United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

June 1997 CHEMICAL WEAPONS

STOCKPILE

Changes Needed in the

Management of the

Emergency

Preparedness Program

GAO/NSIAD-97-91

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-276238 

June 11, 1997

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

In July 1996, we reported that 8 years after the Chemical Stockpile

Emergency Preparedness Program’s (CSEPP) inception, Alabama

communities near Anniston Army Depot were not fully prepared to

respond to a chemical stockpile emergency because they lacked critical

items.1

 Given the lack of progress in Alabama’s CSEPP and prior CSEPP

management weaknesses we have reported on, we conducted a follow-up

review to (1) assess CSEPP’s progress in enhancing emergency

preparedness in all 10 states participating in the program and (2) identify

opportunities to improve program management. We conducted this review

under our basic legislative responsibilities and are addressing it to you

because of your oversight responsibilities for chemical weapons disposal

programs. Our scope and methodology are described in appendix I.

1

Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Emergency Preparedness in Alabama Is Hampered by Management

Weaknesses (GAO/NSIAD-96-150, July 23, 1996).

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
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Background In November 1985, the Congress directed the Department of Defense (DOD)

(through the Army) to destroy the U.S. stockpile of lethal chemical agents

and munitions and directed that the disposal program provide for the

maximum protection of the environment, the public, and the personnel

involved in disposing of the munitions.2

 In 1988, the Army established

CSEPP to help communities near the chemical stockpile storage sites

enhance existing emergency management and response capabilities in the

unlikely event of a chemical stockpile accident. Another focus of CSEPP is

to enhance the emergency preparedness of the eight Army installations

where the chemical stockpile munitions are stored. (See app. II for the

locations of the chemical stockpile storage sites.)

The Army is responsible for determining the overall direction for CSEPP.

Under a memorandum of understanding with the Army, the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides technical assistance and

distributes Army funds to states through cooperative agreements.3

Program funds flow from the Army to FEMA headquarters, through FEMA

regional offices, and to the states.4 Annual allocations to the states are

based on the states’ current concept of operations and progress in

implementing approved and funded CSEPP initiatives and on the results of

annual negotiations. (See app. III for data on funds allocated to the various

CSEPP entities in fiscal years 1988-96.) On the basis of approved activities

and projects, states provide funds to counties as their subgrantees. States

and counties, in accordance with state and local laws, have primary

responsibility for developing and implementing programs to enable

communities to respond to a chemical stockpile emergency.

In 1993 and 1994, the Army and FEMA issued CSEPP benchmarks and

planning guidance that identify funding priorities and items critical to

respond to a chemical stockpile emergency.5

 In February 1994, in response

to congressional guidance, the Army and FEMA signed a restructuring

agreement to establish the CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team to coordinate and

implement public affairs, exercises, training, communications, and other

activities for the program. The Joint Army/FEMA Team is managed by

2

Public Law 99-145, section 1412.

3

The funds provided to the states are covered by FEMA’s Uniform Administrative Requirements for

Grants and Cooperative Agreements to State and Local Governments (44 CFR, part 13) and the Office

of Management and Budget Circular A-128.

4

Section 1521 (c) (3) 50 U.S.C. provides that the Secretary of Defense may make grants to state and

local governments, either directly or through FEMA.

5

Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, the Army and

FEMA (May 17, 1996).

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
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Army’s Project Manager for Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness

and consists of 14 Army officials and 6 FEMA officials. The team’s

objectives are to create an environment for teamwork and build a working

partnership.

In the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 104-201, section

1076), the Congress directed the Secretary of the Army to submit a report

on his assessment of the implementation and success of the site-specific

integrated process teams. As envisioned by the Army, the integrated

process teams will (1) identify issues, develop solutions, and integrate

program plans and budget submissions among CSEPP jurisdictions and

(2) include officials from the CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team, appropriate

FEMA region, participating states and counties, and local Army chemical

storage command. According to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for

Research, Development, and Acquisition, the joint Army and FEMA report

was scheduled to be issued by the end of May 1997.6

 On May 30, 1997, the

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Environment)

informed the Congress that the Secretary’s report would be delayed until

July 15, 1997.

Results in Brief Although it has taken longer than it should, CSEPP officials expect that

most critical items will be in place by the end of 1998. After 9 years and

funding of $431.4 million, states and local communities surrounding the

chemical stockpile storage sites still lack some items critical to responding

to a chemical stockpile emergency (see table 1).

6

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition letter to the Chairman,

House Committee on National Security (Mar. 31, 1997).

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
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Table 1: Availability of Five Critical CSEPP-Funded Items in the States We Visited

CSEPP entity

Integrated

communications

system

Personal

protective

equipment

Personnel

decontamination

equipment

Siren

system

Tone alert

radios

Alabama and counties Partial Partial Partial Yes No

Arkansas and counties Yes No Yes Yes No

Colorado and county Yes No No No No

Maryland and counties Yes No Partial Partial No

Oregon and counties Partial Partial No No No

Utah and counties Partial Yes Yes Yes Partial

Washington and county Yes No No Yes No

Note: As of March 1, 1997.

Source: Based on data provided by the Army’s Project Manager for CSEPP and state and county

emergency management agencies.

As we have reported since 1992, CSEPP’s slow progress has been due

largely to long-standing management weaknesses, including disagreement

between the Army and FEMA over their respective roles and

responsibilities.7

 The FEMA Inspector General, Members of Congress, and

state and local officials have also expressed concern about these

management weaknesses. Moreover, the Congress has expressed concern

that states and communities lack critical CSEPP items and that program

costs continue to increase.8

Although the Army and FEMA have taken actions in response to this

criticism, opportunities still exist to improve program management.

Specifically, disagreements between Army and FEMA officials on their

respective roles and responsibilities continue to hamper program

effectiveness. For example, the Army is still working to respond to the

requirement of the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act to report on

the integrated process teams because FEMA questions the efficiency of the

Army’s involvement. As a result of this and other differences, the Army

and FEMA have not reached agreement on a long-term management

structure for the program. In his March 1997 letter to the Chairman of the

House Committee on National Security, the Assistant Secretary of the

Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition) said that, if the Army and

FEMA were unsuccessful in reaching an agreement on the long-term

7

See list of related GAO products at the end of this report.

8

Program costs have remained level since the Joint Army/FEMA Team developed the CSEPP life-cycle

cost estimate in 1995.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
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management structure for CSEPP and integrated process teams, the Army

would assume full control and responsibility for the program. Until the

Army and FEMA leadership take steps to delineate their agencies’ roles and

responsibilities and reach agreement on a long-term management

structure for CSEPP, the future effectiveness of CSEPP is at risk.

Progress in Enhancing

State and Local

Emergency

Preparedness Has

Been Slow

Nine years after CSEPP’s inception and funding of $431.4 million, states and

local communities still lack items critical to responding to a chemical

stockpile emergency, including integrated communication systems,

personal protective equipment, personal decontamination equipment,

sheltering-in-place enhancements, and alert and notification systems.

Program officials expect that nearly all these items will be funded and/or

operational by the end of 1998, but that may be optimistic unless

management weaknesses and differences at the Army and FEMA level are

corrected and states and counties take prompt actions to implement the

projects.

Almost $431.4 Million Has

Been Allocated to CSEPP

Through fiscal year 1996, almost $431.4 million has been allocated to the

program (see table 2). As of December 1996, approximately $152.5 million

had been allocated to Army organizations, installations, and contracts.

According to Army officials, some of these expenditures were for

computer equipment and software provided to state and local emergency

management agencies and emergency preparedness projects at Army

installations. Approximately $43.2 million was allocated to FEMA

headquarters, regional offices, and contracts. According to FEMA, the

agency’s contracts support the entire CSEPP community and include the

development of program guidance, training courses, and computer

software. Participating states and counties have received $220.8 million.

The Army has allocated $1.1 million to other organizations and has not

allocated $13.8 million.

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Table 2: Allocation of CSEPP Funds in

Fiscal Years 1988-96 Dollars in thousands

Entity/activity Amount Percent

Army organizations, installations, and contracts $152,509.2 35.4

FEMA headquarters, regional offices, and contractsa 43,234.4 10.0

States and counties 220,779.0 51.2

Other organizations 1,093.1 0.3

Not allocated 13,766.4 3.2

Total $431,382.1 100b

Note: As of December 1996.

aIncludes $14.7 million (3.4 percent) allocated to FEMA headquarters and regions and

$28.6 million (6.6 percent) allocated for contracts.

bPercents do not total 100 due to rounding.

Source: Based on data provided by the Army’s Project Manager for CSEPP.

The Army’s current life-cycle cost estimate for CSEPP is $1.03 billion, an

800-percent increase of the initial estimate of $114 million in 1988.

According to Army officials, the initial CSEPP estimate was made before the

Army had fully defined the program’s scope, requirements, and time

frames, and the current estimate has not increased since the CSEPP Joint

Army/FEMA Team developed the $1.03 billion life-cycle cost estimate in

1995. Management weaknesses, including the lack of adequate financial

data and internal controls, have contributed to the growth in costs.

