In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 20-1124 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

JEFFREY ESPOSITO, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. 

Case No. 1:18-CR-00109— Jane E. Magnus-Stinson, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MAY 12, 2021 — DECIDED JUNE 11, 2021 

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. 

BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Jeffrey Esposito, convicted of multiple counts of sexually exploiting a child as well as of possessing child pornography, was sentenced to 200 years in 

prison. He appeals, arguing that the district erred when, rather than first determining his total punishment, sentences 

were imposed on each individual count and then added together. Because the district court did not err when sentencing 

Esposito, we affirm. 
2 No. 20-1124 

I

Jeffrey Esposito sexually assaulted and abused his 

adopted son from Guatemala for years, beginning when his 

son was seven or eight years old and ending a couple of years 

before he turned sixteen. Esposito’s crimes were repetitive, 

shocking, and horrific. In addition to anal and oral penetration, including with objects, the abuse included urinating on, 

choking, whipping, tying, and putting a collar on the victim. 

Esposito documented his abuse in videos and photographic 

images which he shared online on the dark web. He had also 

downloaded other child pornography—hundreds of thousands of images and videos—by the time he was arrested by 

federal law enforcement. 

Esposito was charged with 20 counts of sexually exploiting a minor, each reflecting a different instance of abuse documented in videos and images taken by the defendant. He 

was also charged with one count of possessing child pornography. Esposito pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. 

In the presentence investigation report, the defendant’s offense level was calculated at 51, which defaulted to a maximum of 43 under the Sentencing Guidelines. Esposito had no 

criminal history. The resulting Guidelines range was life in 

prison, but none of the crimes of which Esposito was convicted had a statutory maximum of life imprisonment. The 

probation department recommended that Esposito be imprisoned for 600 years. The government argued for 620 years. The 

defense suggested 420 months, so Esposito would finish his 

sentence in approximately 28 years. That length would give 

Esposito, who is in his mid-fifties, a chance at release from 

prison near the end of his life. 
No. 20-1124 3

At the sentencing hearing, the district court explained 

why it concluded that a de facto life sentence was appropriate

for Esposito. Then the court pronounced Esposito’s sentences, 

count by count, imposing six 30-year sentences to be served 

consecutive to each other, followed by fifteen 20-year sentences to be served concurrent with each other but consecutive to the 30-year sentences. These sentences totaled 200 

years in prison. 

Esposito now appeals, claiming the district court sentenced him erroneously. He argues the court should have considered his criminal conduct, history, and characteristics as a 

whole, determined an appropriate overall punishment, and 

then set the sentences for each count to equal that overall punishment. 

II

A 

The parties dispute the standard of review. At the sentencing hearing, the defendant did not object to the method the 

court used to arrive at his sentences, although he did seek 

clarification of the consecutive-versus-concurrent aspect of 

the sentences and how the 200 years was calculated. 

The defendant contends he has raised a procedural challenge, so review is de novo. See United States v. Ballard, 950 

F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. Pennington, 908 

F.3d 234, 238 (7th Cir. 2018). He also argues he had no obligation to object under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51(a), 

which provides “[e]xceptions to rulings or orders of the court 

are unnecessary.” 

The government submits that the plain error doctrine under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 52(b) should 
4 No. 20-1124 

apply here. Plain error has three elements: the error (1) has 

not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned, (2) must be 

clear or obvious, and (3) must have affected the defendant’s 

substantial rights. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 

1338, 1343 (2016). We should review for plain error, the government argues, because Esposito was given an opportunity 

to object at the sentencing hearing but failed to do so. 

But contrary to the government’s position, a court’s general invitation for objections is not enough to show waiver or 

forfeiture by the defendant. Id. As this court concluded in 

United States v. Speed, 811 F.3d 854 (7th Cir. 2016), courts only 

elicit waiver when they ask specific questions—like whether 

the defendant is satisfied with the court’s treatment of their 

main arguments in mitigation—not generalized inquiries 

about whether the defendant was confused or had anything 

else to say. Id. at 857–58; see also United States v. Mzembe, 979 

F.3d 1169, 1173 (7th Cir. 2020) (“A general invitation for objections or asking, “anything else?” at the end of the hearing 

is not sufficient, however, to show a waiver of challenges to 

the sufficiency of an explanation.”). Here, the district judge’s 

inquiry, while not completely general, was broad: 

Counsel, do you have any legal objection to the 

sentence I have proposed or request any further 

elaboration of my reasons under Section 3553(a) 

as to the length of imprisonment or as to the 

length and/or conditions of supervised release

[?]

The defense counsel responded by seeking and receiving an 

explanation of how the court had calculated the consecutive 

and concurrent sentences to total 200 years imprisonment. 

Given this colloquy, we do not find waiver or forfeiture. 
No. 20-1124 5

The defense has the better of this disagreement. Esposito 

argues the district court erred by determining punishment on 

each individual count and then adding those terms together 

to impose a total sentence. In other words, he disputes the 

way the court pronounced and explained his sentence. This 

is properly characterized as a procedural error. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (“failing to adequately explain the 

chosen sentence”); see also Pennington, 908 F.3d at 238 (challenging the sufficiency of the district court’s explanation of its 

sentencing decision was a procedural error). Esposito claims 

the district court erred by not adhering to procedure, which 

as the defendant points out warrants de novo review. 

For these reasons, we will review de novo Esposito’s challenge to his sentences.

