IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dara R. Cozzi, :

Petitioner :

: v. : No. 1068 C.D. 2020
: SUBMITTED: July 16, 2021 Unemployment Compensation : Board of Review, :

Respondent :
BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, President Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: November 17, 2021

Dara R. Cozzi (Claimant) petitions for review , pro se , of the August 26, 2020 Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) affirming the
decisio n of a Referee to deny Claimant unemployment compensation (UC) benefits.
The Board determined that Claimant was ineligible for UC benefits under Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law) 1 because she voluntarily quit her employment without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. We
affirm the Board’s Order

. Background
C laimant l ast worked as a full

- time L egal A ssistant II for the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Employer) from December 16, 2013 through October 25, 2019. Bd.’s Finding of Fact (F.F.) No. 1 ; Record (R.) Item No. 3

.

1 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended , 43 P.S. § 802(b). Section 402(b) of the Law provides that a claimant is “ ineligible for [UC] for any week . . . [i]n which [ her] unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work with out cause of a necessitous and compelling nature .” 43 P.S. § 802(b).2

Ninety percent of Claimant’s job invol ved working on a computer. Bd.’s F.F. No.
2. In June 2019, Claimant began experiencing eye issues at work , which substantially affected her vision and caused eye pain

. Id. No. 3. Claimant sought
medical attention and was diagnosed with corneal abrasion. Id. No s

. 3, 4. Claimant informed her supervisor that she was having an eye issue and that her eye doctor recommended that she take frequent breaks from the computer to rest her eyes. Id. Claimant’s supervisor advise d Claimant to take breaks from working as needed. Id

. No. 5. Due to understaffing in her office, however, Claimant did not believe she
could take breaks as often as she neede d

. Id. No. 6. In August 2019, Claimant experienced a second eye issue and retu rned to her eye doctor. Id. No. 7. Several weeks later, o n September 30, 2019, Claimant experienced a third eye issue , and her eye doctor referred her to a specialist. Id. No.
8. Thereafter , Claimant notified her supervisor that : (1) she was being ref erred to a specialist for her eye condition; (2) she was unsure i f she would return to work that week; and (3) she was unsure how much longer she would be able to perform her job. Id. No. 9.
When Claimant returned to work on October 3, 2019 , she gave Emp loyer a doctor’s note for the three days she had missed due to her eye condition. Id. No. 10. At that time, Claimant informed Employer that her doctor recommended that she reduce the amount of time she spends on the computer until she heals. Id. No. 11. Claimant’s supervisor stated that Employer would accommodate her requested
restriction. Id. No. 12. Claimant’s supervisor asked Claimant if she had enough

non

- co mputer work to fill her work days until she healed, and Claimant replied that
she did. Id. The supervisor also asked Claimant if she needed assistance with any3

non

- computer

- related work matters with an upcoming due date, and Claimant replied that she did not. Id. Employer could have continued to accommodate Clamant by giving her work that did not involve prolonged computer usage. Id. No. 13. However, on October 10, 2019, Claimant submitted a resignation letter to Employer without indicating why she wa s resigning. Id. 2 Claimant quit her employment due to her eye condition.
Id. No. 14

. Claimant filed a claim for UC benefits, which the local UC Service Center granted. The Service Center found , based on the documents in the UC claim record

at that time, that Claimant quit her employment for health reasons and Employer failed to offer her alternate work after being notified of her work limitations. R. Item

2 In her October 10, 2019 resignation letter , Claimant stated:
This letter is to serve as an official notification that I will be resigning from my position as a Legal Assistant II with [Employer]. My final day . . . will be Friday, October 25, 2019.
. . . I would like to express my sincere gratitude for the opportunity to serve in this capacity for nearly two years. During this period, I have learned much valuable information related to the area of law and various court systems. I am also grateful for the training and development opportunities made available to me during my tenure with the Commonwealth . . . . As I exit this position, I will take along with me a great deal of benefi cial wisdom and also many great memories during my time with [Employer]. . . . [I]t has been a pleasure working with everyone here in our office.
During the remainder of my time with the Office of Chief Counsel, I plan to assist with making this transiti on as smooth as possible, helping in any way I can. Please do not hesitate to let me know if there is anything additional I can do to aid before I move onto my next adventure.

