IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs September 15, 2015 at Knoxville

MICHAEL V. MORRIS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

 Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2005-B-875 Monte D. Watkins, Judge

No. M2015-01113-CCA-R3-ECN – Filed December 29, 2015

The pro se petitioner, Michael V. Morris, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition 

for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that due process requires that the statute of 

limitations for filing his petition be tolled because Sutton v. Carpenter, 745 F. 3d 787 (6th

Cir. 2014), which he interprets as establishing that he has the right to effective assistance 

of post-conviction counsel, was not released until after the time limit for filing the 

petition had expired. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the 

petition as time-barred pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed 

Pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals

ALAN E. GLENN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which NORMA MCGEE OGLE

and D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JJ., joined.

Michael V. Morris, Wartburg, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Brent C. Cherry, Senior Counsel; 

Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and Roger D. Moore, Assistant District 

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 The petitioner was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of 

aggravated robbery on July 11, 2006, and was subsequently sentenced by the trial court 

as a career offender to thirty years at 60% in the Department of Correction. His 

conviction was affirmed by this court on direct appeal, and our supreme court denied his 

application for permission to appeal. State v. Michael V. Morris, No. M2006-02738-
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CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 544567, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 25, 2008), perm. app. 

denied (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2008), reh’g denied (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2008). 

The petitioner subsequently filed two successive petitions for writ of habeas 

corpus, in both of which he argued, among other things, that he was improperly 

sentenced as a career offender. Both petitions were summarily dismissed, and this court 

affirmed the summary dismissals in both cases. See Michael V. Morris v. State, No. 

M2008-02113-CCA-R3-HC, 2010 WL 2075933, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 25, 2010), 

perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 26, 2010); Michael V. Morris v. James Fortner, Warden, 

No. M2008-01022-CCA-R3-HC, 2009 WL 690304, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 

2009).

The petitioner also filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he raised 

claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. This court affirmed the 

denial of the petition, and our supreme court denied the petitioner’s application for 

permission to appeal. Michael V. Morris v. State, No. M2010-02069-CCA-R3-PC, 2012 

WL 76905, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 6, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 20, 

2012). 

On April 2, 2015, the petitioner filed the petition for writ of error coram nobis at 

issue in this case, alleging that Sutton v. Carpenter, which he interprets as establishing his 

constitutional right to post-conviction counsel, constitutes newly discovered evidence that 

may have led to a different judgment at trial. The petitioner conceded that his petition 

was untimely, but he argued that the statute of limitations should be tolled because his 

interest in presenting his constitutional claim regarding effective assistance of postconviction counsel outweighed the State’s interest in preventing stale claims. On May 

26, 2015, the court entered an order summarily dismissing the petition, finding that it was 

untimely and that the petitioner failed to show any due process grounds for tolling the 

statute of limitations. This appeal followed. 

A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinary remedy by which the court may 

provide relief from a judgment under only narrow and limited circumstances. State v. 

Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tenn. 1999). Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-

105 provides this remedy to criminal defendants:

Upon a showing by the defendant that the defendant was without fault in 

failing to present certain evidence at the proper time, a writ of error coram 

nobis will lie for subsequently or newly discovered evidence relating to 

matters which were litigated at the trial if the judge determines that such 

evidence may have resulted in a different judgment, had it been presented at 

the trial. The issue shall be tried by the court without the intervention of a 
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jury, and if the decision be in favor of the petitioner, the judgment 

complained of shall be set aside and the defendant shall be granted a new 

trial in that cause.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-105(b), (c) (2012).

Our supreme court has stated the standard of review as “whether a reasonable 

basis exists for concluding that had the evidence been presented at trial, the result of the 

proceedings might have been different.” State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 525-28 

(Tenn. 2007) (citation omitted).

Coram nobis claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 27-7-103. The statute of limitations is computed “from the date the judgment of 

the trial court becomes final, either thirty days after its entry in the trial court if no posttrial motions are filed or upon entry of an order disposing of a timely filed, post-trial 

motion.” Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 141, 144 (Tenn. 2010). The one-year statute of 

limitations, may, however, be tolled on due process grounds if the petitioner seeks relief 

based upon newly discovered evidence of actual innocence. Wilson v. State, 367 S.W.3d 

229, 234 (Tenn. 2012). The issue of whether a claim is barred by an applicable statute of 

limitations is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. See id.

As we understand it, the petitioner’s attenuated argument is that the Sutton

opinion, which he interprets as establishing that he has the right to effective assistance of 

post-conviction counsel, constitutes “newly discovered evidence that would establish 

[his] actual innocence of career offender designation” because had post-conviction 

counsel provided effective assistance, counsel would have investigated and shown that 

the State’s use of his out-of state convictions to establish his offender classification was 

unconstitutional. 

The petitioner’s reasoning is flawed. First, the petitioner is mistaken in his belief 

that Sutton establishes a constitutional right to the effective assistance of post-conviction 

counsel. As the State points out in its brief, we rejected a similar argument based on 

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), and its successor cases, such as 

Sutton, in a recent case. In David Edward Niles v. State, No. M2014-00147-CCA-R3-

PC, 2015 WL 3453946 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 1, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 

17, 2015), we noted that those federal cases, which provide that a petitioner in a federal 

habeas corpus petition is not procedurally barred from raising a claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel when post-conviction counsel was ineffective for not raising 

the claim and the state procedural law either prohibited or made it highly unlikely for the 

petitioner to have had a meaningful opportunity to raise the claim on direct appeal, do not 

establish a constitutional right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Id.
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at *6-7 (citations omitted). Second, the petitioner claims not that the alleged newly 

discovered evidence shows his actual innocence of the crime, but only his “innocence” of

his career offender classification. Thus, we agree with the coram nobis court that the 

petition is untimely and that the petitioner has not shown any basis for tolling the statute 

of limitations on due process grounds. Accordingly, we affirm the summary dismissal of 

the petition as time-barred. 

When an opinion would have no precedential value, the Court of Criminal 

Appeals may affirm the judgment or action of the trial court by memorandum opinion 

when the judgment is rendered or the action taken in a proceeding without a jury and 

such judgment or action is not a determination of guilt, and the evidence does not 

preponderate against the finding of the trial judge. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 20. We 

conclude that this case satisfies the criteria of Rule 20. Accordingly, the judgment of the 

trial court is affirmed in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal 

Appeals.

_________________________________ 

ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE