourage individual effort. I was happy to see that, but 

to rely on this is just, I think, wholly inappropriate. 

It also overlooks the fact that it is difficult to contact FEMA 

when your home is a pile of rubble and you do not have access to 

5 

telephones or Internet, which was another interesting aspect of our 

Federal Government’s requirement. For people who had lost everything in their home, before they could get a loan through the Small 

Business Administration, they had to provide, as I recall, five clean 

copies—not in blue ink, but in black, as the requirement of the 

Federal Government—of their last tax returns before they could 

apply. When the Small Business Administration sits somewhat in 

proximity to the IRS, it would seem to be impossible for the Federal Government to work with the agency across the street, and yet 

expected disaster victims to provide five clean copies of their last 

5 years’ tax returns before they could even request help. So if you 

are expecting someone to pick up the phone and call you, your plan 

should realize they may not have phones, and we need to think 

about that—or the Internet. 

Our investigation has uncovered stories of families sleeping in 

shifts so they could pass the phone around as they waited for a 

FEMA representative to pick it up. And I want to repeat that. We 

know of families that slept in shifts so that when the FEMA representative answered the phone, someone would be awake to take 

the call. And my question in this Subcommittee is: What have we 

done to correct that? 

The strategy reflects progress in some areas. The appointment of 

State and local emergency managers to coordinate the emergency 

shelters is a good recommendation, but, on the other hand—since 

I am on Appropriations, I will put my hat on here. On the other 

hand, while you all appointed more people at the State level to do 

their job and basically said this is about individuals and the State, 

this Administration cut funding for training. So I just want that to 

be part of the record. 

I was pleased to see that FEMA now requires formaldehyde testing, certification for all manufactured housing, should the States 

request it. However, I did get a call from the Governor of Iowa, 

who after the storms last week asked me if he had to take trailers 

with mold, or was he allowed to return them. I told him to return 

them with dispatch and suggest that FEMA send him trailers without mold. I hope that was done. 

I expected a detailed plan or at the very least one that complied 

with the law because FEMA told Congress time and time again it 

would be something we could be proud of and, more importantly, 

something that would help prepare disaster mechanisms for a catastrophe in the future. Neither of these seem to be true. 

In addition to the strategy, we will consider whether the Hurricane Pam simulation in 2004 led to the development of a plan or 

not. The exercise did in 2004, as you all remember, right before the 

storms, predict how a massive hurricane would impact New Orleans. The outcome yielded very important predictions, but, sadly, 

none of that information seems to have gotten into the hands in a 

useful way of this agency to do anything before Hurricanes Katrina 

and Rita, which happened later in the summer. 

So let me close by saying this: I speak confidently for myself and 

my colleagues when I say that we want FEMA to be successful. We 

are doing everything we know how to do to help you be successful. 

We have passed laws. We have increased your funding. We have 

given you flexibility. We have provided everything that you have 

6 

1The joint prepared statement of Admiral Johnson and Mr. Garrett appears in the Appendix 

on page 27. 

asked of us to my knowledge. And yet today, 3 years later, we sit 

with what you have submitted as a housing plan which basically 

says our plan is to establish a plan by creating a task force that 

does not yet exist. Admiral Johnson, this is unacceptable. 

So, with this opening statement, we are going to start this hearing, and we are going to continue to have hearings until we can 

find out, using all appropriate investigative techniques, why we are 

in this situation because, obviously, we must figure that out so we 

can move forward. 

I am going to ask Admiral Johnson to begin the first panel. I do 

not think he need any introduction, but for those that might not 

recognize his name, he is now the Deputy Administrator officer at 

FEMA. He was commander of the Coast Guard Pacific Area before 

joining FEMA in 2006. He served as Director of Homeland Security 

Task Force Southwest, and he has extensive background and capabilities, obviously, in these areas. 

So I thank you for being with us today, Admiral. We look forward to your testimony. And then we will have a round of questions. 

Unfortunately, I am going to have to close this hearing at 1:40 

because of a previous commitment. We may be joined by other colleagues. But if you could—I think we have limited your opening 

statement to 5 minutes, and then we will have a round of questioning. 

Please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HARVEY E. JOHNSON, JR.,1 DEPUTY 

ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Admiral JOHNSON. Chairman Landrieu, Senator Stevens when 

he arrives, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you 

for this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the challenges of disaster housing, and specifically FEMA’s recent release 

of the draft National Disaster Housing Strategy. This draft inviting 

us to testify on the subject of disaster housing. This draft strategy 

was released last Wednesday to initiate a 60-day public comment 

period and as required by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, it has been specifically provided to the FEMA 

National Advisory Council, to the National Council on Disabilities, 

as well as the pertinent Federal departments and agencies for their 

review and comment. I expect to engage with each of these groups 

and many others over the next 60 days, actively seeking comment 

and suggestions such that later in the fall we can release the final 

strategy and embark on a deliberate course to achieve the visions 

and goals outlined in the strategy. 

The draft National Disaster Housing Strategy is likely one of the 

most significant documents prepared by FEMA and released under 

the umbrella of the National Response Framework. The strategy 

describes how the Nation currently provides housing to those affected by disaster, and, more importantly, it charts a new direction 

for where our disaster housing efforts must focus if we, as a NaVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:25 Mar 31, 2009 Jkt 044585 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\44585.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
7 

tion, are to better understand and meet the emergency disaster 

housing needs of disaster victims and communities. 

This strategy captures lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina 

and subsequent disasters. It embraces the larger issues of disaster 

victims beyond simply providing a structure and seeks innovative 

and creative housing options. It also elevates issues of safety and 

security and access to those within disabilities, emphasizes again 

and again the value of planning, and differentiates the catastrophic 

event above all other disasters. 

For the first time in a single document, the strategy addresses 

all forms of housing and suggests that these issues merit full-time 

attention before and between disasters, not just traditionally at 

just-in-time, short-term, sporadic interest just after a specific disaster. 

There are three attributes that distinguish the strategy and the 

role that it will have to shape the disaster housing efforts across 

the Nation. 

First, the strategy is, in fact, a strategy. It is an essential precursor to a plan, but intentionally not a plan in and of itself. As 

a strategy, it captures the challenges of disaster housing, clarifies 

roles and responsibilities, establishes key principles, and sets 

courses for new directions and pragmatic solutions in sheltering, 

interim housing, and permanent housing. As a strategy, it describes the national vision and strategic goals—neither of which, by 

the way, existed before—key building blocks for plans, policies, and 

procedures. Its purpose is to frame the issue, engage in collaborative discussion, and ensure that every subsequent action taken 

contributes to strengthening the disaster housing capabilities at 

every level of jurisdiction. 

Differentiating a strategy from a plan is not an issue of semantics. It is an issue of leadership to effectively meet our shared objectives. A national strategy is the first step in developing integrated disaster housing plans across the Nation that all support a 

common vision and goals. The strategy will provide a common basis 

for synchronized disaster housing plans at the local, State, and 

Federal Government, as well as plans of our key partners, including nongovernmental organizations and private sector. 