States and Local

Communities Lack Critical

CSEPP Items

State and local emergency management officials repeatedly expressed

concern to us about their communities’ lack of readiness to respond to a

chemical stockpile emergency. In 1993 and 1994, the Army and FEMA issued

benchmarks and program guidance that identified items critical to respond

to a chemical stockpile emergency, such as automated information

systems, emergency operations centers, integrated communication

systems, personal protective equipment, personnel decontamination

equipment, sheltering-in-place enhancements, and alert and notification

systems. Table 3 shows the status of CSEPP items in each of the 10 states

participating in the program.

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Table 3: Availability of Critical CSEPP-Funded Items (as of Mar. 1, 1997)

Item

Alabama

and

counties

Arkansas

and

counties

Colorado

and

county

Illinois

and

counties

Indiana

and

counties

Kentucky

and

counties

Maryland

and

counties

Oregon

and

counties

Utah and

counties

Washington

and county

Automated

information

systema

Partial Partial Partial Partial Partial Partial Partial Partial Partial Partial

Emergency

operations

center

Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial Yes Partial Partial Yes Partial

Integrated

communications

system

Partialb Yes Yes Partial Yes Partial Yes Partial Partial Yes

Personal

protective

equipmentc

Partial No No No Partial No No Partial Yes No

Personnel

decontamination

equipment

Partial Yes No No No No Partial No Yes No

Shelteringin-place

enhancements

No Yes No NR No NR Yes Nod NR NR

Sirens

system

Yes Yes No NR Yes Yes Partial No Yes Yes

Tone alert

radios

No No No NR No Partial No No Partial No

Note: Yes means that the CSEPP-funded item is fully operational and meets standards.

Partial means that the CSEPP-funded item is partially operational because additional

requirements are anticipated and/or the current system or equipment do not meet CSEPP

standards.

No means that the state and counties do not have the required CSEPP item.

NR means that the state and counties do not have a requirement for the CSEPP item.

aFederal Emergency Management Information System.

bThe system was fully funded in 1996.

cThe equipment has been funded since 1995.

dThe enhancements were funded in 1996.

Source: Based on data provided by the Army’s Project Manager for CSEPP and state and county

emergency management agencies.

In our survey of CSEPP participants, all 10 states and 37 of 40 counties

participating in the program said that their emergency response

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
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capabilities had increased since the implementation of CSEPP. Officials of

three counties said that their emergency response capabilities had not

changed. Most communities near the chemical stockpile sites had little

capability to respond to a chemical emergency when the program began in

1988. For example, emergency management officials from both the state of

Oregon and Lonoke County, Arkansas, said that CSEPP has made good

progress, considering that they had very little capability before the

program was implemented. According to a Lonoke County official, the

county would have only a few radios without CSEPP’s assistance, and it is

better able now to respond to all types of emergencies. Appendix IV

discusses the status and funding of specific CSEPP projects.

According to FEMA, most CSEPP states and local communities have the

operational capability to respond to a chemical stockpile emergency even

though all CSEPP items have not been procured or installed. We did not

assess whether states and local communities have operational capability

to respond to a chemical incident. Our conclusion that states and local

communities lack critical items is based on CSEPP benchmarks and

guidance and data from the Army, FEMA, states, and local communities. We

continue to believe that using benchmarks and program guidance is the

appropriate measure for assessing whether program goals are being met.

Program Officials Expect

That CSEPP Will Transition

to a Maintenance Phase

After 1998

By the end of 1998, according to federal, state, and county officials, states

and local communities will have nearly all of the critical CSEPP items

funded and/or available and the program will transition from procurement

into a maintenance phase. At that time, most of the program’s

expenditures are expected to be for operations and maintenance activities

rather than construction or procurement of major capital items. The

transition to a maintenance phase will require less contract management,

training, and federal oversight of state and local daily operations.

According to Army CSEPP officials, the programs in Arkansas, Illinois,

Indiana, and Utah have already transitioned into the maintenance phase.

Local communities in Alabama, Colorado, and Oregon, however, will still

lack some critical CSEPP items after 1998.

The CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team is in the process of negotiating standard

baseline operating costs with each of the 10 states participating in the

program. The negotiated funding will cover (1) agreed-upon recurring

fixed-costs (for example, salaries, office supplies, and telephones) plus an

inflation factor and (2) variable operating costs (for example, training and

exercises) that are recognized costs but the level of funding is subject to

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
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annual fluctuation. Other funding will be for short-term projects and

one-time procurement requirements. Procurement funds are used to

purchase major capital items such as communication systems or

decontamination equipment. According to Army officials, inadequate

actions by states and counties have caused several of the major projects to

lag and the accumulation of procurement funds in state accounts.

For fiscal years 1997-2004, the Army expects to need another

$598.6 million to operate the program. It estimates that 66.4 percent of the

funding allocated to the states will be operations and maintenance funds

and 33.6 percent will be procurement funds (see fig. 1). Only Alabama is

estimated to receive more procurement funds, mostly for costly

sheltering-in-place projects, than operations and maintenance funds.9

Other states such as Illinois, Indiana, and Maryland are expected to

receive very little procurement funds compared with their estimated

operations and maintenance funding.

9

Sheltering-in-place enhancements can be as simple as taping doors and windows or as elaborate as

installing pressurized air filtration systems in schools, hospitals, jails, community centers, and public

buildings. In 1996, the Calhoun County Emergency Management Agency in Alabama estimated that the

county would require about $67.6 million for sheltering-in-place enhancements to 55 facilities located

near the stockpile storage site.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
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Figure 1: Estimated Allocation of

CSEPP Funds for Fiscal Years

1997-2004

Dollars in thousands

0

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

60000

70000

80000

90000

100000

Alabama

Arkansas

Colorado

Illinois

Indiana

Kentucky

Maryland

Oregon

Utah

Washington

CSEPP state

Procurement funds

Operations and maintenance funds

Note: Future allocations are based on the estimated funding required to maintain an acceptable

level of emergency preparedness. Within DOD’s budget constraints, the required funding will vary

by CSEPP jurisdiction.

Source: Based on CSEPP’s life-cycle cost data provided by the Army’s Project Manager for

CSEPP.

CSEPP Has a History

of Management

Weaknesses and

Concerns Still Remain

The Army, FEMA, and the states and counties have been frustrated in

attempts to implement CSEPP. As we and FEMA’s Inspector General have

reported, problems have stemmed from management weaknesses in the

program and disagreements over respective roles and responsibilities.

Prior Reports Discuss

Management Weaknesses

The Army has been slow in achieving its main objective of helping

communities to enhance their emergency management capabilities

because the program’s (1) management roles and responsibilities are

fragmented between Army and FEMA offices and are not well defined,

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
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(2) planning guidance is imprecise, (3) the budget process lacks

coordination and communications, and (4) financial data and internal

controls are inadequate. Army and FEMA officials have differed and

continue to differ on various aspects of program management, and

consequently, CSEPP’s effectiveness and efficiency continue to suffer.

In 1993, we testified that the Army had made little progress in achieving its

main objective of helping communities prepare for emergencies involving

chemical agent release.10 The lack of progress was partly because of

management weaknesses at the federal level, including fragmented

authorities and responsibilities and weak financial controls, that led to

missed program milestones and delays in issuing program guidance. In

1994, we reported that the Army’s management approach had not been

effective and that communities near the chemical stockpile sites were not

prepared to respond to a chemical stockpile emergency.11

In 1995, we reported that program officials lacked accurate financial

information to identify how funds were spent and ensure that program

goals were achieved.12 Because of inadequate financial data and internal

controls, Army and FEMA could not provide reliable information on actual

expenditures. Army and FEMA officials still do not have accurate financial

information to identify how funds are spent. Specifically, records on

expenditure data are limited; allocation data differ among federal, state,

and local agencies; and states and counties maintain large unexpended

balances of funds. According to Army and FEMA officials, the Office of

Management and Budget’s Circular A-102 limits the Army in requesting

expenditure data from the states.

In July 1996, we reported that Alabama communities near the Anniston

Army Depot were not prepared to respond to a chemical emergency

because they lacked critical items. Although the communities had been

allocated $46 million, they had not spent $30.5 million because federal,

state, and local officials had not reached agreement on specific

requirements for four projects. We concluded that the lack of progress was

the result of management weaknesses at the Army and FEMA levels and

inadequate action by state and local agencies.

10Chemical Weapons Storage: Communities Are Not Prepared to Respond to Emergency

(GAO/T-NSIAD-93-18, July 16, 1993).

11Chemical Weapon Stockpile: Army’s Emergency Preparedness Program Has Been Slow to Achieve

Results (GAO/NSIAD-94-91, Feb. 22, 1994).

12Chemical Weapons: Army’s Emergency Preparedness Program Has Financial Management

Weaknesses (GAO/NSIAD-95-94, Mar. 15, 1995).

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Management Weaknesses

Cited by the FEMA

Inspector General

In February 1993, the FEMA Inspector General reported that CSEPP’s

reporting system did not provide timely, accurate, or consistent data and

did not satisfy the management needs of either FEMA or the Army.13

Specifically, FEMA officials could not accurately account for how CSEPP

funds were spent and Army officials lacked accurate data to determine

whether funds were spent effectively.