R. Item No. 3.4

No. 7. The Service Center determined that Claimant had a necessitous and compelling reas on to voluntarily quit and, thus, she was eligible for UC benefits

. Id. Employer appealed to the Referee, who held an evidentiary hearing on February 21, 2020. Claimant , appearing with counsel, testified on her own behalf. Employer presented the testim ony of its Law Clerk and Office Manager, Cindy G. Watson, who was Claimant’s supervisor at the time of her resignation

. At the hearing, Claimant testified that on a typical work day, she spent 90 % of her shift working on a computer. Notes of Testimony ( N.T. ) , 2/21/20, at 9.
Claimant believe d that she would not be able to fill an entire shift with non

- computer work because “everything that we do is primarily done on a computer” and “there is

not su fficient [non

- ]computer[

- ]related work to fill a work day.” Id. at 9

- 10.
Claimant described the eye problems she began experiencing in June 2019.
Claimant testified that , in June 2019, she experienced “burning, tearing[,]” and

“ extreme discomfort and pa in in [her] eye while [she] was at work.” Id. at 10. At that time, her eye doctor d i ag n osed her with corneal abrasion , but “later [she] found out through further occurrences of this same event that it was not simply an abrasion, . . . [she] was actually experiencing . . . recurrent corneal erosions.” Id. Shortly after this first eye occurrence, Claimant spoke with Ms. Watson and
informed her that Claimant was “in a bandaged contact that [she] was using until [she] healed.” Id. She also informed Ms. Watson that her eye doctor advised her “to take frequent breaks from the computer usage that [she] performed during [her] shift to give [her] eyes a break , si nce this [eye problem] was trying to heal .” Id. at 11. According to Claimant, Ms. Watson “acknowledged [the doctor’s recommendation] and encouraged [Claimant] to take those breaks as needed.” Id. Claimant testified, however, that th is accommodation “wa s not always workable”5

for her, because her office “had been consistently understaffed . . . since the previous February.” Id. at 12. Claimant explained:
It was very difficult to even take normal breaks some days. And I had difficulty in doing this be cause of the workload. There were also days when I was covering the office alone and[] . . . the phone was ringing and things needed to be completed. And . . . I was the person that others were coming to for questions and help with assignments or tasks, anything that needed to be done. So I was in demand at that point. It was very difficult , those days, to get the breaks that I needed, especially in this case with needing frequent breaks.

Id. Claimant testified that she had expressed to Ms. Watson man y times during the course of her employment that she felt “overwhelmed with work.” Id. at 27. However, she never told Ms. Watson, prior to quitting, that she was going to resign due to understaffing. Id. Claimant testified that she experienced a second eye occurrence on a weekend in August 2019. Id. at 12

- 13

. O n the following Monday, she notified Employer that
she would not be at work that day

. Id. at 13. She was able to see her eye doctor a day or two later. Id. With regard to her work, Claimant testified that “since these erosions were recurring, . . . [she] was attempting to try to follow the initial recommendation of [her] doctor to take frequent breaks when [she] was at work.”
Id.
Claimant test ified that she experienced a third eye occurrence in September
2019. Id. At that time, her eye doctor referred her to a corneal specialist. Id. at 14.
Claimant testified:
I informed [Ms. Watson] that I still could not see to drive, so I would not be coming into work. I told her that I was being referred to a specialist[] . . . . And I told her that I was not sure when I was actually coming back to work that week. And when I did return, I provided a doctor’s note for the three days that I had mis sed.6

Id. 3 When she returned to work after her specialist appointment, Claimant told Ms. Watson that she “was not sure how much longer [she] could continue to do the job.”
Id. at 27.
Claimant then testified about text message s she had exchanged with Ms.
Watson af

ter her third eye occurrence , which w ere entered into evidence. The messages were dated between September 30, 2019 and October 7, 2019. See id. at 15

- 18 & Ex s . C

- 1 & C

- 2

. With regard to the final text message, dated October 7, 2019, Claimant testified:
[In this message], I’m notifying [Ms. Watson] that since my appointment is in the mid

- day, I might not be returning to work. . . .