Second, this strategy is imbued with the imperative that disaster 

housing solutions be defined and achieved collaboratively. Addressing challenges of disaster housing should not be driven from the 

Federal level; rather, we must provide leadership, set the pace, and 

actively engage and gain commitment from individuals and communities from States, Federal partners, NGOs, and the private sector, and from other elements in order to achieve the strategy. 

Third, the strategy embraces the need for immediate action by 

framing FEMA’s establishment of a Standing National Disaster 

Task Force charged specifically to aggressively implement the 

strategy. Far from passing the buck, reassigning duties, handing 

off, or outsourcing the problem, FEMA will own the strategy. 

FEMA will retain responsibility, and we will lead the charge and 

reach to the representatives of State and local governments, people 

with disabilities, NGOs, the private sector, individuals, and other 

constituents to implement the strategy and achieve its purpose. 

8 

While we may not have described the task force as well as we 

could have, one point should be made very clear. This is no other 

entity in government or elsewhere that offers a full-time daily focus 

and commitment to addressing what you, Madam Chairman, and 

most disaster victims would describe as one of the most important 

elements of disaster response and recovery, that being disaster 

housing. 

While this strategy has only been in the public view for just one 

more day than week, it has drawn a number of comments, some 

favorable and some not. On the downside, I acknowledge that the 

document is late. It was due in July last year. I apologize for 

FEMA that we did not meet this date, but the time has been well 

spent as we continue to learn, understand, and appreciate the 

many elements of disaster housing. We could not have produced 

this document 1 year ago, and I trust that the value of having a 

strategy will overshadow the late date of its delivery. 

Another criticism is that the strategy is not responsive to the requirements set forth in PKEMRA. While a fair observation of the 

draft strategy, the elements specified in PKEMRA will be contained 

in the final version of the strategy, yet the point must be made 

that, absent this document, the collection of the specifications in 

PKEMRA would not have made a strategy as collectively they do 

not create a vision or an integrated set of goals. Yet with this strategy as a foundation and with the Standing National Disaster Task 

Force as the engine, the specifications enumerated in PKEMRA 

will find their value. 

On the positive side of the ledger, there are those who recognize 

the value of a strategy, see that we for the first time in a single 

document have described all the elements of disaster housing in 

terms of challenges and new directions. There are those who recognize that existing housing plans are not integrated, but that by 

bringing these efforts together, we will be able to make more 

progress and address the diverse needs of communities and States 

across the Nation. 

There are those who appreciate recognition of the broader human 

need as an element of disaster housing. There are those who are 

standing in the aisles even now, ready to support the implementation efforts of the National Disaster Housing Task Force. 

Madam Chairman, as you and your staff took pen to paper and 

had a large hand in drafting the requirements for the strategy 

within PKEMRA, I trust that you as well will see that this strategy 

meets your purpose to establish valuable and pragmatic public policy that will elevated preparedness and provide better assistance to 

disaster victims. While understandably impatient that this could 

not have been accomplished long ago, I trust that the point now is 

to draw on the State and local partners, Federal partners and the 

NGOs, the private sector and all those who work in disaster housing to roll up their sleeves and do the work necessary to develop 

plans and, more importantly, the capabilities to implement effective disaster housing plans. These plans need to be effective for all 

hazards, for all disasters, from small to catastrophic, and to meet 

the full and broader needs of disaster victims. FEMA recognizes 

those challenges and is ready to provide the leadership to accomplish all of those objectives. 

9 

Thank you for this opportunity, and I am prepared to respond to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Johnson and Mr. Garratt 

follows:] 

Senator LANDRIEU. My first question is that there are seven provisions, as you are aware, that are the core of the law that Congress passed requiring this strategy. And I have in my hand the 

requirements of the law, and Congress said in this law that a strategy should be developed—not may be developed, but a strategy 

shall be developed. 

The seven missing annexes, though, that were required by Congress, the first is Annex Number 1, Housing Programs; Number 2, 

and it is blank, as you can see; Number 2, Methods of Housing Victims, that is blank; Number 3, Programs for Low-Income Housing 

Populations, that is blank; group site housing. 

These seven provisions were the core of the law that Congress 

asked you all to provide. Why are these seven mandates required 

still blank? And when do you think the law requires you to fill 

them in? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Madam Chairman, in the strategy, in developing the document in response to Katrina, which did ask for a 

strategy, these seven annexes are under development. We have 

staffs working to complete those now, and we anticipate that when 

we publish the final strategy in the fall, they will have each of 

those components fairly represented. And as we are writing these 

annexes, we are reaching out to involve all the relevant agencies, 

State and locals and others who have equity inside each of those 

annexes to be part of that process. 

In my view, those elements in and of themselves would not have 

met your purpose. They would have been without any foundation. 

They are almost independent efforts that collectively will help to 

respond to what the Nation needs in terms of disaster housing. 

They will all find greater value when the foundation which is 

there, which is, I believe, the strategy we provided in draft. And 

so as a complete package, I believe we will meet your objectives. 

We will meet every letter of the law. 

Senator LANDRIEU. But why, in your view, since I am not privy— 

and no one is—to even the drafting of these annexes that are 

blank, why, in your view, would it have been inadequate, do you 

think, for this Subcommittee? What in the draft would lead you to 

that conclusion? 

Admiral JOHNSON. As you commented in our separate meetings 

and in multiple hearings, you pointed to an array of issues that we 

must confront as a Nation. And in confronting those issues, we can 

have a bunch of independent discussions which each of these elements of the annexes could very well generate independent discussions of those important issues. But nothing brings them together, 

nothing draws focus to where they really are. And the language of 

the law asked us to describe, and so in at least four or five of those 

seven is to describe. Describing will not tell us where we need to 

go as a Nation to improve our capabilities. So we believe that the 

strategies we provide—it does bring into a single document the elements of shelter, interim housing, and permanent housing. It does 

clearly realign roles and responsibilities, which I think—I hope you 

10 

would acknowledge were misaligned in Katrina. It sets the foundation of perspective and context to take each of now these seven annexes and to bring them together into an effective plan that approaches disaster housing. 

So I believe this is really the glue that pulls them all together 

and ties them and gives them a sense of direction and purpose. 

Senator LANDRIEU. But I think what is puzzling, if I might, Admiral Johnson, is the law says the National Disaster Housing 

Strategy—it does not say ‘‘plan.’’ It does say ‘‘strategy.’’ But it says 

‘‘. . . shall, one, outline the most efficient and cost-effective Federal 

programs that will best meet the short-term and long-term housing 

needs of individuals and households affected by a major disaster; 

two, clearly define the role, programs, authorities, and responsibilities of each entity in providing housing assistance.’’ Some of these 

entities are HUD, Agriculture, Veterans Affairs, Health and 

Human Services, Indian Affairs. None of that was done. 

It says, ‘‘Three, it should describe in detail the programs that 

may be offered by entities.’’ That has not been done. ‘‘Outline any 

funding issues.’’ 