Concerns Expressed by

State and County Officials

Several states and counties said that they were frustrated with the Army’s

and FEMA’s joint management of CSEPP and needed greater discretion in the

use of program funds (see table 4). However, Army officials expressed

concern over providing the states greater discretion in the use of CSEPP

funds because of past indiscretions. In 1995, we reported some of the

indiscretions noted by the Army. For example, Arkansas reprogrammed

$413,000 in unobligated funds to construct office space, and Washington

reprogrammed $100,000 allocated for telecommunication equipment to

design an emergency operations center without FEMA headquarters’

approval.

13Audit of FEMA’s Management of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, FEMA

Inspector General (Feb. 1993).

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Table 4: Selected States’ and Counties’ Comments About the Army and FEMA Management of CSEPP

Organization Comment

Alabama Emergency

Management Agency

If CSEPP was effectively managed, the program would be much farther along than it is now.

Clay County Emergency

Management Agency,

Alabama

CSEPP lacks federal leadership and guidance.

Etowah County Emergency

Management Agency,

Alabama

Substantive changes in the program’s management, direction, and budget process are needed to make

CSEPP effective.

Arkansas Office of

Emergency Services

Federal agencies lack sensitivity to state and local requirements and micromanage the budget process.

Jefferson County Office of

Emergency Services,

Arkansas

Federal agencies need to improve CSEPP’s lines of communications and coordination.

Colorado Office of

Emergency Management

Federal agencies spend too much effort micromanaging and reevaluating every aspect of the state’s

program.

Kentucky Disaster and

Emergency Services

Recent changes in CSEPP guidance, lines of communications, and responsibilities have hampered the

progress of the program.

Maryland Emergency

Management Agency

Inadequate and partial funding of CSEPP projects detracts from the state’s ability to respond to a

chemical stockpile emergency.

Baltimore County Office of

Emergency Preparedness,

Maryland

If program priorities and guidance were firmly established, CSEPP would be more effective and less

costly.

Harford County Division of

Emergency Operations,

Maryland

The Army and FEMA roles and responsibilities are not clear, and they often dictate to state and local

governments.

Oregon Emergency

Management Agency

CSEPP lacks good communications, clear priorities, and timely decisions.

Morrow County Emergency

Management, Oregon

The Army and FEMA roles and responsibilities are not clearly defined.

Utah Department of Public

Safety

Federal micromanagement of CSEPP compromises the state’s ability to plan, direct, implement, and

evaluate the program.

Washington Military

Department

Federal agencies lack clear direction, roles, and responsibilities.

Benton County Emergency

Management, Washington

Federal agencies micromanage the program and make decisions with little or no coordination with the

county.

Note: Based on our prior work and recent visits to 7 of the 10 states and several of their counties,

we believe that these comments are valid and are based on justified concerns about the Army

and FEMA management of the program.

As discussed later in this report, our work shows that the Army and FEMA

have management problems and disagreements that have adversely

affected CSEPP’s effectiveness.

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Efforts to Improve

Program Management

Have Been Frustrated

by Continued

Disagreements

Although Army and FEMA officials have acted in response to criticism and

improved program management, the effectiveness of these actions has

been limited by continued disagreements between Army and FEMA

officials. Specifically, the lack of agreement prevented the Secretary of the

Army from timely compliance with the statutory requirement to report on

the implementation and success of CSEPP integrated process teams. Two

important steps taken to improve the management of the program were to

establish the CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team and implement the integrated

process teams. However, based on FEMA’s stated positions, we believe that

the agency does not fully support the Joint Army/FEMA Team or

site-specific integrated process teams. Because of these and other

differences regarding their roles and responsibilities, Army and FEMA

officials have not agreed to a long-term management arrangement for

CSEPP.

Disagreements Over the

Implementation of the

CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA

Team

In 1993, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported that CSEPP’s

cost growth and program delays were unacceptable, and indicated that

there were problems with the program’s management structure.14 In

addition, the Committee concluded that the Army and FEMA maintained a

top-heavy bureaucratic organization to manage the program. The

Committee directed the Army to (1) assume full management

responsibility for the execution of CSEPP, (2) directly receive and review

states’ budget requests for program funds, (3) tighten program controls

and ensure timely improvements in local capabilities to respond to a

chemical stockpile emergency, (4) streamline CSEPP’s management

structure, (5) reevaluate FEMA’s role in CSEPP, (6) establish milestones for

critical CSEPP projects, and (7) establish strict financial controls to ensure

accountability over program funds. Although the Army established the

CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team in response to this direction, the team has not

functioned as the Army intended. Specifically, CSEPP’s management

structure was not streamlined, and the Army and FEMA continue to share

responsibility for executing CSEPP, receiving and reviewing states’ budget

requests, and implementing financial controls over program funds.

According to the CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team’s charter, dated January 6,

1995, the joint team was intended to (1) establish a focal point for

accountability of the program, (2) coordinate and integrate on- and

off-post activities, and (3) create an environment for teamwork. However,

according to DOD officials, the team has not functioned as intended.

According to FEMA officials, the establishment of the joint team has posed

14Senate Report No. 103-158, at 368-369 (1993).

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
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several management challenges to FEMA, including the differentiation

between the roles and responsibilities of the team and FEMA’s regional

offices. FEMA officials have proposed that the Army eliminate the joint

team and associated staffing.

In August 1996, the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization

reported that, in some situations, FEMA’s implementation of the charter had

inhibited the progress of CSEPP.

15 According to the Program Manager,

pressure from FEMA headquarters’ officials to have the agency’s joint team

members spend more of their duty time at FEMA headquarters’ and less

with the joint team had impeded their integration with Army’s members.

The Program Manager concluded that communications with the CSEPP

participants and coordination with the Army had been adversely affected.

In response, FEMA’s Deputy Associate Director for Preparedness, Training,

and Exercises agreed that the program was not functioning as effectively

as it should and that respective roles, responsibilities, and working

relationships needed to be clarified.

Disagreements Over the

Implementation of CSEPP

Integrated Process Teams

In the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 104-201, section

1076), the Congress directed the Secretary of the Army to submit a report,

within 120 days of the law’s enactment, that assessed the implementation

and success of the site-specific integrated process teams. The act further

states that if the Army and FEMA were unsuccessful in implementing the

integrated process teams within each of the participating states within

120 days, the Secretary of the Army shall (1) assume full control and

responsibility for the program by eliminating the role of the FEMA Director

as a joint manager; (2) clearly define the goals of the program;

(3) establish fiscal constraints for the program; and (4) agree with each of

the participating states regarding program requirements, implementation

schedules, training and exercise requirements, and funding to include

direct grants for program support.

In January 1997, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research,

Development, and Acquisition, reported that the Army was unable to

provide the report on January 28, 1997, as required, because of delays in

scheduling required training and the subsequent establishment of

site-specific integrated process teams.16 The Army views these teams as a

15The Army’s Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization letter to FEMA’s Deputy Associate

Director for Preparedness, Training, and Exercises (Aug. 20, 1996).

16Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition letter to the Chairman,

Senate Committee on Armed Services (Jan. 30, 1997).

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
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mechanism for identifying issues, developing solutions, and integrating

program plans and budget submissions among CSEPP jurisdictions at each

stockpile location. The teams will make recommendations to Army and

FEMA officials for consideration and determine solutions to site-specific

issues. The Assistant Secretary’s letter included an interim status of the

formation of the site-specific integrated process teams, concluding that the

training and formation of the teams were nearing completion. He also

reported that FEMA headquarters had some concerns over the efficiency of

the integrated process teams. In contrast, the FEMA regions were

supporting the teams.

In March 1997, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research,

Development, and Acquisition, reported to the Chairman of the House

Committee on National Security that the Army was unable to provide the

report, as required, because Army and FEMA officials had not reached

agreement on the long-term management structure for CSEPP and on the

implementation of integrated process teams at the management and

working levels. While training and implementation of the working-level

integrated process teams had been completed, he said that it was

necessary to further delay the submission of the report on the

implementation and success of the teams until May 30, 1997.17 The

Assistant Secretary concluded that, if the Army and FEMA were

unsuccessful in reaching an agreement on the long-term management

structure for CSEPP and integrated process teams, the Army would assume

full control and responsibility for the program. According to FEMA’s

comments on a draft of this report, FEMA officials disagree with Army’s

conclusions in the letters complying with the legislative reporting

requirement.

Several state and local officials we visited were pleased with the initial

results of the teams. However, others expressed concern that the teams

may be good in theory but only add another layer of bureaucracy to the

program. For example, officials in Oregon and Kentucky expressed

concern over which agency or integrated process team would be

responsible for making final decisions.

Although FEMA has participated in CSEPP’s integrated process teams, its

concept for site-specific integrated process teams differs from the Army’s

concept, and the agency has not signed the Army’s proposed

memorandum implementing the integrated process teams. Specifically,

17On May 30, 1997, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Environment)

informed the Congress that the report would be delayed until July 15, 1997.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
B-276238 

FEMA does not want the Army involved in off-post CSEPP activities and

wants to eliminate the Army from site-specific integrated process teams.