. . . .
. . . The thread continues on October 7th with some back and forth regarding what the outcome of the a ppointment was, because [Ms. Watson] had asked me to update her. . . .
N.T., 2/21/20, at 17. That same day, a fter her appointment with the corneal specialist, Claimant texted Ms. Watson:
[M]y corneas are just ripply /bumpy on the surface. It can be caused by long[

- ]term dry eye and many other things including irritants to the eye and any allergies. Basically because my corneas are bumpy it increases my risk of current erosions . . . .

. . . . We are going to work from the conservative treatment through more aggressive . . . procedures to give this a chance to continue healing. . . .

3 The doctor’s note Claimant provided to Employer did not i dent i f y any restrictions on her ability to work

. See N.T., 2/21/2 0 , Ex. C

- 3 ; Ref.’s Order, 3/6/20, at 3.7

Id. , Ex. C

- 2

. Claimant testified that, following these text communications , Ms. Watson offered “no additional accommodations” to Cla imant, “[d]espite that [she] suffered all th[o]se months with recurring erosions,” and “was . . . referred to a specialist who diagnosed [her] with an actual disorder.” N.T., 2/21/20, at 18. Claimant testified that she began actively searching for anothe r job that would
involve less computer work, but she was not offered any positions. Id. at 18

- 20. Claimant did not notify Ms. Watson that she was attempting to find another job because she “was concerned that it may create a negative environment” in the office

. Id. at 20.
Claimant a cknowledged that she did not state her reason for quitting in her resignation letter to Employer. Id. She explained why she omitt ed that informat ion
as follows : It had been my experience in the past in working for [Employer], and in the office setting[,] . . . that a lot of personal information at various times had been[] . . . spread around the office or[] . . . through office gossip and whatnot . And I didn’t wish to have others questioning me as to what my health issues were, nor did I want to include what my actual diagnoses were in my letter of resignation.

Id. Claimant testified , however, that she had discussed her resignation with Employer “some time during that week” before she submitt ed the resignation letter.
Id. at 21.
Ms. Watson then testified on Employer’s behalf. Ms. Watson testified that she and Claimant had discussed her possible resignation before she resigned ; however, at that time, Claimant had offered a different reason for possibly resigning : [Claimant] and her father were not getting along that well, and . . . he planned to get his own apartment, which would leave [Claimant] without free daycare. And her concern was not being able to be home8

with her daughter. And . . . she would like to spe nd

– her daughter was to have gone to kindergarten th[at] year, but did not because she has some issues that I’d rather not touch on. That’s [Claimant’s] business. But she wanted to be home with her daughter to make sure that she was ready for kindergart en in 2020.

Id. at 32

- 33. Ms. Watson testified that Claimant did not mention health problems as

a reason for wanting to resign. Id. at 33. When asked if she accommodated Claimant’s request for frequent breaks beginning in June 2019, Ms. Watson replied, “Absolutely.” Id.
Ms. Watson agreed with Claimant’s testimony that the office had been
understaffed and testified that “[ they ] . . . all felt overworked at times.” Id. at 33

- 34. With regard to Claimant’s request to take frequent breaks, Ms. Watson testified:

