DEFENSE STUDIES SERIES

Pentagon 9/11

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DEFENSE STUDIES SERIES

Pentagon 9/11

Alfred Goldberg

Sarandis Papadopoulos

Diane Putney

Nancy Berlage

Rebecca Welch

Historical Office

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Washington, D.C. - 2007
This is the Official U.S. Government edition of this publication and is herein

identified to certify its authenticity. Use of the 0-16 ISBN prefix is for U.S.

Government Printing Office Official Editions only. The Superintendent

of Documents of the U.S. Government Printing Office requests that any

reprinted edition clearly be labeled as a copy of the authentic work with a new

ISBN.

It is prohibited to use the Department of Defense seal, as appears on the

title page, on any republication of this material without the express, written

permission of the Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Any

person using official seals and logos in a manner inconsistent with the Federal

Regulations Act is subject to penalty.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Pentagon 9/11 / Alfred Goldberg... [et al.].

p. cm.-- (Defense studies series)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN-13: 978-0-16-078328-9

1. September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 2001. 2. Pentagon (Va.). 3. Terrorism-Virginia-Arlington. 4.

Rescue work-Virginia-Arlington. I. Goldberg, Alfred, 1918- II. United States. Dept. of Defense.

Historical Office.

HV6432.7.P43 2007

975.5'295044-dc22

2007016098

ISBN 978-0-16-078328-9
Preface

As no other event in U.S. history, not even Pearl Harbor, the deadly

assaults on New York and Washington that took the lives of almost 3,000 people

on 11 September 2001 shattered the nation's sense of security. The utter destruction of the Twin Towers in New York and the severe damage done to the Pentagon by Middle East terrorists signaled a changed world in the making, one

that poses a constant threat of attack that the United States must guard against

and defeat if its people are to live in freedom and safety. The nation responded

first with stunned surprise and overwhelming grief, then with outrage and stern

refusal to be intimidated.

What happened at the Pentagon that day and for days afterwards is a

compelling story of trauma and tragedy as well as courage and caring and an

instructive case study in coping with such appalling contingencies. Any history of

this event must relate the resolve and fortitude exhibited by the military and civilians most immediately affected as well as the indispensable help that came from

thousands of responders in the aftermath. In the first terrifying minutes after the

plane crashed into the building the swift actions of survivors and rescuers helped

save the lives of many who would otherwise have perished. The prompt response

and subsequent performance of federal, state, and especially local agencies, in particular their coordination and cooperation with each other and with Pentagon
PreftIce

authorities, provided invaluable lessons for dealing with other large-scale emergencies in the future.

The Department of Defense undertook preparation of a history of the 11

September 2001 attack on the Pentagon at the suggestion of Brig. Gen. John S.

Brown, director of the U. S. Army Center of Military History. The OSD Historical Office initiated the project as a Defense Historical Study-a joint endeavor

on behalf of the Department of Defense. At the request of the director of the

Naval Historical Center, the OSD Historian assigned responsibility for preparation of the study to the Naval Historical Center.

Reconstructing and clarifying this complex event required a collaborative effort. A first draft of the history was prepared by Sarandis Papadopoulos

of the Naval Historical Center. He performed extensive research, conducted and

directed a large number of oral history interviews, and provided an overall framework for further review and revision. Edward Marolda of the Naval Historical

Center edited the manuscript and provided a second draft. A third and final version was prepared by members of the staff of the OSD Historical Office-Alfred

Goldberg, Diane Putney, Nancy Berlage, and Rebecca Welch. They performed

much additional research including oral history interviews, reorganized and

rewrote the manuscript, thoroughly edited it, and checked it rigorously to insure

accuracy of fact and of use and citation of all sources. Stuart Rochester gave the

manuscript a final review and prepared the book for publication. The final product reflects the efforts of all of these participants and the researchers, compilers,

editors, and fact checkers who assisted them.

Above all, this book would not have been possible without the cooperation of the more than 1,300 people who participated in oral history interviews conducted by the historical offices of the Army (almost 900 interviews),

Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and OSD. The interviews were conducted by

staff members of these offices and by Army and Navy reservists who entered on

active duty for the purpose. Most of the firsthand evidence needed to provide the

foundation for an evocative, broad-based historical narrative comes from these

far-ranging interviews. Until a fuller and more definitive in-depth history can be

written, this account represents the most comprehensive effort to date to capture what occurred at the Pentagon on 9/11. Although there are intricate treatments of the crash scene and the physical impact of the collision, the work is not

H11
Preface

as much concerned with elaborate technical analysis, which can be found in afteraction reports and other literature, as with conveying in accurate and sufficient

detail both the essential chronology and the kaleidoscopic nature of the unfolding developments that day, including evoking both the shock and destructiveness

surrounding the catastrophe. The focus is on what happened to people and to the

building on 11 September 2001 as seen chiefly through the eyes of participants

and observers. The huge cast of thousands includes the dead and injured, survivors, rescuers, firefighters, medical attendants, FBI agents, police, Defense military and civilian volunteers, forensic specialists, morticians, representatives of

scores of federal, state, local, and volunteer organizations, family assistance staff

of the Department of Defense, and the families of the survivors. The many recollections of individual experiences are as fragmented as was the collapsed E Ring

section of the building. As with rebuilding of the collapsed area, this account had

to reconstruct the sequence and progression of events piece by piece.

The necessary reliance on oral history interviews varying greatly in scope,

recollection, and quality presented a challenge in establishing a dependably accurate and consistent record. A number of survivors, rescuers, and responders still

suffered from the physical and emotional effects of their traumatic experiences

when interviewed days, months, and even years later. Given the circumstances

in which those in the impact area found themselves-shocked, injured, dazed,

fearful, disoriented, gasping for breath-it is understandable that they could

not retain clearly all that had happened to them or that they had observed. Even

where witnesses had vivid recollections of their experiences they often acknowledged lack of precision in recalling all that had happened-time, place, people,

and circumstances. Physical factors-smoke, darkness, fire, debris, and other

hazards-all contributed to disorientation and confusion. It is not surprising,

therefore, that versions of the same event by participants or observers viewing the

scene from individual perspectives often differed and therefore had to be weighed

carefully. Still, it was necessary to make prudent judgments where discrepancies

existed. Material used in this study was distilled from the enormous amount of

information available from the more than 1,300 interviews, of which we found it

possible to use only a representative portion, relying on the corroborative testimony of two or more witnesses wherever possible.

iii
Of the many problems encountered in seeking to render an accurate and

authoritative account, the most difficult was to establish an exact timeline for 11

September. Few participants or observers could pinpoint precise times for what

happened-the building collapse, arrivals and departures, rescues, treatment and

evacuation of injured, the progress of fires, warnings and evacuations, building

searches, and escapes from the wreckage. For many of the day's developments the

best that can be done to identify time of occurrence is to use such locutions as

"about 10:00 a.m.," at "approximately 1 1:15,""between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m." This is

especially necessary where there are conflicting recollections or gaps in the available evidence, and other sources such as physical documentation did not permit

the authors to resolve the discrepancies or achieve absolute certainty. In general,

there may be confidence in the accuracy of the sequence of events if not the exact

time of each.

Space does not allow giving here the credit due many individuals who

contributed importantly to this volume. We acknowledge them by name in a

list appended after the text and regret any inadvertent omissions. The hundreds of oral history interviews cited in the study appear in a list included in the

bibliography.

Finally, although this volume was prepared in the Department of Defense, the views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the department.

ALFRED GOLDBERG

OSD Historian

iv
Contents

TARGET: THE PENTAGON ...... . . . . . .. . ............. 1

The Building ........... ..... ................. 1

The Attack ................. .................. 8

II. THE DEADLY STRIKE ............ . . ............. 23

First Floor ............ .................. 28

Second Floor ............. ................. 36

Third Floor ............. ............ ..... 44

Fourth Floor ............. ................. 45

Fiftb Floor ............ .................. 46

III. THE RESCUERS ............... . . .............. 50

IV. FIGHTING THE FIRE ............ . . ............. 64

The First Responders .......... ............... 64

Command and Control ......... ............... 72

Initial Search, Rescue, and Firefighting Efforts ... . . ....... 77

E Ring Collapse ........... ................. 80

Inbound Plane Rumors and Evacuations .... .......... 82

Fighting the Fire "Tooth and Nail" ........ . . . ... .. 86

The Roof Fire ............ ................. 91

Searching and Shoring .......... ............... 95

Logistics ............. ................... 100

Operational Coordination ........ . . ............ 102

V. TREATING THE INJURED, SEARCHING FOR REMAINS ........ 106
Contents

M edical Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Removing Remains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

VI. UP AND RUNNING .............. ................ 128

National Command Authority ........ ............. 129

Military Command and Operations Centers ..... ......... 133

Keeping the Building Operating ......... ............ 136

Open for Business on 12 September ....... ........... 146

VII. SECURING THE PENTAGON ........... ............. 149

Defense Protective Service .......... .............. 150

FBI and the Crime Scene ........... .............. 157

Federal, State, and Local Police and the Old Guard .. ....... 161

Tightened Security and Military Police ...... . .......... 168

VIII. CARING FOR THE DEAD AND THE LIVING ..... ......... 177

Identifying the Dead ......... .. ............... 178

Organizing for Family Assistance ........ ............ 186

Pentagon Family Assistance Center .................. 187

Continuity and Commemoration ......... ............ 198

AFTERWORD ............. ... ................. 201

APPENDICES ............. . .. . . ............... 207

A. List of 9/11 Pentagon Fatalities ...... ........... 208

B. National Transportation Safety Board Reports ......... 213

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............. .............. 227

NOTES ................ ... .................... 229

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ............ .............. 253

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............ ............... 267

INDEX ................ . .. . . .................. 269

ILLUSTRATIONS

1. The Pentagon in 2001 ......... ..... ............... 5

2. Plan of the Building-First Floor ........ ... ............ 7

3. Boeing 757 Schematics .......... ............... 11

4. Flight Path of American Airlines Flight 77 ... ......... 14

5. Aircraft's Final Maneuver before Impact with Pentagon ........ 15

6. Path of Plane into Building .......... .............. 18

7. Path of Aircraft through the First Floor ..... .......... 21

8. Affected Areas on Second Floor ....... ............ 38

vi
Contents

9. Pentagon and Vicinity ........... ............... 71

10. Initial Incident Command Structure ...... ........... 74

11. First Floor Damage ............ ................ 81

12. Second Floor Damage ........... ............... 88

13. Roof Damage .............. .................. 94

14. Road System and Medical Facilities ....... ........... 116

15. Injured Disposition ............ ................ 118

Photographs follow pages 82 and 162.

vii
DEFENSE STUDIES SERIES

Pentagon 9/11
CHAPTER I

Target: The Pentagon

Since World War II the Pentagon has stood as a symbol of American

power and influence to the nation and the world. By 11 September 2001 it had

been the command center of the nation's military establishment for more than

a half century. In retrospect it seems obvious that in some regions of the world,

particularly in the Middle East, a U.S. military presence and perceived ascendancy should have made the Pentagon an object of fear and hatred and a likely

target of attack by terrorist enemies.

The Building

Knowledge of the purpose, design, and construction of the Pentagon

is requisite to understanding the deadly effect of the 11 September attack. The

original conception of the huge structure in the summer of 1941 derived from

the urgent need for space to house the rapidly expanding War Department headquarters in Washington. The shadow of the war in Europe and a growing threat

in the Pacific from Japan had caused the United States to mount a partial mobilization of industry and manpower that greatly multiplied the activities and numbers of the Army in 1940-41. By July 1941 Chief of Staff General George C.

Marshall had obtained permission from his superiors to plan for a single build-
PENTAGON 9/111

ing to accommodate the burgeoning War Department staff scattered among 17

buildings in the Washington area.1

Where to place the building occasioned much controversy during the

summer of 1941 until President Franklin D. Roosevelt decided in August on a

site along the Potomac River in Arlington County, Virginia, directly across from

Washington. Groundbreaking occurred on 11 September, exactly 60 years before

the 2001 attack. The building was declared completed 16 months later, on 15

January 1943.

Originally the Pentagon Reservation had 583 acres; by 2001 it had

shrunk to 280 because of transfers to other purposes. The building covers 29

acres; parking lots take up 67 acres. North and South Parking and other smaller

parking areas accommodate about 10,000 vehicles. A Center Court of more than

five acres provides appealing landscaping and more light for the inside A Ring.

Of the 6.6 million square feet in the building, about 3.8 million were originally

devoted to office space.

From the beginning, the building architects and engineers had decided

on a pentagonal shape and a horizontal rather than vertical projection, limiting

the height to four stories. The afterthought addition of a fifth story in 1942 raised

the building's height to 71 feet. A low-rise structure of such massive dimensions-almost a mile around the exterior-gives the Pentagon a fortress-like

appearance-not inappropriate for a military headquarters. The appeal of the

pentagonal shape, second only to a circular shape in efficient design, lay in making it possible to reach anywhere in the huge building by foot in seven or eight

minutes. Stairways, escalators, freight elevators,* and wide ramps provide ready

access to all parts of the building. At the outset of construction, given wartime

austerity and fiscal constraints, all parties involved agreed that it would be a nononsense building-no marble, no decoration, no ornamentation. Truly a pentagon, the structure has five concentric rings (labeled A to E from the innermost

ring out), five sides, and five floors. Four light wells between the rings, mainly

at the upper three floors, provide daylight for most offices. The dimensions are

impressive-the five exterior walls are each 921 feet long, and the five innermost

walls facing the Center Court each 362 feet long. From the outer face of E Ring to

* Since 2001 renovated sections of the building include passenger elevators and new two-way escalators.

2
Target: The Pentagoni

the outer face of A Ring the building has an overall depth of 396 feet. The roofs

are concrete and flat, except for those over the more visible A and E Rings and

the 10 radial corridors, which are sloped and covered with slate tiles. Outermost

walls are faced with limestone and backed with unreinforced 9-inch brick; inner

ring walls are of 10-inch architectural concrete. The building rests on more than

41,000 concrete piles, ranging from 27 feet to 45 feet in height, that support an

equal number of columns reaching to the roof. The building's structural framework (floors and columns) is made of reinforced concrete.

Ten numbered corridors radiate like spokes from the A Ring apexes on

the inside of the building to the E Ring on the outside. These wide corridors and

narrower ones running through the middle of the rings provide 17.5 miles of

hallways. The five rings are each 50 feet deep separated by 30-foot gaps known

as light wells, except for a 40-foot-wide roadway, the A-E Drive, running through

the light well between the B and C Rings, that provides access for vehicles to the

Center Court from the outside of the building through tunnels at either end. In

much of the building on the 1st and 2nd Floors there are no light courts between

the C, D, and E Rings, so that office space is contiguous from the E Ring through

the C Ring. The five exterior apexes are at the centers of the five "wedges:" The five

rings are segmented by expansion joints at four locations evenly spaced around

the structure. Where load-bearing partitions are not present, non-bearing partitions separate offices. The five interior apexes at the A Ring have exits to the

Center Court at the 1st and 2nd Floor levels. The building's five-digit numbering

system indicates the floor, the ring (a letter), the corridor, and the specific room.

Thus, 2E460 (in the direct path of the crash) is on the 2nd Floor, E Ring, near

Corridor 4.

The Pentagon Department of Defense (DoD) work force, numbering

more than 30,000 military and civilians during World War II and the Korean

War, had diminished to fewer than 22,000 people, more than half civilian, in

1998. After renovation work on Wedge 1 began in 1998, the building's DoD

population declined still further to about 18,000, where it stood on 11 September 2001.*

* The authorized personnel strength in the Pentagon for the years 1945-1998 is listed in Department of

Defense Selected Manpower Statistics, Fiscal Year 1999, Table 1-7, prepared by Washington Headquarters

Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports. In addition to DoD employees, the building's population usually included about 2,000 non-DoD employees, chiefly contractors.

3
PENTAGON 9/11

Built originally for the War Department, the Pentagon eventually came

to include the major headquarters components of DoD after its establishment

in 1947: the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the three military

departments-Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Marine Corps headquarters did

not join the other three services in the building until 1996. Accordingly, all of the

most senior officials of the Defense Department have their offices in the Pentagon-the secretary of defense, the secretaries of the three military departments,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff,* and the numerous high-ranking civilian and military

officials who support them.

In 1989, approaching the half-century mark, the Pentagon's historical

importance and architectural merit received recognition by placement on the

National Register of Historic Places. By that time it had also become apparent

that the aging building urgently needed to be thoroughly renovated and made

more secure. Concern about the vulnerability of the structure had for some time

engaged the attention of responsible officials. There had been security incidents

as long ago as the 1960s; on two occasions bombs planted in the building by

unknown persons had exploded but caused little damage and no casualties. The

growing terrorist threat in the 1980s and 1990s had led to a number of security

improvements both inside and outside the building.

The structure's major deficiencies, as reported to Congress, centered on

materials and engineering systems failures, fire protection and safety shortcomings, lack of technological modernization, and inadequate security. During its

50 years of existence, the original building systems had never been replaced or

significantly improved. Consequently, all systems-heating, ventilation and air

conditioning, plumbing, electricity, and telecommunications--required replacement and modernization to bring the building up to code. The 17.5 miles of corridors and the 100,000 miles of telephone cables indicated the scale of the renovation task. Some parts of the ground-supported basement floors between the

piles had settled as much as 12 inches. Major structural modifications to the pilesupported foundation were required to create more usable space by enlarging the

mezzanine floor to cover most of the basement. Windows, both casement and

double-hung, were generally in disrepair and badly in need of replacement. Archi-

* The Defense Department has three military departments and four military services. The chiefs of the military services and a chairman and vice chairman constitute the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4
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PENTAGON 9/11

tectural elements--windows, doors, stairways-and the building facade (concrete and limestone), which showed cracks and spalling, required comprehensive overhaul. Removal of hazardous materials, especially asbestos, was another

imperative. Moreover, the building did not incorporate modern fire and safety

features. Finally, the machinery housed in the Heating and Refrigeration Plant,

a separate building nearby, had become obsolete. This long bill of particulars

underscored the need for a total renovation of the Pentagon.2

In 1990 Congress authorized a complete overhaul of the Pentagon, capping the cost at $1.218 billion in 1994. To plan and eventually oversee this huge

undertaking DoD established under Washington Headquarters Services an

office that evolved into the Pentagon Renovation Program Office (PENREN)

in 1997. PENREN managed all aspects of planning and execution of the renovation and construction work, employing contractors for almost every phase of

the project.' It soon became evident that the original plan to complete the work

within 10 years was optimistic; by 2001 planners projected a completion date of

2014. The first construction phase, a necessary preliminary to all renovation, was

the new Heating and Refrigeration Plant and associated exterior utility projects

beginning in 1993 and completed in September 1997. There followed the renovation of the basement and the extension of the basement mezzanine floor, a

project of high priority and longer duration. Upgrading security stood high on

the list for the next stage of reconstruction and renovation of the building proper,

which began in 1998 with clearance of Wedge 1, most of whose approximately

5,000 occupants were moved to leased facilities in Northern Virginia by the end

of the year. By September 2001, Wedge 1 had been largely reoccupied and work

was under way on adjacent Wedge 2, which had been cleared of all but about 700

occupants.

Extending from midway between Corridors 2 and 3 to midway between

Corridors 4 and 5, with more than one million internal gross square feet of space,

Wedge 1 was only five days from official completion and housed about 3,800

people on 11 September. Corridor 4 provided access to Wedge 1 on all floors, but

a temporary construction barrier wall midway between Corridors 4 and 5 limited

access to Corridor 5 by Wedge 1 occupants in all rings on most floors.4

Under the renovation plan all of the walls, utilities, and asbestos in

Wedge 1 were removed. The outer wall was reinforced with structural steel tub6
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PENTAGON 9/11

ing to increase its lateral stability and provide support to new blast-resistant

windows. The building's windows indeed required special attention. Analysis of

attacks on large structures elsewhere bore out that flying glass from blast-shattered windows caused many casualties, including deaths. The Pentagon's original

7,748 mostly casement-type windows, varying in size from 5'x6' to 6'x7, offered

no resistance to blast-generated fragmentation. Reinforcing the windows on the

outside of the E Ring and the A Ring would diminish the blast and fragmentation effects of exterior explosions. New windows for the E Ring,* the same size

as their predecessors but with glass 1 1/2 inches thick and weighing more than a

ton apiece, were welded into special tubular steel frameworks. On 11 September

many survived the blast.'

Long regarded as a physical security risk, the extensive south side loading dock for truck deliveries was replaced in August 2000 by a new 250,000 sq.

ft. Remote Delivery Facility (RDF) adjacent to North Parking, some hundreds

of yards from the Pentagon. Named for David Cooke, a longtime DoD administrator popularly known as the "Mayor of the Pentagon" and familiar to all as

"Doc;' the RDF was linked to the Pentagon by tunnel in February 2002, permitting unloading of large vehicles at a safe distance from the building. After deliveries were x-rayed, goods came into the Pentagon by electric-powered carts via the

tunnel. Built largely for security reasons, two new pedestrian bridges at the south

side of the Pentagon, entryways into Corridors 2 and 3 at the 2nd Floor level,

provided massive barriers separating vehicular and pedestrian traffic.6

While security concerns received increasing attention as renovation progressed, the measures planned, under way, or instituted could neither anticipate

nor fully defend against the powerful attack that came on 11 September 2001.

Indeed, it is difficult to see how any realistic physical changes to the Pentagon

could have deflected or greatly diminished the effects of the attack.

The Attack

For their assault on the U.S. homeland on 11 September 2001 the terrorists, identified as belonging to the al Qaeda network headed by Osama bin

Laden, chose four targets known to the world as prominent symbols of American

* New A Ring window glass was not as thick as the E Ring window glass.

- 8
Target: The Pentagon

prestige and power. 'The first two, the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center

in New York, were icons representing American economic strength. The third,

the Pentagon, represented U.S. military might. A fourth and highest-value target

selected-presumably the White House or the Capitol-escaped attack when

the hijacked plane destined for it crashed in Pennsylvania.

Previous attacks against U.S. official facilities by radical Muslim terrorists had occurred overseas: most notably the suicide truck bombing that killed

241 American military at the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, in October

1983; a similar strike against the Air Force Khobar Towers housing complex in

Saudi Arabia in June 1996; the massive attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi,

Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in August 1998; and the small-boat bombing of the destroyer USS Cole in Yemen's port of Aden in October 2000. The only

strike within the United States by Middle Eastern terrorists occurred in February 1993 when they exploded a truck bomb in a parking garage under the World

Trade Center in New York City, killing six people. Before 2001 the al Qaeda terrorists had decided to aim at more high-value and high-visibility targets in the

United States.7

Over a period of two years before September 2001, in accordance with

plans conceived by a network of al Qaeda plotters, the chosen agents entered the

United States and made preparations for their stunning assault. They selected

the most practical, lethal, and obtainable means of achieving their purposelarge aircraft carrying huge loads of explosive fuel. Beginning as early as July

2000, 14 months before the hijackings, several of the terrorists took flight-training courses. They acquired flight deck videos for Boeing 747, 757, 767, and 777

aircraft. By September 2001 the hijackers were ready.8

On the morning of 11 September, the terrorists hijacked four airliners,

two from Boston's Logan International Airport, one from Newark Liberty International Airport, and one from Washington Dulles International Airport, in Northern Virginia. The two aircraft departing from Boston-American Airlines Flight

11 (11 crew, 76 passengers, 5 hijackers) at 7:59 a.m. and United Airlines Flight

175 (9 crew, 51 passengers, 5 hijackers) at 8:14 a.m.-were Boeing 767s bound for

Los Angeles. Their flight crews each stopped transmitting within half an hour of

departing, when they were over central New York State. Air controllers first registered concern at 8:21 a.m. when American Flight 11 turned off its transponder; the

9
PENTAGON 9/11

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) sent its first warning of the hijacking of

American Flight 11 to the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) of the North

American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) at 8:38 a.m.9

The call from the FAA did not come in time. The military had less than

9 minutes' warning before the first airliner hit the World Trade Center and 25

minutes before the second. The Air National Guard launched two F-15 fighter

planes from Otis Air Force Base, on Cape Cod, Massachusetts, at 8:53, too late to

intercept the hijacked aircraft. Flights 11 and 175 hit the North and South Towers of the World Trade Center at 8:46 a.m. and 9:03 a.m. respectively, with the

fighters still 70 miles distant at the time of the second crash. Otis and Langley Air

Force Base in Virginia, each with a pair of fighters at the ready, were the only two

alert sites available to NEADS for air defense of New York and Washington.Just

14 fighter planes on alert guarded the whole of American airspace that morning.

The New York City attacks caused the South Tower to collapse at 9:59 a.m. and

the North Tower at 10:28 a.m., killing more than 2,700 people.1

"

United Flight 93 (7 crew, 33 passengers, 4 hijackers), a Boeing 757 bound

for San Francisco, left Newark at 8:42 in the morning. At approximately 9:24

a.m., NEADS ordered Langley Air Force Base, near Norfolk, Virginia, which

had been put on alert at 9:09, to prepare to scramble fighters presumably to intercept not Flight 93, but Flight 11, mistakenly thought to be moving south, this

almost 40 minutes after Flight 11 had struck the North Tower. Another 40 minutes later, after a struggle between the hijackers and passengers, Flight 93 crashed

into the ground near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, killing all on board."

The conspirators no doubt chose and methodically planned the takeover

of these particular flights to maximize explosive damage. Because all four aircraft

were headed nonstop for the West Coast, they carried large loads of highly volatile fuel. The full force of their destructive power became apparent when Flight

175 hit the South Tower in New York; the resultingjet fuel fireball exploded

downward into lower floors.' 2

Near-simultaneous departure and subsequent hijacking of the four planes,

all of which took off within a period of 43 minutes, maximized the element of

surprise, allowing the FAA little time to warn pilots in U.S. airspace. The huge

number of aircraft-more than 4,600-aloft over the continental United States

10
BOEING 757 SCHEMATICS

S(49 15.21 Ft 11 MIn.)•

7.32 M (24 Ft 0 In.)

37.95 M

(124 Ft 6 In.)

000000..........00 ..... .... • ............... ' 3t•In

-- _ 47.32 M

(155 Ft 3 In.)

Source: Boeing Company
PENTAGON 9/11

made it difficult for NORAD to identify the four rogue aircraft. Finally, the element of surprise reduced the time available to launch interceptors to divert or

shoot down the hijacked aircraft, assuming that a decision to do so could have

been made in time.13

At Dulles International Airport five hijackers boarded American Airlines Flight 77 bound for Los Angeles: Khalid al Midhar, Majed Moqed, Nawaf

al Hazmi, Salem al Hazmi, and Hani Hanjour, of whom the first four were subsequently listed as "possible Saudi" nationals. Although some of the men set off

metal detector alarms, they were passed through the security checkpoints. When

the plane lifted off at 8:20 a.m. it had 64 people on board-a crew of 6 plus 58

passengers, including the 5 hijackers with their weapons, probably small knives

and box cutters.

In a speculative reconstruction of what took place in the plane, it seems

likely that over eastern Kentucky the hijackers made their move, probably between

8:51 and 8:54, and took over Flight 77. They either waited for a cabin attendant

to knock on the flight deck door and then rushed the cockpit or took an individual cabin crew member or passenger hostage and used threats against the victim

to gain access. Once on the flight deck the attackers either incapacitated or murdered the two pilots and then took over the aircraft. With one hijacker as pilot,

the other four herded the passengers to the rear of the aircraft and forestalled any

attempts to retake control of the aircraft before it reached its target. Under the

control of the five terrorists, at about 8:55 a.m. Flight 77 turned south and then

five minutes later turned eastward from a point near the junction of West Virginia, Ohio, and Kentucky. Hani Hanjour, who had received FAA pilot certification, no doubt piloted the aircraft. 14

Tracking Flight 77 would not have been easy, even if controllers had been

able to identify the plane to follow. Its transponder, a transmitter that broadcast the course, speed, and altitude of the airplane, was turned off at 8:56. The

hijacker pilot refused to answer any radio messages, adding to the uncertainty

of making a decision to dispatch military aircraft to intercept the airliner. For air

traffic controllers the lack of a transponder signal meant they could not find the

Boeing 757 until it crossed the path of a ground-based radar. In any event, there

was not enough warning time for NORAD to take effective action. The only relevant action taken came in response to the erroneous FAA notice that Flight

12
Target: 77)e Pentagoni

11 was flying south toward Washington. At 9:30 a.m. Langley Air Force Base

launched three* F-16s that were still about 150 miles away from Washington

when Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon seven minutes later. The fighters had

flown over the ocean in accordance with standing instructions and did not turn

toward Washington until ordered to do so at almost the same time that the Pentagon was struck.15

The crashes into the Twin Towers, quickly perceived as terrorist attacks,

were a call to action at the Pentagon. The acting deputy director for operations

in the National Military Command Center, Navy Captain Charles Leidig, initiated a call for a "significant event" telephone conference of senior military leaders at 9:29. Leidig rejected the erroneous FAA warning that Flight 11 was heading for Washington. At 9:33 the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport

tower passed to the Secret Service Operations Center in Washington the alarming word that "an aircraft [is] coming at you and not talking with us" A minute

later the plane, Flight 77, turned south below Alexandria, Virginia, then circled

back to the northeast and flew toward Washington again. Its destination was the

Pentagon, not the White House or the Capitol.t 16

The final minute of the airliner's flight took it along an east-northeast

course above an Arlington County, Virginia, roadway, Columbia Pike. County

Police Department Corporal Barry Foust, stopped at a traffic light at the intersection of Walter Reed Drive and Columbia Pike less than two miles from the

Pentagon, spotted the aircraft flying low, saw a plume of smoke, then radioed,

"We just had an airplane crash . .. must be in the District area:' Three blocks

further along, at the intersection of Columbia Pike with South Wayne Street,

Police Motorcycle Officer Richard Cox observed the airliner flying so close to

the ground that the polished underside of its fuselage reflected the images of the

buildings it passed on its flight; then he heard an explosion.1 7

* The two fighters on alert werejoined by a third, a spare aircraft that had not been placed on alert. NEADS

had ordered Langley to send up three fighters.

t "At 9:34 AM the aircraft was positioned about 3.5 miles west-southwest of the Pentagon, and started a

right 330-degree descending turn to the right. At the end of the turn the aircraft was at about 2000 feet altitude and 4 miles southwest of the Pentagon. Over the next 30 seconds, power was increased to near maximum .... The airplane accelerated to approximately 460 knots (530 miles per hour) at impact with the Pentagon. The time of impact was 9:37:45 AM." (National Transportation Safety Board, "Flight Path Study

- American Airlines Flight 77;' 19 Feb 02. See Appendix B.)

13
PENTAGON 9/11

FLIGHT PATH OF AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 77

Pennsylvania

Ohio

West Virginia Virginia )

Kentucky

A - Departure from Washington Dulles Airport

8 - Reached assigned altitude of 35,000 feet North Carolina

C - Deviation from assigned course (assumed takeover point)

D - Airplane heading east

E - Course change to northeast; autopilot disconnected, then re-engaged

F - Autopilot disconnected

Sources: NTSB Flight Path Study, 19 February 2002, and 9/11 Commission Report

Flying just above the Navy Annex Building and a Virginia State Police

radio mast, both uphill from the Pentagon and adjacent to Arlington National

Cemetery, the hijacker pilot guided the Boeing 757 downhill and turned it in a

northeasterly direction. Less than two seconds before the plane hit the Pentagon,

R. E. Rabogliatti, a building management specialist at the Navy Annex, peered

out of his office window and saw the airliner looming over the building. Later,

recalling its screaming engines he judged that the pilot must have pushed the jet's

throttle to the limit; he estimated its altitude at less than 150 feet. In the Army

Operations Center in the Pentagon Basement, Brigadier General Peter Chiarelli

14
Target: The Pentagon

AIRCRAFT'S FINAL MANEUVER BEFORE IMPACT WITH PENTAGON

" /LI

23M35

+a ~ ....... .....

Source: Adapted from NTSB Flight Path Study, 19 February 2002

was told by "the INTEL folks" that an "aircraft was headed for D.C. and it was

right about then that we heard the noise and the building had been hit:'"8

Others in the immediate vicinity who witnessed the impact recalled that

the airliner struck several obstacles, including light poles on Route 27, on the way

to its target. The right wing hit a portable generator and the right engine crushed

15
PENTAGON 9/11

a chain link fence. The left engine smashed an external steam vault. Observers

saw debris falling from the plane and the building. Five images from a Pentagon

security camera, approximately a second apart, recorded the approach, the crash,

and the immediate effect-a huge fireball."9

Witnessing the fiery crash from above was the crew of a C-130 transport plane that had taken off from Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, minutes

before. As Flight 77 descended toward the Pentagon it crossed the C-130's flight

path. An air traffic controller asked the C-130 pilot, Lieutenant Colonel Steve

O'Brien, to reverse course and follow the airliner. O'Brien turned and followed,

watching in disbelief as Flight 77 smashed into the Pentagon. Ordered to leave

the area immediately because fighter aircraft were approaching, the C-130 flew

on to its destination-Minneapolis-St. Paul.2

u

Flight 77 hit the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m.* A description of the moment of

impact on the building is contained in a report by the American Society of Civil

Engineers--The Pentagon Building Performance Report:

The Boeing 757 approached the west wall of the Pentagon from the

southwest at approximately 780 ft/s. As it approached the Pentagon

site it was so low to the ground that it reportedly clipped an antenna

on a vehicle on an adjacent road and severed light posts. When it was

approximately 320 ft from the west wall of the building (0.42 second before impact), it was flying nearly level, only a few feet above the

ground .... The aircraft flew over the grassy area next to the Pentagon

until its right wing struck a piece of construction equipment that was

approximately 100 to 110 ft from the face of the building (0.10 second

before impact) .... At that time the aircraft had rolled slightly to the

left, its right wing elevated. After the plane had traveled approximately

another 75 ft, the left engine struck the ground at nearly the same

instant that the nose of the aircraft struck the west wall of the Pentagon .... Impact of the fuselage was ... at or slightly below the secondfloor slab. The left wing passed below the second-floor slab, and the

right wing crossed at a shallow angle from below the second-floor slab

to above the second-floor slab. 2

1

The impact proved devastating. The aircraft had taken off with a total

weight of over 90 tons, roughly 25 percent of it in fuel. Allowing for the hourand-a-quarter flight from Dulles Airport to Kentucky and back, Flight 77 still

had most of its original 7,256 gallons of fuel on board, the greater part of it in the

* 9/11 Commission Report, 9, 25-27, 461 (n 154), puts the time at 9:37:46.

16
Target: The Pentagon

wings, when it hit the Pentagon. Traveling at 530 m.p.h., the aircraft, and the subsequent fuel explosion, delivered enormous destructive power. The catastrophe

might well have been even greater had the Pentagon been struck by either of the

two Boeing 767s that crashed into the World Trade Center. These larger aircraft,

carrying thousands of gallons more fuel than the Boeing 757s that departed from

Newark and Dulles, would have done far more damage.*22

Flight 77 struck the west side of the Pentagon at the 1st Floor level just

inside Wedge 1 near the 4th Corridor and proceeded diagonally at an approximate 42* angle toward the 5th Corridor in the mostly vacant and unrenovated Wedge 2. After the nose of the plane hit the Pentagon a huge fireball

burst upward and rose 200 feet above the roof. Multiple explosions occurred as

the plane smashed through the building. The front part of the relatively weak

fuselage disintegrated, but the mid-section and tail-end continued moving for

another fraction of a second, progressively destroying segments of the building

further inward. The chain of destruction resulted in parts of the plane ending up

inside the Pentagon in reverse of the order they had entered it, with the tail-end

of the airliner penetrating the greatest distance into the building. Remarkably,

these circumstances meant that the bodies of the passengers in the rear of the aircraft traveled deeper into the ground floor of the building than did those in the

front. The largest concentration of body parts was found at the deepest area of

penetration-the C Ring. 23

While the immediate building interior area hit by the nose of the aircraft

was small, the section subsequently wrecked by the large plane debris and multiple explosions of jet fuel from the ruptured tanks seconds after impact spanned

a larger irregular area of more than an acre on each of the 1st and 2nd Floors.

Office spaces and corridors on these floors accounted for the locations of all but

two of the DoD victims. On the ground floor, the impact damage extended as

* The Boeing two-engine 757-200 aircraft had a wingspan of 124 ft. 6 in., overall length of 155 ft. 3 in.,

and tail height of 44 ft. 6 in. According to American Airlines, Flight 77 carried "approximately 7,256 gallons of Jet A fuel" on board when it departed Dulles (ltr D. Douglas Cotton, Legal Department, American

Airlines, Inc. to Dalton West, OSD Historical Office, 24 Mar 06). According to the National Transportation Safety Board, Flight 77 carried 48,983 lbs. of fuel while on the ramp prior to departure and still had

36,200 lbs. of fuel on board when it hit the Pentagon. A standard conversion factor of 6.7+ lbs. per gallon of

fuel yields the 7,256 gallons figure that American Airlines provided as above. See NTSB Office of Research

and Engineering, "Study of Autopilot, Navigation Equipment, and Fuel Consumption Activity Based on

United Airlines Flight 93 and American Airlines Flight 77 Digital Flight Data Recorder Information,"John

O'Callaghan and Daniel Bower, 13 Feb 02, 8.

17
uZC

.. Imm

00

I75 coZS

LLI

-

00

"1"
Target: The Pentagon

far as the inner wall of the Pentagon's C Ring adjoining A-E Drive, a depth of

210 feet, although the plane traveled about 270 feet along an angled path into

the building. A-E Drive in Wedges 1 and 2 marked the C Ring back end of the

1st and 2nd Floor areas that suffered almost all of the fatalities. Impact damage

on the 2nd Floor proved much more limited than on the 1st Floor, with no supporting columns destroyed at a distance more than 50 feet from the outside wall.

Above the 2nd Floor most of the damage in the D and C Rings resulted from fire

and smoke and collapsed ceilings and light fixtures.24

The velocity of the plane's fuselage expended itself by the time it reached

A-E Drive, which dissipated the remaining explosive energy of the crash. But

the blast had enough force left to blow holes in the C Ring wall and force open

the doors of an electrical vault opening into the drive; the openings proved the

salvation of many survivors. Parts of the aircraft-including a tire part-hurtled through the outer three rings of Pentagon offices, emerged from a so-called

"punch out" hole in the C Ring wall, and came to rest in A-E Drive. The plane's

voice recorder and flight data recorder were not recovered until several days later,

14 September.25

The report of the American Society of Civil Engineers concluded that

"the direct impact of the aircraft destroyed the load capacity of about 30 firstfloor columns and significantly impaired that of 20 others:' Moreover, "this

impact may have also destroyed the load capacity of about six second-floor columns adjacent to the exterior wall:" Shattering the many columns essentially doubled the span between columns, thereby imposing severe stress on the stability of

the affected building section and causing collapse of the four floors in the E Ring

above the impact point at 10:15 a.m. The collapse started with the 2nd Floor just

north of Corridor 4 along an expansion joint in the E Ring, and opened a hole to

the outside about 95 feet wide at the 1st Floor level. The collapsed zone extended

approximately 50 feet from the outside to the still-standing inside E Ring wall.*

* Establishing an exact time for the collapse of the Pentagon's floors above the impacted E Ring area required extensive research. The "Arlington County After-Action Report" cited an incorrect time (9:57 a.m.)

in its Appendix 1, page 1-1, seeming to confuse the warning of a collapse with the collapse itself: see A-29-

30, A-66. Time-stamped video images provide the best evidence for 10:15 a.m. as the time of the collapse.

See WUSA 9 News video, David Statter reporting from the Pentagon, 11 September 2001,4100 Wisconsin Ave., Washington, D.C., and ABC News video,"World Trade Center and Pentagon Bombings:' 11 September 2001, 705204, Television News Archive, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tenn. (local Nashville

time), http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/tvn-month-search.pl. See also Rossow, Uncommon Strength, 83, n 1.

19
PENTAGON 9/11

The D and C Rings did not collapse. The low hit reduced the damage visible from

outside.26

No building could have absorbed the energy of such a crash without suffering structural damage and, if occupied, casualties. Nevertheless, the Pentagon fared better than less sturdy buildings would have. The greatest power of

the interior explosions was confined to a limited area bounded by concrete floors

and sturdy walls. Major structural damage ended with the collapse of the impact

zone. Additional damage incurred over the next 36 hours extended deep into the

Pentagon, with a considerably larger area beyond the impact site damaged by fire

and smoke as well as the water from sprinklers, burst pipes, and fire hoses. The

worst damage came from the volume and flammability of the fuel rather than the

structural strength of the plane.

Although never designed to offer the protection of a bunker, the building's steel-reinforced concrete and brick construction protected most employees

in Wedges 1 and 2 from fires and explosions and saved their lives. Moreover, the

rigidity of the Pentagon's facade caused some of the fuel in the wings to detonate

on impact, diminishing the inside destruction and probably reducing the number of dead-all 64 on board the plane and 125 from the building. The lighter

structure and largely glass facade of the World Trade Center buildings presented

much less impact resistance.27

In other respects, the structural strength of the building proved a mixed

blessing. Concrete and brick, not yielding easily to the energy of the impact,

channeled the ensuing explosion and flames along paths of less resistance. The

new windows, frames, and walls in Wedge 1 held up under extraordinary pressures, but they diminished venting of the fires, heat, and smoke. Consequently

the explosion's constrained energy coursed through offices, corridors, elevator

shafts, and stairwells, where doors offered less resistance than concrete. The furious energy of the explosion made the bottom two floors in the immediate vicinity

of the crash site death traps, compromised stairwells as escape routes, and made

firefighting more difficult.

The delay in the collapse of the E Ring in Wedge 1, almost 40 minutes,

proved critical to the survival of occupants of the upper three floors, where the

immediate impact of the plane claimed only two lives, both on the 3rd Floor. The

20
CORRIDOR~ 4

00

0

IrIt

IJII
PENTAGON 9/11

Pentagon's sturdy construction served to delay the collapse, affording time for

hundreds of people on the upper floors to escape.

The destruction and, more importantly, the loss of life, would have been

worse without the reinforcement of the exterior wall of Wedge 1 and installation

of the blast-resistant windows and fire suppression systems. Hitting just inside

Corridor 4 in Wedge 1, the plane penetrated into the unrenovated Wedge 2. On

11 September the offices in or near the impact point were not completely occupied, either awaiting new tenants in Wedge 1 or mostly vacated in preparation for

renovation in Wedge 2. Had the aircraft hit fully-occupied unrenovated Wedge

5, several hundred yards to the right, the toll of dead and injured, as well as structural damage, would have been much greater. If the plane had missed Wedge 1

entirely and plowed through only unrenovated and nearly-vacated portions of

Wedge 2, the structural and fire damage would have been far greater, but the

death toll might have been less. No matter where it might have struck the Pentagon, Flight 77 would have wreaked havoc.

22
CHAPTER II

The Deadly Strike

At 9:37 a.m. on 11 September the 20,000 people present in the Pentagon had no hint of the stunning explosion and firestorm about to engulf those in

the path of the doomed airliner only seconds away from striking its target. A few

of those witnessing the televised horror of the crashes into the World Trade Center's Twin Towers in New York did, indeed, wonder aloud if the Pentagon might

be next. Their worst fears became reality when 34 minutes after United Flight

175 struck the South Tower of the World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m. American

Flight 77 smashed into the west side of the Pentagon, bringing great damage to

the building and death and injury to many of its inhabitants.

Despite the fortuitous circumstance that only 3,800 of the 4,500-5,000

intended occupants had moved into newly renovated Wedge 1 with its strengthened walls and windows and that Wedge 2 had been largely emptied of personnel

(about 700 remained) as renovation began there, the exploding airliner exacted a

heavy toll of dead and injured.' Of the 125 Department of Defense fatalities in

the Pentagon, 92 occurred on the 1st Floor, 31 on the 2nd Floor, and 2 on the 3rd

Floor, all between Corridors 4 and 5. The dead included 70 civilians (10 of them

contractor employees) and 55 military.* The Army incurred the greatest loss-

* There is evidence that one OSD contract employee, Allen Boyle, may have been outside the building just

before the plane hit.
PENTAGON 9/11

75 men and women.* Another 106 injured were taken to area hospitals.2 On the

periphery of the damaged area many persons suffered from inhaling the dense

and noxious smoke that engulfed a large part of the building on all five floors,

reaching beyond the 2nd and 7th Corridors on either side and as far as the A

Ring and even the Center Court on the lower floors.

On the airliner, all 64 people died, including the 5 hijackers, most of

them instantly. Among the six crew members were a husband and wife pair of

flight attendants. A party of eight from the Washington area-three teachers,

three 11-year-old students, and two escorts from the National Geographic Society-had looked forward to a field trip to the Channel Island Marine Sanctuary in California. One of the children was the son of a Navy chief petty officer on

duty in the Pentagon. A family of four, including two small children, and a honeymoon couple bound for Hawaii were among the victims. What befell two passengers-William Caswell and Bryan Jack-was especially ironic. Both were

Department of Defense employees on official business trips and had offices in the

Pentagon.t 3

The attack killed 189 people, all of whom, with a few exceptions, died

within minutes. Antoinette Sherman, an Army employee, died six days later in

the hospital. Caswell and Jack on Flight 77 brought the total of DoD-affiliated

fatalities in the Pentagon to 127.t

A life-and-death drama for many hundreds of Pentagon occupants

played out on the large stage between Corridors 4 and 5 and mostly on the 1st

and 2nd Floors in Rings E, D, and C-an area of some two acres on each floor.

Those floors contained numerous offices and hundreds of individual cubicles creating mazes awkward to negotiate even under normal conditions. The layout of

the building and the drastically altered state of their surroundings caused by the

crash dictated the escape routes taken by survivors. The main escape routes from

the impact area to the outside of the building from the E Ring were Corridor 5

and the Heliport entrance midway between Corridors 4 and 5. In the opposite

direction, Corridors 4 and 5 provided the chief exits through the A Ring to the

Center Court. Some survivors from Wedge 2 managed to escape through blown

* For a complete list of fatalities see Appendix A.

t Still another DoD employee, Herbert Homer, was killed when the plane on which he was a passenger,

American Airlines Flight 11, smashed into the World Trade Center.

See Appendix A.

24
The Deadly Strike

windows in the E Ring outer wall. On all floors and most rings a wooden construction barrier midway between Corridors 4 and 5, a temporary product of the

renovation, often prevented people in Wedge 1 from reaching Corridor 5 and

those in Wedge 2 from reaching Corridor 4V* In large measure, this particular

obstacle determined routes taken by many of the survivors. Other main escape

exits from the impact area were through Corridors 4 and 5 into A-E Drive from

the C Ring. Three openings in the C Ring wall between Corridors 4 and 5, one of

them the blown doors of the C-4 electrical vault, and a forced window at the 2nd

Floor level proved the salvation of many survivors from the 1st and 2nd Floors.

The holes into A-E Drive also made it possible for rescuers to enter the building and bring to safety lost and injured occupants who would otherwise have

perished.

For people in the immediate vicinity of impact and along the path of

destruction the first minutes brought surprise, disorientation, fear, panic, danger,

and death. For those spared annihilation, the first minutes began a grim, desperate struggle for survival. In the menacing darkness and smoke, fear for their lives

caused some to panic and cry out or scream; many prayed silently or aloud. Others, although frightened and expecting to die, did not panic and strove singlemindedly to find escape for themselves and their coworkers. Close to the crash,

bewildered and shaken men and women, their thought and senses clouded by

shock, had to function at whatever levels of instinct and willpower they retained.

They faced a host of instant hazards: utter darkness, toxic smoke, fire, immense

heat, piles of hot debris, collapsed ceilings and walls, live electric wires, blocked

exits and stairways, and the beginning of a structural collapse within the critical zone. Hardly any knew or guessed what had precipitated the appalling chaos

that had descended on them, even though most were aware of the crashes into the

Twin Towers little more than half an hour earlier.

In sections of the building as much as two or three corridors removed

from the Corridor 4 crash site, people could not help but notice the effect of

the impact-variously described as a loud noise, a sudden shudder of the structure, an explosion, a concussion, the firing of large guns. Most of the occupants

* The wooden construction barrier wall on all floors midway between Corridors 4 and 5 separated Wedge

1 from Wedge 2. Doors in most of the barrier walls permitted access to corridors on either side of a barrier, but they were often obscured by the smoke and most of the escapees from Wedge 2 turned toward

Corridor 5.

25
PENTAGON 9/11

in these areas departed in orderly fashion, some after encountering smoke and

obstacles. A number stayed behind to help rescue others. Army Major Craig Collier recalled that he and his colleagues remained in their office, 2C638, after the

plane hit:

Moments later the buildingjolted and we heard a muffled boom, then

a rumble. Some loose plaster and dust fell from the ceiling, but otherwise there was no other indication of what had just taken place about

200 feet away. All of my peers in the area are experienced combat arms

officers, and we quickly agreed that it sounded and felt like a bomb.

Most of us stayed in place watching the news and waiting for more

information as one or two officers walked out into the hallway to see

what was going on. Remarkably, my boss walked in and asked us what

was happening. He had been in the latrine next door and hadn't felt or

heard a thing. Within about 2 minutes the TV banner below the video

of the burning towers changed from "World Trade Center" to "Pentagon;' but before I could hear any of the details the word came to evacuate the building. Two of our female civilian secretaries bolted out of the

office but the rest of us took the time to calmly turn off computers, call

our wives, grab our bags, and exit.4

Away from the impact area, 1,000 and more feet removed, many occupants had no inkling that an attack had occurred and felt little or no immediate

effect. They heard the fire alarms, smelled smoke, and heeded instructions from

the Defense Protective Service (DPS) to leave the building. Unlike the skyscraping World Trade Center, the low-lying Pentagon's numerous exits to the outside and to the Center Court facilitated rapid evacuation; for most of the 20,000

inhabitants the evacuation proved orderly. Once outside the Pentagon no one

could miss the immense column of smoke rising from the crash site.

During the renovation sophisticated fire alarm and sprinkler systems had

been installed in Wedge 1. These operated initially after the attack, but many

were soon damaged or destroyed and ceased to work. Surviving sprinklers helped

limit the spread of the fire and toxic smoke and provided survivors much needed

relief from the great heat. The older alarm systems in the rest of the building had

false alarm and other functional failures. These systems included an automated

recorded message giving instructions to evacuate. A backup public address system, called "Big Voice;' complemented the automatic announcements by indicating the best escape route. Unfortunately the systems performed poorly. In

26
The Deadly Strike

some sections of the building workers heard no alarm at all or received a garbled

announcement. In Wedge 2 there were no sprinklers.5

Many occupants in the newly renovated Wedge 1 on the 1st and 2nd

Floors were not yet fully familiar with their new quarters. In windowless, blacked

out, and smoke-filled areas, disoriented, they had difficulty knowing where to

turn to find exits leading to safety. Even occupants of Wedge 2, more familiar

with their surroundings, found themselves at a loss in the smoke and darkness.

Knowledge of what happened to the hundreds of people in Wedges

1 and 2 and nearby areas most immediately affected by the explosion and fire

comes from an abundance of eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence. The

accounts of death and survival that follow are representative of the range of experiences endured by most of those unfortunate enough to find themselves in or

near the path of the exploding airliner.

Among those who actually saw Flight 77 hit the building, perhaps closest to the crash site were Air Traffic Controllers Sean Boger and Army Specialist

Jacqueline Kidd, in the air traffic control tower between the building and the Pentagon Heliport, from where they directed helicopter landings and departures. On

hearing the news of the crashes in New York, Boger wondered aloud, as he had

on other occasions, why no airliner had ever accidentally hit the Pentagon, given

its close proximity (approximately a mile) to Reagan National Airport. Moments

later, after Kidd had gone downstairs to the restroom, Boger, looking out the

window, saw "the nose and the wing of an aircraft just like coming right at us, and

he didn't veer.... I am watching the plane go all the way into the building." He

stared as the Boeing 757 "smacked into the building" less than 100 feet away.

When the plane exploded into the Pentagon, Boger "hit the floor and

just covered up" his head because he was "surrounded by glass:' As the tower's

alarms sounded and emergency lights flashed, he rose, yanked open the control

room door, and plunged down the stairs, jumping steps to avoid a clutter of ceiling tiles, light fixtures, and broken stair railings. On the ground floor he met Specialist Kidd, and the two ran from the scene. About 25 yards distant they fell to

the ground and turned to look at the conflagration that had set on fire their cars,

parked next to the tower.6 Inside the building, others in the path of the plane did

not have the opportunity to run.

27
PENTAGON 9/11

First Floor

On the 1st Floor of the E Ring and part of the D Ring, directly in the

path of the oncoming airliner, the U.S. Army's Resource Services-Washington (RSW) office, part of the Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, employing 65 to 70 people, managed money and personnel

for the headquarters staff. By 11 September two RSW divisions had moved from

their older, unrenovated offices to their new 1E400 area workplace. However, the

RSW director, longtime government employee RobertJaworski, and many of his

people from the personnel, financial management, and accounting staffs, had not

yet moved into their new spaces and were still working in the D Ring, Corridors

6 and 7 area, 500 feet or more removed from their colleagues.

In his 3D735 office Jaworski heard radio broadcasts of the World Trade

Center attacks. After the second airliner hit, Jaworski and his staff realized the

crashes were terrorist attacks; he remarked to one staff member visiting from the

new E Ring office that the Pentagon would be a likely target. Seconds laterJaworski heard the building shake and the sound of shattering glass-instant, staggering confirmation of his speculation. He and his nearby colleagues got up from

their desks, moved quickly down Corridor 7 to the A Ring, then to Corridor 9,

down the ramp into the Concourse, and out an exit leading to South Parking.

For the RSW staff in the E Ring, location determined their fate. Jaworski later observed sorrowfully that"they didn't have a chance:"Just two occupants

of one office along the inner side of that part of the E Ring survived, only because

they had stepped out to the restroom moments before the airliner slammed into

the building. None of their immediate office mates escaped. RSW's Program and

Budget Division, hit especially hard, lost 25 of its 28 members. Across the E Ring

hallway, along the outside wall of the building, the jet's impact proved almost as

lethal. Of the Managerial Accounting Division's 12 members present, only 3 survived. For these three the fireball and partial collapse of a wall almost proved their

undoing; not one escaped without injury. All told, 34 of the 40 members of the

Program and Budget and Managerial Accounting Divisions present that morning perished. 7

Among the six who survived, Sheila Moody was one of the luckiest.

Seated at her desk in 1E472, she heard a "whistling sound.... And then there

was a rumble, and a large gush of air and a fireball that came into the office and

28
"The Deadly Strike

just blew everything all over the place and knocked us over.' Trapped in "a lot of

smoke and just darkness," she could not see that the hole blown in the outer E

Ring wall was only a few feet away. Then, in the silence that had descended, she

heard the working of a fire extinguisher and a voice calling out. She called back

but "then the smoke and the fumes started taking my breath away, and I couldn't

really call out to him. So I started clapping my hands:' Her rescuer, Staff Sergeant

Chris Brahman, extinguished the flames between them and led her to the outside. Moody was hospitalized for burns to her hands that proved worse than she

initially realized.8

Two other survivors from the RSW offices, Juan Cruz Santiago and Louise Kurtz, were less fortunate than Sheila Moody. When the plane hit, Cruz was

thrown to his knees and engulfed by fire. Most of his body was scorched with second-, third-, and fourth-degree burns. Reduced to a state of semiconsciousness,

he became aware of water being poured over him and he vaguely perceived someone carrying him out of the building. As the initial shock wore off he experienced

excruciating pain. Hospitalized for three months, Cruz underwent nearly 30 surgical procedures, including skin grafts to his face, right arm, hands, and legs. He

was left with cruel damage to his face, eyes, and hands.9

Louise Kurtz was standing at a fax machine in her RSW office when, she

later recalled, she was "baked, totally.... I was like meat when you take it off the

grill:' In spite of her pain and shock she managed to crawl on top of a table and

through a window to the outside of the E Ring. She lapsed into unconsciousness in an ambulance and woke up in the hospital; doctors gave her a 50 percent chance of survival. After more than three months she left the hospital without her fingers and her ears, with multiple skin grafts, and with other severe

disabilities.'°

Another Army office under the administrative assistant to the secretary

of the Army, the Information Management Support Center (IMCEN) on the 1st

Floor, suffered six fatalities. Room 1E460 lay in the direct path of the airliner; its

three occupants-Michael Selves, Lieutenant Colonel Dean Mattson, and John

Chada-perished. Three other IMCEN employees-Teddington Moy, Robert

Maxwell, and Scott Powell, a contractor-died at other locations occupied by

IMCEN in the E Ring.'"

29
PENTAGON 9/11

More fortunate than her six fellow IMCEN employees was Specialist

April Gallop, in Room 1E517 in Wedge 2. On 11 September she brought her

two-month-old son Elisha to work with her because her babysitter had been

hospitalized. With Elisha in a stroller alongside her desk, Gallop sat in front of

a computer.'And as soon as I was about to turn the computer on, boom ... the

computer blew:' The walls and ceiling crumbled, and she found herself covered

in debris up to her waist. Frantically looking for her son in the smoke-darkened

room, with flames providing the only light, she saw that the stroller was on fire

but empty. Freeing herself from the debris, Gallop searched desperately for her

baby and found him covered up in the litter." He's in a ball, like that .... So I was

thinking, oh, my God, his bones are broken:'

Two of Gallop's office mates, Corporal Eduardo Bruno and Sergeant

Roxanne Cruz-Cortez, soon came to her aid after freeing themselves from the

rubble that had trapped them for a few minutes. They helped her climb over

the half-demolished office wall and passed the baby from hand to hand as they

moved toward an outside window in the E Ring that led to safety. Followed by

perhaps as many as 10 civilian workers, Bruno and Cruz-Cortez reached the window. Cruz-Cortez pushed and pulled two hysterical women to the window. The

baby was passed outside and the others followed, dropping one by one. Bruno,

although injured and later hospitalized, helped catch people dropping from the

window. Once on the outside Gallop lost consciousness. When she awoke in

George Washington University Hospital she called for her baby. Fortunately he

had survived without serious injury.12

Beyond the Army offices in Wedge 1, the newly opened Navy Command

Center (NCC) occupied a much larger space than the RSW offices between Corridor 4 and the wooden barrier midway between Corridors 4 and 5. Including

much of the D Ring and all of the C Ring, bridging the light well between the D

and C Rings, the center's area exceeded a third of an acre.

The Command Center tracked movements of U.S. Navy vessels and aircraft and monitored significant international events, keeping the chief of naval

operations and other senior Navy leaders informed of important developments.

The Watch Floor, focal point of the NCC, was staffed 24 hours a day. Seven

other offices shared the center's spaces with the Watch Floor. Five-foot-high

movable partitions separated most of the office cubicles. For meetings, includ30
The Deadly Strike

ing daily briefings during the workweek, a theater and conference room provided

larger spaces. Between 50 and 70 people were normally on duty during a workday. Although its near end was some 80 feet from the outer wall of the Pentagon,

the NCC had no real protection from the exploding airplane. In a matter of seconds it became an inferno of explosion, fires, and tangled wreckage that killed or

injured most of the occupants.13

At work in the Meteorology and Oceanography section of the center

on 11 September were the officer in charge and two petty officers. Early that

morning, Lieutenant Nancy McKeown, a former chief petty officer, gave a briefing on global weather patterns. After completing the morning briefing, McKeown returned to her office, where she and her two aerographers, Petty Officers

Edward Earhart and Matthew Flocco, watched as United Airlines Flight 175

struck the South Tower in New York City. Soon after, McKeown returned to her

own cubicle nearby and sat down. Almost immediately she heard a roaring crescendo of sound as ceiling tiles came down and she fell from her chair. It felt like

an earthquake (she had experienced quakes in Japan) and the roar became louder.

McKeown yelled"Bomb!" and dived under her desk; the office plunged into darkness and began to fill with smoke. Within moments the thunderous din subsided,

the smoke thickened, and she emerged from her now "deathly quiet" office calling

out for her two petty officers; there was no response. Only flickering lights overhead illuminated the "pitch black" space.

Disoriented, McKeown walked the wrong way, toward the path the jet

had taken through the building. Feeling the wall growing hotter, seeing visibility

dropping further, and finding breathing more difficult, McKeown turned around

and headed back toward her office, stopping momentarily under the spray of a

broken sprinkler line to ward off the intense heat. On spying a small bright spot

in the distance she moved toward it, eventually recognizing the glass doors at

the 4th Corridor entrance to the Command Center. Although the dense smoke

choked her, she somehow succeeded in gaining the attention of two rescuers who

took her into Corridor 4 and sat her down. Sputtering, McKeown told them that

"we had to go back in and get my two guys." She thought that one of the nearby

rescuers headed back into the center. As she awaited further assistance McKeown

"could hear people yelling, 'Don't jump! Don't jump!" Looking up, she could "see

... silhouettes falling from the second floor down. I don't know if they were jump31
PENTAGON 9/11

ing or falling.... All I could actually see was the silhouettes coming down and

... people kind of reaching up trying to grab people as they were coming down."

After reaching a triage center in North Parking, McKeown was transported by

ambulance to the nearby Arlington Urgent Care Center where she was treated

for smoke inhalation. Unfortunately, Petty Officers Earhart and Flocco did not

survive.14

Anotherjunior officer in the Command Center, Lieutenant Kevin Shaeffer, a 1994 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy who worked in the Strategy and

Concepts office, also watched the attacks on the Twin Towers on the center's

large-screen television sets. Shaken, Shaeffer returned to his cubicle, where he

stood and continued to watch over the tops of the partitions. Suddenly the walls

"exploded;' and "the next moment was just a gigantic fireball with obviously a ton

of force coming through the space' A "huge flash of fire" erupted with such force

it blew him to the floor.

Despite suffering grievous injuries Shaeffer never lost consciousness and

his actions remained purposeful. Realizing that his hair and skin were on fire, he

rolled around on the floor to put out the flames. In those same few seconds he

wiped his hands through his hair, and found it charred. When he managed to

stand up, smoke-filled air increasingly irritated his mouth and throat and limited what he could see. As far as he could tell, no one around him remained alive.

Aware that he was badly hurt, and neither hearing nor seeing anyone, he began

looking for a way out. Judging that the explosion had come from the E Ring, he

crawled in the opposite direction.

