United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on National Security, International

Affairs, and Criminal Justice, Committee

on Government Reform and Oversight,

House of Representatives

February 1997 DRUG CONTROL

Long-Standing

Problems Hinder U.S.

International Efforts

GAO/NSIAD-97-75

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-275976 

February 27, 1997

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,

 International Affairs, and Criminal Justice

Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Illegal drug use, particularly of cocaine and heroin, continues to be a

serious health problem in the United States. Under the U.S. national drug

control strategy, the United States has established domestic and

international efforts to reduce the supply and demand for illegal drugs.

Over the past 10 years, the United States has spent about $20 billion on

international drug control and interdiction efforts to reduce the illegal

drug supply. At the request of the former chairman and your staff, this

report summarizes the findings from our past work on international drug

control and interdiction efforts and provides our overall observations on

(1) the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to combat drug production and the

movement of drugs into the United States, (2) obstacles to implementation

of U.S. drug control efforts, and (3) suggestions to improve the operational

effectiveness of the U.S. international drug control efforts. This report

contains recommendations for the Director, Office of National Drug

Control Policy (ONDCP), and matters for congressional consideration. (See

the list of related GAO products at the end of this report.)

Background The United States has developed a multifaceted drug control strategy

intended to reduce the supply and demand for illegal drugs. The 1996 U.S.

drug control strategy includes five goals: (1) motivate America’s youth to

reject illegal drugs and substance abuse; (2) increase the safety of U.S.

citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence;

(3) reduce health, welfare, and crime costs resulting from illegal drug use;

(4) shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat; and

(5) break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.

The last two goals of the national drug control strategy are the primary

emphasis of U.S. international drug control and interdiction efforts. These

are aimed at assisting the source and transit nations1

 in their efforts to

1

The major source countries for coca and cocaine are Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. The major source

nations for opium are Burma, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Laos, Colombia, and Mexico. The major drug

transit areas include Mexico, the eastern Pacific, the Caribbean, and the nations of Central America.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
B-275976 

(1) destroy major drug-trafficking organizations by, among other things,

arresting, convicting, and incarcerating their leaders and seizing their

drugs and assets; (2) reduce the supply of drugs through eradication, a

reduction in drug crop cultivation, and other enforcement efforts;

(3) increase the political will and capabilities of nations’ institutions to

fight drug-trafficking activities; and (4) make greater use of multilateral

organizations to share the burdens and costs of international drug control

efforts.

Federal drug control spending is categorized into four functional areas:

demand reduction, domestic law enforcement, international, and

interdiction. The latter two categories, funded at approximately

$400 million and $1.4 billion, respectively, for fiscal year 1997, deal

primarily with curbing the production of drugs in foreign nations and

stopping the movement of drugs from the sources of production to the

United States.

ONDCP is responsible for producing the national drug control strategy and

coordinating its implementation with other federal agencies. Although

ONDCP has authority to review various agencies’ funding levels to ensure

they meet the goals of the national strategy, it has no direct control over

how these resources are used. Furthermore, although various federal

agencies are involved in implementing the national drug control strategy,

the following principal federal agencies are involved in implementing the

international portion of the drug control strategy:

• The Department of State is the lead agency for coordinating all U.S.

antidrug efforts overseas and also provides assistance for eradication and

interdiction efforts to counterdrug organizations of foreign nations.

• The Department of Defense (DOD) assists both U.S. and foreign

government law enforcement agencies by providing detection, monitoring,

and tracking support; intelligence support; planning assistance; and

communications, logistics, and training support.

• The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is the principal federal

agency responsible for coordinating drug enforcement intelligence

gathering overseas, conducting law enforcement operations, and providing

training to foreign government law enforcement personnel.

Other U.S. agencies involved in counternarcotics activities overseas

include the U.S. Agency for International Development; the U.S. Coast

Guard; the U.S. Customs Service; various U.S. intelligence organizations;

other U.S. law enforcement agencies, including the U.S. Attorney’s Office,

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
B-275976 

which directs the investigation and prosecution of federal drug cases

against international narcotics traffickers and money launderers; and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which assists and supports some

international counternarcotics activities. (See app. I for information on the

roles of these agencies.)

Results in Brief Despite long-standing efforts and expenditures of billions of dollars, illegal

drugs still flood the United States. We have reported on obstacles faced by

the United States and host countries in their efforts to reduce illegal drug

supplies. Although these efforts have resulted in some successes,

including the arrest of traffickers and the eradication, seizure, and

disruption in the transport of illegal drugs, they have not materially

reduced the availability of drugs.

A key reason for U.S. counternarcotics programs’ lack of success is that

international drug-trafficking organizations have become sophisticated,

multibillion-dollar industries that quickly adapt to new U.S. drug control

efforts. As success is achieved in one area, the drug-trafficking

organizations change tactics, thwarting U.S. efforts. Other significant,

long-standing obstacles also impede U.S. and drug-producing and transit

countries’ drug control efforts. In the drug-producing and transit countries,

counternarcotics efforts are constrained by competing economic and

political policies, inadequate laws, limited resources and institutional

capabilities, and internal problems such as terrorism and civil unrest.

Moreover, drug traffickers are increasingly resourceful in corrupting the

countries’ institutions. U.S. efforts have been hampered by competing U.S.

foreign policy objectives, organizational and operational limitations,

difficulty in obtaining bilateral and multilateral support for U.S. drug

control efforts, inconsistency in the funding for U.S. international drug

control efforts, and the lack of ways to tell whether or how well

counternarcotics efforts are contributing to the goals and objectives of the

national drug control strategy, which results in an inability to prioritize the

use of limited resources.

There is no panacea for resolving all of the problems associated with

illegal drug trafficking. However, a multiyear plan that describes where,

when, and how U.S. agencies intend to apply resources would provide a

more consistent approach. This plan should include performance

measures and long-term funding needs linked to the goals and objectives

of the international drug control strategy. ONDCP should, at least annually,

review the plan and make appropriate adjustments. With this multiyear

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B-275976 

plan, program managers and policymakers can make more-informed

decisions on prioritizing funding levels based on performance and results.

Also, we believe improved use of intelligence and technology and the

development of a centralized system of “lessons learned” could enhance

counternarcotics efforts.

Illegal Drugs Remain

Readily Available

Over the past 10 years, the U.S. agencies involved in counternarcotics

efforts have attempted to reduce the supply and availability of illegal drugs

in the United States through the implementation of the U.S. international

drug control strategy. Although they have achieved some successes, the

flow of cocaine, heroin, and other illegal drugs into the United States

continues, and the availability of drugs and the cultivation of drug crops

have not been reduced. In fact, between 1988 and 1995, illegal drug

cultivation and drug-related activities have increased throughout South

America, Mexico, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and other countries.

According to the August 1996 report of the National Narcotics Intelligence

Consumers Committee,2

 cocaine and heroin were readily available in all

major U.S. metropolitan areas during 1995. Since precise information is

not available, U.S. agencies use data obtained through several surveys to

measure drug availability and use. Fluctuations in drug price and purity

levels are two yardsticks used by DEA to measure illegal drug availability.

According to the DEA Administrator, a depressed price and elevated purity

often signals an increased availability of a specific drug, on the other hand,

increased price and declining purity indicates decreased availability of that

drug. As shown in table 1 and figure 1, the price and purity of cocaine has

remained relatively constant since 1988.

2

The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee is a multiagency U.S. government panel

that was established in 1978 to coordinate foreign and domestic collection, analysis, dissemination,

and evaluation of drug-related intelligence.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
B-275976 

Table 1: Average Retail Price for One

Kilogram of Cocaine (1988-95) Year National price range

1988 $11,000 - $34,000

1989 $11,000 - $35,000

1990 $11,000 - $40,000

1991 $11,000 - $40,000

1992 $11,000 - $42,000

1993 $10,500 - $40,000

1994 $10,500 - $40,000

1995 $10,500 - $36,000

Source: DEA and the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee.