It is hard not to conclude that someone either instructed or suggested that none of those details be filled in because it might cost 

something. I have to just say the law required you in very clear 

English to come up with these strategies, and you have turned in 

a report with blank paper saying, well, we know we were supposed 

to do it, but we did not do it, and now we are going to set up a 

task force to do it, and it is 3 years? Not 30 days, not 90 days, 3 

years. I don’t know how to conclude this. I am looking for an answer. Was it that no one in the Administration or maybe someone 

else in the Cabinet said you could not put anything down on the 

paper if it cost anything? Why isn’t anything on this paper? 

Admiral JOHNSON. One of the comments that you made at the 

very beginning was that the lack of a plan does not indicate the 

absence of effort on the part of Congress, and I think that is exactly right. And I would say that the lack of words on that 

paper—— 

Senator LANDRIEU. This is not about—excuse me. 

Admiral JOHNSON [continuing]. Does not indicate a lack of—— 

Senator LANDRIEU. Excuse me, Admiral Johnson—— 

Admiral JOHNSON [continuing]. Effort on the part of FEMA. 

Senator LANDRIEU. This is not about Congress. I said Congress 

could not have done any more than Congress has done—let me finish. One of Congress’ jobs is to pass laws. We did pass a law. 

Admiral JOHNSON. Right. 

Senator LANDRIEU. And the President signed it into law. And the 

law is very clear. We required your agency, with some specificity, 

to develop a strategy that could be described as a plan, because it 

is very clear, and the fact is that we do not have one. And I am 

trying to find out why these pages are blank, and I don’t understand your answer. So try again. Why are these pages blank? And 

what was it actually that prevented you, if you could name two or 

three things that prevented you from filling in some of this detail. 

Admiral JOHNSON. First of all, I think the law is a very good law, 

and the law is very clear. And when FEMA publishes the final 

strategy in the fall, it will, in fact, have each of those elements in 

11 

it. And so what you are reviewing is the draft strategy, so the draft 

does not have those annexes complete. We are working those annexes concurrently, and when we publish the final strategy in the 

fall, that will have those annexes. 

But, again, I believe that while each of those are very well directed, we have no quarrel with any of the seven. They were very 

well chosen. They are very well described in the law. And just as 

building a house, for example, every house needs a foundation, I 

view this as the strategy that we provided is the foundation to advance the issues of disaster housing. And on top of that foundation, 

with the course set by that strategy, each of these becomes very 

implement. 

And so when we do complete these and publish the final in compliance with the law, admittedly late, you will find that we address 

each of those issues in the final version of the strategy. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. Let me just remind everyone for the 

record that the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee’s Hurricane Katrina investigation staff called 325 witnesses. 

It had over 838,000 pages of documentation and 22 public hearings, 

which we thought—and, again, I was not a Member of the Committee but was influential in some of this, as you know. We 

thought, I know the Members of Congress thought, that was a pretty good foundation to give you all a head start. 

So, again, 325 witnesses, 838,000 pages, and 22 public hearings 

was the foundation. We handed all that information, which is the 

public record, over to FEMA and said, ‘‘We know this is a difficult 

time. Take this information from all comments and build a housing 

strategy that we can provide to the Nation.’’ We gave you a time 

frame, and we get blank pages late. 

Now, I just cannot tell you how upsetting this is to not just me 

but to the Members of Congress that have worked so hard on this. 

And my question is again—I am going to ask you for the record. 

When will you complete the strategy as required by the law? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Let me respond and preface that by saying 

again that you have about seven blank pages, but you have 81 

pages that are filled, and those 81 pages provide a very valuable 

foundation and, again, a good synopsis of our current practices. It 

reflects all the issues that you have personally advocated in terms 

of differentiating catastrophes, in terms of recognizing the broader 

needs of disaster victims beyond just the structure itself, in terms 

of providing access to those who have disabilities and young and 

old and other issues. Every issue that you have raised personally 

and advocated for you will find inside that document as a solid 

foundation for the strategy. 

It is our full intent to—as you know, there is a 60-day comment 

period. That will end September 22. We will receive those comments back, adjudicate those comments, go through a clearance 

process, and we will release it in the fall. 

I have learned my lesson from my first appearance and my first 

date not to offer a specific date, but I would say in the fall we will 

present the strategy. As we go through the comment period, we 

will be very open with you and your staff to let you know how 

many comments we receive, and it will give a sense for what the 

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12 

ments. So I can provide a better estimate once we have begun to 

receive comments. 

But, again, I think that you will find immense value in the 81 

pages that precede those 7 pages of the annexes. 

Senator LANDRIEU. I am going to have to ask you to be a little 

bit more clear than ‘‘the fall.’’ Could I ask you what month you 

might have this ready? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Madam Chairman, with the best of intentions, on your chart I indicated I would have the strategy on the 

1st of April. We all know that did not happen. I subsequently indicated I thought we could get it done in June, and we all know that 

we did not come quite close to the end of June in that strategy. 

And so, again, I think I am, candidly, very hesitant to give you 

a date. But, again, I think in the fall, early fall, we hope to have 

this strategy in final form. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. Let me ask this question: Since you have 

missed two deadlines and you are reluctant to give me a third, I 

have to ask you this: What three things—there could be 15, but 

just give me three things that are preventing you from meeting 

these deadlines? Just three. 

Admiral JOHNSON. The number one is a desire for a quality product. It did take extra time to do strategy, more so than I expected 

it to take. I personally labored over this strategy, and I am very 

pleased with the product that you have as a draft document. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. What the second thing? 

Admiral JOHNSON. So the number one is to provide a quality 

product. 

The second is to be truly collaborative, as we have indicated we 

intend to be over this 60-day comment period. As required by law, 

the National Advisory Council has this strategy. So we want to 

make sure that we do reach out and seek comments and take suggestions and bring those in. 

Senator LANDRIEU. But who would you consider your major collaborative partners? There are many, but who would you consider—other agencies are you talking about? 

Admiral JOHNSON. I think three groups, and it is—the National 

Advisory Council is our avenue to state and locals. There is a Subcommittee of the National Advisory Council that met just yesterday. I briefed them yesterday on the strategy. And they have local 

elected officials, they have representatives from NEMA, IEM. So 

that is the avenue to those. 

The second, of course, is to the Federal departments and agencies, and we are going through that administrative review now. 

And the third, I think, is the general public and make sure we 

really do hear the voices of disaster victims. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. That is a fair answer to that. What 

would be the third? You said quality, collaboration. What is the 

third barrier? 

Admiral JOHNSON. I think the third barrier—i think those are 

really the two. Those are the two things we need. The third barrier 

is really we want to be—it gets back to—first, we want to be 

thoughtful in how we accomplish this. We want to make sure that 

we do reflect good public policy. 

13 

Senator LANDRIEU. Let me ask this: Since HUD, the Department 

of Housing and Urban Development, is one of the collaborative 

partners, Can you tell us how many meetings you personally have 

had with high-level HUD officials on this? 