“ [Claimant and I] met, we went over what [Claim a nt] was doing. I volunteered to
take some of what she had. We talked about different ways[] . . . that we could begin doing our processors [ sic] to make it a little less intense.” Id. at 34. Ms. Watson explained : “[A]s [Claimant] went through these [eye] episodes, I would always check with her. I’d check in in the morning, see how she was doing; check in in the afternoon, see how she was doing. She, honestly, did mention dust, because our offices can be dusty. . . .” Id. Ms. Watson also testified that she gave Claimant her own office so that Claimant could control the lighting in her workspace, which had been causing her to experience migraines. Id. at 29, 34. Ms. Watson acknowledged that Claimant had spoken with her several times about her eye issues between June and October 2019, but “[n]ot specifically [about] what [the diagnosis] might be.” Id. at 36. When asked if she was aware that Claimant’s eye condition was not improving, Ms. Watson replied : “I am not a
doctor. I ’ m not an ophthalmologist. I couldn ’t make that decision. I can tell you there were episodes.” Id.9

Ms. Watson testified about the accommodations Employer offered to Claimant for her eye issues as follows :
I gave [Claimant] an office of her own. I told her to take as many brea ks
as [she] needed. I asked her when she was suffering the one time, would she like me to give her work that wasn’t computer[

- ]related. I did everything that I could to accommodate what she shared with me. I’m not a mind reader.

. . . .
When I have an employee who has an issue, I will find work for them to do to accommodate whatever their medical issue is at the time.

. . . . [Claimant] said she had enough work. . . . She said she had enough
non

- computer work to keep her busy.

. . . .
I ask ed her specifically, . . . do you have enough work to do? Do you need something? [Claimant] said no, I have enough here that I can work on without using the computer, for that period of [time].

Id. at 37

- 38. Ms. Watson then elaborated on the type of non

- computer work that
would have been available to Claimant:
She could have worked in our law library. She could have done other work that I normally do that isn’t related to being on the computer. We could have had her copying. We could have had her scanning for the attorneys. There were several things. And we could have seen if our Chairman’s Office had anything that she could help with.

Id. at 38. Following the hearing, the Referee reversed the Service Center’s decision.
The Referee concluded :10

[C]laimant has shown that she has a serious [eye] problem and conveyed the information to . . . [E]mployer with the recommendations prov i ded to her by her eye doctor. [E]mployer provided . . . [C]laimant with accommodations, including reduced computer work, work office with better lighting, and allowed [C]laimant to have frequent breaks. [C]laimant chose not to take the frequent breaks because of the workload. [C]laimant did not take advantage of the supervisor’s offer to reduce [C]laimant’s amount o f computer work with alternate duties. [C]laimant returned to work after the [third] occurrence, with a doctor’s statement that did not indicate any restrictions or need for accommodations. The super v isor continued to check with [C]laimant on her conditi on. [C]laimant did not advise the supervisor that she was contemplating voluntarily terminating her employment because of the continued amou n t of computer work she was doing, or that she did not feel that she could take her needed breaks . [C]laimant did not [pursue] other options to resolve the problem and [to] remain employed by checking with the chief counsel, the human resources office, her union, or the office of general counsel. Ref.’s Order, 3/6/20, at 3 (emphasis added)

. The Referee found that Claimant did
not sustain her burden of proving that she had a necessary and compelling reason for voluntarily quitting

. Id. Therefore, the Referee concluded that Claimant was ineligible for UC benefits under Sectio n 402(b) of the Law. Id.
Claiman t appealed to the Board, which affirmed the Referee’s decision

. The Board credited Claimant’s testimony that she suffered an eye condition affected by prolonged computer work and that she informed Employer that she needed to take frequent breaks

. Bd.’s O rder, 8/26/20, at 3. However, t he Board made the following additional credibility findings :

While [C]laimant testified[ that] she was unable to take all the breaks she needed due to staffing issues and workload, there is a lack of evidence that she comm unicated that her accommodations were not being met to her supervisor. [ C]laimant’s supervisor only testified to having a general conversation with [C]laimant about being11

overwhelmed with work and the [Board] credits that testimony. If the employer is unaware that an accommodation is not being met, it cannot take steps to correct the problem.
Further, [C]laimant testified that her doctor informed her after her third occurrence that she should do non

- computer[

- ]related work due to her condition. The Board credits the [written] statement in evidence authored by [E]mployer’s witness [, Ms. Watson,] wherein [Ms. Wats on] indicated that [C]laimant informed her of the need for non

computer work until she healed. However, the Board also credits [Ms. Watson’s] statement and testimony that when she asked [C]laimant if she had enough non