Piles of blown-down light fixtures, ceiling tiles, duct work, wiring, and

cubicle furniture made the going difficult, and Shaeffer resorted to crawling

under and over these heaps, cutting his badly burned hands. Following a zigzag

path he worked his way towards the back of the Command Center, where he saw

a dim light ahead. Gasping from the choking smoke, he crawled through rubble,

scaled more piles of wreckage, and finally staggered out into A-E Drive through a

hole blown in the C Ring wall. Later, he reckoned it had taken about five minutes

to crawl the roughly 70 feet to A-E Drive.

After receiving on-the-spot first aid, Shaeffer was transported to the

DiLorenzo Clinic in the 8th Corridor, from where he was carried outside on an

electric cart and taken by ambulance to Walter Reed Army Medical Center. His

32
The Deadly Strike

burns were so severe (over 42 percent of his body) that he was transferred to the

Washington Hospital Center where he underwent many weeks of painful treatment in the intensive care unit. After an ordeal of more than three months he was

able to leave the hospital. Having suffered permanent damage to his lungs and to

the right side of his body, Lieutenant Shaeffer was retired on medical disability."

In the Intelligence Plot section, tucked into a corner of the Command

Center in the C Ring, 13 people were present on the morning of 11 September.

This area was a SCIF (Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility), a highly

secured space containing especially sensitive classified materials. It lay almost

200 feet from the outer E Ring wall of the Pentagon and along the course taken

by Flight 77. The officer in charge, Commander Dan Shanower, and six coworkers had completed briefing Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence Susan Long

and members of her staff about 20 or 30 minutes before the impact. Also in the

Intelligence Plot that morning were six others: Lieutenant Commander Charles

Capets, using a computer on the Watch Floor alongside Lieutenant Megan

Humbert and Petty Officer of the Watch Jason Lhuillier, while Petty Officers

Steven Gully and Jesse Polasek and Seaman Sarah Cole worked in the adjoining

Graphics space."6

Lhuillier interrupted a meeting in Shanower's office to report the second

World Trade Center strike. A few minutes later, after returning to his desk, Lhuillier heard a"Kaboom;' and was thrown to the floor and under an adjacent desk.

Within seconds of the impact, as the fire intensified and the smoke thickened,

Lhuillier began to have difficulty breathing. Capets, visiting the Intelligence Plot

from his office on the 5th Floor, was present when the Watch Officer received

information that a hijacked aircraft was headed toward Washington. Thinking

that his boss should know, he picked up the phone to call when "this thing hit:"

Like Lhuillier he was flung to the floor of the wrecked office and experienced the

fire, heat, smoke, and darkness. After initial confusion and failed efforts to find an

exit, Capets saw the beckoning light from a hole blown open in the C Ring office

wall to A-E Drive and crawled toward it. Finding the office door jammed shut

by the explosion, Lhuillier followed Capets, scrambled over a barricade of office

equipment, and escaped with him through the same large hole. The two turned

back to pull Humbert to safety through a pile of debris. Capets and Lhuillier

assisted in frantic rescue efforts that helped survivors get out of the building into

33
PENTAGON 9/11

A-E Drive."7 For Shanower and his briefing team there was no escape. The rapid

spread of the fire and the deadly smoke quickly killed all of them.

Other survivors from the Intelligence Plot also had a close brush with

death. The force of the blast slammed Steven Gully into a huge copy machine,

knocking the wind out of him, "kind of like taking a head-on in football." Gully

recalled that "my smoothie [drink] went flying. I actually saw my smoothie fly

away from me, which you know ... was kind of surreal:' On extricating himself,

he scrambled through a hole in the C Ring wall to safety in A-E Drive. Polasek

remembered "a huge force throwing me from behind;' expelling him through a

hole into A-E Drive as he was still seated in his chair. Blown off her chair, Cole

landed in A-E Drive as well, dazed but only slightly injured. These 3, plus Capets,

Lhuillier, and Humbert, were the 6 survivors of the 13 Intelligence Plot occupants.'s All of the Navy's losses occurred in the Command Center-42 military

and civilian dead, including 3 contractor employees."9

The deadly force that ravaged the NCC penetrated the wooden barrier separating Wedge 2 from Wedge 1 and slammed into Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) offices where about 70 employees occupied a large space in

1C535. The remnants of Flight 77 ended the plane's path of death and destruction at the inner wall of the C Ring, adjacent to A-E Drive, claiming seven victims in 1C535, members of the DIA Program and Budget Office, who must have

died immediately.* Among the 11 survivors, Paul Gonzales, a former Navy officer

and chief of the office, later related that he could not "even describe the sound....

And then I got hit from behind by a blast of air and heat .... I remember looking

and just watching things go flying past me .... Just flying and I started flying with

them:" Although injured and burned, Gonzales remained alert and sought to find

survivors during what he remembered as a chaotic 20 or 25 minutes of frantically

seeking an escape route through the thick choking smoke, which forced the survivors low to the floor.2

"

Kathy Cordero, in the same office, felt "a real big gush of wind;' saw a"big

ball of ... red, orange fire;' and felt herself on fire. Gonzales came to her rescue.

With others they crawled under, over, and through the debris until they emerged

through a hole into A-E Drive from where they were led to the Center Court.

* Rosa Maria Chapa, Sandra Foster, Robert Hymel, Shelley Marshall, Patricia Mickley, Charles Sabin, and

Karl Teepe.

34
The Deadly Strike

Severely burned, Cordero was taken on a stretcher to North Parking and from

there to the Virginia Hospital Center in Arlington where she woke up six days

later in the intensive care unit. The ensuing surgery, including skin grafts, kept

her in the hospital for more than three weeks. Gonzales, badly hurt and suffering from severe lung damage, was taken to Walter Reed Hospital. He believed

that doctors used heroic measures to save him. After two weeks he was able to

go home to recuperate. Four of Gonzales's colleagues, including Cordero and

Christine Morrison, later testified that they owed their lives to his courageous

leadership.21

Christine Morrison gave a singularly striking description of her first

fleeting awareness of what happened:

From the back of the room there was a heat wave like haze extending

from the back of the room up to the ceiling .... You could see through

it. It was moving. Before I could register or complete that thought, this

force hit the room, instantly turning the office into an inferno hell.

Everything was falling, flying, and on fire, and there was no escaping it.

The swiftness and force has no comparison, my body mass didn't exist

and my body was useless. I was slam-dunked backward into another

co-worker's cubicle and a piece of a hot heating and ventilation duct

trapped the top half of me. I was stunned, desperately trying to do

something; I did not understand what was happening.

I felt the heat and I heard the sizzling of me. My eyes had a front

seat to the horror.... I couldn't move any part of my body.... Everyone

in our office area was struggling for breath and life.

The majority of the lights went out in an instant. Oxygen disappeared; my lungs felt like they were burning and collapsing. The room

filled with overpowering thick gaseous smoke with heavy particles

before you could get a chance to take the next breath.... Somehow I

was bartering for just one breath of air. I finally managed to stand up.

My mind was like sludge and thoughts took forever to form and

longer to reach the brain and even longer to make use of them. I was

barely able to think through what was a button and how to do a simple

function like unbuttoning each section of my blouse to get some relief

from the heat. We would later discover that the blast had shifted the

cubicles and blocked two of our exits. By then, everyone lost his or her 22 sense of direction.

Morrison finally managed to stand. The heat and the smoke drove her

back down to the floor where she lay for many minutes before she could manage

35
PENTAGON 9/11

to summon whatever willpower and strength she had left and begin crawling. She

saw an area ahead that appeared to be lighter; hearing someone say "over here:"

she went toward the sound. By now barefoot, somehow she managed to "navigate the wreckage;' finally emerging upright into A-E Drive after more than 20

minutes of horror. Suffering from head lacerations and smoke inhalation, Morrison was sent to the Virginia Hospital Center where she received treatment in the

intensive care unit.23

Second Floor

On the newly renovated 2nd Floor, the Office of the U.S. Army Deputy

Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) had just moved 275 people into a section of the C, D, and E Rings between Corridor 4 and the barrier halfway to Corridor 5. The senior officer, Lieutenant General Timothy Maude, and his immediate staff occupied a large expanse in the E Ring with windows facing west toward

Arlington Cemetery.

Most of the DCSPER space, across the hall from General Maude's office,

held a"bay" of cubicles that extended through the C Ring, adjacent to A-E Drive.

From the E Ring to the windows overlooking A-E Drive, the DCSPER occupied an area of about an acre. The common area held 138 cubicles with five-foothigh partitions for military and civilian personnel serving in two directoratesMilitary Personnel Management and Plans, Resources and Operations. The bay

also included a conference room, enclosed offices, spaces for contractors, and four

copier areas. Occupants entered the office spaces through three doors-two leading from the 4th Corridor on the south, and one from the E Ring hallway; they

could leave the area through three staircases, one in each of the F, D, and C Rings

at the Corridor 4 end of the office. Restrooms lay outside the space, along Corridor 4.

General Maude was meeting with eight members of his staff (including

three contractors)* in his conference room along the windowed outer wall of the

Pentagon when Flight 77 smashed into the building almost immediately below

that exact point. The impact penetrated the 2nd Floor slab, scattering lethal

* Major Ronald Milam, Sergeants Major Larry Strickland and Lacey Ivory, civilians Gary Smith and Max

Beilke, and contractors Gerald Fisher, Terence Lynch, and Ernest Willcher. (Historical Project Notes, Individuals in DCSPER Conference Room, 11 September 2001, OSD Hist.)

36
The Deadly Strike

debris throughout the area; Maude and his colleagues probably died instantly or

within a short time after impact.2 4

A huge conflagration* spread quickly in the DCSPER area. The Jet A

fuel atomized and quickly combusted, causing explosive bursts as the plane hurtled into the building. A detonation 150 feet inside the building resulted from a

"fuel-air" explosion after the Jet A tanks disintegrated on impact. Here, as elsewhere, there was no uniform pattern of death and destruction. The vagaries of

the fuel-air explosions and freakish blast effects meant deaths occurred randomly

inside the Pentagon, with the occupants of seemingly more secure interior offices

sometimes suffering worse fates than those nearer the outside wall.2 5

Although the Army and Navy offices on the 1st Floor bore the brunt

of the kinetic energy created by the aircraft striking the building, the DCSPER

2nd Floor offices also felt its effects as an immense upward force penetrated the

reinforced concrete floors of the bays. These offices suffered chiefly from the fuel

explosion and fire. Some notion of the intense heat in the 2nd Floor offices may

be gained from the experience of Librarian of the Army Ann Parham, who had

resumed work in the bay after watching television coverage of the second airliner striking the World Trade Center. Fortunately, she had stepped away from

her desk in 2D470 to send a fax to the library at Fort Benning, Georgia, and was

returning to her office when the plane hit. A colleague in a nearby space, Marian

Serva, was killed while seated at her desk. Recalling her own predicament, Parham described the heat as suffocating and the smoke-filled air as so dense that it

"felt like I was in London and I actually had thought that I was in London and

this was a very foggy ... night: Through the gloom, office furnishings appeared

shapeless. Worse, she was coated by a mist of foul-smelling, dangerous Jet A fuel.

The fireball caused flash burns on her face and hands, her eyes were burning, and

a flaming ceiling tile burned off a two-inch swath of hair. With help she made her

way out of the bay and to the River Entrance and out of the building. When she

arrived at the Alexandria Hospital in a Defense Protective Service car, still wearing her plastic Pentagon identification badge, she realized it had curled in the

heat from the fire. Doctors attended to her burns and a lacerated foot and broken toe.

26

* This might more properly be termed a deflagration-a chemical process burning extremely rapidly and

producing intense heat, flames, and sparks.

37
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7The Deadly Strike

As with many other people in the Pentagon, for Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Zappalla the morning's main event was the attack in New York City. Still

watching television in the 2nd Floor C Ring office of his absent civilian supervisor, Raymond Robinson, he felt the impact shake the building. Seated in Robinson's chair, Zappalla suffered a blow on the head from falling ceiling tiles and was

thrown against a wall. Dazed but otherwise unhurt, he arose and got out of the

office, swearing he would never again sit in his boss's chair. On emerging from the

office Zappalla saw fire coming toward him from the E Ring. Abruptly the flames

changed direction, veering to the right in the direction of Corridor 5. Disoriented, he blundered about until he heard voices through the smoke that directed

him to Corridor 4; from there rescuers assisted him to the A Ring, where he went

first to the Center Court and then to South Parking.27

For two civilians and two noncommissioned officers the erratic path of

the fire proved their salvation. Tracy Webb, Dalisay Olaes, Specialist Michael

Petrovich, and Sergeant First Class Michael Weaver all worked in 2E477. Seated

across from one another in a quartet of cubicles, they heard radio reports of the

attacks in New York. Shortly thereafter, as the floor beneath them shuddered and

fractured, they heard a bang followed by an explosion. Olaes felt her hair burn as

the fire passed through the office. Screams of surprise and pain from other office

occupants filled the air; furniture blew about and a blizzard of papers surged

around them. Petrovich looked for Webb and Olaes, but could find only Olaes

in the smoke. The pair crawled below the smoke outward toward the E Ring

exit, but when Petrovich felt the door hot to the touch and saw an orange glow

radiating from under it, they turned around and headed inward towards the C

Ring. Weaver, after seeing the fireball pass, initially headed towards the E Ring

door as well, found it impassable, and escaped by going toward the inside of the

building.28

As the fireball roared through her area, Tracy Webb turned to escape the

flames, which had set her hair afire. Batting out the fire in her hair, she saw Petrovich and Olaes heading towards the nearby E Ring exit and tried to follow, only to

become lost among the cubicles and unable to find her way. Without realizing it,

she was moving northward toward the D Ring exit. Confused, and with little to

guide her in the increasing gloom of the office, Webb panicked and stood up only

to feel the heat and smoke sear her lungs as she tried to breathe. Sinking to the

39
PENTAGON 9/11

floor, she was convinced she was about to die. Fortunately her desperate attempt

to stand had brought her to the attention of Major Regina Grant, who had fled

from 2E487 where she had been attending a meeting. Convinced, too, that her

end was near, Grant had given up moving and had started praying when she spotted Webb trying to stand. Grant crawled over, grabbed at Webb's clothing, and

pulled her down to the floor. Grant's anguished cry for help was heard by Sergeant Major Tony Rose, who had been helping people out of the large DCSPER

bay area. Rose had been knocked down by the blast and had gotten out of his

C Ring cubicle to join others in leading survivors out of the bay to safety. When

Rose answered Grant's cry, Grant and Webb followed the sound of his voice,

staggered over to Corridor 4, and met up with him. They escaped down the corridor into the Center Court.

At the moment of impact, Dr. Betty Maxfield, an Army demographer

who had come from her office at 2B659, stood at Tracy Webb's desk talking

about personnel matters. Maxfield remembered "a fireball went passing through

the area in which I [was] standing.... And everything went black.... The smoke

was very, very dense. And the burning ceiling tiles began to drop on us like hot

cinder balls ... . The only damage to me personally was that the hair on my

arms ... [was] burned:' After turning back from the direction of the E Ring, she

dropped to the floor and joined a chain of crawling people, some of whom were

crying and screaming. In two separate groups, one led by Petrovich, the crawlers

reached the C Ring windows at A-E Drive several minutes apart.29

For Olaes, Webb, Petrovich, Weaver, and Maxfield, their good fortune

came about because the Jet A fuel had largely passed over their heads without

exploding. Army people further inside the building were not so lucky. Explosions on the 1st Floor directed energy upward with such force that they ripped

and "buckled and penetrated" the concrete deck of the 2nd Floor."' Four soldiers

from the Officer Accession and Sustainment Branch* were killed in their cubicles by one of these detonations and the thick toxic smoke and immense heat that

accompanied it.

Elsewhere in DCSPER, 12 officers and civilians assembled for a regular

biweekly meeting at 9:00 a.m. in Conference Room 2E487, along the inside of

* Lieutenant Colonels David Scales and Karen Wagner, Chief Warrant Officer William Ruth, and Sergeant First Class Jose Orlando Calderon-Olmedo.

40
"Ibe Deadly Strike

the E Ring. Seated around a table or along the walls were Colonels Philip McNair

and Larry Thomas; Lieutenant Colonels Robert Grunewald, Dennis Johnson,

Marion Ward, Curtis Nutbrown, and Marilyn Wills; Majors Regina Grant

and Stephen Long; and civilians Max Beilke, Martha Carden, and Lois Stevens.

Beilke* left early to attend General Maude's meeting and was killed. Because the

previous meeting had been postponed, this one in 2E487 ran long, so that at 9:37

a.m. none of the participants knew of the World Trade Center attacks.3

"

As Marilyn Wills was making her report to the group, Flight 77 struck.

One attendee later remembered seeing a fireball behind Carden at the north

end of the table; then the lights went out and parts of the ceiling came down at

Carden's end as well. Several conferees in the room, including McNair, shouted to

get down on the floor below the smoke that filled the room. Grunewald called out

to Carden, and when she "yelled, help ... [he] said, Martha, I'm going to come get

you ... and dove over the table:' Most of those in the room turned to the exit that

opened into the E Ring hallway, near where Johnson and Carden had been seated.

Wills found the door to the flame-engulfed hallway, but it was locked, so the participants reversed direction and headed out into the DCSPER office bay.32

The bay was dark and eerily quiet. In the smoke and great heat, they

quickly split into smaller groups, each seeking to find the best way out by crawling below the smoke. Holding on to Grunewald's belt, Carden followed him into

the bay towards Corridor 4. Grunewald, the most familiar with the area, cleared

debris from their path through the office. With others following, Grunewald and

Carden continued crawling, the officer encouraging his companion to keep moving. Competing with his words was the recurring sound of the Pentagon alarm

system, repeating, 'Attention, a fire emergency has been declared in the building. Please evacuate:' As Grunewald and his followers traversed the full length

of the bay the overhead sprinklers began spraying. Shortly thereafter Grunewald

realized he was no longer on carpeting but on the tile floor of Corridor 4 at the

C Ring exit. The pair stood up and headed inward toward the A Ring. Subsequently, Grunewald went back into the stricken area at the C Ring to look for

other survivors, but the roiling black smoke that discouraged even crawling along

the floor forced him to turn back. Carden was escorted to safety in the Cen-

* As an Army master sergeant in 1973, Beilke had had the distinction of being the last U.S. serviceman to

depart Vietnam, other than Marine guards and military attaches at the American Embassy in Saigon, following the Paris peace agreement that concluded the Vietnam War.

41
PENTAGON 9/11

ter Court, followed shortly after by Grunewald. They made their way out of the

building to North Parking. Both later received hospital treatment. Carden later

said: "I absolutely could not have done it. Rob literally saved my life"'"

Fortunately, most of the others in the conference room also managed

to escape. Carden especially was lucky, as her office (2D460) was opposite the

E Ring hallway, where she would have been instantly killed at her desk, as were

most of her colleagues. McNair and the other escapees got out into Corridor 4

and headed for the inside of the building. As previously noted, Major Grant met

up with Tracy Webb, and the two followed Sergeant Major Tony Rose to safety.

Sadly, one pair did not reach safety. Johnson and Long got out of the conference

room only to perish in the E Ring near the bay's exit door after becoming trapped

in the inferno there. They may have taken the wrong turn, as several staircases

around the DCSPER spaces were blocked and inaccessible because the fuel-fed

fire had already spread over two floors.3 4

Another group from the meeting had an equally harrowing experience.

Wills and Lois Stevens began crawling toward the back of the bay. They feared

they would collapse from the smoke until a sprinkler doused them with water,

soaking their clothes and allowing them to use some of the clothes as filters. At

one point Wills carried another woman on her back as she crawled. Wills, Stevens, and later Maxfield followed McNair and crawled through the darkness and

smoke to the back of the office bay next to A-E Drive where they found Specialist

Petrovich and Dalisay Olaes at the windows.3

"

Petrovich and Olaes had reached the 2nd Floor windows overlooking

A-E Drive several minutes before McNair, Wills, Stevens, and Maxfield arrived.

Finding no way to open one of the renovated windows, Petrovich had picked up

a nearby laser printer and begun hammering away at the already bowed window

and its twisted steel frame. Joined in the effort by McNair, who got on the sill and

used his feet to push out the frame, the two finally managed to create a humansize opening. McNair and Petrovich then lifted Stevens to the window ledge and

lowered her out of the opening, not letting go of her wrists until she had only

a short distance to fall into the arms of catchers below. Stevens did not realize

she had a broken foot until she was let down on the ground. The military and

civilian rescuers in A-E Drive cushioned her fall, then did the same with Maxfield and Olaes; the latter sustained a broken leg. Petrovich, who had begun to

42
The Deadly Strike

experience trouble breathing, slipped down next with McNair's help. Wills and

McNair repeatedly called out for additional survivors. Finding none, the colonel

lowered Wills to the driveway and then dropped down the wall to safety. Suffering from burns and smoke inhalation, Petrovich eventually reached Walter Reed

Army Medical Center where he spent several days in treatment. Also at Walter

Reed, Wills received extended treatment for similar injuries and a frozen shoulder. Olaes underwent an operation on her leg at Virginia Hospital Center. Stevens, too, spent the night being treated in the hospital.3 6

The last man out of the large DCSPER bay was probably the luckiest.

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Beans had been watching the television set next to

Marian Serva's desk. Turning away from the view of the World Trade Center, he

recalled he had moved about 20 feet toward his cubicle in 2D470 when he heard

and felt a"loud concussion" and was thrown on the floor. The lights went out and

in the dark room Beans could see small fires burning around him. He tried to

escape through the nearby E Ring door, only to see fireballs rolling down the corridor. He hurriedly shut the door and turned back into the bay, crawling below

the dense smoke. Part way through the bay the sprinklers began spraying water

on him and he heard the automated system announcing the fire. He crawled

slowly and painfully to the C Ring wall where he wielded a chair in a vain attempt

to smash one of the windows overlooking A-E Drive. Beans then decided to try

to reach Corridor 4 and crawled through C Ring as fast as he could. When he felt

the tile floor of Corridor 4, he paused to catch his breath, and then got up and

ran for the safety of the A Ring. As the smoke cleared, he spotted a DPS officer

motioning him toward an exit into the Center Court. From there he was taken

to the Pentagon's DiLorenzo Clinic and then to the Virginia Hospital Center for

treatment of wounds and burns.37

Overcoming pervasive confusion from the suddenness of the attack, the

cataclysmic and unpredictable nature of the fire, and the lack of visibility brought

on by the choking smoke, most of DCSPER's office workers evacuated speedily and helped each other as best they could. Individually or in small groups

they managed to improvise escape routes. Although many of its people escaped,

DCSPER suffered 29 military and civilian (including 4 contractor employees)

dead and 27 injured.38

43
PENTAGON 9/11

Another Army work area, adjacent to DCSPER on the 2nd Floor, the

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (2E486), also

sustained casualties. Lieutenant Colonel Brian Birdwell,* a field artilleryman, had

left his desk to use the Corridor 4 restroom. As he was returning to his office he

heard a "very loud explosion." He was still in Corridor 4 when a fireball enveloped him and flung him onto his back. Birdwell tastedjet fuel vapor and suffered

severe burns over much of his body. Soon he felt cool water on his face as the

ceiling sprinklers came on, providing him a measure of relief and hope. Dazed,

he struggled to stand up and managed to stagger down the corridor toward the

B Ring until he collapsed again. This time he was seen by Colonel Roy Wallace,

Colonel Karl Knoblauch, and others who, after securing emergency treatment

for Birdwell, carried him to a nearby triage point from where he was evacuated

to Georgetown University Hospital in Washington and later to the Washington Hospital Center. Although he could not have imagined it during his agonizing ordeal, Birdwell was lucky. Had he been in his office he would not have survived. Two people who were in his office, Cheryle Sincock and Sandra Taylor,

were killed.39

Third Floor

Before 11 September the Directorate of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, an

element of the Army's Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans,

had moved into a large area of Wedge 1 in the vicinity of the E Ring and Corridor 4 on the 3rd Floor. The director, Major General John Wood, and his immediate staff had offices in the E Ring, 3E450, looking out on the Heliport. When

Flight 77 struck the building the concussion blew Wood out of his chair and onto

the floor. Outside his bulging windows, he could see flames; smoke began filling

the office. Unable to open his jammed office door he frantically pounded on it.

Fortunately his deputy, Brigadier General Karl Eikenberry, who had been thrown

against the wall of his own office, was alerted to his boss's plight by the screams

of Linda Moore, Wood's secretary. Unable to open the door manually, Eikenberry

lay down on the floor and kicked it in, freeing Wood from what would have been

certain death.4°

* See also Chapter I11.

44
The Deadly Strike

Wood, Eikenberry, and others emerged into the blackness of E Ring,

where the floor had already buckled. Uncertain about escape routes, after some

false starts they turned into Corridor 4, collecting people from offices as they

went, urging them on toward the A Ring through the thickening smoke. Eikenberry and several other officers remained behind for a time in the C Ring to assist

others. The group made their way to the Center Court, where they encountered

what Wood described as "pandemonium:' Instructed shortly after to leave the

building because of warning of an anticipated second attack, they made their way

to South Parking and beyond.4'

Unfortunately, in an office next to Wood's, there were two fatalitiesMajor Wallace Hogan, executive officer to Major General Philip Kensinger, assistant deputy chief of staff for operations and plans, and the general's secretary,

Diane Hale-McKinzy. The freakish shock wave spared Wood but not Hogan and

Hale-McKinzy. Their bodies were found on the 1st Floor. Both died of multiple

blunt force injuries and smoke inhalation. 2

Fourth Floor

On the 4th Floor, above the direct impact area in Wedge 1, occupants of

the Marine Corps Office of the General Counsel counted themselves fortunate

that they did not suffer the fate of Army and Navy offices on the floors below.

General Counsel Peter Murphy, in Room 4E468, remembered hearing a "huge

noise, louder than any noise I've ever heard before" He was standing with his

back to the window that looked out on the Heliport when he felt himself lifted

and "tossed" perhaps 15 feet to the other side of his office. He saw a huge fireball

at the window and the ceiling started to fall in. He observed the wall move, "actually.., moved in several inches. But the windows just stood absolutely tall and

never splintered, never cracked, nothing:' Murphy's deputy, Robert Hogue, and

MajorJoe Baker were also thrown to the floor, Unlike most other survivors, Murphy and his companions "were pretty certain it was a plane and it was a terrorist:' even though they had not seen the plane coming in. They had been watching

the attack on the Twin Towers and had speculated about such an attack on the

Pentagon.

The office began filling with smoke. The office administrative clerk, Corporal Timothy Garofola, succeeded after a few minutes in forcing open the heavy

45
PENTAGON 9/11

office door, which had jammed, and the four men emerged into the hall. After

making certain that their other offices were clear of people, they made their way

to Corridor 4, noticing flames coming up through the floor seams. Through the

black smoke they heard "Follow my voice. Follow my voice." Crouched low, they

made their way to the A Ring and from there to the 2nd Floor. After rejecting going to the Center Court and failing to get through to North Parking, they

emerged into South Parking. Murphy recollected that "once we got down to the

second deck there were now hundreds and hundreds of people all going in different directions. Most, very disciplined and moving quick and not running, but

moving quickly."43

Elsewhere on the 4th Floor the damage was immediately evident. Commander Joan Zitterkopf, a Navy helicopter pilot assigned to a training aircraft

redesign group, was standing at her desk in 4C453 at the moment of impact.

Actually standing astride one of the Pentagon's expansion joints, Zitterkopf felt

the shift of the seam between her feet and later remembered "one foot going up

and it felt like one foot going down:' She toppled and fell. The bright orange fireball she saw through a window left no doubt in her mind that the Pentagon was

under attack.

Recovering her balance, Zitterkopf joined colleagues in filing out of the

office. Black smoke from the fuel fire spewed down Corridor 4 toward them.

One of the Pentagon's new automatic smoke and fire suppression doors began to

close across the corridor, adding to her anxiety. These doors had not been demonstrated to Pentagon occupants, nor had their override switches been made

known to them; the corridor barriers deployed automatically to limit the spread

of smoke and fire. This one threatened to block Zitterkopf's exit. She instinctively ran to the door and somehow tripped the override switch, locking it open to

permit escape from the smoke-filled side of the door. Keeping up their pace along

the corridor, the evacuees walked down the escalators in the A Ring and eventually reached the safety of North Parking.44

Fifth Floor

There were no fatalities on the 5th Floor, but only because the occupants

of the E Ring offices managed to fight their way out before the floor, directly

above the impact zone, collapsed. Fortunately, because the 5th Floor was fur46
Ibe Deadly Strike

thest removed from the lower floors' inferno, they had more time to get away. The

largest and best organized group that escaped, 30 Navy civilian employees of the

Surface Warfare Group from Crane, Indiana, had come to Washington as part

of an industrial management course. Shortly after 9:00 a.m. they were attending a briefing by Under Secretary of the Navy Susan Livingstone in 5E490. As

she began answering questions after the conclusion of her remarks, the attendees

felt the building lurch and saw a light fixture and ceiling tiles fall as smoke began

spilling from air vents. Captain Dennis Kern, Livingstone's executive assistant,

had a vivid recollection of a "very loud explosion" that "rocked the room:' He likened it to the sudden jolt of an earthquake. Livingstone instinctively exclaimed

"there has been a terrorist event .... And we need to evacuate and get out of here:'

She and Kern then led the way out of the room to seek escape from the building.

Kern was the only one who knew the 5th Floor layout.45

Because none of the offices on the floor had windows facing the outside of the building, neither the meeting participants nor the occupants of other

offices in the E Ring had a clear notion of what had happened. While these offices

were not seriously damaged, light fixtures had dropped from the ceiling and hung

loosely from their cables, and broken acoustic ceiling tiles lay across the floor in

the corridor, adding to the uncertainty of movement. As moments passed the air

filled with the black smoke spewing from the ventilators, making it hard to see

and breathe.46

When Livingstone and Kern tried to descend the same staircase that

they had used to get to the meeting, they found the way blocked. Later inspection

revealed that the explosion had made the stairwell into a chimney full of smoke

and flames. Unable to get through to Corridor 5 because of the wooden construction barrier wall across the E Ring near the conference room, Livingstone

and Kern turned back toward Corridor 4, encountering some 15 people who had

emerged into the hallway from another Navy office. One of this group, Gail Wirick, customarily used a motorized wheelchair to move about the Pentagon. This

time, with the help of two colleagues, she used a walker to evacuate her office.*

The group, grown to almost 50 people, pushed on in its search for a way OUt.47

* Some disabled workers needed help to escape. On the 4th Floor, departing Navy workers encountered a

disabled custodian with limited language comprehension. Clearly disoriented by the alarm and smoke, she

had to be escorted out of the building.

47
PENTAGON 9/111

When another effort to use a staircase in the direction of Corridor 5

proved futile, Livingstone and Kern concluded that the route toward Corridor 4

offered the only escape and reversed direction in the E Ring once again, encountering a drop of about eight inches in the floor at the major building expansion

joint next to the area that later collapsed. Livingstone warned those behind her

of the downward "step"; the warning was passed down the line. At this point, the

evacuees were walking directly over the impact area hit by the airliner minutes

earlier. The drop traced the line of an expansion joint of the building where the

upper four floors were nearing collapse because of the loss of supporting columns

below. Almost 40 minutes after the initial impact, that section of the E Ring collapsed. Pressing forward, many holding hands by this time, the group turned into

Corridor 4. Sam Cardenas and Laurie Burrow helped Gail Wirick negotiate the

full distance. Without their support Wirick would have been unable to manage

on her own with her walker, which she eventually abandoned. 48

As the group emerged into Corridor 4 the smoke became so black and

dense it forced them to crawl, still hanging on to one another. Low to the floor

along Corridor 4 and scarcely able to see their way, they could feel the heat from

the burning floor below. Unexpectedly, they heard a voice calling through the

black smoke, "Is anybody back there?" Kern, still in the lead, returned the hail and

asked the caller to keep yelling so that the group could move in his direction. The

caller, Commander Dan Braswell, had gotten out of his office, 5D453, into Corridor 4, immediately after impact. He and some fellow officers "looked to the left

and realized hey, there's nobody coming from the E Ring yet. So we started yelling

back there." Braswell urged the Livingstone group to continue moving and drew

their attention to an emergency strobe light flashing from a place of relative safety.

As the smoke thinned to a gray haze, the evacuees stood up. When Kern saw a

fire and smoke suppression door closing across the 4th Corridor, threatening to

block their path out of the building, he quickly leapt forward, smashed it back

against the wall, and held it open. After the group passed that point, the smoke

in the air thinned, and they emerged into the A Ring. Livingstone and Kern, separated from the rest of the group, descended to the 1st Floor, where, instead of

exiting into the Center Court, they made their way to the Concourse and out to

South Parking. The Crane group, still pretty much together, also left the building

48
The Deadly Strike

and reached South Parking. Using verifiable time references, members concluded

that their harrowing journey had taken about 15 minutes.4 9

Along with thousands of other evacuees the Crane group had to move

further away from the building when warning of a second aircraft attack on the

Pentagon before the collapse at 10:15 a.m. led to orders to evacuate the crash site

and the vicinity. In North and South Parking, evacuees were pushed further and

further back until they were hundreds of yards away.50

Concern for others, particularly in the area most affected by the impact,

was almost universally reflected in the anxiously repeated efforts by office leaders and staff members to account for all of their colleagues. They checked and

rechecked to ensure that all known to them had gotten out safely. Once outside,

they searched among the milling crowds until they accounted for all of their people. Some went back into the building in an effort to get a complete tally. Sadly,

they had to accept that not all had reached safety.

Within minutes of the crash, the toll of Pentagon occupants dead and

injured stood distressingly high. In addition to the 124 killed, not counting

the Army employee who died of injuries days later, the Arlington County Fire

Department reported that of the 106 victims transported to hospitals, 49 were

admitted.* For those in the impact area lucky enough to escape, finding a route

out of the building afforded the key to survival. This was especially so for those in

the newly refurbished Army and Navy offices on the 1st and 2nd Floors as well

as those on the upper floors. Both military and civilians, in spite of their fear and

confusion in the chaos that engulfed them, displayed uncommon courage and

comradeship in assisting one another to escape the stricken building.

* The others were treated and released. About a hundred more received treatment for minor injuries on site.

For injured disposition see Chapter V; for causes of death see Chapter VIII.

49
CHAPTER III

The Rescuers

There could not have been as many survivors of the attack on the Pentagon without the persistent and selfless acts of others-military and civilianwho were themselves caught in the maelstrom or came unhesitatingly from elsewhere in the building to respond to the desperate circumstances facing the many

victims trapped in the wreckage. The suddenness and split-second penetration

of the attack, followed by the instantaneous havoc wrought in the stricken area,

allowed no time for organized rescue efforts. Necessarily, much of the assistance

rendered by rescuers came from the improvised action of individuals or small

groups. Men and women from within the devastated area-themselves directly

threatened by fire, smoke, and explosive force-provided the leadership, encouragement, and physical assistance that enabled hundreds of shaken and injured

people to escape death. From elsewhere in the building outside the immediately

affected area, daring rescuers, with a minimum of equipment and relying only

on their knowledge of the building and sheer will, plunged into the smoke and

debris of corridors and offices to seek out bloodied and burned survivors and

deliver them from the inferno. Others entered the burning E Ring from outside

the building and helped victims they described as "charred" to reach safety. Using

flashlights and voice direction they showed lost and disoriented wanderers the
"7he Rescuers

way of escape. Some, perhaps many of the rescuers, risked their own lives or, at

the very least, injury.

Almost all of the successful rescues of survivors occurred within the first

half hour after the attack. For all the daring acts, in some instances, especially subsequent to the initial response, the large numbers of impatient military and civilian volunteers seeking to engage in independent actions compounded confusion

and impeded the work of the firefighters. When the first fire companies arrived

only minutes after the impact to assist in the rescue efforts, they found volunteers

searching for survivors in parts of the building near the impact site. The firefighters ordered them to leave the building because they were not trained or equipped

to deal with the dangerous conditions they encountered.

As the volunteers were forced to abandon the search, they congregated

outside at the Heliport, in the Center Court, and in A-E Drive. They organized

into groups to assist medical and firefighting efforts however they might. Some

teams served as stretcherbearers; others lined up ready to follow the firefighters

into the building and bring out survivors. Their impatience was reined in when

the collapse of the ruptured E Ring made it clear that what remained to be done

was a job for professionals.

Fully engaged in directing Emergency Medical Service (EMS) efforts,

Assistant Fire Chief John White found that his primary challenge was managing the mass of eager helpers during the morning. Anxious to assist, volunteers

of all ranks donned gloves, handled IV bags, grabbed backboards, and provided

other services. At one point, feeling that the professional emergency responders

were not doing everything they should, some volunteers tried to get back into the

building; Defense Protective Service officers helped the firefighters block them.

In the Center Court, Arlington Fire Battalion Chief Jerome Dale Smith stopped

a squad of Marines from marching into the building. Luckily, the officer leading the squad cooperated. Fort Myer firefighter Sergeant Thomas Hodge understood the volunteers' desire to reenter the building but knew they could not help

and would only put others in jeopardy. The last thing the firefighters needed was

"another victim' When Major General James Jackson, commander of the Military District of Washington (MDW), arrived about noon, he saw the need to "get

some kind of cohesive unit in here, specifically the Old Guard" (3rd Infantry Regiment) from Fort Myer and to move the volunteers out of the way.'

51
PENTAGON 9/11

On receiving reports from his officers that throngs of volunteers were

impeding the firefighters and EMS workers, Incident Commander James

Schwartz, assistant chief of the Arlington County Fire Department, left the command post to investigate. When he encountered an Army brigadier general and a

line of soldiers protected only by thin dust masks preparing to go into the Pentagon he confronted them. Asserting command of the site, he ordered that all nonemergency people be prevented from going inside the building. Schwartz believed

the order saved the life of one defiant soldier seeking to enter who got into a scuffle with firefighters shortly before the E Ring collapsed. He later explained that

while he respected the "truly heroic" efforts of the civilian and military rescuers,

such "freelancing" was inexcusable and could lead to death and injury. 'And that's

what we were trying to stave off'2 Still, the early efforts of Pentagon volunteer

rescuers, the very first responders, undoubtedly saved the lives of many, probably

most, who would otherwise have perished.

Close by the unfortunate Defense Intelligence Agency office in the C

Ring of Wedge 2 was a clutch of Army offices including the Quadrennial Defense

Review (QDR) Office.* The Army QDR people in 1D536, although closer to

the outside of the building than the DIA group, did not suffer the full brunt of

the impact because the plane's angle of approach skirted the D Ring in Wedge 2

but penetrated the C Ring. Still, the effect on the D Ring offices was life-threatening. The shock wave blew people over, caused walls and ceilings to collapse, and

flung furniture about. The rubble, fires, and dense smoke threatened to thwart

the occupants' frantic struggles to escape. Members of the QDR office who managed to get out testified to the generally calm and purposeful behavior of their colleagues in effecting the rescue of most of those in the office. Most of the officers

there possessed command experience and were trained to deal with emergencies,

albeit not this particular one. Colonels Mark Perrin and Sean Kelly and Captain

Darrell Oliver, the last initially rendered unconscious for a time by a blow to the

head, led others out of the badly damaged, smoke-filled area. Twice Oliver carried

frightened people on his back, scaling debris and climbing over a ruined office

wall. The first was the office secretary, who had been blown from one office into

another and covered by debris. He described her as "not emotionally able to get

over that wall .... I didn't have time to debate with Desire6, so I said, hey, just get

* The QDR is a recurring Department of Defense four-year report required by Congress.

52
/1e Rescuers

on my back.... I took her and threw her on my back and scaled the wall and there

... [were] two walls at 45 degree angles-the walls just collapsed:' After passing

his burden to Lieutenant Colonel William Delaney, Oliver returned and carried

a second person, this time a frightened man, on his back over the wall and to an

exit. Meanwhile, Perrin assisted others and sought to account for all of his people. Once over the wall, the survivors made their way into the E Ring and down

Corridor 5 toward the exit to the outside. Unfortunately, two members of the

QDR office-Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Dickerson and Staff Sergeant Maudlyn

White-did not escape.'

In A-E Drive a group of approximately 20-civilians and Army, Marine,

Navy, and Air Force officers and enlisted men-mounted dangerous but successful rescue efforts. Two of the group, Marine Lance Corporals Dustin Schuetz

and Michael Vera, had come from their office, 4E487, above the crash site in

an unrenovated part of the 4th Floor in Wedge 2. The two young Marines were

discussing the attack on the World Trade Center when Flight 77 hit the building. The blast knocked Schuetz to the floor and slammed Vera and his chair

into a wall where his books and manuals fell on him. Undeterred, the two collected themselves, helped their panicked and confused colleagues evacuate the

offices down Corridor 5, and pointed them the way to leave the building. As Vera

described it, "myself and Cpl. Schuetz, we just, I guess, did a telepathic connection or whatever you want to call it ... and without thinking we went back to the

site and started helping people out." After looking into E Ring offices for injured

victims they ran to the 1st Floor and A-E Drive, where they joined a group that

included a party of five sailors from the Navy staff's security detachment, several Marine officers, three or four Army soldiers, and perhaps five to eight civilians. Responding to screams and pleas for help from trapped victims, the rescuers entered the dense smoke and fumes and the flames of the C Ring through the

holes in the wall with only rudimentary equipment-handheld fire extinguishers, a single flashlight, and shirts dampened in the ankle-deep water in A-E Drive

for use as face masks against the suffocating smoke. The only illumination other

than from the flashlight came from the flames.

Because of the choking, toxic smoke, parties of three or four rescuers

crawled in relays into the destroyed areas, where they had to dig through and

move collapsed furnishings and rubble to create exit routes for trapped victims.

53
PENTAGON 9/11

To protect their skin from fire and heat, they rolled in pools of standing water in

A-E Drive, despite which some of them suffered burns. When teams could no

longer bear the heat and smoke inside, they retreated to A-E Drive and handed

over the meager equipment to another group to use in the rescue effort. By the

time firefighters relieved them these daring rescuers had made a number of forays

into the smoking, ruined space. In a period of perhaps 30 to 40 minutes Schuetz

and Vera estimated that the group saved a dozen people suffering from cuts,

burns, and smoke inhalation. Fortunately, the two Marines incurred only minor

injuries.4

Schuetz later explained what drove them. "We're Marines, that's what

we're supposed to do. It may sound corny to somebody that ... is not a Marine,

but that's something we've always been trained to do.... But we were mentally

prepared and we just used instinct and went directly into the smoke:' Expressing the same compelling sentiment another rescuer, Air Force Master Sergeant

Paul Lirette, a medical technician from the Pentagon's Air Force Flight Medicine

Clinic, who had also helped evacuate survivors, asserted that "as far as going into

the building, I mean I figure that's what we get paid to do. Somebody was hurt,

we're military, and that's what we've got to do."'

One of the most heroic deliverers, Lieutenant Commander David Tarantino, a Navy flight surgeon, served as a disaster relief specialist in the Office

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity

Conflict. His office, 4A531 in Wedge 2, did not experience the direct impact of

the collision. Aware of the attacks in New York City, Tarantino suddenly "felt a

violent shudder and a loud explosion:' He left the office, but instead of departing from the building as did most others from his area, he decided to make use of

his medical skills at the crash site. Making his way to smoke-filled Corridor 4, he

moistened paper towels in nearby restrooms, passing them out to persons with

breathing trouble, while continuing on toward the impact area. When the smoke

and noxious fumes became too dense for Tarantino to walk upright, he dropped

to the floor and crawled slowly on his belly. He moved down to the lower floors

and at each level helped dazed and confused people to reach the Center Court.

Moving on to A-E Drive, Tarantino encountered human remains, a large hole

in the C Ring wall, a large airplane tire, and smoke billowing along the roadway.

Cries for help coming from trapped victims compelled response.6

54
7he Rescuers

After first helping evacuees in A-E Drive, Tarantino joined Navy Captain

David Thomas, who had come from Corridor 6 in the E Ring area, and other volunteers preparing to enter the building. Thomas later explained that he "went to

the scene because that was where ... [I] thought ... [I] should go. It was just an

instinctive thing for me. I don't even know why, but it was like being back on the

ship. You go to where your shipmates are having a problem.' He wanted to search

for Captain Robert Dolan, the commanding officer of the Navy Command Center, his Naval Academy classmate and the best man at his wedding. Unbeknownst

to Thomas, Dolan was already dead. Other volunteers included Commander

Craig Powell, a Navy SEAL new to the building who came from the 5th Floor;

Surgeon General of the Air Force Lieutenant General Paul Carlton, Jr.; Lirette;

and an unidentified Army sergeant. Of this multi-service party the general, who

had organized a medical rescue team, later observed, "I don't know how we could

get any more joint than that"'7

The rescue group went into the building from A-E Drive through one

of the holes spewing smoke. Working his way into the impact area, Powell came

upon dazed and injured Nancy McKeown* and helped her reach safety. Powell

then joined Army rescuers in A-E Drive working to get people out of a 2nd Floor

window in the C Ring. Another participant, Army Lieutenant Colonel Kenny

Cox, had run to A-E Drive from his office in 1D711. The group positioned a

six-foot ladder on top of a dumpster hoping to reach the 2nd Floor window, but

finding the ladder not long enough, Cox had the ladder hoisted to his shoulders.

This still did not do the job. Finally, group members returned to catching escapees dropping from the 2nd Floor window.8

Meanwhile, armed with fire extinguishers and flashlights, some of this

group made their way from A-E Drive into the Navy Command Center on the

1st Floor, a scene of utter devastation and chaos. Tarantino described the scene as

he and Captain Thomas sought to respond to calls for help:

At this point in this area there were live electrical wires. I got shocked

twice. It's so hot that the debris is melting and dripping off the ceiling

onto your skin and it would sear your skin and melt your uniform. We

went a little farther, turned a corner and came into this bombed out

* See Chapter II.

55
PENTAGON 9/11

office space that was a roaring inferno of destruction and smoke and

flames and intense heat you could feel searing your face.

With only a moistened T-shirt to beat back the fire, he made "a serpentine path"

through the debris.'

Calls for help heard by Tarantino and Thomas came from Petty Officers Christina Williams and Charles Lewis, trapped beneath collapsed partitions

and other debris, as was Darrell "Jerry" Henson, the office chief. Henson's deputy,

retired Navy Captain Jack Punches, had died at his desk. The door to their office

was jammed shut. The two young sailors trapped in the debris remained conscious but had increasing difficulty breathing. They had talked with each other

and Henson for about 15 minutes after the explosion, repeatedly calling for help,

but smoke and heat gradually sapped their energy and hope. Encouraged by the

rescuers calling out, Lewis squeezed out from under the wreckage and escaped

with their assistance. Williams, unable to escape from under a pile of rubble, had

to wait until the rescuers could pull her out and take her to safety."0

Thomas described the scene as he and Tarantino struggled to reach Henson, trapped in a mountain of wreckage, "There is this face ... almost like a caricature of a face. It appeared to be floating in space, just this face at an angle, cut up.

It looked like a Halloween thing.... It wasjust sitting there. It looks like it's floating.... Then I focused a little further in and it's actually a guy's head squashed

between furniture and his desk, actually his computer:' Tarantino crawled into the

"little tiny space" alongside Thomas and shone his flashlight on Henson, a retired

Navy pilot with 72 combat missions in Vietnam to his credit. Sitting upright at

his desk, Henson was saying"Help me! Help me!" His"bruised and bloody" head

was pinned against his left shoulder by a massive weight; he couldn't move in any

direction. The injured and weakened Henson, with flames licking ever closer, had

almost given up hope when Thomas and Tarantino found him. Craig Powell had

also inched into the room and helped by clearing some of the debris."

Crawling into the cramped space where Henson lay entrapped, Tarantino reassured him: "I'm a doctor, I'm here to help. We're going to get you out of

here, but you have to help yourself. You've got to fight your way out." But Henson,

pinned down, couldn't move. At first Tarantino alone, then with Thomas, tried

but failed to move the partition or clear the wreckage atop Henson. It seemed to

56
The Rescuers

Thomas that the debris entrapping Henson looked like "a couple of tons" Adding

to the urgency, the flames and smoke were starting to weaken the rescuers who

feared also that the ceiling was about to collapse on them. Finally, "out of desperation;' Tarantino lay on his back underneath Henson and leg-pressed against the

cubicle wall, while Thomas lifted with his shoulder. After Herculean effort the

two officers finally succeeded in raising the confining mass a few inches. Exerting

himself mightily, Henson wriggled almost free of the wreckage when a computer

cable snagged his shoe; leaving the shoe behind he made good his escape, crawling

over Tarantino. Thomas "dragged him the rest of the way out of the hole."'2

Other members of the rescue party, including General Carlton, who witnessed Tarantino's and Thomas's heroics, helped Henson out of the Command

Center, placed him on a stretcher, and carried him out to the Center Court. Tarantino, while still holding up the heavy weight with his legs, called out for other

victims but heard nothing. Urged by others to get out, he rolled over and crawled

out. When Powell saw that the ceiling might collapse, he held up the ceiling mesh

until all had gotten out of the room.

Later, in A-E Drive, Tarantino and Thomas, "coughing and retching,'

wiped "the crap off our faces and tears from our eyes" Thomas remembered: I'm

thinking... I was motivated looking for my friend [Dolan], I don't know what

the hell is motivating this guy, but he's just as insane as I am. He might not make

it and I don't even know who the hell he is" So that he wouldn't forget the man

with whom he had just been through so much, Thomas reached over and ripped

Tarantino's name tag off his uniform, exclaiming, "in case one of us doesn't make

it, at least if I do, I'll know who you were and I'll tell your parents:"' Hell of a guy"

Thomas later pronounced him. Tarantino provided medical assistance to Henson

and saw to it that he was loaded on an ambulance bound for the hospital. For the

rest of the day, Tarantino assisted with triage outside the building. 3

On the 2nd Floor C Ring, in the Wedge 1 area occupied by the Army's

Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Colonel Karl Knoblauch and

Lieutenant Colonel William McKinnon felt the crash. Knoblauch described it as

a"thunderous strike and rocking of the building"; he thought that there had been

a gas explosion. Fire alarms sounded and sprinklers activated, as the two officers

made their way through the ravaged area calling out to colleagues in the darkness,

urging them to leave the building. Acrid, pungent smoke forced them to crouch

57
PENTAGON 9/11

close to the floor. Emerging into Corridor 4, where the air was much better, they

met Colonels John Davies and Roy Wallace; Lieutenant Colonels Gerald Barrett,

Thomas Cleary, and George Richon also joined them.14

Soon afterward, on spying someone lying in Corridor 4 in the direction

of the E Ring, the rescue party gently picked him up and went back down the corridor toward the A Ring. McKinnon later recalled the "skin was hanging off his

fingers in shreds" and that he was bleeding. As the officers carried the injured soldier toward safety, McKinnon looked down at him but failed to recognize his

Army Command and Staff College classmate and friend; facial burns and a covering of soot prevented recognition. Only when he glimpsed the injured man's

name tag did he realize the identity of the man he was carrying--Lieutenant Colonel Brian Birdwell.1"

At the intersection of Corridor 5 and the A Ring the group paused to

irrigate Birdwell's wounds with bottled drinking water. Here they encountered

the commanding officer of the Pentagon's Air Force Flight Medicine Clinic, Colonel John Baxter, who was also Secretary Rumsfeld's flight surgeon and accompanied him on trips. On learning of the emergency situation Baxter and his medical

team had snatched up medical trauma packs from their clinic at 4A750 and gone

to the DiLorenzo Clinic. Hearing of casualties elsewhere in the building, they

proceeded to Corridor 5 on the 2nd Floor, where they found and immediately

attended to Birdwell and other injured people. Baxter observed that Birdwell was

"very badly burned, had blast injuries and inhalation injuries. He had obvious

soot in his mouth:' Baxter gave him an injection of morphine to ease his terrible

pain. As Baxter and his team worked on Birdwell, the latter kept asking McKinnon to telephone his wife and reminded his rescuers that some of his colleagues

might still be trapped in their C and D Ring offices on the 2nd Floor. The medical team placed Birdwell on a motorized cart that took him past the DiLorenzo

Clinic and out to North Parking. 6

At the triage site where Colonel Baxter had treated Birdwell, Navy financial manager Natalie Ogletree, on her way out of the building, observed Birdwell.

Her own experience of being burned as a child led her to believe that Birdwell

needed a comforting presence. After glancing at his name tag, she took his hand

and said, "Brian, we're going to pray." The officer responded, "OK, Ma'am;' and

the two recited the 23rd Psalm together. Producing a Bible, Ogletree read aloud

58
"The Rescuers

the 91st Psalm. When the called-for ambulance failed to arrive in North Parking after some 30 minutes, medical personnel hoisted Birdwell into an Army captain's sport utility vehicle for transport to Georgetown University Hospital.17

In the meantime, the Knoblauch/Davies group returned to the 2nd Floor

by way of Corridor 5 to look for other victims. Despite the threat to their lives

and the grim reality of their surroundings, they hesitated self-consciously before

entering a women's restroom in search of water to soak their T-shirts for use as

face masks. They continued toward the crash area, but their improvised protection could not shield them from the dense smoke and intense heat that prevented

them from getting any further along the E Ring. They headed back toward the

center of the building."

Soon the officers encountered Army Major John Thurman hobbling

along wearing only one shoe. Thurman, whose 2D491 office was uncomfortably

close to the impact site, had been flung, still in his chair, across his cubicle by the

force of the shock wave. Crawling out from under his desk where he had managed to find refuge, Thurman called for his coworkers, Lieutenant Colonel Karen

Wagner and Chief Warrant Officer William Ruth, and sought to lead them

to safety. Unfortunately, he became separated from them in the smoke. Thurman found an emergency exit that permitted him to get out into Corridor 5. He

propped the door open with his shoe because he saw that the outside handle was

missing and the door would otherwise lock automatically. At Thurman's urgent

plea, Knoblauch's group then searched for Wagner and Ruth but could not penetrate the smoke that poured out of their office. Neither survived. Thurman eventually wound up at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center from which he was

discharged three days later.

As the search party reversed course and headed toward the Center

Court, its members ensured no one remained in nearby D, C, and B Ring

offices, 9 At one point, Davies and other members of the group descended to the

1st Floor, entered A-E Drive, and then sought to enter the building through one

of the holes in the C Ring wall. Rear Admiral Phillip Balisle, the Navy's director of surface warfare, already engaged in helping rescue efforts, dissuaded them

from entering the space unless they equipped themselves with fire extinguishers.

Finding none, the Army officers returned to the D Ring to continue their rescue

59
PENTAGON 9/11

efforts. When they heard the warning of another hijacked airliner headed for the

Pentagon, they left the building andjoined in the assistance effort outside.2 °

Efforts to control movement in the building led to confrontations

between police carrying out orders to keep people from entering dangerous areas

and rescuers passionately eager to do their utmost. The police seemed not to take

sufficiently into account that they were dealing with people, chiefly military and

retired military, many of whom by instinct and training responded unhesitatingly

to such emergencies.

With other rescuers, Commander Samuel Perez, who had come down

from the 5th Floor to A-E Drive, reentered the building in the vicinity of the

Navy Command Center on the 1st Floor. Even though voices could be heard calling for help from behind a jammed door, a Defense Protective Service officer and

a Navy shore patrolman ordered Perez and the others to vacate the area. When

Perez objected, the shore patrolman made an implied threat to use his pistol.

Complying for the moment, the would-be rescuers returned when the security

guards had moved on. Although they failed to get into the room and heard nothing more from behind the jammed door, they later thought that those trapped in

the room eventually made their way to safety.21

In other instances, people ignored the order to evacuate and returned

again and again to help in any way possible. In A-E Drive, Admiral Balisle and

other rescuers would not leave when toward 10:20 a.m. they received word that

security authorities had ordered complete evacuation of the building following

the report of another presumed hijacked airliner headed for the Pentagon. Later

Balisle recalled the order "was tough because there was nobody there yet as a fire

party." Earlier, he had seen people jumping from a C Ring second-story window

into A-E Drive and had supervised rescuers going into the burning building. In

response to his urgent calls for help, relayed by DPS officers' radios and messengers, Balisle learned that the attack had taken place on the E Ring west side and

that the firefighters there had their hands full, as did those fighting the fire from

the Center Court. In the absence of firefighters, many military personnel did not

want to quit their search for survivors, viewing departure as tantamount to abandonment of wounded on the battlefield. Standing fast, the admiral and many

others would not leave until it became painfully evident that the overpowering

smoke prevented them from reentering the building.22

60
The Rescuers

Not long after, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, who had

begun arriving at the crash site before 10:00 a.m. (Special Agent Christopher

Combs was first), declared the area a crime scene. Still, for a few more hours some

military and civilians persisted in their desperate rescue efforts, evading FBI and

other guards. Some slipped into the building hoping to account for colleagues

for whom they felt responsible or to salvage records and even equipment. Others

helped injured Pentagon workers outside the building, serving in less dramatic

but still timely and beneficial ways. Navy Captain William Toti, an engineer officer serving as an assistant to the vice chief of naval operations, had made his way

from his office at 4D620 out an exit to the Heliport area. He joined a team of

stretcherbearers to carry a badly burned man from the impact area in Wedge

1 and then went back inside to help bring out a badly burned woman from the

Army's Resource Services Office. As he helped her, Tori saw smoke coming from

his mouth as he exhaled. Outside on the lawn, medical personnel started an

intravenous drip and gave the injured woman oxygen. Kneeling beside Antoinette

Sherman, Toti asked her if she felt better. She responded,"Doctor, am I going to

die?" Convinced that she would survive, despite her critically burned body, Toti

responded, "No ... you're not going to die .... We have a helicopter coming for

you, I'm going to stay with you until you're on it" Sherman nodded. Six days later

she died in the hospital.23

One notable Pentagon worker also helped render assistance to victims

of the attack. Soon after the airliner hit the building, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld left his office, went out a 1st Floor emergency exit, and hurried to the affected

area. There he joined a stretcher party and helped carry injured persons to a medical treatment area. Once satisfied that enough help was on hand, the secretary

returned to the building, where during the course of the morning he spoke by

telephone with the president and the vice president.24

Another rescuer, Army Captain Lincoln Leibner, who was in South

Parking about 100 yards from the point of impact, saw Flight 77 come in "full

throttled, wheels up, a controlled flight:' He ran toward the impact site, "hyper

aware' of what had happened. Leibner entered the Pentagon through a door to

Corridor 5 that had been blown off its hinges and immediately encountered a

badly burned woman whom he helped out of the building. He went inside again

61
PENTAGON 9/11

and found that the smoke had greatly worsened. Hearing voices calling for help,

he called back to give guidance out of the smoke.

Close to the doorway Leibner saw two women trapped in debris. He

freed them and walked them out, glad to have a chance to clear his lungs of

smoke. Once more he returned through the same door and this time had to leave

because of the smoke. Observing a broken window in Wedge 2, he pulled himself up through it and worked his way through and around debris toward a line of

people, some of whom were injured. He "was able to grab people and lower them

down [from the window] to other people who were taking them out:' When he

heard a warning to "get away from the building" he climbed from the window and

walked over to a triage area. Unable to walk further because of the smoke in his

chest, he got down on one knee. Refreshed a bit and in spite of his burns and cuts,

he got up and helped carry the injured to ambulances. By this time Leibner had

attracted attention to his own condition and he "got put into an ambulance." After

receiving treatment at the Virginia Hospital Center, he returned early in the afternoon to the Pentagon and to his job in the communication section that directly

served the secretary of defense. As one just returned from the trenches, he was

summoned to tell his story to Secretary Rumsfeld, who, according to Leibner,

wanted to hear his firsthand account of the explosion. Leibner recounted witnessing Flight 77's plunge into the building. He remained on the job until after 9:30

p.m. when he was ordered to go home. 5

It is possible that the fire might have been contained sooner and more

people spared injury had the firefighters and other rescuers not been forced to

pull back from the site on receipt of the warning of another incoming hijacked

aircraft. This presumably was the fourth of the hijacked planes-United Airlines

Flight 93-that crashed into a field near Shanksville, in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, at 10:03 a.m. Some time after the attack on the Pentagon, before 10:15

a.m., FBI Special Agent Combs received warning of a possible second attack

from the FBI field office in Washington, which had been informed by the Federal

Aviation Administration. Using a radio provided by a firefighter from the Reagan National Airport, he confirmed the warning directly with the airport's control tower. Combs immediately informed Incident Commander Schwartz, who

ordered evacuation of the building and the surrounding area. Thousands withdrew to what were thought to be safe areas. The firefighters and other emergency

62
"The Rescuers

responders returned only after about 25 minutes (shortly after 10:40 a.m.) when

they received the all clear signal.26

In the first hour or two after Flight 77 struck, the scene in the Pentagon

was one of confusion, fright, panic, escape, injury, and death. But for the presence

of the many powerfully motivated rescuers-most of them volunteers and some

of them victims themselves-who repeatedly placed themselves in harm's way,

the outcome would certainly have been worse. In a long day of suffering and tragedy, their heroics provided moments of emotional uplift as defining as the terrible pain and sorrow.*

* See Chapters IV and VII for rescue work by the Defense Protective Service, firefighters, and other

responders.

63
CHAPTER IV

Fighting the Fire

The fierce fire, powerful explosions, and chaos caused by Flight 77's

plunge into the Pentagon confronted the hundreds of firefighters on the scene

with what must have been the worst disaster they had ever encountered. The

great size and uncommon configuration of the building permitted full play for

the furious kinetic energy generated by the plane's impact to cause death and

destruction on a stunning scale. For 36 tense and exhausting hours the firefighters performed their most critical missions-at first to save lives, and then to

save property by containing the blaze. Strengthening their grim motivation was

awareness of the vital importance of keeping the Pentagon up and running.