Admiral JOHNSON. I have probably had—between meeting personally and telephone calls, I have probably had a dozen meetings 

with HUD. 

Senator LANDRIEU. How many meetings besides telephone calls? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Probably a dozen meetings with HUD, with 

senior officials of HUD, Jan Opper who is here to testify today, either over in his offices, our offices, meeting with other officials in 

HUD. This has been discussed at the Deputy Secretary level. This 

has been briefed both to Secretary Chertoff, of course, to Secretary 

Preston. And so between FEMA and HUD, there has been a lot of 

attention to those sections of the strategy. 

Senator LANDRIEU. And how many meetings do you think you 

have had with the first partner that you outlined, which is the 

local collaborative of State and local emergency managers, approximately, that you personally have been involved in? 

Admiral JOHNSON. That I have personally been involved in? Not 

very many. In the early stages of our—— 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, who is your designated person? Who do 

you designate as tasked to get this done? 

Admiral JOHNSON. One of our other witnesses is Dave Garratt, 

the Disaster Assistance Director, who has been primarily involved 

in helping draft this strategy. In the very early drafts of this strategy, they reached out to the Red Cross, to Federal departments and 

agencies, to several States. 

Senator LANDRIEU. So while you have not been engaged directly 

in some of those meetings with your local and State partners, 

David Garratt has been engaged. 

Admiral JOHNSON. And his staff has been engaged. 

Senator LANDRIEU. I will ask him how many meetings he has 

been engaged in. 

Why didn’t FEMA establish this task force 2 years ago when this 

bill was signed into law? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Well, I think they—again, I think that would 

have been the cart before the horse. I would certainly want a task 

force to implement a plan, and so I think we would have wanted 

to do the groundwork before we had a task force and not to do that 

early. 

I think it came out—when we began this strategy, our thought 

initially was not about a task force. Our thought came in, as we 

began to learn and absorb more about disaster housing, recognized 

that there had never been a strategy before, recognized that there 

really was no single focus on disaster housing. We began to see the 

value of actually having a task force with people who do this as a 

full-time job. So I think that came out of our learning process in 

developing the strategy. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Let me move to a different line of questioning. This Subcommittee remains very confused about FEMA’s 

position on travel trailers, and you can understand why, because 

Administrator Paulison appeared before, I think it was, the entire 

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14 

ed that, ‘‘FEMA was never going to use trailers again,’’ when he 

was questioned not just by myself but other Members of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. And yet this 

strategy, basically its main focus still remains, after all of what has 

been said and done about the inadequacy of using travel trailers, 

particularly, it seems as though trailers are still a part of our housing strategy for catastrophic disaster. 

So could you please clarify? Was Administrator Paulison confused at the time? Was it something that had been decided and 

then it has been changed? Could you help clarify that? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Certainly. First, Mr. Paulison, I think, has 

never been confused. He is a wonderful person, and I think he provides strong leadership in FEMA. And I think in the strategy and 

in the plan—which I know that you have seen a copy of the 2008 

Disaster Housing Plan—it certainly is not primarily going to travel 

trailers. We go out of our way in the strategy to emphasize the desire for alternative forms of housing. FEMA stood up—after Hurricane Katrina, we stood up the Joint Housing Solutions Group to 

identify alternatives to mobile homes and travel trailers. Congress 

provided $400 million to find alternatives to mobile homes and 

travel trailers. 

This very day on the street is an application Request for Proposal 

due by August 1, 2008, offering FEMA funds to have any entity 

who has another alternative idea, a creative idea, to apply for funding. 

The City of New York has a competition which we are partici- pating in that is going to provide $10,000 to winners of a contest 

of some competition to identify alternatives to trailers. And so we 

have a number of initiatives to find alternatives to travel trailers. 

I think what you find in our strategy and what you find in the 

housing plan is a recognition that in a catastrophe where we do 

need to find all forms of housing beyond what is existing, which is 

our first line, use all rental and all existing resources, go through 

all of our alternative forms, create a form such as you will recall, 

as you mentioned, cruise liners and other forms of housing. We 

may very well find ourselves in a position to needing travel trailers, and so we did not want to take that off the table. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, for the record—go ahead—I am sorry. 

Admiral JOHNSON. Let me just add one point. We also have contract specifications I know that you are aware of, 0.016 for formaldehyde. It is the lowest contract specification that has ever been 

written with regard to formaldehyde. We have awarded one contract for park models. We will award a second within the next few 

weeks, and we will award a contract for mobile homes, all with 

that low level of formaldehyde. And so we are looking at a number 

of alternatives so we do not have to go back to travel trailers. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. Let the record reflect that no plans or 

funding requests for alternative future disasters was requested by 

FEMA to date, to our knowledge. And if we are wrong, we will be 

corrected by the record. 

The alternative housing money was put in the Appropriations 

Committee by myself and Senator Cochran, actually over the objection of FEMA, who never requested the money. We could see clearly we needed an alternative. FEMA never requested the money. 

15 

The Administration never requested the money. So we appropriated, aggressively appropriated the funding, only then to find 

out that the way that funding was distributed was wholly inadequate to Louisiana’s situation, which is the topic of a whole other 

hearing which I will not get into now. 

In addition to FEMA not requesting any money for alternatives, 

despite your acknowledgment that trailers have many problems, 

not the least of which is that it was hard in the California fires to 

lug them to the top of mountains—so this is not just about Louisiana and Mississippi. We have had testimony from California officials that said, ‘‘Senator, does FEMA realize these trailers are 

heavy and sometimes it is hard to get them to tops of mountains?’’ 

I said, ‘‘I do not think they have weighed them yet, but let me try 

to convey that to them.’’ 

So despite that, we set up a rental repair authority and said, 

‘‘trailers are not working real well, here is some money for alternative housing, which in my view you all messed up as well.’’ So 

then we said, ‘‘well, why don’t we just repair some of the rental 

units to give people a place to live, which might cost less money 

than the $50,000 to $70,000—and it is arguable, but anywhere 

from $30,000 to $75,000 to put people in a trailer 16 by 8.’’ Maybe 

we could give them $30,000 to repair a unit that people could live 

in. 

Now, we appropriated this money. To my knowledge, you have 

not used it. My question is: Why? 

Admiral JOHNSON. We have developed the IA pilot project which 

came in PKEMRA, and we are evaluating a complex right now in 

Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and we expect that we will be able to use that 

authority and do a pilot project to see if we cannot help refurbish 

units so that people in Iowa will not have to move into a travel 

trailer but can go into a rental—— 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. And what do you call this pilot again? 

What is the name of it? 

Admiral JOHNSON. IA, the Individual Assistance pilot project. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK, Individual Assistance pilot project. You 

say it is underway in Iowa. 

Admiral JOHNSON. We are finalizing our project plan, which we 

would be glad to provide to your staff when it is complete here in 

the next few days. And we expect to do this first pilot project here 

in Iowa shortly. 