FEMA’s desire to eliminate the Army from site-specific integrated process

teams is inconsistent with the tenets of the process and does not recognize

the Army’s position that they should work as partners.

Army and FEMA Officials

Disagree on FEMA’s Future

Role

In September 1996, FEMA’s Deputy Associate Director for Preparedness,

Training, and Exercises reported that the Army and FEMA had very

different management styles and philosophies and that the current

approach was not working.18 She concluded that attempts to combine

Army and FEMA approaches in developing off-post preparedness

capabilities have resulted in delays and conflicting messages to

participating states. Additional FEMA correspondence indicates that the

agency continues to want to manage all off-post activities with little or no

Army involvement.

In October 1996, the Army Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization

agreed that Army’s and FEMA’s management styles were different and

added that relationships were strained and leadership was less effective

than desired.19 The Program Manager reported that maintaining the

current management structure would continue regional and state

confusion over the program’s leadership and prolong the program’s

problems. He concluded that FEMA’s participation in CSEPP was preferred

but suggested that FEMA’s role and personnel involved in the program be

reduced. (See app. V.) He rejected options to eliminate either the Army’s

or FEMA’s role in the program.

The Program Manager also provided FEMA with a draft memorandum

reorganizing CSEPP. The memorandum identifies the Army Project Manager

for CSEPP as the primary program decision-making authority and the

site-specific integrated process teams as the primary means of carrying out

the program. FEMA officials said they had not agreed to the reorganization

because of questions over the integrated process teams and FEMA’s future

role in the program. Because of these and other differences regarding their

roles and responsibilities, the Army and FEMA have not agreed to a

management arrangement for CSEPP after September 1997.

18FEMA’s Deputy Associate Director for Preparedness, Training, and Exercises letter to the Army’s

Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization (Sept. 20, 1996).

19The Army’s Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization letter to FEMA’s Deputy Associate

Director for Preparedness, Training, and Exercises (Oct. 9, 1996).

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
B-276238 

Conclusions and

Recommendations

We believe that the future effectiveness of CSEPP is at risk given the

continuing disagreements between Army and FEMA officials and that

high-level management attention is needed to clearly define CSEPP

management roles and responsibilities. Therefore, we recommend that the

Secretary of the Army and the Director of FEMA work together to complete

the mandated assessment of the implementation and success of integrated

process teams by July 15, 1997. We also recommend that, as part of this

assessment, the Secretary and the Director reach agreement on a

long-term management structure for CSEPP that clearly defines the roles

and responsibilities of Army and FEMA personnel. Should the Secretary and

the Director be unable to complete their assessment and issue a report

that includes a plan for revising CSEPP’s management structure, we

recommend that the Secretary of the Army implement the requirements of

the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act to (1) assume full control and

responsibility for the program and eliminate the role of the FEMA Director

as a joint manager; (2) clearly define the goals of the program;

(3) establish fiscal constraints for the program; and (4) agree with each of

the participating states regarding program requirements, implementation

schedules, training and exercise requirements, and funding to include

direct grants for program support.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

We received written comments on a draft of this report from both DOD and

FEMA, and they are presented in their entirety in appendixes VI and VII,

respectively. DOD concurred with the report and its recommendations.

FEMA generally concurred with the recommendations but strongly

disagreed with our conclusions. Our evaluation of FEMA’s overall response

is presented below and our specific comments are presented in 

appendix VII. We also added information to the report to more fully reflect

FEMA’s position. DOD and FEMA also provided technical corrections and

clarifications and, where appropriate, we incorporated them in the report

as well.

FEMA disagreed with our assessment that the program is at risk because of

its ongoing differences with the Army. FEMA noted that it has been working

closely with the Army to clarify roles, responsibilities, and working

relationships and resolve the differences as soon as possible. While we

agree that FEMA and the Army have been discussing this issue, it continues

to go unresolved after more than a year of discussions. Our concern is not

whether the Army’s or FEMA’s approach to resolving the management issue

is the more appropriate; we are concerned that CSEPP’s implementation is

being delayed because this issue has not been resolved. As a consequence,

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
B-276238 

the program’s goal of providing communities with items critical to

responding to a chemical stockpile emergency remains to be achieved

after 9 years and funding of $431.4 million.

We prepared this report under our basic legislative responsibilities. We are

providing it to you because of your oversight responsibilities for chemical

weapons disposal programs. We are also sending copies of this report to

the Secretaries of Defense and the Army, the Directors of the Office of

Management and Budget and FEMA, and other interested parties. We will

make copies available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any questions.

Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VIII.

David R. Warren, Director

Defense Management Issues

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

24

Appendix II 

Chemical Stockpile

Locations in the

Continental United

States

26

Appendix III 

Funds Allocated to

CSEPP Entities in

Fiscal Years 1988-96

27

Appendix IV 

Acquisition and

Installation of

Essential CSEPP

Projects Are Behind

Schedule

28

The Final Automated Information System Continues to

Experience Problems

28

Most Emergency Operation Centers Are Fully Operational 30

Most CSEPP Communication Systems Are Fully Operational 31

Personal Protective Equipment Purchases Are Scheduled for

Completion in 1997 and 1998

32

Personnel Decontamination Equipment Purchases Are Scheduled

for Completion in 1997

33

Additional Sheltering-in-Place Projects Are Anticipated 34

Most Alert and Notification Systems Are Scheduled for

Completion in 1997 and 1998

35

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Contents

Appendix V 

Army’s Proposed

Full-Time Equivalent

Positions for FEMA in

Support of CSEPP

38

Appendix VI 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

39

Appendix VII 

Comments From the

Federal Emergency

Management Agency

41

Appendix VIII 

Major Contributors to

This Report

60

Related GAO Products 64

Tables Table 1: Availability of Five Critical CSEPP-Funded Items in the

States We Visited

4

Table 2: Allocation of CSEPP Funds in Fiscal Years 1988-96 6

Table 3: Availability of Critical CSEPP-Funded Items 7

Table 4: Selected States’ and Counties’ Comments About the

Army and FEMA Management of CSEPP

13

Table IV.1: Status of CSEPP Automated Information Systems, by

Location

30

Table IV.2: Status of CSEPP Communication Systems, by

Location

32

Table IV.3: Status and Funding of CSEPP Personal Protective

Equipment, by Location

33

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Contents

Table IV.4: Status and Funding of Personnel Decontamination

Equipment, by Location

34

Table IV.5: Status and Funding of CSEPP Pressurization Projects,

by Location

35

Table IV.6: Status and Funding of Outdoor Siren Systems, by

Location

36

Table IV.7: Status and Funding of Indoor Alert Radio Projects, by

Location

37

Figure Figure 1: Estimated Allocation of CSEPP Funds for Fiscal Years

1997-2004

10

Abbreviations

CSEPP Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program

DOD Department of Defense

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FEMIS Federal Emergency Management Information System

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix I 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

In July 1996, we reported that 8 years after the Chemical Stockpile

Emergency Preparedness Program’s (CSEPP) inception, Alabama

communities near Anniston Army Depot were not fully prepared to

respond to a chemical stockpile emergency because they lacked critical

items. Given the lack of progress in Alabama’s CSEPP and prior CSEPP

management weaknesses we have reported on, we conducted a follow-up

review to (1) assess CSEPP’s progress in enhancing emergency

preparedness in all 10 states participating in the program and (2) identify

opportunities to improve program management.

To assess CSEPP’s progress in enhancing emergency preparedness in the

states participating in the program, we examined a variety of Army,

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), state, and county

planning and funding documents and reconciled data among the Army,

FEMA, and state and county emergency management agencies. We

interviewed and obtained and analyzed data on the status of CSEPP projects

from officials of the Army Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization

and the CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team located at Edgewood, Maryland, and

from officials of the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; the Anniston

Army Depot, Alabama; the Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas; the Pueblo Depot

Activity, Colorado; the Tooele Army Depot, Utah; and the Umatilla Depot

Activity, Oregon. We also met with officials from FEMA headquarters and

regional offices in Atlanta, Georgia, and Bothell, Washington. Although we

met with officials from the Army installations where the chemical

stockpile munitions are stored, we did not try to assess the status of the

installations’ emergency preparedness programs.

To observe emergency preparedness operations and facilities, we visited

Alabama and its Calhoun and Talladega counties, Arkansas and its

Jefferson and Grant counties, Colorado and its Pueblo county, Maryland

and its Harford and Baltimore counties, Oregon and its Morrow and

Umatilla counties, Utah and its Tooele and Salt Lake counties, and

Washington and its Benton county. We also interviewed and obtained data

on the status and costs of CSEPP projects from emergency management

officials in Illinois, Indiana, and Kentucky. In addition, we sent

questionnaires to the 10 state and 40 county program directors at the end

of 1995 to obtain data on the status of their emergency preparedness

programs and on their views of the Army’s and FEMA’s joint management of

the program. All state and county program directors responded to our

questionnaire. We updated portions of the questionnaire responses

through interviews and data collection instruments in October 1996

through February 1997. For those critical projects not yet completed, we

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix I 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

did not attempt to determine their impact on emergency preparedness and

risk to the local population, but we identified and analyzed the reasons for

the delay in their implementation.