Figure 1: Average Cocaine Purity

(1988-95) Percent

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Year

Kilograms

Grams

Source: DEA.

DEA reports indicate that, like cocaine, the average price and purity of a

kilogram of heroin has remained relatively constant since 1990. However,

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
B-275976 

the purity of lesser weights of heroin sold on the streets of the United

States has more than doubled, while its average price has remained

relatively constant during this period. (See app. II for additional

information on the trends in the price and purity of heroin.)

Despite long-term efforts by the United States and many drug-producing

countries to reduce cultivation, to eradicate crops, and to seize illicit

drugs, the total net area of cultivation for coca leaf and opium poppy has

increased. Between 1988 and 1995, about 56,000 hectares3

 of coca plants

were eradicated. However, while the areas under cultivation have

fluctuated from year to year, farmers planted new coca faster than existing

crops were eradicated. Thus, the net area under cultivation increased from

186,000 hectares to 214,800 hectares, or by about 15 percent. According to

officials at the Department of State, initial information indicates that

during 1996 significant reductions occurred in the amount of coca under

cultivation in Peru. In addition, the amount of opium poppy under

cultivation increased by over 46,000 hectares, or by about 25 percent

between 1988 and 1995. (See table 2.)

Table 2: Changes in Area of Land

Under Cultivation for Drug Crops From

1988 to 1995

Area under cultivation

Numbers in hectares

Crop cultivated 1988 1995

Net change in area

cultivated

(1988 to 1995)

Coca

Bolivia 48,500 48,600 100

Colombia 27,000 50,900 23,900

Peru 110,500 115,300 4,800

All other countries 240 0 (240)

Total 186,240 214,800 28,560

Opium poppy

Burma 104,200 154,070 49,870

Laos 40,400 19,650 (20,750)

Afghanistan 23,000 38,740 15,740

Mexico 5,001 5,050 49

All other countries 15,141 16,704 1,563

Total 187,742 234,214 46,472

Source: Department of State.

3

One hectare equals 2.47 acres.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
B-275976 

The amount of cocaine and heroin seized between 1990 and 1995 made

little impact on the availability of illegal drugs in the United States and on

the amount needed to satisfy the estimated U.S. demand. The August 1996

report by the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee

estimates potential cocaine production at about 780 metric tons for 1995,

of which about 230 metric tons were seized worldwide. The remaining

amount was more than enough to meet U.S. demand, which is estimated at

about 300 metric tons per year. Heroin production in 1995 was broadly

estimated to be over 300 metric tons, while seizures were about 32 metric

tons and U.S. demand was between 10 and 15 metric tons. (See 

figs. 2 and 3.)

Figure 2: Potential Cocaine

Production, Seizures, and Availability

(1989-95)

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

- - - - - - Total potential production

Metric tons

Cocaine supply after seizures Worldwide seizures

Source: National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
B-275976 

Figure 3: Potential Heroin Production,

Seizures, and Availability (1990-95)

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

0

100

200

300

400

- - - - - - Total potential production

Metric tons

Heroin available Worldwide seizures

Note: Accurate worldwide seizure data is unavailable for 1989.

Source: National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee.

Drug-Trafficking

Organizations Have

Substantial

Resources,

Capabilities, and

Operational Flexibility

A primary reason that U.S. and foreign governments’ counternarcotics

efforts are constrained is the growing power, influence, adaptability and

capabilities of drug-trafficking organizations. Because of their enormous

financial resources, power to corrupt counternarcotics personnel, and

operational flexibility, drug-trafficking organizations are a formidable

threat. In March 1996, the DEA Administrator testified that

“Drug trafficking organizations in Mexico have become so wealthy and so powerful over

the years that they can rival legitimate governments for influence and control. They utilize

their vast financial wealth to undermine government and commercial institutions. We have

witnessed Colombia’s struggle with this problem, and it (is) not unexpected that the same

problems could very well develop in Mexico.”4

4

The Narcotics Threat to the United States Through Mexico—S.1547, Committee on Banking, Housing,

and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, March 28, 1996.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
B-275976 

Despite some short-term achievements by U.S. and foreign government

law enforcement agencies in disrupting the flow of illegal drugs into the

United States, drug-trafficking organizations have continued to meet and

exceed the demand of U.S. drug consumers.

Many extremely wealthy drug-trafficking organizations operate in some of

the poorest countries in the world. The governments of these countries

have few resources with which to counter the traffickers’ activities. The

widespread poverty within many source and transit countries makes

government personnel, especially low-level law enforcement officials,

especially susceptible to corruption.

According to U.S. agencies, drug-traffickers’ organizations use their vast

wealth to acquire and make use of expensive modern technology such as

global positioning systems and cellular communications equipment. They

use this technology to communicate and coordinate transportation as well

as to monitor and report on the activities of government organizations

involved in counterdrug activities. In some countries, the complexity and

sophistication of their equipment exceed the capabilities of the foreign

governments trying to stop them.

When confronted with threats to their activities, drug-trafficking

organizations use a variety of techniques to quickly change their modes of

operation, thus avoiding capture of their personnel and seizure of their

illegal drugs. For example, when air interdiction efforts have proven

successful, traffickers have increased their use of maritime and overland

transportation routes. According to recent U.S. government reports, even

after the capturing or killing of several drug cartel leaders in Colombia and

Mexico, other leaders or organizations soon filled the void and adjusted

their areas of operations.

Obstacles in Foreign

Countries Impede U.S.

Drug Control Efforts

The United States is largely dependent on the countries that are the source

of drug production and transit points for trafficking-related activities to

reduce the amount of coca and opium poppy being cultivated and to make

the drug seizures, arrests, and prosecutions necessary to stop the

production and movement of illegal drugs. While the United States can

provide assistance and support for drug control efforts in these countries,

the success of those efforts depends on their willingness and ability to

combat the drug trade within their borders.

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B-275976 

Like the United States, source and transit countries face long-standing

obstacles that limit the effectiveness of their drug control efforts. These

obstacles, many of which are interrelated, are competing economic,

political, and cultural problems, including terrorism and internal unrest;

corruption; and inadequate law enforcement resources and institutional

capabilities. The extent to which the United States can affect many of

these obstacles is minimal.

Drug Control Competes

With Other Economic,

Political, and Cultural

Problems

The governments involved in drug eradication and control have other

problems that compete for limited resources. As we reported in 1988, six

drug-producing countries’ efforts to curtail drug cultivation were

constrained by political, economic, and/or cultural problems that far

exceeded counternarcotics program managers’ abilities to resolve. For

example, these countries had ineffective central government control over

drug cultivation areas, competing demands for scarce host nation

resources, weak economies that enhanced financial incentives for drug

cultivation, corrupt or intimidated law enforcement and judicial officials,

and legal cultivation of drug crops and traditional use of drugs in some

countries.5

Many of the source countries lack the political will necessary to reduce

coca and opium poppy cultivation, partly because drug trafficking

contributes to their economies. In Peru, for example, U.S. officials stated

that it would not be feasible for the government of Peru to push hard for

the eradication of coca leaf without a guarantee that the United States and

other countries would support extensive, long-term economic

development efforts because of the coca-growing farmers’ potential

influence in general elections. In 1996, we reported that part of the reason

the Burmese government had done little to pursue counternarcotics

initiatives was that it ceded control over key opium-producing regions of

Burma to an insurgency group.6

Most of the countries where opium poppy and coca leaf are grown are

very poor. In fact, both Bolivia and Peru are two of the poorest countries

in the Western Hemisphere. Consequently, a cash crop like coca is vitally

important in these regions, where legitimate business alternatives are few.

According to a 1996 study, the cocaine industry added $640 million to

Peru’s gross domestic product in 1993 and 4 percent to Bolivia’s 1994

5

Controlling Drug Abuse: A Status Report (GAO/GGD-88-39, Mar. 1, 1988).