B 

Esposito argues the district court should have determined 

his correct overall punishment and then conformed the sentences on the individual counts to achieve that total. He relies 

on the text of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2, which states in relevant part: 

(b) ... the court shall determine the total punishment and shall impose that total punishment on 

each such count, except to the extent otherwise 

required by law. 

 ... 

(d) If the sentence imposed on the count carrying 

the highest statutory maximum is less than the 

total punishment, then the sentence imposed on 

one or more of the other counts shall run consecutively, but only to the extent necessary to 

produce a combined sentence equal to the total 
6 No. 20-1124 

punishment. In all other respects, sentences on 

all counts shall run concurrently, except to the 

extent otherwise required by law.

Esposito also cites United States v. De la Torre, 327 F.3d 605 

(7th Cir. 2003), in which the defendant was convicted of several drug and money laundering counts. Initially, a 

151-month sentence was imposed for the drug conspiracy and 

money laundering counts, along with a 60-month concurrent 

sentence for the distribution of marijuana count. Id. at 607. 

Due to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the maximum sentence for the drug conspiracy counts became only 60 

months. The defendant petitioned to change the sentence, arguing that because the 151-month sentence was based on a 

crime that now had a much lower statutory maximum, it was 

improper to use the other counts, with lower Guidelines 

ranges, to achieve a 151-month sentence. Id. at 607–08. The 

court agreed and reduced the defendant’s sentence to 71 

months on the money laundering counts and 60 months on 

the drug counts, to be served concurrently. Id. The government appealed. 

This court reversed the district court in De la Torre. We explained that the purpose of the Guidelines is to determine the 

“total punishment” appropriate for an offender. Id. 609–11. 

The statutory maximum has no bearing in the calculation of 

the Guidelines range for total punishment. Id. This holds true

even in cases like De la Torre, where that range is based on an 

offense with a much lower statutory maximum. Id. Of course, 

the sentence for any individual count cannot exceed the statutory maximum for that count, but as § 5G1.2(d) of the Guidelines explains, the sentences for other counts can be set, consecutively as necessary, to achieve the total punishment. Id. 
No. 20-1124 7

See also United States v. Griffith, 85 F.3d 284 (7th Cir. 1996) (concerning the same issue as in De la Torre). 

Esposito’s argument here is technical, and it imports a 

methodology that the Guidelines do not require. If, before 

delving into imposing sentences count by count, the district 

court had stated that it thought the correct total punishment 

was 200 years—rather than merely saying that the correct 

total punishment was a de facto life sentence—then, per Esposito, the district court would not have erred. After its sentencing remarks, the district court imposed sentences count

by count and noted that the total was 200 years. To the defendant, this suggests the court did not come up with the 200-

year number first and then set the count-by-count sentences, 

but did the opposite, setting the count-by-count sentences 

and then adding them up to total 200 years. 

The difficulty with Esposito’s argument is that before imposing sentence, the district court effectively determined that 

Esposito’s total punishment should be life imprisonment. The 

court’s sentencing comments evince that it was pronouncing 

a de facto term of life imprisonment before pronouncing 

prison terms on each count. 

The district court expressly rejected the defendant’s 

request to set his imprisonment based on his 28-year life expectancy, from which we can deduce that the court was contemplating a longer sentence than that. The district court was 

also alert to this court’s directive to be thoughtful when imposing life sentences when the statutes do not provide for 

them. Still, the district court concluded that the defendant’s 

crimes against this victim—bondage, urination, beating, rape, 

rape with objects—were so horrific as not to be minimized, 
8 No. 20-1124 

and that Esposito’s crimes did not warrant a shorter sentence 

equal to his life expectancy at the time of sentencing. 

The district court further suggested that it was not concerned about the effect a lengthy sentence may have on other 

defendants contemplating pleading guilty, and the court 

stated unequivocally that Esposito can never be around children again. So we can conclude that the court meant to 

impose what is effectively a life sentence. Indeed, at oral argument before us, the defense agreed that the district court 

made it clear that it wished to impose a de facto life sentence.1 

Because the highest statutory maximum was less than life 

in prison, the district court, following § 5G1.2(d), imposed 

consecutive sentences as necessary to achieve an effective life 

sentence. So, the district court did not commit any error here.

Esposito would have the district court apply a rigid, twostep sequence that neither 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) nor the Sentencing Guidelines require. The text of § 5G1.2(b) provides that 

the court shall determine the total punishment “and” shall 

impose that total punishment on each such count. That provision does not say “and then” or explicitly set out the calculative process the defendant contends. Rather, § 5G1.2(b) was 

designed to address a circumstance different than here. This 

case fits better under § 5G1.2(d), as the defendant presented 

with no prior criminal history, so without any single count 

expressly providing for life imprisonment, the court meted 

out a term of de facto life imprisonment by means of the consecutive and concurrent sentences imposed here.2

1 Oral Argument at 7:50. 

2 It also bears noting that in the decision on which Esposito relies, De 

la Torre, the Sentencing Guidelines had to be given much more weight 
No. 20-1124 9

III

We conclude that the district court did not err when imposing Esposito’s sentences, so we AFFIRM. 

than here. 327 F.3d at 609, 611. De la Torre predated United States v. Booker, 

543 U.S. 220 (2005), which struck down the provision of the federal sentencing statute that required sentences to fall within the Sentencing Guidelines range, along with the provision that deprived federal appeals courts

of the power to review sentences imposed outside the range. Id. at 245.