To identify opportunities to improve program management, we discussed

the actions the Army has taken and further actions that should be taken to

improve the program with Army, FEMA, state, and local officials. We also

discussed the impact of the Army’s actions and reviewed planning

documents, progress reports, memoranda, and correspondence. We

discussed the CSEPP benchmarks and guidance with federal, state, and

local officials to determine how this guidance was applied in implementing

the program. Furthermore, we compared planning and operational data for

CSEPP projects with the benchmarks and guidance and determined whether

the projects complied with program requirements and time frames. To

assess the effectiveness of the federal, state, and county management, we

reviewed the Army’s and FEMA’s management structure and guidance and

compared them with state and local requirements and concerns. We also

documented and analyzed the magnitude and impact of state and county

emergency management agencies’ involvement in the funding process,

federal feedback on the budget process, partial funding of projects, and

slow disbursements of funds.

The Department of Defense (DOD) and FEMA provided written comments on

a draft of this report and they are presented in their entirety in appendixes

VI and VII, respectively. DOD agreed with the recommendations in our draft

report. FEMA generally concurred with the recommendations but strongly

disagreed with our conclusions. Our evaluation of FEMA’s specific points is

presented in appendix VII. DOD and FEMA also provided technical

clarifications and, where appropriate, we incorporated them in the report.

Our review was conducted from August 1996 to March 1997 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix II 

Chemical Stockpile Locations in the

Continental United States

Umatilla Army Depot

 Activity, Oregon

Tooele Army 

Depot, Utah

Pueblo Depot

 Activity, Colorado

Blue Grass Army

Depot, Kentucky

Pine Bluff

 Arsenal, Arkansas

Anniston Army

Depot, Alabama

Aberdeen Proving

Ground, Maryland

Newport Chemical

 Activity, Indiana

States participating in the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program.

Source: Based on data provided by the Army’s Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix III 

Funds Allocated to CSEPP Entities in Fiscal

Years 1988-96

Dollars in thousands

Entity Amount Percent

Army headquarters and commands $27,846.2 6.5

Army installations 36,070.1 8.4

Army major contracts (over $100,000)a 88,195.0 20.4

Other Army contractsa 398.3 0.1

FEMA headquarters and regions 14,667.0 3.4

FEMA contractsa 28,567.4 6.6

Alabama and counties 54,808.6 12.7

Arkansas and counties 22,030.5 5.1

Colorado and county 14,670.6 3.4

Illinois and counties 3,877.1 0.9

Indiana and counties 14,336.7 3.3

Kentucky and counties 21,194.6 4.9

Maryland and counties 19,382.5 4.5

Oregon and counties 25,303.0 5.9

Utah and counties 27,991.2 6.5

Washington and county 17,184.2 4.0

Other entities 1,093.1 0.3

Not allocated 13,766.4 3.2

Total $431,382.5 100.0

aAccording to the Army and FEMA, these contracts support the entire CSEPP community and

include direct support to Army installations; the development of program guidance, training

courses, and computer programs; and the procurement of personal protective equipment and

computer hardware and software.

Source: The Army’s Project Manager for CSEPP.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix IV 

Acquisition and Installation of Essential

CSEPP Projects Are Behind Schedule

Implementation of projects needed to respond to a chemical stockpile

emergency is behind schedule. States and local communities still lack

items critical to responding to a chemical stockpile emergency, including

integrated communication systems, personnel protective equipment,

personnel decontamination equipment, sheltering-in-place enhancements,

and alert and notification systems.

The Final Automated

Information System

Continues to

Experience Problems

In 1994, officials estimated that the installation of the final CSEPP

automated information system would be completed by July 1995. The

CSEPP automated information system—computer equipment and

software—is required to support planning and managing emergency

response activities. The process of determining appropriate protective

actions is too complex and time-consuming to perform manually during a

chemical stockpile emergency. Computer equipment and software are

considered essential in helping local officials to plan for the appropriate

protective actions. In 1993, the Army and FEMA started to develop a

standard automated information system, called the Federal Emergency

Management Information System (FEMIS), with the specifications of

software requirements by the CSEPP community. The Army started testing

FEMIS in September 1994, and since then, the system has undergone eight

tests, culminating in the government acceptance test in Alabama. Although

the Army spent $14.7 million on FEMIS,

1

 the system still has problems.

During the period September 9 through 20, 1996, the Army tested FEMIS at

the Anniston CSEPP site, and the system met most performance measures.

The test plan identified 75 measures of performance. Of these, 59 were

satisfied, 5 failed, and 11 were not tested. According to personnel

participating in the test, however, the system was slow and cumbersome.

In addition, the reliability, availability, and maintainability parameters for

FEMIS had not been established and were not evaluated as in a traditional

operational test. The test was structured to determine the level of

confidence that the reliability, availability, and maintainability of the

system is progressing. Test results indicated that FEMIS was available for

61 percent of the training and test period. The predominant reason for the

system’s unavailability was its inability to update data from one CSEPP

location to another, which occurred when power at a CSEPP site either

surged or was interrupted. For example, during the test, the Alabama

emergency operations center was struck by lightning. Other sites

experienced interruptions in telephone connections when the local

telephone company was making repairs and when nearby construction

1

Funding is through fiscal year 1996.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix IV 

Acquisition and Installation of Essential

CSEPP Projects Are Behind Schedule

workers cut a telephone cable. Hardware and software maintenance was

outside the scope of the test and was not evaluated.

Because of the system’s technical problems and requirement for

supplemental personnel, Army and FEMA officials decided in 1996 that

FEMIS was the preferred but optional system. As a result, the system may

not be adopted by all participating states and counties (see table IV.1).

Until FEMIS is operational, CSEPP states and counties are using interim

automated information systems—computer equipment and software—to

support planning and managing emergency response activities. These

interim systems include the Army’s Emergency Management Information

System (designed to be used by Army installations where the chemical

stockpile weapons are stored) and Integrated Baseline System (designed

to be used by the off-post communities).

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix IV 

Acquisition and Installation of Essential

CSEPP Projects Are Behind Schedule

Table IV.1: Status of CSEPP Automated Information Systems, by Location

Location Status

Alabama and counties The state and counties are now using the on-post Emergency Management Information

System. The state and counties may decide to field FEMIS.

Arkansas and counties At the beginning of 1997, the state and counties installed the Emergency Management

Information System. Final selection of the automated information system will be based on

the results of FEMIS’ government acceptance test.

Colorado and county Pueblo County is now using the Emergency Management Information System. The state

and county may select either the Emergency Management Information System or FEMIS

depending on the results of the government acceptance test of FEMIS. Full

implementation at Pueblo County depends on CSEPP’s providing adequate support for

the system and network management. Negotiations with FEMA for contract support are

continuing.

Illinois and counties The state and counties are now using the Emergency Management Information System.

The state has requested $100,000 for computer equipment and work stations. Final

selection of the automated information system will be based on the results of FEMIS’

government acceptance test.

Indiana and counties The state and counties are currently using the Emergency Management Information

System. Final selection of the automated information system will be based on the results

of FEMIS’ government acceptance test.

Kentucky and counties The state and county will be using the Emergency Management Information System and

plan to switch to FEMIS.

Maryland and counties The state and counties are now using a variety of over-the-counter software, including

the Emergency Information System and SoftRisk, and have detached copies of the

Emergency Management Information System. The state and counties are not connected

to the automated information system at Aberdeen Proving Ground, but funding was

provided for the connection for the state and Harford County in fiscal year 1997. Final

selection of the automated information system will be based on the results of FEMIS’

government acceptance test and correction of faults.

Oregon and counties The state and counties are currently using the Integrated Baseline System, but plan to

switch to FEMIS.

Utah and counties The state and counties are using FEMIS, but the system is not fully operational. Tooele

County is using portions of the Emergency Management Information System to

communicate with the Tooele Army Depot for the daily work plans and hazard

assessments. The county decided to use the Emergency Management Information

System and not FEMIS.

Washington and county Equipment has been purchased, installed, and configured for the installation of FEMIS.

At the discretion of the Army, the installation of FEMIS software is expected in mid-May

1997.

Most Emergency

Operation Centers Are

Fully Operational

In 1993, the Army and FEMA agreed that each Army installation and

immediate response zone county should have a functioning emergency

operations center where responsible officials can gather to direct and

coordinate emergency operations, speak with other jurisdictions and

emergency response officials in the field, and formulate protective action

decisions.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix IV 

Acquisition and Installation of Essential

CSEPP Projects Are Behind Schedule

Benton County, Washington; Harford County, Maryland; Vermillion

County, Indiana; the state of Colorado; and Morrow and Umatilla counties,

Oregon; are constructing or trying to upgrade their emergency operation

centers. At an estimated cost of $1.5 million, Benton County’s center is

scheduled to be completed by August 1997. Construction of a new

operations center in Harford County, Maryland, is scheduled to be

completed in mid-May 1997. In Indiana, Vermillion County is trying to

upgrade its emergency operations center to better support the CSEPP

automated information system. Vermillion County has set aside $140,000

for the project but received a contractual bid of $197,000 for the project.