6

Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Program Encounters Many Obstacles in Southeast Asia (GAO/NSIAD-96-83,

Mar. 1, 1996).

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
B-275976 

economy. U.S. Embassy officials in Peru reported that an estimated

200,000 farmers are involved in the coca industry, which represents a

sizable portion of the Peruvian economy.7

 In addition, as we reported in

1992, severe economic problems in Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela limited

these countries’ ability to devote the resources needed to develop effective

drug control efforts.8

Internal strife in the source countries is another problem that competes

for resources. Two primary source countries—Peru and Colombia—must

allocate scarce funds to support military and other internal defense

operations to combat guerilla groups, which negatively affect

counternarcotics operations. We reported that in Peru, for example,

terrorist activities had hampered antidrug efforts.9

 The December 1996

hostage situation at the Japanese ambassador’s residence in Lima is the

latest example of the Peruvian government’s having to divert antidrug

resources to confront a terrorist threat. Although some key guerilla

leaders in Peru and Colombia have been captured, terrorist groups will

continue to hinder efforts to reduce coca cultivation and the country’s

efforts to reduce its dependence on coca as a contributor to the economy.

In 1991 and 1993, we reported similar problems in Colombia, where

several guerilla groups made it difficult to conduct effective antidrug

operations in many areas of the country.10 More recently, Colombia has

encountered resistance from farmers when it has tried to eradicate their

coca crops.

Corruption Permeates

Institutions in Countries

Involved in Drug

Production and Movement

Narcotics-related corruption is a long-standing problem in U.S. and foreign

governments’ efforts to reduce drug-trafficking activities. Our work has

identified widespread corruption in Burma, Pakistan, Thailand, Mexico,

7

Patrick L. Clawson and Rensselaer W. Lee III, The Andean Cocaine Industry (New York: St. Martin’s

Press, Aug. 1996).

8

The Drug War: Extent of Problems in Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela (GAO/NSIAD-92-226, June 5,

1992).

9

The Drug War: U.S. Programs in Peru Face Serious Obstacles (GAO/NSIAD-92-36, Oct. 21, 1991) and

The Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Programs in Colombia and Peru

(GAO/T-NSIAD-92-2, Oct. 23, 1991).

10The Drug War: Counternarcotics Programs in Colombia and Peru (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-9, Feb. 20,

1992) and The Drug War: Colombia Is Implementing Antidrug Efforts, but Impact Is Uncertain

(GAO/T-NSIAD-94-53, Oct. 5, 1993).

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
B-275976 

Colombia, and Peru—among the countries most significantly involved in

the cultivation, production, and transit of illicit narcotics.11

Corruption remains a serious, widespread problem in Colombia and

Mexico, the two countries most significantly involved in producing and

shipping cocaine.12 In March 1996, the State Department reported that

corruption in Colombia was pervasive and high-level government officials,

members of congress, judicial officials, and government functionaries

were under investigation for corruption. And according to the U.S.

Ambassador to Colombia, corruption in Colombia is the most significant

impediment to a successful counternarcotics effort. In March 1996, the

State Department also reported that persistent corruption within Mexico

continued to undermine both police and law enforcement operations.

While several hundred law enforcement officers have been dismissed due

to corruption, the Mexican attorney general believed that the problems of

corruption are deep-rooted and will take all 6 years of the current

administration’s term to address.

Drug-related corruption also exists, although to a lesser extent, throughout

several island nations in the Caribbean13 and in Bolivia and Peru. In

March 1996, the Department of State reported that corruption exists in the

Peruvian government and impedes drug law enforcement efforts.

Inadequate Resources and

Institutional Capabilities

Limit Arrests and

Convictions of Drug

Traffickers

Effective law enforcement operations and adequate judicial and legislative

tools are key to the success of efforts to stop the flow of drugs from the

source and transit countries. Although the United States can provide

assistance, these countries must seize the illegal drugs and arrest,

prosecute, and extradite the traffickers, when possible, in order to stop

the production and movement of drugs internationally. However, as we

have reported on several occasions, these countries lack the resources and

capabilities necessary to stop drug-trafficking activities within their

borders. In commenting on a draft of this report, officials of the U.S.

Southern Command stated that some countries are making strides in

11Drug Control: U.S.-Supported Efforts in Burma, Pakistan, and Thailand (GAO/NSIAD-88-94, Feb. 26,

1988); The Drug War (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-2, Oct. 23, 1991); The Drug War: Colombia Is Undertaking

Antidrug Programs, but Impact Is Uncertain (GAO/NSIAD-93-158, Aug. 10, 1993); The Drug War

(GAO/T-NSIAD-94-53, Oct. 5, 1993) and Drug Control: Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico

(GAO/NSIAD-96-163, June 12, 1996).

12Drug War: Observations on the U.S. International Drug Control Strategy (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182, 

June 27, 1995) and Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-96-163, June 12, 1996).

13Drug Control: U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean Decline (GAO/NSIAD-96-119, Apr. 17, 1996).

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
B-275976 

stopping drug-trafficking activities within their own borders and Colombia

and Venezuela have started cross-border, joint operations.

In 1991, we reported that the lack of resources and adequately trained

police personnel hindered Panama’s ability to address drug-trafficking and

money-laundering activities.14 Also, in 1994, we reported that Central

American countries did not have the resources or institutional capabilities

to combat drug trafficking and depended heavily on U.S. counternarcotics

assistance.15 In June 1996, we reported that equipment shortcomings and

inadequately trained personnel limited the government of Mexico’s ability

to detect and interdict drugs and drug traffickers, as well as to aerially

eradicate drug crops.16

Our more recent work indicates that the problem persists. For example,

we reported in 1995 that the Colombian national police had only 10

helicopters available for interdiction and eradication operations in the

entire country.17 According to a senior Bolivian government official,

Bolivia is highly dependent on U.S. assistance, and any reduction in the

current level of U.S. aid would result in a corresponding reduction in

Bolivian drug control efforts. U.S. officials in Peru stated that developing

an adequate force to counter drug traffickers’ expanded use of rivers to

move illegal drugs will take 3 to 10 years because Peru has no strategy for

addressing the problem and lacks trained personnel, equipment, and

infrastructure.

Other Obstacles

Inhibit Success in

Fulfilling U.S.

International Drug

Control Strategy

Our work over the past 10 years has identified other obstacles to

implementing the U.S. international drug control strategy: (1) competing

U.S. foreign policy objectives, (2) organizational and operational

limitations among and within the U.S. agencies involved, (3) inadequate

financial and program management accountability of U.S. resources,

(4) the lack of support from bilateral and multilateral organizations, and

(5) inconsistent U.S. funding levels.

14The War on Drugs: Narcotics Control Efforts in Panama (GAO/NSIAD-91-233, June 16, 1991).

15Drug Control: Interdiction Efforts in Central America Have Had Little Impact on the Flow of Drugs

(GAO/NSIAD-94-233, Aug. 2, 1994).

16Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-96-163, June 12, 1996).

17Drug War: Observations on U.S. International Drug Control Efforts (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-194, Aug. 1,

1995).