Senator LANDRIEU. And the scope of it is for how many families, 

approximately? Would you know? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Our first project is probably going to be about 

20 units to get this concept down, and then we will consider other 

units in Iowa. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. So you think you have a pilot for maybe 

30 families. How many families are you trying to provide housing 

for in just Iowa? I know the tornados were in other States, but just 

approximately give us—— 

Admiral JOHNSON. In Iowa, it may be upwards of a thousand. 

Senator LANDRIEU. A thousand, OK. So in Iowa we have a challenge of trying to find housing for a thousand people. In the Gulf 

Coast, we were trying to find housing for upwards of 300,000. 

Admiral JOHNSON. Correct. 

16 

Senator LANDRIEU. That is a thousand households as opposed to 

300,000 households, not people. This program expires December 30, 

2008. Do you intend to ask for its extension? 

Admiral JOHNSON. We have not considered yet whether we will 

ask for the extension. Our expectation is that we will execute this 

pilot project, evaluate the pilot project, come back and find that, in 

fact, it does work, it is successful, and then may ask for continued 

authority to keep that as a program within FEMA. But we would 

like to go through the process, evaluate the pilot, and come back 

with a thoughtful proposal. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. Administrator Paulison told this Subcommittee in April that the Stafford Act needs to be amended because it is too restrictive and does not work for catastrophic disasters like Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. One of the provisions in 

PKEMRA invited FEMA to describe any additional authorities necessary to carry out the strategy, and yet according to our initial review, this strategy does not request a single change to the law. 

Why does FEMA fail to recommend any changes when even the 

Director of FEMA suggested that the underlying law is not adequate to provide you the legal foundation you need to respond adequately to victims of a disaster? Why does this report fail to even 

ask for any changes to the law? 

Admiral JOHNSON. One of the items in the annexes, Annex 6, 

which is consistent with PKEMRA, asked us to identify what authorities would be required, so I certainly would expect to have 

that annex complete as well when we publish the strategy in the 

fall. 

Senator LANDRIEU. So it is your intention to ask for specific 

changes to the law that would allow you all to have a better effective housing strategy in the future? 

Admiral JOHNSON. We certainly expect to comply with your request with the law and indicate those additional authorities that 

are required. 

Let me say again, though, that Director Paulison has also 

said—— 

Senator LANDRIEU. Wait, hold on. I just need to get this clear for 

the record. It is not the law, PKEMRA, that requires you, I do not 

believe, to come up with law changes. Secretary Paulison himself 

has testified that the law is inadequate. So you are his representative. Are you going to recommend changes to the law that might 

help us to provide a better housing strategy for people in the future? 

Admiral JOHNSON. It is our intent, when we publish the final 

strategy, to have in there what additional statutes are required, 

what additional authorities are required in order to carry out the 

strategy. Again, that is required here—I mention that because it is 

required as part of PKEMRA in the strategy. 

I want to also say that Administrator Paulison has also been 

very vocal to say that the Stafford Act is a very flexible piece of 

legislation, and that, in fact, perhaps an area of great focus should 

be in regulatory reform and policy reform. And so we are looking 

even now in areas of recovery, where should we be making changes 

in policy and in regulation that would de-bureaucratize and make 

more flexible the ability of FEMA to provide assistance. 

17 

As a matter of fact, in Iowa—the citizens of Iowa, Indiana, Missouri, Wisconsin, Illinois are all benefiting from lessons learned in 

Hurricane Katrina where we have changed a number of FEMA 

policies in recovery that will make it a lot easier for them to work 

with us, a lot easier to gain assistance, and accelerate recovery. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Could you just for the record list two of those 

changes that come to your mind that you are implementing now? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Certainly. The one that I think you certainly 

have an affinity for is in education, where we have looked at improved projects and alternate projects which we did not have before 

Hurricane Katrina. And we have found ways to work with communities and to give them the flexibility then to reorient their infrastructure to match their new demographics of where they want to 

rebuild their city. 

And a second also comes out of education, and that is the contents policy, where we were, as you know, very prescriptive in what 

was required—proscriptive in what was required in order to replace contents within schools. We changed that policy to the great 

benefit in Louisiana and Mississippi, and we expect to apply those 

same policies in Indiana and Iowa. The University of Iowa is probably one of the largest applicants as we get project work sheets 

completed. So my guess is they will appreciate the lessons learned 

in Louisiana with regard to both contents and improved and alternate projects. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. I have no further questions, and I guess 

that is a good note to end with. We want to try to remain positive, 

but we will not dismiss reports submitted to us late, blank pages, 

failed deadlines, inadequate requests for funding or changes to the 

law. We consider this to be a very important work of the Nation. 

I believe there is some urgency to get it right, to get it ready, to 

get it available, and to get it known. And it is going to take time 

once this strategy and plan is developed. That is why there is some 

urgency to get your job done because many other people have other 

jobs that cannot get started until this job is done. 

And so I thank you, and this record will stay open on your testimony for several days. I would like to call the next panel. Thank 

you, Admiral Johnson, and if you could stay for this next panel, I 

would appreciate it. It will just be another 30 minutes. 

On our next panel, our first witness will be David Garratt, the 

Acting Assistant Administrator of Disaster Assistance at FEMA. 

He has held various positions at FEMA, including Acting Director 

of Preparedness and Executive Operations Officer to the Assistant 

Director for Readiness, Response, and Recovery. He has also led 

the development of the Catastrophic Incident Supplement to the 

National Response Plan. 

We will next hear from Jan Opper, Associate Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Disaster Policy and Management of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. In my view, HUD has 

a very particular and important role to play as the Nation’s premier housing entity, and in my view, must work closely with 

FEMA to make sure that individuals are housed after a disaster. 

He has also managed HUD’s disaster recovery assistance and response to the Northridge earthquake, which was more than 10 

18 

1The joint prepared statement of Admiral Johnson and Mr. Garrett appears in the Appendix 

on page 27. 2The prepared statement of Mr. Opper appears in the Appendix on page 37. 

years ago; the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks; and the 2005 

hurricanes. 

I thank both of you for being with us, and we will start with you, 

Mr. Garratt, for a very brief opening statement. 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID GARRATT,1 ACTING DIRECTOR OF RECOVERY EFFORTS, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. GARRATT. Thank you, Senator. In the interest of time, I will 

forego an opening statement. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. Mr. Opper. 

TESTIMONY OF JAN C. OPPER,2 ASSOCIATE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DISASTER POLICY AND MANAGEMENT, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. OPPER. Good morning, Madam Chairman. Thank you for the 

invitation to testify at this Subcommittee hearing on Planning for 

Post-Catastrophic Housing Needs. As you indicated, I am Jan 

Opper, Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy and Management at HUD. 

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has 

traditionally been a key player in recovery from major disasters, 

particularly with respect to long-term recovery. Since 1992, HUD 

has received 22 supplemental appropriations totaling approximately $26 billion for recovery. From Hurricane Andrew to the 

Midwest floods in 1993, 1997, and now 2008, HUD was there. HUD 

was also there following the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 and 

the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York City, as you 

indicated, and offers assistance in some form after any major disaster—whether natural or manmade. 