The county is requesting $57,000 in CSEPP funds to pay for the funding

shortfall. In fiscal year 1996, Colorado requested $20,000 to determine the

requirements for a state-operated emergency operations center, but the

request was denied.2

 The state requested funding again in fiscal year 1997.

According to local officials in Oregon, the Morrow County emergency

operations center does not meet CSEPP requirements. In fiscal year 1992,

the Army and FEMA provided Morrow County $315,000 to renovate an

existing building for the county’s emergency operations center. The

Morrow County Emergency Management Director said that his center has

limited capacity, lacking adequate space for CSEPP equipment, and should

be expanded.3

 In Umatilla County, construction of the new CSEPP

emergency operations center is scheduled to be completed in

February 1998.

Most CSEPP

Communication

Systems Are Fully

Operational

In 1992, the Army and FEMA determined that every CSEPP jurisdiction

should have a functioning communications system connecting the Army

installation, state emergency management agency, and immediate

response zone counties. The system should provide direct, reliable, and

redundant communications capabilities to interagency and intra-agency

emergency response workers. Currently, 5 of the 10 CSEPP states have fully

operational CSEPP communication systems. The communication systems in

Alabama, Kentucky, and Oregon do not meet program standards, and

Illinois and Utah are upgrading their communication systems. (See 

table IV.2.)

2

The Pueblo County Emergency Operations Center has been operational since 1992.

3

The center includes office space and a holding cell for the county sheriff.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix IV 

Acquisition and Installation of Essential

CSEPP Projects Are Behind Schedule

Table IV.2: Status of CSEPP Communication Systems, by Location

Location Status

Alabama and counties The primary CSEPP communications system is not operational, but is fully funded. The

county project manager expects to begin operational testing in August 1997 and begin

operations in March 1998.

Arkansas and counties The CSEPP communications system is operational.

Colorado and county The CSEPP communications system is operational.

Illinois and counties The state is upgrading its CSEPP communications system.

Indiana and counties The CSEPP communications system is operational.

Kentucky and counties The funded elements of the communications system are operational. The state wants to

expand the current system and requested additional funds in fiscal year 1997. Funding

was deferred, pending completion of a cost-sharing agreement between the state and

Madison County.

Maryland and counties The CSEPP communications system is operational.

Oregon and counties Oregon is experiencing contractual and technical problems in implementing the CSEPP

communications system, and the system is not fully operational. These problems are

considered significant, and the completion date of the system is not known. The project

is managed by the state of Oregon.

Utah and counties According to county officials, the CSEPP communications system is not fully operational.

Two new microwave links are required to provide proper communications coverage

linking the state and counties. Partial funding was approved, but a second allocation is

needed to purchase and install the equipment. Tooele County also needs to replace two

obsolete microwave links that provide voice and data communications and siren

activation capabilities. Army officials said that the current CSEPP communications

system in Utah was operational without these upgrades.

Washington and county The CSEPP communications system is operational.

Personal Protective

Equipment Purchases

Are Scheduled for

Completion in 1997

and 1998

Personal protective equipment has been considered a critical response

requirement for several years. In July 1994, the Argonne National

Laboratory concluded there was a potential for the aerosol deposition of

agents off post from a chemical stockpile accident.4

 The deposition

creates the requirement for personal protective equipment, which includes

portable respirators, protective suits, gloves, boots, and hoods. Because of

their assigned traffic, decontamination, health, and other critical response

duties at the periphery of the chemical plume, local emergency workers

may find themselves in danger of contamination from an unexpected shift

in the plume. Although the states received funding for the equipment in

1995 or before, only communities in Utah have the required personal

protective equipment. Other CSEPP jurisdictions are now determining

requirements or acquiring the equipment. These projects are scheduled to

be completed in 1997 and 1998. (See table IV.3.)

4

Potential for Surface Contamination by Deposition of Chemical Agent Following Accidental Release

at an Army Storage Depot, Argonne National Laboratory (July 1994).

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix IV 

Acquisition and Installation of Essential

CSEPP Projects Are Behind Schedule

Table IV.3: Status and Funding of CSEPP Personal Protective Equipment, by Location

Location Status Fundinga

Alabama and counties The project is not completed. According to state officials, only a portion of the requirement

has been funded. Talladega County has received government-furnished equipment, and

Calhoun County is now acquiring the equipment. Procurement of additional equipment will

be based on a needs assessment, scheduled to be completed in late 1997.

$850,000

Arkansas and counties The project is not completed. The equipment was funded in September 1995 and will be

purchased based on recommendations of the Arkansas integrated process team.

720,000

Colorado and county The project is not completed. The equipment was funded in fiscal year 1995 and part of

the equipment is scheduled to be purchased in early 1997. Issues regarding the remaining

equipment are being negotiated by Army and FEMA officials.

760,000

Illinois and counties The project is not completed. The equipment was funded in fiscal year 1995 and is

scheduled for delivery in mid-1997.

200,000

Indiana and counties The project is not completed. The equipment was funded in fiscal year 1995, 400 suits

have been received, and the protective masks are scheduled for delivery in July 1997.

400,000

Kentucky and counties The project is not completed. The equipment was funded in fiscal year 1995. It will be

purchased based on the state’s needs assessment, to be completed in October 1997.

400,000

Maryland and counties The project is not completed. Equipment was funded in fiscal year 1995, but the funds

were retained at the state pending completion of a federal, state, and county team’s review

and selection of equipment. However, this effort was placed on hold, pending the results

of the Maryland integrated process team’s examination of all aspects of CSEPP in the state.

1,240,000

Oregon and counties The project is not completed. The equipment was funded in fiscal year 1995 and 277

protective masks were received in January 1997. Federal, state, and local officials

disagree over which protective suit to purchase and whether an additional person is

needed to support and care for the personal protective equipment.

420,000

Utah and counties The project is completed. The equipment was funded in fiscal year 1993 and received in

December 1996.

648,000

Washington and county The project is not completed. The equipment was funded in 1995, but no procurement

action will be taken, pending the completion of negotiations over monitoring requirements

and the appropriate type of equipment.

445,000

aAllocated funds for fiscal years 1988-96.

Personnel

Decontamination

Equipment Purchases

Are Scheduled for

Completion in 1997

The most urgent decontamination priority during a chemical stockpile

emergency is the cleansing of people contaminated with chemical agents.

The decontamination process helps to minimize the effects on people’s

health and to prevent the spread of agents to other people. Communities in

Arkansas and Utah have operational decontamination units. The remaining

locations have received funding for personnel decontamination units and

are conducting need assessments, acquiring the equipment, or requesting

additional equipment to move the units. The decontamination projects are

scheduled to be completed in 1997. (See table IV.4.)

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix IV 

Acquisition and Installation of Essential

CSEPP Projects Are Behind Schedule

Table IV.4: Status and Funding of Personnel Decontamination Equipment, by Location

Location Status Fundinga

Alabama and counties The project is not completed. Four decontamination units were funded in fiscal year 1995

and delivered to Calhoun County in February 1996. The Alabama Department of Public

Health has purchased and delivered small decontamination units to each of the nine

hospitals in the area. According to Alabama Emergency Management Agency officials,

there is an unmet requirement for more than 10 additional decontamination units.

$216,000

Arkansas and counties The project is completed. 517,000

Colorado and county The project is not completed. Four decontamination units were funded in fiscal year 1995

and are scheduled for delivery in 1997.

240,000

Illinois and counties The project is not completed. Eight decontamination units were funded in fiscal year 1995.

Federal and state officials are negotiating design requirements.

64,000

Indiana and counties The project is not completed. Four decontamination units were funded in fiscal year 1995

and are scheduled for delivery in December 1997.

44,000

Kentucky and counties The project is not completed. Kentucky’s needs assessment was completed in October

1996. Five decontamination units were funded in fiscal year 1995 to cover basic

requirements, and the units are scheduled for delivery by September 1997.

250,000

Maryland and counties The project is not completed. Equipment was funded in fiscal year 1995, but the funds

were retained at the state, pending completion of a federal, state, and county team’s

review and selection of equipment.b

35,684

Oregon and counties The project is not completed. Four decontamination units were funded in fiscal year 1995.

Federal and county officials are negotiating the type of decontamination units to purchase.

200,000

Utah and counties The project is completed. Four decontamination units were purchased. 291,000

Washington and county The project is not completed. The initial proposal covers the equipment costs for the main

traffic control points and a reception center and includes four small decontamination

trailers and equipment for the construction of decontamination stations.

152,000

aAllocated funds for fiscal years 1988-96.

bThis effort was placed on hold pending the results of the Maryland integrated process team’s

review of all aspects of CSEPP in the state. As a result of this review, CSEPP requirements have

been reduced. Inflatable decontamination tents and some equipment were purchased in 1997 to

augment Harford County’s existing decontamination capabilities.