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U.S. Foreign Policy

Objectives Compete for

Attention and Resources

In carrying out its foreign policy, the United States seeks, among other

things, to promote U.S. business and trade, improve human rights, and

support democracy, as well as reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the

United States. These objectives compete for attention and resources, and

U.S. officials must make tough choices about which to pursue more

vigorously. As a result of U.S. policy decisions, counternarcotics issues

have often received less attention than other objectives. According to an

August 1996 Congressional Research Service report, inherent

contradictions regularly appear between U.S. counternarcotics policy and

other policy goals and concerns.18

Our work has shown the difficulties in balancing counternarcotics and

other U.S. foreign policy objectives. For example, in 1990, we reported

that the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Agency for

International Development disagreed over providing assistance to Bolivia

for the growth of soybeans as an alternative to coca leaf.19 The Agriculture

Department feared that such assistance would interfere with U.S. trade

objectives by developing a potential competitor for U.S. exports of

soybeans. In 1995 we reported that countering the drug trade was the

fourth highest priority in the U.S. Embassy in Mexico. During our visit, the

U.S. Ambassador told us that he had focused his attention during the prior

18 months on higher-priority issues of trade and commerce such as the

North American Free Trade Agreement and the U.S. financial support

program for the Mexican peso. In 1996, the embassy elevated

counternarcotics to an equal priority with the promotion of U.S. business

and trade.20

In addition, resources allocated for counternarcotics efforts are

sometimes shifted to satisfy other policy objectives. For example, as we

reported in 1995, $45 million originally intended for counternarcotics

assistance for cocaine source countries was reprogrammed by the

Department of State to assist Haiti’s democratic transition.21 The funds

were used to pay for such items as the cost of non-U.S. personnel assigned

to the multinational force, training of a police force, and development of a

job creation and feeding program. A similar diversion occurred in the early

18International Drug Trade and Its Impact on the United States, Congressional Research Service,

96-671F, August 9, 1996.

19Restrictions on U.S. Aid to Bolivia for Crop Development Is Competing With U.S. Agricultural

Exports and Their Relationship to U.S. Anti-Drug Efforts (GAO/T-NSIAD-90-52, June 27, 1990).

20Drug War (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182, June 27, 1995).

21Drug War (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-194, Aug. 1, 1995).

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
B-275976 

1990s when U.S. Coast Guard assets in the Caribbean were reallocated

from counternarcotics missions to the humanitarian mission of aiding

emigrants in their mass exodus from Cuba and Haiti.

Likewise, the United States has terminated most efforts to address opium

cultivation in Burma, the world’s largest opium producer, because of its

human rights policies and the failure of the Burmese government to

recognize the democratically elected government.22

Organizational and

Operational Limitations

Hamper Drug Control

Efforts

The United States faces several organizational and operational challenges

that limit its ability to implement effective antidrug efforts. Many of these

challenges are long-standing problems. Several of our reports have

identified problems involving competing priorities, interagency rivalries,

lack of operational coordination, and inadequate staffing of joint

interagency task forces.

For example, our 1995 work in Colombia indicated that there was

confusion among U.S. Embassy officials about the role of the offices

involved in intelligence analysis and related operational plans for

interdiction.23 In 1996, we reported that several agencies, including

Customs, DEA, and the FBI, had not provided personnel, as they had agreed,

to the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) in Key West because of

budgetary constraints.24 Our recent fieldwork in Bolivia and Peru showed

that coordination between the counternarcotics police and military units

continues to be a problem.

We also found instances where lessons learned from past counternarcotics

efforts were not known to current planners and operators, both internally

in an agency and within the U.S. antidrug community. For example, the

United States recently developed an operation to support Colombia and

Peru in their efforts to curtail the air movement of coca products between

the two countries. This operation is similar to an operation conducted in

the early 1990s. However, U.S. Southern Command personnel stated that

while they were generally aware of the previous operation, they were not

aware of the problems that had been encountered, or of the solutions

developed in the early 1990s when planning the current operation. U.S.

Southern Command officials attributed this problem to the continual

22Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-96-83, Mar. 1, 1996).

23Drug War (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182, June 27, 1995).

24Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-96-119, Apr. 17, 1996).

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
B-275976 

turnover of personnel and the requirement to destroy most classified

documents and reports after 5 years. These officials stated that an

after-action reporting system for counternarcotics activities is now in

place at the U.S. Southern Command.

Limited Oversight of

U.S.-Provided Assistance

We have reported that in some cases, the United States did not adequately

control the use of U.S. counternarcotics assistance and was unable to

ensure that it was used as intended.

Despite legislative requirements mandating controls over U.S.-provided

assistance, we found instances of inadequate oversight of

counternarcotics funds. For example, between 1991 and 1994, we issued

four reports in which we concluded that U.S. officials lacked sufficient

oversight of aid to ensure that it was being used effectively and as

intended in Peru and Colombia.25 We reported that the government of

Mexico had misused U.S.-provided counternarcotics helicopters when it

used the helicopters to transport Mexican military personnel during the

1994 uprising in the Mexican state of Chiapas.26

Our recent work indicates that oversight and accountability of

counternarcotics assistance continues to be a problem in Mexico. We

reported in 1996 that the number of staff devoted to monitoring the use of

previously provided U.S. counternarcotics aid was reduced, limiting the

ability of U.S. officials to oversee how this assistance was being used.

Furthermore, in 1995, we reported that the U.S. Embassy had conducted a

1993 inventory of U.S.-funded spare parts for aircraft used by the

Colombian counternarcotics police and found that over $200,000 worth of

equipment could not be found.27

Counternarcotics

Contributions of

International Donors Are

Limited

The U.S. international drug control strategy emphasizes the use of

multilateral institutions and bilateral donors to share the burden and costs

of drug control efforts, especially where the United States has limited

access and influence. Although international organizations have

undertaken drug control efforts in countries where the United States has

no bilateral program and have supplemented U.S. programs, in many cases

25Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia (GAO/NSIAD-91-296, Sept. 30, 1991);

The Drug War (GAO/NSIAD-92-36, Oct. 21, 1991); The Drug War (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-2, Oct. 23, 1991);

and The Drug War (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-53, Oct. 5, 1993).

26Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-96-163, June 12, 1996).

27Drug War (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182, June 27, 1995).

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
B-275976 

their contributions have been too small to make a significant impact. For

example, in March 1996, we reported that the United Nations Drug Control

Program (UNDCP) to reduce opium production in Burma, supplemented

with U.S. funds, lacked sufficient scope in poppy-growing areas to result in

long-term crop reductions.28 In addition, its funds supplementing U.S.

bilateral efforts in Peru have also been limited: $2.2 million compared to

the U.S. expenditure of an estimated $15 million in 1995. According to the

Department of State, UNDCP’s annual budget for its global activities is about

$70 million, or about half of State’s international narcotics funding in fiscal

year 1996. In Peru, UNDCP recently reduced its activities, since Italy—one

of its largest donors—decided South America is no longer a regional

priority.

In addition, international donors’ drug control goals and objectives

sometimes differ from those of the United States, and some do not link to

the U.S. international drug control strategy. In June 1993, we reported that

donors in Europe and Asia tend not to support interdiction efforts. They

prefer instead to provide assistance for law enforcement training and

equipment and for activities to reduce the demand for illegal drugs.29 Also,

U.S. officials in Peru stated that although international donors often

support development assistance efforts in drug crop cultivation areas,

many have been reluctant to link their assistance to specific illicit crop

reduction goals. These officials further stated that European donors’ and

UNDCP’s development activities in Peruvian coca-growing areas often lack

this link.

Inconsistent Funding

Levels Have Adversely

Affected Drug Control

Efforts

From 1986 to 1996, the United States spent about $103 billion on domestic

and international efforts to reduce the use and availability of illegal drugs

in the United States. Of this amount, $20 billion was spent on international

counternarcotics efforts supporting (1) the eradication of drug crops, the

development of alternative forms of income for drug crop farmers, and

increased foreign law enforcement capabilities ($4.1 billion) and

(2) interdiction activities ($15.6 billion). However, from year to year,

funding for international counternarcotics efforts has fluctuated and until

recently had declined. In some instances, because of budgetary

constraints, Congress did not appropriate the level of funding agencies

requested; in others, the agencies applied funding erratically, depending

on other priorities. The reduction in funding has sometimes made it

28Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-96-83, Mar. 1, 1996).

29Drugs: International Efforts to Attack a Global Problem (GAO/NSIAD-93-165, June 23, 1993).

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
B-275976 

difficult to carry out U.S. operations and has also hampered source and

transit countries’ operations (see fig. 4).