Much of the HUD disaster funding has addressed housing-related recovery needs. That is particularly true with respect to two 

catastrophic disasters for which HUD received funding: The 

Northridge earthquake in 1994 and the Gulf Coast hurricanes of 

2005. In fact, following the Northridge earthquake, of the $505 million appropriated to HUD for the Community Development Block 

Grant program and the HOME Investment Partnerships program, 

more than $230 million of that went to restore or replace housing. 

And of the $16 billion plus in the first two supplemental appropriations in CDBG funds for the Gulf Coast, more than $11.3 billion 

is going for housing-related recovery activities. Additional amounts 

were appropriated for the Gulf Coast for a disaster voucher program. 

The point of this is to say that most of HUD’s program authorities and resources, received through supplemental appropriations, 

have focused on recovery rather than response, and the focus of recovery has mostly been long term. The long-term recovery activities 

have covered a broad span of housing, community and economic recovery, and infrastructure activities. 

The Department’s programs have been an effective resource following catastrophic and other major disasters. However, HUD has 

19 

almost entirely relied on supplemental appropriations for funding 

and only once has that included funding for staffing, support costs, 

and IT support. This has been a strain on the Department’s resources and has had an effect on catastrophic planning as well. 

Through the years, HUD has only occasionally been invited to 

participate in interagency catastrophic planning efforts. To my 

knowledge, HUD was not invited to participate in the Hurricane 

Pam simulation in 2004 that was referred to in your invitation letter to this hearing. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Could you repeat that, please? 

Mr. OPPER. I said that, to my knowledge, HUD was not invited 

to participate in the Hurricane Pam simulation in 2004 that was 

referred to in your invitation letter. 

HUD does not have its own strategy or plan for a catastrophic 

event per se, nor is it resourced to conduct catastrophic planning. 

Under the National Response Framework Catastrophic Incident 

Annex, and under the National Response Plan Catastrophic Incident Annex before it, the Department of Homeland Security is assigned primary responsibility for housing. 

HUD looks to FEMA for guidance regarding a strategy for a catastrophic event, including catastrophic housing. HUD is not a first 

responder. It bears reiterating that HUD does not build housing 

but instead finances the construction, reconstruction, and rehabilitation of housing primarily through its State and local government 

partners. HUD does participate in National Level Exercises and 

numerous interagency coordination meetings and task forces. It 

has operating plans and procedures for its programs that have 

been used in disaster recovery. 

Another topic that has been discussed here by the Subcommittee 

is the National Disaster Housing Strategy. HUD was asked by 

FEMA to contribute to its development of the strategy. The strategy describes how the Nation currently provides housing to those 

affected by disasters and describes future directions for disaster 

housing efforts to better meet the needs of disaster victims and 

communities. It promotes engaging all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector in a national 

housing effort to meet the needs of disaster victims and enable rebuilding of communities following a disaster. The strategy identifies key principles gleaned from past experience, lessons learned 

that could benefit current and future disaster housing efforts. 

FEMA did consult regularly with HUD on the strategy, asking 

us to provide our expertise in interim and permanent housing. 

HUD contributed to the interim housing chapter of the strategy 

and provided much of the initial text for the chapter on permanent 

housing. 

The strategy helps further define HUD’s and FEMA’s roles with 

respect to disaster housing. Under the strategy, FEMA and HUD 

will partner to provide interim housing assistance, each bringing 

its expertise and experience to bear. 

When Federal permanent housing assistance is needed for longterm recovery, the strategy gives HUD the lead responsibility to coordinate with its partners, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Small Business Administration, FEMA, and others, to provide housing and community development resources. The strategy 

20 

also calls for a National Disaster Housing Task Force, to be jointly 

led by FEMA, HUD, and the American Red Cross that will help 

achieve the long-term vision and goals of the strategy. Within the 

strategy, HUD—— 

Senator LANDRIEU. You are over your time. OK? I am going to 

have to ask you to stop, if I could. 

Are you, Mr. Opper, the person that has been appointed within 

HUD to develop, either within HUD or with FEMA, some part of 

this housing plan? Are you the person that has been tasked to do 

that? 

Mr. OPPER. I have been the lead person tasked to do that. 

Senator LANDRIEU. And how long have you been in this position? 

Mr. OPPER. In the position I am in now, about a year or so, but 

I have been working on disasters since 1992. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. So you have been with HUD since 1992? 

Mr. OPPER. No. Since 1975. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Since 1975. You have been working on disasters at HUD since 1992. 

Mr. OPPER. Correct. 

Senator LANDRIEU. And you have been doing this particular job 

for a year. 

Mr. OPPER. About a year. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Who was doing this job before you were 

there, in the last 2 or 3 years? 

Mr. OPPER. This job did not exist before I had it. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK, so it is a new position—— 

Mr. OPPER. This particular job. 

Senator LANDRIEU [continuing]. That has been created. So it is 

your new position that you are in charge of the disaster recovery. 

How many meetings have you actually had with high-level officials 

over the last, would you say, year on this housing plan? 

Mr. OPPER. Quite a few. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Would you say a half dozen? A dozen? 

Mr. OPPER. At least that, probably. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. You said that HUD does not have the 

money, in the earlier part of your statement. Can you report to this 

Subcommittee what you or the Secretary of the Deputy of budget 

has requested in additional funding to help you do your job? 

Mr. OPPER. Well, it has fallen in between the budget cycles, this 

new job. What I had been doing before that, as you may recall, I 

was at your hearing in February 2006, down in New Orleans, and 

at that time I was managing our CDBG disaster assistance. At this 

point my responsibilities deal more with coordinating the overall 

Department role. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK, but I am going to ask you to stay focused, if you could, on this request for funding, because you testified that HUD in your view did not have the resources necessary 

to follow. If you could provide to this Subcommittee any request 

that HUD has made since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita for additional resources or additional funding relative to trying to step up, 

step out, implement any kind of housing plan, that is what I would 

like you to submit to this Subcommittee. 

Does HUD consider its responsibility to replace public housing 

that you actually do finance? Or is that FEMA’s job, in your view? 

21 

Mr. OPPER. That is not my area. I can submit an answer for the 

record. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Since you have been doing disaster planning 

in HUD since 1975, have you ever been involved in any discussions 

about HUD’s responsibility to actually replace housing that is destroyed—HUD housing destroyed in a catastrophic disaster—that 

you could share with us about what HUD thinks is its responsibility? 

Mr. OPPER. My role with disasters since 1992 has been, up until 

recently, primarily dealing with the Community Development 

Block Grant program and providing disaster assistance through 

that program. As you know, we have another part of HUD, our Office of Public and Indian Housing, that has responsibility for the 

public housing. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. In your job now that you have, do you 

think it is partly your responsibility? Here you are the Associate 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Disaster Policy and Management 

for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. So 

this is a new position that has been created. 