The First Responders

At the Pentagon Heliport, 150 feet from the west side of the building,

preparations were under way early on 11 September for the expected arrival of

President George Bush around noon.* On duty in the Air Traffic Control Tower

were Tower Chief Sean Boger and Army Specialist Jacqueline Kidd. Soldiers

from a bomb ordnance disposal unit were en route from Fort Belvoir, 15 miles

* The president was scheduled to return from a trip to Florida. On occasion he used the Pentagon Heliport

instead of the White House grounds for his helicopter when going to and from Air Force One at Andrews

Air Force Base. He had left from the Pentagon on 10 September. The helipad at the White House was not

available for use because of preparations for a social function on the grounds.
Fighting the Fire

away, to do a routine sweep of the Heliport before the president landed. To cope

with helicopter emergencies, three civilians from the fire department at nearby

Fort Myer manned the fire station next to the Heliport.1

Inside the fire station, Alan Wallace, Mark Skipper, and Dennis Young

watched the TV coverage of the World Trade Center attacks until Fort Myer Fire

Chief Charlie Campbell telephoned and warned them to stay alert as "Washington, D.C., could be a target" Skipper and Wallace went outside to check on the

new crash truck (Foam 161) equipped with the special chemical foam used in

fightingjet fuel fires. Wallace had parked it outside the station with the back end

toward the Pentagon.'

The two men stood next to the truck discussing the New York attacks

when Wallace glanced up and saw an airplane "coming at us:' He yelled to Skipper to run for cover. Instantly Wallace thought: "Now it's happening here ...

we are being attacked in Washington;' and then, "I [am] going to be on fire very

soon:' Diving under a nearby vehicle, Wallace felt the blast and the explosion's

enormous heat and pressure as Flight 77 smashed into the Pentagon, just 20 feet

from the corner of the fire station. Skipper heard a tremendous crash and saw

the orange glow of a huge fireball bursting from the blast site and rising above the

building. Boger and Kidd ran from the control tower, fleeing its shattered windows and collapsing ceiling.3

When the falling debris began to settle, Wallace and Skipper quickly

checked that neither was seriously injured; only later would they realize they

were flash-burned. As flames engulfed the building, Wallace jumped into the

crash truck and started the engine, but it would not budge-the back end was

ablaze and belching smoke. At the same time he radioed the fire department

headquarters at Fort Myer that an airliner had hit the west side of the Pentagon,

probably providing the first report of the exact crash location.4

Within moments, people near the impact site began streaming out of

the Pentagon, escaping any way possible-from damaged exit doors, blown-out

windows, and through holes in the inside C Ring wall. Black smoke clouded the

air. On emerging from the building, Navy Captain William Toti was stunned to

see the Heliport "all torn apart:' When he saw Wallace sitting in the burning fire

truck, he ran to help, wondering, "Is he dead? No, he's moving. He's making a

65
PENTAGON 9/11

radio call ... what a stupid thing to do:' Only later did he realize how important

that radio call was.

Wallace and Skipper salvaged medical supplies, fire extinguishers, and

breathing apparatus from the crash truck, grabbing what was left of their equipment and gear. Wallace's boots were filled with debris and the suspenders on

his fire pants were burned. Although the explosion had caused part of the ceiling to collapse around him, Young emerged from the station house unharmed.

When they heard cries for help coming from inside the building, the three firefighters rushed to help workers attempting to escape through a blown-out, firststory window. With others they helped move the injured to an area beyond the

Heliport.6

Meantime, area first responders learned of the crash and reacted immediately, arriving at the Pentagon within minutes despite initial uncertainty

about the location. They came from nearby Arlington County Fire Department

(ACFD), the Pentagon's primary emergency service for fire and medical incidents, and the Fort Myer Military Community Fire Department, which operated

the Heliport fire station. From Reagan National Airport came emergency crews

that had special aircraft fire and rescue training and equipment and automatic

authority to respond to any crashes within a five-mile radius of the airport. These

units belonged to the Fire and Rescue Department of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority.7

They were able to respond rapidly in part because the Arlington County

Emergency Communications Center (ECC), focal point of all police and fire 911

calls for the county, received early warnings from county emergency workers who

saw the low-flying plane. Captain Steve McCoy and firefighter Andrea Kaiser,

on ACFD Engine 101 traveling north on Interstate 395 for a training session,

caught sight of an airliner descending steeply and disappearing over the horizon,

heard an explosion, and then saw a plume of smoke. McCoy radioed ECC and

reported,"We got a plane down, it looks like in the Crystal City area by the 14th

Street Bridge.' Police Corporal Barry Foust radioed that it might have crashed

in Washington, D.C., while Officer Richard Cox identified the Pentagon as the

possible site. A flood of similar calls coming into ECC overwhelmed phone lines

and radio channels, making it difficult for dispatchers to determine the location

of the crash, assign an alarm rating, and direct the types and number of units to

66
Fighting the Fire

respond. Finally, ECC confirmed the Pentagon as the crash site and assigned an

augmented first alarm rating to the emergency and dispatched Arlington fire and

Emergency Medical Services (EMS) units.'

When the plane struck, nine ACFD medical and fire units were less

than two miles north of the Pentagon in Arlington's Rosslyn area responding to

an apartment building fire that had been extinguished by the time the first unit

reached the scene. ECC diverted them to the new emergency, and the first unit,

Truck 105, roared into the Pentagon's South Parking about five minutes after

the crash and pinpointed the Heliport as the incident site. Confronted by a huge

tower of black smoke rising from the building and people streaming out, the crew

instructed ECC to call for additional resources. Other Arlington units took the

step of self-dispatching when they heard the radio reports, barely discernible

through the chatter. Incident Commander Schwartz later explained that ECC

found it difficult to make assignments because of the confusion and heavy radio

traffic: 'And quite honestly, all of the units in Arlington County ... knew they

were going to the dance. So they all just started responding:' 9

ECC notified the Fort Myer and Reagan National fire departments,

both of which had already begun to respond. Dispatchers also asked Alexandria and Fairfax County fire and EMS services to stage units in readiness near

the Pentagon. All of these departments were signatories of the Northern Virginia

Response Agreement, a "mutual aid" pact that allowed regional fire and EMS

organizations to respond automatically to emergencies and share resources across

jurisdictional boundaries. As one responder put it, "You get the closest available

unit of the type needed for the incident, and it doesn't matter whose name is on

the side of the truck:' ECC also asked the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Services to stage units nearby; the District shared a mutual aid agreement

with Arlington, but rather than authorizing automatic dispatch it required the

party seeking assistance to first request it.1°

Arlington's first responders converged on congested South Parking, stopping at the corner of the building nearest the impact site. Renovation construction trailers and equipment parked near the corner made it difficult to get to

the Heliport. Firefighters abandoned their vehicles, grabbed their equipment,

and ran to the building. Senior ACFD officers began arriving in South Parking

within six minutes and immediately initiated command and control protocols.

67
PENTAGON 9/11

Training Captain Chuck Gibbs was followed by Robert Cornwell, a seasoned

battalion chief who knew the Pentagon well. Cornwell assumed overall command

of the scene and began to assess the situation. Battalion Chief Dale Smith raced

from Virginia Hospital Center, arriving around the same time as EMS Supervisors Captains Ed Blunt and Alan Dorn, who at once set up makeshift triage,

treatment, and casualty collection areas. ECC dispatched additional medical services, and Arlington County Police soon arrived to control traffic to enable emergency units to get through."

At the time of the crash, most of the firefighters at Fort Myer, about a

mile west of the Pentagon, were attending an aircraft rescue and firefighting class

led by Captain Russell Dodge, Jr., assistant chief of the Fort Belvoir Fire Department. Ironically, they were discussing aircraft fuel loads when they heard of the

New York attacks over the station's radio. Suddenly, Vance Valenzo heard a"horrendous explosion" and Jeff Afforder felt a'"jolt" like "somebody shutting a door:"

Immediately, there was confused radio chatter about a "plane going down;' location unknown. The station simultaneously received Alan Wallace's radio call from

the burning Heliport truck identifying the target. Momentarily stunned into disbelief, the firefighters reacted quickly. Captain Dennis Gilroy, acting Fort Myer

department commander for the day, recalled that "everybody just got up [and]

we're gone.... We didn't wait for anybody's dispatch.... We just responded."

"Self-dispatch," Gilroy called it. 2

Speeding toward the Pentagon, Fort Myer crew members, aware that two

planes had crashed in New York, feared the possibility of another hit and "kept

looking around like something [was] going to happen:' Rescue Engines 161 and

162 and the command vehicle arrived at about 9:42 a.m., mere moments after the

first Arlington unit, followed by a reserve pumper, Engine 163."3

The Fort Myer crews encountered what they later described as a surrealistic scene. Brian Ladd of Engine 161 spotted people 'just coming out the windows;'

some badly burned. Expecting to see pieces of the wings or fuselage, he saw instead

"millions of tiny pieces" of debris spread "everywhere:' Through the heavy black

smoke, Sergeant Thomas Hodge and Bruce Surette on Engine 162 caught sight

of large crowds of people, some coming out the doors, others "walking through

the field ... burned, injured:' For Hodge, the "devastation" on their faces "was terrible" to see. Roger Reardon on Engine 161 felt that he had entered "a war zone"

68
Fighting the Fire

or a film set. "It was like Hollywood.... People were sitting there screaming or

standing [or] running around yelling'medics' and'we need firefighters and police

officers."14

Better informed than the first Arlington units thanks to Wallace's radio

call, the crew on Fort Myer Engine 161 knew to go to the Heliport. But when an

Arlington fire truck inadvertently blocked their access to Heliport Road, Ladd

and Reardon impatiently jumped off and ran toward the burning area where,

with relief, they saw Wallace, Skipper, and Young, apparently unharmed, helping people out of the building. Sergeant William Harris quickly managed to drive

Engine 161 around the Arlington truck. The first to arrive at the Heliport, the

crew hooked up to a hydrant in minutes. Reardon and Wallace, helped by civilians and military, pulled five-gallon canisters of foam agent out of the damaged

fire station for later use. Meanwhile, the Engine 162 crew stopped in South Parking and considered the best way of entering the building. Along with ACFD firefighters they directed the outpouring of escapees away from the building, assisting those who needed help.'"

Gilroy arrived about the same time as his units. Stopping his command

vehicle on the shoulder of Heliport Road to assess the situation, he viewed the

scene with amazement; injured people seemed to be "everywhere" and people

were still trying to get out of the blazing building. For a moment he wondered

why he saw no aircraft parts, then sped to the Heliport "hot zone;' where he

assumed command of his units. Dodge, the instructor who had ridden with Gilroy, ran to a blown-out office window behind the burning foam truck and with

"an army captain, another civilian, and two deputy sheriffs" helped workers climb

out. Although lacking protective gear, he searched in the building until the thick

smoke drove him out; then he joined other firefighters setting up at the impact

site. 16

Little more than a mile south of the Pentagon at Reagan National Airport, a stunned Captain Michael Defina watched the TV coverage of the New

York attacks. Defina commanded the airport's emergency units that day; some

of his firefighters were attending an officer training class or taking part in antiterrorism exercises at the District of Columbia Fire and EMS Training Academy in

preparation for possible incidents at upcoming International Monetary Fund and

World Bank meetings. When notified of an automobile accident in front of the

69
PENTAGON 9/11

terminal Defina responded, thinking it suspicious coming so soon after the New

York attacks.1 7

Standing on the upper-level roadway of the airport around 9:37 a.m.

Defina heard a low rumble and then observed smoke rising to the northwest.

Captain John Durrer, also on the scene, saw a "flash" followed by smoke billowing up; with three others he jumped into Rescue Engine 335, a pumper carrying hoses, water, ladders, and rescue equipment, and headed in the direction of

the smoke. Confused reports came over the radio: the airport's River Rescue boat

reported a crash near the 14th Street Bridge; others identified a Crystal City

location. Durrer switched to Arlington's channel and heard voices shouting, "It's

into the Pentagon!"; he headed toward South Parking, arriving just after the first

Arlington and Fort Myer units. He reported to Arlington officers gathered there,

urgently engaged in assessing the situation and determining which resources had

arrived and what tactics to employ. Awaiting his assignment from Captain Gibbs,

Durrer noted the gaping hole and fire but felt something was missing. Like Fort

Myer's Brian Ladd, he had expected to see large parts of the plane and thought,

"Well where's the airplane, you know, where's the parts to it. You would think

there'd be something"'18 The near total disintegration of the plane had left only a

multitude of bits scattered outside the building.

Firefighter Cary Henry left Reagan National about the same time as

Durrer. As he drove Foam 331 toward the smoke, he noticed that people stood in

the streets pointing north toward the Pentagon. When the radio confirmed the

location, he sped the wrong way down a ramp to Route 27 (Washington Boulevard) and quickly reached the Heliport. As he parked close to the great gash in

the building, he felt the heat from the fire and recognized the smell of fuel residue.

The fire seemed to be advancing rapidly to all the E Ring floors. Gibbs assigned

Durrer's specially trained team to help operate the foam truck; the crew immediately attacked the fire with the chemical foam used on jet fuel.' 9

Defina arrived at the Heliport in the command vehicle a few minutes later

than the other Reagan National units after mobilizing the rest of his department.

Like his colleagues, he had been uncertain of the crash location: the airport's control tower reported several possible locations, but finally Arlington's ECC confirmed the crash into the Pentagon. En route he summoned all off-duty airport

fire personnel to duty. Once on the scene he called for the truck (Foam 345) that

70
PENTAGON AND VICINIW

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oil
PENTAGON 9/11

had stayed behind to protect the airport. With all U.S. civilian aircraft supposed

to be grounded, the truck would no longer be needed at the closed airport. Later,

Defina had Dulles Airport send an additional foam truck to the Pentagon.2"

Immediately following the New York attacks, but before they received

reports of the Pentagon strike, District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Services units kept busy responding to a spate of alarms. Some units mobilized

in anticipation of calls, while others checked on the White House after receiving reports of an explosion and an inbound plane. On learning of the crash at

the Pentagon, the D.C. services responded to Arlington's request for assistance

(received around 9:44 a.m.) and dispatched units across the river. After inching their way through traffic, the first components went directly to the building, while others staged nearby. D.C. Deputy Fire Chief James Martin arrived

approximately 15 to 20 minutes after impact to take command of his firefighters.

The D.C. firefighters communicated with the Arlington County command post

and jumped in with other units"helter skelter" to help with efforts to rescue people still in the building.21

Command and Control

The number of departments responding and the confusion at the scene

underscored the need for the exercise of effective command and control, which

became the responsibility of ACFD Assistant Chief James Schwartz, who

arrived at the Pentagon within 10 minutes of impact. Over the radio, he heard the

report that a plane was down near the 14th Street Bridge and then that the Pentagon was hit. Making his way down Route 27 in "a wave of emergency response

vehicles;' he gave ECC specific instructions for requesting additional emergency

resources and for recalling off-duty members. As he pulled into South Parking,

he saw tremendous smoke and fire, a "sea of people" trying to assist the injured

lying "strewn" across the lawn, and military forming small groups to reenter the

Pentagon.22

Schwartz immediately implemented the incident command system

(ICS), used to coordinate response efforts at all incidents but especially important for large-scale events involving multiple agencies and jurisdictions. The ICS

was first developed in the 1970s after a series of inadequate responses to disastrous wildfires in Western states demonstrated the need for firm command, plan72
Fighting the Fire

ning, and communications procedures that could be used within and across organizations. Over the years increasing numbers of emergency services had come to

use some variant of the ICS. After the defective response to the Air Florida jet

crash into the Potomac River in 1982, some fire and EMS organizations in the

Washington region began to use the ICS.

In March 2001 the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments,

a regional agency addressing problems of mutual concern to its 19 members,

advised area fire and EMS departments to implement a standardized ICS. By 11

September, mutual aid partners in Northern Virginia had for the most part done

so, but other services in the metropolitan region had not yet fully complied. The

goal was to have standard operating procedures so that responders at the scene,

no matter their locality, would integrate into this single system, know what was

expected of them, and communicate effectively with one another. Chief Schwartz

and other commanding officers later attributed the overall success of the emergency response at the Pentagon to the ICS.23

The Arlington County Fire Department took initial command of the

scene even though the Pentagon was federal property; under the ICS, the agency

responsible for the most critical functions at any given stage was to assume

authority. While the Pentagon attack created both a fire scene and a crime scene,

fire suppression and rescue clearly demanded priority. As the highest-ranking

ACFD officer on the scene, Schwartz relieved Cornwell as incident commander,

a position ICS protocols vested with top authority in managing the incident.

While Schwartz was entitled to operate under a single command structure, giving him sole responsibility for decisionmaking, he exercised tact and diplomacy in

dealing with the innumerable participating federal, state, local, and private organizations, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which was designated

the lead agency for investigating domestic terrorist events.* For 10 days, until the

fire was officially declared extinguished, the ACFD retained control, relinquishing it on 21 September to the FBI.24

Schwartz set up the Incident Command Post in South Parking. Operating initially out of his "command buggy," a Chevrolet Suburban (later in the

day switching to the Arlington County Police Department command vehicle

and still later to a Fairfax County vehicle), he assigned the tactical missions that

* See Chapter VII.

73
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Fighting the Fire

needed the most urgent attention. Since no one yet had a good sense of the damage inside the building he assigned several fire companies under Chief Cornwell

to rapidly assess the interior.25

The huge scale of the conflagration compelled Schwartz early on to

establish the tiered working groups prescribed by the ICS for the most urgent

tasks at hand. He appointed Gibbs to command the River Division,* which

fought the fire and performed search and rescue missions at the Heliport "hot

zone:' Operating from the Center Court, Battalion Chief Smith commanded

the A&E Division, which took its name from A-E Drive. The EMS Division

(initially called the South Parking Division) was commanded first by Assistant

Chief John White and then by Battalion Chief James Bonzano. As the morning progressed, Schwartz created the upper supervisory levels. He assigned Battalion Chief Randy Gray command of the Fire Suppression Branch, overseeing

firefighting in the A&E and River Divisions; the EMS Branch handled medical

activities, by that time centered mostly in South Parking. Around noon, he created the Operations Section to run the Fire Suppression and EMS branches, and

around 1:00 p.m. he established the Logistics Section. This organization allowed

the commanders to focus on their own sectors and functions and at the same

time broadened Schwartz's span of control. He delegated authority at first to his

own ACFD officers, later turning to other departments to help sustain the high

level of effort.26

When radio communications failed, "runners" carried information

between the sectors and the command post. In general, the division commanders communicated face-to-face with subordinate officers, who in turn led the firefighting companies on tactical missions. Division commanders had a better grasp

of the situation on the ground than the command post, and they had discretion to use what tactics they thought necessary. Because they were so intensely

engaged the first day commanders had little chance to interact with Schwartz. In

the opinion of some officers it was exactly this flexibility that allowed for success.

Indeed, firefighters at all levels often had to exercise their own judgment, especially in the early going.2 7

* Schwartz derived the name from a nearby sign directing motorists to the Pentagon's River Entrance,

which was some distance from the impact area.

75
PENTAGON 9/11

Schwartz was setting up the Incident Command Post when FBI Special

Agent Christopher Combs arrived about 9:50 a.m. Combs served on the FBI's

National Capital Response Squad, an antiterrorism rapid response unit. Until

additional FBI personnel arrived not long after, Combs served as on-scene FBI

commander and stayed with Schwartz at the command post. The two knew each

other and had a comfortable working relationship. As the regular FBI liaison to

the fire services, Combs routinely cross-trained with regional departments; earlier that morning he had been at the D.C. Fire Academy training firefighters in

counterterrorism tactics.28

The outpouring of fire departments to the scene, some of them self-dispatched, complicated Schwartz's efforts to establish effective command and control. Those closest to the scene-Arlington, Fort Myer, Reagan National, and

Washington, D.C.-raced in first and bore the brunt of the battle. Manpower was

short at first, but the number of units arriving from other departments throughout the day became overwhelming. Many had to remain on standby, some at a

considerable distance from the Pentagon, and never saw any action. Other units

ignored staging protocols, drove to the building, and jumped into action on their

own, further aggravating the control problem and causing hard feelings among

those who awaited instructions. Different types of units came from Alexandria,

Falls Church, Fairfax City, Fort Belvoir, Dulles Airport, and Fairfax, Prince William, and Loudoun Counties in Virginia, and from Montgomery, Prince George's,

and Frederick Counties in Maryland.* Dealing with hundreds of trucks and

other vehicles and thousands of firefighters, medical people, and other responders

sorely taxed the capacity of the command post.2"

Chief Edward Plaugher of the Arlington County Fire Department gave

strong support to Schwartz. After hearing of the attack he raced to the scene,

lights flashing and sirens wailing, arriving around 10:00 a.m. As the county's

senior firefighter Plaugher could have assumed the role of incident commander,

but he recognized that Schwartz, already on the scene for some time, had a better

grasp of the situation. Instead, the 30-year veteran of both the Fairfax and Arlington County Fire Departments took control of administrative and support mat-

* In these localities mutual aid agreements allowed firefighters from municipal and volunteer fire departments to "backfill" the many fire stations left empty when units raced to the Pentagon. They provided the

resources to meet other fire and medical emergency needs. Some of these volunteers also served at the

Pentagon.

76
Fighting the Fire

ters. Throughout the event, he monitored the overall functioning of the response

effort, serving in a'"senior advisor-responsible party" capacity.30

When he arrived, Plaugher expressed concern that the command structure still lacked the information to calculate medical and firefighting needs. To

betterjudge the scale of the disaster, he commandeered a nearby U.S. Park Police

helicopter to fly him over the Pentagon rings, as near to the flames as possible.

From that aerial vantage he saw that the fire had not progressed inward beyond

the C Ring. When the pilot warned that the helicopter's air intakes would suck

smoke into the engines if they got any closer, Plaugher decided he had seen

enough. They returned to the ground just as Schwartz ordered a site evacuation

because of a report of an inbound plane.3

'

Initial Searcb, Rescue, and Firefigbting Efforts

It took about an hour for the formal ICS structure to become fully operational at all levels. Communication between arriving first responders was difficult; the radio channels were so overwhelmed that some found them almost useless.32 Nevertheless, during this time the firefighters "knew what needed to be

done and went ahead and did it." They followed the systematized approach used

at every fire. While the situation was huge and complex, involving multiple emergency organizations, the tasks to be performed were familiar. The firefighters

drew on their training and experience. Fort Myer firefighter Vance Valenzo found

the situation daunting, but he'Just didn't have time to focus on one specific area.

You had to make a decision based on your training, based on our job, and you just

went ahead and did it.... There were so many decisions to be made, and not one

decision you made was wrong, because there was so much needed to be done. You

just reacted to your job:' Several firefighters who described the early situation as

one of "organized" or "controlled chaos" noted that initially the command structure was as shocked as everyone else.33

Because saving lives is paramount in all catastrophic incidents, some of

the first responders entered the building immediately to look for survivors and

to reconnoiter the scene so that tactical decisions could be made. Arlington crews

entered the building from South Parking through Corridor 3 and began to assess

conditions on all floors and to direct workers to leave. As they advanced toward

the impact point, they encountered heavy smoke.34

77
PENTAGON 9/11

Firefighters from Reagan National, Fort Myer, and Arlington did the

same from the Heliport side via Corridor 5. Vance Valenzo's group searched

through offices on the 2nd Floor, finding debris everywhere. The black smoke was

so thick that Valenzo could not even see his hand in front of his face. The firefighters went as near the blast zone as possible before a hole in the floor stopped

further progress. They found no one, dead or alive."

Initial search and rescue missions were exceedingly dangerous. The firefighters did not know how far the fire had spread nor to what degree the buildings structural integrity was compromised. Furthermore, the plane might

have carried chemical agents or secondary explosives. The ruined interior that

reminded Roger Reardon of a movie set was all too real as he and his colleagues

crawled through dangling lights, loose electric wires, fallen ceiling tiles, and concrete. It was an experience he wanted never to repeat.36

Additional responders from Reagan National, Fort Myer, Arlington, the

District, and elsewhere continued to arrive during the confused first hour after

the attack, although traffic congestion and crowds near the building slowed them.

Some had been in classes or training, others had been off-duty. Reagan National's

Battalion Chief Walter Hood, Jr., Captain Robert Mott, and firefighters Michael

Murphy and Greg Long had been attending the counterterrorism class at the

D.C. Fire Academy. The police provided an escort, clearing the way so that they

arrived around 10:00 a.m. Hood checked into the command post and was given

charge on the Heliport side of several firefighting companies from surrounding jurisdictions. They searched as much of the E Ring as they could, but calls to

vacate the building interrupted them.37

Captain Charles Howes and Michael Murphy, from Reagan National,

joined a rescue group that entered Corridor 5 and the E Ring to search for survivors. The firefighters searched room to room, using axes, crowbar-like tools,

sledgehammers, and a hydraulic device to pry doors open. They encountered

damaged and destroyed office areas with tables and equipment thrown about and

everything on fire or falling down. The firefighters used a thermal energy (infrared) camera to look for bodies (indicated by a heat signature) through the smoke

and darkness, but they found no one alive. At least three times during the day

they were forced to leave the building because of evacuations triggered by the E

Ring collapse and two reports of incoming planes.38

78
Fighting the Fire

Despite their strenuous efforts, emergency personnel made fewer rescues near the blast site than might have been anticipated. Indeed, most rescues

occurred immediately after impact, before emergency assistance arrived. Chief

Schwartz later acknowledged that military and civilian personnel "saved far more

lives in those first few minutes than we saved at any time" When the Fort Myer

units first pulled up to the impact site at about 9:42, rescuers were still "grabbing"

some people out of the building, but shortly after the rescues from the E Ring

seemed to stop. Reagan National units arriving only moments later assisted a

few survivors "staggering around;' trying to find a way out of the building. Defina

noticed that very few survivors came out from near the impact site; Gibbs, also on

scene in the first minutes, saw no victims come out near the blast zone. It became

clear to the firefighters early on that there would be no more survivors from the

impact area. Nevertheless, throughout the day, as fire suppression teams made

headway against the blaze, rescue groups would follow, searching against all odds

for survivors.3 9

In the first minutes, while some firefighters searched near the impact

site, others set up the fire suppression equipment as rapidly as possible, with the

immediate imperative to suppress the external fires caused by the spewed jet fuel

that saturated whatever lay in its path. The explosion had generated a huge fireball that blasted outward, up and over the building. The spilled fuel, a highly

combustible kerosene derivative known as Jet A, burned itself off. Whatever was

near the E Ring blast hole burst into flames, including the Heliport crash truck,

two cars parked near the air control tower, a construction shed, and a diesel fuel

tank and generator on a flatbed trailer. Oxygen bottles stored near the trailers

apparently exploded, adding to the pandemonium. Firefighters connected multiple hoses to Reagan National's foam trucks 331 and 345 and Fort Myer's Rescue

Engine 161 to fight the exterior fires, drenching everything around the building

that was burning.'

Defina and his Reagan National firefighters attacked the visible E Ring

fire from the outside. They sprayed the foam and water mixture into the hole

where the plane had hit. When they ran out of foam they had to switch to water.

Reagan National's spare crash truck arrived shortly after 10:00 a.m., bringing a

new supply of the chemical agent.4

"

79
PENTAGON 9/11

Under Gilroy's supervision the Fort Myer crews set up a "deluge gun;' a

cannon-like portable device used for applying high volumes of water to large fires,

directing it at the building and a doorway where "people were trying to come out."

Also known as a "deck gun' or "master stream;' it required several firefighters to

operate it. Crews began to lay water supply hoses into the building and attacked

the fire with hand lines, switching nozzles where necessary to adjust the pressure

and reach of the spray.42

Smith, commander of the A&E Division, directed fire suppression efforts

from the Center Court. When he drove his command vehicle in there and took

charge, he saw "hordes" of people everywhere fleeing the building. Although

Arlington firefighters and a three-person truck unit from the D.C. Fire Department soon appeared and more help arrived later, Smith, short of firefighters for

much of the day, at times deemed the situation out of control because of the limited resources he had on hand to deal with such a large fire and complex building. He did not know that a plane had hit until he later saw aircraft fragments

inside the building. To Smith, the Center Court seemed a separate world, a sentiment echoed by others. (Gilroy similarly observed that the Heliport site "became

a small world" to those working there.) According to Schwartz, the untelevised

and generally unrecognized Center Court operation constituted a significant portion of the overall suppression effort.43

E Ring Collapse

As they battled the blaze at the blast site, the firefighters watched the

building closely, fearing structural failure. One firefighter explained that they

"pretty much knew that the building was going to collapse because it started making weird sounds and creaking." When Battalion Chief Tim Lasher of Reagan

National noticed a crack in the structure and Gilroy saw a cornice of the building

move, Defina warned of imminent collapse and urged everyone near the impact

site to evacuate. Immediately all units on the Heliport side were ordered to leave

the area.44

Minutes after the warning, around 10:15 a.m., an E Ring area above the

hole carved by the plane collapsed, pulling down the 2nd through 5th Floors and

the roof. Narrower than the swath of damage created by the plane crash, the collapse zone was about 95 feet at its widest point along the building's outer wall

80
Fighting the Fire

FIRST FLOOR DAMAGE

CORRIDOR

HELIPORT

CRRRIDOR CORRIDOR

4 17

CORRIDOR

S;CORRIDOR

CORRIDOR CORRIDOR / ot 1 10

E] Structure Damage

* Fire Damage

* Water and Smoke Damage

and approximately 50 feet at its deepest point, reaching to the E Ring's inner wall,

which remained standing. The force of the plane's impact and the ensuing fire had

destroyed or damaged a number of 1st and 2nd Floor columns in the plane's path,

increasing the span between the remaining ones. Through a complex redistribution of forces, the weight normally supported by the missing columns temporarily shifted to other structural elements that held long enough for upper-floor

occupants to escape. Eventually, when the load became too much, more supporting columns collapsed and a break occurred along an expansion joint between

Corridor 4 and the Heliport entrance.45

81
PENTAGON 9/11

Gibbs and other firefighters searching for survivors left just in time.

Onlookers saw buckling floors sag and swing downwards as though hinged. The

section of the building seemed to "pancake" down on itself, looking as if someone

had "cut it with a knife" and "left it to crumble:' As hundreds of tons of concrete

and bricks rumbled down, onlookers watched in fear and anguish. PENREN

worker Michael DiPaula, "completely numb and in a daze" after his escape from

a construction trailer near the impact site, was horrified as he watched the collapse,'just not knowing who got out" For U.S. Park Police helicopter pilot Keith

Bohn, the image of "the building collapsing and burning and people fleeing" was

imprinted forever on his mind.46

Inbound Plane Rumors and Evacuations

Warnings and rumors of more plane attacks caused apprehension and

disrupted the firefighting. Schwartz ordered evacuations in the morning and

afternoon of the 11th and another evacuation the next morning. The first warning came before the 10:15 a.m. E Ring collapse, when FBI agent Chris Combs

received a call through his FBI radio that a hijacked plane thought to be headed

toward Washington was only 20 minutes away. Notified by Combs at the command post in South Parking, Schwartz considered the options. If he did not evacuate and another plane hit, the cost in lives could be staggering. If he retreated,

the firefighting and rescue efforts would be delayed. With the New York attacks

fresh in his mind, Schwartz decided to order a full incident site evacuation, urging emergency workers to seek cover under nearby highway overpasses. He relocated the Incident Command Post from South Parking to beneath an Interstate

395 overpass near Hayes Street, several hundred yards from the building.

The order to evacuate was broadcast repeatedly on fire, police, Defense

Protective Service, and other radio channels, and the countdown began. Portable radios, however, were not always fully functional, cell phones did not work,

and there were few of the more reliable Nextel radio phones available. Consequently, evacuation orders were passed by word of mouth, shouted out through

bullhorns, or sounded by air horns and honking fire trucks to clear the area rapidly. But it took time to disseminate the command and even longer for everyone

in and around the building to respond. Every five minutes or so radios announced

the time remaining until the aircraft was expected to arrive.48

82
Images from a security camera video as Flight 77 strikes the Pentagon.

AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT ZOOMED

Indistinct view of aircraft. Zoomed image focusing on aircraft.

I 9

Impact at 9:37 a.m.
Above: Foam residue visible on the Pentagon facade, before the collapse.

Below: Military and civilian personnel cluster close to the Pentagon, hoping to aid first responders in

search and rescue efforts.

.. ~~ .......
U :4

Carrying the injured.

S • • Emergency treatment

-• of injured victims in the

i j first triage area.
Above: Secretary Rumsfeld (foreground, second from right) assists with carrying a victim on a stretcher

toward an ambulance on Route 27. (Courtesy of WUSA-TV, Washington)

Below: View of the burning Pentagon from the Washington side of the Potomac. 4 L
Above: Volunteers and firefighters at the Heliport entrance, planning to search the building for

victims.

Below: Firefighters and volunteer rescuers in front of the impact site and burning generator.

4

S• • I
Above: Firefighters pull back as part of the E Ring collapses.

Below: Dark smoke rises from the flaming Pentagon shortly after the collapse of the E Ring.
S. -.-..... . . -.

Above: Impact scene with the Capitol in the background.

Below: Fort Myer firefighter Vance Valenzo carries a hose across the debris-covered Helipad.
*

- Ib

Incident Commander James Schwartz at a press conference on

14 September 2001.

Evacuation from Corridor 2 to South Parking.
Above: Evacuating injured by helicopter.

Below: Volunteers and emergency responders offer aid in the Center Court.

*

S.... ... OMULA 17IZo

?q
Above: In A-E Drive, debris and airplane tire remnant.

Below: 'Ihe"punch out" hole in A-E Drive.
Above: Debris covering the Heliport area.

Below: District of Columbia Fire Department Tower 10 fighting fire in upper stories.
Above: Removing a damaged building column.

Below" Weary workers emerge from Heliport entrance.

=A
Above: Search and rescue workers.

Below: Rescue worker indicates an area has been searched.
4 c k I

Above: Firefighters 

battle the roof fire on the morning of 12 September 2001.

Below: The burnt roof of the Pentagon on 14 September 2001.

•_• ____ __2001.
E0

-41
U

Firefighters and military personnel unfurl the flag from the Pentagon roof during President Bush's visit

on 12 September 2001.
Fighting the Fire

As the orders passed down the chain of command, the firefighters

dropped their hoses, shut off their equipment, and abandoned the search missions. Some moved their fire trucks away from the building, withdrew across

Route 27 and Interstate 395, and sought shelter behind barriers or under overpasses. As word of the evacuation spread around the vast Pentagon perimeter,

Pentagon police, helped by military volunteers, steered the many clusters of people away from the building and ordered those still inside to leave. Army Lieutenant Colonel Bill McKinnon recalled,"I was standing out there ... and the police

started coming to us and told us that another plane was heading inbound to

Washington ... and that we needed to get away from the area. So you had this

migration of thousands of people just moving away from the Pentagon-just a

sea of people, civilian and military, just migrating across the fields and the highways, the ramps and everything, to move away from the area.'4 9

Most complied readily, some more calmly than others. While a group of

Defense Intelligence Agency colleagues waited in North Parking, rumors of additional attacks abounded. The atmosphere seemed "strangely calm yet uncertain,'

Karl Glasbrenner recalled, until an armed sailor passed by yelling, "Take cover

NOW!!! There is another plane inbound that will arrive in less than two minutes!!!" Running to the Potomac River bank from North Parking, some DIA

employees brought the children from the Pentagon's Child Development Center. As they waited, "everyone's eyes turned skyward, searching for the alleged

inbound aircraft that carried the threat of yet more deaths" Airboats, with armed

police clothed in black tactical gear, patrolled the river. "Sirens could be heard

almost continuously:' Glasbrenner later described the thoughts that had raced

through his mind: "Where do you go? Where do you hide? You are outside, with

nothing to provide cover.... There is virtually nowhere you can run in one minute.... Panic filled the air, as people ran screaming through the park, many in circles, as they attempted, in vain, to choose a safe destination"'50

In the crowded Center Court, by the time Smith received the evacuation

order he thought it too late to clear the area. Although he ordered his firefighters from the building, they remained in the Center Court, along with a number of

volunteers and Pentagon workers who had not yet made it to the outside.* Smith

felt"helpless;' because "we were trying to do our job" while "under attack."5 1

* See Chapters III and V for evacuation of medical personnel and patients from the Center Court at this

time.

83
PENTAGON 9/11

Elsewhere, military volunteers seeking to carry on with rescue work were

dismayed by the interruptions. Major Craig Collier, who had evacuated from

2C638, lined up in South Parking with other volunteer stretcherbearers when

police "began screaming for us to move to the other side of 1-395, as there was

another aircraft inbound just minutes away:' Commander Randall Lescault, who

continued to search the building after he escaped from Corridor 4, D Ring, reluctantly left when a firefighter insisted. In retrospect, he believed that the evacuations "really interrupted the rescue operations;' but he also recognized that at the

time the danger seemed genuine: "Everybody else is thinking World Trade Center. You know that plane number two is going to kill all the firefighters while they

are in place."'52

Some military and civilians objected to the decision to evacuate. A few

still combing the building for missing colleagues ignored the order, insisting that

live victims remained trapped inside. Angered, some felt that FBI officials cared

more about protocols and collecting evidence than finding survivors. Ensign Will

Parks later experienced a feeling of guilt and wondered long after what might

have been if he had been allowed back into the building. 3

Minutes after the countdown reached zero and the threat did not materialize, Combs received a communication that the hijacked aircraft had crashed into

Camp David, the presidential compound in Maryland-learning only later that

it had crashed in rural Pennsylvania. At about 10:40 a.m. Schwartz announced

the all clear, and the firefighters converged on the building again.54

Testimony about evacuations of the building on 11 September is confusing and often contradictory; the prevailing turmoil surely blurred perceptions of

time and space. While it is clear that there were three major evacuations-two in

the first hour and one in the afternoon-some groups may have had to leave the

building more than three times during the day. The Reagan National firefighters who tuned in to the airport's control towers rather than the Arlington channel reported pulling back for multiple inbound plane warnings in the morning;

TV reporter David Starter and the Fort Myer Fire Department log both described

receiving another inbound aircraft warning around 11:30 a.m. Some people

pulled back mistaking as threats the military jets and helicopters that flew over

the Pentagon in the morning. Rumors of bomb threats and other alarming hearsay also caused some responders to retreat. No doubt localized evacuations of

84
Figbting the Fire

some parts of the building occurred because hazardous conditions endangered

firefighters and rescuers.55

The disruptive evacuations kept firefighters "on the get go:' requiring

them to scramble back and forth in full protective gear between the building and

safer areas, draining their energy. Captain Durrer from Reagan National remembered that on two or three occasions he had to drop everything, run back across

to Washington Boulevard, and stay there for a while. "Then they'd clear us and

we'd come back across and, you know, we kept getting them:' Search and rescue

efforts were also interrupted. Captain Howes found that the periods between

evacuations were too short for his Reagan National firefighters, loaded with

heavy tools, to complete their assignment. Each time they got into the building,

they made it "virtually nowhere" before being evacuated again. Of most serious

consequence, the morning evacuations cost firefighters progress already made in

suppressing the E Ring fire and allowed it to rekindle with greater intensity. Frustrated as he waited behind a barrier, firefighter Cary Henry saw the outer fire gain

strength. The interruptions also delayed firefighters from advancing on the interior fires and suppressing them.56

Still, fire officers gained a few precious minutes during the morning

inbound plane evacuation to regroup and organize their plans of attack. Arlingtons Chief White held an impromptu meeting with EMS officers so they could

be "smarter going back in:' Howes used the time to plan search missions and

update newly-arriving colleagues. Alan Wallace and Mark Skipper, the firefighters who had been at the Heliport during the attack, finally had a spare moment to

realize they were burned and needed medical attention."

The arrival of some units was delayed by the second evacuation. Several District of Columbia units had reached the perimeter of the Pentagon area

when they were told to stop and take cover under the overpasses because of the

inbound plane report. On "pins and needles" as they waited 15 to 20 minutes, the

firefighters were relieved when they saw a military jet fly overhead. After the all

clear, they moved up to the Pentagon. Battalion Chief John Thumann and Sergeant Richard Zegowitz and their companies joined the Arlington firefighters on

the Heliport side. Although Thumann checked in with the command post via

radio and worked "in liaison" with Arlington's Suppression Branch, some of the

D.C. units operated independently under their own commanders. This gener85
PENTAGON 9/11

ated friction between the departments until Gibbs and Thumann, who knew one

another, succeeded in achieving a measure of coordination."'

Fighting the Fire "Tooth and Nail"

Interruptions made it difficult for the firefighters to make progress; not

until about an hour after impact could they mount a sustained effort against the

interior fires. When the firefighters first arrived, the fire burned most intensely on

the first two floors near the blast hole and in the E, D, and C Rings. After the collapse and during the evacuations, the interior fires intensified, spreading upward

and northward into unrenovated Wedge 2 toward Corridor 5. Although the fire

suppression system in the renovated area had helped slow the fire from spreading

more widely in Wedge 1, by this time it was blazing on all five floors in the outer

three rings of the unrenovated areas. The immediate goal was to prevent the fire

from jumping past the C Ring.5 9

After waiting on the Pentagon outskirts until the threat of a second aircraft attack had passed, David Tinsley steered D.C:s Tower 10 truck carefully

across the lawn to avoid the thick debris that might puncture his tires. Observing the still expanding fire, he positioned the truck with its long ladder to the left

of the impact site and hooked up to a water supply. Gary McKethan operated

the bucket at the top, while Tinsley operated the levers below. For the next few

hours, they directed a stream of water into the interior through windows that had

been burned out, carefully avoiding hitting the firefighters below going in and out

of Corridor 5. McKethan operated in stop-and-go fashion, waiting for crews to

assess the interior before he "threw" more water from the bucket. Later, to avoid

getting stuck in the wet ground, Tinsley repositioned the heavy truck from the

grass onto a cement pad. As specialized tower truck operators the two understood their mission and had little interaction with other departments or the

Arlington command structure.6

"

Firefighters at the Heliport found the foam mixture worked well to

extinguish the external fires and those in the outer ring but when they directed

it toward the blazing inner reaches of the blast zone, whirlwinds blew the foam

back out. It seemed evident to Gibbs, in command of fire suppression there, that

the foam was ineffective for fighting the interior fire.6'

86
Fighting the Fire

The depth of the building made it difficult to attack the innermost part

of the conflagration, in the C Ring. Even Tower 10 had a limited reach. As the

interior continued to blaze, it soon became clear that the firefighters had to go

deeper inside the Pentagon and fight the fire up close, a far more dangerous and

labor-intensive undertaking than directing streams from the outside. They had

to "tooth and nail it'" as D.C. Deputy Fire Chief Martin put it, resulting in "some

pretty hairy moments" for some of the firefighters battling inside.62

After about 11:00 a.m., the firefighters concentrated a two-pronged

attack on the interior fires. On the Heliport side, multiple teams of firefighters

moved inward from the E Ring using Corridor 5 as their primary route. From

the Center Court, firefighters went outward toward the E Ring, moving through

the rings and floors successively. The fires that raged in the C Ring, deep in the

building, proved the most difficult to extinguish. There were too few firefighters to fight the inner ring fires effectively until additional help arrived as the day

advanced.63

The firefighters carried heavy, large-diameter supply hoses into the building and connected them to thinner, hand-held lines. The size of the Pentagon,

its honeycomb structure, and the diverse layout of areas and offices on the different floors and rings, made this an arduous, energy-draining task. To reach the

fires on the upper floors the firefighters connected sections of hoses together and

stretched them down the long corridors and up the stairwells. Because the building's damaged water system now had very low pressure, the water supply had to

come from exterior hydrants, rather than the building standpipes. From the Center Court the firefighters had to extend large-diameter supply hoses to hydrants

outside the building, where civilian and military volunteers assisted in connecting

and stretching out the fire hoses.'

The fire suppression efforts required careful coordination as the firefighters advanced into the inner rings. Working from both directions and on different floors, the teams were out of sight of each other. Under no circumstances

did they want to move forward while an inferno raged beneath them. As Martin

explained, they made sure there was no floor space between groups of firefighters: "If you were on two, there was somebody on one, because fire below you is

a really bad thing." Seeing puddles of water boiling on the concrete floor under

87
PENTAGON 9/11

SECOND FLOOR DAMAGE

CORRIDORCORRIDOR

HELIPORT

CORRIDOR CORRIDOR

CCORRIDOR

RCORRODOR

CORRIDOR CORRIDOR h

1 10

Q Structure Damage

* Fire Damage

* Water and Smoke Damage

their feet, one group of firefighters backed out because the fire burned too hot on

the floor below.61

Dense smoke and limited visibility made for dangerous and challenging

conditions. Many of the electrical fixtures were damaged or destroyed, and the

darkness obscured hazards such as the "hot" electrical wires strewn about. With

water pooling on the floors, electrocution remained a threat until building engineers managed to shut off the electrical power to the affected areas. Moreover, the

firefighters "encountered some of the highest heat conditions they had ever expe88
Fighting the Fire

rienced in any fire" Thejet fuel burned fiercely hot, intensified by the radiant heat

coming from the center of the crash site. Estimates of maximum interior temperatures ranged up to 2,0000 Fahrenheit.66

Each firefighter working inside carried a respirator such as the "SCBA'

(self-contained breathing apparatus), but the air supply lasted only 45 to 60 minutes, not much time to navigate the large building and fight the blaze. Despite

the risks, some delayed using the respirators, breathing in the smoky air as long

as they dared, to prevent being"out of air before they got to a place at which they

were able to do any kind of significant tactical operations" One unit tried several times to extend to the 3rd Floor a supply hose and attach hand lines to it.

Because they had difficulty getting the hoses connected, their air supply ran out

before they could finish. In the end, the unit commander refused to let them try

again until more of the fire was extinguished. Some units ran short on respirators

and air bottles. As a result of this experience, after 11 September departments

enlarged their stocks and ensured that air packs were interchangeable between

regional departments.

After most of the fire had been put out in the E Ring, units moved into

the D Ring through Corridor 5. Battalion Chief Thumann led a group of D.C.

firefighters deep into the building, going first, checking the walls and ceilings for

spalling (cracking) that might cause hot blocks of concrete to fall on them. They

put out pockets of fire as they moved through burnt-out office suites. Their handheld lines reached far enough for them to avoid having to crawl over charred

desks and shifting debris, but the full hoses were heavy. The work was exhausting

and no doubt seemed endless.68

As the fire suppression units beat back the fires, moving up successive

floors and deeper into the rings, other teams continued to search. By late afternoon they could search the upper floors more thoroughly. Reagan National's

Defina led Arlington and Fairfax firefighters from the Heliport to the E and D

Rings to check for bodies and survivors. Advancing down long corridors and

breathing hard from their labor and load of equipment, they rapidly exhausted

their air supply, making it difficult to reach some of the inner locations. Another

group from Reagan National and Alexandria wielded hydraulic and other tools

to force entry through closed doors but found no one. While working on the 5th

Floor they used a part of the 3rd Floor, burned so badly it was open and venti89
PENTAGON 9/11

lated, as a refuge where they could regroup and breathe freely. Tower 10's long

ladder came in handy to reach the upper floors; when one Alexandria firefighter

was overcome by heat exhaustion and dehydration, he was hastily lowered to the

ground in its bucket.69

Additional ladder trucks arriving during the afternoon allowed the firefighters to gain greater access to the interior fires on the upper levels. They set up

"ladder-pipe" operations-hoses running up the ladders and attached to a nozzle

at the tip-to reach the upper floors, sometimes dropping the heavy hoses over

windowsills or down the facade of the building rather than lugging them down

corridors and up stairwells to reach the inner rings and upper floors. Still, it was

not easy. Reagan National's Michael Murphy recollected that it took his group

about 20 minutes just to smash through a 2nd Floor E Ring window from the

inside in order to drop a hose down to a pumper truck,70

The buildings structural complexity compounded the firefighters' problems. While Arlington, Reagan National, and Fort Myer responders had some

familiarity with the building, firefighters from other jurisdictions did not. Military personnel gladly provided directions. One firefighter from Greenbelt, Maryland, operating out of the Center Court was confused by the layout. By sheer

coincidence he spotted Commander George Navas, a naval officer he knew

slightly through his son's Little League, and asked for help. Navas pulled down

from the wall a renovation guide map and traced a path through the interior.

Navas was not surprised that outsiders had difficulty finding their way around

the "puzzle palace:' Sailor Kevin Hazelwood, who remained in the Center Court

for much of the day, led firefighters into and around the building.71

The renovation had made changes in Wedge 1 not yet familiar to most

occupants. PENREN and building engineers advised the fire officers of corridor changes and structural peculiarities, providing them with maps and drawings of the building. Richard Fitzharris, a PENREN group leader, speaking in

the morning with Schwartz about the building, noticed the chief had an outdated drawing. Fitzharris initiated a search for Stacie Condrell, a senior PENREN planner; somehow a DPS officer found her among the crowds by calling

over a bullhorn. Condrell retrieved current drawings, took them to the command

post, and explained the overall design and layout. She spent the day with the fire

suppression command team at the Heliport and helped orient firefighters, FBI

90
Fighting the Fire

agents, and search and rescue teams. Captain Gibbs found the maps crucial as did

D.C. Deputy Chief Martin, who used them to plot assignments and keep track of

the firefighters, an absolute requirement for ensuring their safety. The extremely

hazardous conditions made it a priority to maintain accountability. Fire Marshal

Charles Burroughs from Reagan National and others at the Incident Command

Post tracked the location of crews and what they were doing. Officers at the crash

site set up their own systems to account for their units. 72

During the afternoon, another evacuation disrupted the attack on the

fire. Around 2:00 p.m. Schwartz received notice of another unidentified aircraft

headed for the Pentagon. Once again, the firefighters had to drop their hoses,

climb down high ladders or flights of stairs, and take cover several hundred yards

away. When Schwartz learned that the plane bore federal officials, he ordered his

men and women back to fight the fire.73

The Roof Fire

As the firefighters made progress against the interior fires a new challenge emerged. Early in the day Fitzharris warned Schwartz that a hidden layer

of highly flammable old wood under the Pentagon's slate roof might pose a threat.

If the wood ignited, fire could spread rapidly through the roof and affect much

of the building. By late afternoon it was evident that the fire had indeed ignited

parts of the Pentagon roof.74

The original pitched roofs, capped by slate shingles, covered the E and A

Rings and the 10 radial corridors, while the rest of the building had flat concrete

roofs covered by a layer of granite chips. The pitched slate roof began from the

bottom with a 4 1/2-inch inverted V-shape concrete slab supported by columns.

Underneath the slab was a 2-inch layer of insulation, above it a covering of tarpaper on which stood 2"x2" sleepers (timbers) 16 inches apart that had a wooden

sheathing of random-width planks nailed to them. At the very top, 1/4-inch to

3/8-inch slate shingles were affixed to the wood below. The open spaces in the

sheathing/sleeper structure made conditions ripe for open combustion, allowing

the fire to spread rapidly. With few, if any, "stops" (breaks that flames could not

jump across) in the pitched roofs, the blaze could run freely along the wood layer.

Burning between the hard slate and concrete, the fire was difficult to access."

91
PENTAGON 9/11

Several hypotheses suggest how the wooden layer caught fire. The blast

may have spewed jet fuel onto the roof, saturating it, although it is difficult to

envision how the fuel seeped through the slate layers. Or, when the giant fireball

rolled over the top of the building, falling debris may have penetrated the roof

line. Another plausible theory is that the collapse exposed wooden roof areas of

the E Ring, making them vulnerable as the fire intensified and spread upward.76

In the afternoon a team searching the 5th Floor unsuccessfully attempted

to reach the fire. Typically with a roof fire, firefighters would "poke holes in the

ceiling and rip the ceiling down" then "take a ladder and stick a nozzle up in there

and put the fire out." But Captain Howes found that this "bullet proof building;"

with its concrete decking, rendered these tactics useless. The roof fire burned so

long because they'"ust couldn't get to it:' 77

Crews climbed up truck ladder extensions or from the 5th Floor onto the

roof and tried to put out the fire from above. D.C:s Tower 10 used its bucket to

ferry equipment up to the roof. Groups of firefighters attacked different sectors.

Some time after 2:00 p.m. D.C. Chief Charles Drumming took command of several Alexandria and Arlington companies that worked on one sector of the obstinate fire for"a long period of time;' he remembered. These firefighters thought the

roof had been "breached" from below but were not certain where or how. They

called on the Fairfax County Urban Search and Rescue team to use a powerful

saw known as a"Dig Bird" to cut a hole in the E Ring roof. Even with the special

tool this took considerable time. After finding the inner layer of wood and the

concrete below, they concluded that the fire was "moving along the various sections of the roof" above the crash site.78

As darkness fell on 11 September, Chief Schwartz withdrew the crews

from the roof, switching from an offensive to a defensive strategy. He distrusted

the pitched roof's safety as a working platform for the fatigued firefighters since

he knew neither the scope of the damage done to the roof nor its soundness. Also

he was uncertain about the structure and composition of the roofing materials

and whether there was insulation that might be acting as an accelerant.* Danger

threatened at every turn; in the dim lighting one could easily slip on the sloping

roof and fall into the wide gaps between the rings and radial corridors.79

* It is unclear to what extent insulation, known by the name of horsehair, proved an accelerant, in that it lay

above the 5th Floor ceiling but below the concrete slab, and was not present in the wooden sheathing layer

of the pitched roof through which the fire spread.

92
Fighting the Fire

Until daybreak firefighters fought the roof fire from the outside with

large streams of water pumped up through ladder pipes and large monitor nozzles to try to contain the fire. Not everyone was happy with the decision. One

participant likened this standoff to"babysitting" the fire. An onlooker, Lieutenant

Colonel Harold Campbell, found the battle dramatic. He saw outlined against

the night sky a fireman standing on a ladder, shooting water down onto the roof:

"The fire goes away and he stays up there because it comes right back.... It just

doesn't go away."'8

By daybreak the roof fire was still making significant headway. Determined DoD workers who returned to their offices on the morning of 12 September saw firefighters still pumping water onto the burning roof. The overnight

spraying had done little to stop the flames; they stubbornly kept rekindling. Ultimately, the roof fire did not critically affect the building's structural stability, but

the televised scenes of the flames that allowed the world to watch the Pentagon

burn overnight made things seem worse than they were. According to Schwartz,

the night of 11 September Secretary Rumsfeld kept asking when the fire was

going to be out so "he could have his building back:' A report that the roof fire

was approaching crucial communication equipment heightened anxiety; if damaged, Defense command and control capabilities would be seriously compromised. Fortunately, the firefighters prevented the fire from reaching that far.8'

New crews rotated in. The only way to reach the fire was to open up

the roof. In a backbreaking task, the firefighters swung heavy sledgehammers to

smash through the slate and wood and put hose streams into the holes to stop the

fire's spread. It became a chase."If you put some water in the middle, then the fire

is going to go out to the left. If you put water out to the left, it's going to go back

to the right:' Once a fire had gotten into the wood in the open spaces, the best

thing was "to cut it off" on two ends. The most viable and safest tactic, although

time-consuming, was to make trench cuts on either side of the fire to serve as firebreaks and so prevent the flames from traveling all the way around the building.

There were hazards; if the firefighters did not make the cuts sufficiently far from

the wood burning underneath, they could fall through the weakened structure.

Fatigued as they were, their judgment could easily be impaired. To avoid risk,

they made the cuts well away from the burning areas and then left the fire to burn

93
PENTAGON 9/11

ROOF DAMAGE

CORRIDOR

CORRIDOR 56 CO

HELIPORT

CORRIDOR 4 CRDRIDOR 7

3ORIO CORRIDOR

• • •CORRIDOR

\0WCORRIDOR CORRIDOR / ot

1 10

El Structure Damage

* Fire Damage

between the cuts. While this may have allowed more of the roof to burn, it kept

the firefighters safe.82

The firefighters continued battling the roof fire throughout the morning and afternoon of the 12th except when they were interrupted briefly around

10:00 a.m. by another evacuation order in response to a mistaken warning of an

inbound plane.83 By early evening, for the most part both the roof and the interior fires had been contained. At 6:00 p.m. Arlington County issued a cautious

press release stating that the Fire Department considered the fire "controlled" but

not fully "extinguished"; it might flare up again. Over the course of the next few

94
Fighting the Fire

days, firefighters mopped up some hot spots on the roof, but the need to do so

was minimized when a contractor cleared debris all the way down to the concrete

roof base. In the end, fire burned the roof of E Ring between Corridors 4 and 5,

as well as the roofs of those corridors, part of A Ring near Corridor 4, and part

of Corridor 3.84

In succeeding days, the firefighters extinguished small fires caused when

residual heat ignited pools of jet fuel that remained in the building. On the 13th,

TV cameras caught a flare-up of rubble in the collapsed area that Schwartz knew

had continued to smolder. It led to a wryly humorous moment when a concerned

television viewer in San Francisco called the Arlington County 911 number to

report that "the Pentagon was on fire again" As Schwartz remarked, the visual

was graphic, but the flare-up posed little threat,.5

Searching and Shoring

Fighting fire is only one of the tasks confronting fire departments. Integral to the central work of firefighting is searching for survivors and preventing

building collapse. A huge and intense fire such as that at the Pentagon demanded

search and shoring resources far beyond those possessed by the Arlington and

other fire departments that came to its assistance. As the fire raged on during the morning of the 11th, Schwartz recognized that the formidable task facing him would require the services of many more highly skilled, specialized,

and well-equipped professional units. Fortunately, such assistance was available

from Army engineers and Urban Search and Rescue Teams (US&R) from Fairfax County, Virginia, Montgomery County, Maryland, and elsewhere. Schwartz

requested the dispatch of the US&R teams.

Although highly qualified for search, rescue, and shoring operations,

these units could not arrive in time-within the first hour after the attack-to

rescue any survivors. The initial mission assigned them by Schwartz after they

began arriving in the afternoon of the 11th was to search the impact area to the

extent possible and report on the conditions they encountered. They noted bodies and body remains but in accordance with instructions left them for the FBI to

deal with. Their main contribution thereafter-an indispensable one-was shoring up areas of the building in danger of collapse.86

95
PENTAGON 9/11

The only one of its kind in the U.S. Army, the engineer company of the

Military District of Washington (MDW), stationed at Fort Belvoir, 15 miles

south of the Pentagon, had the mission of rescuing survivors of building breakdowns and preventing such collapses in emergencies. Intended chiefly for employment in the National Capital Region, before 11 September its services had never

been called on.8

"

The company's 76 soldiers included a heavy platoon equipped with bulldozers, bucket loaders, dump trucks, and other equipment; a light platoon of four

squads, each with a leader and two three-soldier teams to carry out confinedspace rescue operations and render medical assistance; and a command and logistical platoon. Equipment included high-speed saws, steel-cutting torches, jackhammers, breathing equipment, and lumber and other materials for use in shoring up structures."

Shortly after the attack, MDW alerted the company and Captain Aaron

Barta prepared his troops for deployment; within 40 minutes, they were ready to

go. At the direction of MDW Commander Major General James Jackson, Barta

flew by helicopter with his Initial Reconnaissance Team (IRT), one of the four

light rescue squads, to Fort McNair in the nation's capital. There he conferred

with Jackson, who told him to delay committing the engineer company because

of concerns about another possible attack in the Washington area. Jackson and

Barta then proceeded to the Pentagon, which they reached after 12:00 p.m., and

reported to Schwartz. Soon after, Jackson gave the order to deploy the full company to the site. The IRT arrived from Fort McNair by 1:00 p.m. With the help

of a police escort, the rest of the company from Fort Belvoir reached the Pentagon

sometime between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m.8

"

About a half hour after his troops from Fort Belvoir arrived Captain Barta

ordered one three-soldier rescue team into the impact area to assess damage and

rescue any survivors on the 1st and 2nd Floors. Although equipped with breathing equipment, the team could not progress very far into the building because of

the intense heat and thick smoke. In the short time spent in the building the soldiers found no survivors but reported seeing"lots of bodies [but] ... no signs of

life."90

Less than an hour later another rescue team headed by Sergeant Eric

Godbehere entered the Pentagon from the south side between Corridors 3 and

96
Fighting the Fire

4 and approached the impact area, making their way through hallways littered

with rubble. When they opened doors "to some of the rooms ... the temperature

would jump up 50 to 100 degrees." As the team members advanced, the more

they encountered "rooms that ... [weren't] even recognizable as rooms anymore"

They found no one alive. Godbehere estimated that his team encountered about

20 bodies or remains during the days that they searched.91

Like the firefighters who had preceded them, the search teams had to

endure an environment of high heat, toxic smoke, poor lighting, and mounds

of rubble in a still smoldering building. During the early searches the possibility

existed that more of the partially collapsed building might fall on them, a calamity

they later helped to avoid by laboring desperately to shore up weakened areas.

To keep track of rescuers inside the building, each soldier had a Velcro name tag attached to his helmet. As the soldiers entered the Pentagon, each

removed his name tag and handed it to a checker, who placed it on a display

board indicating each team's working area. Team members retrieved their tags

and returned them to their helmets as they left the building. Each team had a

hand-held radio for communication with the command post. Team members

also wore an alarm that sounded if they failed to move after a short period of

time. By 5:30 p.m. the Army engineers had determined that no one remained

alive in the searched areas.92

In an additional dangerous task some of the engineers assisted the firefighters in battling the persistent roof fire that continued to imperil the building through the second day. Working on the sloping roof they cut and punctured

holes in the slate to permit ventilation of the fire in the wooden sheathing below.

They spent many hours on the roof, not descending until about 9:00 p.m. on 11

September.93

In response to Schwartz's morning request, highly-trained Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) units joined in the search phase during the

afternoon and in subsequent work in the building for the next 10 days. Trucks

and buses brought in the US&R teams from Fairfax and Montgomery Counties.