Figure 4: Funding for U.S. Interdiction

and International Drug Control Efforts

(Fiscal Years 1987-97)

Dollars in millions

0

250

500

750

1000

1250

1500

1750

2000

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

Fiscal year

International

Interdiction

Note: 1997 figures are requested amounts.

Source: ONDCP.

Funding for drug interdiction in the transit zone declined from about 

$1 billion in 1992 to $570 million in 1995. This adversely affected U.S.

interdiction capabilities. In addition, funding to support source country

activities—called for in the new cocaine policy of 1993—did not

materialize. Moreover, as we reported in August 1993, the State

Department reduced the support of military and law enforcement

counternarcotics activities in Colombia from a planned level of $58 million

to $26 million because of budgetary constraints. As a result, Colombian

police and military requirements could not be met.30 In 1995, U.S. Embassy

30The Drug War (GAO/NSIAD-93-158, Aug. 10, 1993).

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
B-275976 

officials stated that without additional funding they could not adequately

support plans for both eradication and interdiction operations.

In March 1994, the Congressional Budget Office reported that the amount

of funding to support counternarcotics efforts in the Andean region source

countries was substantially below the 5-year level proposed by the

executive branch (see fig. 5).31

Figure 5: Proposed and

Actual/Estimated Funding Levels for

Support of Drug Control Efforts in the

Andean Region (Fiscal Years 1989-94)

Dollars in millions

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Fiscal year

Proposed

Actual and estimated

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

In April 1996, we reported that U.S. funding in source countries had

declined in 1994 and 1995 from earlier levels, even though U.S. policy

called for greater emphasis on source country counternarcotics efforts.32

The lack of consistent funding for counternarcotics efforts has in some

cases made countries hesitant to fully cooperate with the United States.

31The Andean Initiative: Objectives and Support, Congressional Budget Office, March 1994.

32Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-96-119, Apr. 17, 1996).

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
B-275976 

For example, according to U.S. Embassy officials, the Peruvian

government has been reluctant to push for the eradication of mature coca

partly because the United States cannot promise consistent or negotiated

levels of alternative development assistance to support the long-term

efforts needed to significantly reduce the growth of coca leaf. U.S.

Southern Command officials concur in the view that sporadic funding has

adversely affected drug control efforts and believe that some minimal level

of support should be established as a baseline for drug control efforts in

the source countries and transit regions.

For fiscal year 1997, the funding levels for some agencies’

counternarcotics activities were increased. For example, the State

Department’s international narcotics control and law enforcement

programs were fully funded for fiscal year 1997 at $213 million. However,

without longer-term budget stability, it may be difficult for agencies to

implement programs that they believe will reduce drug production and

drug trafficking.

Ways to Improve the

Effectiveness of U.S.

International Drug

Control Efforts

There is no easy remedy for overcoming all of the obstacles posed by

drug-trafficking activities. International drug control efforts aimed at

stopping the production of illegal drugs and drug-related activities in the

source and transit countries are only one element of an overall national

drug control strategy. Alone, these efforts will not likely solve the U.S.

drug problem. Overcoming many of the long-standing obstacles to

reducing the supply and smuggling of illegal drugs requires a long-term

commitment. We believe the United States can improve the effectiveness

of planning and implementing its current international drug control efforts

by (1) developing a multiyear plan with measurable goals and objectives

and a multiyear funding plan, (2) making better use of available

intelligence and technologies and increasing intelligence efforts, and

(3) developing a centralized system for recording and disseminating

lessons learned by various agencies while conducting law enforcement

operations.

Develop Long-Term Plans

That Include Multiyear

Funding Requirements

U.S. counternarcotics efforts have been hampered by the absence of a

long-term plan outlining each agency’s commitment to achieving the goals

and objectives of the international drug control strategy. Judging U.S.

agencies’ performance at reducing the supply of and interdicting illegal

drugs is difficult because the agencies have not established meaningful

measures to evaluate their contribution to achieving these goals. Also,

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
B-275976 

agencies have not established multiyear funding plans that could serve as

a more consistent basis for policymakers and program managers to

determine requirements for effectively implementing a plan and

determining the best use of resources.

We have issued numerous reports citing the need for an overall

implementation plan with specific goals and objectives and performance

measures linked to them. In 1988, we reported that goals and objectives

had not been established in any of the six drug-producing countries

examined,33 and in 1991 and 1992, we reported a similar situation in

Colombia and Peru.34 Moreover, in 1993, we reported that DOD’s

surveillance mission in support of interdiction efforts was not cost

beneficial, partially because ONDCP had not established quantifiable goals

or valid effectiveness measures. Later, in 1993, we recommended that

ONDCP develop performance measures to evaluate agencies’ drug control

efforts and incorporate the measures in the national drug control

strategy.35

Under the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 

(P.L. 103-62), federal agencies are required to develop strategic plans

covering at least 5 years, with results-oriented performance measures.

ONDCP officials recently told us that they are now working with an

interagency group to develop performance effectiveness measures that

will be linked to a 10-year drug control strategy. In our view, this effort is

long overdue and will be critical for evaluating the overall success of

counternarcotics efforts and for establishing a better basis to set resource

priorities. Because changing events may significantly affect the plan, ONDCP

needs to monitor progress and make necessary adjustments at least

annually.

In addition, with the involved agencies’ multiyear funding requirements,

ONDCP could prepare an aggregated multiyear budget plan that clearly

reflects the total nature and extent of combined efforts. By establishing a

longer-term funding plan similar to DOD’s Future Year Defense Program

(FYDP),36 some of the problems caused by sporadic funding patterns could

33Drug Control: U.S. International Narcotics Control Activities (GAO/NSIAD-88-114, Mar. 1, 1988).

34Drug War (GAO/NSIAD-91-296, Sept. 30, 1991) and The Drug War (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-9, Feb. 20, 1992).

35Drug Control: Reauthorization of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (GAO/GGD-93-144, Sept.

29, 1993).

36The FYDP is DOD’s budget “blueprint” supporting the defense strategy. It provides an official set of

planning assumptions and projections far enough ahead to allow DOD to estimate the future

implications of its current decisions. The FYDP has been annually submitted to Congress since 1988.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
B-275976 

be overcome. Like the FYDP, an overall multiyear counternarcotics budget

plan linked to the international drug control strategy could lay out

program requirements to enable policymakers to better judge each

agency’s contribution toward achieving results.

Improve and Expand

Intelligence and

Technology Efforts

In an environment of limited budgets and assets, it is important for U.S.

officials to effectively use their resources to make the maximum impact

against drug-trafficking activities. A key component of U.S. operational

strategy is reliable and adequate intelligence to help plan interdiction

operations. Having timely intelligence on trafficking activities is

increasingly important because traffickers frequently change their

operational patterns and increasingly use more sophisticated

communications, making it more difficult to detect their modes of

operations. U.S. officials have indicated that more intelligence resources,

including human intelligence resources, are needed. They recognized that

this expansion could take several years, even if additional funds are made

available. Nevertheless, expanded intelligence efforts are critical to law

enforcement and interdiction activities.

As traffickers become more sophisticated in using technology to

communicate and conduct their operations, technological improvements

will become increasingly important. Use of detection technology is needed

because over 400 million people, almost 120 million cars, and 10 million

containers and trucks pass through the 301 points of entry into the United

States each year. Two general groups of technologies can be used to

detect narcotics. The first group uses X-rays, nuclear techniques, or

electromagnetic waves, while the second group—referred to as trace

detection technologies—uses chemical analyses to identify narcotics’

particles or vapors.37

The U.S. Customs Service, which is responsible for the ports of entry,

currently has inspectors with relatively little equipment other than

handheld devices that manually screen containers to detect false

compartments. Customs has identified containerized cargo at commercial

seaports as its greatest unsolved narcotics detection requirement. Tests

have shown that fully loaded containers can be effectively screened for

narcotics with available high energy X-ray technologies. According to DOD

and Customs officials, future efforts in container screening will include

less expensive X-ray systems with higher energy levels, mobile X-ray

37Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives and Narcotics

(GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
B-275976 

systems, and more capable handheld trace detection systems. We believe

these technologies will likely become more important in addressing

maritime and border trafficking threats.