- computer work to fill her days until she healed[, C]laimant responded that she did, and when [Ms. Watson] asked [C]laimant if she needed any help with [non

- ] computer[

- ]related tasks with upcoming deadline s [, C]laimant responded that she did not. The Board does not credit [C]laimant’s contra ry testimony that she was not offered non

- computer work as an accommodation. Therefore, the Board finds [that E]mployer offered [C]laimant a reasonable accommodation. [C]laimant quit despite that accommodation.

Id. (emphasis added)

. The Board determined that Claimant voluntarily quit without necessitous and compelling cause and failed to take reasonable steps to preserve her employment before quitting. Id. at 3

- 4. Therefore, the Board conclud ed that Claimant was ineligible for UC benefits und er Section 402(b) of the Law. Id. at 4. Claimant now petitions for review of that decision. 4 Analysis A claimant who becomes unemployed by voluntar il y terminat ing her employment “ bears the burden of proving that the termination was for cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. ” Lee Hosp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. ,

4 Our scope of review is limited to determining whether the necessary factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed, or whether constitutional rights were violated. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 704.12

637 A.2d 695, 69 7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) ; see 43 P.S. § 802(b)

. A h e alth problem can provide a necessitous and compelling reason to voluntarily quit in some
circumstances

. Gene tin v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. , 451 A.2d 1353, 1355 (Pa. 1992). To establish a health problem as a compelling reason to quit, the
claimant must : (1) offer competent testimony that adequate health reasons existed to justify the voluntary termination ; (2) have informed her employer of the health problem ; and (3) be available to work if reasonable accommodations can be made. Lee Hosp

. , 637 A.2d at 698. “Failure to meet any one of these conditions bars a
claim for [UC] .” Id. Further, “ a c laimant who desires to quit a job for health reasons must communicate her health problem [] to her employer so the employer can attempt to accommodate the problem. ” Blackwell v. Unemployment Comp

. B d. of Rev

. , 555
A.2d 279 , 281 ( Pa. Cmwlth. 1989).
First , Claimant asserts that the Board erred in concluding that she is ineligible
for UC benefits because the evidence showed that Employer failed to comply with Commonwealth of Pennsylvania , Governor’s Office Management Directive 205.25 , titled “Disabilit y

- Related Employment Policy ” (Management Directive), in handling her accommodation requests.
Claimant devotes a significant portion of her appellate brief to arguing that
Ms. Watson did not have the authority to make the accommodation s she made, did

not forward Claimant’s request for accommodation to Employer’s disability coordinator, and did not p rovide additional long

- term accommodations as allegedly required by the Management Directive

. See Claimant ’s Br. at 17

- 25. However,
Claimant did not raise th ese issues before the Referee , nor did she present any evidence relating to the Management Directive at the Referee’s hearing

. Claimant
also did not raise these issues in her initial appeal to the Board. The first time13

Claimant raised the se issues was in a “Supplement to Appeal” that she filed with the
Board three months after filing her appeal , to which she appended a copy of the Management Directive. It is well settled, however , that both the Board and this Court are prohibited
from consid ering such extra

- record evidence. This Court has held that “ [t] he [Board] cannot review evidence that was not submitted to the Referee, unless it directs the taking of additional evidence

. ” Umedman v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev

. , 52 A.3d 558 , 564 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) ; see 34 Pa. Code § 101.106 (stating that in an appeal from a referee ’s decision
, “ the Board may review both the facts and the law pertinent to the issues involved on the basis of the evidence previously
submitted , or direct the taking of additional testimony ”) (emphasis added). This
Court also cannot consider evi dence that is not part of the certified record on appeal.
Umedman , 52 A.3d at 564; see Grubbs v. P a. Bd. of Prob. & Parole , 481 A.2d 1390, 1391 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984) (“[N] either the [agency] in its decision [] making process,
nor this Court in a review of that process, may consider any matters not made a part of the record when counsel and the litigants are present. ”)