Additional

Sheltering-in-Place

Projects Are

Anticipated

Program documents state that people closest to most stockpile storage

sites will not have time to evacuate and will remain in place during a

chemical stockpile release. Sheltering-in-place enhancements can be as

simple as taping doors and windows or as elaborate as installing

pressurized air filtration systems in schools, hospitals, jails, community

centers, and public buildings. Pressurization systems draw outside air into

the shelter through a filter that removes the chemical agent. The pressure

from this filtered air increases to the point that the contaminated air from

the outside cannot leak into the facility. Pressurized air-filtration systems

have been completed in Arkansas and Maryland and are scheduled for

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix IV 

Acquisition and Installation of Essential

CSEPP Projects Are Behind Schedule

completion in Alabama, Colorado, Indiana, and Oregon. Communities in

Illinois, Kentucky, Utah, and Washington are located too far from the

chemical stockpile sites to require pressurized air-filtration systems for

their facilities. (See table IV.5.)

Table IV.5: Status and Funding of CSEPP Pressurization Projects, by Location

Location Status Fundinga

Alabama and counties The pressurization projects are not completed. In fiscal years 1995 and 1996, the state

received funding for pressurization of 37 facilities in Calhoun County. The projects are

scheduled to be completed by June 1999. State and county officials believe that additional

projects will be funded in the future.

$7,400,000

Arkansas and counties The pressurization project is completed. 140,175

Colorado and county The pressurization projects are not completed. Two projects in the immediate response

zone were funded in fiscal year 1995 and are tentatively schedule to be completed in late

1997. According to Army officials, the lack of adequate action by the county has delayed

this project.

200,000

Illinois and counties There is no requirement.

Indiana and counties The pressurization projects are not completed. Vermillion County plans to protect the

county jail. Funding has not been spent, pending the results of a technical review of the

project. County officials expect that additional funding will be needed to complete the

project.

87,500

Kentucky and counties There is no requirement.

Maryland and counties The pressurization projects are near completion. Pressurization equipment was installed in

four Harford County schools in fiscal year 1996 and completed and tested in January

1997. As a result of additional FEMA guidance in January 1997, the county and its

contractors are considering additional changes to the pressurization projects. County

officials estimate that additional costs of $300,000 and delays of 6 months may be realized.

1,016,100

Oregon and counties The pressurization projects are not completed. In fiscal years 1994 and 1995, the state

received funding for the pressurization of 14 facilities in Morrow and Umatilla counties.

Morrow County projects are scheduled to be completed in 1997. Umatilla County has

requested additional funding to complete its projects.

2,800,398

Utah and counties There is no requirement.

Washington and county There is no requirement.

aAllocated funds for fiscal years 1988-96.

Most Alert and

Notification Systems

Are Scheduled for

Completion in 1997

and 1998

During the initial minutes of a chemical stockpile emergency, sirens and

tone alert radios should instruct government officials, emergency response

workers, and residents on what protective actions to take. Outdoor sirens

with voice message capability can alert the population of the emergency

and provide instructional messages about appropriate protective actions.

Tone alert radios are placed in homes, schools, hospitals, jails, nursing

homes, and businesses to provide alert signals and instructional messages.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix IV 

Acquisition and Installation of Essential

CSEPP Projects Are Behind Schedule

Initially, CSEPP officials planned to have alert and notification equipment

installed and tested by October 1992. In 1994, we reported that program

officials anticipated that sirens would be installed at all eight storage sites

by January 1995 and that tone alert radios would be installed at six sites by

October 1995.

Communities in 6 of the 10 CSEPP states have operational siren systems.

Communities in Illinois are located too far from the Newport Chemical

Activity, Indiana, to require a system. The remaining siren systems are

schedules to be completed in 1997 and 1998. (See table IV.6.)

Table IV.6: Status and Funding of Outdoor Siren Systems, by Location

Location Status Fundinga

Alabama and counties The siren system is operational. The first installment is completed, but county officials

anticipate that the county will need additional sirens.

$2,417,602

Arkansas and counties The siren system is operational. 1,312,368

Colorado and county The siren system is not completed. Federal funding was allocated in 1994 for sirens. A

sound propagation study was completed in February 1996, and funds for the siren system

are scheduled to be committed in late 1997.

475,000

Illinois and counties There is no requirement for sirens.

Indiana and counties The siren system is operational. 1,061,288

Kentucky and counties The siren system is operational. 873,244

Maryland and counties The siren system is not fully operational. The contract was awarded in April 1996, and

installation and testing were completed in December 1996 and January 1997, respectively.

As a result of problems encountered during the initial test, the final 60-day test and

prove-out period has been delayed, and the state will not take possession of the system

until the period is successfully completed.

1,294,700

Oregon and counties Forty-two sirens were installed, but the system is not operational. The project is managed

by the state of Oregon.

1,373,758

Utah and counties The siren system is operational. 1,755,771

Washington and county The siren system is operational. Testing of the siren system was completed in February

1997.

1,687,406

aAllocated funds for fiscal years 1988-96.

In general, homes and buildings in communities near the chemical

stockpile sites do not have tone alert radios. The exception is Kentucky,

where 5,000 radios have been installed and additional radios are scheduled

to be installed in 1997 and 1998. Most of the remaining indoor alert radio

projects are scheduled to be completed in 1997 and 1998. (See table IV.7.)

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix IV 

Acquisition and Installation of Essential

CSEPP Projects Are Behind Schedule

Table IV.7: Status and Funding of Indoor Alert Radio Projects, by Location

Location Status Fundinga

Alabama and counties The project is not completed. The radios are scheduled to be installed in December 1998,

pending completion of the demographics survey in April 1998.

$4,002,850

Arkansas and counties The project is not completed. The radios are scheduled to be installed in October 1997. 2,043,720

Colorado and countyb The project is not completed. Funds for the tone alert radios and infrastructure were

allocated in fiscal year 1995 and are scheduled to be committed by late 1997.

600,000

Illinois and counties There is no requirement for tone alert radios.

Indiana and counties The project is not completed. The state estimates that the project will cost $1,319,500 to

complete. The radios are scheduled to be installed and operational by July 1997.

1,319,500

Kentucky and counties The project is partially completed. Ten thousand radios have been delivered, of which

5,000 have been installed; the remaining 5,000 radios are scheduled to be installed in

mid-1997. Additional radios are scheduled to be purchased and installed by March 1998.

3,890,371

Maryland and counties The project is not completed. Requirements for tone alert radios will not be addressed until

the Maryland integrated process team completes its review of all aspects of CSEPP in the

state. According to Harford County officials, it is possible that few or no tone alert radios

will be needed.

650,000

Oregon and countiesb The project is not completed. Procurement of the radios is deferred, pending completion of

a review of alternatives to tone alert radios. The review is scheduled to be completed in

1997.

3,713,300

Utah and counties The project is not completed. Installation of tone alert radios in households is in progress

and scheduled to be completed in mid-1997. The procurement of enhanced radios with

printing capabilities for special need populations and facilities is in progress and

scheduled to be completed at the end of 1997.

574,570

Washington and countyb The project is not completed. 100,000

aAllocated funds for fiscal years 1988-96.

bIn an effort to reduce the cost of each tone alert radio through economies of scale, Colorado,

Oregon, and Washington are attempting to combine their purchases.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix V 

Army’s Proposed Full-Time Equivalent

Positions for FEMA in Support of CSEPP

Position Location

Full-time

equivalent

CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team action

officers

Edgewood, Maryland 6

Clerical and administrative support Edgewood, Maryland 2

Information technology support Olney, Maryland As needed

Emergency Management Institute Emmittsburg, Maryland 1

Exercise support Washington, D.C. 2

Public affairs support Washington, D.C. 1

Financial and administrative support Washington, D.C. 2

Planning and federal preparedness

coordination

Washington, D.C. 1

Clerical and administrative support Washington, D.C. 1

Action officers, FEMA Region III Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 3

Action officers, FEMA Region IV Atlanta, Georgia 4

Action officers, FEMA Region V Chicago, Illinois 3

Action officers, FEMA Region VII Kansas City, Missouri 3

Action officers, FEMA Region VIII Denver, Colorado 4

Action officers, FEMA Region X Seattle, Washington 4

Total 37

Source: Based on correspondence from the Army’s Program Manager for Chemical

Demilitarization to FEMA’s Deputy Associate Director for Preparedness, Training, and Exercises

(Aug. 20, 1996).

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 18.

Now on p. 18.

Now on p. 18.

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

See comment 1.

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

See comment 1.

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

Now on p. 4.

See comment 2.

Now on p. 4.

See comment 3.

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

Now on p. 4.

See comment 4.

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

Now on p. 5.

See comment 5.

Now on p. 7.

See comment 6.

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

Now on p. 8.

See comment 7.

Now on p. 11.

See comment 8.

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

Now on p. 12.

See comment 9.

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

Now on p. 13.

See comment 10.

Now on p. 14.

See comment 11.

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

Now on p. 14.

See comment 12.

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

See comment 13.

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

See comment 14.

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

The following are GAO’s comments on the letter from the Director, FEMA,

dated April 22, 1997.

GAO Comments 1. The issues raised here are also covered in FEMA’s detailed comments and

we respond to them specifically in the agency comments and evaluation

section of the report and the notes that follow.