An After-Action Reporting

System Could Strengthen

Planning and

Implementation

U.S. agencies could strengthen their planning and operations through the

development of an after-action reporting system similar to DOD’s system.

Under DOD’s system, operation reports describe an operation’s strengths

and weaknesses and contain recommendations for consideration in future

operations. A governmentwide system would allow agencies to learn from

the problems and impediments encountered internally and by other

federal agencies in implementing past efforts and interdiction operations.

With such information, the agencies could develop plans that avoid past

problems or contingencies in known problem areas. ONDCP should take the

lead in developing a governmentwide lessons-learned data system to

quickly provide agency planners and operators with information to enable

them to anticipate changing drug-trafficking patterns and respond

accordingly and to develop more effective source country efforts.

Matter for

Congressional

Consideration

To ensure continuity and commitment to achieving the goals and

objectives of the drug control strategy, Congress should consider

providing ONDCP the authority to require that key U.S. drug control

agencies develop and submit multiyear funding plans tied to the drug

control strategy.

Recommendations To aid decisionmakers in planning improved counternarcotics efforts and

using U.S. resources to their best advantage, we recommend that the

Director, ONDCP, (1) complete the development of a long-term plan with

meaningful performance measures and multiyear funding needs that are

linked to the goals and objectives of the international drug control

strategy; (2) at least annually, review the progress made and adjust the

plan, as appropriate; (3) enhance support for the increased use of

intelligence and technology to improve U.S. and other nations’ efforts to

reduce supplies of and interdict illegal drugs; and (4) lead in developing a

centralized lessons-learned data system to aid agency planners and

operators in developing more effective counterdrug efforts.

Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, ONDCP said it supports all of our

recommendations. According to ONDCP, the President’s Drug Control

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
B-275976 

Council fully supports a 5-year drug budget planning process in

conjunction with the development of a 10-year drug strategy. ONDCP

indicated that the executive branch had developed a 5-year national drug

control budget for submission to Congress for fiscal year 1998. The budget

process is expected to identify the resources needed to achieve the goals

and objectives in the 1997 strategy. ONDCP added that it has already begun

the process of developing measures of effectiveness in concert with the

national drug control program agencies.

ONDCP pointed out that it must be reauthorized by the end of fiscal 

year 1997 and that reauthorization language was being developed for

submission to Congress. Central to ONDCP’s reauthorization is legislation to

permit a 10-year strategy and an annual report to Congress on progress.

To enhance support for the increased use of technology and intelligence,

ONDCP indicated that it had initiated reviews of both the overall intelligence

architecture and the work of the Counterdrug Technology Assessment

Center. ONDCP also stated that it anticipated that a coordinated

implementation plan will be key to making a centralized lessons-learned

data system operational. (ONDCP’s comments are reprinted in full in 

app. III.)

In written and oral comments, the Department of Justice expressed

concern that the report did not recognize the full extent of its role in

international drug control activities. We added information on the role

played by the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the FBI in investigating and

prosecuting drug cases against international drug traffickers. Justice’s

comments and our evaluation of them are included in appendix IV. The

Departments of State and Defense orally advised us that they had no

disagreement with the findings, conclusions, and recommendations in our

report.

We have made technical changes and updated information in the report,

where appropriate, based on suggestions provided by the Departments of

State, Defense, and Justice; ONDCP; and the U.S. Southern Command.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

The previous Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, International

Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the House Committee on Government

Reform and Oversight requested that we provide information on U.S.

international drug control efforts. The objectives of our review were to

summarize the findings from our past work and provide our overall

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
B-275976 

observations on (1) the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to combat drug

production and the movement of drugs into the United States,

(2) obstacles to implementation of U.S. drug control efforts, and

(3) suggestions to improve the operational effectiveness of the U.S.

international drug control strategy.

To address these issues, we employed a combination of approaches. To

obtain information for this report, we reviewed 59 prior GAO reports,

testimonies, and supporting documentation on U.S. international drug

control efforts. To obtain information on past, ongoing, and planned drug

control policies and efforts, we spoke with appropriate officials and

reviewed planning documents, studies, cables, and correspondence at the

Departments of Defense, State, and Justice—primarily DEA; the U.S. Coast

Guard; the U.S. Customs Service; the U.S. Agency for International

Development; the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator; and ONDCP in Washington,

D.C.

To obtain information on drug-trafficking activities in the Caribbean and

U.S. efforts to address this problem, we visited the U.S. Atlantic Command

in Norfolk, Virginia, and the Joint Interagency Task Force in Key West,

Florida, where we obtained detailed briefings from U.S. officials and

reviewed documents, cables, and related documents. To obtain

information on drug-trafficking activities in the source countries of South

America, we visited the U.S. Southern Command in Panama and the Joint

Interagency Task Force at Howard Air Force Base in Panama, where we

met with senior U.S. military officials and obtained detailed briefings on

planned and ongoing drug interdiction efforts in the cocaine source

countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.

We visited the U.S. embassies in La Paz, Bolivia, and Lima, Peru, where we

met with numerous U.S. Embassy personnel involved in planning and

implementing drug control efforts in these two countries. We also

reviewed planning documents, field reports, cables, and correspondence

maintained at the embassies. To obtain the views of the governments of

Bolivia and Peru, we met with senior Bolivian, Peruvian, and United

Nations law enforcement and drug control officials responsible for

counternarcotics programs. In Bolivia, we also visited the Chapare

coca-growing region and met with U.S. and Bolivian drug control officials

and numerous coca- and non-coca-growing farmers.

Our report contains various figures and tables showing data related to the

production and consumption of illegal narcotics. Because of the nature of

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
B-275976 

the illegal drug trade, in which traffickers’ activities are not always known

to foreign and U.S. government agencies, it is difficult to develop precise

and reliable information. For the most part, the data are only

approximations and represent the best available U.S. government

estimates. In addition, our report includes data through 1995 because U.S.

government data for 1996 was not available and will not be officially

issued until March 1, 1997, when the Department of State publishes its

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.

We conducted our review from June 1996 through January 1997 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. As

you requested, we obtained written agency comments from ONDCP on a

draft of this report. We also discussed the information in this report with

officials of other concerned agencies and included their comments where

appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional

committees; the Secretaries of State and Defense; the Attorney General;

the Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration; and the Director of

the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Copies will also be made

available to other interested parties upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, I can be

reached on (202) 512-4128. Major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix V.

Sincerely yours,

Benjamin F. Nelson

Director, International Relations

 and Trade Issues

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

U.S. Agencies

Involved in

Developing and

Administering

Counternarcotics

Activities

30

Department of State 30

Department of Defense 30

Department of Justice 31

U.S. Coast Guard 31

U.S. Customs Service 31

U.S. Agency for International Development 32

Appendix II 

Trends in the Price

and Purity of Heroin

33

Appendix III 

Comments From the

Office of National

Drug Control Policy

34

Appendix IV 

Comments From the

Department of Justice

36

Appendix V 

Major Contributors to

This Report

42

Related GAO Products 45

Tables Table 1: Average Retail Price for One Kilogram of Cocaine 5

Table 2: Changes in Area of Land Under Cultivation for Drug

Crops From 1988 to 1995

6

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
Contents

Table II.1: U.S. Retail Prices for One Kilogram of Heroin, by

Region or Country of Origin, 1988-95

33

Figures Figure 1: Average Cocaine Purity 5

Figure 2: Potential Cocaine Production, Seizures, and Availability 7

Figure 3: Potential Heroin Production, Seizures, and Availability 8

Figure 4: Funding for U.S. Interdiction and International Drug

Control Efforts

18

Figure 5: Proposed and Actual/Estimated Funding Levels for

Support of Drug Control Efforts in the Andean Region

19

Figure II.1: Average Retail Heroin Purity, 1988-95 33

Abbreviations

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DOD Department of Defense

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FYDP Future Year Defense Program

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act

JIATF Joint Interagency Task Force

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy

UNDCP United Nations Drug Control Program

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
Appendix I 

U.S. Agencies Involved in Developing and

Administering Counternarcotics Activities

The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), located within the

Executive Office of the President, oversees international and domestic

drug programs. It is responsible for developing the U.S. national drug

control strategy and overseeing and coordinating the drug control efforts

of about 50 different U.S. federal agencies engaged in implementing the

strategy and managing programs. ONDCP does not manage the programs

themselves. Some of the key U.S. agencies involved in counternarcotics

efforts are the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense; the Drug

Enforcement Administration (DEA); the U.S. Coast Guard; the U.S.