Mr. OPPER. Yes. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Do you think it is part of your job to focus 

on public housing residents that your agency built the housing and 

then it becomes destroyed in a disaster? Is it your understanding 

that it is not your job to think of what happens if that happens, 

that what do we do when that happens, is that your job? 

Mr. OPPER. It is part of my job to coordinate and make sure that 

someone is thinking about that, and our Office of Public and Indian 

Housing is doing that. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. Do you have anything you would like to 

share with us, since you have been in this job for a while, that you 

have talked with the person that is in charge of public housing 

about that? 

Mr. OPPER. Nothing to share at this time. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK, because I am going to ask you to share 

some details with us at a later date about plans that you all might 

have involving what you do when public housing is destroyed, 

housing that HUD has financed and built, because HUD is the primary agency for this in the country. This means housing for the 

senior citizens, housing for disabled individuals, housing for low-income individuals, and other types of special housing. 

Mr. Garratt, in 2002, FEMA prepared a draft catastrophic housing plan that said, ‘‘Business as usual will not be sufficient in a 

catastrophic event.’’ 

I am looking at the strategy today. Obviously, you know I am 

very troubled by the blank pages and the lack of what I would consider details that people in America were expecting. 

In 2002, the plan that you all submitted said, ‘‘FEMA’s standard 

forms of assistance (rent and home repair) will not necessarily 

meet housing needs.’’ In 2004 and 2005, FEMA spent millions on 

another planning effort, the Hurricane Pam exercise. This exercise 

actually predicted almost the exact impact of what actually happened in Hurricane Katrina. It was almost predicted to the detail 

of what would happen. 

22 

During that exercise, FEMA said, ‘‘Response and recovery after 

a catastrophic disaster requires the mobilization of a gigantic juggernaut, and for this juggernaut to be successful, it has to be 

planned in detail.’’ 

If FEMA had come up with a plan in 2002, then we again came 

up with a plan during the exercise of Pam, FEMA concluded that 

detailed planning was necessary, how can this agency justify its 

failure to provide detailed plans in the strategy that is now before 

us 4 years later? And, actually, it is 6 years from 2002, 4 years 

from the Pam exercise. Could you please respond? 

Mr. GARRATT. Certainly. I am familiar with the 2002 catastrophic plan to which you referred. I would suggest that, in fact, 

that is really less a plan, less a strategy, than it is recognition that 

we will face a lot of special challenges in a catastrophe. And it 

identifies the fact that we are going to face a number of special 

challenges and that we need to pursue new ways to address those. 

We recognize that we needed to do that, and it was as a result 

of that catastrophic plan or strategy or aggregation of concerns that 

really was the impetus for driving us to begin the southeast Louisiana catastrophic planning effort. You mentioned that Hurricane 

Pam cost millions. In fact, the hurricane planning effort cost millions. I think Hurricane Pam only cost $800,000 as part of that. 

But what that resulted in and what Pam was central to help us 

accomplish was to inform our ability in working with the State and 

working with the local jurisdictions to develop this, which was a 

fairly comprehensive plan for southeast Louisiana. And this was 

published in January 2005. That plan, accompanied by these appendices, again, identified and captured a lot of the lessons learned 

from Hurricane Pam. So, yes, it was a very valuable exercise, and 

you are exactly right. It did on a number of scores, on a number 

of counts, come very close to identifying exactly the sorts of impacts 

that we faced following Hurricane Katrina. What it did not do necessarily was provide a lot of assistance or information about how 

to deal with the housing problem. The focus of Hurricane Pam, the 

focus of this effort, was largely around the response effort, so dealing with the immediate concerns facing that population. 

So although it is heavy in sheltering, heavy in evacuation, heavy 

on getting supplies, commodities in to provide assistance, it, in fact, 

is lacking in the areas of housing. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, then, let’s talk about sheltering for a 

minute. What is your primary remembrance or recommendation in 

terms of immediate sheltering for a catastrophic disaster? Is your 

recommendation to use public shelters? 

Mr. GARRATT. I have to admit I was not personally involved in 

the development of this plan. I was, at the time this plan was being 

developed, leading a different catastrophic planning effort, and that 

was the development of the Catastrophic Incident Supplement to 

the National Response Plan. So I was not personally involved in 

this, but we saw that there were opportunities for convergence 

here, and what we expected was this particular planning effort to 

identify and inform how the Catastrophic Incident Supplement 

would be used to support an event in southeast Louisiana. 

In terms of the sheltering question, it identified at least, I think, 

as a result of Hurricane Pam, if my memory is correct—and I can 

23 

probably look in here and find out. I think it identified between 

200,000 and 300,000 people were going to require either sheltering 

or housing for families as a result of the Hurricane Pam scenario. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Did that report—and I know you did not have 

anything to do with it, but do you remember in that report if it had 

recommended using travel trailers as an appropriate response to a 

hurricane-prone area that could not be easily moved? 

Mr. GARRATT. I do not recall whether it did. However, travel 

trailers have been, at least—and they were at the time—a standard 

part and, in fact, an important part of our response strategy. And 

they have been—not only travel trailers but manufactured housing. 

Mobile homes, park models have for a very long time been an integral part of our temporary housing strategy, and an important part 

of that. 

Senator LANDRIEU. All right. What has FEMA done to help State 

and local governments organize their resources and plan for postdisaster housing, just if you could list one, two, or three things that 

FEMA has done in that regard? And have you all requested the 

funding for that training? 

Mr. GARRATT. I am sorry, Senator. I need you to repeat that 

question. 

Senator LANDRIEU. What has FEMA done to help State and local 

governments organize their resources and plan for post-disaster 

housing assistance? 

Mr. GARRATT. Most of the planning that we do with the States 

is done either through our regions, dealing with the unique and 

special requirements of individual States. They work with the 

States to identify what their requirements are, what their needs 

are, and then they will augment and provide assistance to the 

States in the development of their planning requirements. And 

they do that through such forums as Regional Interagency Steering 

Committees, which each region sponsors, which each region has 

meetings with their State representatives on a regular basis, as 

well as Federal representatives. 

We also provide assistance through the Emergency Management 

Performance Grants program, and that program identified targets 

that we want States to meet as part of acceptance of those grants. 

We have also developed in our Preparedness Directorate a target 

capabilities listing and other preparedness documentation that provides guidance to the States on what it is that they should be trying to achieve in support of improving their individual and respective preparedness. 

What I can do is reach back, and we can provide a more comprehensive listing of what is being done in the preparedness realm 

to work with the individual States to answer the question that you 

asked. But I do not have specifics that I can provide you, just these 

generalities. 

Senator LANDRIEU. All right. Let me ask you this, because I am 

concerned about statements that I continue to see in the reports 

that come to us that say this exactly or something like it: ‘‘All incidents should be managed at the lowest jurisdiction level possible, 

and this holds true for disaster housing assistance as well.’’ It is 

this reliance on everything local, individuals should be responsible. 