2. Our report states that state and local emergency response capability has

increased since the implementation of CSEPP. However, as shown in 

table 3, in some cases progress has been made but, in others, much

remains to be done to provide all 10 CSEPP states and their counties with

the items CSEPP officials have defined as critical to emergency

preparedness.1

We revised the report to reflect FEMA’s position that CSEPP states and local

communities could respond to a chemical stockpile emergency even

though they do not have all critical CSEPP items. We also reviewed FEMA

capability graphs and, where appropriate incorporated them in the report.

However, we did not assess whether states and local communities have

operational capability to respond to a chemical incident. Our conclusion

that states and local communities lack critical items is based on CSEPP

benchmarks and guidance and data from the Army, FEMA, states, and local

communities, and we continue to believe this is the appropriate criteria for

measuring progress.

We disagree with FEMA’s position that program delays were not the result

of disagreements between the Army and FEMA over their respective roles

and responsibilities. Despite attempts to streamline decisionmaking for

programmatic and budget issues, five federal offices are still involved in

decisionmaking. State and local officials have expressed confusion over

which office is in charge and reported that the fragmented management

structure delayed decisionmaking. In October 1995, CSEPP state directors

identified 27 individual issues and concerns. One concern was the lack of

an agreement defining the roles and responsibilities of the Army and FEMA

headquarters and the CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team. This basic problem

continues today.

1

Our conclusion that CSEPP states and local communities lacked critical items was based on CSEPP

standards. Specifically, we used the 1993 CSEPP National Benchmarks and the May 17, 1996, CSEPP

Planning Guidance as our criterion to determine whether local communities should have the

emergency preparedness or response items. To assess the availability of those items in the CSEPP

communities, we used data from the Army, FEMA, states, and local communities.

Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

Moreover, both FEMA and Army officials have reported that their

disagreements over management roles and responsibilities have resulted

in program delays. For example in September 1996, the FEMA Deputy

Associate Director for Preparedness, Training, and Exercises wrote that

CSEPP was not functioning as effectively as it might and that respective

roles, responsibilities, and working relationships needed to be clarified.

Similarly, in October 1996, the Army Program Manager for Chemical

Demilitarization wrote that the Army and FEMA leadership was divided and

less effective than desired. He concluded that the management was not

focused on CSEPP and effectiveness and efficiency could be improved.

3. Since 1992, we have reported on CSEPP’s management weaknesses,

which include fragmented and unclear management roles and

responsibilities, imprecise and incomplete planning guidance, a

cumbersome budget process, and ineffective financial controls. These

weaknesses have resulted in time-consuming negotiations among federal,

state, and county officials and hampered the progress of numerous CSEPP

projects. In addition, we have reported that inadequate actions by states

and counties have also slowed the progress of several CSEPP projects. As

stated in comment 2 and our evaluation of FEMA’s comments on pages 18

and 19, our concern is not whether the Army’s or FEMA’s approach to

resolving the management issue is the more appropriate; we are

concerned that CSEPP’s implementation is being delayed because this issue

has not been resolved. As a consequence, the program’s goal of providing

communities with items critical to responding to a chemical stockpile

emergency remains to be achieved after 9 years and funding of

$431.4 million.

4. See comment 2.

5. We added information to table 2 of the report to note that $14.7 million

(3.4 percent) was allocated to FEMA headquarters and regions and

$28.6 million (6.6 percent) was allocated for FEMA’s contracts.

6. See comments 2 and 3.

7. We revised the report to show that the CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team was

in the process of negotiating standard baseline operating costs with each

of the 10 states participating in the program.

8. We did not assess whether FEMA’s financial management system

complies with the Office of Management and Budget requirements.

Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

Nonetheless, we are encouraged to see that FEMA’s CSEPP Program Office is

working with the FEMA Inspector General to improve management and

funding accountability of specific state projects.

Notwithstanding these actions, we continue to be concerned about the

adequacy of financial management data available to CSEPP managers.

Specifically, records on expenditure data are limited; allocation data differ

among FEMA, states, and counties; and states and counties continue to

maintain large unexpended fund balances. For example, data at FEMA

consist primarily of reports that identify states’ withdrawals from the

federal treasury, but not how the funds were spent. Also, as of July 1996,

participating states held $67.2 million in unexpended CSEPP funds, or

35.3 percent of the funds allocated to them. We continue to believe that

effective stewardship over the program requires managers to have

information on actual expenditures of funds.

9. We revised the report to show that the FEMA Inspector General reported

that CSEPP’s reporting system did not provide FEMA managers timely,

accurate, or consistent data or the data they need to monitor CSEPP’s

progress. In addition, the Inspector General report states that “[t]he two

financial reports in the CCA [Comprehensive Cooperative Agreement]

reporting system do not meet the financial reporting need of FEMA CSEPP

managers or the Army. They monitor allocation of funds to States and

identify surplus funds. They do not track the use of funds.”

10. Table 4 is included to support our position that state and county CSEPP

officials have expressed a sense of dissatisfaction with the Army’s and

FEMA’s management of the program.

We do not agree that table 4 should be deleted from the report as FEMA

suggested. States and local officials have primary responsibility for

developing and implementing programs to respond to a chemical stockpile

emergency. We believe it is important to include their views as part of our

analysis.

11. We revised the report to reflect FEMA’s position that it disagrees with

the Assistant Secretary’s position on integrated process teams.

12. Although FEMA has participated in CSEPP’s integrated process teams, its

concept for site-specific integrated process teams differs from the Army’s

concept, and the agency has not signed the Army’s proposed

memorandum implementing the teams. Specifically, FEMA does not want

Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

the Army involved in off-post CSEPP activities and wants to eliminate the

Army from site-specific integrated process teams. The Assistant Secretary

of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition cited the lack of

agreement as a basis for requesting an extension to the legislative

requirement to report on the implementation and success of the teams.

FEMA’s desire to eliminate the Army from site-specific integrated process

teams is inconsistent with the tenets of the process and does not recognize

the Army’s position that they should work as partners. Moreover, the

example cited by FEMA illustrates the fundamental problems that exists

over roles and responsibilities and why that issue has hampered CSEPP’s

progress.

As envisioned by the Army, the integrated process teams will (1) identify

issues, develop solutions, and integrate program plans and budget

submissions among CSEPP jurisdictions and (2) include officials from the

CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team, appropriate FEMA region, participating states

and counties, and local Army chemical storage command. The teams are

designed to foster open communications with the CSEPP stakeholders and

empower the team members with decisionmaking authority. Integrated

process team literature suggests that full and open discussion does not

mean that each view must be acted on by the team.

13. We believe that the establishment of the CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team

was an important step to improving the management of the program.

According to the CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team’s charter, dated January 6,

1995, the joint team was intended to (1) establish a focal point for program

accountability, (2) coordinate and integrate on- and off-post activities, and

(3) create an environment for teamwork. We believe that, if effectively

implemented, the CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team could eliminate the

problems associated with management roles and responsibilities.

However, the team has not functioned as intended. In August 1996, the

Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization reported that, in some

situations, FEMA’s implementation of the charter had inhibited the progress

of CSEPP. According to the Program Manager, pressure from FEMA

headquarters officials to have the agency’s joint team members spend

more of their duty time at FEMA headquarters and less with the joint team

had impeded their integration with Army members. The Program Manager

concluded that communications with the CSEPP participants and

coordination with the Army had been adversely affected.

14. See comments 2 and 3.

Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VIII 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Thomas J. Howard, Assistant Director

Mark A. Little, Evaluator-in-Charge

Bonita J. Page, Evaluator

Atlanta Field Office Fredrick W. Felder, Evaluator

Terry D. Wyatt, Evaluator

Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VIII 

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VIII 

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Appendix VIII 

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 63 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
Related GAO Products

Chemical Weapons and Materiel: Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and

Schedule (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118, Mar. 11, 1997).

Chemical Weapons and Materiel: Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and

Schedule (GAO/NSIAD-97-18, Feb. 10, 1997).

Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Emergency Preparedness in Alabama Is

Hampered by Management Weaknesses (GAO/NSIAD-96-150, July 23, 1996).

Chemical Weapons Disposal: Issues Related to DOD’s Management

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Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Review (GAO/NSIAD-95-66R, Jan. 12,

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Chemical Weapons: Stability of the U.S. Stockpile (GAO/NSIAD-95-67, Dec. 22,

1994).

Chemical Weapons: Issues Involving Destruction Technologies

(GAO/T-NSIAD-94-159, Apr. 26, 1994).

Chemical Weapons Destruction: Advantages and Disadvantages of

Alternatives to Incineration (GAO/NSIAD-94-123, Mar. 18, 1994).

Chemical Weapon Stockpile: Army’s Emergency Preparedness Program

Has Been Slow to Achieve Results (GAO/NSIAD-94-91, Feb. 22, 1994).

Chemical Weapons Storage: Communities Are Not Prepared to Respond to

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Chemical Weapons Destruction: Issues Affecting Program Cost, Schedule,

and Performance (GAO/NSIAD-93-50, Jan. 21, 1993).

(709230) Page 64 GAO/NSIAD-97-91 Chemical Weapons Stockpile
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