Customs Service; and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Department of State In the Department of State, the Assistant Secretary for International

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is responsible for formulating and

implementing the international narcotics control policy and for

coordinating the narcotics control activities of all U.S. agencies overseas.

The Assistant Secretary also manages the International Narcotics Control

Program, authorized by section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,

as amended, which provides aid to law enforcement agencies involved in

antidrug activities. In addition, the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of

Politico-Military Affairs manages the Foreign Military Financing Program,

and the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Human Rights and

Humanitarian Affairs is responsible for ensuring that U.S. human rights

policies are implemented. A number of key U.S. embassies overseas are

staffed with a narcotics affairs section which manages the International

Narcotics Control Program. The section’s mission is generally to provide

equipment and training, operational support, technical assistance, and

coordination to host country agencies involved in counternarcotics.

Department of

Defense

In the Department of Defense (DOD), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support is responsible for

planning, implementing, and providing support to law enforcement

agencies that have counternarcotics responsibilities. The Director of the

Defense Security Assistance Agency is responsible for providing

equipment and training to host country military and law enforcement

agencies. DOD’s overall activities include detecting and monitoring

suspected drug traffickers and providing training and equipment. At a

number of U.S. embassies overseas, military aid is administered by the

U.S. Military Group, which is responsible for coordinating security

assistance programs with host countries’ military forces and with other

U.S. agencies involved in counternarcotics activities.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
Appendix I 

U.S. Agencies Involved in Developing and

Administering Counternarcotics Activities

Department of Justice DEA is the principal federal agency responsible for coordinating drug

enforcement intelligence overseas and conducting all drug enforcement

operations. DEA’s objectives are to reduce the flow of drugs into the United

States through bilateral criminal investigations, collect intelligence

regarding organizations involved in drug trafficking, and support

worldwide narcotics investigations covering such areas as money

laundering, control of chemicals used in the production of cocaine and

heroin, and other financial operations related to illegal drug activities. DEA

also provides training to host country law enforcement personnel.

The Department of Justice and its U.S. Attorney’s Office enforce the

narcotics and money-laundering laws and prosecute cases against

international drug traffickers and money launderers and seize and forfeit

their illicit proceeds and laundered assets domestically and overseas. The

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has a role in drug trafficking

investigations and has concurrent status with DEA because of its

responsibility for traditional organized crime groups. The FBI has placed

agents in several DEA offices overseas and is involved in joint U.S.-Mexican

law enforcement initiatives. The FBI also supports international drug law

enforcement training by either conducting or facilitating courses in

drug-related topics.

U.S. Coast Guard The U.S. Coast Guard is the principal maritime law enforcement agency,

with jurisdiction on and over the high seas, as well as in U.S. territorial

waters. The goal of the Coast Guard’s drug interdiction effort is to

eliminate maritime routes as a significant trafficking mode for the supply

of drugs to the United States through seizures, disruption, and

displacement. The program emphasizes interdicting vessels and aircraft

smuggling cocaine and marijuana into the United States and tracking,

monitoring, and apprehending aircraft suspected of carrying drugs from

source and transit countries over the high seas.

U.S. Customs Service The U.S. Customs Service is primarily responsible for preventing

contraband from entering or exiting the United States. It plays a key role

in interdicting illegal drugs and investigating drug-smuggling

organizations. The Customs Service has a border inspection force and an

extensive air program, which aims to detect and apprehend

drug-smuggling aircraft, and a variety of seagoing vessels.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
Appendix I 

U.S. Agencies Involved in Developing and

Administering Counternarcotics Activities

U.S. Agency for

International

Development

The Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development is

responsible for planning and implementing U.S. economic assistance

programs that are directed to the international drug problem through

alternative development—strengthening and diversifying the legitimate

economies of drug-producing and trafficking countries. Agency activities

also include assistance to host countries in repaying debt and improving

judicial systems, drug awareness and education programs, and general

project support.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
Appendix II 

Trends in the Price and Purity of Heroin

Table II.1: U.S. Retail Prices for One

Kilogram of Heroin, by Region or

Country of Origin, 1988-95

Dollars in thousands

Year

Southeast

Asia

Southwest

Asia

South

America Mexico

1988 $100 - $210 $70 - $200 N/A $100 - $200

1989 $60 - $204 $45 - $160 N/A $70 - $130

1990 $70 - $260 $70 - $200 N/A $65 - $80

1991 $90 - $260 $80 - $220 N/A $50 - $200

1992 $90 - $250 $80 - $200 N/A $50 - $150

1993 $150 - $250 $70 - $200 N/A $50 - $250

1994 $100 - $260 $75 - $200 $85 - $180 $50 - $250

1995 $70 - $260 $70 - $260 $80 - $185 $50 - $250

Note: N/A - Not applicable.

Source: DEA.

Figure II.1: Average Retail Heroin

Purity, 1988-95 Percent

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Year

Source: DEA.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
Appendix III 

Comments From the Office of National Drug

Control Policy

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
Appendix III 

Comments From the Office of National Drug

Control Policy

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Justice

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Justice

See comment 3.

See comment 3.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Justice

See comment 3.

Now on p. 20.

See comment 4.

Now on p. 22.

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

Now p. 8.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Justice

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Justice

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Justice’s letter

dated February 20, 1997.

GAO Comments 1. This report reflects the contents of previous GAO reports. When

appropriate, the prior GAO reports included agency comments and our

evaluation of these comments.

2. We did not obtain formal Department of Justice comments on a number

of our reports and testimonies because (1) they made no reference to the

Department of Justice; (2) at hearings scheduled by congressional

committees, we were asked to provide our views, not the views of other

witnesses; or (3) in the past, we honored requests of congressional

committees that specifically asked us not to obtain agency comments.

However, it should be noted that DEA—recognized by the Department of

Justice as the lead agency for most U.S. international drug trafficking

investigative efforts—did provide written comments on three of the four

reports we have issued since September 1994. DEA was not mentioned in

the fourth report. We obtained oral comments from DEA officials on all of

our international drug control reports in which DEA activities were

discussed.

3. We have included additional information on other Department of Justice

entities involved in U.S. international counterdrug activities. However, it

should be clearly recognized that some activities were largely beyond the

scope of our review. These include (1) the U.S. Attorney’s Office efforts to

prosecute money-laundering and drug-trafficking cases and (2) the FBI’s

efforts to deal with traditional organized crime groups. In addition, the

Department’s comments did not reflect any disagreement with the fact

that (1) the counternarcotics efforts to date have not significantly impeded

the flow of drugs and (2) the obstacles we identified have hampered

counterdrug efforts.

4. The report text has been modified to reflect this information.

5. We do not take a position on the merit of digital telephony legislation

and the need to intercept and decode encryption transmissions because it

was beyond the scope of our review.