Schwartz and the Army engineer company had worked with both of them previously. The Fairfax team pulled into the Pentagon staging area about 2:00 p.m.;

the Montgomery team arrived later in the afternoon.94

97
PENTAGON 9/11

Established in 1989 by FEMA, the national Urban Search and Rescue

Team program received half of its normal operating and training expenses from

the federal government while local jurisdictions covered the other half. In September 2001, 28 US&R groups around the country, each with about 62 members, were subject to recall on six hours' notice, drawing federal pay only when

activated. The well-trained men and women of these groups, working at civilian

jobs until called to duty, possessed emergency firefighting, engineering, construction, medical, search-dog handler, and other specialized skills. Normally, each

team deployed search, rescue, technical, and medical sections.9

"

The US&R teams, equipped with "sensitive listening equipment .. medical supplies as well as enough food, water and shelter ... for up to 72 hours;' provided emergency response to natural and man-made disasters. Their availability to provide direct support in local emergencies largely relieved state and local

jurisdictions subject to fires, earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and tornadoes from

having to buy and maintain specialized equipment and train personnel."6

Late on 11 September Schwartz asked FEMA to deploy two more teams

to the Pentagon site to assist the Fairfax and Montgomery units. A team of 77

people from Virginia Beach, Virginia, arrived in Washington that evening, spent

the night awaiting orders, and did not reach the Pentagon until early the next

afternoon. Meanwhile, after driving all night, a team from Memphis, Tennessee,

arrived at the site at noon, shortly before the Virginia Beach team. Thereafter, the

two Virginia teams worked the 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. shift; the Maryland and

Tennessee teams handled daytime duties. During the second week of the operation, a US&R team from New Mexico arrived to relieve the Fairfax and Montgomery units.17

Over a two-week period teams performed with dedication and perseverance under the direction of a FEMA Incident Support Team (IST)* responsible

to Schwartz. The US&R teamsjoined the Army engineers in searching for survivors and body remains and reporting conditions in the building. With more people and resources than the Army engineer company could muster they did most

of the shoring on the 1st and 2nd Floors and helped fight the roof fires.98

* ISTs are composed of highly experienced specialists drawn from all parts of trle country who are rapid

responders to crises and coordinate and supervise the US&R teams. They are responsible to the Incident

Commander.

98
Fighting the Fire

Preventing the collapse of ceilings, floors, and walls, and especially the

supporting columns greatly weakened by the impact of Flight 77 and the resulting fire, became the major task of the US&R teams and the Army engineer company. Once the teams had determined that no one remained alive in the affected

area, it became critical to protect the lives of other responders, who could not

be permitted to enter damaged segments of the building until they were judged

safe.

The shoring units faced a formidable task. The building had sustained

massive damage."Exterior blast, interior blast, kinetic impact, and fire all impacted

the structure with enormous force" Most of the columns in the collapsed zone

had been destroyed and some of the remaining ones were "stripped and bowed,

retaining little structural strength;' causing the E Ring section collapse almost 40

minutes after the attack. 99

The first shoring operation did not begin until 11:45 p.m. on 11 September. To safeguard entry into Army and Navy offices on the 1st Floor E Ring,

Army engineers and Fairfax and Montgomery US&R team members reinforced an exterior Pentagon wall just north of the impact point toward Corridor 5. Around a damaged column, the teams typically placed a "crib," chiefly 6"x6"

wooden timbers 4 to 6 feet long in a box as high as 15.5 feet, even using cribs to

replace columns completely eliminated by the crash. The box-like reinforcement

rose as alternating pairs of timbers emplaced from floor to ceiling like "Lincoln

Log" toy structures. The teams also employed a "nine-point crib" three-by-three

layout that had a load capacity of 68 tons; one solid crib of eight-by-eight layout

had an estimated capacity of 576 tons."' 0

The fast pace of work by the engineers and US&R units soon consumed

the lumber brought with them to the site. To assure the speediest delivery of the

huge supply of timbers still required, PENREN officials and FEMA authorized

purchases of materials on the local retail market. Commercial firms responded

quickly in supplying the additional structural reinforcing materials, estimated to

have cost hundreds of thousands of dollars."'0

Overall, US&R teams and the Army engineers shored 42 damaged or

destroyed columns on the 1st Floor and 6 columns on the 2nd Floor. Some of

this shoring created supports where none had existed before, further guaranteeing the stability of the building. Another 40 columns on the two floors received

99
PENTAGON 9/11

some shoring. No shoring was needed on the upper floors. For more than a week

the US&R and Army engineer units worked in shifts 24 hours a day on structural operations, laboring long hours under appalling conditions that afflicted the

senses. Their labors prevented further deterioration of areas adjacent to the collapsed space.l11 2

To oversee the emergency shoring work PENREN called on Allyn

Kilsheimer, head of several Washington, D.C., structural engineering companies

and widely experienced in dealing with building disasters. Kilsheimer arrived on

the scene about 5:00 p.m. on 11 September and soon after entered the building

to assess its condition, especially how far inside it was safe to go, providing guidance to emergency teams and occupants seeking to reenter. He directed shoring teams on what had to be done and where, seeing the work through to a successful conclusion during the next weeks. Subsequently, he accepted responsibility for demolition and rebuilding of the destroyed area of the Pentagon. His

contribution to the recovery effort-saving endangered areas-would be widely

acknowledged.""

Logistics

A number of agencies, of which the Arlington Emergency Operations

Center (EOC) was chief, provided crucial communications and logistics support

to the firefighting. Activated only in times of disaster, EOC was staffed by county

officials and workers who supported all emergency field operations. Around the

clock for 14 days EOC oversaw to good effect the flow of replacement personnel,

equipment, shelter, food, and water to the Pentagon; yet the center was not without deficiencies in performing these difficult tasks, especially in the early days. t 1 4

Within 15 minutes of the crash, the EOC was in full operation at municipal headquarters two miles north of the Pentagon. Captain Mark Penn, on only

his second day as deputy coordinator of emergency services, assumed management of staff operations with the assistance of Battalion Chief Ray Blankenship; both were from the Arlington Fire Department. The county manager led

the decisionmaking, and senior county officials, including the fire chief, served as

policy advisers.)"

Penn ran the center for some 20 hours straight. The first few hours at

EOC were "chaotic." Fire and police officers at the Pentagon could not be reached,

100
Fighting the Fire

forcing the center to rely on media reports until direct communication with the

command post was finally established. DoD officials communicated directly with

the incident commander rather than coordinating through EOC.'"

Expecting large numbers of casualties, Penn immediately secured additional EMS assistance. With the help of the Virginia Department of Emergency Management, Penn arranged for ambulances and medical units to come

from as far away as Fredericksburg and the Shenandoah Valley, 50 to 100 miles

to the south and west. Around 11:30 a.m. Arlington County Manager Ron Carlee declared a local state of disaster after consulting with Schwartz. Working with

the Virginia state government, Carlee cut through the cumbersome process for

obtaining state and federal assistance, facilitating rapid deployment of FEM~s

Urban Search and Rescue Teams that Schwartz urgently needed. 1

1

7

From start to finish, EOC had the primary responsibility for ensuring that the emergency workers received whatever they needed, even as requirements changed. By early afternoon, Schwartz had assigned Chief White to set up

a logistics section at the site to coordinate equipment requests and pass them to

EOC. Working with White and commanders who succeeded him, EOC requisitioned materials and specialized equipment. Supplied with catalogs, computers, and telephones and given carte blanche, purchasing agents culled from county

offices secured a wide range of supplies-fencing, boots, bottles, hoses, airpacks,

cranes, gloves, thermal imagers, fuel, dump trucks, school buses, and public works

vehicles.'' 8

Logistics also involved providing for daily needs-clothing, shelter,

health, food, and sanitation-a gargantuan task, given that crews numbering

many hundreds worked 24 hours a day. On scene, White found EOC staff indispensable, especially when portable toilets became an urgent necessity the first

afternoon. For the first several days, EOC coordinated the supply of food and

beverages. Penn relied on the food services contractor for the Arlington County

Jail to feed emergency workers before the Red Cross, Salvation Army, volunteer

agencies, and restaurant chains set up a variety of food services at an area designated Camp Unity on the Pentagon grounds.109

Help came from other quarters also. On the first day, when fire suppression was still crucial, private companies donated truckloads of bottled water,

flashlights, batteries, and other critical equipment. On 12 September, a Wiscon101
PENTAGON 9/11

sin factory delivered specialty boots that workers desperately needed to replace

their rubble-damaged ones. Early on, after Plaugher made a chance remark that

the site would become a quagmire if it rained, the Army Corps of Engineers rapidly built an all-weather road that became the primary access route to the site

for all vehicles; the engineers also installed telephone and electric cables. PENREN, too, supplied equipment, supplementing the EOC system. On the first

day it procured backhoes, dump trucks, dumpsters, cranes, generators, and light

towers-all indispensable for the heavy work under way. At White's request the

Fairfax County Fire Department sent an experienced logistics team to assist. In

Schwartz's opinion logistical needs were met handsomely, but from time to time

there were anxious moments.11

The EOC also helped coordinate activities of the many supporting organizations, including the Department of Health and Human Services, Environmental Protection Agency, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S.

Forest Service, Red Cross, and Salvation Army. "You name it ... everybody that

we possibly could need was brought to bear on the problem;' Penn later observed.

A spirit of generosity and fellowship pervaded these support efforts, from the

Arlington County Sheriff who brought 40 pizzas to the workers in the middle of

the night to the local businessman who provided a warehouse.' 11

Operational Coordination

On the afternoon of 11 September Schwartz decided to institute a unified command team* in the belief that he would benefit by incorporating in the

decisionmaking process key representatives from the principal responding agencies with jurisdictional responsibilities. Finding that some newly arriving agency

representatives were not checking in at the command post or were unfamiliar

with the Incident Command System, Schwartz also wanted to ensure that organizations operated within the system. He anticipated that more units from many

local, state, and federal agencies and volunteer groups would arrive in the follow-

* The ICS provided also for adoption of a Unified Command (UC), "an important element in multi-jurisdictional or multi-agency domestic incident management. It provides guidelines to enable agencies with

different legal, geographic, and functional responsibilities to coordinate, plan, and interact effectively....

In a UC structure, the individuals designated by their jurisdictional authorities jointly determine objectives, plans, and priorities and work together." (National Incident Management System, Dept of Homeland Security, 1 Mar 04, 14, 16.) Schwartz modified this UC by retaining final authority for the Incident

Commander.

102
Fighting the Fire

ing days, some of them unsolicited, making a centralized command team all the

more essential to prevent utter chaos.

At a meeting in the Pentagon on the evening of 11 September, agency

representatives-more than a hundred-introduced themselves. After describing the ICS Schwartz announced that he was appointing a unified command

team, all the while emphasizing that his fire department had ultimate command

and he would remain the final decisionmaker. At the end of the meeting, MDW

Commander General Jackson introduced himself as the DoD representative

"appointed to make sure" Schwartz got everything he needed. Later in the evening Schwartz met with the unified command team, including FBI agent Combs,

Jackson, Arlington Police Chief Edward Flynn, and two FEMA representatives.

Over the next days, the team held meetings at regular intervals to keep each other

informed about developments.1 2

The evening of the 11th the FBI announced plans to set up a Joint Operations Center (JOC) at the Fort Myer Community Center that all responding

federal agencies could use to facilitate their assistance to local entities. The FBI

also planned to run its criminal investigation from the JOC. Although uncertain

that it could be as effective at Fort Myer, Schwartz agreed to the FBI's request to

move his command post to the JOC, which became operational by early morning on the 12th. The inadequacy of the new setup became apparent on the morning of the 12th when the air traffic control tower at Reagan National informed

fire officers at the Pentagon that an airplane was approaching the building. This

transmission bypassed the Incident Command Post at theJOC, which knew that

the plane bore FEMA personnel. Arlington Assistant Chief Shawn Kelley-who

replaced Schwartz at t&e JOC as incident commander for the day shift on the

12th and then regularly took over the night shift beginning the 14th-had difficulty breaking through the radio chatter but finally managed to inform the Pentagon firefighters that the plane was friendly."'

Schwartz realized that the incident commander could not function effectively so far from the action, especially when his only view of the incident scene

was through fuzzy television monitors. On the 13th he moved the command post

back to the Pentagon vicinity. Chief White served as Schwartz's representative

at the JOC. FBI agent Combs returned to work on-site with Schwartz. White

103
PENTAGON 9/11

believed this arrangement worked well for the most part and that the two posts

succeeded in making joint decisions as necessary.1 14

Presenting a "public face" was an important element of the unification

and coordination process. While functioning as senior adviser to Schwartz, Chief

Plaugher took on responsibility for managing public relations for the duration.

As evening fell on 11 September he realized that no arrangements had been

made to provide the public with reports. DoD's press office, although active,

focused on the broad picture rather than details, and to Plaugher's disappointment the FBI had declined to set up a joint information center to fill that role.

Americans urgently wanted news, particularly of the human toll, about which the

media had only unofficial bits of information. To meet this need, Plaugher conducted ajoint press conference with General Jackson at 11:00 p.m. Subsequently

Dick Bridges, the Arlington County deputy manager, assumed the spokesman

role, although Plaugher continued to make appearances."'

Dealing with the press could have misleading outcomes as Plaugher

learned the day after the attack when he conscientiously estimated a range of

100 to 800 casualties. The press melodramatically reported the higher number.

Among his other tasks, Plaugher greeted the vice president, members of Congress, and other high-ranking officials and dignitaries visiting the scene. He

came away from the experience thoroughly convinced that the ICS should add a

senior adviser akin to an "executive incident commander" to serve as "a big picture

person."'16

On the morning of the 12th, the incident commander began releasing

firefighting crews from the District of Columbia and other nearby jurisdictions;

fresh units replaced them. There were no fatalities among firefighters and other

responders. Finally, at 7:00 a.m. on 21 September, the Arlington County Fire

Department turned over control of the site to the FBI, which continued its search

for evidence and remains at the declared crime site. Thereafter only a firefighting

company, a technical rescue team, and paramedics remained on scene until control was turned back to DoD."17

After the fire was contained, late in the afternoon on 12 September Captain David Lange (Fairfax County) led a crew of firefighters and soldiers to the

roof where they draped a huge American flag over the side of the building, just

south of the impact point, near Corridor 4. The flag was unfurled moments

104
Fighting the Fire

before President Bush arrived at the Pentagon to witness the tragic scene and

thank emergency workers. The president and Secretary Rumsfeld joined the

gathering of fire and rescue workers and soldiers, shaking hands and offering

words of encouragement. Secured on top of the roof, the flag waved gently in

the breeze. For those present, the unveiling of the flag and the president's arrival

helped lift morale after two days of unremitting toil and raw emotion. The picture of the huge flag flanked by firefighters and soldiers would become familiar to

many, symbolizing not only the tragedy of 11 September but also the prevailing

spirit of endurance and hope. 18

105
CHAPTER V

Treating the Injured, Searching for

Remains

In the hours and days after the attack firefighters, medical personnel,

trained rescue teams, and other military and civilian responders and volunteers

initially searched for survivors and later for human remains. They made their

way into smoke-filled corridors to rescue the wounded, set up triage stations outside, and transported victims to local hospitals and clinics. During the terrifying

time between the attack at 9:37 a.m. and the building evacuation ordered around

10:15 a.m. under threat of another attack, virtually all the injured who could be

recovered were removed from the building.

The dead remained. Some were entombed under tons of rubble, some

perished intact in their offices, some lay in stairwells or corridors where they had

tried to escape, and some bodies were too battered or fragmented to be identifiable. Remains recovery proceeded in two steps-locating and removing bodies

from the building, and sifting through debris gathered and deposited in North

Parking. The difficult task of searching the wreckage for victims or parts of them,

documenting their whereabouts, and removing them for identification fell principally to Federal Emergency Management Agency search and rescue teams, Army

engineers, FBI agents, Marine Corps photographers, cadaver dogs and their handlers, and the young soldiers of the Old Guard (3rd Infantry Regiment) from

Fort Myer. Not until 26 September was this sad work declared finished.
Treating the Injured, Searching for Remains

Medical Assistance

To nurse Deborah Lutgen, director of the Arlington Urgent Care Center

a few blocks from the Pentagon, the concussion "felt like we... [were] in a huge

warehouse .... A lot of the roof is metal and ... the whole place kind of vibrated

for quite some time afterwards." Nearby at the Rader Army Health Clinic at

Fort Myer, after announcing a "Code Yellow" for a mass casualty situation, officials ordered an evacuation of the building and once an all clear sounded stood

by to receive casualties. Arlington County's Emergency Communications Center

alerted several local hospitals to activate their disaster and emergency preparedness plans. Other trauma centers were notified by airport authorities or learned

of the attack from news reports. The ECC dispatched Arlington County Emergency Medical Service units and asked nearby Fairfax County, Alexandria, and

District of Columbia fire departments to send theirs.2

Two medical facilities, the Army's DiLorenzo Tricare Health Clinic

(DTHC) and the Air Force Flight Medicine Clinic, provided outpatient care

in the Pentagon. With over 200 staff people in newly relocated basement offices

just inside the Corridor 8 entrance, the DiLorenzo Clinic offered primary and

emergency care to DoD civilian employees and military from all of the services.'

The smaller Air Force Clinic on the 4th Floor at 4A750, the apex between Corridors 7 and 8, served only Air Force military personnel. The attack did not find

this in-house medical community unprepared for a large-scale disaster. Just as

local and federal emergency preparedness units had trained to cope with contingencies involving weapons of mass destruction, the two clinics routinely staged

mass casualty "tabletop" exercises. The scenario changed for each drill; presciently,

training carried out the previous May supposed casualties resulting from an accidental crash of a twin-engine airliner into the west side of the building. This

premise was adopted at the suggestion of Colonel John Baxter, commander of

the Air Force Clinic, who, like everybody else in the building, was reminded often

that the Pentagon was on the Reagan National Airport's flight path. The exercise

assumed that the two Pentagon clinics would treat patients inside their facilities.'

Instead, circumstances on 11 September compelled the medics to perform triage

in the Center Court and in the parking lots, grassy areas, and roads surrounding

the Pentagon.

107
PENTAGON 9/11

Unlike many of their colleagues elsewhere in the building, people in the

below-ground DiLorenzo Clinic did not feel or hear the impact of the crash. No

lights flickered, no phones went dead. Ironically, the clinic's director, Army Colonel James Geiling, on duty that day at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center in

northwest Washington, learned of the crash before his staff did. On phoning his

office, he later recalled, he asked his secretary what was going on "and she said,

'What do you mean what's going on?' She hadn't even heard."' Moments later an

Air Force officer raced into the clinic and shouted that a plane had hit the building and for everybody to get out. At first nobody knew the location of the disaster

area; calls to the Defense Protective Service for information went unanswered.

But there was an announcement to "evacuate, evacuate, evacuate" and hundreds of

people and billowing smoke began filling the hallways. As patients began arriving

or were carried in, the clinic activated its mass casualty plan.

Mass casualty situations called for the staff to assemble in the clinic's

front lobby or, in the event of evacuation, rally outside the River Entrance by

the flagpole. Major Lorie Brown, chief nurse and chairperson for the DiLorenzo

Action Response Team, took charge in Geiling's absence. Her job, she later explained, was "to manage, medically, the scene, directing traffic as it were:' Fairly

quickly the team set up medical aid stations at several locations and, when communication was possible, deployed to areas as requested by the DPS. A 10-person team remained inside the clinic. Brown directed the triage site outside in the

North Parking area near the Pentagon Athletic Club (PAC) and constituted new

teams as needed.6

Pushing their way through the crowds leaving the building, the chief

nurse of the Acute Care Section, Army Captain Jennifer Glidewell, and another

medic headed inside toward the Center Court. Since she was familiar with mass

casualty exercise procedures, Glidewell assisted patients there and directed other

medically trained volunteers until the evacuation order about 10:15 a.m. forced

most medical personnel and patients to leave the Center Court and retreat to the

outside of the building.

Colonel Baxter was attending a patient in the Air Force Clinic when he

heard the alarms sounding. On going out into the 4th Floor hallway he realized

"that this was not a fire drill. This was a true emergency:' Baxter and others in the

clinic grabbed prepared portable trauma packs and hurried to the DiLorenzo

108
Treating the Injured, Searcbing for Remains

Clinic where all Pentagon clinic staffs were to receive instructions. From there

they went to Corridor 5 on the 2nd Floor at the A Ring where they treated a

badly burned Army officer."8

Despite the evacuation order, Baxter and five members of his medical team then headed upstairs to search for other wounded. As they moved up

from floor to floor they encountered noxious smoke and a few people, whom

they encouraged to leave the building. Finding no one on the 5th Floor they

returned to the 1st Floor, eyes burning and throats choking. On reaching the

Center Court the team began to treat patients lying on the ground. When the

warning of another airplane threat came around 10:15, Baxter recalled, "we gathered up our equipment, the patients, and ... actually ran through the building"

and out Corridor 8, where the team joined in the triage work near the PAC. Subsequently Baxter and his assistants made their way to the crash site on the west

side of the building and helped set up triage areas for the critically injured. Concerned that he had left his clinic unlocked, later in the day Baxter and"several others were able to basically talk our way back into the Pentagon:' In the clinic they

"turned off all of the electrical equipment, secured the pharmacy, secured the safe

with controlled substances, and then got.., back out to the site" Late in the afternoon, when it seemed certain there were no more survivors to assist, Baxter sent

his people home.9

Air Force Surgeon General Lieutenant General Paul Carlton, Jr., who

had approved the Air Force proposal for the May exercise, made his way from his

office on the 5th Floor to the DiLorenzo Clinic, volunteering to head one of the

teams of medics that deployed to the Center Court, a seemingly safe area where

people had begun to gather as they staggered from their offices. There he established a casualty collection point near the apex of Corridors 3 and 4, then led one

of the teams back into the building to A-E Drive to rescue survivors from the

C Ring. Based on a "lesson learned" from the recent exercise, medical personnel

donned newly purchased blue flame-resistant vests with bright reflective stripes

so that amid the confusion they could be identified as medics.1 °

Joining other medically trained personnel on duty in the building that

morning was a skilled veteran of an earlier tragedy, Army nurse Lieutenant

Colonel Patricia Horoho. In March 1994, as chief nurse of the hospital emer-

* Lieutenant Colonel Brian Birdwell. See Chapter III.

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PENTAGON 9/11

gency room at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, she had participated in the urgent

response to the "Green Ramp" disaster, a terrible accident in which an Air Force

F-16 fighter collided with a C-130 transport, then plummeted to the tarmac and

careened into a parked C-141, killing 24 paratroopers and injuring and burning

another 43."1 On 11 September Horoho was assigned to the Army's Personnel

and Health Management Policy Office, located on the north side of the Pentagon. Leaving from the Mall Entrance after the crash she came around the building toward the Heliport where she directed people to the safer grassy area near a

tree that became known as the "triage tree:' A driver who had stopped on Route

27 (Washington Boulevard) gave her a first-aid bag containing basic medical

materials, and she borrowed a belt from a senior officer to use as a tourniquet.

She instructed volunteers how to employ an intravenous tube and treated survivors with puncture wounds from blast fragments and others who were burned or

had inhaled toxic smoke.12

In the first hours after Flight 77 struck the Pentagon, many health care

providers materialized from off-site to offer their services. Eventually, Horoho

recalled, "we had physicians from Walter Reed. We had physicians from Bethesda

[Naval Hospital]. We had physicians and nurses from all civilian hospitals in

the area, as well as the medical ... students from the Industrial College of the

Armed Forces" at Fort McNair in Washington."3 From the Rader Clinic at Fort

Myer came a team of five physicians and a physician's assistant led by Colonel

John Roser, who had been alerted virtually at the time of impact that morning.

Roser thought they could reach the Pentagon more quickly on foot than by vehicle so they "high tailed it down there"; partway they were picked up by a man

driving a van. Eventually other Rader medics with two patient transport vehicles

joined them. At the Pentagon they divided into smaller teams under the direction of Arlington County Fire and EMS officers, treating an estimated halfdozen patients. Remaining at Fort Myer, Colonel Lorraine Jennings, deputy commander for clinical services and nursing, set up three triage areas for possible use

in an adjoining parking lot, and oversaw the emergency operations center inside

the clinic."4

Dr. James Vafier, medical director of Alexandria's Fire and Emergency

Medical Services, accompanying a unit of paramedics on a mission that morning, was less than two miles from the Pentagon when the airplane struck. When

110
Treating the Injured, Searching for Remains

Vafier arrived shortly after 10:00 a.m., Arlington County Assistant Fire Chief

John White, commanding the EMS Branch under the incident command system,

appointed him the command physician. Beside Route 27 Vafier set up the standard color-coded triage arrangement for determining the order of treatment and

evacuation of patients: red for people needing immediate care, yellow for those

whose treatment could wait, and green for those whose injuries were slight. Vafier

did not set up a black site for those with injuries so severe they had little chance of

survival and could benefit only from palliative measures."

Vafier and Horoho assumed primary responsibility for coordinating

medical operations near the impact site. Assisting them was Air Force Master Sergeant Noel Sepulveda, one of the first people on the scene. A reservist

on active duty at an Air Force office in Arlington, Sepulveda had been a combat

medic in Vietnam many years earlier. That morning he had gone to the Pentagon

to take a promotion test only to learn that it had been cancelled. On returning to

South Parking to get his motorbike, Sepulveda watched Flight 77 smash into the

building. The explosion knocked him back against a pole, but not realizing that

he had sustained a head injury he ran around the building to join rescue efforts

and help set up the triage station, using a bullhorn to summon medical personnel

in the immediate vicinity."

The main difficulty in treating casualties resulted not from organizational

confusion or jurisdictional disputes but from the immense size of the Pentagon

and its many exits, which made it difficult at times to determine where available

resources were most needed. Firefighters battled the blaze on two fronts-on the

west side of the building and from the Center Court. The injured were evacuated via several routes, emerging randomly hundreds of yards apart. Victims who

could not be evacuated through the blazing outer rings to the west side were initially taken to the Center Court, where many of the most seriously injured were

gathered. Also, in the first half hour many people stopped at the DiLorenzo

Clinic for treatment. From both places and from the triage site near the Pentagon

Athletic Club area, people moved to the huge North Parking area.

Sometime around 10:15 a.m., medical operations were disrupted when

Incident Commander Schwartz, alarmed by reports of another attack, ordered

evacuation of the crash site and building vicinity. Chief White remembered telling the medics on the west side, "I don't care what you've got to do, get these peo111
PENTAGON 9/111

pie ... out of here, and you all figure out where you're going to take them once

you get en route. Just get them out:' As a result, he added, "no matter what their

criticality was, they immediately became load-and-go patients. And within five

minutes, they were gone" 7 Major Brown of the DiLorenzo Clinic found that

the evacuation order "really hindered us, the chaos began again."'8 Medical personnel helped patients who were in the clinic out of the building, taking whatever equipment and supplies they could carry. From the Center Court the injured

were loaded onto small vehicles used for moving cargo through the wide hallways

of the Pentagon, and then taken out to the north side of the building. Treatment

of injured at the casualty collection point near the Pentagon Athletic Club close

by North Parking was moved across the road to a grassy area along the Potomac

River. Those victims already outside near the impact area relocated beneath the

overpass at the intersection of Columbia Pike and Route 27. When it was learned

that the fourth hijacked airliner had crashed, search and rescue efforts resumed

around 10:40. On the north side, although the DiLorenzo Clinic staff never

received an official all clear, some medical teams gathered up their equipment and

supplies and headed back inside.'

On the west side, the treatment area from beneath the overpass was

moved onto Route 27 in the lane adjacent to the Heliport.2" Chief White described

the scene:

And finally it got to a point where I commandeered one of our EMS

supervisor's vehicles that had a public address system in it and I got in

and identified myself to the crowd... [and] said, "Here's the plan. So

just stand fast where you are. As the casualties are brought out by the

firefighters, they're going to come to this particular point out here on

the heliport. When they do, they're going to be transferred to you people and here is where they're going to go and here is who is going to tell

you where to take them!'2'

After the evacuation, with all medical people outside and more visible,

tighter organization became possible. Vafier confirmed that "once a command

structure was set up, it really started to flow much, much better:' Some medics

were relocated; Major Brown took over the red triage area for acute care near the

impact site. That area became known informally as the "triage street;' according to

Staff Sergeant Keith Pernell, who commented that it"became a famous meet area

112
Treating the Injured, Searching fior Remains

for the medics, that was our meeting point for all meetings, commander briefs,

and all that stuff"

By the time the reorganized triage operation materialized it became clear,

as White noted, that there were "no [more] casualties" at the impact site.''All the

casualties got taken care of prior to the first evacuation"'22 No victims remained

in the Center Court, so medics there treated firefighters and volunteers suffering from smoke inhalation, dehydration, and exhaustion. Brown summarized the

status of the medical response by mid- to late-morning: "Getting more organized;

getting more equipment on the scene and more drugs. At one point we had the

police bring in narcotics and paralytics [relaxants] to the scene in case of more

serious patients. That's what we spent the next couple of hours doing, just finessing what we already had and then no one came out. That was it"'23

Even during the first hour after the attack, in spite of shock and fear

and uncertainty, the improvised teams of emergency medical responders worked

exceptionally well. Nurse Suzanne Bucci had come to the USAF Flight Medicine

Clinic for an interview that morning, and remained at the side of Colonel Baxter throughout much of the day. "Major Brown or Dr. Geiling, or whoever;' she

recalled, accepted the authority of the civilian "command doctor"-Vafier. "There

wasn't any, 'Wait a minute. We're the Army and so we're in charge here: None of

that."24 Master Sergeant Paul Lirette, also from the Air Force Clinic, had a similar

reaction."To me, it was like a movie. I mean it just worked.... A lot of times you

train and you simulate a lot, but it worked like clockwork. I was impressed with

the way things were handled. The people... [with] high ranking positions, they

stood back and let people do what they get paid to do. They helped when they

could help."25 A member of an ambulance crew from the DeWitt Army Hospital at Fort Belvoir expressed the spirit of cooperation: "Everyone had thousands

and thousands ... of dollars worth of equipment that would belong to their hospital, and everyone was just great about unloading it andjust giving it to whoever

needed it:" 26

The west side of the Pentagon at the impact point remained the focus

of the medical response, but as the morning wore on the number of health care

personnel around the impact site far outnumbered the Pentagon employees and

firefighters needing medical assistance there. Vafier recalled that "by 1 or 2 in the

afternoon, it looked like a MASH unit.... We had tents with six bays .... It was

113
PENTAGON 9/11

the most incredible thing. We were ready to handle a large, large number of casualties and there were none."27

Ready road access brought rescue responders principally to the impact

side of the Pentagon along Route 27 and to South Parking. Three wounded

patients were airlifted from a makeshift landing pad on Route 27, two of them

by a U.S. Park Police helicopter. Most of the ambulances that raced to the Pentagon congregated close to the crash area and there they idled. The greatest number

of people, however, had exited the building elsewhere. Once many of the burned

and injured reached safety in the North Parking area they sometimes waited up

to 30 minutes for transportation. Only two private ambulances stood ready to

pick up patients on that side of the building.28 Meanwhile, frustrated ambulance

crews on the southwest side felt a sense of helplessness brought on by inactivity,

a reaction undoubtedly intensified after collapse of part of the building at 10:15

a.m. One Rader Clinic driver found the waiting "a little disturbing and disappointing, and I think that was the worst part of it, because we couldn't do our job

or at least save some people. It just made us realize that nobody else was coming

out, and that all those people were dead in there."29

Communication problems greatly hindered efforts to care for the injured

on the north side, in particular evacuating them to hospitals. Almost immediately radio traffic gridlocked, land lines were unavailable, and cellular telephone

networks became so overloaded that for a time Pentagon officials and employees as well as some emergency responders could not call outside. Neither the

DiLorenzo Clinic at the Pentagon nor the Fort Myer Rader Clinic could establish reliable communications; the DiLorenzo staff called repeatedly to DPS to

request ambulances.3

" Hospitals and clinics could not be informed about the

flow of casualties, and perhaps more damaging, communication between the fire

and rescue and the emergency medical elements on-site was severely impaired.

Fighting the blaze from the west side and from the Center Court, the firefighters in direct contact with Incident Commander Schwartz had little idea of what

transpired elsewhere in or about the building. From the Center Court firefighters

saw victims being taken toward the north side of the Pentagon, but they had no

idea what happened to them thereafter. They did not realize the need to request

ambulances until communications improved, and by then emergency transporta114
Treating tbe Injured, Searching for Remains

tion was not needed. ACFD Captain Mark Penn said, "I had ambulances all over

the place ready to come but we never got the call so they just stood by.'31

In the absence of ambulances, people took the initiative to get themselves to hospitals or to send or accompany others. In one of the first ambulances to arrive, Army Sergeant First Class Donald Workman rode with badly

burned Navy Lieutenant Kevin Shaeffer on what the lieutenant recalled as a

"roller coaster" ride to Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington. Shaeffer, seriously hurt but still conscious, later said, "we were off-roading... hitting

cars, ... kind of nicking some bumpers:' and remembered someone commenting,

"there's another Volvo bumped."32 An ambulance transported one person to the

Arlington Urgent Care Center while two other injured walked there. Three victims treated at the George Washington University Hospital arrived on their own.

One man, his clothes smoldering, hailed a taxicab to take him to the nearest hospital. Captain Holly Pierce, a public affairs officer with the Army's DCSPER,

which incurred the largest number of casualties, carried a number of people in

her pickup truck to one of the hospitals.33

The DiLorenzo staff called on passing SUV and minivan drivers to take

victims to area emergency rooms. Volunteers had to maneuver their private vehicles, not equipped with sirens or flashing lights, through heavy traffic and, when

heading for Washington hospitals, across the clogged Potomac River bridges.

Often they were unaware of the best medical facility for their charges. Very few

patients were taken to the regional trauma center, Fairfax Hospital; a large number went instead to the closer Virginia Hospital Center in Arlington or to the

Alexandria Hospital. Others arrived at hospitals not equipped to handle them

and had to be stabilized before being moved elsewhere.34 When a van carrying

five injured people wearing color-coded tags pulled up to the Virginia Hospital Center emergency room, nurse Jean McGuire assumed that a private vehicle

transporting coded casualties meant that there were so many victims that ambulances were overwhelmed. Although this was not so, she later said, "I can even

hear my voice now saying, oh my God, we are losing control"35

To the contrary, because of the strategic importance of the National Capital Region its hospitals and clinics were unusually well prepared to handle mass

casualties. They routinely conducted drills to practice for chemical or biological

attacks. On learning of the events that morning, several facilities shut down non115
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Treating the Injured, Searching for Remains

essential services, implemented their emergency disaster plans, and geared up for

a wave of casualties.36 Even before the plane hit the Pentagon, in accordance with

established procedure the Dulles Air Traffic Control Tower notified Fairfax Hospital, the largest in Northern Virginia, that a hijacked aircraft was missing, alerting Dr. Thomas Mayer, chair of the Department of Emergency Medicine and

medical director for Fairfax County Fire and Rescue. Mayer recalled: "We knew

that something was headed towards the national capital area. We didn't know

where. But we knew we needed to get ready. So we immediately went on disaster

planning mode:' The hospital moved patients from the emergency rooms to other

areas, halted all elective surgery, freed up 37 of the 40 operating rooms, and activated eight trauma teams.37 As it turned out, these splendid resources were not

required.

Thus, both the Pentagon and local medical facilities and personnel were

equipped to handle a far greater flood of people than became necessary. Aware

that medical care for the Pentagon casualties more than sufficed, the Headquarters Air Force Crisis Action Team relocated from the Pentagon to nearby Bolling Air Force Base, ready to prepare for assistance to New York where the need

was thought to be more urgent and far greater than in the well-served Washington area.*3s As Dr. Mayer observed, "The problem was that there was tremendous

capacity to care for patients and not enough patients to care for.'3 9

In all, 106 Pentagon patients reached Washington area medical facilities;

49 were admitted and 57 cared for as outpatients. The Virginia Hospital Center

and the Alexandria Hospital received almost two-thirds of the injured as well as

most of the people hospitalized overnight. The Washington Hospital Center in

the District of Columbia, with one of the nation's most highly regarded burn-care

units, admitted eight patients, the most grievously injured.4

"

The improvised nature of much of the medical and evacuation activity

complicated the task of accountability, of determining the whereabouts of those

wounded and hospitalized, as well as the numbers and identity of the dead. The

Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, for example, which suffered heavy casualties, set up a phone bank of 20 lines to send and receive calls

about its people. The difficulty in producing a casualty list was compounded

because many of the injured had been transported to civilian rather than military

* See Chapter VI.

117
PENTAGON 9/11

INJURED DISPOSITION

Virginia Hospital Center - 44 26 18*

Arlington 2 transferred to Washington Hospital

Center

Inova Alexandria Hospital 23 4 19

Inova Fairfax Hospital 1*

*Transferred to

HealthPlex

Northern Virginia 6 6

Community Hospital

Inova Emergency Care 3 2*

Center (HealthPlex) 'Transferred to Inova

Fairfax Hospital

George Washington 3 3

University Hospital

Washington Hospital 13 58*

Center *Includes patient from

Georgetown University

Hospital

Arlington Urgent Care 10 7 3*

Center *Transferred to

other hospitals

Andrew Rader U.S. Army 4 1"

Health Clinic *Transferred to Virginia Hospital Center - Arlington

Totals 16

t A few of the 49 patients listed as admitted above wound up at Walter Reed Army Medical Center.

Source: Arlington County After-Action Report, amended

facilities. Teams dispatched to local hospitals sought to find out who had been

checked in and then subsequently admitted or released."

As it happened, an unusually large number of Army chaplains-33-

were in the vicinity on the morning of the attack, most attending a meeting in the

118
Treating the Injured, Searching.for Remains

Office of the Chief of Chaplains in Crystal City, Arlington. When they learned

of the strike they hurried to the Pentagon. Army Chief of Chaplains Major General Gaylord T. Gunhus, on leave at his home in Minnesota at the time, knew the

chances of catching a plane back to the city were slight. He drove straight through

to Washington, staying in touch by cell phone and arriving the next day. Among

the chaplains on the scene several congregated in the Center Court to comfort

the injured and frightened streaming out of the building. Thereafter, a few joined

the extraction teams as stretcherbearers, entering the burned and smoke-filled

offices. Another group took up posts at the triage site near the Pentagon Athletic

Club. A third contingent remained with people huddled alongside Route 27 and

the nearby first aid stations.4 2

As the fires subsided and then flared up again during the afternoon, the

focus of the chaplains' attention shifted from first response to recovery. After the

collapse of the E Ring area it seemed probable that no more survivors would be

found; the seriously wounded had already been removed to trauma centers. In

early afternoon the deputy chiefs of chaplains of the Army, Navy, and Air Force

developed a coordinated plan for their ministry They shared a tent with the Red

Cross and decided to staff it with six Army chaplains until 9:00 p.m., Air Force

chaplains standing by until 3:00 a.m. the next morning, and Navy chaplains taking the shift thereafter until 9:00 a.m. Their pastoral care embraced consoling the

soldiers engaged in the gruesome recovery efforts, the injured who had been hospitalized, and the families of those killed or missing. Army Chaplain Art Pace

and his team would perform the hospital ministry for another two months.43

Removing Remains

Greatly concerned about the need for more help in rescue and recovery

operations as the morning progressed, Incident Commander Schwartz requested

reinforcement by FEMA Urban Search and Rescue teams from Fairfax and

Montgomery Counties.' In the afternoon, shortly after arrival, these and other

recovery teams entered the building, which was still burning, unstable, and toxic.

Army troops from an engineer company stationed at Fort Belvoir were the first

such teams to survey the interior, finding no survivors but noting the presence of

human remains. By early evening a more intensive reconnaissance confirmed the

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much earlier presumption that there could be little hope that anybody remained

alive.

It fell therefore to FBI agents and photographers to record the location

and condition and photograph the human remains, and for members of the 3rd

Infantry Regiment-the Old Guard, of Fort Myer-and on the first day a group

of Marines, to carry bodies to the morgue set up on the grounds outside.45 ACFD

Captain Penn spoke appreciatively of the soldiers brought in "to handle the bodies" They felt they knew "how to do it" in a way that would "pay the proper

respect:' To Penn, "that was really the part of the job that everybody dreads ....

The Old Guard and the other folks they brought in were wonderful at it and very

professional at it and did a great job and never blinked doing it."46

On their first sweep on the 12th, recovery teams moved into the south

side of the Pentagon and proceeded through the E Ring until they reached the

Navy Command Center in the D and C Rings, fanning out to scour the primary damaged area on the 1st and 2nd Floors.47 Because of the collapse, no bodies were found above the 2nd Floor and only 20 were discovered on the 2nd

Floor, most close to the site of impact. Allen Boyle died near an exit to the building, and Antoinette Sherman died in the hospital. The other 167 fatalities were

strewn along the diagonal slice of the 1st Floor that marked the path of the airliner. Some remains were blasted through holes in the C Ring's inside perimeter

into A-E Drive.48

In addition to removing remains, the strong, self-described "able bodies"

of the 3rd Infantry performed much manual labor during the following weeks.

They had already spent the night of the l1th and the day of the 12th securing the corridors leading into the impact area and clearing debris to the left of it

on the 1st Floor.49 So immense was the scale and extent of the destruction that

some likened the interior to the set of a disaster movie or "kind of like going into

a haunted house because it didn't look real.""0 To another "it was like walking into

hell.""1 Yet there were occasional scenes of normalcy; an office adjacent to an area

of total devastation might contain intact computers, books, and desks holding

food and drinks hurriedly abandoned-bags of pretzels, cans of soda, a copy of

the Washington Post opened to the sports section. For the occupants who got out

of these rooms it was a matter of "meters between life and death:' as one observer

remarked."2

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Treating tbe Injured, Searching for Remains

Searchers often had to make their way through several feet of rubble.

Water from broken mains and fire hoses had pooled on the floors six inches deep

and even knee-high in some areas. Ceiling grids sagged, electrical wiring snaked

down walls and across floors, and plastic light fixtures melted by intense fire hung

down like ribbons of caramelized sugar. Plumbing, burned batteries, twisted

pipes, heating ducts, and air conditioners were heaped among the ruins, along

with jagged metal, nails, and broken glass. Wood, plaster, and tiles had fallen

from the floors above. Desks and filing cabinets were reduced to scrap metal.

Asbestos lay exposed and lead paint peeled off walls. A layer of black soot covered virtually every surface. Without lights it was pitch dark; even with flashlights

dust in the air limited visibility to 10 feet in places. The noxious atmosphere and

standing water carried the threat of infectious disease. Fires still smoldered, adding to the acrid stench and smell of decay from the jet fuel, burned plastic, metal,

and human flesh. 3

A body recovery team typically consisted of one or more FBI agents, one

or two FEMA representatives, a photographer, and four body or litter carriers

from the Old Guard. For the recovery work the FBI drafted Navy and Marine

photographers already on the scene taking pictures of the impact site and pieces

of evidence strewn as far away as Arlington Cemetery. Inside the building, body

recovery teams followed the trail of the earlier teams that had spray-painted a

door or remaining column or panel with an orange fluorescent X. In the top

quadrant of the X appeared the initials of the team that had cleared the room, on

the right the number of bodies believed to be there, and in the other quadrants a

code to indicate the location of a body.14 The agents created a numbering system,

noted the condition of the dead, and chalked the number on a slate as an identifier code. The photographers recorded the scene, including wide-angle and closeup shots of bodies in the position found, along with the crime scene designation

numbers. After debris was lifted away, bodies and body parts were photographed

from several angles, including close-ups of faces to aid identification.55

Some remains were unrecognizable, so badly charred that in one case,

Navy photographer Kevin Rimrodt recounted, only a remnant of clothing that

appeared to be a scrap of a blue bra indicated that the body was of a female. Moreover, without ambient lighting in what resembled an endless junkyard, accurate

identification was difficult. In the Navy Command Center on the 1st Floor where

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42 people died "there were so many bodies;' Rimrodt recalled,"I'd almost step on

them. So I'd have to really take care to look backwards as I'm backing up in the

dark, looking with a flashlight, making sure I'm not stepping on somebody."" A

soldier added that "it was dark; you couldn't tell what was wreckage and what was

a human being."' 7 Such circumstances made drawing up the numbering and location grid an exacting task."

All evidence including human remains had to be removed from the building since, according to FBI Special Agent In Charge Arthur Eberhart, otherwise

"we would have been there for months and months and months.""5 After having

been photographed in situ, the dead and any personal or identifying effects were

taken outside by the soldiers. On the afternoon of the attack many body bags

had been laid out in the Center Court in anticipation of it becoming the field

morgue.'° But by the time Old Guard soldiers began bringing out bodies, a protected and controlled temporary morgue had been set up in North Parking.

Moving bodies through the clogged passageways could be laborious. For

one of the first, a heavyset victim, the soldiers created a rolling chain, walking on

top of the rubble and passing the body from hand to hand, with the last man in

line moving to the front and the others repeating the process until they were clear

of obstacles. They quickly learned that putting a body on a stretcher and handing

it down the line made the sad task easier. Sometimes in the less-damaged corridors the bodies or body parts could be wrapped at the scene before being carried

outside to the refrigerated trucks.6'

For biohazard protection at the toxic impact site, soldiers handling the

human remains wore a thin, disposable plastic coverall, rubber boots, safety helmets, carbon-filter face masks, and up to three layers of gloves. Early in the operation these items were in short supply. Some soldiers initially had only goggles

and about 40 had to share a little more than half that number of face masks;

later there were complaints of respiratory problems. The gloves, boots, masks,

and helmets were cumbersome. Because the suits were taped shut at the wrists

and ankles, the temperature became punishingly hot inside the clothing. Goggles

fogged up. For those with masks, frequent filter changes became the rule. After

finishing a shift soldiers cleaned their hands and faces with hand scrubbers and

wipes and then entered a decontamination tent.62

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Treating the Injured, Searching for Remains

Widespread destruction made recovery of remains slow. As more resources

became available in succeeding days the pace picked up, becoming a round-theclock operation with some 60 soldiers working with the FBI in 12-hour shifts.

Sergeant Steven Stokes recalled putting in the half-day shifts five days in a row,

and some soldiers worked longer hours than their assigned shift. After 17 September each platoon split its shift into thirds, alternating four hours of work

inside the building with guard duty, light labor for the Red Cross, and short break

periods. 63 The Old Guard soldiers accomplished an enormous amount of backbreaking work. ACFD Captain Penn extolled their "tremendous job;' remarking

on how gratifying it was to see them marching down from Fort Myer for the shift

change.'

Members of the Old Guard, participating annually in hundreds of burials at Arlington National Cemetery, learn that their job demands a level of"ceremonial composure" and emotional detachment, but handling remains proved

tough duty for these soldiers.65 Most were in their late teens or early twenties and

had never seen a dead person outside a formal setting or funeral parlor. Specialist

John Myers acknowledged that "most people have never seen anything like this in

their life at all"'66 Even the more seasoned soldiers were unprepared for the ordeal.

Sergeant David Davis, not a new recruit, said, "I can just say that I have seen

things there that I don't wish anyone else would have to see, because it's just-it's

just unbelievable!'67 For Sergeant Robert Farrar, the "thick charred smell;' noticeable even from the highway outside, "is something that I'll never forget .... You

just cannot get rid of that smell''68 Lieutenant Mark O'Neill agreed:"I don't think

I'll ever forget the smell of it"'69 Over and over, soldiers remembered the "smell of

it.'

Removing the dead in these circumstances, admitted one soldier, "doesn't

hit you until you're there!' Some victims were found in relatively normal positions, seated at their desks or clustered around a conference table where they

had worked up to the moment of death.7

" Some people had suffocated quickly

because of the sudden and intense heat. Others had died from smoke inhalation,

trapped in a stairwell as they tried to escape. Many bodies were badly burned,

disfigured, or dismembered. It could be hard to dissociate from the human tragedy; seeing a recognizable person was often more disturbing than finding disconnected body parts. Farrar remembered looking at a corpse with a wedding ring

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PENTAGON 9/11

still on its finger, knowing "there's some woman at home right now that's praying:'"71 Marine Sergeant Michael Farrington was moved by "a child's doll floating

around in there and that just kind of got to me because I know that there was a

child that went along with that doll."72 Private First Class Glen Litchfield had to

sit down for a few minutes to regain his composure when he too spotted a toy."'

Family and baby pictures stuffed into a day planner-"those faces keep reappearing," reported one soldier.74 Sometimes they were undone by the ghastly sights

they encountered. One soldier was so traumatized by his experience that he had

to leave the site.

Usually the FBI bagged the remains. And although the situation was too

chaotic to permit clear and consistent assignment of duties, Old Guard senior

enlisted men and officers, when they could, assisted with this most painful job,

leaving the younger soldiers to carry the remains outside.75 Rotation of troops

assigned to body recovery helped, as Private Joshua Frauman said, because otherwise "you'll go numb. .... Both mentally and emotionally we just couldn't handle it anymore, couldn't do it."7, Military chaplains and mental health counselors stood by to help. Either the regimental commander, the deputy commander,

or the executive officer was always there for support.77 Officers were concerned

about their men, as Lieutenant Gilbert Munoz explained:

We tried the best we could to keep a close eye on them ... while we

were actually inside the building, and then again as they were coming out, to make sure-you know, everyone was shaken a little bit, just

from the hard work and the sweating and the real long hours. But we

did the best we could to look eye-to-eye with the soldier and see if he

was ... a little more disturbed, or if he was a little more shaken up and

needed to maybe ... talk through his emotions a little bit with some of

the chaplains that were on hand.78

Private Joel Reynolds confirmed that chaplains "were everywhere. You couldn't

walk ten feet without a chaplain asking you if everything was all right or how you

were doing. They definitely played a big part in helping the people who needed

their services''71 Many of the soldiers claimed that they bore up quite well without any help, but several confessed that Army culture discouraged talking about

the feelings aroused by what they saw.

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Treating the Injured, Searching fir Remains

The soldiers came away from the experience with an enhanced respect for

all civilian and military responders, especially the firefighters. They spoke appreciatively also of agencies such as the Red Cross and Salvation Army; the businesses and volunteers-even a North Carolina Baptist church-that provided

supplies and food; the FBI, the local police, and many other units from far and

near. And they were rightfully proud of their own effort. Even though there were

"countless guys that didn't want to go in and do body recovery,' nonetheless, Sergeant Farrar declared, "they got up, they put their stuff on, they went in, and they

didn't do anything halfheartedly.";8 Private First Class Matthew Malmquist's Old

Guard company spent most of their time clearing rubble, but inevitably they

encountered body parts. He was "very impressed with ... how respectfully" those

were handled. They were put "in a body bag and then carried out on a stretcher:"

No matter what was found, "everything was treated as a full human body:' And

on the site, he observed, "it didn't matter who you were, who you worked for, you

were all a part of the same team ... all working towards the same goal:' It was,

"for lack of a better word ... inspirational"'" Until the last day of their duty at the

Pentagon, "our guys;' Lieutenant Rob Wolfe recalled with pride, were "on hands

and knees looking for anything because those are our brothers and sisters in

there.... Character, the honor and dignity that [the soldiers] had every day was

just amazing'"2

Many remains could not be retrieved through the normal recovery process: tons of debris were carted from the Pentagon, loaded into trucks, and deposited in North Parking adjacent to the morgue for a final sifting. An FBI agent

rode in each vehicle to ensure a continuous chain of custody over all potential evidence. In the recovery area two FBI agents ran round-the-clock shifts to comb

through the wreckage for crime scene evidence, personal effects, and remains of

the dead.

Volunteers from several federal, local, and nongovernmental agencies as

well as Old Guard companies assisted the North Parking operations.83 In search

and rescue and remains recovery in the aftermath of man-made or natural disasters, the FBI frequently employed teams of dogs and their handlers, usually

bureau agents or law enforcement officers. The highly trained animals possess a

keen sense of smell that allows them to locate body parts or even minute pieces of

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skin too small for the human eye to detect in the surrounding debris. 4 Dogs and

handlers played an important role here as well.

Four days after the attack, on 15 September, Officer James Lugaila and

his dog, from the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department's K-9 unit, accompanied

an Urban Search and Rescue team into the building to search for remains. Lugaila

suggested that other cadaver dogs be brought in to assist with remains recovery.

Captain Eileen Roemer, an FBI employee who was also a naval reservist, kept and

trained a cadaver dog. Roemer and Lugaila contacted their own cadaver dog networks and essentially became the day and night team leaders, respectively, of the

handlers and their canines who came to work at the Pentagon. The dog teams

assembled quickly. At 5:00 p.m. on Sunday evening, 16 September, Roemer and

the first six dog teams checked in. The 29 teams in the search worked alongside

members of the Army's 54th Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs) and

other volunteers under the direction of the FBI and FEMA.8 5

Like the soldiers, the dog handlers wore protective suits, gloves, and face

masks. But because of the constant distractions and noise and the need to communicate with their dogs, the handlers didn't always cover their mouths with the

breathing apparatus. The dogs did not take to their safety "uniforms" much better than their handlers or the soldiers; for them to get traction and scale the piles

of debris safely, booties were placed over their paws. A team usually remained on

the scene for an eight-hour shift, but often a dog could only work about 20 minutes before its concentration waned and it needed a break. Although dog teams

sometimes participated in the search for remains inside, they spent most of their

time searching the debris in North Parking. They uncovered numerous pieces

of flesh and bone, internal organs, bloody clothing, or anything with traces of

human protein. At the end of a shift dogs and humans were decontaminated in

a pair of tents. Volunteer veterinarians and technicians washed and checked out

the dogs.86

The searchers in North Parking carried out the work in stages. First, to

dampen the concrete dust, soldiers hosed down the debris heap. The dogs, working on leads held by their handlers, sniffed for human remains. When a dog signaled that it had found something by pawing, sitting up, or otherwise indicating

the spot, investigators and mortuary affairs personnel raked through the rubble

or placed it on sifting screens. Remains were photographed and tagged with an

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Treating the Injured, Searching for Remains

identifying number, put in an evidence bag, and taken offsite for future identification. For the final search small front-end loaders spread out the debris to as little

as a six-inch depth. Then the dogs went over it again.87

Roemer recalled that there were times when a dog was"alerting," but people working at the scene were disbelieving; all that could be seen might be a piece

of bent, crushed metal. When the handler insisted that it be investigated, "they

would then pry it open and find something in there:' The dogs had "figured it out,"

she said. "One of the early things I learned was trust your dog, and I definitely

trusted them every time in this, and I was very proud of the work they did:'88

Besides their invaluable contribution to remains recovery, when "off duty" the

cadaver dogs were affectionate and agreeable companions to their human partners in the stressful work and were credited by at least one handler with helping

to relieve tension.89

The large-scale sifting of the debris in North Parking probably accounted

for most of the body remains that would be processed at the morgue.9

" The

remaining debris was loaded onto trucks for transport to a hazardous material site. Ten days after the attack, on 21 September, control of the crime scene

shifted from the Arlington County Fire Department to the FBI; on the 26th the

FBI relinquished control to the Defense Department.9 1 By this time, all human

remains had been flown to the Dover Port Mortuary at Dover Air Force Base,

Delaware, where after identification they would be returned to their families.

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CHAPTER VI

Up and Running

The destruction wrought by the attack on the Pentagon threatened the

ability of the Defense Department to carry out its most vital function-maintaining effective command of worldwide U.S. military forces. Recognition during the Cold War that government operations might be interrupted by attack

from without or by devastating fires and storms and mechanical failures had led

the government to prepare for such contingencies. DoD developed"continuity of

operations" plans to ensure performance of essential military functions in times

of emergency. When disaster at the Pentagon on 11 September confronted DoD

officials with a stern test of their "continuity of operations," they realized that

preparations had not taken sufficiently into account an attack of the nature and

on the scale that occurred. A major immediate effect was that all of the command

centers in the Pentagon had to resort to improvisations to continue or reconstitute their operations.

Despite the explosion, fire, and smoke hazard, Secretary Rumsfeld remained

in the Pentagon continuing to direct departmental operations and exercise control

of the U.S. armed forces. The attack did not prevent him from communicating

with President Bush, a critical need because the president and the secretary comprise the National Command Authority from which overall direction of military

operations emanates. When the secretary chose not to follow emergency plans
Up and Running

that called on him to move to an alternate command site outside Washington,

most other Defense leaders also stayed in the Pentagon-or close to it. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff and the Army, Navy, and Air Force each maintained a command

and operations center in the building that provided up-to-date information for

decisionmaking. So extensive was the damage inflicted that it seemed for a while

that all of these centers might have to be abandoned. The building maintenance

staff of the Washington Headquarters Services, responsible for DoD facilities in

the Washington area, worked with great intensity to keep the National Military

Command Center, operated by the Joint Staff, and the other centers up and running. They could do nothing, however, for the Navy Command Center, utterly

destroyed in the first minutes of the attack.

National Command Authority

Word of the attacks on the World Trade Center reached President Bush

in Sarasota, Florida, where he was visiting an elementary school. At approximately 9:30 a.m. in the school's crowded media center, he spoke briefly to educators, parents, and reporters about the New York attacks, asked for a moment of

silence for the victims, then immediately departed for Air Force One to return to

Washington. En route to the airport he learned that an airplane had struck the

Pentagon. The presidential aircraft was airborne at 9:55 a.m.; the pilot, after conferring with the lead Secret Service agent on board, flew the plane as high and

fast as possible for better security. By telephone Vice President Richard Cheney

advised the president to delay his return to Washington, repeating advice already

given by the Secret Service. At approximately 10:10 a.m., Air Force One changed

direction and headed west, eventually landing at Barksdale Air Force Base, near

Shreveport, Louisiana. While the aircraft refueled, the president recorded a short

broadcast message pledging that "the United States will hunt down and punish

those responsible for these cowardly acts:' Stating that he was in contact with

the vice president, the secretary of defense, other members of the cabinet, and

national security advisers, he assured the nation that"we have taken the necessary

security precautions to continue the functions of your Government."'

The vice president and the Secret Service again advised the president

against returning to the nation's capital because of the confused and uncertain

conditions there. By this time Cheney and other officials in Washington believed

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that a threat existed against Air Force One, known by its codename 'Angel;' a

concern later proven to be unfounded. Continuing to heed their advice the president flew from Barksdale to Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha, Nebraska, the

highly secure headquarters of the U.S. Strategic Command. There, with his

safety assured, the president could use elaborate command and control communication systems and facilities. At about 3:15 p.m. during the president's video

teleconference with key administration officials, Director of Central Intelligence

George Tenet reported that evidence pointed to the al Qaeda organization as the

mastermind behind the attacks.2

In the Pentagon Rumsfeld was hosting a breakfast meeting with members of Congress when word came that a plane had crashed into the World Trade

Center; following the meeting he was told of the strike into the second tower in

New York. In his office listening to an intelligence briefing at the moment Flight

77 struck the Pentagon, Rumsfeld recalled, "The plane hit the building, and the

building shook and the tables jumped.' 3

Thinking bomb, the secretary opened his office door and asked Vice

Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, his military aide, "What the hell's happening?"

On peering out the window and seeing nothing unusual he went into the hallway

and asked his plainclothes security guards, Officers Aubrey Davis and Gilbert

Oldach, what was going on. Listening to Pentagon police communication traffic via his radio earpiece, Davis stated that there was a report of an explosion at

the Mall side of the building. Rumsfeld immediately hastened down the E Ring

in that direction, accompanied by his two guards, his communications officer,

and the deputy director of security for the secretary's office. At the undamaged

2nd Floor Mall Entrance, after Davis relayed new reports of a plane crash at the

Heliport, Rumsfeld pressed on through the smoke and down the stairs to the 1st

Floor, where he exited the building just north of the Heliport.4

"Oh, my Lord, the whole place was burning,' he later remembered. He

smelled jet fuel and saw hundreds of pieces of metal on the lawn. He picked up

a piece and examined it. Hearing someone shout "We need help!" he ran over to

assist in carrying a badly burned victim on a stretcher to the sidewalk by Route

27. From there he had a direct view of the inferno and destruction before the

floors collapsed. His questions about what had happened elicited the answer that

an airliner had flown into the building.5

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Up and Running

After a few minutes, observing that the injured were being attended to,

Rumsfeld reentered the building on the Mall side, went directly to his office, and

tried without success to telephone the president. Then proceeding to the Executive Support Center on the 3rd Floor he joined a White House video teleconference in progress. From Air Force One the president telephoned the secretary

after 10:00 a.m. Rumsfeld told him that despite the severe damage the Pentagon still functioned. Because the Executive Support Center had too few phones,

desks, and computers and its teleconference screens were small, shortly before

10:30 a.m. the secretary and his staff moved one floor down to the National Military Command Center. The spacious, compartmented center, although smoky

and without air conditioning, had electrical power, and its communication and

computer systems were operating adequately. General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had come to the command center about 10:00

a.m., standing in for Chairman General Hugh Shelton, who was on his way back

from Europe.6

Soon after arriving at the command center the secretary participated in

an air threat conference call with officials from the North American Air Defense

Command, a representative from the Federal Aviation Administration, and Vice

President Cheney and others in the White House shelter conference room. At

10:39 a.m. Cheney gave Rumsfeld a situation update. At 10:53 Rumsfeld raised

the military Defense Condition from level 5, the lowest level, to 3, an intermediate level, requiring a heightened alert status for U.S. armed forces worldwide.

During the morning, while in the support and command centers, the secretary

focused on immediate questions relating to control of U.S. airspace: the status of

the fourth hijacked aircraft, grounding of all civilian flights, tracking of unidentified aircraft, the possibility of more hijackings and attacks, possible orders for

launching intercept aircraft, maintaining combat air patrols, and providing rules

of engagement for fighter pilots. He sought information on the security of the

nation's borders, the identity of the terrorists, and forces available in the Persian Gulf area. He also telephoned Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov in Moscow

requesting that the Russians terminate a military exercise-which they didand he ordered the U.S. Strategic Command to end its Global Guardian exercise

testing nuclear command and control procedures. Reports on the number of peo131
PENTAGON 9/11

ple killed and injured at the Pentagon and the World Trade Center helped him

provide guidance for public information statements.'

Despite acrid smoke seeping into the NMCC, the possibility of a second

air attack against the Pentagon, and a White House request to begin implementation of continuity of operations measures, Rumsfeld ignored repeated suggestions that he leave the building. Instead he directed Deputy Secretary of Defense

Paul Wolfowitz to relocate to the alternate headquarters outside Washington,

established at the height of the Cold War. Within minutes a helicopter landed on

the parade ground on the River side of the Pentagon and carried off a reluctant

Wolfowitz and a few others.8

Chief Edward Plaugher of the Arlington County Fire Department suggested that the NMCC be evacuated but chose not to press the issue with Rumsfeld who was determined to stay, largely because the communications network

enabled him to keep in touch with key government officials and military commanders. Plaugher worried that carbon monoxide, odorless and colorless, would

possibly reach the NMCC and render its occupants "irrational" before it killed

them. At the same time he appreciated the magnitude of the crisis and the determination to continue operations in the Pentagon. The firefighters provided the

NMCC occupants with a carbon monoxide detector and respirators along with

instructions for their use, but by 12:19 p.m. their eyes and throats had become so

irritated by smoke that the secretary and others returned to the Executive Support Center where the air was better. During the afternoon the secretary again

spoke with the president by telephone; later he participated in the president's

video teleconference from Offutt Air Force Base.9

Besides tracking aircraft-at noon there were still dozens of planes in

U.S. airspace and some airliners inbound from other countries (one later sent a

false signal indicating a hijacking)--Defense officials remained vigilant against

coordinated "cyberspace" attacks on the nation's computer and communication

systems. Information flowed to the secretary from Defense Department components, the FBI, the FAA, and other sources. Calling from the alternate command

post, Wolfowitz reported that the computer and communication systems there

functioned poorly or not at all. He could, however, participate in video teleconference calls. 10

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Up and Running

Military Command and Operations Centers

The Army, Navy, and Air Force command and operations centers in the

Pentagon, operating 24 hours a day seven days a week, normally provided leaders with timely intelligence and information about operations around the world.