. In her Supplement to Appeal, Claimant asserted that she was unaware of the Management Directive at the time of the Referee’s hearing and di d not discover it until after she filed her appeal with the Board. See R. Item No. 18. However,
Claimant fail ed to explain why she could not have discovered the Management
Directive with the exercise of reasonable diligence before the hearing, particularly when she was represented by counsel in the proceedings before the Referee

. See Croft v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. , 662 A.2d 24, 28 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) ( en banc ) ( concluding that the Board may not consider post

- hearing factua l communications, as it is restricted to the facts and law pertinent to the issues on the14

basis of the evidence previously submitted; thus , the Board was justified in refusing
to consider evidence attached to the claimants’ briefs that was not entered into the record); Helverson v. Workmen ’ s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Cent. Foundry Co.) , 463 A.2d
1243 , 1247 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983) ( recognizing that a remand will not be granted for presentation of newly discovered evidence that could have been discovered through
reasonabl e diligence at the time of the agency hearing )

. Th erefore , we conclude that
the Board properly declined to consider Claimant’s supplemental evidence and arguments relat ing to the Management Directive

. 5 Next, Claimant asserts that the Board erred concluding that she is ineligible
for UC benefits when evidence in the UC claim record show s that , despite Ms. Watson’s testimony to the contrary, Employer failed to provide Claimant any accommodations for her worsening eye condition

. We disagree. In par ticular, Claimant points to Employer’s responses o n the Employer Questionnaire comp l eted shortly after Claimant filed her initial UC claim. See Claimant’s Br. at 27. The Employer Questionnaire was completed by Stephanie Festog, a claims analyst with Employer’s third

- party claims administrator

. See R.
Item No. 3. On the Question n aire, when asked, “Did you offer other work to the

c laimant , ” Ms. Festog re plied , “No.” Id. When asked, “[W]as conti n uing work available within the claimant’s limitations had the claim a nt no t separated [from her employment] , ” Ms. Festog re plied , “Yes.” Id. Ms. Festog did not respond to the question, “[P]lease explain why the work was not offered to the claimant.” Id.

5 Furthermore , in her “Supplement to Appeal,” Claimant did not request a remand to the Referee or a supplemental hearing to pres ent evidence relating to the Management Directive. She merely asked the Board to consider what she deemed to be “additional information and facts essential to reaching an appropriate decision in [her] case,” averring that “the issues [relating to the Mana gement Directive] are part of the record in this matter.” R. Item No. 18.15

Despite these representation s by Employer’s third

- party claims analyst, t he
Board chose to credit the t estimony of Claimant’s direct supervisor, Ms. Wa tson, that : she advised Claimant to take breaks as needed; she asked C laimant if she had enough non

- computer work to fill her days until she healed and if she needed any help with non

- computer tasks with upcoming deadlines; and Employer could have
continued to accommodate Cla i mant by giving her work that did not involve prolonged computer usage

. Bd .’s F.F. No s

. 5, 12, and 13

. Claimant’s attempt to cast doubt on Ms. Watson’s credibility by pointing to contrary evidence in the record
is insufficient to establish that the Board’s finding s are un supported by substantial
evidence. See Ductmate Indus., Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. , 949 A.2d 338, 342 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) ( “I t is irrelevant whether the record contains evidence to support findings other than those made by the [Board as] fact [] finder; the critical inquiry is whether there is evidence to support the findings actually made

. ” ) (emphasis added)

. Claimant also conte nds that Employer failed to produce any documentary
evidence to corroborate Ms. Watson ’s testimony and written statement. Claimant

asserts that “Employer should have been expected to provide some form of documentation supporting [Ms. Watson’s] claims that accommodatio n s were provided in order to meet its burden . . . .” Claimant ’s Br. at 29 . Claimant also asserts that “[w]hen an employer makes a verbal claim or statement in the absence of any supporting documentation, it does not meet its burden of showing the availability of continuing work, or in this particular case, of providing accommodations.” Id. Contrary to Claimant’s assertion s , however, the Board’s
factual findings can be based on testimony alone; corroborating documentary
evidence is not required. See Holt v. U nemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. , 840 A.2d16