6. We have not changed the statement made by the DEA Administrator. The

statement was cited in both the prepared statement and testimony given

by the Administrator at a March 28, 1996, hearing before the Senate

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Justice

Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. The statement and

hearing record have been published and contain no reference to “third

world nations.”

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
Appendix V 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Jess Ford, Associate Director

Joe Murray, Assistant Director

Allen Fleener, Evaluator-in-Charge

Ron Hughes, Senior Evaluator

George Taylor, Senior Evaluator

Nancy Ragsdale, Senior Evaluator (Communications Analyst)

Dan Tikvart, Evaluator

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
Appendix V 

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
Appendix V 

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
Related GAO Products

Customs Service: Drug Interdiction Efforts (GAO/GGD-96-189BR, Sept. 26,

1996).

Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Control Efforts in Southeast Asia

(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-240, Sept. 19, 1996).

Drug Control: Observations on Counternarcotics Activities in Mexico

(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-239, Sept. 12, 1996).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives

and Narcotics (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).

Drug Control: Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico (GAO/NSIAD-96-163,

June 12, 1996).

Drug Control: Observations on Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico

(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-182, June 12, 1996).

Drug Control: Observations on U.S. Interdiction in the Caribbean

(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-171, May 23, 1996).

Drug Control: U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean Decline

(GAO/NSIAD-96-119, Apr. 17, 1996).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and

Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar. 27, 1996).

Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Program Encounters Many Obstacles in

Southeast Asia (GAO/NSIAD-96-83, Mar. 1, 1996).

Review of Assistance to Colombia (GAO/NSIAD-96-62R, Dec. 12, 1995).

Drug War: Observations on U.S. International Drug Control Efforts

(GAO/T-NSIAD-95-194, Aug. 1, 1995).

Drug War: Observations on the U.S. International Drug Control Strategy

(GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182, June 27, 1995).

Honduras: Continuing U.S. Military Presence at Soto Cano Base Is Not

Critical (GAO/NSIAD-95-39, Feb. 8, 1995).

Drug Activity in Haiti (GAO/OSI-95-6R, Dec. 28, 1994).

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
Related GAO Products

Drug Control: U.S. Antidrug Efforts in Peru’s Upper Huallaga Valley

(GAO/NSIAD-95-11, Dec. 7, 1994).

Drug Control: U.S. Drug Interdiction Issues in Latin America

(GAO/T-NSIAD-95-32, Oct. 7, 1994).

Drug Control In Peru (GAO/NSIAD-94-186BR, Aug. 16, 1994).

Drug Control: Interdiction Efforts in Central America Have Had Little

Impact on the Flow of Drugs (GAO/NSIAD-94-233, Aug. 2, 1994).

Drug Control: U.S. Counterdrug Activities in Central America

(GAO/T-NSIAD-94-251, Aug. 2, 1994).

Illicit Drugs: Recent Efforts to Control Chemical Diversion and Money

Laundering (GAO/NSIAD-94-34, Dec. 8, 1993).

Drug Control: The Office of National Drug Control Policy-Strategies Need

Performance Measures (GAO/T-GGD-94-49, Nov. 15, 1993).

Drug Control: Expanded Military Surveillance Not Justified by Measurable

Goals (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-14, Oct. 5, 1993).

The Drug War: Colombia Is Implementing Antidrug Efforts, but Impact Is

Uncertain (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-53, Oct. 5, 1993).

Drug Control: Reauthorization of the Office of National Drug Control

Policy (GAO/GGD-93-144, Sept. 29, 1993).

Drug Control: Heavy Investment in Military Surveillance Is Not Paying Off

(GAO/NSIAD-93-220, Sept. 1, 1993).

The Drug War: Colombia Is Undertaking Antidrug Programs, but Impact Is

Uncertain (GAO/NSIAD-93-158, Aug. 10, 1993).

Drugs: International Efforts to Attack a Global Problem (GAO/NSIAD-93-165,

June 23, 1993).

Drug Control: Revised Drug Interdiction Approach Is Needed In Mexico

(GAO/NSIAD-93-152, May 10, 1993).

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
Related GAO Products

Drug Control: Coordination of Intelligence Activities (GAO/GGD-93-83BR,

Apr. 2, 1993).

Drug Control: Increased Interdiction and Its Contribution to the War on

Drugs (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-04, Feb. 25, 1993).

Drug War: Drug Enforcement Administration’s Staffing and Reporting in

Southeast Asia (GAO/NSIAD-93-82, Dec. 4, 1992).

The Drug War: Extent of Problems in Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela

(GAO/NSIAD-92-226, June 5, 1992).

Drug Control: Inadequate Guidance Results in Duplicate Intelligence

Production Efforts (GAO/NSIAD-92-153, Apr. 14, 1992).

The Drug War: Counternarcotics Programs in Colombia and Peru

(GAO/T-NSIAD-92-9, Feb. 20, 1992).

Drug Policy and Agriculture: U.S. Trade Impacts of Alternative Crops to

Andean Coca (GAO/NSIAD-92-12, Oct. 28, 1991).

The Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Programs in Colombia

and Peru (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-2, Oct. 23, 1991).

The Drug War: U.S. Programs in Peru Face Serious Obstacles

(GAO/NSIAD-92-36, Oct. 21, 1991).

Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia

(GAO/NSIAD-91-296, Sept. 30, 1991).

Drug Control: Impact of DOD’s Detection and Monitoring on Cocaine Flow

(GAO/NSIAD-91-297, Sept. 19, 1991).

The War on Drugs: Narcotics Control Efforts in Panama (GAO/NSIAD-91-233,

July 16, 1991).

Drug Interdiction: Funding Continues to Increase but Program

Effectiveness Is Unknown (GAO/GGD-91-10, Dec. 11, 1990).

Restrictions on U.S. Aid to Bolivia for Crop Development Competing With

U.S. Agricultural Exports and Their Relationship to U.S. Anti-Drug Efforts

(GAO/T-NSIAD-90-52, June 27, 1990).

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
Related GAO Products

Drug Control: How Drug Consuming Nations Are Organized for the War on

Drugs (GAO/NSIAD-90-133, June 4, 1990).

Drug Control: Anti-Drug Efforts in the Bahamas (GAO/GGD-90-42, Mar. 8,

1990).

Drug Control: Enforcement Efforts in Burma Are Not Effective

(GAO/NSIAD-89-197, Sept. 11, 1989).

Drug Smuggling: Capabilities for Interdicting Airborne Private Aircraft Are

Limited and Costly (GAO/GGD-89-93, June 9, 1989).

Drug Smuggling: Capabilities for Interdicting Airborne Drug Smugglers Are

Limited and Costly (GAO/T-GGD-89-28, June 9, 1989).

Drug Control: U.S.-Supported Efforts in Colombia and Bolivia

(GAO/NSIAD-89-24, Nov. 1, 1988).

Drug Control: U.S. International Narcotics Control Activities

(GAO/NSIAD-88-114, Mar. 1, 1988).

Controlling Drug Abuse: A Status Report (GAO/GGD-88-39, Mar. 1, 1988).

Drug Control: U.S.-Supported Efforts in Burma, Pakistan, and Thailand

(GAO/NSIAD-88-94, Feb. 26, 1988).

Drug Control: River Patrol Craft for the Government of Bolivia

(GAO/NSIAD-88-101FS, Feb. 2, 1988).

Drug Control: U.S.-Mexico Opium Poppy and Marijuana Aerial Eradication

Program (GAO/NSIAD-88-73, Jan. 11, 1988).

U.S.-Mexico Opium Poppy and Marijuana Aerial Eradication Program

(GAO/T-NSIAD-87-42, Aug. 5, 1987).

Status Report on GAO Review of the U.S. International Narcotics Control

Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-87-40, July 29, 1987).

Drug Control: International Narcotics Control Activities of the United

States (GAO/NSIAD-87-72BR, Jan. 30, 1987).

(711228) Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-97-75 Drug Control
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