Explosions and fire quickly destroyed the Navy Command Center on the 1st

Floor and killed many of its people, confronting the Navy with the urgent need to

improvise a functioning operations center. 1

Deprived of his command center, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral

Vernon Clark, outside the building near North Parking shortly after 10:15 a.m.,

told his vice chief, Admiral William Fallon, and Vice Admiral Patricia Tracey,

director of the Navy staff, that he would not relocate to the Pentagon's alternate command post. Instead he would move to the Washington Navy Yard, a

few miles away in the District of Columbia; some staff members had already

left to prepare accommodations there in the headquarters building of the Naval

Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). Secretary of the Navy Gordon England

joined Clark at the temporary site. NCIS agents kept them informed of efforts to

account for missing personnel, a top priority.2

Earlier, at Clark's direction Fallon had traversed the short distance to

the Navy Annex building on Columbia Pike to establish a command center that

would allow Navy leaders to operate in close proximity to the Pentagon. By the

time Fallon arrived the Annex had been evacuated. He heard alarms still blaring there. The building had electrical power but had lost its air conditioning, a

breakdown that could cause computerized communication systems to overheat

and shut down.' 3 Still, the Marine Corps Command Center in the building was

functioning. After its director, Major General Gordon Nash, offered space to the

Navy, Fallon made arrangements for the Navy's leadership and support personnel to move there and to other space in the building. Maintenance crews began

to set up portable air conditioners and exhaust fans for the center. Because of

fear of another attack, however, only mission-essential personnel might enter the

Annex.'4

Navy officers accepted an offer from the Virginia Department of Transportation to use a conference room in its building on Columbia Pike across from

the Annex where, with a laptop computer and a large white pad on an easel, they

began to track casualties and those who had gotten out safely. Captain Thomas

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PENTAGON 9/11

McAtee and a few others who drove to local hospitals reported by phone the

names of the injured arriving for medical care. They also exchanged names with

Army personnel trying to account for people at the hospitals."

Throughout the night Captain Mary Jo Sweeney and staff officers summoned technical support teams to prepare offices in the Annex for the Navy's

leadership. The casualty tracking and muster undertaking moved to the Annex,

where Admiral Tracey spent the night directing the effort. The next day, with the

building's utilities functioning normally, the Navy leadership worked from the

Annex."6

Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones was leaving the

building to attend a funeral in the District of Columbia when the plane hit. While

he attended the funeral his driver tried to maintain communication with the general's staff at the Pentagon. On returning after 11:00 a.m. Jones went directly to

a second office he maintained in the Navy Annex, meeting with his staff continually and receiving updates on casualties and extent of damage. Later in the day

Admiral Clark and his staff moved from the Navy Yard to the Annex and joined

Jones for meetings in the commandant's conference room.17

The Army Operations Center (AOC) in the Pentagon basement functioned throughout the day. Half a world away in Singapore, Army Chief of Staff

General Eric Shinseki learned of the attack on the World Trade Center and

immediately telephoned the Operations Center, speaking with Brigadier General

Peter Chiarelli, in charge of current operations there. Chiarelli gave Shinseki as

much up-to-date information about the New York attacks as he could glean from

CNN. 8

As executive agent for DoD the Army coordinated with the Navy and

Air Force on proposed action to support civilian authorities during emergencies

involving mass casualties. Chiarelli told Shinseki that in his additional capacity as

director of military support he had activated the Crisis Action Team to respond

to the contingency in New York if requested by state and local officials. He anticipated that the World Trade Center disaster would require enormous rescue, firefighting, and recovery efforts."9

During the conversation with Shinseki an intelligence analyst interrupted

to inform Chiarelli that other aircraft had been hijacked. One was thought to be

headed toward Washington. Sensing the urgency of the situation, Shinseki ended

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Up and Running

the phone call, saying that he would call back later. Shortly thereafter Flight 77

hit the Pentagon; Chiarelli later described the impact as a "muffled noise:' 20

Soon senior Army leaders including Vice Chief of Staff General John

Keane and Secretary of the Army Thomas White streamed into the Operations

Center, Word came that the Pentagon's continuity of operations plan required

White to leave the building for the alternate command site. He wanted to stay

but his staff advised that he go; like Wolfowitz, he departed by helicopter.`21

All day smoke threatened to close down the crowded Army Operations

Center. Colonel Bruce Bachus, head of the Command and Control Support

Agency responsible for keeping the center functioning, depended on engineer

Alvin Nieder to operate fans and open regular and emergency doors to create

strong drafts that pulled out much of the smoke. Water from fire hoses and burst

pipes flowed down corridors, hallways, and stairwells, and seeped through floor

and wall cracks toward the AOC's computer and telephone lines and electrical

systems. Nieder monitored the water flow all evening. At 1:00 a.m. on 12 September he and NMCC engineer Michael Bartos waded through water over a foot

deep in A-E Drive to clear debris from drains, especially the heavy muck from

water-saturated ceiling tiles. Their efforts prevented short-circuiting of systems,

allowing their respective centers to function continuously during the crisis.22

The center's immediate task was to account for Army personnel, an effort

spearheaded by the Personnel Contingency Cell, with members of the Crisis

Action Team assisting. Initially working with a social roster sent to her by e-mail

a week earlier, Major Corrina Boggess and her colleagues located other rosters

and compiled personnel lists. Colonel Mark Lewis, director of plans, resources,

and operations in the Army's devastated personnel office, called the cell with valuable information about the impact site and escapees from the building. He had

departed his office in the B Ring, could not reenter the building, and now led a

team of four as they operated from an empty trailer of the Pentagon Renovation

Program Office near North Parking. His team spent the entire day and night

making phone calls, coordinating information about the injured, missing, and

safe.23

* The secretary of the Army was second in the line of succession, after the deputy secretary of defense, to

assume responsibility as the acting secretary of defense.

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PENTAGON 9/11

In the Air Force Council conference room on the mezzanine level of the

Pentagon basement, General John Jumper was chairing his first staff meeting as

Air Force chief of staff when he learned of the attack on the World Trade Center. At approximately 9:00 a.m. a large screen displayed coverage of the burning

North Tower after the first hijacked airliner had slammed into it. The group then

saw United Airlines Flight 175 crash into the South Tower. After viewing televised news for about eight minutes, Jumper resumed the meeting, concluded it

quickly, and departed for his office.24

When Flight 77 struck the Pentagon, Jumper and Secretary of the Air

Force James Roche rushed to their Operations Center on the mezzanine. Members of the Air Force Crisis Action Team had already begun to assemble there for

a 10:00 a.m. briefing; one of their responsibilities was to work with the Army to

provide assistance to civil authorities in New York. They soon activated a team to

focus on continuity of operations. 25

Over the next few hours efforts to ventilate the smoke penetrating the

Operations Center failed. At 12:20 p.m., about the time conditions forced Rumsfeld to move from the National Military Command Center, Air Force leaders

and assistants left their center for Bolling Air Force Base,just across the Potomac

River. Like their Navy counterparts, the secretary and the chief of staff chose to

stay near the Pentagon and not travel to the emergency headquarters well outside

Washington. They went to Bolling by helicopter; by 1:00 p.m. the new operations center was functioning. Surgeon General Paul Carlton, who had come from

rescue operations at the Pentagon, briefed Roche and Jumper on medical assistance-equipment, people, and air evacuation-that the Air Force could provide

to both New York City and the National Capital Region. The leaders approved

Carlton's plan to send medical personnel and equipment to McGuire Air Force

Base, New Jersey, to stand by to assist civilian efforts in New York as needed. At

3:00 a.m., after conditions on the mezzanine had improved, operational command was moved back to the Pentagon; the Operations Center became fully

operational in the Pentagon at 5:30 a.m. on 12 September.26

Keeping the Building Operating

To keep the building going required a prodigious effort by the managers, engineers, and mechanics of the Building Management Office and the Heat136
Up and Running

ing and Refrigeration Plant. Their leap into action immediately afrer the plane

hit the Pentagon helped save lives and limit damage. At the Building Operations

Command Center (BOCC) on the 1st Floor in Wedge 1, usually two or three

people kept watch around the clock, receiving maintenance calls from building

occupants and monitoring the functioning of utility systems. On 11 September

Kathryn Greenwell, answering calls and preparing work orders, sat at the control

desk viewing multiple computer monitors that displayed data about heating, air

conditioning, ventilation, steam, electricity, elevators, escalators, and fire alarms.

The information appeared also on huge high-definition color screens above and

behind the desk on one wall of the center. To the right of the large screens two

television sets displayed the Weather Channel and CNN.2 7

When CNN reported that an aircraft had crashed into the World Trade

Center, Greenwell notified her supervisor, Assistant Building Manager Steven

Carter, in his office opposite the control panel. As they watched the second aircraft hit the other tower Carter realized the crashes were deliberate; he immediately ordered the lockdown of all mechanical and electrical rooms in the building

to secure utilities against attack. Carter had issued this order previously, but only

during security exercises. He notified key staff of the lockdown: Michael Bryant,

the building manager, and John Irby, director of the Federal Facilities Division

of the Washington Headquarters Services. He also telephoned the Pentagon's

Defense Protective Service and learned that the Threat Condition for the building remained at "Normal." Should it change, DPS would notify the center. WHS

maintenance managers came immediately to the BOCC; anticipating a raised

Threat Condition they discussed additional procedures for securing the building's utility systems, after which they returned to their offices.28

When the plane smashed into the Pentagon minutes later it destroyed

part of Wedge 1 where the BOCC was located. Carter and Greenwell felt the

impact and heard what the latter described as a"thwoom" The two tried to comprehend the information rapidly displaying itself on screens as alarms beeped

and data flashed. Greenwell saw the fire alarm system go "berserk" as the number of alarms climbed incredibly fast, 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10- and on to 20 ...

30 ... 40 ... 50... 60 ... relentlessly to 100 ... 200 ... 300 and higher. She knew

that for each fire alarm, two smoke detectors had activated. From the hallwayjust

outside the center she clearly heard the public address system instructing every137
PENTAGON 9/11

one to evacuate the building. Judging that no danger immediately threatened the

BOCC, Carter instructed Greenwell to continue answering phones while he

went to investigate and to keep in contact with him by radio. Because he served as

the Building Management Office's representative to incident commanders, usually ranking officers from the Arlington County Fire Department, Carter asked

her to let him know when the incident commander arrived and the location of his

command post.29

In the Center Court Carter received radio calls from Greenwell telling

him of people trapped in Wedge 1. He ran to A-E Drive and entered Corridor

4, where he encountered dark, dense smoke, heat, and water from burst pipes

pouring into the drive. Nevertheless, he joined in helping others flee the building.

Returning to the drive he entered Corridor 5, again assisting occupants to leave

the building. In A-E Drive he could see dense smoke issuing from holes in the C

Ring wall. People were dipping their shirts in rapidly accumulating water in the

drive to sustain them in the search for survivors. Walls had collapsed, debris lay

everywhere, and fires still burned. Going back to the Center Court in search of

the incident commander, he saw DiLorenzo Clinic medical personnel conducting

triage for the injured lying on the grass. Incident Commander James Schwartz

was already on the scene but on the west side of the building near the crash site.

Building management established direct liaison with him when Charles McCormick, a building repair and alterations supervisor standing outside when the

plane hit, linked up with the commander when he moved his command post to

beneath the 1-395 overpass near South Parking.3"

The BOCC received a steady stream of calls from civilian and military

officials inquiring about conditions in the building. For people who intended to

remain in their offices, smoke, not fire, now posed the main threat. During his

quick examination of the Pentagon between Corridors 4 and 5 Carter had gained

a good idea of the extent of damage and the locations of heavy smoke concentrations. Back in the BOCC he had Greenwell bring up"Metasys" a computer software program for monitoring and controlling utility systems. Contractors had not

yet completed its installation as part of the Wedge 1 renovation, but it operated

sufficiently to permit manipulation of components of the ventilation system.31

Greenwell and a contractor, Chad Hensen, could not connect to Metasys from the computers in the BOCC, but they were in radio contact with work138
Up and Running

ers in the Control Group, a section of the Building Management Office elsewhere

with access to Metasys through their computers. Carter asked them to shut down

air handlers-air conditioning and heating system components that blew air

through the ductwork-in Corridors 3,4, 5, and 6 and set up air barriers in Corridors 1, 2, 7, and 8.32

When Arlington Fire Department Battalion Chief Dale Smith arrived

in the Center Court some time before 10:15 a.m. and established an auxiliary

command post, he thought the entire building had been evacuated. He relayed

an order from the incident commander to close down all air handlers, not knowing that Rumsfeld and many others in command centers intended to remain in

the building. Carter informed Smith of the critical work by building maintenance

personnel to keep essential elements functioning; an officer from the NMCC

also impressed on fire officials the importance of continuing operation of that

center. The incident commander and subordinates later directed the manipulation of the air handlers to reduce the amount of smoke in certain undamaged sections of the Pentagon. 33

As the morning wore on dense smoke that wrapped around the building

thwarted efforts to bring fresh air into the structure until wind shifts temporarily

blew away the fumes. Control Group crews and contractors operated the ventilation system all day and into the night to ease the task of the firefighters. Despite

their persistent efforts smoke and soot permeated the building.3 4

Around 10:00 a.m., within minutes of returning from his inspection

of the impact site and while focusing on the ventilation system, Carter received

an urgent call from Donald Kuney, the manager of the Heating and Refrigeration Plant, located a few hundred yards from the Pentagon, asking him to send

mechanics immediately to basement tunnels near the destroyed areas to turn off

valves to keep chilled water from gushing from large burst pipes. Water normally

flowed through pipes and coils around the building to cool air and then returned

to the plant. Closing the valves would prevent the water from reaching broken

pipes and hemorrhaging. Failure of air conditioning would cause large, sophisticated computer and communications systems to close down, leaving the nation's

military headquarters without a means of command and control. Backup generators and portable air conditioners could be substituted in certain areas, but those

alternate sources were not adequate under the existing extraordinary circum139
PENTAGON 9/11

stances. To conserve water for firefighting and to increase pressure for the chilled

system Kuney also wanted valves closed on broken pipes carrying water from city

lines."•

At the Heating and Refrigeration Plant Kuney and operations manager

Brian Maguire noted with alarm that the pressure in the chilled water system had

fallen rapidly from 80 to 38 pounds per square inch. If the pressure reached 30, it

could create cavities that would seriously damage pumps. As the pressure continued to drop, Kuney ordered engineers to shut down the chillers, pumps, condensers, and other sub-systems, effectively closing down the cooling plant, not to be

restarted until the maintenance crews at the Pentagon stopped the massive loss of

water from the broken pipes there.36

While Carter was turning off valves he learned of the warning of another

hijacked airliner flying toward Washington and heard the Pentagon police in

the Center Court ordering an evacuation. Some of the mechanical and electrical crews communicated by radio and split into two teams; one went to South

Parking and the other to North Parking. If the plane crashed into the building or

near it at least one of the crews would survive and return to help minimize damage. Carter and a few workers, including electrician Daniel Murphy and maintenance inspector Dennis Smith, stayed behind and waded through water in dark,

smoky tunnels to turn off valves on broken water and steam pipes, taking care not

to touch red fire valves that controlled water flow to ceiling sprinklers.37

Some workers returned to the Center Court around 10:30 a.m. with

only minutes left before the anticipated follow-on plane attack. Six men and

Kathryn Greenwell divided into two groups and walked to different areas of the

Center Court, increasing the odds that some of them would survive another air

attack. An eerie silence fell over the court as Carter, Murphy, Smith, Greenwell,

Robert Candido, David Brown, and Anthony Freeman waited for the plane; firefighters and others had remained there as well. After receiving the all clear notification maintenance crews resumed their work to save the building.38

Word of the supposed inbound aircraft was late in reaching the Heating

and Refrigeration Plant, so that operators continued to monitor systems, waiting for the water pressure to rise before restarting the cooling plant. Once it rose

sufficiently everyone had to be ready to activate all plant components in precise

sequence. Nothing could go wrong, especially in the condenser system that pulled

140
Up and Running

water from the Potomac River and put it through several filtering screens. Everyone knew the chilled water was indispensable to keeping the Pentagon functioning as a command center. Once the pressure reached a normal level Kuney gave

the go-ahead to start the sequence to bring the plant back on line. The 10-minute process ending about 10:30 a.m. permitted the cooling of the major computer

and telephone systems. None of the critical components had to shut down.39

Still responding to the warning of a second attack, police arrived at the

plant and ordered everyone into the nearby parking lot except Maguire, who volunteered to stay and monitor the stabilized systems. Kuney soon returned to the

plant, put some coins in a vending machine for a couple of sodas, and, handing a

drink to Maguire, asked about the terrorists, "Do you think they'll come back?"

"Nah;' replied Maguire. Shortly after the presumed threat ended police allowed

everyone to return to the plant to tackle restoring chilled water to the Navy

Annex building.4"

The Pentagon's electrical system also suffered critical damage. After the

plane crashed, mangled live wires threatened to electrocute survivors, firefighters,

and rescue workers. Arcing from short-circuited lines could rekindle fires, spark

explosions of jet fuel vapors, and damage components of the electrical system

throughout the entire building.41

Electrician Matthew Morris, just inside Corridor 6 off A-E Drive when

the crash occurred, stood about a hundred yards from the destroyed area. Running along the drive toward the impact site, he saw people climbing over the chain

link fence across the drive near Corridor 4. After helping to unlock the gate in the

fence he was appalled to see people emerging through the heavy smoke from the

C-4 electrical vault, which carried 13,800 volts of electricity. The vault's doors to

the drive and its inner doors had all been blown open, and part of its ceiling caved

in. Peering into the deep vault, Morris saw water on the floor and heard the transformers humming even though they were twisted off their bases. He quickly went

inside as more people were coming out, saw digital displays still operating, and

pulled disconnect switches to cut all voltage.42

From the A-E Drive Morris hurried through the building to the E Ring

and outside to check on the temporary emergency power generator for Wedge

1, mounted on a trailer. He found it burning. The airplane had grazed it, igniting its hundreds of gallons of fuel. Fortunately his coworker, John Robinson,

141
PENTAGON 9/11

had not been performing his weekly maintenance on the generator at the time of

the crash. After the explosion Robinson had run to A-E Drive, saw the injured

emerging from the C Ring, and found and drove a small utility vehicle to transport them to the DiLorenzo Clinic or the North Parking area for evacuation. The

police ordered Morris away from the building for his own safety and would not

let him reenter from the west side. He kept in touch with the BOCC and Steven

Carter by radio.4

"

Shortly after impact Morris's supervisor, William Thomas, ran to a vault

in the basement and began to identify and pull levers to cut the flow of electricity to the crash site. For the next few hours he and electricians coordinated with

fire officials through the BOCC to cut power to firefighting areas. An old wiring

maze that carried electricity from other parts of the building complicated their

search for sources of power to some live wires arcing and sending out flashes of

sparks. Computer servers still working from emergency battery-operated "uninterruptible power supply" components also caused concern. When part of the

NMCC lost power, workers set up generators.44

Voltage disconnections also caused the BOCC to lose some of its power.

Then about 11:10 a.m. an electrician pulled a switch for Wedge 1 that cut remaining power to the BOCC causing it to lose computers and telephones. Earlier it

had lost its backup electrical power when the plane hit the wedge's temporary

emergency generator. After Greenwell left the center and headed up a flight of

stairs to the smaller, less capable alternate BOCC, she spent her time between

that site, the Building Management Office at 2A258, and the Center Court,

mostly responding to phone calls and passing messages.45

The air in the building worried managers, workers who remained in

their offices, and first responders, fearful that carbon monoxide, cyanide, asbestos, lead from paint, and other toxins might be circulating. The building's industrial hygienist, Matthew Skowronski, quickly set up equipment to check levels of

common gases. The Arlington County Fire Department tested for carbon monoxide in the NMCC. The Safety and Occupational Health Branch of WHS

called on contractors to remove water-soaked plaster and asbestos that fell from

ceilings onto furniture and floors. Within 24 hours, in addition to contractors,

Army environmental specialists were testing air throughout the building. PENREN contractors continued to conduct routine air sampling, the results serving

142
Up and Running

as cross-checks to other tests. Filters, coils, and grills were repeatedly changed or

cleaned to improve air quality. The Labor Department's Occupational Safety and

Health Administration assisted with matters involving asbestos and structural

damage. The Environmental Protection Agency collected air, water, and debris

samples and monitored conditions for first responders, Pentagon occupants, and

residents in the surrounding community.46

Immediately after the plane hit, WHS Director Doc Cooke, responsible

for overall management of the building, hurried to the entrance closest to Rumsfeld's office to check the emergency security arrangements and evacuation procedures. During the day and into the evening, he did not leave the building, providing the secretary with information on casualties and the building's condition

and security. In turn he received reports from DPS Chief John Jester, Director of

Real Estate and Facilities (RE&F) Paul Haselbush, and the latter's deputy, Ralph

Newton.47

Haselbush and Newton had responsibility for the building's maintenance and security. In accordance with their continuity of operations procedures,

they moved to their alternate command post in a satellite office on Army Navy

Drive, beyond South Parking. The continuity plan remained fresh in their minds

because a month earlier a fire in the Pentagon had produced smoke that caused a

partial building evacuation, prompting Haselbush to direct his staff to update the

directorate's emergency plans. 48

Federal Facilities Division Chief Irby and Building Manager Bryant kept

Haselbush and Newton, who closely monitored the activity of the maintenance

crews and police officers, informed about the activity of the BOCC; Jester relayed

security information. They received calls also from division chiefs accounting for

employees and contractors and tried to determine the number of people in the

damaged wedges at the time of the attack, all the while keeping Cooke and other

officials abreast of the situation.4

About mid-afternoon Cooke informed Newton that Rumsfeld wanted

the Pentagon open for business the next day. All morning that had been the gritty

intent of the maintenance crews, who knew the Pentagon symbolized the nation's

defense. Carter spoke for them when asked if the building evacuation would be

100 percent. "Not on our watch;' he replied."

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PENTAGON 9/11

While the crash site smoldered and the roof continued to burn, Haselbush and Newton took measures to prepare the building and its occupants for as

normal a day as possible on 12 September. They and their staff tried to determine

how much was habitable and if utilities could sustain the return of the workforce;

checked on the building's air quality; discussed ways to inform employees about

conditions at the Pentagon; and provided assistance in preparing information

for Rumsfeld. Problems of transportation and parking required that Haselbush's

staff also keep in touch with incident command officials and police authorities

to learn which roads would remain closed around the Pentagon; coordinate with

the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority on the resumption of train

and bus service to the Pentagon; reroute DoD shuttle buses; and find additional

parking spaces since South Parking was taken over by numerous emergency vehicles. They also consulted with Jester to identify new security requirements for the

building.5"

Fire Chief Plaugher did not welcome Rumsfeld's directive to bring back

the workforce on 12 September-the roof still burned and the air at the impact

site was contaminated. Worried that fire gases might travel throughout the

building, fire officials directed the placement of barriers to prevent anyone from

approaching the impact site and surrounding areas without authorization and

protective gear. FBI representatives, too, were concerned because the area was a

crime scene. Yellow crime scene tape and guards declared sections of the building between Corridors 2 and 7 off limits. Wooden wall barriers were built later to

further restrict access to the impact site.5 2

NancyJudd, head of the RE&F contracting office, spent much of the day

on 11 September along the Potomac River bank, along with other civilians and

military, helping care for infants and youngsters from the evacuated Pentagon

Child Development Center, located adjacent to North Parking. Most parents had

rushed from the building to the center and then to the river bank to retrieve their

children. Many others frantically made their way through massive traffic jams to

get to the center. In the late afternoon Judd arrived at the RE&F alternate command site.53

On learning of the expected return of workers to the Pentagon the next

day, Judd, after consultation with Haselbush, immediately let a service contract

to clean soot and smoke from habitable areas and arranged for a recovery man144
Up and Running

agement firm specializing in cleanups after disasters to send a 50-person work

crew on the morning of the 12th. For the next few weeks they cleaned the building 24 hours a day, washing floors, walls, ceilings, windows, doors, vents, and light

fixtures.54

By evening on the 11th the firefighters and maintenance crews had thus

far preserved the Pentagon. The roof still burned, but ruinous damage was confined to the crash area; utilities functioned in most of the building. The widespread smoke did not prevent holding two significant conferences during the

evening.

Confident and reassuring, Rumsfeld held a brief press conference in the

Pentagon at 6:42 p.m., especially to demonstrate to the American people and

the world that despite the damaging attack the Pentagon still operated. Most

of the attending press people had been working outdoors several hundred yards

from the building, on South Joyce Street near the Navy Exchange gas station, the

closest they were permitted to the crash site. The staff of Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Public Affairs Victoria Clarke helped the press haul their equipment

to the Pentagon and pass through tight security checks.55

Sen. Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and

Sen.John Warner, the committee's ranking minority member, had asked to come

to the Pentagon to show bipartisan support. Appreciating their concern, Rumsfeld welcomed them. After visiting the crash site the senators participated in the

press conference, joined by JCS Chairman General Shelton just arrived from

Europe and Secretary of the Army White, back from the alternate command

location. Near the end of his remarks Rumsfeld pointedly declared that the briefing was taking place in the Pentagon and that "the Pentagon's functioning. It will

be in business tomorrow.' He spoke of casualties but said it was too early to have

firm figures because roster checks were still under way. In response to a question

he stated that the FBI had secured the site.56

After the conference the secretary went to the White House to listen

to the president, returned from Omaha, speak to the nation at 8:30 p.m. Earlier in the evening on his helicopter ride from Andrews Air Force Base to the

White House, the president had flown over the Pentagon to see for himself the

extent of the destruction. After the speech Bush met with Rumsfeld and other

top advisers.57

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PENTAGON 9/11

At the Pentagon immediately after Rumsfeld's press conference, Cooke

and MDW Commander General Jackson met with representatives from security,

firefighting, and search and rescue organizations; building maintenance; PENREN; and the military services to discuss responsibilities. The FBI announced

that later that night it would establish a Joint Operations Center (JOC) at the

nearby Fort Myer Community Center, where staffs of federal and local agencies

would answer questions and provide updated information."

Open for Business on 12 September

Some of the thousands of military personnel, civil servants, and contractors who returned to the Pentagon on 12 September, determined to keep the

building in operation, arrived well before sunrise to avoid traffic jams and find

parking. At some points in the E Ring embers had flared up during the night, and

fire persistently consumed the dry wood under areas of the slate roof, Anthony

Conques recalled, "I came in the next morning around 5:00, and the worst part

for me was looking out over the courtyard at the bandages, bags, and debris, and

in the dark the building was still on fire.... In the dark it was eerie-the orange

flames and smoke, the shining lights from the firefighting efforts-it was surreal and upsetting." Most poignant for workers was knowing that the building

entombed colleagues and friends."

As the chief of the RE&F Office of Space Policy and Acquisition,

Conques had to find office space in the National Capital Region for displaced

workers. With the help of the General Services Administration (GSA) he found

quarters in three buildings in Crystal City in Arlington, two subway stops from

the Pentagon. The RE&F staff and GSA acquired desks, chairs, computers, and

telephones and arranged for cabling and electrical power for 3,000 people, down

from the original estimate of 5,000 displaced by fire, smoke, and water; many

people found space with colleagues either within the Pentagon or elsewhere in

the area. Through Cooke, Conques coordinated with the military department

administrative assistants: J. B. Hudson (Army), John LaRaia (Navy), and William Davidson (Air Force). Douglas Benton of the GSA cut through red tape for

them. Within five days all displaced employees were at alternate work stations.6(

Two stubborn problems on 12 September could have forced Rumsfeld

from the building after all. Had the roof fire continued to spread it would have

146
Up and Running

destroyed an antenna cluster located atop the building; destruction of the antennas would have seriously degraded the NMCC's communications capability,

forcing a relocation of the center and DoD leaders. Firefighters battling the blaze

beneath slate roof areas through the 12th succeeded in keeping the flames from

the communication gear. Likewise, water pouring from fire hoses into the building threatened to short-circuit the Pentagon's main telephone switching room.

Quick action by building maintenance workers using pumps and sandbags saved

the critical equipment.61

For many days after the attack managers and employees faced scores of

urgent, unusual problems, exhibiting impressive skill and in some instances courage under hazardous conditions. On the 12th, electrician Robert McCloud led a

team to assess the condition of the building's high-voltage electrical distribution

system. Using a flashlight in smoky, wet electrical vaults he began the process of

restoring power to parts of the building. Later, in full firefighting gear the team

entered the collapsed impact area where they sought the source of a live connection and disconnected a battery still trying to power a computer server backup

system. Kuney, with a team of employees and contractors on the lawn immediately in front of the crash site, used a generator, air compressor, and pump to

remove thousands of gallons of water from a utility vault damaged by the attacking aircraft. They hastened to pump the water out so it would not touch steam

pipes in the vault. 62

The RE&F contracting office quickly arranged for contractors to tear off

damaged roof slate and cover the openings with tarpaulins and wood to protect

the floors beneath in the event of rain. No matter how waterproof they made the

roof, however, heat from warm days that followed affected wet, dark, sealed areas

of otherwise undamaged sections of the building and unleashed a wild growth of

mold that would require removal of walls and ceilings and extensive environmental testing in the ensuing weeks.63

Maintenance crews worked around the clock for weeks after 11 September. Robert Cox, chief of the technical staff of the Federal Facilities Division,

spoke for many of the civil servants and contractors: "Everyone I know and talk

to who was involved in this intensive effort unanimously felt privileged to be a

part of it. There were so many people... who like me got many phone calls from

*After 11 September the Pentagon renovation eliminated these vulnerabilities.

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PENTAGON 9/11

family and friends worried about [our] safety. This was overwhelming.... There

was an amazing feeling of satisfaction that went with the whole effort."64 Closing

valves, pulling switches, testing the air, pumping water, setting up generators, and

hundreds of other jobs helped to reestablish the physical environment in the Pentagon that the department needed to carry out its responsibilities. Office workers

responded with as much toughness and resilience as the building itself, returning

to their jobs the next day while fires still burned and rescue and recovery efforts

continued.

That terrorists, rather than accidental or natural occurrences, caused the

Pentagon's damage, made it crucially important to maintain continuity of operations. DoD had to act immediately to safeguard the nation against other possible strikes and prepare for military action against those who facilitated and perpetrated the attacks. The department's resourcefulness in carrying on effectively

under extreme conditions reflected the steadfast dedication of its leaders and

rank and file-military and civilian.

148
CHAPTER VII

Securing the Pentagon

Security provided by the police, FBI, and military was indispensable to

the efforts to save and protect the Pentagon's people and to limit damage to the

building on 11 September and the days that followed. For the Pentagon policethe Defense Protective Service-and more than 30 other law enforcement agencies and military units that came to its assistance the attack created immediate,

immense security requirements. Together they faced a myriad of problems far

beyond the capacity of DPS to handle alone: overseeing evacuation of the building rescuing survivors, guarding the building and grounds, collecting evidence,

safeguarding the building's secrets, protecting against possible additional terrorist strikes, controlling traffic in a wide area, and keeping intruders and the curious away from the site. All this required the services of more than two thousand federal, state, local, and military police, and other military units, some of

whom remained on the job for months, even years. With the security provided

by the police and the military, the firefighters could concentrate on their formidable tasks, as could search and rescue units, medical teams, engineers, cleanup and

construction crews, and even chaplains and the family assistance center. Involvement of so many different agencies could have created jurisdictional and chain of

command problems, but the incident command system and the compelling sense
PENTAGON 9/11

of responsibility and urgency experienced by all responders made effective cooperation possible.

Defense Protective Service

The DPS, led by Chief John Jester, had responsibility for security and law

enforcement on the Pentagon Reservation. Approximately 250 armed officers,

trained at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Georgia, patrolled

the building and grounds, guarded entrances, screened deliveries, responded to

bomb threats, formed an Emergency Response Team commonly known as a

special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team, and staffed the Protective Services

Unit that guarded the secretary of defense, other high-ranking DoD officials,

and visiting dignitaries. The DPS also supervised contract security guards at 45

DoD leased facilities around the National Capital Region. Additionally, some 50

unarmed DPS members operated the locksmith and building pass offices and

had responsibility for installing and maintaining alarms and intrusion detection

devices, securing classified material, and promoting industrial and information

security.'

The Pentagon required extensive security arrangements around the clock

to protect not only the people in the building, but also command and control

operations, communication equipment, and a vast number of classified documents. To safeguard foreign official visitors, DPS worked with the United States

Secret Service, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Whenever the Pentagon became the target of protest demonstrations DPS coordinated with civilian and military agencies in the region. Managing the flow of

100,000 tourists who visited the building each year also required coordination

with other agencies.

During the 1980s and 1990s DPS studied the lessons learned from truck

bombings against Americans abroad and at home. Despite the steep costs, Jester

and others strongly advocated incorporating as part of the Pentagon renovation

such changes as blast-proof windows, a remote facility for truck deliveries, a blast

wall between South Parking and the building, moving the Metro bus terminal

further from the structure, and rerouting the exit path from the Metro train station-all measures eventually carried out.'

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Securing the Pentagon

The 1995 sarin nerve gas attack in a Tokyo subway prompted DPS to

initiate planning to counter a terrorist chemical or biological attack on the Pentagon. For Exercise Cloudy Office in 1998 DPS employed a scenario in which sarin

was released after terrorists breached security, reached the office of the secretary

of defense, and took hostages. The exercise, participated in by 500 people from

local, state, and federal agencies, "killed" 26 people and "contaminated" 100 at the

Pentagon. By 2001, however, DPS had made little progress in acquiring chemical and biological detection equipment, a key component of its counterterrorism

planning.4

Because the Pentagon lay in the flight path of Reagan National Airport,

the 16th busiest in the country, DPS also considered the possibility of the crash

of an airplane into the building, an event it thought more likely to be accidental

than deliberate. In 2000 DPS held a tabletop exercise with a scenario of a singleengine aircraft hitting the roof and bursting into flames.'

During these exercises DPS regarded the Arlington County Fire Department as the first responder since it normally served the Pentagon for fire and

medical incidents. Arlington officials introduced DPS to the incident command

system.* On the other hand, although the Arlington police were the law enforcement and security arm for the firefighting incident commander, they did not have

jurisdiction on the Pentagon Reservation. Chief Edward Flynn of the Arlington

County Police Department and Jester, however, knew each other well as members of the police chiefs committee of the Metropolitan Washington Council of

Governments. Membership in the committee afforded Jester opportunities to get

to know his counterparts throughout the region.6

On 11 September Jester, at his desk in room 4A275, received a telephone

call from Glenn Flood, a public affairs specialist in the Office of the Secretary of

Defense, alerting him to the first strike in New York City. Turning on his television set he saw United Flight 175 plunge into the second tower. When Lieutenant Michael Nesbitt, who ran the day-to-day operations in the DPS Communications Center on the 1st Floor, telephoned the chief asking if he knew of the

New York plane crashes, Jester directed him to send a message to the building's

Real Estate and Facilities Directorate reassuring all that the Pentagon remained

secure-its Terrorist Threat Condition stayed at "Normal;' meaning no present

* See Chapter IV.

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PENTAGON 9/11

threat of terrorist activity. Terrorist Threat Condition, renamed Terrorist Force

Protection Condition in June 2001--a term not yet widely used in September

2001--ranged from Normal to four higher levels, Alpha through Delta.7

No one in DPS received warning of a hijacked aircraft on its way to

the Washington area. Reacting to the news from New York City, Army Deputy

Administrative Assistant Sandra Riley telephoned jester and asked,"What do we

have in place to protect from an airplane?" He replied, "Nothing:' The Pentagon

did not have an antiaircraft system on the roof of the building or on the grounds.

Even if DPS had received word of an inbound plane, it had no plan to counter a suicide air attack. Had a warning been issued in time, DPS's only effective

response would have been evacuation and dispersal of the building's occupants.'

A surface attack was a different matter. After reviewing contingency

plans and procedures for tightening security with DPS Major James Phillips,

Jester proceeded to the offices of Doc Cooke, head of the Washington Headquarters Services, and Paul Haselbush, Jester's immediate supervisor and director

of Real Estate and Facilities. He informed them of DPS procedures to beef up

patrols outside the building and impose stricter security checks at entry points.

Before returning to his office Jester met with Deputy Chief John Pugrud and

discussed the tighter security arrangements. He directed Pugrud to notify the

DPS Communications Center to raise the Force Protection Condition to Alpha,

meaning that a general threat of possible terrorist activity existed which required

enhanced security.'

Pugrud had the phone in his hand dialing the center when Flight 77

hit. He heard the crash more than felt it. When the phone call was answered,

he could hear the center's alarms activating and radio calls taking place. The dispatcher yelled, "We've been hit! We've been hit! Wedge one. Wedge one?' DPS

Officer Mark Bright, who was standing outside the building, saw the plane fly

low over the Navy Annex and slam into the building. He radioed in his report,

sped in his police cruiser to the crash site, and called in a description of the scene.

Other officers also radioed the center.10

In his office about 600 feet from the crash site Jester thought the shaking and loud noise was caused by a heavy load of furniture on a pallet rolling over

an uneven expansion joint. He heard someone yell, "We've been hit!" His first

thought was "No, not here. It can't happen here:' He looked out the window, saw

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Securing the Pentagon

smoke, ran down the stairs to the Communications Center, and shouted, "Get a

camera up there!" Some of the center's eight monitor screens mounted on a wall

remained blank because the crash had destroyed the camera nearest the impact

site and cut connectivity to others.11

One monitor came on automatically, showing debris and doors blown

off their hinges in Corridor 5. Officer Jesse DeVaughn brought up an image

from a camera at the Navy Annex that had zoomed in on the roiling red flames

and smoke. Nesbitt thought he was looking at the nearby gas station on South

Joyce Street, so when he called to notify the Arlington County Fire Department

of reports that a plane had hit the Pentagon, he also reported a fire at the gas station. Nesbitt then refocused the Annex camera to clearly show a normal gas station scene and the blaze at the Pentagon.12

In the meantime Jester told Nesbitt to use the public address system to

order everyone to evacuate but not to use Corridors 3 and 4. The chief ran to

the Center Court, then over to A-E Drive where he saw black smoke and raging flames. With others he tried to enter the building, but the intense heat forced

them back. He heard shouts about windows ready to blow. Jester ran back to the

Communications Center and told Nesbitt, "Mike, you've got to get Fire or somebody in here because people are trapped. They're burning alive" Jester ran out

to A-E Drive again, heard people shouting for fire extinguishers, and directed

DPS officers to find some, but he feared the equipment could do little against

the horrible flames he had just seen and felt. The officers found extinguishers in

the Remote Delivery Facility and brought them to A-E Drive. Moving on to the

Center Court for a while, Jester tried to gather information and coordinate DPS

activity, then headed for the impact site on the west side of the building, arriving

after the E Ring floors had collapsed at 10:15 a.m.13

Although smoke began to filter into the Communications Center, DPS

personnel remained at their posts, communicating with the ACFD and agencies with medical evacuation helicopters and responding to and monitoring radio

calls, while utilizing 11 phone lines. Knowing that a move to the untested, off-site

backup center further from the building could disrupt DPS communications for

nearly an hour and might even result in a long-term disconnect, they were determined to remain in place and function as the DPS communication hub despite

153
PENTAGON 9/11

the thickening smoke and warnings about another hijacked airliner on its way to

the area."4

Immediately after the crash, DPS officers rushed to the devastated area

to rescue people. Officers Fred Hodges and Marc Baker left their police cruiser

near the crash site and ran to help terrified people fleeing the inferno. "It seemed

like an eternity before the fire trucks arrived, but it was only five minutes;' Hodges

recalled. Officer David Webster pedaled his bike from the Pentagon Metro bus

area to the impact site where he helped people exit from Corridors 5 and 6. He

met Master Police Officer George Clodfelter who with Officer Jose Rojas pulled

victims from the burning building near the Heliport. One of these had hair and

clothes on fire. Officer Arthur Rosati plunged into the smoke in a hallway to grab

and guide a lieutenant colonel to safety. On meeting Clodfelter, who had blood all

over his shirt, he heard him say, "This is insane.'15

From the Remote Delivery Facility Officer James Murphy and K-9 Officer Isaac Ho'opi'i ran to the building, entering it through the double doors at

the Heliport entrance. They attempted to move deeper into the 1st Floor but

smoke and heat drove them back. Murphy then ran to a window and pulled people out. Hoopi'i reentered the structure at a different point and carried people to

safety. The heavy smoke caused some victims to lose their bearings, but the calming instructions from Ho'opi'i guided them to safety. In one pitch-dark room

thick with smoke, William Sinclair, with severely burned hands and arms, heard

Ho'opi'i say over and over, "If you can hear me, head toward my voice;' which he

did. Sinclair called Hoopi'i his "guardian angel:' Officers Bruce Centner and W.

T. Carpenter joined other rescuers in the A-E Drive, leading injured survivors to

safety and operating fire extinguishers to help others exit the building.16

DPS Major James Koerber, Investigator Robins Mapp, and two Virginia

State troopers entered the building from the Heliport side, braving the smoke

and heat to help dazed and injured people escape from the destruction. Koerber had rushed to the scene from the Navy Annex with Officers Michael Benedict and John Kinnard. Despite the threat of a building collapse, Mapp, Koerber,

and the troopers removed debris, called out to survivors, and searched halls and

rooms. On the 4th Floor above the aircraft entry hole, when smoke and heat disoriented one of the troopers, Officers Donald Behe and Abraham Diaz took him

out of the Pentagon to paramedics who sent him to the hospital. Increasingly

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Securing the Pentagon

dangerous conditions also forced the others to leave the building shortly before

the floors collapsed. 17

Duty required many DPS personnel to remain at their posts within the

building and at main entrances during and after the evacuation. Officers William

McNeil, Richard Brown, andJames Griggs, among those protecting the National

Military Command Center and other JCS offices, could respond only with makeshift, barely effective means when the smoke reached them. McNeil used wet

paper towels on his mouth and nose to filter out the smoke. Offered a dust mask,

Brown readily donned it for the meager protection it offered. Griggs relied on wet

tissues to breathe through and to soothe his irritated eyes.1"

Although often at risk, no DPS officers were killed or seriously injured

on 11 September. Unfortunately, Allen Boyle, a DPS contract worker installing

alarms in Wedge 1, had apparently taken a break on the west side by Corridor 4,

was close to the impact point, and perished."9

DPS and the Pentagon Building Management Office had responsibility

for the orderly evacuation of the approximately 20,000 military and civilian personnel, contractors, vendors, and visitors in the building. They conducted periodic fire drills and provided floor plans, exit routes, and guidance about evacuations. Each organization had to select its own assembly area and publicize its

exit paths. In the unrenovated wedges frequent false alarms accidentally triggered

by maintenance work had often led to occupants not leaving until they received

confirmation of a fire or other incident. On 16 August 2001 Cooke reported to

DoD senior managers that a few days earlier while a fire burned in the cafeteria

area some people ignored alarms and DPS evacuation directions. He stressed the

importance of emergency response training for DoD personnel and urged managers to consult a circular recently issued by building management explaining

supervisory responsibilities in the event of a fire or other dangerous situations.

For the new, recently occupied Wedge 1, an evaluation after 11 September found

that "many survivors said that they were not aware of evacuation plans for the

areas of the building in which they worked and that there had been no drills during the period of time they occupied their new space!'2°

Since a local fire was not thought to warrant the evacuation of the entire

building, the fire alarm systems in the renovated Wedge 1 and the unrenovated

Wedges 2-5 were not designed to sound throughout the entire structure. The

155
PENTAGON 9/11

explosion and fires destroyed or damaged some alarms; others automatically activated. Alarms in corridors on the opposite side of the building from the crash site

did not automatically activate; occupants and DPS officers set them off manually. DPS personnel and building maintenance workers also entered alarm control rooms near the building apexes and activated alarms for an entire wedge. A

pre-recorded voice evacuation message and an alarm sounded in the new and

old wedges, but in the old wedges the message was often unintelligible. In addition, DPS's patched together "Big Voice" public address system, allowing an officer to issue specific exit instructions during an evacuation, did not amplify well

or reach all parts of the building; in some parts it was difficult or impossible to

understand.21

Jester wanted the entire building evacuated except for critical command

sites. Knowing that some people could not hear or understand the alarms or

might ignore them if they were unaware of the plane crash, Pugrud instructed

the staff of the Security Services Branch tojoin armed officers to pound on doors

and enter offices from the 5th Floor to the Basement, ordering everyone to leave.

Locked emergency doors at the Mall and River Entrances required people to find

other routes. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz directed a guard to open the emergency door near the River Entrance that became an exit route. Officers unlocked

the Mall emergency door as well.22

By and large the massive evacuation directed by DPS was orderly, but

emotions ran high. Some people in South Parking were dazed and crying. On

the River side, D.C. Harbor Patrol Officer Jeffrey Blevins observed: "Everybody

was running out. The first group that we were dealing with were the ones that

were just kind of in shock. They didn't know what was going on; they just knew

there was an explosion" Army Colonel Bruce Bachus heard people "yelling and

screaming" as they ran past him. John Irby, head of the Federal Facilities Division, observed, "Out in the corridor you could see the terror on people's faces as

they left. There was no question that it was not a drill:' People with disabilities

received help if they needed it; most got out with little difficulty.23

DPS could not help the many Pentagon evacuees who carried wireless

telephones but could not send their calls through the communication networks.

Local television reporter David Statter referred to the situation as "cellular gridlock:" Navy Lieutenant (jg) James McDonner noted that about 15 to 20 people

156
Securing the Pentagon

using his phone tried unsuccessfully to make connections. Sometimes if a call got

through, the caller would ask others in the crowd if they wanted to send a message to a relative via a third party. Army Major Carl Jaley reached his sister in

Seattle and gave her a list of names and numbers to phone on behalf of others.

Army Colonel Mark Volk's wife received a call from a stranger telling her that her

husband was fine and that the caller could not talk at length because she had to

continue contacting people on a list. Telephones connected to wires functioned

much more reliably than cell phones; people formed long queues at pay phones

such as those in the Pentagon City shopping mall to await their turn to call family, friends, and supervisors.24

Jester moved through the crowd to meet Incident Commander Schwartz

at South Parking and walked with him to South Hayes Street under the 1-395

overpass where Schwartz set up his command post to elude the second hijacked

airliner reportedly headed toward the Pentagon. A man in motion the rest of

the day, Jester went back and forth between the 1-395 location and the crash site

when he was not in the Pentagon at the DPS Communications Center or providing status briefings for Rumsfeld, Cooke, and others. Major Koerber, who eventually arrived at the 1-395 command post, duringJester's absence functioned as the

DPS liaison with the incident commander. Pugrud stayed in the Center Court

as the police liaison with Fire Battalion Chief Dale Smith.Jester had ordered the

recall of all off-duty officers. Many rushed to the Pentagon without a recall message, but massive traffic jams delayed their arrival. Once there, heavy smoke in the

armory made it difficult to retrieve service weapons. After the attack DPS raised

the Force Protection Condition to Delta, the highest level; officers took maximum security measures.

25

FBI and the Crime Scene

In the vanguard of federal government responders racing to support the

rescue, firefighting, and security operations at the Pentagon, FBI Special Agent

Christopher Combs had taken action in accordance with the Federal Response

Plan first issued in 1992. Shortly after the attack, the Federal Emergency Management Agency activated the plan. Designed to bring together 28 federal departments and agencies and the American Red Cross to aid state and local govern157
PENTAGON 9/11

ments in coping with presidentially declared disasters and emergencies, the plan

identified lead federal agencies to perform 12 emergency support functions such

as conducting search and rescue operations, handling and disposing of hazardous materials, and providing health and medical services. In 1995 President Bill

Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, "United States Policy

on Counterterrorism" and in 1997 an annex based on PDD 39 was added to the

Federal Response Plan expanding the plan's scope to include acts of terrorism. 2

6'

As the lead federal agency responsible for dealing with terrorism within

the United States, the Department of Justice had delegated operational responsibility to the FBI. Responsible for "crisis management;' primarily law enforcement functions, the FBI was charged to anticipate, thwart, respond to, and

resolve terrorist incidents. FEMA, as lead agency for "consequence management;'

was charged with coordinating federal efforts to protect public health and safety,

restore government services, and provide emergency relief. In January 2001 the

FBI and FEMA issued the "United States Government Interagency Domestic

Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan;' affirming FEMAs lead role in consequence management and the FBI's in crisis management.*2 7

On his arrival about 9:50 a.m. Combs reported to Schwartz, and asked

how the FBI could support him. Schwartz told Combs, who was well-known to

him, that he wanted intelligence about the attack. The agent had secure radio contact with the FBI's Washington Field Office at Judiciary Square in Washington,

which had direct lines to the Strategic Information Operations Center at FBI

headquarters on Pennsylvania Avenue. He passed to Schwartz reports from the

Field Office and warned him shortly before 10:15 a.m. that the fourth hijacked

airliner was on a direct flight path to Washington. When the airliner threat vanished after the 20-minute countdown, Combs received and relayed the all clear

report from the Field Office.28

FBI agents arriving at the Pentagon reported to Combs, who initially

exercised FBI command and control on scene. Later in the afternoon Assistant Special Agent in Charge Robert Blecksmith took over on-scene command,

and on 13 September Special Agent in Charge Arthur Eberhart assumed the

responsibility.

29

* The FBI defined a terrorist incident as "a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, in violation of the

criminal laws of the United States, or of any state, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political and social objectives:'

158
Securing the Pentagon

To establish for the record the cause of the explosion and fire the FBI

conducted interviews with eyewitnesses and learned that a commercial airliner had hit the building, dispelling early suspicions and reports that a truck

bomb or small commuter plane had caused the damage. Seeking to collect lasting visual evidence, an FBI agent asked for assistance from two combat photographers, Marine Corporal Jason Ingersoll and Navy Petty Officer Kevin Rimrodt,

who took photographs of the damaged building, the debris field, the path of the

plane, and also the crowds of people who gathered to watch, among whom it was

thought there might be terrorists. When another hijacked airliner was thought to

be on its way, the agent asked Ingersoll and Rimrodt to stand where they could

photograph the incoming aircraft if it smashed into the building. The photographers watched as everyone fled, leaving them behind at an exposed site to wait for

the next catastrophic strike. The all clear signal brought them special relief. Other

photographers boarded helicopters to take aerial shots of the Pentagon.3

"

As the fire raged, FBI agents identified grid zones and formed a line

of Arlington police officers, military personnel, and others to walk shoulder to

shoulder on the west side lawn to search for remnants from the airliner. Keeping clear of rescue and firefighting efforts, agents then identified, photographed,

removed, and bagged pieces of the airplane and personal effects. Although much

of the plane disintegrated within the Pentagon, the searchers found many scraps

and a few personal items widely scattered on the grass and Heliport. Plane remnants varied from half-dollar size to a few feet long. Anxious to hunt for investigative leads, the FBI scoured the debris field as soon as possible to prevent souvenir seekers from helping themselves or fire trucks from running over, crushing,

and destroying evidence. That morning and afternoon and the next day they conducted line sweeps, systematically searching through the debris, finding the larger

plane pieces to the north of the impact point.3

"

Seeking assured security for the Pentagon area, Combs met briefly with

Jester in South Parking and again at the Incident Command Post under the I395 overpass. Both worried that terrorists would again hit the Pentagon and

agreed that members of the DPS SWAT team should protect the command

post. To control entrance to the area, Arlington County officers augmented the

FBI and DPS by guarding the perimeter of the reservation along Route 27, now

closed to all but emergency vehicles. Arlington Battalion Chief Randy Gray on

159
PENTAGON 9/11

the west side of the edifice remembered, "When I got my assignment I looked

up and there were guys with guns all around. I felt that they had my back. It was

important to know that our back was covered so I could concentrate on my job:'

Fire Chief Plaugher directed the Arlington County Emergency Operations Center to obtain 2,000 feet of chain link fence for access control, and a contractor

began installation that day.32

Not overly concerned that the terrorists might have carried chemicals or

biological agents on board Flight 77 since a plane crash was an ineffective delivery

mode for toxic substances, Combs and Schwartz nonetheless wanted additional

air testing at the site to detect chemical, biological, and radiological weapons of

mass destruction.* The county's Emergency Operations Center asked FEMA to

arrange for the Department of Health and Human Services to deploy the National

Medical Response Team (NMRT) to conduct tests for poisons possibly released

by the hijackers. Based in and managed by Arlington County, the NMRT's 36

members lived and worked in the region; team members arrived at the site within

hours. After tests proved negative, the team focused on setting up and operating

a decontamination tent to wash down workers in their protective clothing as they

left the Pentagon after shoring up columns, clearing paths through rubble, and

locating and removing human remains.33

Inside the building, late that night and around the clock afterward, Special Agents John Adams and Thomas O'Connor led teams recording locations of

human remains and numbering, tagging, and photographing them. Aircraft parts

were placed in a pile on the lawn and then in a steel container or a tent for examination and disposal by National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) officials.

When loads of debris were trucked to North Parking for more detailed sifting,

the FBI took custody of recovered items deemed to be evidence. DPS provided

initial safekeeping for classified documents and disks.34

The aircraft's flight data and cockpit voice recorders, the so-called "black

boxes;' were found 14 September about 4:00 a.m. in the Pentagon near the hole

in the inner C Ring wall. The FBI transferred custody of the canisters to the

NTSB for analysis. Both recorders had been installed in the rear of the aircraft

beneath the tail. The badly damaged voice recorder yielded no information, but

the flight recorder provided data about altitude, speed, and headings."

* See also Chapter VI for a discussion of air quality.

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Securing the Pentagon

For command operations, the FBI stationed its mobile command post

near the Heliport. At 6:00 a.m. on 12 September, it established a Joint Operations Center at the Fort Myer Community Center, in accordance with federal

plans requiring that after a terrorist incident the FBI set up aJOC to include federal, state, and local officials with crisis management and consequence management responsibilities. Such quick action was possible because months earlier the

agency had surveyed regional sites and selected Fort Myer as a JOC location to

coordinate the law enforcement response to expected disruptive and violent protests during World Bank and International Monetary Fund meetings scheduled

for Washington later in September. Twenty-six government organizations sent

representatives to the JOC, commanded by Special Agent in Charge Timothy

Bereznay.36

To assist the FBI with its evidence search, DPS and contractors gave

agents videos from two cameras positioned north of the crash site. The recently

installed digital cameras were still undergoing testing as part of a security system

enabling a guard in a protective booth to identify drivers in cars heading toward

the parking lot for the Pentagon Mall Entrance and to raise turnstile arms permitting entry. The cameras captured images of the west facade bursting into a huge

fireball as Flight 77 crashed. An image a second before the explosion showed an

indistinct view of the plane at nearly ground level heading toward the building.37

The FBI investigation involved far more than the Pentagon. On the

morning of the crash agents raced to Dulles Airport in Virginia, where American Airlines Flight 77 had originated, to collect evidence and interview ticket

agents, security personnel, baggage and food handlers, and others. At its peak the

global investigation involved 7,000 agents, making it the largest and most complex investigation in the bureau's history. The FBI named its overall investigation

of the 11 September attacks PENTTBOM, an acronym for "Pentagon, Twin

Towers bombing."38

Federal, State, and Local Police and the Old Guard

Within minutes of the attack, federal, state, and local civilian police officers reached the Pentagon. Among the first to respond were helicopters from the

U.S. Park Police Aviation Unit near the Anacostia River in Washington. When

an alarm sounded and the emergency circuit "crash" phone rang in the unit office,

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PENTAGON 9/11

Sergeant Ron Galey answered the call from the Reagan National Airport air traffic controller, who reported that the tower had just lost track of a Boeing 757 aircraft in the vicinity of the Pentagon. Galey, Sergeant Kenneth Burchell, and their

crews quickly took off in two medical evacuation helicopters, arriving at the Pentagon within minutes. As Burchell landed on the Route 27 cloverleaf he could

see people on fire running from the building. He loaded two burn victims and

flew them to the Washington Hospital Center. The center's MedStar helicopter

landed to transport another victim. Galey remained airborne when the tower at

Reagan National gave him air traffic control responsibility because the thick billowing smoke from the explosion blocked the tower's view and overwhelmed its

ventilation system. He soon passed control responsibility to a District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department helicopter equipped with communication

systems. Landing to transport more victims and finding none on the west side

of the building, he remained on the ground until the rumored threat of another

airliner attack passed. Galey then went airborne over the Pentagon to send live

images of the scene to Secret Service, FBI, Metropolitan Police, and Park Police

operations centers. Park Police helicopters also carried incident command team

members aloft to examine the extent of the conflagration and structural damage.

Afterward, they flew security-related missions throughout the region.39

The first on-scene commander for the Arlington County Police Department, Lieutenant Robert Medairos, arranged with DPS that his officers would

secure the perimeter of the Pentagon Reservation, freeing DPS to focus on the

building and grounds. Lieutenant Brian Berke and Sergeant James Daly moved

quickly to keep all but emergency traffic off the feeder roads to Route 27 immediately west of the crash site. Police officers closed the route to regular traffic and

prevented first responders from parking vehicles haphazardly and blocking emergency lanes.4

In the absence of Chief Flynn and two deputy chiefs, attending out-oftown conferences, responsibility for command of the Arlington police on the

scene fell to Captain Rebecca Hackney, a district commander. Arriving at the

Pentagon before the E Ring collapse she moved with her mobile command post

further away from the crash site to Route 27. When the threat of a second air

attack loomed, she relocated the post under a highway overpass near Route 27

with a line of sight to the fire. Hackney, who had received training in the incident

162
Above: An FBI-directed line sweep in front of the Pentagon Heliport to find evidence of the terrorist

attack.

Below. Remnant of the fuselage from Flight 77.

T __ i

- i-• !li l'
Secretary Rumsfeld at his Pentagon press conference the evening of 11 September, with (left to right) Secretary of the Army Thomas White, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Hugh Shelton, Sen.John

Warner (R-Va.), and Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.).

"Mayor of the Pentagon" David 0. (Doc)

Cooke, Director of Administration and

Management.
Above: Personnel emerge from the A-E Drive access road leading into Center Court.

Below: Soldiers from the Military District of Washington arrive at the Pentagon Reservation.
Dogs and handlers in search and rescue operarions.

~John Jester (left),

chief of the Defense

Protective Service.

'4w -77
Ai

Decontamination.

Preparing to transport body bags.
Heliport air tower controllers' burnt cars.

Damaged interior offices sheared open by the collapse of the E Ring.
Above: Clock in Room 3E452, located near the "hinge" of the collapsed floors. The 9/11 Commission

determined that the plane hit the building at 9:37 a.m.

Below: An inside view.
Lieutenant General John Van Alstyne directed the assistance program for families of victims.

A /

/t

Joyce Rumsfeld, the wife of the defense secretary, visits Sheila Moody, 13 September 2001.
I i

Above: Days after the attack, the lawn west of the Pentagon filled with vehicles, equipment, and tents for

command and control, search and recovery, shoring, demolition, and security.

Below: "Camp Unity" in South Parking provided a respite from search and recovery operations.

i T ...
Piece of the aircraft that struck the Pentagon.

Flight data recorder found in the building near the hole in the inner C Ring wall leading to A-E Drive,
Above: One of the larger pieces of debris from Flight 77.

Below: FBI representatives Arthur Eberhart and Van A. Harp (left) hand over management of the crash

site to Major General James Jackson, Commander, U.S. Army Military District of Washington, 26 September 2001.

SA
V J

Above: Demolition in preparation for reconstruction.

Below: The inner E Ring wall still stands days after the collapse.
llio= Ilit

Above: Debris sifting operations in North Parking.

Below: Reconstructing the damaged area.

I '

KMMw

goo
STAMiO

S Ra

Above: Using radiology to help

identify victims at the Dover

Port Mortuary.

Right: Identifying victims at

the Dover Port Mortuary.

, -i "
T

Impromptu memorial near the Navy Annex.

Soldiers from Company B, 3rd U.S. Infantry Regiment, "The Old Guard."
Pentagon workers attend October 2001 memorial service for victims of the 9/11 attack.
Securing the Pentagon

command system, immediately directed officers to assume prescribed responsibilities: directing vehicle traffic and pedestrians, planning logistics, setting up a

staging area, requesting mutual aid as needed, and protecting the firefighters.41

With thousands of Pentagon occupants crossing nearby streets en masse,

police cars and fire trucks racing to the scene, helicopters landing and lifting off,

and automobile traffic stopping as occupants gawked at the burning building,

roads around the Pentagon had to be closed to non-emergency traffic. Arlington County and Virginia State police, experienced in blocking entry ramps and

detouring traffic along routes near the building for two annual races-the Marine

marathon and the Army 10-mile run-quickly closed key intersections and

points. Sergeant Richard Keevill, one of the first Virginia state troopers on the

scene to coordinate road closings, had years of experience working with DPS and

Arlington police. Arlington County deputy sheriffs, detectives, and park rangers

assisted in partially shutting down four major routes and more than a half-dozen

streets.

42

Virginia troopers closed the northbound lanes of 1-395 nine miles south

of the Pentagon at the intersection of 1-95 and 1-495 (Washington Beltway),

blocking all entry ramps. Park Police closed Arlington Memorial Bridge and the

George Washington Memorial Parkway; D.C. Metropolitan police closed the

14th Street Bridge. Sixteen Fairfax County motorcycle officers augmented the

patrols of the Arlington motorcycle police, keeping pedestrians off roads and

away from emergency access lanes, redirecting sightseers heading toward the Pentagon, and searching for aircraft debris on 1-395. Also helping with road closings

and pedestrian traffic were officers from the Treasury Department's U.S. Mint

Police and a lone officer from the Justice Department's U.S. Border Patrol, Assistant Chief Patrol Agent Jeffrey Parsons from Del Rio, Texas, in town on business.