24 

Do you think that this makes sense in catastrophic disasters, as 

opposed to regular, normal, major disasters? 

Mr. GARRATT. Senator, I would say that by its very nature, a catastrophe means that disaster exceeds the capabilities of State and 

local governments. So in a catastrophe, I do not think anyone has 

the expectation that local governments will be able to handle that 

and that Federal assistance is not only going to be required, it is 

going to be required quickly and in a very aggressive way to help 

them deal with those particular—— 

Senator LANDRIEU. So I would take that as you are actually disagreeing with the fact that it says, ‘‘All incidents should be managed . . . ‘’ It would be, I don’t think, leading you to say that you 

say certain incidents should be managed at the lowest jurisdiction, 

but there might be some of a catastrophic nature—— 

Mr. GARRATT. No, I think, Senator, what I was trying to say was 

I do believe that from a strict management perspective that the responsibility for management should be at the lowest level. What I 

am saying is that the lowest level is not going to be able to handle 

or even come close to handling the requirements that they are 

going to face in a catastrophe. They should expect and they should 

receive a lot of assistance from the Federal Government and from 

States and from mutual aid partners. And we need to be prepared 

to provide and project that assistance very quickly. But we should 

not be running that response operation unless they cannot do it. If 

they have the capability of managing it, we should be folding our 

resources in to support their management requirements. 

Senator LANDRIEU. But you just said that, in your view, they 

cannot manage a catastrophe, and I actually agree with you. 

Mr. GARRATT. Management in the term of assemble and respond 

to that disaster using exclusively their own resources is what I 

meant when I said that. In terms of providing the command and 

control under the Incident Command System, which is the basis— 

the National Incident Management System, the basis for how we 

deliver and augment response operations throughout the Nation, 

we would fold our resources in support of the incident commander 

at the very lowest level. 

So I think we are saying the same thing in terms of the overall 

management and—I believe that we are saying the same thing in 

terms of the resources involved. In terms of command and control, 

I think that has to rest and continue to be applied in an Incident 

Command System structure. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, I am not sure we are saying the same 

thing, and in large measure, this is the heart of a debate that is 

going on right now. Is the Federal Government, even after all the 

evidence has been laid down, is the Federal Government trying to 

make a distinction between regular disasters and catastrophic disasters? You claim there is a difference. I actually agree with you. 

But I have yet to see any document that seeks to describe a trigger 

or seeks to suggest that there be one strategy for lower-level disasters and a different strategy for catastrophic. And so while I continue to hear people say it, I do not see it. 

Do you know if this strategy makes any distinction? Because we 

cannot find any distinction recommended in your strategy between 

catastrophic and lower-level disasters. 

25 

Mr. GARRATT. You are talking about the housing strategy now? 

Senator LANDRIEU. Yes. 

Mr. GARRATT. I would suggest that—to back up a little bit, certainly FEMA recognizes that a catastrophic disaster does have and 

has required a specialized response, and we need to be able to respond to that in a different way. That was the genesis of that understanding for the development of the Catastrophic Incident Supplement to the National Response Plan, now the National Response 

Framework. That Catastrophic Incident Supplement has a special 

response protocol that is employed whenever the Secretary of 

Homeland Security designates a disaster as a catastrophe. That is 

implemented immediately, and it is implemented aggressively. 

However, it is designed to cover the first 72 to 96 hours of that 

disaster because the prevailing belief has been ever since the Federal Response Plan and its successors—the National Response 

Plan, the National Response Framework—were developed was that 

those documents are scalable and that what we do during the recovery phase is something that needs to be determined by the characteristics of the situation. 

So if we have a large housing mission, then we need to expand 

the capability to provide housing to that group. But what we cannot necessarily do is invent or manufacture a housing capability for 

catastrophes that we would not already have available for any size 

disaster. 

Senator LANDRIEU. You are going to have to repeat that because 

I do not understand it. Let me tell you what I think I heard you 

say: ‘‘We have a plan that is a housing plan for trailers, and if it 

is a big disaster, we will just get you more of them.’’ That is what 

I heard you say. So if you did not say that, please say it again. 

Mr. GARRATT. I would say it differently than you said it, Senator. 

What I would say is that if we have a large housing mission, we 

are going to use all of the resources available to us to meet that 

requirement, but the size of the housing mission does not necessarily mean that at this particular size we are going to invoke 

and use a housing capacity that we would not use before that. 

All of these forms of housing assistance are available to us now— 

alternative forms of housing, temporary forms of housing, forms of 

rental assistance, permanent reconstruction. All of those are forms 

of assistance that are authorized to us. When we choose to use 

them is fully articulated in the National Disaster Housing Plan— 

or, excuse me, the 2008 Disaster Housing Plan. We do that on a 

staged basis. But we can also, as the plan indicates, implement 

them all simultaneously if the size of the disaster so requires, and 

that I think is the fundamental point I am trying to make, which 

is we have identified everything that we can do. What we do and 

when we do that is dependent on the size of the disaster and the 

characteristics of that disaster. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Is there any question in your mind that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was not a major catastrophe? 

Mr. GARRATT. No question whatsoever. 

Senator LANDRIEU. So you are testifying before this Subcommittee that you have all the authority you need right now in 

terms of these options—trailers, rental housing, etc.—to take care 

of this housing catastrophe. 

26 

Mr. GARRATT. What I am saying is that for those forms of housing that are available to us, we can go out and we are going out— 

and we are going to be awarding a contract for a number of alternative forms of housing here in August. We can secure right now 

using our authorities whatever we need to provide housing assistance, just as we did following Hurricane Katrina. There is no form 

of housing that is out there that we did not employ because we did 

not have the authority to employ that. 

Senator LANDRIEU. I could not disagree with you more, and I am 

actually puzzled, very puzzled to hear you say that you have all the 

options you need and you use them all? 

Mr. GARRATT. No, ma’am. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Do you realize we have had thousands of people sleeping under interstates for the last 3 years? And you did not 

step forward to provide housing vouchers. The Congress had to basically thrust them to you to make you take them. 

Mr. GARRATT. Ma’am, everyone who was eligible for assistance 

from the Federal Government under our authorities received that 

assistance or had the opportunity to receive that assistance. 

Senator LANDRIEU. I could not disagree with you more, and the 

record will reflect that. 

[Pause.] 

Senator LANDRIEU. This has been a very interesting hearing, I 

want you to know, Mr. Garratt, to me. I am getting such conflicting 

testimony between you, who claim that you have all the authority 

you need to act, although the budget does not request any additional funding; a rental housing program that has yet to be implemented; it is 3 years after the biggest catastrophe, which nobody 

on these panels disagrees was a catastrophe, but there is a wide 

disagreement as to what authority you have, what budget you 

have, what money you have, and a document that has been submitted with seven blank pages. 

So I am very sorry that the time has run out on this hearing 

today. I appreciate your testimony, but we will continue to have 

several hearings that we can get to the bottom of what happened, 

why it happened, and what can be done to prevent it in the future. 

Meeting adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:32 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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