1071, 1073 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) ( concluding that testimony alone , if credited by the Board, is substantial evidence sufficient to support a finding of fact )

. A t the hearing, Ms. Watson testified : “I told [Claimant] to take as many
breaks as she needed. I asked her when she was suffering the one time, would she like me to give her work that wa sn ’ t computer [

- ] related. I did everything that I could
to accommodate what she shared with me . . . .” N.T., 2/21/20, at 37

. This testimony was consistent with Ms. Watson’s prior written statement , where she stated:
[Claimant] did advise me, at that time, that she was being treated for the eye issue and that the treating physician had instructed her to reduce the amount of time she spent on the computer until her eye healed. At that time, I advised [Claimant] that we would accommodate her physic ian’s advice.

R. Item No. 8

. The Board express ly credited Ms. Watson’s testimony and written

statement and dis credit ed Claimant’s contrary testimony that she was not offered

non

- computer work. Bd.’s Order, 8/26/20, at 3. This Court will not disturb the Board’s credibility determinations on appeal , as they are supported by the evidence
of record

. See Serrano v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. , 149 A.3d 435, 439 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (“Q uestions of credibility . . . are within the sound discretion of the
Board [] and are not subject to re

- evaluation on judicial review. ”)

. Finally, Claimant asserts that Employer failed to provide any long

- term accommodations for her deteriorating eye condition after Claimant informed Ms.
Watson that she was referred to a specialist and was unsure how much longer she

cou l d do her job

. See Bd.’s F.F. No. 9. A fter making this statement, however,
Claim ant returned to work on October 3, 2019 , and told Ms. Watson only that her doctor recommended that she reduce the amount of time she spends doing computer
work until she heal ed

. Id. No. 11 ; R. Item No. 8

. The doctor’s note Claimant17

provided upon her return to work also did not identify any restrictions on her ability
to work

. See N.T., 2/21/20, Ex. C

- 3; Ref.’s Order, 3/6/20, at 3.
The evidence of record establishes that the only restriction Claim a nt communicated to Employer before quit ting w as that she needed frequent breaks
from computer work

. Claimant testified:
[Employer’s Representative : ] [T]hese frequent breaks, according to your testimony, was that your supervisor encouraged you to take frequent breaks.
[Claimant : ] Yes. [Employer’s Representative : ] And that restriction, or need, never chang ed between the time of the first [eye] incident continuing to October?
[Claimant : ] Correct. It was a progressively

– basically, it would recover to the point where I needed few breaks. And then it would happen again, and then they would tell me the sa me thing. So, yes

. [Employer’s Representative : ] Right. But[] . . . Ms. Watson was always supportive in that, take whatever you need, do whatever you need, correct?
[Claimant : ] Yes.

. . . . [Employer’s Representative:] . . . [Ms. Watson] was willing to accommodate the need to have frequent breaks?
[Claimant:] That’s correct.
[Employer’s Representative:] But other than that, there [were] no other restrictions you placed on your ability to work, correct?
[Claimant:] That is correct.18

N.T., 21/21/20, at 24

- 25 (emphasis added)

. Ms. Watson also credibly testified that
she provided the following accommodations to Claimant :
I gave [Claimant] an office of her own. I told her to take as many breaks as she needed. I asked her when she was suffering the one time, would she like me to give her work that wasn ’ t computer related. I did everything that I could to accommodate what she shared with me. I ’ m not a mind reader.