Parsons felt the explosion and saw the smoke from his hotel near South Parking.

He changed into his uniform with sidearm, donned his "Smokey the Bear" hat,

and positioned himself at a key intersection on Army Navy Drive, keeping it clear

for emergency vehicles. He stayed at the post all day.43

In the District of Columbia the White House and Capitol were hurriedly

evacuated, the federal and D.C. governments dismissed workers, and companies closed their doors. Thousands of people poured out, clogging transportation

routes; gridlock gripped the region, and some people abandoned their cars. View163
PENTAGON 9/11

ing abandoned vehicles near the Pentagon as possible bombs, police dispatched

K-9 dog explosive detection teams to investigate. The D.C. Harbor Patrol and the

U.S. Coast Guard checked for explosive devices under the 14th Street Bridge and

kept boats from docking under Potomac River bridges. About 10:30 a.m. a report

in official channels, repeated through the rumor mill, mistakenly stated that a car

bomb had exploded at the State Department. Reports about truck bombs at the

Capitol, fires on the Mall, and a "suspicious" rental truck near the Pentagon, possibly loaded with explosives, added to the confusion. Sergeant Keith Bohn of the

Park Police recalled, "There were a lot of things coming up. All of a sudden, everything was just unbelievable-to check bridges for abandoned cars which were

believed to be packed with explosives. So, we were running from one report of

things to another report. Actually, in the city nothing else, in essence, happened

that day, but ... lots of fear was running rampant."44

Arlington Deputy Police Chief Stephen Holl drove hurriedly from Richmond, Virginia, arrived at the Arlington Police command post under the overpass about noon, and took over from Hackney. A few hours later Flynn returned

from New Jersey and assumed command. In one of his first actions, Holl ordered

the implementation of a decision to stage police resources at Arlington Fire Station 5, about a mile from the Pentagon. Police officers from the county and neighboring jurisdictions were to report there to receive instructions and assignments

before moving on to the Pentagon.4

"

A signatory to both the Northern Virginia Law Enforcement Mutual Aid

Agreement and the Northern Virginia Sheriffs Mutual Aid Agreement, Arlington County invoked prescribed actions on 11 September. In response, a host of

local Virginia jurisdictions sent police officers and/or sheriffs to Station 5 over

the duration of the emergency: City of Alexandria, Fairfax County, City of Fairfax, City of Falls Church, Loudoun County, City of Manassas, Prince William

County, Fauquier County, and George Mason University. From Maryland help

came from the City of Greenbelt, Montgomery County, Prince George's County,

and the City of Rockville. Officials from these localities had experience working

together through the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments."'

Help came also from a number of specialized law enforcement organizations. Agents from the Alexandria office of Virginia's Alcohol Beverage and Control Board arrived at the River Entrance side of the Pentagon not long afrer the

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Securing the Pentagon

plane struck and assisted the injured, drove people to hospitals, and helped to

evacuate the Child Development Center, as did National Park rangers. Personnel from the Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

arrived at the Pentagon about 11:00 a.m. and immediately assisted the Arlington police with site security. The Justice Department's Immigration and Naturalization Service sent officers who helped guard the perimeter from 6:00 p.m. until

6:00 a.m. for the next few nights. Holl welcomed this support: "It was nice to

have 20 extra federal agents in their raid jackets with their guns walking around

because we don't know who was out there surveying us and how we responded

and where our weaknesses might be. So it was great to be able to plug them at different posts and confuse people, if nothing else!'47

Under a mutual aid agreement with the District of Columbia, Flynn

asked Metropolitan Police Chief Charles Ramsey for help with crowd and traffic

control; Ramsey sent about 50 officers on 12 September. On the 11th the Metropolitan police had their hands full in the District supporting Secret Service agents

and Capitol and Park Police guarding the White House, the vice president's residence, the Capitol, and monuments. They also responded when the Union Station train depot was evacuated because of a truck bomb scare, put extra patrols

at the city's critical infrastructure facilities, and tried to manage the traffic chaos

in the city's business and government sections. That morning Ramsey received a

report that six planes from Europe were flying under radar coverage and heading

toward the District of Columbia. Fortunately a Federal Aviation Agency representative assigned to the police command center determined the information to

be incorrect. 48

While Arlington police provided security for the rescue and firefighting operations at the Pentagon, they maintained patrols in neighborhoods and

responded to calls from frightened citizens and business owners concerned about

suspicious people and packages. Captain Hackney recalled, "The officers were

going from call to call to call to call:" Within a fortnight Arlington County shifted

more Pentagon perimeter patrols to officers from neighboring jurisdictions, freeing Arlington police for regular patrol duties and securing the county's high-value

facilities.49

The organized military role in support of firefighting, rescue, and police

operations expanded in size and scope after arrival at the Pentagon from Fort

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PENTAGON 9/11

McNair in Washington of General Jackson, not long after noon. As commander

of the Army's Military District of Washington, Jackson had responsibility for

security, ceremonial, and training duties in the National Capital Region but not

at the Pentagon. Aware of the huge and urgent demands of the emergency, Director of the Army Staff Lieutenant General John Pickier told Jackson to provide

military support for operations at the crash site. Later in the day, Jackson met

with Army Secretary Thomas White who told him that Rumsfeld wanted the

Army to take the lead among the military services in supporting the emergency

response at the Pentagon. This lead role followed established policy assigning

to the Army executive agent responsibilities for DoD assistance to local civilian

authorities during disasters and emergencies nationwide."°

On arrival Jackson met with Chief Plaugher, whom he had met previously, and informed him of the deployment of the MDW engineer company

from Fort Belvoir for search and rescue operations.* The general also met later

with Schwartz. He joined Schwartz's unified command team that included representatives from the FBI, DPS, FEMA, and Arlington police. That evening he

ordered his mobile command vehicle positioned close by the incident commander's; after a few days he moved immediately adjacent to Schwartz's command

post.5'

Soon after arriving at the scene Jackson relieved about a hundred volunteer Pentagon military of all ranks who continued to stand by at the crash site

waiting to carry stretchers, replacing them with 3rd U.S. Infantry (Old Guard)

soldiers stationed at Fort Myer. The general recalled: "My first thought was to

get some kind of cohesive unit in here, specifically the Old Guard down there,

then start to release these volunteers to get them out of the way.... Not that they

weren't doing exactly what they were supposed to do, it's just the sooner I could

get guys in class A and Bs [uniforms] out of here and have troops in fatigues who

could be doing things for us, the better off we were. I wanted NCOs in charge of

small units, and officers in charge of bigger units."' 2

Old Guard soldiers spent the next few weeks participating in search and

rescue/recovery operations as their primary mission,t but they also performed

security duties. In the evening of the 11th, dressed in battle dress uniforms but

* See Chapter IV.

t See Chapter V.

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Securing the Pentagon

without weapons, some went to Arlington Cemetery to assist Park Police in clearing people from an area affording a good vantage point for observing the burning building. The soldiers also joined in searching for airplane parts, as did Naval

Criminal Investigative Service agents who conducted line sweeps of the cemetery

the next morning and found evidentiary items.53

The first night, platoons of soldiers donned dust masks and joined DPS

officers in putting up FBI crime scene tape at Pentagon hallway entrances on all

floors from Corridors 2 to 7 and then stood sentry duty. The next day some people returning to work, seeing that hallways between Corridors 6 and 7 were not

damaged, asked to be allowed to retrieve personal items and professional data,

but the guards, as ordered, allowed no one in without special authorization. Private Keith Dooley recalled, "If any general or anybody wanted to go up to their

offices, we didn't let them just for the fact that there's a bunch of doors that were

still open with Top Secret ... in there, and they didn't want anybody going in

there until everything was checked out" In other areas guards prevented people from entering offices possibly contaminated with asbestos, lead paint, and

unhealthy air.5 4

An exception had to be made for the staff of the OSD Graphics Office in

2E271. They received permission to return to their space in the off-limits area to

produce much-needed charts showing the extent of damage on each of the Pentagon's floors from fire, water, and smoke as maintenance crews provided the information. The graphics specialists worked around the clock preparing materials for

emergency operations and press briefings. The FBI examined rooms in the building and authorized their release as soon as possible. After a few weeks, however,

people still could not return to some cleared but damp, dark, and warm offices

because of the thick mold that posed a health hazard. Eventually plywood walls

were constructed to keep unauthorized people away from hallways closest to the

impact site, the"hot zone."'

The Old Guard also pulled guard duty at the North Parking area. The

FBI, assisted by officers from a large number of federal, state, and local agencies,

used the location to sift through tons of material from the impact site in search of

human remains, personal effects, airplane remnants, documents, and other items.

Around the mound of debris, the sifting lane, and the evidentiary piles were tents

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PENTAGON 9/11

and a newly installed security wire fence. Illumination from generator-powered

floodlights allowed the search to continue around the clock. 6

Above the sifting area, Route 27 and its exit ramp to Route 110 North

adjoined the lot. Despite the closed roads curious spectators walked to the site to

watch the work and sometimes took photos, even though signs warned against

doing so. Unarmed soldiers stood guard for "presence" and to augment armed

personnel from the DPS, FBI, U.S. Marshal Service, and local police who kept

people moving and confiscated camera film.5 7

Tightened Security and Military Police

In the days following the attack DPS contended with the many problems

brought on by the expanded security requirements. Captain Randall Harper

functioned as the DPS on-site commander, with Lieutenant William Stout as

assistant commander. DPS worked from a command post consisting in succession of a vehicle, a small truck, tents, and a borrowed mobile van. Stout attended

Schwartz's unified command meetings as well as FBI briefings. Leaves and training for DPS personnel were cancelled; for the next four months all worked 12-

hour shifts instead of the usual 8 hours. Radio communication among DPS

guards outside the building worked well as long as batteries lasted; recharging

equipment received constant use and newly purchased batteries kept the radios

functioning. Unfortunately the different radio frequencies employed prevented

DPS from talking with officers from local police departments. Communication

greatly improved after the Secret Service and Verizon Communications set up

cellular telephone towers on the Pentagon grounds and distributed cell phones to

security personnel and others, 8

Force Protection Condition Delta required the highest security at the

Pentagon, but the thousands of people who responded without clearance to the

emergency enormously complicated the situation on 12 September. With the

workforce returning in large numbers police searched cars and required drivers

and passengers to identify themselves. South Parking still held many automobiles left from the day before; emergency support vehicles rapidly filled the empty

space. Police routed cars to partially cordoned-off North Parking. Automobile

security checks caused long traffic backups extending to some of the reopened

highways and bridges near the Pentagon; lines stretched for miles into the Dis168
Securing the Pentagon

trict of Columbia and Virginia. Metro trains and buses did not stop at the Pentagon the morning of the 12th, but fortunately the Pentagon City station lay within

easy walking distance. Within days workers were allowed to park at the Pentagon

City mall and at Reagan National Airport, which remained closed to air traffic

for 23 days, easing North Parking congestion."

For better security DoD shuttle buses were rerouted from South Parking to Boundary Channel Drive, further from the building. The Joint Operations

Center gave emergency cargo priority clearance for access. Arlington police and

state troopers provided escorts for deliveries to search and recovery operations.

DPS directed trucks to an area where a K-9 explosive detection unit could check

cargo. For inspections and responses to bomb threats, DPS received K-9 assistance from the Army, federal, and other police agencies. They found no explosive

cargo or bombs. 60

To protect the Incident Command Post and watch for suspicious activity,

Arlington County SWAT and anti-sniper teams, DPS teams, and others took

up positions atop the tall Drug Enforcement Administration building across

from the Pentagon City mall and on the roofs of the Navy Annex and Pentagon.

Arlington officers also assisted DPS in guarding hotels in nearby Crystal City

where DoD had arranged billeting for families of victims and for search and rescue units. The day after the attack some people who had not heard from family members gathered on the Navy Annex hill overlooking the Pentagon and just

beyond the police off-limits boundary, where they had a clear view of the building

as they awaited word about their missing relatives. Soon the site became a memorial to the victims with family, friends, colleagues, neighbors, and strangers leaving photos, notes, flags, and other items of remembrance. On Saturday, 15 September, Coneleous Alexander, a Navy Annex building manager, and a contractor

installed a memorial board on the hill; it soon filled with photographs of those

who died at the Pentagon. Police guarded the site, visitors, and memorabilia.61

More police arrived on 12 September between 7:00 and 9:00 a.m., when

two companies of the 115th Military Police Battalion of the Maryland National

Guard, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Bernard Liswell, reached the Pentagon to assist with security; joined by a headquarters company that evening

the battalion remained until 30 September. The soldiers guarded the temporary

morgue, hallways, and classified storage areas. They also secured the perimeter

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PENTAGON 9/11

of the crash site and the sifting operations in North Parking, denying access to

reporters, photographers, and onlookers. When the president and later the prime

minister of Japan visited the site the battalion provided additional security. Over

three weeks, the military police detained only a few people at the crash site, one of

them an Army general officer not authorized to be at the scene.62

Providing security became a growing concern as the lawn between the

west facade and Route 27 became increasingly congested with command post

vehicles, vans, trucks, trailers, cranes, front-end loaders, other heavy equipment,

tents, generators, and power and telephone lines. The fence Plaugher had ordered

ran along Route 27, forming the outer perimeter of the crash site. DPS established and guarded five entry points through the fence.63

In South Parking there sprang up "Camp Unity," an accumulation of tents

and facilities for the food and aid assistance from the Red Cross and Salvation

Army; chaplains and counselors; supplies and food services donated by commercial establishments; a small post exchange; ice and hand-washing stations;

light towers, telephones, and latrines. NCIS Special Agent Michelle Jackson,

who worked on the sifting operation, observed: "Food was never a problem. You

never had to leave the scene. You could eat, drink, change your clothes, brush your

teeth-all right there:" Army Private First Class Michael Chandler from the Old

Guard was pleasantly surprised that he did not have to eat field rations day after

day. Army Specialist William Corcoran, who also labored on recovery operations,

later commented that the support elements were"heaven sent, I mean really. They

made it a lot more bearable"'64

Some who came to the Pentagon were pretenders or freelancers. The

absence of an effective identification system to control the large number of people

that passed through the outer perimeter fence to support firefighting and recovery operations worried incident command, DPS, and FBI officials. The day after

the attack DPS arrested three people in firefighting gear who were not firefighters. "When you have a major event, certain people are like moths around a light

bulb;' noted Jester. "They come to the scene as thrill seekers./"6

On the 12th the FBI and DPS quickly removed from the west side of the

building anyone who was not fighting the fire or doing search and rescue work.

As people returned they were screened and given color-coded plastic wrist bands

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Securing the Pentagon

provided by DPS and the Arlington police; the supply of 2,000 bands was soon

exhausted.66

The following day DPS used its photo identification computer system

to make badges, but the large number processed caused the unit to burn out.

Finally DPS and the FBI procured from the Secret Service five mobile stations

that mass-produced photo badges. Members of the Army Band from Fort Myer

operated the equipment and compiled lists of badge recipients who had displayed

agency identification and a driver's license. Eventually everyone connected with

firefighting, search and rescue, criminal investigation, security, and building operations had a badge. Some 4,000 people, an excessive number, received badges

that allowed access to all sites including the dangerous and sensitive impact zone

within the building.67

Authorities reviewed badge lists, asked fire, military, and security organizations for priorities, and compiled a new short list of people who received red

badges allowing access to the devastated areas of the Pentagon, now referred to

as the "red zone:' A fence close to the building further restricted access. At first

DPS and military police and then U.S. marshals guarded the inner perimeter and

checked for badges. Security was ironclad. The day Plaugher escorted Vice President Cheney to the site, they tried to enter the red zone even though the vice president did not have a badge. The guard said, "I'm sorry, Mr. Vice President;' and

denied him entry. Plaugher eased the refusal by telling Cheney that he probably

did not want to enter the building because he would then have to be decontaminated. The vice president replied, "Absolutely right. I don't need a field shower.6

Granting access to destroyed and damaged offices required taking precautions. Representatives from the two largest offices demolished in the attack,

the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and the Navy Command Center, urgently requested permission to retrieve documents, disks, and

hardware from the damaged areas. The Army's servers and routers on the 2nd

Floor were far enough from the impact site to survive, but they were threatened

by water and smoke damage. Fire officials examined the area for structural integrity, after which the FBI checked and allowed access to the server room. Starting

on 13 September and working all the next day technicians, accompanied by DPS

officers and military police, removed the heavy equipment from racks and transported it to the nearby Hoffman Building in Alexandria, Virginia, where the Per171
PENTAGON 9/11

sonnel Office had been reconstituted. On 13 September NCIS Special Agent

Dennis Becker led a team into the Navy Command Center. During the next week

the team brought out highly classified documents and disks and equipment, making sure that remaining safes were secure for later retrieval.' 9

A steady stream of requests for access to rooms in off-limits areas of the

Pentagon flowed to the incident commander; people urgently wanted to retrieve

personal belongings and professional items. MDW officials at the Joint Operations Center evaluated and prioritized requests from organizations and people of

all ranks. Firefighters, engineers, and FBI agents inspected the sites before they

authorized entry. Workers in protective clothing were led to the offices by escorts

concerned with safety and security. Later, the FBI cleared rooms and turned them

over to Pentagon renovation personnel who permitted employees from affected

offices to enter and claim belongings.7

"

The enormous task of securing and disposing of many thousands of documents from destroyed and damaged offices fell to DPS and the FBI.7 ' Unclassified documents included information readily available to the public, personnel

data protected by the Privacy Act, or information marked" For Official Use Only."

Classified documents included those marked Confidential, Secret, Top Secret,

and higher levels, in paper format, on disks, and in computers, stored in safes or

kept on desks and in file cabinets within highly secure rooms.

When the aircraft's impact blew holes through the C Ring wall between

Corridors 4 and 5, it also blew many documents into A-E Drive. DPS officers

retrieved and guarded them. During the search for human remains and evidence,

stacks of charred and wet papers were carried through the holes and placed on

the drive for DPS to remove. Initially, the FBI set up an evidence recovery point

near the Heliport where documents mixed with other debris were taken. Classified documents raked up during the sifting operation in North Parking were

brought in wheelbarrows to massive document piles; there teams of agents from

the military criminal investigative agencies and intelligence organizations clad in

Tyvek protective clothing examined them for disposition.'

Within weeks, as PENREN contractors began demolition at the crash

site, hundreds of burned, crushed, and mangled file cabinets and safes weighing

from 350 to 1,200 lbs., many stuffed with classified material, were brought to the

fenced, lighted yard of the DPS incinerator. Many could not be identified because

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Securing the Pentagon

affixed tin plates and cards had melted or burned. Ruined combination locks and

damaged suspension systems prevented drawers from opening, as did damage

to containers that had fallen between floors. More often than not the DPS locksmiths-Marion "Snake" Cochran, Michael Dooley, and John Bukowski-could

cut through locking bolts, but they could not easily open drawers. One morning,

after working for hours at the backbreaking task, Dooley asked to borrow the

Arlington County Fire Department's 'jaws of life" hydraulic equipment used for

prying open cars at devastating accidents. The apparatus operated so efficiently

that DPS ordered its own machine, receiving it the next day. As the locksmiths

opened about 300 safes, DPS had security and records managers of affected

offices provide teams of people to review the contents-sometimes undamaged,

sometimes still smoking and charred-for ownership and disposition.73

On 20 September the continuing need for police help was alleviated

when active-duty military police arrived at Fort Myer from Fort Bragg, North

Carolina, to work with DPS on access control and physical security. The convoy

of Humvees consisted of troops from the 503rd Military Police Battalion (Airborne), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Wade Dennis. The 293rd MP Company from Fort Stewart, Georgia, joined them the next day.74

The MPs and DPS officers joined with Secret Service and Virginia State

and Arlington County police to provide security for the memorial service on

11 October at the Pentagon parade ground, attended by thousands of building

occupants, families of victims, Secretary Rumsfeld, and President Bush. Because

Route 110 passed close enough to the Pentagon for terrorists to detonate a truck

full of explosives next to the building, in December the MPs and Virginia State

troopers worked in tandem to close it to all truck traffic until a bypass could

be constructed. Also in December the MPs began training with Metro Transit

police on bus evacuation techniques in the event that the large bus terminal at the

Pentagon became the site of an incident. Additional MP companies-the 988th

from Fort Benning, Georgia, and the 978th from Fort Bliss, Texas-arrived

before the end of the year. Military police remained at the Pentagon for approximately two years after 11 September until the DPS, beginning in May 2002,

could grow sufficiently in size and expertise to transform itself into the Pentagon

Force Protection Agency.71

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The high state of emergency wound down before the end of September.

Within 10 days after the plane hit the building, firefighters and search and rescue teams had extinguished all fires and hot spots and had concluded rescue and

recovery operations. At 7:00 a.m. on 21 September, Schwartz passed incident

command to FBI Special Agent Eberhart. The FBI remained in control of the

Pentagon crime scene until 7:00 a.m. on 26 September when Eberhart passed

command to General Jackson. Old Guard soldiers removed a flag from one of

the shored columns and folded and presented it to FBI officials during a small

change-of-command ceremony. A few days later Jackson turned control of the

site back to the director of the Washington Headquarters Services.76

On the larger scene, in the skies above the Pentagon, Air Force F- 16

fighters guarded the nation's capital as they had since 11 September, when at 9:30

a.m., only seven minutes before the Pentagon was hit, the first three armed Air

National Guard fighters had taken off from Langley Air Force Base, Virginia,

and via a circuitous route over the ocean headed for the Baltimore area to intercept Flight 11, mistakenly thought to be flying south toward Washington. Redirected to head for Washington because of an FAA report of another unidentified

aircraft (Flight 77) six miles southwest of the city, the fighters flew at a maximum

subsonic speed of 660 m.p.h., but were too late to intercept the airliner. After

the fighters arrived over the capital two of them established a combat air patrol

over the Pentagon by 10:10 a.m. at an altitude of about 20,000 feet. Warned that

hijacked United Flight 93 was off course in the Cleveland area and presumed to

be heading toward Washington, the two fighters set up a 20-mile racetrack pattern patrol over the area. The third Langley fighter, after investigating and identifying two aircraft near the Potomac as a military helicopter and a police helicopter, flew at low altitude around Washington, following instructions from the

Secret Service to protect the White House.7

The low-flying Langley jet frightened many Pentagon evacuees who had

been warned that another hijacked aircraft was on its way to the area. They heard

the fighter before they saw it and mistook it for the dreaded second airliner. In the

Center Court assisting firefighters, Lieutenant Commander Dale Rielage went

"face first in the grass" as the roaring jet neared the building and overflew it. Some

people in the crowd walking from North Parking toward the Memorial Bridge

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Securing the Pentagon

ducked into the woods towards the river to hide from the fighter. Recognition of

the plane as "friendly" brought relief and reassurance; some people cheered."

Meanwhile in the president's absence on the 11th, Vice President Cheney

directed actions from the White House. The threat of further possible attack on

the nation's capital from the missing hijacked United Flight 93 and possibly still

other aircraft as yet unknown, created the tragic dilemma of whether or not to

authorize fighters to shoot them down. In a telephone conversation some time

before 10:20 a.m. the president authorized Cheney to order the shootdown of

hijacked planes, which he did by sending word to the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon which communicated the order to NORAD. At

10:39 the vice president informed Secretary Rumsfeld of the shootdown order.7

"

Within the hour Air National Guard fighters from Andrews Air Force

Base, Maryland, augmented the initial patrols by the Air Force fighters from

Langley. Thereafter during the day Air National Guard fighter aircraft came from

air bases at Richmond, Virginia, and Atlantic City, New Jersey; at times as many

as 12 fighters flew patrol over the capital area. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft

also contributed to the improvised air defense on 11 September, as did Air Force

tanker planes and E-3 Airborne Warning and Aircraft Control Systems (AWACS).

Combat air patrols over the Washington area became a fixture until the spring of

2002. Thereafter, intermittent patrols were flown by fighters kept on alert,80

The extraordinary scale of Pentagon security after the attack was the

product of immediate and ongoing cooperation among the federal, state, and

local security agencies augmenting DPS and the military. The 9/11 Commission

in its report highlighted the effectiveness of the collaboration:

While no emergency response is flawless, the response to the 9/11

terrorist attack on the Pentagon was mainly a success for three reasons: first, the strong professional relationships and trust established

among emergency responders; second, the adoption of the Incident

Command System; and third, the pursuit of a regional approach to

response. Many fire and police agencies that responded had extensive prior experience working together on regional events and training exercises.

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PENTAGON 9/11

Jester strongly agreed: "We knew each other, and we had worked together. So the

cooperation just happened. There [was] no 'Who are you, what is your jurisdiction, why are you here?.".'81

DPS and the FBI, stretched thin, welcomed the reinforcements required

to secure the Pentagon Reservation. Understanding the historic nature of the

emergency, most police officers wanted to be a part of the action, guarding

against another attack and protecting those in their charge. The many responders who closed roads, guarded doorways and sites, investigated bomb threats,

and patrolled on foot and in vehicles performed indispensable security functions,

working long days with a heightened sense of duty. The massive security presence

enabled the recovery effort to proceed apace and assured the Pentagon workforce

that they could safely return to their desks and the job of protecting the nation.

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CHAPTER VIII

Caring for the Dead and

the Living

Within the first few hours of the attack injured people were treated by

medics at the Pentagon and at clinics and hospitals elsewhere. Of the 189 fatalities, only one, Antoinette Sherman, a civilian employee of the Army, died in hospital. The remains of the others who perished at the Pentagon were transported

to the Dover Port Mortuary for final identification. There, a small army of military and civilian experts, using traditional forensic procedures and advanced technologies, identified the remains of all but five of the victims.

"The fragmented condition of many of the human remains greatly complicated the forensic investigation, requiring two months of intensive effort that

prolonged the anguish of the families of the missing. The Defense Department

immediately initiated measures to help the families through this painful period.

Opened early on the morning of the 12th and operating for one month, the Pentagon Family Assistance Center (PFAC) served as the central source of information and coordination for the families. Casualty assistance officers were assigned

to each family, and civilian and military authorities drew up policies regarding

burial, compensation, legal, and other matters. DoD staffs, other government

agencies, and numerous relief organizations and volunteers aided the families in

making their arrangements.'
PENTAGON 9/11

Identifying the Dead

As they removed bodies from the building, rescuers were at first uncertain about where to establish a temporary morgue. On the afternoon of the attack

many body bags were laid out in the Center Court in anticipation of it becoming the field morgue. It had the advantage of relative privacy since entry to the

building was closely controlled. But by the time soldiers of the Old Guard began

bringing out bodies on the 12th, the FBI had set up a protected and controlled

temporary morgue in North Parking; refrigeration units stood by at the Remote

Delivery Facility loading dock. The Army had dispatched its sole active mortuary

affairs unit, the 54th Quartermaster Company, from Fort Lee, Virginia, and activated a reserve unit, the 31 1th, based in Puerto Rico, that arrived on the 15th.2

The location and nature of the emergency, overlapping layers ofjurisdiction, and statutory regulations that governed military operations added a legal

dimension to identifying and laying to rest the remains of the dead, both military

and civilian. Normally, the Commonwealth of Virginia exercised authority over

crimes committed within its borders. But the unusual circumstance of an attack

on U.S. soil by foreign terrorists and the resultant national emergency caused the

Departments ofJustice and Defense to assume jurisdiction. Navy Captain Glenn

Wagner, director of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP), described

that decision:

So jurisdiction became a very important aspect since it clearly was an

act of terrorism and the FBI was running the operation. The FBI and

the US Attorney General really wanted to keep this on the federal

side and were relieved to get confirmation that the Pentagon was [an]

exclusive[ly] federal jurisdiction and that there wouldn't have to be any

more state involvement than was absolutely necessary in the search and

recovery. At that particular point the AFIP in the mobilization of our

resources and the mobilization of DoD resources became a priority)

The FBI, in consultation with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Health Affairs, directed AFIP to carry out forensic identification at the

Dover Port Mortuary at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, the Defense Department's only active port mortuary. Virginias chief medical examiner requested and

received a letter from the U.S. attorney general relieving the state of forensic and

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mortuary responsibilities. Death certificates would be issued at Dover on behalf

of the Commonwealth of Virginia.4

Until forensic activity shifted away from the Pentagon to Dover, AFIP

senior staff coordinated on-site with the FBI, Arlington County Fire Department, and state law enforcement officials, as well as their own chain of command,

headed by the commander of the Military District of Washington. All parties

worked together to recover remains while preserving crime scene evidence. After

being photographed and labeled in a controlled area, twice daily beginning on the

13th, in the continuous custody of the FBI the remains were transported under

Virginia State Police and Fairfax County motorcycle officer escort from the Pentagon to Davison Army Airfield at Fort Belvoir, some 15 miles south of the Pentagon. From there Army CH-47 Chinook helicopters transported them 100

miles northeast to the Dover Port Mortuary. To ensure proper legal custody and

continuous evidentiary control, FBI agents accompanied the remains until they

were released to the medical examiner in Dover. As the bodies arrived at the base

a brief plane-side prayer service was held and a Dover AFB honor guard removed

the remains from the planes.5

Since 1955 the Dover Port Mortuary had been the primary receiving

point for America's military personnel and civilian employees and their families

who died on overseas assignments. Although a new state-of-the-art facility lay in

its future, in September 2001 the Mortuary building was a typical military prefab structure--nondescript, metal-sided, with a concrete floor, fenced off from

the rest of the base. Its interior, resembling a warehouse with high ceilings and

minimal furnishings, contained administrative offices, a storage room, spaces for

receiving and holding remains, medical examination and autopsy rooms, a mortuary clothing and supplies area, and a casket room.6

The permanent Air Force staff consisted of one mortuary affairs officer, two mortuary specialists, one noncommissioned officer in charge, and three

administrative personnel, supported by the 512th Memorial Affairs Squadron

and the 436th Services Squadron.7 AFIP, the triservice organization supervising

the greatly augmented operation at the Mortuary, had its origin, explained Captain Wagner, in the "Army Medical Museum established in the Civil War by the

Army Surgeon General's directive to study combat injuries and infectious diseases. Its first forensic case was the autopsy or medical postmortem of Abraham

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Lincoln followed by that of John Wilkes Booth:' The Institute expanded in size

and mission over the years; by 2001 it occupied nine buildings on the grounds of

Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington.8

For its Dover assignment AFIP assembled some 50 specialists and more

than 400 personnel from across the country to conduct, according to Wagner,

"one of the most comprehensive forensic investigations in U.S. history"'9 The

experts, scientists, and technicians included military personnel under the direction of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AFME), a component of AFIP;

regional and reserve medical examiners; forensic anthropologists from the Smithsonian Institution, the FBI, and the Army's Central Identification Laboratory in

Hawaii; autopsy assistants from AFIP and the National Naval Medical Center

in Bethesda, Maryland; experts from AFME's Armed Forces DNA Identification

Laboratory; dental investigators headed by the director of AFIP's Department of

Oral and Maxillofacial Pathology; and other staff support, including photographers."' Wagner, the site commander, reported his day-to-day activities through

the Air Force and its Air Mobility Command, and on a"case-by-case basis" to the

Army Surgeon General's office and the deputy assistant secretary of defense for

military personnel policy. In addition, casualty representatives served as liaison

between the military services and the Dover activity."

To perform its singular role in military medicine AFIP possessed the

expertise required for complex forensic investigations. But the old Mortuary

building had not been designed for a task of the magnitude now under way. The

hugely expanded staff of investigators and their sophisticated equipment created

crowded conditions. The dental area alone had to accommodate banks of computers, x-ray machines, digital sensors, and other specialized equipment. Oral

pathologist Navy Captain Douglas Arendt, AFIP's chief of forensic odontology,

recalled that they used space carved from "the shell of an old whole body radiography area that was full of trash when we got there.... We found a corner and

so we just moved out the trash."12 Inadequate air conditioning and lighting as

well as pest control problems contributed to the unpleasant conditions. Administrative complications owing to the large number of agencies involved caused

further slowdowns. The AFIP After-Action Report noted, for example, that it

was unclear at first who would acquire the records of the Flight 77 casualties;"

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while the FBI ultimately assumed that responsibility, it took weeks to gather the

records.

The immense burden of family and national grief weighed heavily on all

those engaged at Dover, motivating them to issue frequent and as accurate information as possible. Their work attracted intense public, media, and official attention. Emotional newscasts ran day and night. AFIP's Public Affairs Office was

swamped by inquiries.14 Congressional offices pressed for updates. Senior Army

and Navy leaders called about subordinates or old friends among the soldiers and

sailors killed in the attack; some flag and general officers visited repeatedly. Captain Wagner observed that "the intensity of this investigation, the personalness of

this investigation, resulted in significant flag interest at every level, in all service[s]

because everybody wanted to have the information before the next guy""5

Remains of the 183 victims and the 5 hijackers sent to Dover bore the

identification tags attached during the recovery effort. On arrival they were

scanned for the presence of unexploded ordnance or other metallic elements

and photographed. Where possible, FBI agents took fingerprints that could be

matched against a database containing the prints of DoD uniformed personnel

and civilian employees. Whole-body radiographs documented injuries, the age of

victims, and the presence of teeth andjewelry.1 6

Wallets, purses, credit cards, badges, military "dog tags,' or other identifying materials accompanied some bodies. These and any other personal effects

kept with the remains throughout the identification process were removed, photographed, and accounted for; two individuals were always present to witness the

handling of such items. Once it was determined that these items had no further

use as evidence, they were forwarded to casualty assistance officers who returned

them to next of kin.17

When characteristics of a body could be described, examiners recorded

victims' height, weight, and skin and hair coloring. Compiled and compared with

reference information including blood type, this data helped to identify many

people. Autopsies also aided identification, disclosing scars, birthmarks, or other

identifying features as well as the presence of specific prescription drugs in the

body. Such information could be checked against medical records of likely casualties, although this approach was inexact. Where possible, autopsies were performed to help determine the cause of death, needed for the issuance of death

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certificates. Moreover, next of kin often wanted to know how a person had died.

The mortuary staff compiled reports on the cause of death when that information became conclusive; eventually autopsy reports were made available to the

families.18

The tremendous energy generated by the impact of the airliner as it

slammed into the building fragmented many bodies, making it impossible to

identify them by visual means or by doing an autopsy. In these instances forensic

anthropologists and state-of-the-art techniques and equipment were brought to

bear. Eight anthropologists worked alongside the radiologists and pathologists.

Investigators matched the DNA profiles of 50 military fatalities with the samples

kept on file at the Armed Forces Repository of Specimen Samples for the Identification of Remains. In other instances, they compared specimens with the DNA

supplied by family members.19

DNA evidence, regarded by the public and the courts as the "gold standard" for identification, was not, however, always available because in many

instances it too had been destroyed. For example, the most precise form, nuclear

DNA, whose testing reveals unique characteristics, degrades quickly and is vulnerable to fire. The second type, mitochondrial DNA, more resistant to high temperatures, can require a month or more of laboratory time to process, and since

only the mother's mitochondrial DNA carries on to subsequent generations, its

use for proof of identity often requires additional genealogical research.2

"

Particularly where there existed no soft tissue evidence or other markers for recognition, forensic dentistry proved a powerful tool. Air Force Colonel Charles Pemble headed the group of odontologists, other dentists, and technicians from the 436th Dental Flight at Dover and the 81st Dental Squadron

from Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi. Pemble pointed out that dental examinations often furnish definitive data since teeth, which are calcified structures,

are the hardest substances in the human body and generally much less susceptible than soft tissue to destruction by blunt force trauma or fire. Moreover, the

arrangement of teeth is unique to each person. The forensic team employed traditional methods as well as a computer software program known as WIN ID that

permitted postmortem dental radiology to be compared with antemortem dental records. Through the use of such advanced digital and other technologies, the

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oral pathologists completed their work in just one month. Odontologist Arendt

estimated that 65 identifications resulted solely from the dental investigation. 21

Findings confirmed that most victims had died swiftly; comparatively

few died from slower-acting burns or asphyxiation attributable to the fire itself.

The greatest number died from blunt force injuries. The remainder died from

other causes or from effects that could not be determined. "Given the level of char

and fragmentation;' Captain Wagner thought that the"real challenge" in identification and determining the cause of death had not been the"DoD folks" but the

contractors and the airplane passengers and crew for whom it was more difficult to reconstitute medical and dental records. Only five victims-two from the

Army, two from the Navy, and one aboard the aircraft-could not be identified

from remains. Although analysis indicated the hijackers' remains, their individual

identities could not be determined since there was no reference dental or DNA

information. The FBI took custody of them.22

By mid-November the identification process was complete. Medical

evidence and other relevant materials were turned over to the military services

whose task throughout had been to prepare the remains for burial and communicate with the families of the dead. The Army and Navy assigned liaison personnel

to assist with these arrangements, the Defense Intelligence Agency coped with its

civilian dead, and the FBI with the people on board the airplane, including the

hijackers. To the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel fell the

sad duty of fielding a liaison team to deal with the various matters required for

final disposition. Lieutenant Colonel Harold Campbell of the Mortuary Affairs

and Casualty Support Division explained that the job was "finding health and

dental records; working family reference samples for DNA if necessary; awards

and decorations for uniforms; posthumous promotions; the information that the

Medical Examiner would need to do the State of Virginia death certificate" The

team also forwarded information about the identification of remains and about

personal effects and shipping arrangements and, finally, dressed the Army dead

for cremation or burial.23

Headed by Thomas Ellis, civilian chief of DCSPER's Mortuary Affairs

Branch, the team included Sergeant First Class Thomas Jones of the Disposition Branch and Staff Sergeant Robert Bryson of the Repatriation and Family

Affairs Branch. Jones had left a month or so earlier for an assignment in Japan

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but requested to return for this duty. Campbell considered him "uniquely qualified" in that he was "one of the few NCOs that [had] ever worked an incident....

He knew what was going on and having him back was helpful." Reservist Major

Richard Chaloupka, a licensed funeral director and embalmer in the Alaska State

Medical Examiner's Office, was recalled for duty at Dover. He and Sergeant First

Class Albert Brown, who had been present at the crash scene, relieved Ellis and

Bryson at the Mortuary.24

The Navy also sent a three-member liaison team, but unlike the Army

team the Navy men had no previous training in mortuary affairs. The senior officer in charge, Naval Reserve Captain Stephen O'Brien, had previously dealt only

with the death of a subordinate. Master Chief Petty Officer Gale Bond, stationed

with the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) in Millington, Tennessee, was in

Washington at the time of the attack, where he learned he was the only BUPERS

"representative on the East Coast of the United States right now ... within driving distance" of Dover, and he had a rental car. On his way out of town, Bond

picked up the third member, Hospitalman First Class Prince Brown, who was

to provide administrative support.2

" Although they lacked training for their temporary assignment and had never met nor worked together, the three men performed their duty with commitment and sensitivity.

The military services had to clarify and resolve several internal jurisdictional matters. Although all the services were represented and cooperated, as

DoD's executive agent in mortuary affairs the Army took the lead in the operation. Even so it had to determine whether its personnel office, DCSPER, or its

logistics office, DCSLOG, should take charge. Ultimately the CentralJoint Mortuary Affairs Office decided that both offices would provide staff support to the

MDW commander,2 6 Because of the Army's years of practical experience dealing

with mortuary matters, it had highly detailed procedures and regulations in place,

as Colonel Campbell explained:

As a matter of culture, if you look at Navy regulations and Air Force

regulations and Army regulations and pamphlets, the Army is usually

more anal in its description of what you can and can't do, how to do,

what to do; and the other Services are kind of like: You have a flat tire.

Fix it. We say: You have a flat tire. Open your trunk. Get out your jack.

Get out your spare. Check your spare. Jack up the car. And because

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the Army's publications have been more detailed, that's why they were

more helpful.27

With a murkier chain of command for mortuary affairs, at first the senior

Navy officer, Captain O'Brien, wondered,"Who do we work for.... What is my

authority to make decisions?" He continued to chafe over the lack ofjoint coordination, the failure to establish "a military command post set up ... to bring structure to the effort, to focus the issues, to update the entire group on the status of

the remains, on the status of records, personal effects."28 The Navy's internal casualty notification process also proved cumbersome and time-consuming-"ludicrous" as far as Bond was concerned.29

Moreover, the Navy personnel office demanded constant updates from

its liaison staff According to Bond, "they wanted voice reports five times a day

and a written report about four times a day.' But in his workspace he had neither

internet connectivity nor print capability. "I've got a telephone that sometimes

works, sometimes doesn't." Citing the pressure on their time and psyches, the

team members finally persuaded BUPERS to accept a daily situation report. The

team also had to coordinate the flow of information among nearly 200 different

individuals assigned to approximately 38 agencies and offices. They compiled a

checklist of 37 items, including the deceased's personal effects, full personal data,

and whether the individual's remains should be viewed. They took great care,

aware that any mistake, even the misspelling of a middle name on a death certificate, could cause problems. 30

Ahen the identification and notification procedures ended, the service

liaison teams faced their most painful task-dressing or draping the remains of

the military dead in full regalia, regardless of their condition, before they were

released for burial or cremation. The Mortuary maintained complete sets of military dress uniforms, ribbons, decorations, badges, and other emblems of rank and

accomplishment. Posters on the walls displayed proper wear. MDW provided the

Army uniforms. Bond arranged for the purchase of new Navy uniforms. The uniforms reflected promotions to which the decedents were posthumously entitled.

End-of-tour commendations and Purple Heart medals were affixed. Once the

remains were ready for release the liaison officers received and briefed the escorts

on their duties, then signed over the remains to them. Civilian remains were not

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dressed for burial at the Mortuary but were respectfully covered, and like those of

the military placed in caskets and returned to their families or designated funeral

homes.3'

Organizing for Family Assistance

While the dead remained in military hands during the forensic investigation, Pentagon officials undertook to see to the needs of the living-the families of the victims. Such care had long been a solemn and committed obligation

of the military establishment; regulations and procedures provided for assistance

to the bereaved. However, the character of the Pentagon disaster made it unique

in Department of Defense experience-its immediacy, the location and scale, and

the varied nature of the victims: military and civilians, male and female adults,

children, and foreign nationals on board the plane. Moreover, the military dead

were multiservice-Army and Navy. These circumstances pointed clearly to the

need for a joint response orchestrated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense

and involving resources of all the military services as well as elements of the civilian sector. A centralized organization at one location would facilitate coordination of the large number of agencies providing support.

David Chu, DoD undersecretary for personnel and readiness, exercised

overall responsibility for personnel policy. Under his charge came the Office of

Family Policy headed by Meg Falk, which monitored matters relating to the education, medical care, and employment of American dependents at military bases

around the world, and aided dependents after the death of a service member

overseas. As Falk and her staff evacuated their 1B700 office after the attack, hurrying out by way of the Center Court to North Parking and then driving to an

Air Force office in nearby Crystal City, she began to ponder what needed to be

done in the emergency. Realizing that the likelihood of a large number of casualties would require setting up a family assistance center, she sought and received

authorization from Chu to do "whatever it takes"32

The most immediate requirement was to find a location for the center

that offered adequate space and parking. After considering and discarding several possibilities, Falk, with strong support from members of the local community and the help of Arlington's assistant county manager, John Mausert-Mooney,

secured use of the Crystal City Sheraton Hotel, little more than a mile from the

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Pentagon. Although he could not be certain of reimbursement from the government, hotel manager Perry Ahmed quickly agreed to the arrangement.33

To take charge of what became known as the Pentagon Family Assistance Center (PFAC), Chu turned to his deputy assistant secretary for military

personnel policy, Lieutenant General John Van Alstyne, an infantry officer and a

Vietnam combat veteran, a reticent man of whom Falk spoke as the "heart and

soul of that Center." Chu called him a "hero." Van Alstyne had been in the Pentagon only a month when he was confronted with the "nightmarish scene" on 11

September and accepted the sensitive task. A year later, in one of the few remarks

he made about his experience, he recalled that he pulled up a desk and chair in

the hotel lobby and"that became my command center for family assistance. I lived

there for a full month:' Center staff members later expressed a grateful consensus

that Van Alstyne ran it with the efficiency of a well-managed military operation

but with notable modesty and compassion.34

Pentagon Family Assistance Center

As word of the attack spread on the morning of the 11th, distraught

family and friends rushed to the Pentagon hoping for news of the injured, missing, or dead. That day and throughout the night chaplains at the site stayed with

the fearful bystanders near the temporary morgue and escorted a group of about

30 to the Sheraton in the morning. At 7:00 a.m. on 12 September, less than 22

hours after Flight 77's deadly attack, they found the Pentagon Family Assistance

Center up and running with a hastily assembled staff of about 50 volunteers from

the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and

the private sector.35

While making arrangements for the center location, Falk also gave

thought to staffing it. Seeking experienced help, she telephoned the Navy Fleet

and Family Support Center at Hampton Roads, Virginia, to confer with a team

that had counseled the families of sailors killed in the terrorist attack on the

destroyer USS Cole in Aden, Yemen, the year before. By 4:00 p.m. six team members were cleared to go; they arrived that night and were present for PFAC's

opening the next morning.3 6

By then the military departments and other agencies had also inaugurated family assistance services. The Army Community Service headquarters

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staff, alerted almost immediately after the attack, began to receive calls as early

as 10:00 a.m. on an existing toll-free phone number. 7 American Airlines set up

an inquiry office at Dulles Airport; the Department of Justice Office for Victims of Crime went into action. In order that all might speak with one voice,

Chu directed that the separate services stand down; PFAC became the combined

headquarters for DoD components and other federal agencies, the airlines, and

relief organizations. 8

PFAC's professional staff increased rapidly. Organized into management,

administration, and operations sections, the center had as its mission to provide

information concerning recovery and identification of deceased victims, inform

families about benefits and funeral and memorial services, and assist their "return

to normalcy.39

For his deputy Van Alstyne requested a reserve general officer; Brigadier General James Spivey, the Army assistant chief of chaplains for mobilization and reserve affairs, took on the assignment. After arriving on 14 September, Spivey, who had served in combat areas, assumed responsibility for 24-hour

daily operations, briefed and counseled families, and, after the closure of PFAC,

headed the successor Pentagon Family Assistance Resource and Referral Office.

Falk monitored and coordinated day-to-day activities and policy matters and

advised on casualty and mortuary affairs. An Army attorney who had worked

for Van Alstyne at the Pentagon, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Emswiler, oversaw

the legal research and services available from a considerable number of attorneys

and paralegals. Members of the team from the Navy Fleet and Family Support

Center consulted on organizational and other matters. Van Alstyne assigned Air

Force MajorJay Dougherty to handle billing issues and logistics with the hotel1.4

Navy Commander Yvette BrownWahler, also from Van Alstyne's Pentagon office,

spent much of her time conferring with the Army and Navy casualty offices and

the Defense Intelligence Agency about the status of the missing. Reflecting on the

working relationship of the management team, BrownWahler asserted that "we

ended up becoming basically one brain. You know we created this cocoon and I

could tell somebody to do something because the General wanted it done, or I

thought it should be done or whatever else and itjust, it got done. You didn't have

to check up"4

"

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The military services brought to the operation well-formulated family support programs and staffs with years of hands-on experience. OSD, on

the other hand, normally concerned with policy, had no practical experience in

providing family support. Established ad hoc as a joint organization but without command authority, PFAC had to rely on voluntary cooperation in obtaining resources from the military services and other federal agencies. It did not,

for example, task the services to assign any specific number of people to PFAC.

Some critical service components remained apart from the center-one such, the

Navy Casualty Assistance Calls Office at the Washington Navy Yard, did not place

an operational cell at the hotel for several weeks. But Navy Lieutenant Commander Elizabeth Stair, who took charge of volunteer staffing and military manning, informed personnel working at the assistance center that "this is a team

effort, and if somebody needs your help, you help them" She turned to Navy master chiefs who typically maintained close ties with one another; through those

networks many PFAC requests were processed successfully.42 PFAC became the

duty station for staff from Army Community Service who provided information

to the Army leadership, assuring them, according to co-director Delores Johnson, that the Army families were "getting the kind of service they need and they

deserve:' Then "we settled in to do business as a joint element and it flowed very

smoothly."

43

The OSD public affairs office handled the internal release of information

about the victims. On 13 September it released an estimate of the people unaccounted for. The next day it provided the names of the Army, Navy, and Defense

Agencies' military and civilians unaccounted for. The FBI had responsibility for

information about the passengers on Flight 77. Each agency informed the families which organizations would serve them over the longer term.44

The center remained open 24 hours daily. Staff and volunteers typically

worked one of three eight-hour shifts; many put in much longer hours.45 Van

Alstyne received a financial commitment from Chu for federal payment to the

Sheraton for lodging where needed and for feeding the staff and volunteers and

the victims' relatives. For the next month the hotel served meals on a 24-hour

basis at no charge to the families or the workers.46

A half-dozen employees from Falk's Office of Family Policy became the

central administrative unit that tracked, among other matters, staffing levels.

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Having learned from the Cole experience and other disasters, they took steps to

organize media coverage by arranging to have public affairs officers stationed at

the assistance center. They provided space for the media on the first floor and at

prearranged times gave them tours of the center, but journalists and broadcasters were not permitted to enter the meeting rooms during briefings. Chu emphasized the importance of having a senior officer in charge with the authority to say

to the media and others, "No, this is not a circus, this is not a voyeuristic event."

Noncommissioned officers greeted family members at the lobby door; families

and appropriate visitors could come and go at the Sheraton with anonymity if

they chose.48

By 3:00 p.m. on its first day of operation, 12 September, PFAC had

established a call center with a toll-free telephone number to keep communication open for families outside the Washington area. The telephone bank remained

essential even after commercial air transportation resumed on 13 September.4 9

As information became available and could be released, next of kin could learn

who had been confirmed dead and who was still considered missing. They could

proffer a claim for survivor benefits and speak with a therapist or social worker

for psychological support. The call center also served the staff in tracking down

information on the missing and next of kin.Y0

Consolidation of resources and the presence of victims' families at PFAC

aided in the identification of remains at the Dover Mortuary. The Armed Forces

DNA Identification Laboratory under the direction of deputy director James

Canik organized the collection of blood samples at the assistance center. Technicians explained the process and purpose and then took samples from family members to match with victims whose DNA data were not on file at the laboratory.5 1

Since World War II the services had regularly assigned a commissioned

or senior noncommissioned officer to assist the family of any military member

killed in the line of duty. Titled Casualty Assistance Officers in the Army and

Casualty Assistance Calls Officers in the Navy, they normally had a rank equivalent to or greater than the deceased service member.5 2 With the 11 September

attack the services broke with their practice of furnishing casualty officers only

to the families of military personnel and assigned such officers to the families of

civilian victims as well. Finding casualty officers was reported to be a "relatively

easy task" since the intense emotional impact of the attack elicited an eager will190
Caring for the Dead and the Living

ingness to help.53 The Defense Intelligence Agency provided representatives for

families of its dead employees. American Airlines and the FBI, in consultation

with the National Transportation Safety Board's Family Affairs Office, did likewise for the passengers and crew of Flight 77.54 When remains at Dover were

positively identified, casualty officers informed next of kin that the victim's official

status had changed from missing to dead. They signed for and then handed over

to the family the deceased's personal belongings and passed along relevant information regarding survivor benefits and burial options.

Coordination lapses between the involved agencies, attributable in part

to the improvised joint nature of the operation, created some difficulties for casualty officers. Initially they received instructions simultaneously from their parent services and from PFAC, and they had to deal with dissimilar procedures for

civilians and military.5" A few of the victims fell under more than one category.

For example, Bryan Jack, an airplane passenger, was a Pentagon employee, and the

captain of Flight 77, Charles Burlingame III, was a retired Navy reservist. Colonel Campbell, principal coordinator for the Army's casualty process, noted that

the casualty officers "had a great deal of difficulty figuring out what they were supposed to do and what the benefits were and what was really happening because

they would get advice and assistance and guidance from multiple offices from

multiple agencies. So there was never any one single voice!'56 In a questionnaire

filled out after completing the assignment, one casualty officer wrote, "The victim was a passenger on American Flight 77. Coordination of information gathering between the Navy and American Airlines was sorely lacking:' Another stated:

"More coordination between agencies. Too much redundancy and confusion of

benefits."57 Undersecretary Chu later acknowledged that "over the years there has

been a sort of archaeological accretion of legislation" that left uncertainties about

the rights of the dead and their families. After 11 September DoD twice sought

and received additional legislative authority from Congress to remove the uncertainties.58 The assistance center attempted to clarify these issues by providing

additional training and briefings.

Besides the challenge of mastering the regulations, the casualty officers

could not be expected to handle alone the intense emotional reactions to the

traumatic information they conveyed. Here other PFAC staff members helped

families cope not only with their losses but also with practical concerns. Colo191
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nel William Huleatt's group of mental health professionals included active duty

military personnel, government civilian therapists, Red Cross and community

mental health volunteers, and a six-person team from the Department of Veterans Affairs National Center for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Palo Alto,

California. Their expertise ranged from child psychiatry to marriage counseling.

PFAC reported that on average 20 military and civilian counselors were available

24 hours a day.5 9

Relatives and friends could turn also to chaplains for pastoral care. When

invited, chaplains consulted on decisions regarding burials, especially the uncertainty about whether to leave the deceased on forensic hold, as described by

Campbell: "We had twenty some families who received additional portions [of

remains] after they had done their initial interment. Which meant they then had

to either disinter the original casket and put the subsequent portions ... in an

acceptable container and bury it on top of the original casket or treat it as cremation or hold it to be put in with the group remains, when all the unidentifiable

portions [were] interred as a group burial' 6° One of the chaplains made "approximately 18 visits to family members facing these decisions, some of whom were

angry, some accepting, but all in pain"'61

Not only were spiritual and psychological needs of the families attended

to, but a medical aid station staffed with doctors, nurses, and technicians

remained open around the clock. Additionally, military and civilian benefits officers and other specialists were available in the days after the attack. Representatives of the military TRICARE medical program worked with military families

on medical benefits and claims processing. Civilian personnel officers established

standard procedures for determining benefits and entitlements in coordination

with relevant federal agencies such as the Office of Personnel Management. To

afford adults an opportunity to use these services, the center provided free child

care on the third floor of the Sheraton at what was called Kids' Place.62

A large contingent of attorneys contributed legal expertise. Headed by

Colonel Emswiler, the core group of Judge Advocate General reservists was augmented by the Army's 10th Legal Support Organization based in Richmond,

Virginia, and a number of Coast Guard lawyers. Another 110 private attorneys

and paralegals from Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia offered pro

bono advice. Legal assistance covered probate, domestic relations, estate planning,

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power of attorney, and the ramifications of pension, retirement, and social security benefits. Lawyers helped families gain access to victims' bank accounts and

other financial assets, dealt with the Internal Revenue Service, and responded to

child custody questions. Seemingly simple matters such as retrieving family vehicles from Pentagon parking lots could require legal intervention because victims

whose remains had not yet been identified were officially still "missing" and their

property could not be disposed of.63

A host of public and private organizations augmented the work of the

center. OSD authorized the Army Emergency Relief Society, Navy and Marine

Corps Relief Society, Air Force Aid Society, the Federal Employee Education

& Assistance Fund, and the United Services Organization (USO) to accept

donated funds for victims and their families. Other relief agencies and charitable organizations such as the American Red Cross and Salvation Army delivered

services. State and federal entities stepped in, including the Virginia Criminal

Injuries Compensation Fund, Veterans Benefits Administration, Social Security

Administration, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Navy Federal

Credit Union and Pentagon Federal Credit Union representatives stood by to

discuss financial and insurance matters. 64

Assistance came also from ad hoc groups and unexpected sources. The

DCSPER Family Volunteer Group collected and relayed information, consulted

about finances, and helped with chores for the many affected families of that

organization.6

" On 12 September Therapy Dogs Incorporated volunteered its

own "expertise' The group's four-legged members, trained to respond positively

to the embrace of strangers and play easily with children, visited senior citizens

and others in need of companionship. Falk laughingly remembered that the "kids

would pull their tails and pull their ears and these dogs wouldn't even blink:' 66

Not only did they become favorites of the children, but also of adults waiting in

the lobby or meeting upstairs in the conference and counseling rooms.67

From the beginning Van Alstyne deemed it a paramount obligation to

keep the families informed. He established a daily routine, giving briefings in the

hotel's large conference ballroom at 10:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. 68 After announcing the number of remains recovered and identified he invited questions from

the audience. Experts, including the superintendent of Arlington National Cemetery, a representative from the Dover Port Mortuary, and a member of the OSD

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PENTAGON 9/11

casualty assistance office, were invited to speak. When search and rescue activities at the Pentagon shifted to search and recovery, 35 workers and officials from

Arlington, Fairfax, and Montgomery Counties, the Old Guard, and Army engineers briefed the families. Before and after the assembly Van Alstyne and other

senior personnel often met privately with family members; they also arranged for

formal counseling.69

At the twice-daily gatherings Van Alstyne spoke as the definitive voice of

the government in reporting the status of the casualties. He conducted the emotionally charged meetings calmly, with straightforwardness, patience, and sometimes humor. Spivey described him as "very candid, very, very gentle, and very

understanding and compassionate, but at the same time very straightforward"7

The general explained that he was not a public affairs officer. Rather, he described

himself as "an infantry officer of thirty-five years, and I've learned how to deal in

the facts, and that's what I'm going to do. Now you may not like the facts. You ask

me a question, I will answer. If you ask me a question and I don't have the answer,

I'm not going to tell you [that I do]. I'm not going to try to hoodwink you:" Spivey

could see that Van Alstyne "built a bond of trust with those people. They identified with him. They trusted him"7' Falk agreed completely, affirming that "all

the families want is accurate information and he was so respectful of those families.' She believed that his "commanding presence, his authoritative persona;'

his remarks delivered in his slow deliberate Texas drawl, caused the families to

"revere" him. 72

The sessions could be distressingly painful. Sometimes, because of the

condition of the remains, the general and his staff urged that a coffin not be

opened for viewing-"do not put that image in your mind for the rest of your

life;' counseled BrownWahler. When somebody broke down while asking a question, Van Alstyne often stepped away from the podium to console the bereaved

until he or she regained composure and could continue.73 Reports that the status

of a casualty had been officially changed from missing to dead provoked a variety of responses, sometimes deep and overwhelming grief, sometimes relief at

resolution. Robert Jaworski, director of the resource services office, part of the

Army office that suffered the largest number of fatalities, recalled the comfort it

seemed to give to one victim's daughters when told their mother's remains had

been identified.74

194
Caring for the Dead and the Living

PFAC staff and even the chaplains, who had more experience with tragedy, were greatly moved by the sorrow they witnessed. Lieutenant Colonel William Lee, a chaplain with the Maryland National Guard, recalled how at the

recovery site at the Pentagon "a stillness fell over the recovery workers as a child's

pajamas were pulled from the debris.' A Barbie doll followed, then a child's foot.

But it wasn't until Lee went to PFAC that it became horribly personalized. When

he learned about the child whose remains he had seen, probably, he thought, those

of eight-year-old Zoe Falkenberg, "my heart nearly stopped, and hot tears welled

in my eyes:' Apparently she loved to dance and"had perfect ballerina feet"'7

"

Besides waiting to receive the remains, many families were anxious for

any personal effects found with the bodies or recovered elsewhere. As searchers

sifted the debris in the Pentagon and North Parking, they collected items that

belonged to the victims and survivors of the crash--nameplates, photographs,

uniforms and other clothing, award certificates, coffee mugs, day planners, credit

cards, wallets, purses, and much more. Personal items were sent to the Joint Personal Property Depot set up at Fort Myer and manned by some 110 of the Army

Reserve's mobilized 311th Quartermaster Company, commanded by Lieutenant

Colonel Cortez Puryear. The soldiers at the depot, explained the Army's Thomas

Kuhn, "clean everything. They catalogue everything. They record where it was

found in the building. It's very, very detailed. And it's all boxed up, photographs

were taken of all of it:'7 6 At its peak, running a 24-hour operation, the unit produced copies of a register, mostly photographs, of about 310 pages. It was shown

to survivors and to families of the missing and dead; keepsakes that were recognized and claimed were handed over. The depot officially closed on 20 September

although some items were returned afterward.77

Among its many sad but beneficial activities PFAC coordinated the

somber visits of the victims' relatives and friends to the crash site. Mental health

experts insisted that going to the Pentagon, even as crews sifted through the

wreckage, would expedite the healing for next of kin struggling to come to terms

with death under terrifying circumstances, with no bodies yet to see or touch or

bury. When one family member asked why the news media could get closer to

the building than they, Van Alstyne secured permission for a formal visit, even

though the site was still cordoned off and Route 27 closed to traffic. The first

occasion came the weekend of 15-16 September after the attack, when chartered

195
PENTAGON 9/11

buses transported family members, accompanied by military chaplains and counselors. The superintendent of Arlington National Cemetery brought the relatives

small American flags to take with them. 78

MDW commander General Jackson greeted the group on arrival for

the first visit. A member of the Arlington County Fire Department played the

mournful notes of a bagpipe, and Arlington County police officers rendered honors. From an observation platform decorated with flags and flowers and screened

to prevent media intrusion, the viewers could see the burned and badly damaged western side of the building and the feverish work under way to shore up

the structure and recover remains. Although the fire had essentially been extinguished, even as the group watched, a small remnant of the building caved in.

Members of the Army's Old Guard stood by to provide information when

requested about the airliner, the damage on each floor, the progress of the recovery, and other details. Falk was "amazed at the number of family members who

wanted to know every detail.... No matter how hard it is you've got to give it to

them. You don't dance around the truth. You give it to them straight, unequivocal

and that's what these Old Guard members did:' In fact, one soldier felt that talking to family members boosted his own resolve as he continued to comb through

the debris: "It didn't make me happy, but it sure made me feel good about what I

was doing and made me want to perform my best:' Families could stay as long as

they wished, and as the day lengthened and became colder, the Red Cross passed

out blankets. Return trips took place over the next several weeks, usually on Saturday and Sunday nights, including one led by General Spivey for the families

and friends of American Airlines employees killed on Flight 77. A table in the

small viewing area became a memorial of sorts, filled with flowers, pictures, and

mementos.79

PFAC staff relied on the counselors to advise about other activities or

decisions that might be either therapeutic or disturbing for the families. One recommendation was to discourage co-workers of the dead or missing from coming to the Sheraton. To see someone from a nearby office who had survived the

attack when a family member had not, or to be given harrowing accounts about

the day, perhaps a story related to one of the deceased, might be traumatic. 80

Those who wished to see friends or colleagues of the victims were encouraged to

do so privately, not at the Sheraton. When requested, chaplains arranged meet196
Caring for the Dead and the Living

ings between family members and those who worked in the same offices as the

deceased. In those instances Chaplain Donna Weddle found that "they provided

great support for each other."'

The assistance center strove to protect the privacy and sensitivities of the

families but did not try to cloister them. Public recognition of the enormity of

their loss helped in some small way to sustain those whose lives were so shockingly affected. A number of media and political figures, celebrities, and other

well-known or distinguished persons were welcomed at the center. Senior government civilian and military leaders made themselves available even as they

planned the nation's response to the terrorist act. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld

met with the families, as did Secretary of the Army Thomas White, Secretary of

the Navy Gordon England, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other flag officers, the

sergeant major of the Army, and cabinet members. Among the visitors appreciated for her unassuming presence was Linda Carter, a Washington-area resident

and star of the 1970s television series Wonder Woman,' who dropped by regularly to sit quietly with families. Sen. Jean Carnahan of Missouri made a particularly strong impression. She volunteered to answer phones at the center and when

asked to speak, gave a moving and heartfelt talk about how she coped after the

sudden loss of her own husband and son who had been killed in a plane crash just

11 months earlier.82

Besides discussing with families deeply personal and often private matters, center members sought to keep them informed about broader aspects of the

recovery effort at the Pentagon and reactions to the event in the outside world.

To maintain consistency in the information delivered and to avoid giving credence to rumors Van Alstyne occasionally restricted the kind of news released.

In one instance, a congressman talked about retribution in a manner that greatly

upset several of the listening family members; thereafter the general interviewed

beforehand all would-be speakers. 83

The human desire to alleviate pain, ease the specter of death, and comfort

the bereaved is a powerful social force. A generous outpouring of gifts and expressions of sympathy for the victims' families arrived in the form of flags, quilts,

toys, stuffed animals, books, and numerous other items. At first these donations

filled one table, then four tables, and they continued to pour in by the thousands

even after the center closed its doors in October.84 These tokens of concern and

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PENTAGON 9/11

respect added to the cherished remembrances of the relatives. Soon after the center opened, they asked to display photographs of the missing and dead. The hotel

staff set up tables on which white napkins folded into the shape of stars were laid

on a blue tablecloth, with red and white cloths for the stripes. The tables, with a

large American flag on the wall behind, were soon covered with photographs and

mementos and usually surrounded by flowers sent by citizens.8

"

The large conference hotel was transformed in that month. The ballroom

with its wrenching personal display came to represent not only raw individual

grief but also communal mourning, a shared commemoration of the lives lost.

Falk called it "sacred ground" that she and Van Alstyne encouraged staff members

to visit every day "to remind us of why we were there' 86 It was evident that the

center staff and volunteers carried out their duties as gatekeepers at some emotional cost to themselves. Van Alstyne admitted to Falk that heading the Family

Assistance Center ranked only behind his combat tours in South Vietnam as the

most stressful experience of his life. He added, his self-effacing humor coming to

the fore, that "if this ever happens again, just make sure that whoever they select

for this job is mean, ornery and expendable."'87

Continuity and Commemoration

The initial trickle of 30 people who arrived at the Sheraton on 12 September grew to a flood. Friends and family including children of the victims from

the Pentagon and Flight 77 joined the waiting. Hundreds of volunteers and a

like number of relatives could be found in the building at any one time. The center received 2,545 people in its first week and counted over 2,500 volunteers during its month-long tenure, providing services to an average of 466 people each day

and directly assisting 170 families of victims. 8

The Pentagon Family Assistance Center ceased operation at the Sheraton on 12 October, but family assistance did not end. To extend services through

the end of the month the Pentagon Family Assistance Resource and Referral

Office (PFARRO), Phase II or"aftercare" as some termed it, was set up. For continuity of leadership, General Spivey became the officer in charge and BrownWahler his deputy. Although OSD funded it and retained control, the office staff

came mostly from the Army and Navy: senior noncommissioned officers, casualty affairs liaison officers, information and referral representatives, phone center

198
Caring for the Dead and the Living

operators, plus an Army attorney, a mental health counselor, and a family support

coordinator. The Red Cross also sent representatives.89

Located in Crystal City in the Polk Building, a leased facility with restricted

access, PFARRO chiefly provided referral services. Although it offered walk-in

assistance and maintained a hotline, the office did not attempt to be the roundthe-clock center and safe haven of its predecessor. Services did not go beyond

pastoral, mental health, and legal matters. The reduced mission and staffing

meant that daily briefings, 24/7 operations, on-site housing and transportation, food service, and child care were no longer available. The office distributed a

resource and referral guide to family members; it informed those who lived outside the National Capital Region about available support from government agencies and military installations in their area. In addition, an Internet website supplied updated information.90 Although PFARRO significantly scaled back family services, it continued to support the casualty officers' ongoing responsibilities

in dealing with such difficult matters as "forensic hold;' when remains of the dead

had not been returned to next of kin by the time PFAC closed. 91

On Sunday, 16 September, the Dover Mortuary reported the first four

preliminary victim identifications; the final identification came on 11 November.

On the 15th the Armed Forces Medical Examiner stated that no remains could

be found to substantiate the identity of five people killed-two Army, two Navy,

and one young child from the airliner. The Army recommended formal, simultaneous notification of all family members that the process was complete. Falk,

as director of the Office of Family Policy, informed OSD and service officials,

the FBI, and representatives of the families including the five for whom remains

could not be identified. Casualty assistance officers met with the families, all of

whom agreed to release information to the public at the same time, on Friday, 16

November 2001, at 5:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time. 2

Caring for its own is a bedrock military obligation-"fulfilling that Army

promise;' as one official phrased it, maintaining the "reciprocal commitment"

from "cradle to grave" between the department and service members and their

families, said another. 3 In the last chapter of this response to exceptional circumstance, surprise, and violent death on 11 September, the Pentagon implemented

long-established traditions through carefully detailed programs supervised by

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PENTAGON 9/11

well-trained military and civilian professionals, supported by an impressive logistical capability, to bury its dead and offer comfort to the bereaved.

Sustaining the injured survivors, standing by the families whose lives

were forever changed on that day, and memorializing the men and women who

were killed remained a quiet but ongoing responsibility of the Department of

Defense. When PFARRO closed on 1 November 2001, OSD's Office of Family

Policy, the military services, and American Airlines reclaimed the mission of seeing to the welfare of the people who suffered such grievous loss on the morning

of 11 September. The first Pentagon memorial service took place a month after

the catastrophe on 11 October, followed by another on the one-year anniversary.

Plans for a permanent memorial overlooking the scene of destruction began even

as the destroyed part of the Pentagon was being rebuilt and reoccupied.

The honors and tribute paid to the fallen expressed both the nation's grief

and its resolve.

200
Afterword

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington confronted the United States with a new and covert form of aggression of

global dimension difficult to defend against and capable of inflicting great harm

and damage. Although they could not prevent the attacks, the military forces

responded in the hours and days afterward with a greatly heightened level of

alertness and protection and prepared for offensive action against the terrorists

in Afghanistan. The Defense Department ordered the deployment of land, sea,

and air forces in accordance with prescribed alert procedures. The vital role of the

Pentagon in directing the deployment and response of U.S. military forces worldwide was never more manifest even as key portions of the building lay in ruins.

While saving lives and preserving the building were the immediate

imperatives on 11 September, keeping the Pentagon up and running was essential to command and control of U.S. forces. The National Command Authority

(NCA)-the president and the secretary of defense-relied on the established

procedures and the communications capabilities of the command centers in the

Pentagon to exercise effective command and control. While alternate facilities

existed, they were inferior to the Pentagon in their capacity to meet maximum

command and control requirements. The success on 11 September and following days in sustaining continued operation of the Pentagon helped reassure Pres-
PENTAGON 9/11

ident Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld that they would be able to exercise expeditious direction of U.S. forces to cope with the emergency.

Maintenance of the building's operational capability owed much to the

building management staff, which performed the arduous and often dangerous

task of ensuring the continued provision of vital services-power, water, and air

conditioning-without which the building could not function. Although their

labors succeeded in meeting the NCA's immediate needs, it also became obvious that the Pentagon Renovation Program would have to incorporate important

additional changes to satisfy new requirements, some of them deriving directly

from the attack experience. These requirements included modernizing, hardening, and strengthening utilities, modernizing and renovating command centers,

and building new security and fire safety features into the building's design.'

The most pressing and overriding need was to rid the building of the

widespread damage done by fire, smoke, water, and mold that had compelled the

evacuation of thousands of employees to temporary quarters elsewhere for weeks

and months. Nevertheless, large numbers of employees reported for work on 12

September. By 24 September work areas that had not sustained structural damage-Corridors 6 1/2 to 2 1/2 clockwise, or about 66 percent of the buildinghad been reoccupied. In the following months most of the sections of the building that had been evacuated were reoccupied, including parts of Wedges 1 and

2.2

On 11 October 2001, one month after the attack, by which time the Pentagon and surrounding area had been largely cleared of the mountains of debris,

a service of remembrance was held at the site. The large American flag that had

been draped over the top of the building on 12 September was lowered after 29

days and folded with full military honors. Bush and Rumsfeld addressed an audience of many thousands of Pentagon workers and families of the deceased gathered to honor the victims of the assault. Rumsfeld spoke feelingly of the dead and

thanked "those who came to assist that day and afterwards:' The president promised that "the wound to this building will not be forgotten, but it will be repaired.

Brick by brick, we will quickly rebuild the Pentagon"'3

Responsibility for rebuilding fell to the Pentagon Renovation Program

Office, whose staff throughout 11 September and in the days and weeks that followed had been instrumental in limiting damage to the stricken building and

202
Afterword

supporting in so many ways the recovery effort-from supplying building diagrams to the firefighters to shoring up critical areas and providing essential materials and equipment. PENREN had been engaged for almost a decade in planning and overseeing the renovation of the building. It followed naturally that

it should undertake demolition and reconstruction of the structurally damaged

area-all five floors of Rings E, D, and C between Corridors 4 and 5, in all some

400,000 square feet.

Delayed because of the 11 October memorial ceremony, demolition did

not start until 18 October. Working two 12-hour shifts seven days a week, strongly

motivated crews completed the job on 19 November, almost four weeks ahead of

the "aggressive eight week schedule" and months ahead of what would have been

the normal schedule.4 Reconstruction of the huge damaged area of the Pentagon

also made remarkable progress in the 10 months following completion of demolition. Some 3,000 dedicated construction workers labored two 10-hour shifts

six days a week, completing restoration of Wedge 1 Ring E between Corridors 4

and 5 by 11 September 2002, one year after the attack, permitting occupants to

move into offices in the ring. In thanking and praising the workers, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz declared that"like the mythical Phoenix bird, the building, too,

has risen from its ashes to be reborn' Indeed, from the beginning the reconstruction effort had been named the Phoenix Project. Completion of work on the

remaining portion of the damaged area permitted full occupancy of Wedge 1 by

February 2003. Thereafter, with increased appropriations of money by Congress,

renovation of the building proceeded at a much accelerated pace that permitted

advancing the scheduled date of completion to 2010 instead of 2014, as had been

the plan prior to 11 September.5

Of the more than a hundred Pentagon inhabitants and responders requiring hospital treatment, a number who suffered serious injuries and lasting effects

remained the object of continuing anxious attention from the government and

the public. The president, secretary of defense, and other officials, including the

highest-ranking officers of the military services, visited military and civilian victims in hospitals. Their expressions of concern and appreciation reflected the

emotion of a caring public.6

The strong sentiment for lasting commemoration of the victims of the

11 September attack led to planning for two memorials-one inside the building

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PENTAGON 9/11

and one outside. In May 2002 an American Heroes Memorial opened on the 3rd

Floor apex area of Corridors 9 and 10 to display temporarily the many items of

tribute and remembrance that had poured into the Pentagon from the American

public. These included letters, poems, cards, paintings, quilts, candles, mobiles,

and statues that had previously been exhibited in the halls of the building.

A permanent memorial and adjacent chapel opened later in 2002 in the

1st Floor E Ring at the point of Flight 77's impact. In the center of the memorial

room is a book with a page and picture for each of the 184 victims. On either side

is an etched list with all of the names. In the chapel, the most prominent feature is

a pentagon-shaped art glass window, five feet from point to point, including individual pieces of glass for each of the 184 victims. The window was dedicated on

11 September 2002 and the chapel on 12 November 2002.7

The permanent outdoor memorial, authorized but not funded by Congress, was planned for an almost two-acre site near the Heliport. A DoD advisory

group, including family members of some of the victims, approved a location 165

feet west of the Pentagon in April 2002 and conducted a design competition. The

winning design, announced in March 2003, called for 184 cantilevered benches

placed along the path taken by Flight 77, each with an illuminated reflecting

pool. Planned also were some 80 paperbark maple trees to provide shade. To pay

for the construction, under the direction of the Pentagon Renovation Program

Office, a fundraising group led by families of the victims launched a campaign

in April 2004 to obtain the necessary funds. On 15 June 2006 a groundbreaking

ceremony at the site signaled the beginning of construction of the memorial.'

Buried in Arlington Cemetery are 64 of those killed in the attack on the

Pentagon. Also buried there is a casket containing the unidentified remains of

victims presumed to be those of five people who could not be individually identified: Dana Falkenberg, Colonel Ronald Golinski, USA (Ret.), U.S. Navy Electronics Technician 1st Class Ronald Hemenway, James Lynch, and Rhonda Rasmussen. The casket also contains the remains of some others that families desired

to be included. Over the shared grave is a five-sided granite memorial on which

the names of all 184 dead are inscribed in raised silver letters.9

In another traditional expression of homage, the Defense Department

awarded medals and decorations to the dead, to the injured, to the rescuers, and

to other responders who performed over and above the call of duty. On behalf

204
Afterword

of their deceased, military families received the Purple Heart. Civilian families

received the Medal for the Defense of Freedom, a new award created by the secretary of defense in October 2001 as the civilian equivalent of the Purple Heart.

These medals were awarded also to the injured military and civilians. The Army,

Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Defense Intelligence Agency awarded these

and other medals and certificates of distinction to more than 200 of their employees. Another new award, the Medal for Valor, created in September 2001 to recognize acts of heroism or sacrifice by civilians, was presented to 17 Defense Protective Service officers and 22 Real Estate and Facilities Directorate employees.10

205
Appendices
APPENDIX A

List of 9/11 Pentagon Fatalities*

Name Military/Civilian Affiliation

Ambrose, Paul W Civilian Flight 77

Amundson, Craig S. SPC Army

Barnes, Melissa R. YN3 Navy

Beilke, Max J. Civilian Army

Betru, Yeneneh Civilian Flight 77

Bishundat, Kris R. IT2 Navy

Blagburn, Carrie R. Civilian Army

Boone, Canfield D. LTC Army

Booth, Mary Jane Civilian Flight 77

Bowen, Donna M. Contractor Army

Boyle, Allen P. Contractor OSD

Brown, Bernard C., II Civilian Flight 77

Burford, Christopher L. ET3 Navy

Burlingame, Charles F., III Civilian Flight 77

Caballero, Daniel M. ET3 Navy

Calderon-Olmedo, Jose 0. SFC Army

Calley, Suzanne M. Civilian Flight 77

Carter, Angelene C. Civilian Army

Carver, Sharon A. Civilian Army

Caswell, William E. Civilian Flight 77

Chada,JohnJ. Civilian Army

Chapa, Rosa Maria Civilian DIA

Charlebois, David M. Civilian Flight 77

Clark, Sara M. Civilian Flight 77

Cooper, Julian T. Contractor Navy

* Excluding the five plane hijackers. Military ranks are as of time of death.

208
List of 9/11 Pentagon Fatalities

Name Military/Civilian Affiliation

Cottom, Asia S. Civilian Flight 77

Cranford, Eric A. LCDR Navy

Davis, Ada M. Civilian Army

Debeuneure, James D. Civilian Flight 77

DeConto, Gerald F. CAPT Navy

Dickens, Rodney Civilian Flight 77

Dickerson, Jerry D. LTC Army

Dillard, Eddie A. Civilian Flight 77

Doctor, Johnnie, Jr. ITI Navy

Dolan, Robert E., Jr. CDR Navy

Donovan, William H. CDR Navy

Droz, Charles A., III Civilian Flight 77

Dunn, Patrick W. CDR Navy

Earhart, Edward T. AG1 Navy

Edwards, Barbara G. Civilian Flight 77

Elseth, Robert R. LCDR Navy

Falkenberg, Charles S. Civilian Flight 77

Falkenberg, Dana Civilian Flight 77

Whittington (Falkenberg), Leslie A. Civilian Flight 77

Falkenberg, Zoe Civilian Flight 77

Fallon, Jamie L. SK3 Navy

Ferguson, James J. Civilian Flight 77

Fields, Amelia V. Civilian Army

Fisher, Gerald P. Contractor Army

Flagg, Darlene E. Civilian Flight 77

Flagg, Wilson F. Civilian Flight 77

Flocco, Matthew M. AG2 Navy

Foster, Sandra N. Civilian DIA

Gabriel, Richard P. Civilian Flight 77

Getzfred, Lawrence D. CAPT Navy

Ghee, Cortez Civilian Army

Gibson, Brenda C. Civilian Army

Golinski, Ronald F. Civilian Army

Gray, Ian J. Civilian Flight 77

Hale-McKinzy, Diane Civilian Army

Hall, Stanley R. Civilian Flight 77

Halmon, Carolyn B. Civilian Army

Heidenberger, Michele M. Civilian Flight 77

Hein, Sheila M.S. Civilian Army

Hemenway, Ronald J. ET1 Navy

209
List of 9/11 Pentagon Fatalities

Name Military/Civilian Affiliation

Hogan, Wallace C., Jr. MAJ Army

Holley, Jimmie I. Civilian Army

Houtz, Angela M. Civilian Navy

Howell, Brady K. Civilian Navy

Hurt, Peggie M. Civilian Army

Hyland, Stephen N., Jr. LTC Army

Hymel, Robert J. Civilian DIA

Ivory, Lacey B. SGM Army

Jack, Bryan C. Civilian Flight 77

Jacoby, Steven D. Civilian Flight 77

Johnson, Dennis M. LTC Army

Jones, Judith L. Civilian Navy

Judge, Ann C. Civilian Flight 77

Kegler, Brenda Civilian Army

Keller, Chandler R. Civilian Flight 77

Kennedy, Yvonne E. Civilian Flight 77

Khan, Norma C. Civilian Flight 77

Kincaid, Karen A. Civilian Flight 77

Lamana, Michael S. LT Navy

Laychak, David W. Civilian Army

Lee, Dong Chul Civilian Flight 77

Lewis, Jennifer Civilian Flight 77

Lewis, Kenneth E. Civilian Flight 77

Lightbourn-Allen, Samantha L. Civilian Army

Long, Stephen V. MAJ Army

Lynch, James T., Jr. Civilian Navy

Lynch, Terence M. Contractor Army

Lyons, Nehamon, IV OS2 Navy

Marshall, Shelley A. Civilian DIA

Martin, Teresa M. Civilian Army

Mason-Acker, Ada L. Civilian Army

Mattson, Dean E. LTC Army

Maude, Timothy J. LTG Army

Maxwell, Robert J. Civilian Army

May, Ren~e A. Civilian Flight 77

McKenzie, Molly L. Civilian Army

Menchaca, Dora M. Civilian Flight 77

Mickley, Patricia E. Civilian DIA

Milam, Ronald D. MAJ Army

Moran, Gerard P., Jr. Contractor Navy

210
List of 9/11 Pentagon Fatalities

Name Military/Civilian Affiliation

Morris, Odessa V. Civilian Army

Moss, Brian A. ET2 Navy

Moy, Teddington H. Civilian Army

Murphy, Patrick J. LCDR Navy

Newton, Christopher C. Civilian Flight 77

Nguyen, Khang Ngoc Contractor Navy

Noeth, Michael A. DM2 Navy

Olson, Barbara K. Civilian Flight 77

Ornedo, Ruben S. Civilian Flight 77

Padro, Diana B. Civilian Army

Pak, Chin Sun (Wells) SPC Army

Panik, Jonas M. LT Navy

Patterson, Clifford L., Jr. MAJ Army

Penninger, Robert Civilian Flight 77

Ploger, Robert R., III Civilian Flight 77

Ploger, Zandra F. Civilian Flight 77

Pontell, Darin H. LTJG Navy

Powell, Scott Contractor Army

Punches, Jack D. Civilian Navy

Pycior, Joseph J., Jr. AWl Navy

Raines, Lisa J. Civilian Flight 77

Ramsaur, Deborah A. Civilian Army

Rasmussen, Rhonda S. Civilian Army

Ratchford, Marsha D. IT1 Navy

Reszke, Martha M. Civilian Army

Reuben, Todd H. Civilian Flight 77

Richard, Cecelia E. Civilian Army

Rowenhorst, Edward V. Civilian Army

Rowlett, Judy Civilian Army

Russell, Robert E. Civilian Army

Ruth, William R. CW4 Army

Sabin, Charles E., Sr. Civilian DIA

Salamone, Marjorie C. Civilian Army

Sammartino, John P. Civilian Flight 77

Scales, David M. LTC Army

Schlegel, Robert A. CDR Navy

Scott, Janice M. Civilian Army

Selves, Michael L. Civilian Army

Serva, Marian H. Civilian Army

Shanower, Dan F. CDR Navy

211
List o/ 9/11 Peitagoni Fatalities

Name Military/Civilian Affiliation

Sherman, Antoinette M. Civilian Army

Simmons, Diane M. Civilian Flight 77

Simmons, Donald D. Civilian Army

Simmons, George W Civilian Flight 77

Sincock, Cheryle D. Civilian Army

Smallwood, Gregg H. ITC Navy

Smith, Gary F. Civilian Army

Sopper, Mari-Rae Civilian Flight 77

Speisman, Robert Civilian Flight 77

Statz, Patricia J. Civilian Army

Stephens, Edna L. Civilian Army

Steuerle, Norma L. Civilian Flight 77

Strickland, Larry L. SGM Army

Taylor, Hilda E. Civilian Flight 77

Taylor, Kip P. MAJ Army

Taylor, Leonard E. Civilian Flight 77

Taylor, Sandra C. Civilian Army

Teague, Sandra D. Civilian Flight 77

Teepe, Karl W Civilian DIA

Thurman, Tamara C. SGT Army

Tolbert, Otis V. LCDR Navy

Troy, Willie Q. Civilian Army

Vauk, Ronald J. LCDR Navy

Wagner, Karen J. LTC Army

Waller, Meta L. (Fuller) Civilian Army

White, Maudlyn A. SSG Army

White, Sandra L. Civilian Army

Willcher, Ernest M. Contractor Army

Williams, David L. LCDR Navy

Williams, Dwayne MAJ Army

Woods, Marvin R. Civilian Navy

Yamnicky, John D., Sr. Civilian Flight 77

Yancey, Vicki Civilian Flight 77

Yang, Shuyin Civilian Flight 77

Yokum, Kevin W, IT2 Navy

Young, Donald M. ITC Navy

Young, Edmond G.,Jr. Contractor Army

Young, Lisa L. Civilian Army

Zheng, Yuguang Civilian Flight 77

212
APPENDIX B

National Transportation

Safety Board Reports*

Excerpts from original.

213
National Transportation Safety Board Reports

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Office of Research and EngineeringfifWashington, D.C. 20594

February 19, 2002

Flight Path Study - American Airlines Flight 77

A. SUBJECT AIRCRAFT

Location: Arlington, VA

Date: September 11, 2001

Time: 09:38 AM Eastern Daylight Time

Flight: American Airlines Flight 77

Aircraft: Boeing 757-200, registration: N644AA

NTSB#: DCA01 MA064

B. GROUP

NIA

C. SUMMARY

This document provides a brief description of the flight path of the aircraft

based on information obtained from various sources of recorded radar of the

subject aircraft both before and after the hijacking events. Information from the

Flight Data Recorder (FDR) recovered on scene is also used to develop the

description. Flight paths are overlaid onto maps of the area, and time histories of

altitude data are presented

American Airlines Flight 77 - Flight Profile

The following description of American Airlines Flight 77 is based on data from the

flight data recorder (FDR) recovered from the crash site, as well as radar data

obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration's Air Route Traffic Control

Centers, approach control at Washington Dulles Airport, and the U.S. Air Force

84th Radar Evaluation Squadron.

Figure 1 shows the flight path of the aircraft from take off at Washington Dulles

airport to the crash site at the Pentagon. Figure 2 shows the aircraft's altitude

profile for the 1 hour and 17 minute duration of the flight, and figure 3 shows the

flight path during the final maneuver before impact.

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National Transportation Safety Board Reports

American Airlines Flight 77 departed Washington Dulles at 8:20 AM (point A in

Figures 1 and 2) and reached its assigned cruising altitude of 35,000 feet at

about 8:46 AM (B). The final routine radio transmission from the flight was

received at 8:51 AM. The flight appeared normal until a deviation from the

assigned course occurred at approximately 8:55(C), when the aircraft started a

turn to the south. One minute later, radar stations stopped receiving transponder

returns from AA77. At 8:56, FAA's Indianapolis Center Air traffic control facility

attempted to contact the flight several times, with no response. By 9:00 (D) the

airplane was heading to the east, and shortly thereafter began to descend from

35,000 feet. The autopilot remained engaged during the turn, and during the

initial descent from 35,000 feet.

At approximately 9:07 AM, the airplane leveled off at 25,000 feet and made a

slight course change to the east-northeast (E). One minute later, the autopilot

was disconnected for approximately 3 minutes. During these three minutes,

heading remained steady, yet variations in altitude as low as 22,000 feet are

noted. When the autopilot was re-engaged, the airplane leveled again at 25,250

feet, and then began to descend again at 9:22 AM. At approximately 9:29 AM,

when the aircraft was approximately 35 miles west of the Pentagon, the autopilot

was disconnected (F) as the aircraft leveled near 7000 feet Slight course

changes ware initiated, during which variations in altitude between 6800 and

8000 feet were noted.

At 9:34 AM, the aircraft was positioned about 3.5 miles west-southwest of the

Pentagon, and started a right 330-degree descending turn to the right At the

end of the turn, the aircraft was at about 2000 feet altitude and 4 miles southwest

of the Pentagon. Over the next 30 seconds, power was increased to near

maximum and the nose was pitched down in response to control column

movements. The airplane accelerated to approximately 460 knots (530 miles per

hour) at impact with the Pentagon. The time of impact was 9:37:45 AM.

Chief, Vehicle Performance Division

NTSB

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8:19:20 LCW American seventy seven your departure frequency will be one two five point

zero five runway three zero cleared for take off. [lAD 1211-1226 LCW]

8:19:27 AAL-77 twenty five point five cleared for take off runway ah three zero American

seventy seven. [lAD 1211-1226 LCW]

8:20:26 LCW American seventy seven turn left heading two seven zero contact departure.

[lAD 1211-1226 LCW]

8:20:31 AAL-77 two seventy heading departure American seventy seven thanks sir good day.

[lAD 1211-1226 LCW]

8:20:43 ND American seventy seven Duties departure radar contact climb and maintain

five thousand. [lAD 1215-1230 ND]

8:20:47 AAL-77 five thousand American seventy seven. [tAD 1215-1230 ND]

8:22:05 ND American seventy seven climb and maintain one one thousand eleven

thousand. [lAD 1215-1230 ND]

8:22:08 AAL-77 up to one one thousand American seventy seven. [lAD 1215-1230 ND]

8:23:23 ND American seventy seven cleared direct LINDEN contact Dulles one one eight

point six seven. (lAD 1215-1230 ND]

8:23:28 AAL-77 direct LINDEN eighteen sixty seven American ah seventy seven -. [lAD 1215-

1230 ND]

8:23:43 AAL-77 * American ah seventy seven with you passing nine decimal one for eleven

one one thousand. [lAD 1215-1230 NH]

8:23:47 NH American seven seven Dulles approach climb maintain one seven thousand.

[lAD 1215-1230 NH]

8:23:50 AAL-77 one seven thousand American seventy seven. [tAD 1215-1230 NH]

8:25:33 NH American seventy seven contact Washington center one two zero point six

five good flight. [lAD 1215-1230 NH]

8:25:37 AAL-77 twenty six five American seventy seven thank you maam good day. [lAD

1215-1230 NH]

8:25:49 AAL-77 ah center American seventy seven with you passing one three decimal zero

for one seven thousand. [ZDC 1220-1236 05R]

8:25:57 05R American seventy seven Washington center roger climb and maintain flight

level two seven zero. PZ=C 1220-1236 05R]

8:26:00 AAL-77 two seven zero American seventy seven. [ZDC 1220-1236 05R]

8:30:38 05R American seventy seven contact Washington center one three three point two

seven. [ZDC 1220-1236 05R]

8:30:42 AAL-77 ah thirty three twenty seven American seventy seven thanks sir good day.

[ZDC 1220-1236 05R]

8:31:05 AAL-77 * American seventy seven passing two five decimal one for two seven oh.

[ZDC 1223-1246 03R]

8:31:23 03R American seventy seven ah climb, climb maintain flight level two niner zero sir.

[ZDC 1226-1246 03R]

8:31:30 AAL-77 two nine zero American seventy seven. [ZDC 1226-1246 03R]

8:34:16 03R American seventy seven turn twenty degrees right vector for your climb. [ZDC

1226-1246 03R]

8:34:19 AAL-77 turn twenty right American seventy seven. PZDO 1226-1246 03R]

8:37:31 03R American seventy seven recleared direct Charleston climb maintain cor -

correction recleared direct Henderson sir climb maintain flight level three niner

zero. [ZDC 1226-1246 03R]

8:37:39 AAL-77 direct HENDERSON out of two nine for three nine oh requesting three five zero for a final American seventy seven. [ZDC 1226-1246 03R]

8:37:55 AAL-77 center American ah seventy seven you copy request for three five zero as a final? [ZDC 1226-1246 03R]

8:37:59 03R American seventy seven ah roger maintain flight level three five zero III show

that as your flinal. [ZDC 1226-1246 03R]

8:38:03 AAL-77 ah three five zero for a final American seventy seven thank you sir. [ZDC

1226-1246 03R]

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National Transportation Saf'ty Board Reports

8:39:30 03R American seventy seven amend your altitude maintain flight level three three

zero for traffic. [ZDC 1226-1246 03R]

8:39:36 AAL-77 American seven seven stop at three three zero. [ZDC 1226-1246 03R]

8:40:03 03R American seventy seven contact Indy center one two zero point two seven.

[ZDC 1226-1246 03R]

8:40:06 AAL-77 twenty twenty seven American seventy seven thanks sir good day. [ZDC

1226-1246 03R]

8:40:13 AAL-77 center American seventy seven with you level three three zero. [ZDC 1234-

1409 HNN-R]

8:40:15 HNN-R American seventy seven Indy center roger squawk, three seven four three.

[ZDC 1234-1409 HNN-R]

8:40:19 AAL-77 three seven four three American seventy seven. [ZDC 1234-1409 HNN-R]

8:43:51 HNN-R American seventy seven climb and maintain flight level three five zero. [ZDC

1234-1409 HNN-R]

8:43:55 AAL-77 thirty three, three five oh American seventy seven. [ZDC 1234-1409 HNN-R]

8:47:16 HNN-R American seventy seven turn ten degrees to the right vectors for traffic. [ZDC

1234-1409 HNN-RI

8:47:20 AAL-77 ten right American seven seven. [ZDC 1234-1409 HNN-R]

8:50:47 HNN-R American seventy seven cleared direct ah FALMOUTH. [ZDC 1234-1409

HNN-R]

8:50:51 AAL-77 ah direct FALMOUTH American seventy seven thanks. [ZDC 1234-1409 HNNRI

8:56:32 HNN-R American seventy seven Indy. [ZDC 1234-1409 HNN-R]

8:56:46 HNN-R American seventy seven Indy. VZDC 1234-1409 HNN-R]

8:56:53 HNN-R American seventy seven American Indy. [ZDC 1234-1409 HNN-R]

8:57:12 HNN-R American seventy seven American Indy radio check how do you read? [ZDC

1234-1409 HNN-R] 8:57:27 HNN-R American ah seventy seven American radio check how do you read? [ZDC

1234-1409 HNN-R]

8:58:16 HNN-R American seventy seven Indy radio check how do you read? [ZDC 1234-1409

HNN-R]

8:58:20 DAC-RA American seventy seven center. VZDC 1249-1317 DAC-RA]

8:58:41 HNN-R American ah seventy seven ah Indy center how do you read? [ZDC 1234-

1409 HNN-R]

8:58:51 HNN-R American seventy seven Indy radio check how do you read? [ZDC 1234-1409

HNN-R]

8:59:32 DAC-RA American seventy seven center. [ZD 1249-1317 DAC-RA]

9:00:25 HNN-R American seventy seven Indy. =ZDC 1234-1409 HNN-R]

9:00:56 DAC-RA Indy center calling American seventy seven American seventy seven. [ZDC

1249-1317 DAC-RA]

9:00:56 DAC-R Indy center calling American seventy seven American seventy seven- [ZDC

1249-1317 DAC-R]

9:03:06 HNN-R American seventy seven Indy. [ZDC 1234-1409 HNN-R]

9:15:15 AAL-683 (called AAL-77 on guard at center request]. [ZDC 1249-1317 DAC-RA]

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National Transportation Sajty Board Reports

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Office of Research and Engineering

Washington, D.C. 20594

February 13, 2002

Study of Autopilot, Navigation Equipment, and Fuel Consumption Activity

Based on United Airlines Flight 93 and American Airlines Flight 77

Digital Flight Data Recorder Information

by John O'Callaghan and Daniel Bower, Ph.D.

A. SUBJECT AIRCRAFT

Location: Arlington, VA

Date: September 11, 2001

Time: 09:38 AM Eastern Daylight Time

Flight: American Airlines Flight 77

Aircraft: Boeing 757-200, registration: N644AA

NTSB#: DCA01 MA064

Location: Shanksville, PA

Date: September 11, 2001

Time: 10:03 AM Eastern Daylight Time

Flight: United Airlines Flight 93

Aircraft: Boeing 757-200, registration: N591 UA

NTSB#: DCA01 MA065

B. GROUP

American Flight 77: Daniel Bower, Ph.D.

Senior Aerospace Engineer

NTSB, RE-60

490 L'Enfant Plaza E, SW

Washington, DC 20594

United Flight 93: John O'Callaghan

National Resource Specialist - Aircraft Performance

NTSB, RE-60

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National Transportation Safety Board Reports

C. SUMMARY

This document describes information obtained from the Digital Flight Data Recorders

(DFDRs) of the subject aircraft concerning the use of the airplane autoflight and navigation

systems both before and after the hijacking events, and presents fuel on board calculations

based on the DFDR fuel flow data.

D. AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION AND ACTIVITY

Numerous parameters on the DFDRs record the status of various autopilot modes and

navigation equipment settings. Analysis of these parameters provides some indication of the

way the autopilot and navigation equipment was used by those operating the aircraft, both

before and after the hijackings.

The Boeing 757 autopilot can control both the vertical movement of the airplane (climbs,

level flight, and descents), as well as its horizontal movement (direction of flight). In addition,

the autothrottle automatically controls the engine thrust required for different maneuvers.

Taken together, the autopilot and autothrottle comprise the "autoflight" system. The manner

in which the autoflight system maneuvers the airplane is governed by different autopilot and

autothrottle "modes." In some modes, the autoflight system obtains all the information it

needs to fly the airplane from the Flight Management Computer (FMC), which has been preprogrammed (or re-programmed in flight) by the flight crew to fly the desired route at the

desired altitudes and speeds. In other modes, the autoflight system obtains required

information from the Mode Control Panel (MCP), a set of controls on the instrument panel

with which the crew specifies desired headings, altitudes, speeds, and climb or descent

rates. In general, more crew interaction is required when the autoflight system is operated

from the MCP than from the FMC, because with the MCP each change in flight condition

must be initiated by a crew input on the MCP, whereas changes in flight condition can be

pre-programmed into the FMC and so will occur automatically in modes that use the FMC for

input.

The Flight Director is an instrument that provides pitch and roll guidance to the pilot when

flying manually, by displaying "command bars" on the Attitude Direction Indicator (ADI),

which is an electronic version of an artificial horizon. The pitch and roll commands issued by

the Flight Director, if followed by the flying pilot, will result in a flight path identical to the flight

path that would be flown by the autopilot itself. This flight path is a function of the autopilot

mode, and the programming of the FMC or values set in the MCR The autoflight system

calculates the pitch and roll maneuvers that will result in the desired flight path; with the

autopilot on, the autopilot executes these pitch and roll maneuvers itself. With just the Flight

Director on, the system only provides control input guidance to the pilot, and the pilot must

make the control inputs, or the airplane will not follow the desired flight path. The Flight

Director and autopilot can both be on at the same time, or each can be on independently.

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National Transportation Saf'ty Board Reports

AAL 77 Autofliqht Activity

Figure 1 shows a time history of the various autopilot and autothrottle modes engaged on

Flight 77, from takeoff from Dulles airport to the end of the DFDR data at impact with the

Pentagon. Also shown in the Figure are the values of speeds, altitudes, headings, and

Mach that the airplane flew. The values set in the MCP by the pilots (both the American

Airlines pilots and the hijack pilots) had a recording error when recorded on the DFDR, and

could not be determined.

For most of the flight, until after the hijackers turned the airplane back towards Washington,

both the Captain's and First Officer's Flight Directors were on. During the takeoff, the

autopilot was off, and the Flight Director was issuing roll commands based on inputs made in

the MCP, and pitch commands based on inputs coming alternatively from the FMC (when in

VNAV mode) or from the MCP (when in Altitude Hold or Flight Change modes). Once the

flight was cleared to its 35,000 ft. cruising altitude, the autopilot was engaged in LNAV and

VNAV modes, which use inputs from the FMC to guide the airplane along the desired

horizontal and vertical flight path. During the ascent, and while at the cruise altitude, the right

(First Officer's) autopilot was engaged, and heading select mode was used to maneuver the

airplane horizontally.

The autothrottle was engaged throughout the initial part of the flight. During the climb the

autothrottle mode varied between climb thrust mode, airspeed hold mode, flight level change

mode, and Mach mode. Upon reaching the cruise altitudes, first at 33,000 feet, then 35,000

feet, the autothrottle switched to a Mach number hold cruise mode, applying thrust to

achieve a Mach number of 0.83.

A few minutes after the hijackers took control of the cockpit (at approximately 08:52), the

horizontal mode was changed to a heading select and the airplane began a 180-degree turn

back towards Washington. After the new heading was selected, and up until the last nine

minutes of the flight, the autopilot operated in modes that receive inputs from the MCP (i.e.,

target values of altitude, speed, and heading set directly by the operators of the aircraft)

rather than from the FMC. The autopilot was off for the last eight minutes of the flight. For

the remainder of the flight, the horizontal mode remained in heading select and the vertical

mode was operated in altitude hold, altitude, or flight level change mode. Similarly, the

autothrottle remained in either airspeed mode or mach mode, except during times of flight

level changes.

At about 09:08, after a flight level change was initiated from 25,000 feet, the First Officer's

flight director, the autopilot, and the autothrottle all disengaged. This disengagement was

concurrent with a right (First Officer's) autopilot warning. The autopilot remained off for

approximately two minutes, and then re-engaged on the left side (Captain's side). The

autopilot disengaged again, concurrent with an autopilot warning on the left side. After about

a half a minute of disengagement, the left autopilot was re-engaged and the autothrottle was

re-engaged soon after. Over the next ten minutes, the autothrottle was engaged and

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disengaged several times, while the aircraft remained at 25,000 feet, until remaining

engaged in the flight level change mode during descent from 25,000 feet.

At approximately 9:29, while at an altitude of 7000 feet and approximately 30 nautical miles

from Washington Reagan National Airport, the autopilot and autothrottle were disengaged.

These remained off during the 360-degree, descending turn to impact with the Pentagon.

UAL 93 Autoflight Activity

Figure 2 shows a time history of the various autopilot and autothrottle modes engaged on

Flight 93, from takeoff from Newark to the end of the DFDR data at impact. Also shown in

the Figure are the values of speeds, altitudes, headings, and climb/descent rates set in the

MCP, along with the values of those parameters that the airplane actually flew.

For most of the flight, until shortly after the hijackers took control of the cockpit (at

approximately 09:30), both the Captain's and First Officer's Flight Directors were on. During

the takeoff, the autopilot was off, and the Flight Director was issuing roll commands based

on inputs made in the MCP, and pitch commands based on inputs coming alternatively from

the FMC (when in VNAV mode) or from the MCP (when in Altitude Hold or Flight Change

modes). Once the flight was cleared to its 35,000 ft. cruising altitude, the autopilot was

engaged in LNAV and VNAV modes, which use inputs from the FMC to guide the airplane

along the desired horizontal and vertical flight path.

The autothrottle was engaged throughout the flight. During the climb the autothrottle mode

varied between climb thrust mode, airspeed hold mode, and flight level change mode. Upon

reaching the 35,000 cruise altitude, the autothrottle switched to a Mach number hold cruise

mode, applying thrust to achieve a Mach number of 0.82.

At about 09:33, the autoflight modes started to change. Both the Captain and First Officer's

flight directors were turned off, and at about 09:34 the autopilot was turned off briefly. After

the autopilot was reengaged (less than a minute later), up until the last three minutes of the

flight it operated in modes that receive inputs from the MCP (i.e., target values of altitude,

speed, heading, and descent rate set directly by the operators of the aircraft) rather than

from the FMC. The autopilot was off for the last three minutes of the flight.

The autothrottle switched from a Mach hold mode to an airspeed hold mode at about

9:33:30, and remained in this mode for the remainder of the flight, except for brief periods

where the airspeed was either below or above pre-set limits and the autothrottle adjusted

thrust in an attempt to correct the situation (these are the MIN SPD and SPD LIMIT modes).

From 09:33 to the time the autopilot was turned off (about 10:00), the airplane was

maneuvered horizontally via the heading select and heading hold modes, with the desired

heading set on the MCP. The bottom graph in Figure 2 shows the magnetic heading

selected in the MCP was 120 degrees, and also shows the airplane turning towards that

heading. From the airplane's position at this point, a magnetic heading of 120 degrees

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National Transportation Sajicty Board Reports

would put the airplane on course for Washington, D.C.. At 09:57, the heading selected in the

MCP is changed to 90 degrees. About half a minute later, the autopilot switches from

heading hold to heading select modes, and the airplane turns to the 90 degree heading

selected in the MCR

From 09:33 to the time the autopilot was turned off, the airplane was maneuvered vertically

using the vertical speed and altitude hold modes. In the vertical speed mode, the desired

rate of climb or descent is set in the MCP. In altitude hold mode, the airplane maintains the

altitude at which the altitude hold mode button on the MCP is pressed. As shown in Figure

2, initially the vertical speed selected was about +1,500 ft/min, and the airplane climbed

accordingly. Interestingly, at the same time, the altitude selected in the MCP was 9,600 feet

(lower than the current airplane altitude). At about 09:38 the autopilot entered altitude hold

mode at 40,700 feet. A couple of minutes later, the autopilot re-entered vertical speed mode,

with a descent rate of -4,200 feet/minute selected in the MCP, and the airplane started to

descend. At about 09:47, this descent rate in the MCP was adjusted to about -1,300

feet/minute. At around the same time, the altitude set in the MCP was adjusted to about

5,000 feet. This suggests that the intent of the operators may have been to descend to 5,000

feet.

At about 10:00, the autopilot was turned off, and remained off for the remaining three

minutes of the flight.

D. NAVIGATION SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION AND ACTIVITY

The Boeing 757 keeps track of its own position using the Inertial Navigation System (INS),

which uses acceleration sensors to calculate the motion of the airplane over the ground. The

INS position calculation is periodically updated and corrected using data from ground based

radio navigation stations, called "very high frequency omnirange stations" (VORs). By tuning

a receiver to the signals broadcast from a VOR, the bearing from the airplane to the VOR

can be determined. Tuning in two or more stations and knowing the positions of each, a fix

of the airplane position can be obtained.

The 757 has two VOR receivers. The crew can manually tune each of these receivers to a

desired station (provided the station is in range), and view the airplane's bearing relative to

the station on a special display mode on the Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator (EHSI).

This mode is most often used when the crew wants to fly either towards or away from the

selected VOR station, along a specific bearing or "radial" to or from the station. In other

modes, the airplane will automatically tune in VOR stations along the airplane's route in

order to obtain position fixes. The system generally selects stations whose bearings from the

airplane differ by about 90 degrees; this configuration results in the most accurate position

fixes.

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AAL 77 Navigation System Activity

Figure 3 shows the VOR stations tuned to by the two VOR receivers on American Flight 77.

The EFIS mode determines the type of display shown on the EHSI. During the initial part of

the flight, the EFIS is in "MAP" mode. In this mode, the EHSI displays an airplane symbol

pointed towards the top of the display, with the magnetic heading and track shown in a partial compass rose at the top of the display. Various points of interest - VOR stations,

fixes, airports, and so on - can be displayed in their correct position relative to the airplane.

The planned and projected route of flight can also be displayed in the MAP mode. The

range of the MAP mode can be adjusted from 5 miles to 160 nautical miles, depending on

the detail or scale of map required. At about 09:08:20, the display switched to VOR mode; in

this mode, the EHSI displays the airplane's angular deviation or position relative to a

specified radial from the selected VOR.

The points during the flight at which the VOR receivers were tuned to new frequencies are

shown on the map in Figure 2 as yellow diamonds. The points shown occur after the

hijackers took control of the cockpit. Lines from the airplane flight path to the stations

indicate the VOR stations tuned by the left and right VOR receivers. The point on the flight

path from which the lines originate are the points at which the station was first tuned, i.e., the

points at which the VOR station frequency selected by each receiver changed.

Note that while the EFIS was initially in MAP mode, the left and right VOR receivers were

tuned to stations whose bearings from the airplane differed by about 90 degrees, at the time

at which the VOR station pairs were changed. This illustrates the method the system uses

for obtaining VOR position fixes to update the INS.

During the turn back to the east, the frequency of the right VOR receiver was set to 111.0

MHz, corresponding to the VOR station located at Washington Reagan National Airport

(DCA). At the time the DCA frequency was selected, the station was too far away for its

signals to be received by the receiver. The right VOR receiver remained tuned to the DCA

VOR for the remainder of the flight, except for a 1-minute period at 9:15. The left VOR

receiver was tuned to various frequencies, but was tuned to 113.5 (AML in Herndon, VA near Dulles Airport) at approximately 9:08. At approximately 9:18, the left distance measuring

equipment (DME) began receiving information from the AML VOR. After receiving the DME

signal, the airplane remained on a constant heading towards the Washington area. At 9:32,

both VOR receivers were tuned to the DCA VOR.

UAL 93 Navigation System Activity

Figure 4 shows the VOR stations tuned to by the two VOR receivers on United Flight 93. At

the bottom of the Figure, the EFIS mode is shown. For most of the fight, the EFIS is in

"MAP" mode.

As in Figure 3, the points during the flight at which the EFIS mode switched to MAP mode

and then to VOR mode are shown on the map in Figure 4 as yellow diamonds. The VOR

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National Tra•sportationi Sajity Board Reports

stations tuned by the left and right VOR receivers are indicated by lines from the airplane

flight path to the stations. The point on the flight path from which the lines originate are the

points at which the station was first tuned.

As with Flight 77, while the EFIS was in MAP mode, the left and right VOR receivers were

tuned to stations whose bearings from the airplane differed by about 90 degrees, at the time

at which the VOR station pairs were changed. Again, this illustrates the method the system

uses for obtaining VOR position fixes to update the INS.

Shortly after the EFIS was switched to VOR mode, the frequency of the left VOR receiver

was set to 111.0 MHz, corresponding to the VOR station located at Washington Reagan

National Airport (DCA). At the time the DCA frequency was selected, the station was too far

away for its signals to be received by the receiver. If DCA VOR had been in range, the

display on the EHSI could have been used to show the airplane's position relative to an

inbound radial to DCA, and thus help navigate the airplane towards DCA. The selection of

the DCA VOR frequency in the airplane's left VOR receiver suggests that the operators of

the airplane had an interest in DCA, and may have wanted to use that VOR station to help

navigate the airplane towards Washington.

The magnetic heading of 120 degrees selected in the autopilot MCP was the correct

heading for flying to Washington. However, even though the EFIS was in the MAP mode at

the time, it was in the 80 nautical mile range setting, and so would not have shown DCA on

the display; consequently, it is unlikely that the hijackers used the map display on the EHSI

to deduce the correct heading for Washington. It follows that the hijackers had some other

means of obtaining this heading.

A surprising element in the navigation of flight 93 is the rapid descent from cruise altitudes

while still approximately 260 nautical miles from the (presumed) target. If the hijacker's

destination was Washington, they started their descent very prematurely. Figure 5 compares

the descent profiles of all four airplanes hijacked on September 11. Note that by the time

AAL 11, UAL 175, and AAL 77 descended below 5,000 feet, they were all within 10 NM of

their targets. UAL 93, on the other hand, descended to 5,000 feet while still 135 NM from

Washington.

E. FUEL CONSUMPTION AND FUEL REMAINING CALCULATIONS

AAL 77 Fuel Consumption

Figure 6 shows AAL flight 77's fuel flow to each engine as recorded by the DFDR, and the

sum of these, equal to the total fuel flow. By integrating the total fuel flow with time, the

amount of fuel consumed throughout the flight can be calculated. Subtracting the fuel

consumed from the initial fuel load then gives the amount of fuel remaining, as shown in the

bottom plot of Figure 6.

224
National Transportation Saqfrty Board Reports

Based on ACARS transmissions to the airplane, the fuel load on the airplane when on the

ramp was 48983 lbs. This results in about 36,200 lb. of fuel remaining upon impact with the

Pentagon (the end of the DFDR data).

UAL 93 Fuel Consumption

Figure 7 shows fuel flow and fuel remaining for UAL Flight 93, calculated in the same way as

just described for AAL Flight 77.

Based on ACARS transmissions to the airplane, the fuel load on takeoff was 48,700 lb. This

results in about 37,500 lb. of fuel remaining upon impact (the end of the DFDR data). If

instead of descending to about 5,000 feet over Pennsylvania, Flight 93 had continued

cruising at 35,000 feet to Washington, it would have arrived over Washington with about

35,500 lb. of fuel on board.

John O'Callaghan

Daniel Bower, Ph.D.

225
List of Abbreviations

ACFD Arlington County Fire Department

ACPD Arlington County Police Department

AFIP Armed Forces Institute of Pathology

AFME Armed Forces Medical Examiner

AOC Army Operations Center

BOCC Building Operations Command Center

BUPERS Bureau of Naval Personnel

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DoD Department of Defense

DPS Defense Protective Service

ECC Emergency Communications Center

EMS Emergency Medical Services

EOC Emergency Operations Center

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

GSA General Services Administration

ICS Incident Command System

IMCEN Information Management Support Center

IRT Initial Reconnaissance Team
List oj Abbreviations

IST Incident Support Team

JOC Joint Operations Center

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force

MDW Military District of Washington

MWAA Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority

NCC Navy Command Center

NCIS Naval Criminal Investigative Service

NCRS National Capital Response Squad

NEADS Northeast Air Defense Sector

NMCC National Military Command Center

NMRT National Medical Response Team

(Department of Health and Human Services)

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command

NTSB National Transportation Safety Board

ODCSPER U.S. Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff

for Personnel

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PAC Pentagon Athletic Center

PENREN Pentagon Renovation Program Office

PFAC Pentagon Family Assistance Center

PFARRO Pentagon Family Assistance Resources

and Referral Office

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

RDF Remote Delivery Facility

RE&F Real Estate and Facilities

RSW U.S. Army Resource Services-Washington

SCIF Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility

SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics

US&R Urban Search and Rescue

WHS Washington Headquarters Services

228
Notes

Certain conventions-abbreviations and short forms of titles-have

been used to save space. For filler identification of sources, including complete

information about interviews and published works, readers may consult the

bibliography.

I. TARGET: THE PENTAGON

1. Except where otherwise indicated the following description of the Pentagon is drawn from Goldberg,

The Pentagon: The First Fifty Years. Supplementary information is derived from e-mail Dr. Georgine

Glatz (Chief Engineer, Pentagon Renovation and Construction Program Office) to Alfred Goldberg,

10 Oct 06.

2. Office of the Secretary of Defense, A Status Report to the Congress on the Renovation of the Pentagon, I

Mar 91, 4-7 (these annual reports will hereafter be referred to as OSD, Status Report, with the date);

ibid, 1 Mar 95, 6-12; ibid, 1 Mar 02, 13.

3. Defense Authorization Act for FY 1991 (PL 101-510) Sec 2804, 5 Nov 90; DoD Appropriation Act, FY

1995 (PL 103-335), Sec. 8149, 30 Sep 94; Engineering News-Record, 4 Sep 00, 58.

4. OSD, Status Report, 1 Mar 02,3,6,25,56-57,80; ibid, 1 Mar 00, 51, 85; ibid, 1 Mar 01, 14,90-91; email Neal A. Shelly to Alfred Goldberg, 4 Aug 05.

5. "Building Performance Evaluation, The 9-11 Terrorist Attack--Pentagon"' (hereafter "PENREN

Report"), 6:3-4; OSD, Status Report, 1 Mar 00, 4, 51, 84; ibid, 1 Mar 02, 19; interv Evey, 22 Oct 01,

14.

6. OSD, Status Report, 1 Mar 02,4, 28,45; ibid, 1 Mar 00, 73.

7. 9/11 Commission Report, 60-61,68-70,71, 190.

8. Ibid, 223-31, 252-53; indictment, United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui (E. D. Va., Dec 01),

8-9, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/moussaouiindictment.htm.

9. 9-11 Commission Report, 1-8, 32.

10. Ibid, 17, 20-22, 285.
Notes to Pages 10-29

11. Ibid, 10-14, 32-33.

12. Ibid, 4, 278, 285.

13. Ibid, 33; Prepared Statement of Monte R. Belger to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks

upon the United States, 9-11 Commission Hearings, 17 Jun 04, 2, http://www.91 lcommission.gov/

hearings/hearingI 2/belger-statement.pdf.

14. 9-11 Commission Report, 2-3, 8-9, 33, 225; 9-11 Commission, "The Four Flights," staff statement no.

4, 5, http://www.9-4 commission.gov/staff statements/index.htm#statements. A passenger on the

plane, Barbara Olson, wife of U.S. Solicitor General Theodore Olson, called her husband and told him

of being herded to the rear of the plane; see Tim O'Brien,"Wife of Solicitor General Alerted Him of

Hijacking from Plane," 12 Sep 01, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/pentagon.olson/index.

html.

15. 9/11 Commission Report, 33-34, 27-28.

16. Ibid, 37, 39; Center for Cooperative Research, "Context of 8:30 a.m., Rookie in Command of the

NMCC;' 9/11 timeline at http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp.iteem=a830rookienmcc;

"Statement of Captain Charles J. Leidig, Jr., before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks

upon the United States, 9-11 Commission Hearings,' 17Jun 04, http://www.9-1 lcommission.

gov/hearings/hearingl2/leidig-statement.pdf;"PENREN Report," 2:1 (msg); Rossow, Uncommon

Strength, 12.

17. ACPD Incident Reports (Witness Section) filed by Barry Foust and Richard Cox, 11 Sep 01, DepChief Holl ACPD; telcon Foust and Nancy Berlage, 3 Aug 06; telcon Cox and Nancy Berlage, 28 Jul

06.

18. Interv Rabogliatti, 5 Nov 01, 1; interv Chiarelli, 5 Feb 02, 15.

19. American Society of Civil Engineers, The Pentagon Building Performance Report (hereafter ASCE

Report), 12-14, 18.

20. Gross, "9/11 and Operation Noble Eagle," 7-8.

21. ASCE Report, 20.

22. Ibid, 12.

23. Ibid, 20,40;"PENREN Report;' 2:8.

24. ASCE Report, 28, 34, 37;"PENREN Report," 2:2.

25. "PENREN Report:' 2:9, 6:15-16; interv Pugrud, 1 Nov 01, 3; interv Perez, 10 Oct 01, 9; interv K.

Cox, 2 Aug 02, 6; ASCE Report, 40; interv Powell, 29 Oct 01, 9; DoD,"Flight Data and Cockpit

Voice Recorders Found," news release 425-01, 14 Sep 01, http://www.defeinselink.mil; FBI Evidence

Response Team, Penttbom, First Floor-West Graphic w/atchd list of dead, 26 Nov 01, AttOfc EDVa.

26. ASCE Report, 58; "PENREN Report," 6:4,9-12; e-mail Dr. Georgine Glatz to Alfred Goldberg, 27;

Paul Jackson, edJane' All the Worlds Aircraft, 2000-2001, 622,627; ASCE Report, 50.

II. THE DEADLY STRIKE

1. OSD, Status Report, 1 Mar 02,4.

2. "Arlington County After-Action Report;' B-15.

3. September 11, 2001, Bios on Victims, OSD Hist. There is no attribution of compiler or date.

4. Pets acct Collier, 13 Sep 01.

5. "PENREN Report," 1:2, 3.

6. Interv Boger, 14 Nov 01, 10-15.

7. IntervJaworski, 11 Dec 01, 2, 7, 10-13, 19.

8. Interv Moody, 13 Sep 01, 2-7.

9. Donna St. George,"Pentagon Survivor Wounds are Slow to Heal;' Washington Post, 11 Sep 03, 1;

Greg Zoroya,"The Cruzes, Injured at the Pentagon,Juan Cruz Santiago;' USA Today, 11 Sep 02, D4.

10. Donna St. George,"Hope Breathes Beneath Wounds.' Washington Post, 2 Dec 01, 1; Donna St.

George,"Alive, But Not As She Was." Washington Post, 10 Sep 02, 1.

11. See Appendix A; interv Hudson, 25 Feb 02, 9-11.

230
Notes to Pages 30-49

12. Interv Gallop, 31 Oct 01, 7-17.

13. "Navy Command Center Pull Together:' unpaginated manuscript (see sections,"The Survivors" and

"Schematic"), Nay Hist. The dimensions of the Command Center are computed from the Schematic.

14. Interv McKeown, 25 Oct 01, 2-7.

15. Interv Shaeffer, 21 Jun 02, 3-9,15-17, 22, 24,29, 36.

16. Interv Lhuillier, 13 Dec 01, 2-3, 5-6, 9-17; interv Capets, 2 Nov 01, 17.

17. Interv Lhuillier, 10-14; interv Cole, 6 Dec 01, 8-9; interv Capers, 10-14, 17; interv Humbert, 4Jan 02,

7-9.

18. Interv Gully, 6 Dec 01, 3-5; interv Polasek, 6 Dec 01, 5-6; interv Cole, 7-8.

19. See Appendix A.

20. Agency Space Allocation Diagram, Floor One, Pre-9-11-01, PENREN Office; interv Gonzales, 13

Feb 02, 2, 6-9, 13.

21. Interv Cordero, 4 Mar 02, 3-6, 8-9, 11; interv Gonzales, 18-19, 26, 28; Lewis A. Prombain

(DIA),"Recognition of Heroic Acts;' w/atchmt, nd, OSD Hist.

22. Interv Morrison, in"PENREN Report:'2:21-22.

23. Ibid, 2:23-24.

24. Rossow, Uncommon Strength, iv-v, viii-ix, xii; "PENREN Report,' 6:14-15.

25. "PENREN Report;' 6:6-8, 17.

26. Interv Parham, 4 Dec 01, 4-14.

27. Interv Zappalla, 9 Oct 01, 2-6.

28. Interv Olaes, 13 Sep 01, 3-6; interv Petrovich, 21 Sep 01, 5-9; Rossow, Uncommon Strength, 34-36, 38-

39.

29. Interv Grant, 26 Feb 02, 32-40; interv Maxfield, 16 Nov 01, 4-8, 13-14; interv Rose, 23 Jan 02, 9-16;

Rossow, Uncommon Strength, 38, 43-44.

30. "PENREN Report" 6:15.

31. Rossow, Uncommon Strength, 39-40; pers acct McNair, 29 Oct 01, 1.

32. Interv Wills, 12Jul02, 3-4; interv Stevens, 13 Dec 01, 3-4; interv Grunewald, 2 Nov 01, 3.

33. Interv Grunewald, 4-13, 20-21; interv Carden, 29 Oct 01, 3-14.

34. Rossow, Uncommon Strength, 41,49.

35. Interv Wills, 4-8; interv Stevens, 6-8; pers acct McNair, 1-2.

36. Interv Petrovich, 21 Sep 01, 8-12; interv Petrovich, 1 Nov 01, 23-26; interv Stevens, 12; interv Wills,

16-17.

37. Interv Beans, 6 Nov 01, 1-2, 5-6, 8-18, 21, 27.

38. Rossow, Uncommon Strength (Appendix A has pictures of 29 victims; Appendix B lists names of

injured).

39. Interv Birdwell, 7 Mar 02, 5, 7, 9-11, 13-15, 24; interv Knoblauch, 28 Nov 01, 9-10; pets acct R. Wallace, nd, 1; interv Menig, 14 Feb 02,7-9.

40. Interv Wood, 1 Mar 02, 11-15; interv Eikenberry, 6 Feb 02, 5-6.

41. Interv Wood, 16-21; interv Eikenberry, 7-10.

42. Interv Kensinger, 2 Aug 02, 26; FBI Evidence Response Team, Penttbom, First Floor-West Graphic

w/archd list of dead, 26 Nov 01, AttOfc EDVa; September 11, 2001, Bios on Victims, OSD Hist.