Id. at 37

. Employer offered Claimant the precise (and only) accommodation she requested for her eye condition : frequent breaks from computer work

. A claimant
who leaves work for health reasons is ineligible for UC benefits “ if the employer provides alternative work [that] is compatible with the [claimant’s] disability. ” Leonarczyk v. Unemployment Comp

. B d. of Rev

. , 397 A.2d 49, 50 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979) ; see Cent

. Data C tr. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. , 458 A.2d 335 , 337

- 38 ( Pa. Cmwlth. 1983) (“[A] claimant need only communicate [her] medical
difficulties to [her] employer, and stand ready to accept any reasonable accommodation offered by the employer .”) (emphasis added)

. “ [U] nless the requirements of the job being offered are so obviously beyond the physical capabilities of the claimant as to involve an unreasonable risk of injury , then the claimant must make a reasonable effort before declaring [that] she cannot perform
the duties

. ” Leonarczyk , 397 A.2d at 50 (emphasis added). 6 A lthough Claimant

6 In Fetterman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review , 467 A.2d 402, 404 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983) (emphasis added), this Court explained:
Although we are aware that [the Suprem e Court’s decision in] Genetin . . . obviated the requirement that the employee attempt to initiate or effectuate a transfer to more suitable work, we are equally cognizant, however, of the employee ’ s responsibility to remain available to the employer if r easonable accommodations can be made by the employer which are not inimical to the employee ’ s health

.19

argue s that Employer never offered her suitable work to accommodat e her eye condition , the Board credited Employer ’ s evidence to the contrary

. Furthermore , there is no indication in the record that Claimant ever informed Employer that the accommodations provided were inadequate before she voluntarily quit

. In fact, in Claimant’s October 7, 2019 text message to Ms. Watson , after her appointment with the corneal specialis t, Claimant stated , “I will see you tomorrow and let you know if anything changes by morning . . . back to normalcy hopefully [.]” N.T., 2/21/20, Ex. C

- 2 (emphasis added) ; see also N.T., 2/21/20, at 13 (Claim a nt testified that after the third eye occurrence, she “was attempting to . . . follow the initial recommendation of [her] doctor to take frequent breaks when [she] was at
work ”) (emphasis added)

. Three days later, Claimant quit her employment. Bd.’s
F.F. No. 13. Claimant never inform ed Employer that she was contemplating quitting due to her eye condition , nor did she inform Employer of any reason for quitting in her resignation letter. 7 Id. ; Bd.’s Order, 8/26/20, at 3; see Bonanni v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. , 519 A.2d 532, 536 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986) (“We fail to see how an employer can make a reasonable accommodation when th at employer does not know what is reasonable.”)

.

7 The claim record show s that, in her initial interview with UC authorities, Claimant offered the following reason for resigning from her employment :
I used sick time for travel time to and from work and appointments because I was not afforded the opportunity to have time to work from home like others. The staffing levels at the o ffice made me feel like there was no choice but to resign because I was not able to take time off for the weeks needed for me to recover from a potential s u rgery because of sta f fing at the of

fice.

R. Item No. 6 (emphasis added)

.20 Conclusion
Based on the credi ble evidence of record, w e conclude that Claimant failed to satisfy her burden of proving that she had a necessitous and compelling reason to voluntarily quit her employment. 8 Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s Order.

__________________________________ ELLEN CEISLER, J udge

8 In her appellate brief, Claimant also challenges the Board’s finding that Employer gave her an office so that she could control the lighting in order to reduce the frequency of her migraines, asserting that there is “no evidence” to support such a finding. Claimant ’s Br. at 35. The record, however, contradicts this assertion . Claimant testifie d:
[Employer’s Representative:] [I]sn’t it true that your supervisor[, Ms. Watson,] actually put you in an office?
[Claimant:] She did, yes.
[Employer’s Representative:] So that you could control the lighting?
[Claimant:] Oh, that’s true.

N.T., 2/ 21/20, at 29. This testimony was also corroborated by Ms. Watson. See id. at 34.IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dara R. Cozzi, :

Petitioner :

: v. : No. 1068 C.D. 2020
: Unemployment Compensation : Board of Review, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 17 th day of November, 20 2 1 , we hereby AFFIRM the August 26, 2020 Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review.

__________________________________ ELLEN CEISLER , J udge