43. Interv P. Murphy, 19 Sep 01,4-10.

44. Interv Zitterkopf, 27 Nov 01, 4-7.

45. Interv Livingstone, 19 Feb 02,2-6; interv Kern, 24Jan 02, 3-6.

46. Interv Livingstone, 5-6; interv Kern, 7-10; interv Crane Group #1, 25 Feb 02,8-10.

47. Interv Livingstone, 6-8; interv Kern, 8; interv Wirick, 27Jun 02, 3-4; interv Crane Group #2, 25 Feb

02, 17-18.

48. Interv Kern, 8-9; interv Livingstone, 7-8; interv Wirick, 4-6, 25; interv Crane Group #2, 14, 16, 17-18;

"PENREN Report;' 6:12.

49. Interv Braswell, 30 Oct 01, 2-7; interv Kern, 9-14; interv Livingstone, 8-14; interv Crane Group #1,

29; interv Crane Group #2,21-24.

231
Notes to Pages 49-65

50. "Arlington County After-Action Report," A- 13; interv Combs, 11 July 05, 11.

III. THE RESCUERS

1. Interv White, 19 Apr 02, 14-15; interv Gray, Gibbs, and Smith, 3 Feb 06,3-4; intervT. Hodge, 30 Oct

01, 8; intervJackson, 7Jan 02, 12. Chief Smith was known by both names,Jerome and Dale.

2. Interv Schwartz, 17 Apr 02, 41-44.

3. Interv Perrin, 1 Nov 01, 6-7, 9-14; interv S. Kelly, 1 Nov 01, 5-7; interv Oliver, 31 Oct 01, 8, 10-22,

32.

4. Interv Schuetz, 13 Sep 01, 5-8, 10-14; interv Vera, 20 Sep 01, 4-5, 7-18, 21; interv P. K. Carlton, 4

Dec 01, 11.

5. Interv Schuetz, 8; interv Lirette, 30 Nov 01, 13.

6. Interv Tarantino, 25 Sep 01 (corrected transcript), 1, 3-5.

7. Interv Thomas, 23 Jan 02, 5-6; interv Lirerte, 7-10; interv Tarantino, 4-5; interv Powell, 29 Oct 01, 2,

4,6, 10; interv P. K. Carlton, 21-22.

8. Interv Powell, 5-9; interv K. Cox, 5-8; interv P. K. Carlton, 13.

9. Interv Tarantino, 5.

10. Interv Henson, 23 Jan 02, 5-9; interv C. Lewis, 25 Apr 02, 4-7.

11. Interv Thomas, 9-10; interv Tarantino, 5; interv Powell, 11-12.

12. Interv Tarantino, 6-7; interv Thomas, 11-12; interv Henson, 10; interv P. K. Carlton, 12-13.

13. Interv Henson, 11; interv Tarantino, 6-7; interv Thomas, 12-13; interv Powell, 12-13; interv P. K.

Carlton, 11-13.

14. Interv Knoblauch, 28 Nov 01, 6-9; pers acct R. Wallace, 1; interv McKinnon, nd, 3-7; interv Davies,

12 Dec 01, 4; interv Richon, 27 Nov 01, 5.

15. Interv McKinnon, 8-9; interv Knoblauch, 9-10; interv Birdwell, 7 Mar 02, 14-15. For an account of

Birdwells ordeal, see Chapter II.

16. Interv McKinnon, 11, 15; interv Knoblauch, 10; interv Baxter, 30 Nov 01, 5-8; interv Birdwell, 18-19;

interv Wassel, 9 Apr 03, 17.

17. Interv Ogletree, 29Jan 02,4-6; interv Birdwell, 20, 22,42.

18. Interv Davies, 5-6; interv Knoblauch, 10-11; pers acct R. Wallace, 1; interv McKinnon, 12-15.

19. Interv Thurman, 20 Sep 01, 2, 5-6,8-12, 13-16, 23; interv Knoblauch, 11; interv Davies, 6-7; pers accr

R. Wallace, 1.

20. Interv Davies, 7-8; interv Knoblauch, 11-12; interv McKinnon, 14-19, 21; interv Balisle, 28Jun 02, 7-

8.

21. Interv Perez, 10 Oct 01, cover sheer, 6-7.

22. Interv Balisle, 5-7.

23. 'Arlington County After-Action Report;' A-22-23; interv Toti, 10 Oct 01, 1-2, 14, 17, 19-21; interv

Combs, 9.

24. Interv Rumsfeld, 23 Dec 02, 5-7; interv Wassel, 19-20; Video Rcd, WUSA 9,9:41 a.m. to 10:55 a.m.

25. Interv Leibner, 23 Jan 02, passim.

26. Interv Combs, 11-12; "Arlington County After-Action Report,' A-30, C-46; ACPD"Incident History

Detail;' 11 Sep 01, entries 10:41:31 and 10:42:55, DepChief Holl ACPD.

IV. FIGHTING THE FIRE

I. Lilly and Walz,"Tower Terror," Pentaram, 16 Nov 01, 1;"Washington's Heroes,' New,suweek web exclusive, 29 Sep 01, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3069699/; interv A. Wallace, 30 Oct 01, 36-38;

interv Skipper, 30 Oct 01, 3; interv Boger, 5; interv Garofola, 20 Sep 01, 31; interv Valenzo, 30 Oct 01,

6-7; interv Pollygus, 8 Nov 01, 2, 10, 13-14; interv Kidd, 14 Nov 01, 2, 4-5; interv Suvari, 9 Apr 02,

21-22; interv P. Murphy, 11; telcon Maj Damien Marsh (co-pilot of Marine One on 9-11) and Nancy

Berlage, 7 Jul 06; relcon Mai Brian Foley (pilot of second Marine helicopter accompanying POTUS)

232
Notes to Pages 65-70

and Nancy Berlage, 6 Jul 06; telcon Charles Campbell (Chief FMMCFD) and Nancy Berlage, 13 Apr

06; e-mail Sgt Bobby M. Thomas (PFPA) to Diane Putney, 20 Apr 06. The president had taken off

from the Pentagon Heliport on 10 September on his way to Florida. The South Lawn of the White

House was unavailable for helicopter usage due to a special event; see Patrick Gavin,"The Day Before;'

Washington Post, 5 Sep 04.

2. Interv A. Wallace, 6-7, 36-38, 43 (quote, 7); interv Skipper, 3; interv Valenzo, 7; facsimile A. Wallace

to Kelly, 17 Sep 03, w/atchmt, ACFD.

3. Interv A. Wallace 7-10; interv Skipper, 3-4; interv Schwartz, 112, described the initial fireball as burning fuel; interv Kidd, 6-8; Lilly and Walz,"Tower Terror;' 2; interv Boger, 12-14.

4. "Arlington County After-Action Report;' A-4; interv Skipper, 5; interv Gilroy, 30 Oct 01, 10; interv A.

Wallace, 8-12, 14.

5. Interv Skipper, 6, 8; interv A. Wallace, 20; William Toti, "Six Thousand Antoinettes;' nd, Nay Hist;

interv Toti, 10 Oct 01, 14-16 (quotes, 16); Toti"One Year Later Frozen in Time;' 37.

6. Interv A. Wallace, 12-19, 40; interv Leibner, 10-11; interv Skipper, 5; Ward,'Attack on the Pentagon,"

24; interv Afforder, 30 Oct 01, 14-15; interv Hamlet, 26 Feb 02, 16; interv Reardon, 20 Oct 01, 10;

interv Bruno, 15 Apr 02, 12-14; interv Cruz-Cortez, 21 Feb 02, 13-15.

7. Interv Afforder, 3; interv Valenzo, 7; Ward,"Attack on the Pentagon;' 33.

8. Ward, 'Attack on the Pentagon, 25; on ECC general operations, relcon Capt Michelle Nuneville

(Arlington ECC) and Nancy Berlage, 9 Dec 05; "Arlington County After-Action Report;' 9, 44, A-4,

34-35,44, C-26; ACPD Incident Reports filed by Barry Foust, Richard Cox, and Ralph D. Rice,Jr., 11

Sep 01, DepChief Holl ACPD; telcon Richard Cox and Nancy Berlage, 28 Jul 06; telcon Barry Foust

and Nancy Berlage, 3 Aug 06; e-mail John Lisle (Media Relations, ACPD) to Nancy Berlage, 4 Aug

06, w/atchmt digital recording,"Excerpt Released to Public of Arlington ECC Police Response Tape,

11 Sep 01' Arlington ECC.

9. A hospitality room fire was reported at 1001 Wilson Boulevard in the Rosslyn neighborhood. Arlington ECC Fire Dispatch Recording, 11 Sep 01, Arlington ECC;'Arlington County After-Action

Report: A-4-5, 7, 9, 34; Ward,'Attack on the Pentagon;' 25; interv Burroughs, 5 Dec 01, abstract, 2;

interv, Schwartz, 14-15.

10. Ward,"Attack on the Pentagon," 33; 'Arlington County After-Action Report;" A-44; interv Owens, 20

Mar 02, 23,27 (quote, 23).

11. Interv Valenzo, 10-12; interv Gilroy, 14;'Arlington County After-Action Report;' A-6-7; interv

Schwartz, 16, 19-20; interv White, 7; Ward,'Attack on the Pentagon;' 25; interv Gray, Gibbs, and

Smith, 2; e-mail Derek Spector (Truck 105 ACFD) to Nancy Berlage, 18 Aug 06; telcon Capt Steve

McCoy (Eng 101 ACFD) and Nancy Berlage, 17 Aug 06.

12. Brewster, "Belvoir Firefighter among First Responders at Pentagon;' 1; interv Valenzo, 3, 9-10 (quote,

9); interv Afforder, 5; interv Gilroy, 9-11; interv Surette, 30 Oct 01, 3-4; interv Ladd, 30 Oct 01, 11,

12.

13. Interv Reardon, 8-9 (quote); Lilly and Walz, "Local Heroes: FMMC Fire Department Reflects on

Attacks;' 4.

14. Interv Ladd, 12-13; interv Surette, 7-8; interv T. Hodge, 6 (quote); interv Valenzo, 13; interv Reardon, 9; e-mail Michael Thayer (FMMCFD) to Nancy Berlage, 1 May 06, w/atchmt, "Chart of Ft.

Myer Firefighters Names and Assignments on 11 Sept 01"; interv Valenzo, 10-11. Many individuals

described the day's scenes as resembling a movie: see for example interv Howes, 3 Dec 01, 9, 23; interv

Thumann and Zegowitz, 20 Dec 01, 16; interv Tinsley, 20 Dec 01, digital recording.

15. Interv Ladd, 12-15; interv Valenzo, 11-12; interv Reardon, 9-13; interv Wallace, 31; interv T. Hodge,

4-6; interv Surette, 8-9.

16. Interv Valenzo, 21; interv Gilroy, 10-18, 21 (quote, 16); Brewster, "Belvoir Firefighter among First

Responders at Pentagon;' 2.

17. Interv Defina, 3 Dec 01, 4-5; interv Durrer, 3 Dec 01, 4-5.

18. Interv Defina, 3-6; interv Howes, 4; interv Durrer, 6-12, 26 (quotes, 6, 7, 26); e-mails Capt Michael

Defina to Nancy Berlage, 14, 24 Aug 06.

233
Notes to Pages 70-79

19. Interv Henry, 5 Dec 01, digital recording; interv Durrer, 11-12.

20. Interv Defina, 4,6-9; interv Durrer, 27; Ward,'Attack on the Pentagon,' 24;'Arlington County AfterAction Report;' A-6; MWAA Fire Response radio transmissions, 11 Sep 01, MWAA.

21. Interv A. Thompson, 12 Dec 01, abstract, 2; interv Thumann and Zegowitz, 12-13; interv Martin, 12

Dec 01, 2-6, 9 (quote, 6); MWAA Fire Response radio transmissions, 11 Sep 01.

22. Interv Schwartz, 9-15 (quotes, 9, 13, 14).

23. The agreement was The Greater Metropolitan Washington Area Fire/Rescue Services Mutual Aid

Operations Plan (2001). See telcon Calvin Smith (Metropolitan Washington COGs) and Nancy Berlage, 12 Apr 06; interv Plaugher, 22 Apr 02, 83-85; interv Schwartz, 35-36; interv Gray, Gibbs, and

Smith, 33; interv Owens, 9.

24. Interv Schwartz, 16; 'Arlington County After-Action Report;' A-20; interv Eberhart, 15 Jan 02, 7-8;

interv Combs, 9-10; interv Jester, 31 Jan 06, 2-4. For explanation of the ICS see course materials at

the National Wildfire Coordinating Group website, http://nwcg.gov/online.html; http://www.training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/ICS Resource/index.htm; and Kane, "The Incident Command System

and the Concept of Unified Command at a Terrorist Incident" On the Department of Defense's relationship with the incident command system in 2001 compared with the present, see Joint Chiefs of

Staff.Joint Pub 3-08: Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, vol 1, 9 Oct 96: 2:7-10, and

Joint Chiefs of StafJoint Pub 3-08: Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental

Organization Coordination DuringJoint Operations, vol 1, 17 Mar 06, iii, 2:7-11. Presidential Decision

Directive 39, as modified by subsequent provisions, specifies national policy regarding terrorism and

assigns specific missions to designated federal departments and agencies; see unclassified synopsis at

Department of Justice, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/pdd39.htm.

25. Interv Schwartz, 24, 31; interv Combs, 5; 'Arlington County After-Action Report;' A-23-24.

26. 'Arlington County After-Action Report," A-6, 21, 23, 25-26; interv Schwartz, 16, 32-35, 53-54; interv

Gray, Gibbs, and Smith, 32.

27. Interv Gray, Gibbs, and Smith, 15-16, 26, 28.

28. Interv Combs, 1, 6-7; interv Schwartz, 25-26, 39; U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism, 3.

29. "Final Report: The Role of the Volunteer Fire Service in the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks";

interv Smoot, 5 Dec 01, tape recording; interv Cayer, 29 Nov 01, tape recording.

30. Interv Plaugher, 4, 10,13-14,35-36 (quote, 36);'Arlingron County After-Action Report,"A-21; interv

Kelley, 19 Apr 02,8.

31. Interv Plaugher, 14-16; interv Burchell, 20 Nov 01, 12; interv Bohn, 19 Nov 01, 8.

32. Different groups experienced problems of varying degree, depending on location, department, and

type of radio. In the A&E Division, Chief Smith found that the D.C. units lacked functional radios,

while Chief Gray and Captain Gibbs had little difficulty communicating with Arlington firefighters.

Several officers believed the greatest problem was not faulty or incompatible equipment, but that too

many people tried to use the same radio channels simultaneously: interv G. M. Thompson, 30 Oct 01,

10; interv Gray, Gibbs, and Smith, 4, 7, 15; interv Gilroy, 17; interv Ladd, 15-16.

33. Interv T. Hodge, 10 (quote); interv Defina, 22; interv Valenzo, 19-20 (quote); on chaos, interv Gilroy,

26; interv Gray, Gibbs, and Smith, 7-8; interv G. M. Thompson, 10.

34. Interv Defina, 13-14, 22; interv Ramsey, 30 Nov 01, 22; Eversburg,"The Pentagon Attack on 9-11;'

7.

35. Interv Ladd, 17; interv Defina, 14; Gilroy recalls that before the collapse, some of his units were able

to enter via Corridor 4 and go toward the blast site (see interv Gilroy, 20-21); interv Gray, Gibbs, and

Smith, 6; interv Valenzo, 13-14.

36. Interv T. Hodge, 8; interv Ladd, 19; interv Reardon, 15.

37. Interv Hood, 5 Dec 01, digital recording; interv M. Murphy, 5 Dec 01, abstract, 2.

38. Interv Howes, 14-16; interv M. Murphy, abstract, 2; interv Thumann and Zegowitz, 23.

39. Interv Schwartz, 44; on staggering, interv Defina, 13; interv Gray, Gibbs, and Smith, 5; interv Howes,

12-14; interv Reardon, 18.

234
Notes to Pages 79-85

40. Interv Kuney and McGuire, 26 Oct 01, 16; interv Ladd, 14; "PENREN Report:' 2:13-14; interv

Howes, 12; interv Reardon, 11, 14; interv Bryant, 31 Oct 01, 10; interv Carter, 19 Nov 01, 11; interv

Conques, 25 Oct 01, 4; interv Morris, 05 Dec 01, 4, 12; interv Viner and Kelly, 25 Oct 01, 8; interv

Durrer, 13, 18; interv Henry, digital recording; interv Defina, 12.

41. Interv Reardon, 14; interv Defina, 6, 12; interv Durrer, 12-13; interv Howes, 5-6, 9-12; interv Valenzo,

15.

42. Interv Valenzo, 14, 21; interv Gray, Gibbs, and Smith, 19; interv Gilroy, 15-16 (quote, 15); interv A.

Wallace, 23,25-26,30; interv G. M. Thompson, 10-11.

43. Interv Gray, Gibbs, and Smith, 2-4, 7-8, 11-12, 24; interv Gilroy, 24.

44. Interv Combs, 10-11; interv T. Hodge, 8-9 (quote); interv A. Wallace, 23-24; interv Gray, Gibbs, and

Smith, 27; interv Schwartz, 45; Arlington ECC Fire Dispatch Recording, 11 Sep 01.

45. ASCE Report, 10, 28, 35, 39, 58; Titus, "Shoring," 10, Fig 9; "PENREN Report;' 2:7; e-mail Dr.

Georgine Glatz to Alfred Goldberg, 30 Dec 05.

46. Interv Valenzo, 14; interv Gilroy, 20-21; interv Afforder, 10; interv Reardon, 16; interv Gray, Gibbs,

and Smith, 6-7; on pancaking, interv Durrer, 16 (quote) and interv Martin, 25-26; interv Henry, digital recording ("knife" quote); interv DiPaula, 29 Oct 01, 11, 5-6, 26-28; interv Bohn, 18.

47. Interv Combs, 11-14; interv Schwartz, 27-28; "Arlington County After-Action Report;' A-13, 47; map

indicating mobile command post locations, facsimile Jacquelyn Brown (ACFD) to Nancy Berlage, 31

Aug 06, OSD Hist.

48. Interv Combs, 11-14; on the communications challenge see,'Arlington County After-Action Report:'

A-30, 36, C-46; interv Gray, Gibbs, and Smith, 4, 16; interv Hazelwood, 28 Jan 02, 10; interv McCormick, 25 Oct 01, 4; interv Irby, 19 Nov 01, 5; interv Woodson, 8 Nov 01, 6; interv Nelson, 9 Nov 01,

4.

49. Interv Howes, 14; "Arlington County After-Action Report;' A-13; interv Hood, digital recording;

intervJester in Murphy, September 11, An Oral History, 246; interv McKinnnon, 28 Nov 01, 21.

50. Interv Perez, 17; eyewitness acct Glasbrenner, "What About the Children," DAC's Response to Tasker

01-05616, sub ROU-Request for Information Concerning the Sep 11, 2001 Attack on the Pentagon,

OpNE CMH.

51. Interv Gray, Gibbs, and Smith, 11-13; "Arlington County After-Action Report:' A-11, 66; interv

Carter, 7-8; interv Greenwell, 9 Nov 01, 13-14; interv Hilliard, 6 Nov 01, 6-8; interv D. Murphy, 28

Nov 01, 3-4; interv Brady, 5 Nov 01, 4; interv Candido, 12 Dec 01, 4-5; interv Smith, 29 Oct 01, 3.

52. Pers acct Collier, 13 Sep 01; interv Lescault, 27 Nov 01, 11-12.

53. Some recall being prevented from reentering the building as a general policy, not only due to a threatened inbound plane. Interv Balisle, 6-8; interv Morehead, 30 Oct 01, 24-26; interv Schwartz, 42-43;

interv Robinson, 5 Dec 01, 3; interv Hood, digital recording; interv Perez, 7, 12, 14-15; interv Parks,

27 Sep 01, 3-4,7; interv Brady, 6-7; "Command Performance: County Firefighters Take Charge of the

9-11 Pentagon Emergency," 12-15; Captain Gibbs and Chief Smith recalled that the military personnel did not resist the instructions they gave (interv Gray, Gibbs, and Smith, 8).

54. Interv Schwartz, 28-29; interv Combs, 13-14. The 10:40 a.m. time derives from APCD, "Incident

History Detail;' entries 10:41:31 and 10:41:55, DepChief Holl ACPD.

55. On blurring of time perception, see for example interv Howes, digital recording. On confusion over

the timing of collapse and inbound aircraft, see Schwartz, 27-28, 45-46; interv Paull, 26 Feb 02, 9-

10; and interv Hackney, 28 May 02, 11-12. On multiple evacuation warnings in the morning, see Fort

Myer Fire Department Log, 11 Sep 01, Doc 109, OpNE CMH; e-mail David Starter (WUSA9) to

Diane Putney, 9 Feb 07, w/atchmt pers acct Starter; memrcdJohn White (ACFD), sub Pentagon Incident 9/11/01, nd, ACFD; interv Durrer, 14-16; interv Howes, 14-16; interv Hood, digital recording;

interv Huntley, 8 Feb 02,25-28, 34; interv Henry, digital recording; interv Waring, 1 Nov 01, 23-27,6,

11-12. See interv Penn, 17 Apr 02, 37-38, on National air tower reports. Some may have mistaken as

threats helicopters that were in Washington airspace around the time of the collapse (9-11 Commission

Report, 41-43, 465, n224; interv Bohn, 9-13; interv Burchell, 6-11) or the military jets that flew over

D.C. in the morning (interv Martin, 5-9). On bomb scare, see interv Gray, Gibbs, and Smith, 12.

235
Notes to Pages 85-94

56. Interv Penn, 38 ("get go" quote); interv Durrer, 14-16 (quote, 15); interv Howes, 14-17 (quote, 17);

interv Hood, digital recording; interv M. Murphy, abstract, 2;'Arlington County After-Action Report,"

A-16, 30; Henry, digital recording.

57. Interv White, 10-11. White had previously used this strategy effectively when he and other personnel

were evacuated from the scene of the bombed Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995.

Interv Howes, 14; interv A. Wallace, 32-33.

58. Interv McKethan, 28 Dec 01, digital recording; interv Tinsley, 20 Dec 01, digital recording; interv

Thumann and Zegowitz, 16-25 (quote, 25); interv Gray, Gibbs, and Smith, 20.

59. Interv Durrer, 18; interv Hood, digital recording; interv Schwartz, 109; interv Howes, 16-17; interv

McKethan, digital recording; interv Condrell, 30 Oct 01, 13; Rosenbaum, Hunt, and Pitts,"Review of

9/11 Pentagon Scenario from the Fire Fighters, Fire Marshal's and Fire Protection Engineer's Perspectives," 18, 30-31.

60. Interv Gray; Gibbs, and Smith, 22; interv McKethan, and interv Tinsley, both digital recordings; interv

M. Murphy, abstract, 2; interv Howes, 18.

61. Inrerv Henry, digital recording; interv Gray, Gibbs, and Smith, 19.

62. Interv Martin, 11-12.

63. Interv Gray; Gibbs, and Smith, 22-23; interv Martin, 13.

64. Interv Gray, Gibbs, and Smith, 21-22; interv Schwartz, 101; interv Perez, 8; on the water pressure

problem see interv Kuney and McGuire, 12-17.

65. Interv Martin, 12-13; interv Gray, Gibbs, and Smith, 22-23.

66. "PENREN Report;' 3:6; interv Morris, 3-5, 7, 14; interv Schwartz, 102 (quote); Titus,"Shoring;' 8;

ASCE Report, 52.

67. Interv Schwartz, 102 (quote); interv Defina, 15; interv Howes, 17-18; interv Gray, Gibbs, and Smith,

28-29.

68. Interv Thumann and Zegowitz, 34-36.

69. Interv Defina, 15-17; interv Howes, 19-22; interv McKethan, digital recording; interv Beavers, 6 Dec

01, digital recording.

70. Interv Gilroy, 19, 21; interv Defina, 23; interv Thumann and Zegowitz, 34, 41; interv M. Murphy,

abstract, 2; interv McKethan, digital recording.

71. Interv Navas, 28 Nov 01, 18-19; interv Hazelwood, 11-12.

72. Interv Fitzharris, 12 Dec 01, 4-5; interv Condrell, 23-24; inrerv Gray, Gibbs, and Smith, 8-9, 22; interv

Kuney and McGuire, 20; interv Martin, 14, 21-22; interv Burroughs, abstract, 2.

73. 'Arlington County After-Action Report,"A-30.

74. Inrerv Fitzharris, 4.

75. For original roofing details, see"The Pentagon;' booklet signed Sept 42, box 1305, Subj Files, OSD

Hist; materials from Chief Engineer' Office, PENREN, including Roof Plans and Misc. Details Section D, Drawing no. 7185, circa 1942, roofing artifacts, photos, and drawings, now in OSD Hist; interv

Martin, 26-28; interv Schwartz, 103; interv McCormick, 25 Oct 01, 11-12;"PENREN Report;' 8:6.

76. Interv Condrell, 18; interv Drumming, 18 Dec 01, 12-13; mtg, former Pentagon Fire Marshal Diane

Pitts and OSD Historical staff, 24 Feb 06, OSD Hist Office.

77. Interv Howes, 23-24.

78. Inrerv McKethan, digital recording; interv Drumming, 15-16;"Arlington County After-Action

Report," A- 16; intcrv Valenzo, 28; interv Drumming, 9-12 (quotes); interv Tinsley, digital recording.

79. Interv Owens, 36; interv Schwartz, 103-06; interv Newton, 19 Nov 01, 18; interv Bryant, 20-21;

interv Carter, 26.

80. Interv Schwartz, 104; interv Owens, 36 (quote); interv Bethke, Campbell, and Brown, 24Jan 02, 31.

81. Interv Schwartz, 105; interv Nelson, 9 Nov 01, 8-9; interv Cochran, 3 Dec 01, 5; interv Gray, Gibbs,

and Smith, 4, 25-26; interv Schwartz, 105; interv Martin, 26-28; interv Kelley, 11-13; interv Irby, 14.

82. Interv Thumann and Zegowitz, 64; interv Schwartz, 106-07; interv Howes, 23-24; interv Martin, 26-

28 (quote), interv Howes, 24;"Arlington County After-Action Report," A-16; interv McCormick, 25

Oct 01, 11-12; interv Luczak, 7 Nov 01, 8; interv Drumming, 13.

236
Notes to Pages 94-105

83. Interv Kelley, 13; atchmt,"End of Tour Duty Report of 115th MP Bn MNG;' 5, e-mailJoseph Balkoski (Command Hist, MDNG) to Diane Putney, 24Jan 07.

84. Interv Schwartz, 107-08; interv Kelley, 14-15; Arlington County, Va. press release, 12 Sep 01, issued

at 6:08:54 p.m.; intervJudd, 29 Oct 01, 16-17; Real Estate & Facilities,"Initial Damage AssessmentRoof," generated 13 Sep 01, 0800, Pentagon Damage Assessment, OSD Graphics.

85. Interv Schwartz, 98-99, 113-14.

86. Ibid, 48-5 1.

87. Interv Douglas, 17 Oct 01, 17; interv Barta, 19 Oct 01, 10-12; interv Godbehere, 18 Oct 01, 19.

88. Shirer,"MDW Engineer Company;' 1.

89. Interv Barta, 5, 16, 19-24, 26, 28.

90. Ibid, 30-3 1; interv Brown, 14-15.

91. Interv Godbehere, 23-26 (quote, 26), 30.

92. Ibid, 25; interv Brown, 15-16.

93. Interv Balvanz, 17 Oct 01, 19-20; interv Erdelyi, 19 Oct 01, 20-28.

94. Interv Schwartz, 48-50; interv White, 27-28.

95. Titus, "Shoring," 2.

96. Ibid, 3.

97. Interv Schwartz, 49-50; interv Mathias, 12 Dec 01, 13, 16-17, 19, 21-26; Titus,"Shoring;' 1, 7.

98. Titus, "Shoring," 7-8, 25; interv Kelley, 60.

99. "PENREN Report:' 6:5, 9.

100. Titus, "Shoring," 19-20.

101. Interv Starette, 23-24; interv Barta, 35-37.

102. Titus,"Shoring," 25.

103. Interv Kilsheimer, 29Oct01, 1-3,7-9, 10, 19; interv Viner and Kelly, 11, 18; interv Sullivan, 18 Oct01,

13; interv Fitzharris, 7-8, 12, 21, 23, 40; PBS Online News Hour,"The Pentagon: One Year Later:' 6

Sep 02, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/july-decO2/pentagon_9-06.html.

104. Interv Penn, 9-10; interv White, 24-26; "Arlington County After-Action Report," A-53-59, D-2, 8.

105. Interv Penn, 2-3, 9-12, 34; 'Arlington County After-Action Report," D-2-4; interv Plaugher, 18-20;

interv Flynn, 20 May 02, 5, 7.

106. Interv Penn, 12, 14.

107. Ibid, 12-15; interv Schwartz, 49-50;'Arlington County After-Action Report," D-4.

108. Interv Schwartz, 53-54; interv White, 22-27; interv Kelley, 56-57; interv Penn, 27,41.

109. Interv Penn, 16-17, 36; interv White, 24-26; Dennis Ryan, "Hamburgers, Chicken, Steak, Boots,

Prayer, More at Camp Unity," MDW News Service, 21 Sep 01, http://www.mdw.army.mil/news/

Hamburgers-chicken-steak-boots-prayer.html#NavSkip.

110. Interv Gray, Gibbs, and Smith, 29; interv Schwartz, 55-56; interv Plaugher, 70-73.

111. Interv Penn, 13-14 (quote), 36-37; Hannah Mack Lapp,'A Visit at Camp Unity: First Person Reflections;' Nov 01, http://www.emu.edu/ctp/footpaths/vol3no3/page6.html.

112. Interv Schwartz, 58-68 (quote, 63); "Command Performance;' 17-20; interv Combs, 21-22; interv

Jester, 16-17.

113. Interv Schwartz, 91; interv Kelley, 13, 16-21; atchmt,"End of Tour Duty Report of 115th MP Bn

MNG;' 5, e-mail Joseph Balkoski to Diane Putney, 24Jan 07.

114. Interv Schwartz, 62-68, 91; interv Kelley, 13, 16-19; interv White, 31-35.

115. Interv Plaugher, 35-41.

116. Ibid, 39, 45, 61-70 (quote, 39); see for example,"America Counts Its Dead," 12 Sept 01, http://www.

newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn1279; "Command Performance," 22-23.

117. Interv Kelley, 44-45.

118. Interv Mix, 13 Dec 01, 14; interv Mayer, 29 Nov 01, 14-15; interv Hurley, 25 Sep 01, 14; interv

Corcoran, 24 Sep 01, 15; interv Borrego, 2 Oct 01, 7-8; interv Kelley, 32-33; Brinsfield"The Attack on

the Pentagon: The Ministry of Army Chaplains;' 43; Samantha L. Quigley, "Firefighters Visit Walter

Reed, Bethesda, Pentagon," 25 Mar 05, news archive, http://www.defenselink.com; "Chronology: The

237
Notes to Pages 105-1 7

Day After," 12 Sep 01, http://archives.cnn.com/20O1/US/09/12/wednesday.chronology; Jim Garamone,"Bush Visits Pentagon, Meets Rescuers," 12 Sep 01, AFPS News Articles, news archive, http://

wwwdefenselink.com.

V TREATING THE INJURED, SEARCHING FOR REMAINS

1. Interv Lutgen, 7 Dec 01, 5.

2. "Arlington County After-Action Report;' A-44-45; interv Roser, 10 Oct 01, 5-6.

3. Interv Geiling, 17 Dec 01, 3-5.

4. Jamieson,"The U.S. Air Force and 11 September 2001;' 37;'Arlington County After-Action Report;'

B-17.

5. Interv Geiling, 7.

6. Interv Felicio, nd, in Marble and Milhiser, Soldiers to the Rescue, 15-16; interv L. Brown, 29 Nov 01,

2-6; interv Brown in Marble and Milhiser, Soldiers to the Rescue, 7; interv Glidewell, 10 Oct 01, 8;

"Arlington County After-Action Report," B-4.

7. Interv Glidewell, 9-14.

8. Interv Baxter, 5-7; interv Lirette, 30 Nov 01, 5.

9. Interv Baxter, 8-11(quote, 10), 14, 16; interv Lirette, 8-9.

10. Jamieson,"The U.S. Air Force and 11 September 2001;' 38-40,44.

11. Condon-Rall, Disaster on Green Ramp, 3, 6, 27, 115-16.

12. Interv Horoho, 27 Sep 01, 2,9-12.

13. Ibid, 27.

14. "Arlington County After-Action Report," B-5; interv Roser, 3,7-10.

15. Interv Vafier, 8Jan 02, 1-2, 5-6, 10,

16. Interv Sepulveda, 6 Dec 01, 2-6, 11, 14-15; interv Horoho, 39.

17. Interv White, 9.

18. Interv Brown in Marble and Milhiser, Soldiers to the Rescue, 8.

19. Interv Durm, 12 Oct 01, 15;Jamieson,"The U.S. Air Force and 11 September 2001;' 44; interv E.

Murphy, 25 June 02, 8; interv L. Brown, 8-12.

20. Interv Horoho, 27 Sep 01, 16-17, 24-27; interv White, 10-14; interv Vafier,1 1; interv Brown, interv

Pernell in Marble and Milhiser, Soldiers to the Rescue, 9, 111.

21. Interv White, 15.

22. Ibid, 19.

23. Interv Brown in Marble and Milhiser, Soldiers to the Rescue, 9.

24. Interv Bucci in ibid, 62.

25. Interv Lirette, 9-10.

26. Marble and Milhiser, Soldiers to the Rescue, 143.

27. Interv Vafier, 12.

28. Interv Burchell, 8-9;"Arlington County After-Action Report," B-6.

29. Marble and Milhiser, Soldiers to the Rescue, 141.

30. 'Arlington County After-Action Report;' B-7; interv Nesbitt, 7 Nov 01, 3-4.

31. Interv Penn, 20.

32. Interv Shaeffer, 17.

33. Interv Lutgen, 6;'Arlington County After-Action Report;' B- 13; interv Mayer, 6-7; interv Yantis, 8 Feb

02,64.

34. Interv L. Brown, 14; interv Hanfling, 7 Dec 01, 18;'Arlington County After-Action Report;' B- 12, Fig

B-3.

35. IntervJ. McGuire, 7 Dec 01, 5.

36. "Arlington County After-Action Report;' B-3, 5.

37. Interv Mayer, 1, 3.

38. Jamieson,"The U.S. Air Force and 11 September 2001; 45-50.

238
Notes to Pages 1] 7-26

39. Interv Mayer, 9.

40. 'Arlington County After-Action Report:' B-12, 14, Fig B-3.

41. Rossow, Uncommon Strength, 86-87.

42. Brinsfield,"The Attack on the Pentagon: The Ministry of Army Chaplains;' 13-32.

43. Ibid, 45-51,103; interv Horoho, 30-31.

44. Interv Schwartz, 48-49; interv Penn, 24-26.

45. Interv Ingersoll, 28 Feb 02, 16, 22; interv Farrrington, 18 Dec 01, 23,25.

46. Interv Penn, 32.

47. Interv Ingersoll and Rimrodt, 12Jun 02,41-42; interv Eberhart, 13. Eberhart estimated that the crime

scene covered about 30,000 square feet on each of the five floors.

48. Casualty map, FBI Evidence Response Team, 26 Nov 01, AttOfc EDVa.

49. Interv Gouen, 25 Sep 01, 10; interv Boatwright, 2 Oct 01, 4-6.

50. Interv Craft, 2 Oct 01, 5.

51. Interv Frauman, 25 Sep 01, 14.

52. Interv Farrar, 25 Sep 01, 11; interv Hanfling, 25-26 (quote, 26).

53. Interv Stanton, 14 Mar 06, 9, 20; interv Ingersoll, 19-20; interv Rimrodt, 15 Feb 02, 13-14, 16; interv

Ingersoll and Rimrodt, 43-44.

54. Interv Stokes, 25 Sep 01, 6.

55. "Arlington County After-Action Report;' C-57; interv Penn, 32-33; interv Ingersoll, 16, 20; interv

Rimrodt, 16.

56. Interv Rimrodt, 17, 18.

57. Interv Frauman, 15.

58. Interv Ingersoll and Rimrodr, 48-49.

59. Interv Eberhart, 22.

60. Interv Yantis, 37.

61. Interv Stokes, 7; interv Cunningham, 2 Oct 01, 23.

62. Interv Boatwright, 7-8; interv Corcoran, 10-12; interv Craft, 6-7; interv D. Davis, 2 Oct 01, 18, 20;

interv Kovacic, 23 Oct 01, 6; interv Stokes, 8-9.

63. '"Arlington County After-Action Report;' C-54; interv Stokes, 12; interv Litchfield, 2 Oct 01, 11-12.

64. Interv Penn, 34.

65. Interv Gallivan, 2 Oct 01, 18.

66. Interv Myers, 25 Sep 01, 10.

67. Interv D. Davis, 15, 19.

68. Interv Farrar, 9, 20.

69. Interv O'Neill, 2 Oct 01, 13.

70. Interv Watson, 25 Sep 01, 10-11.

71. Interv Farrar, 19.

72. Interv Farrington, 30.

73. Interv Litchfield, 10.

74. Interv Malmquist, 2 Oct 01, 14.

75. Interv Wolfe, 3 Oct 01, 8; interv Boatwright, 16.

76. Interv Frauman, 17.

77. Interv Wolfe, 12.

78. Interv Munoz, 2 Oct 01, 12.

79. Interv Reynolds, 25 Sept 01, 9-10.

80. Interv Farrar, 35.

81. Interv Malmquist, 7, 16-17.

82. Interv Wolfe, 17.

83. 'Arlington County After-Action Report;' C-55.

84. Interv Eberhart, 22-23.

239
Notes to Pages 126-32

85. Interv Roemer, 11 Feb 02, 10-11; interv Lugaila, 19 Nov 01, 14-15, 20-21. Lugaila stated that 30 dogs

were employed.

86. Interv Lugaila, 22, 24, 26, 35; interv Roemer, 13-15.

87. lnterv Eberhart, 24; interv Lugaila, 43; interv Roemer, 12; interv Rimrodt, 23.

88. Interv Roemer, 15-16.

89. Interv Lugaila, 48.

90. 'Arlington County After-Action Report' C-56; interv Rimrodt, 22.

91. Interv Eberhart, 12, 23, 32-33.

VI. UP AND RUNNING

1. 9/11 Commissioli Report, 38-39, 325; Public Papers: Bush 2001, 2:1098-99; Bill Adair and Stephen Hegarty, "The Drama in Sarasota;' St. Petersburg Times, 8 Sep 02, http://www.sptimes.

com/2002/09/08/91 1/The drama inSarasota.shtml.

2. 9/11 Commission Report, 325-26, 554, n 1. The notion of a threat to Air Force One stemmed from a

misunderstood communication.

3. Interv Rumsfeld, 5-6.

4. Ibid, 5; interv Giambastiani, 18 Jul 02, 8 (quote); "Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with Parade Magazine," 12 Oct 01, 1, transcripts archive, 18 Nov 01, http://www.defenselink.mil; interv Davis and

Oldach, 20 Jul 06, 2, 5-8; interv Wassel, 13-14. Davis and Oldach were members of the Protective Service Unit of the Defense Protective Service.

5. Interv Rumsfeld, 6 (quote); interv Clarke, 2Jul02, 8; interv Davis and Oldach, 2-3, 10-11, 12; "Rumsfeld Interview with Parade," 1; interv Wassel, 15-17.

6. Interv Davis and Oldach, 11, 12-13; 9/11 Commission Report, 38,43-44; interv Rumsfeld, 5; Donald

Rumsfeld,"Testimony Prepared for Delivery to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon

the United States," 23 Mar 04, 11, speeches archive, http://www.defenselink.mil; interv Giambastiani,

1 Aug 02, 1-3; interv Wolfowitz, 19 Apr 02, 3, 7; interv Clarke, 8; interv Wassel, 20-21. Wassel set

up the call from Air Force One and heard the secretary's answers to such questions as "Are you okay?"

and "Is the Pentagon still intact?" This seems to be the telephone call mentioned in 9/11 Commission

Report, 43, for which "no one can recall the content of this conversation." Wassel was not interviewed

by the commission. Based on his account, it seems that Rumsfeld had not previously talked with the

president, so Rumsfeld's attempt to call Air Force One from his Pentagon office was not successful.

The president told the commission that "he could not reach key officials, including Secretary Rumsfeld, for a period of time." See 9/11 Commission1 Report, 40,43,465, n 232 (quote, 40). For some of the

NMCC's activity on 11 September, see 9/11 Comoiission Report, 17-18, 35-38,42-44.

7. 9/11 Commission Report, 37-38, 40, 43-44; interv Rumsfeld, 7-8; Rumsfeld, "Testimony to the

National Commission,' 11; interv Giambastiani, 1 Aug 02, 2-7; interv Wolfowitz, 3-5; interv Cambone, 8Jul 02, 3-4; interv Clarke, 8-10, 12; interv Di Rita, 27Jun 02, 5; "Secretary Rumsfeld Interview

with the Washingtoin Post," 9Jan 02,4, 5, transcripts archive, http://www.defenselink.nsil.

8. Interv Wolfowitz, 5-6; interv Giambastiani, 1 Aug 02, 3-4. Lawrence Di Rita, special assistant to

Rumsfeld, stated that the White House directed that federal departments activate alternate command

sites as a precaution (interv Di Rita, 5). The 9/11 Commission Report, 38, states that Deputy National

Security Advisor Stephen Hadley passed on the order.

9. Interv Plaugher, 31-34 (quote, 32); interv White, 16-17; interv Giambastiani, 1 Aug 02, 4-6; interv

Rumsfeld, 7; interv Wolfowitz, 5; interv Cambone, 4; interv Clarke, 11.

10. Interv Wolfowitz, 6-7; interv Di Rita, 8; interv Giambastiani, 1 Aug 02, 5-9. Giambastiani stated,"At

12:18 there were fifty aircraft in the air" (5). These were probably associated with law enforcement or

emergency operations; see Ned Preston (FAA Historian), "Chronology of the Attacks of September

11, 20017 Office of Public Affairs, Federal Aviation Administration, Doc 24, OpNE CMH. In the

months after 11 September, computer and communication systems at the alternate site were signifi240
Notes to Pages 133-38

candy upgraded and improved under authority newly transferred from the Army to the Office of the

Secretary of Defense.

11. For discussion of the plane hitting the Navy Command Center see Chapter II. After 11 September a unified command center was eventually established that co-located service watch cells with the

NMCC and Executive Support Center.

12. Interv Tracey and Sweeney, 28 Sep 01, 4; interv Totushek, 5 Feb 02, 6; Shupe, "Operation Noble

Eagle," 4.

13. Interv Tracey and Sweeney, 4-5; interv Rabogliatti, 6.

14. Interv Tracey and Sweeney, 5; interv Masso, 11 Dec 01, 17; interv Godfrey, 7 Nov 01, 5-6; interv

Rabogliatti, 5-7; interv Alexander, 5 Nov 01, 2,6.

15. Interv McAtee, 25 Sep 01, 3-7.

16. Ibid, 5; interv Sweeney, 13 Mar 02,7-8; interv Rabogliatti, 8; Shupe,"Operation Noble Eagle," 8.

17. Atchmt, summary of interv BrigGen George Flynn, Jones's military secretary, by Fred Allison (Historian, USMC) [Apr 06], e-mail Allison to Diane Putney, 21 Apr 06; interv P. Murphy, 11; Jones, Boys of

'67, 363-65.

18. Interv Chiarelli, 6-7, 10-11; Rossow, Uncommon Strength, 64-65.

19. Interv Chiarelli, 3-4, 7-8; Rossow, Uncommon Strength, 64-65.

20. Interv Chiarelli, 14 (quote); Rossow, Uncommon Strength, 65-66. For information about warnings

of hijacked aircraft approaching Washington before the Pentagon was struck, see 9/11 Commission

Report, 25-27, 37, 39.

21. Interv Chiarelli, 18-25; Rossow, Uncommon Strength, 68. At the alternate site Wolfowitz received

Rumsfeld's approval for White to return immediately to the Pentagon, where White believed he

belonged. See interv Wolfowitz, 5.

22. Rossow, Uncommon Strength, 68-69; interv Spindler, 27 Nov 01, 10-11; interv Bachus, 6 Mar 02, 10-

11, 23-25; e-mail Alvin Nieder to Diane Putney, 13 Mar 06.

23. Interv Spindler, 8-9, 15; interv Boggess, 8 Dec 01, 5-7. Accountability was extra difficult for the Army

because the crash destroyed personnel records in the DCSPER offices. See interv M. Lewis, 12 Dec

01, 7-10; Rossow, Uncommon Strength, 20-22,83-85. In the early evening on 11 September, Lewis and

Lt. Col. William Kelly had the difficult task of calling families to inquire if any of the missing had telephoned or arrived home, and too often the heart-wrenching reply was "no'

24. PerryJamieson notes,"11 Sep 01 CSAF Staff Meeting and Attack on Pentagon," 12 Sep 01, 1, AF

Hist Studies; Jamieson," The U.S. Air Force and 11 September 2001:" 3.

25. "USAF After-Action Report;' 2-3, 9.

26. "USAF After-Action Report;" 2-3; Jamieson, "The U.S. Air Force and 11 September 2001," 45-46.

On 10 May 2002 a DoD Inspector General report addressed the deployment to McGuire AFB: DoD,

OIG, Health Care: DoD Medical Support to the Federal Response Plan.

27. Interv Greenwell, 1-3, 10; interv Carter, 4; interv Bryant, 9; interv Candido, 12 Dec 01, 2. For broadcast news transcripts describing the activity of the building maintenance crews on 11 September, see

CBS Evening News,"How the Pentagon Was Saved on 9/11,'9 Sep 02, and"The Unsung Pentagon

Heroes," 10 Sep 02, (locate by title) http://www.cbsnews.com. For the videos see"September 11/Pentagon Heroes;' CBS Evening News, 9, 10 Sep 02, http://openweb.tvnewsvanderbilt.edu/.

28. Interv Greenwell, 3; interv Carter, 1-3; interv Irby, 3-4.

29. Interv Carter, 3-6, 10; interv Greenwell, 3-5 (quotes, 3). Over the years the Incident Command Post

was usually located in the Center Court. See"PENREN Report;' 3:4.

30. Interv Carter, 4-6, 15; interv Greenwell, 8-9; interv Bryant, 3-4; interv Pugrud, 4; interv Smith, 3;

interv McCormick, 3-4, 19-20. For efforts by Juan Rodriguez, Kevin Hawkins, Anthony Freeman,

Thomas Hayden, and Yong Kim to reenter the building from A-E Drive to rescue people see memo

John F. Irby for AsstDir for Labor Mgt, 16 Oct 01, OSD Hist. See also the account of Daniel Murphy

entering the building from A-E Drive in a second memo Irby for AsstDir for Labor Mgt, 16 Oct 01,

OSD Hist. Later McCormick and Smith, members of the Pentagon Emergency Action Team, donned

241
Notes to Pages 138-44

their firefighting gear and went to steam rooms and other parts of the building to assess damage. See

interv Carter, 23-24; interv McCormick, 5-7.

31. Interv Greenwell, 6-7.

32. Ibid, 7; e-mail Kathryn Greenwell to Diane Putney, 4Jan 06; interv Carter, 11, 14-15, 19; interv 1).

Murphy, 10; interv Bryant, 11-12; interv R. Cox, 15 Nov 01, 4.

33. 'Arlington County After-Action Report;' A-10; interv Gray, Gibbs, and Smith, 19; interv Carter, 25;

interv White, 16-17; interv Greenwell, 9; interv Candido, 2, 11; interv Haselbush, 19 Oct 01, 14.

34. Inrerv Carter, 13-14; interv Irby, 7-8; interv Morris, 11; interv R. Cox, 4.

35. Interv Carter, 7, 9-10, 20-21; interv Kuney and Maguire, 1, 3, 5, 7, 12-16; e-mail Brian Maguire to

Diane Putney, 21 Feb 06; interv Irby, 2-3, 6-7; interv Bryant, 7-8, 11.

36. Interv Kuney and Maguire, 13-15. A chilled water backup system existed but it was nor yet operational, and the broken pipes would also affect its performance.

37. Interv Carter, 7, 9; "Arlington County After-Action Report;' A-13; interv Smith, 5, 8; interv I).

Murphy, 3-4, 12-13.

38. Interv Carter, 7-9; interv Greenwell, 12-14; interv Gray, Gibbs, and Smith, 11. The medical personnel

evacuated patients from the Center Court. See interv L. Brown, 17-18.

39. Interv Kuney and Maguire, 7-8, 15-16, 35.

40. Ibid, 22 (quotes); e-mail Brian Maguire to Diane Putney, 4 Nov 05. The restoration of the chilled

water to the Annex required Kuney and James Graves later in the afternoon to enter the utility vault

near the Heliport in front of the crash site. The aircraft had ripped open the vault door, and debris

hung dangerously from above as the two men waded through two feet of water to examine the condition of water and steam pipes. See interv Kuney and Maguire, 17-20, 25-27, and memo Irby for AsstDir for Labor Mgt, 15 Oct 01, OSD Hist. A team from Washington Gas and Light had arrived at the

Pentagon around 10:50 a.m., and after coordinating with the incident commander and FBI entered

the vault near the Heliport and closed valves on the Pentagon's natural gas line. See interv Cook, 17

Apr 02, 10-11, 14.

41. Inrerv Irby, 2; interv Morris, 14; interv Bryant, 16-17.

42. Interv Morris, 2-5, 8, 16; interv Carter, 5, 12-13; interv D. Murphy, 9-10. Morris brought a ladder

from the vault to A-E Drive for use by the survivors at the 2nd Floor window near Corridor 4. See

Chapter II.

43. Interv Morris, 8-9, 11-12; interv Robinson, 1-3, 13-14; interv Smith, 13-14.

44. Interv Morris, 5, 7-8; interv D. Murphy, 5; interv Bryant, 8-10; interv Carter, 12-13, 17; interv

Breeden, 5 Dec 01, 4; interv Smith, 4;"PENREN Report;' 10:6.

45. Interv Greenwell, 8-9, 11; inrerv Carter, 11-12; interv Candido, 3.

46. Interv Plaugher, 33; interv Clarke, 16; interv Newton, 19-20; interv Haselbush, 21; interv Irby, 14-15;

interv D. Murphy, 5-6; interv R. Cox, 7-10, 13-14; interv Hilliard, 6 Nov 01, 8, 11; interv Breeden,

5; interv Luczak, 11; interv Bryant, 19, 23; interv Penn, 28; memo Ralph E. Newton for AdmAsst

to SecA et al, [24 Sep 01], OSD Hist; 'Arlington County After-Action Report;' A-68; OSHA,"September 11, 2001: Attack on America;' news release USDL 01-307, 14 Sep 01, http://www.yale.edu/

lawweb/avalon/septr1i/osha_001.htm. For a"synopsis of analyses completed by various environmental, health, and safety experts;' see" Environmental Health Response to the September 11, 2001 Attack

on the Pentagon."

47. Interv Cooke, 18 Oct 01, 4-8; interv Haselbush, 2, 10, 13; interv Newton, 5-6, 8.

48. Interv Haselbush, 6-7, 12-13; interv Newton, 2, 4-5; interv Conques, 3; interv Candido, 6; interv

White, 53; Bradley Graham,'At the Pentagon: Response Hampered by Confusion, Lack of Preparedness," Washington Post, 16 Sep 01.

49. Interv Haselbush, 1, 13; interv Newton, 4-7, 10, 17, 20; interv Irby, 4-6; interv Carter, 16.

50. Interv Newton, 7-8; interv Rumsfeld, 10; interv Di Rita, 8; interv Wassel, 25; interv Irby, 10-11; interv

Carter, 9-10, 19-20, 29 (quote, 19); interv R. Cox, 15.

51. Interv Newton, 6-11, 16,18-19. The OSD Graphics and Presentation Division set up a"post incident"

Internet site to communicate with employees. See interv Nelson, 10, 12.

242
Notes to Pages 144-SI

52. Interv Plaugher, 34; interv Pugrud, 7-8; interv Haselbush, 17; interv Pickens, 23 Oct 01, 11; interv

Irby, 11, 13.

53. Interv Judd, 7-10. The Child Development Center was eventually moved from the Pentagon Reservation.

54. IntervJudd, 13-16; interv Haselbush, 17-18; interv R. Cox, 10; interv Luczak, 11-12.

55. Interv Clarke, 15; interv Giambastiani, 1 Aug 02, 8;"DoD News Briefing on Pentagon Attack;' 11 Sep

01, transcripts archive, http://www.defenselink.mil.

56. Interv Rumsfeld, 10; "DoD News Briefing on Pentagon Attack," 1-3 (quote, 2). The Office of Personnel Management issued a news release stating that on 12 September federal agencies in the D.C.

area would be open under an unscheduled leave policy allowing employees to take leave without prior

approval. See OPM, "Federal Government Status;' news release, 11 Sep 01, http://www.opm.gov/

news/federal-government-status,438.aspx.

57. Public Papers: Bush 2001, 2:1099-1100; 9/11 Commission Report, 330, 326; interv Cambone, 5.

58. Interv Newton, 11-12, 14-16; interv Irby, 11-13, 16-17; interv Haselbush, 7; interv White, 32.

59. Interv Clarke, 20; interv Irby, 13; interv Conques, 5 (quote).

60. Interv Conques, 6-9, 11, 18; interv Haselbush, 20; e-mail David Butler (WHS Defense Facilities

Directorate) to Alfred Goldberg, 20 Sep 06.

61. Interv Irby, 14;'Arlington County After-Action Report;' A-16; interv Fitzharris, 35; interv White, 43.

62. Memo Kent A. Womack for AsstDir for Labor Mgt, 25 Oct 01, memo Edgar W Fruit for AsstDir for

Labor Mgt, 18 Oct 01, OSD Hist; interv Robinson, 5-8; interv D. Murphy, 7; interv Carter, 17; interv

Kuney and Maguire, 21.

63. Interv Luczak, 8-9; intervJudd, 26; interv Haselbush, 16; interv Irby, 15; interv Newton, 20.

64. lnterv R. Cox, 15-16 (quote); interv Carter, 31; interv Newton, 26; interv Irby, 20. Individuals from

OSD/WHS who were awarded the Medal for Valor for rescuing people and keeping the Pentagon in

operation were John Brady, Timothy Breeden, Robert Candido, Steven Carter, Donald Ellis, Anthony

Freeman, Michael Gargano, Kenneth Goodnight,James Graves, Kathryn Greenwell, Kevin Hawkins,

Thomas Hayden, Leroy Hilliard, Yong Kim, Donald Kuney, Brian Maguire, Robert McCloud,

Charles McCormick, Daniel Murphy, John Robinson, Juan Rodriguez, and Dennis Smith. See 'Personnel Hilites," WHS Newsletter, 3.

VII. SECURING THE PENTAGON

1. IntervJester, 19 Oct 01, 21; "Defense Protective Service After-Action Report: The Pentagon on 9-

11" (hereafter "DPS After-Action Report"), [19]; 'Arlington County After-Action Report;' C-31, 38;

Kennedy," Renovation of Pentagon Includes Tighter Security." The Pentagon Reservation, approximately 280 acres, includes the Pentagon, Navy Annex, Heating and Refrigeration Plant, other facilities, and parking lots. See 10 USC §2674. The DPS numbers are authorized strength; not all positions

were filled on 11 September.

2. "DPS After-Action Report;" [32]; "Pentagon Tours," http://www.dtic.mil/ref/html/Welcome/tours.

html.

3. Interv Jester, 19 Oct 01, 12; interv Irby, 18-19; interv Nesbitt, 19 Jun 06, 15-16. Deputy Secretary of

Defense John Hamre had also strongly advocated better security for the Pentagon (see interv Haselbush, 19 Oct 01, 3). The Metro renovations were accomplished after 11 September 2001.

4. Interv Jester, 19 Oct 01, 20; ibid, 31 Jan 06, 2; Alicia Borlik, "DoD Drill Tests Response to Terrorist

Attack:' 9Jun 98, AFPS News Articles, news archive, http://www.defenselink.mil; "Pentagon Undergoes Mock Terrorist Attack;' 30 May 98, http://www.cnn.com/US/9805/30/terror.pentagon/; interv

Pugrud, 1 Nov 01, 8.

5. Defense Protective Service special ed newsletter"911" (hereafter DPS newsletter"911"), nd, 3; interv

Jester, 19 Oct 01, 1-2; ibid, 31 Jan 06, 6-8;'Arlington County After-Action Report;' 2. See Chapter V

for discussion of the Pentagon's medical clinics staging a tabletop exercise in May 2001 under the scenario of a twin-engine aircraft hitting the building.

243
Notes to Pages 151-56

6. Interv Jester, 19 Oct 01, 5-6, 14; ibid, 31 Jan 06,3, 5; interv Nesbitt, 7 Nov 01, 1; interv Plaugher, 22

Apr 02, 6.

7. IntervJester, 19 Oct 01, 2-3; interv Nesbitt, 7 Nov 01, 2; ibid, 19Jun 06, 1-2. Dot) Instruction

2000.16, 14Jun 01, changed the terminology. For definitions see http://www.brussels.army.mil/

force-protectioncondition.htm and http://www.ala.usmc.mil/fpcon.asp. For recollections of people

receiving word of the "Normal" condition see interv Carter, 19 Nov 01, 3; interv Luczak, 7 Nov 01, 2;

interv Woodson, 4;"PENREN Report," 4:1.

8. IntervJester, 19 Oct 01, 1; interv Nesbitt, 7 Nov 01, 4-5; interv Riley, 24Jan 02,4 (quote).

9. Interv Phillips, 9 Nov 01, 2; intervJester, 19 Oct 01, 2-3; interv Pugrud, 1; FPCON definitions

arhttp://www.brussels.arnmy.nil/force-protection_condition.hrm.

10. Interv Pugrud, 2; DPS newsletter"911,' 12 (quote); Henderson Hall News, 28 Sep 01, http://www.

dcmilitary.com/dcmilitary-archives/stories/092801/ 10797-1.shtml.

11. IntervJester, 19 Oct 01, 3-4 (quotes); interv Nesbitt, 19Jun 06, 2-3. Some of the cameras at the Pentagon were inoperable because of construction work. See interv Austin and Pennington, 9 Nov 06, 11,

20.

12. Interv Nesbitt, 19Jun 06, 2-3; ibid, 7 Nov 01, 3; DPS newsletter"91 1V4; e-mail Capt Michael Nesbitt

to Diane Putney, 9 Aug 06.

13. IntervJester, 19 Oct 01, 4; interv Nesbitt, 7 Nov 01, 3-4 (quote); intervJester, 31 Jan 06, 13-14.

14. Interv Nesbitt, 7 Nov 01, 3-5, 8; interv Jester, 31 Jan 06, 17-18;"Arlington County After-Action

Report;' C-35-36.

15. Henderson Hall News, 28 Sep 01, 2-6 (quotes, 6, 4); memos John N. Jester, Paul K. Haselbush for

AsstDir for Labor Mgt, both 22 Oct 01, sub Hodges, Baker, Webster, Clodfelter, Rojas, and Rosati

citations, OSD Hist. See also Jose Rojas,Jr., transcript ofjury trial, 11 Apr 06, vol 17A, United States r.

Zacarias Moussaoui. For a list of DPS recipients of the Medal for Valor, see,"Personnel Hilites,' WHS

Newsletter, 3.

16. MemosJohn N.Jester, Paul K. Haselbush for AsstDir for Labor Mgt, 22 Oct 01, 7 and 13 Feb 02, 28

Mar 02, sub Hoopi'i, Murphy, Centner, and Carpenter citations, OSD Hist; DPS newsletter"911 " 13;

Henderson Hall News, 28 Sep 01; CNN news,"Voice of an Angel;' 1 (quote), http://www.cnn.com/

SPECIALS/2002/america.remembers/stories/heroes/hoopii.html. Sinclair and Ho'opi'i reunited on

national television; Hoopi'i became widely recognized. See Glen Finland, "The Guardians;' Washington Post, 11 Sep 05.

17. MemosJohn N.Jester, Paul K. Haselbush for AsstDir for Labor Mgr, 22 Oct 01, 14 Feb 02, sub Koerber, Behe, Diaz, and Mapp citations, OSD Hist. For rescue accounts by two Virginia state troopers see

memos Trooper Myrlin Wimbish for 1st Sgt Richard S. Keevill, 23 Nov 01, Trooper Michael S. Middleton for Keevill, nd, Virginia State Police. For an account of rescue assistance from personnel from

the Arlington County Sheriff's Office, see interv Young, 23 May 02.

18. DPS newsletter"911," 3-5.

19. Interv Jester, 19 Oct 01, 5; interv Nesbitt, 7 Nov 01, 8-9; Jonathan Pitts,'A Caring Man, A Cruel

Irony," http://cf.newsday.com/9 11/victimsearch.cfminid=986; "Radian Receives Pentagon Phoenix

Award;' http://www.radianinc.com/press-releases/01.15.03.htm.

20. Interv Pugrud, 4; interv Newton, 2; interv Nesbitt, 19 Jun 06, 12-13; interv Bryant, 26; 'Arlington

County After-Action Report," C-33; memo D. 0. Cooke for service secretaries, 16 Aug 01, OSD Hist;

"PENREN Report," 9:2, 3:7, 5:4 (quote).

21. Interv Irby, 8-9; interv Candido, 4;"PENREN Report;' 9:1,4; interv Carter, 4; intervJester, 31 Jan 06,

10-11; interv Nesbitt, 19 Jun 06, 9-11; ibid, 7 Nov 01, 3; interv Newton, 23-24;"Arlington County

After-Action Report;' C-35; memo Arthur H. Hildebrandt (AssocGenCoun, Mgt) for Office of Program Appraisal, 1 Oct 01, 1, in"DON Consolidated Lessons Learned"; "DPS After-Action Report."

[33].

22. IntervJester, 31 Jan 06, 10-11; interv Pugrud, 2; memo Hildebrandt for Office of Program Appraisal,

1 Oct 01, 1 in "DON Consolidated Lessons Learned"; memo RAdm S. G. Smith (Office of Program

Appraisal) for UnderSecN, 9 Oct 01, 5, in ibid; interv Sweeney, 4-5; atchmt, pers acct Stauber, e-mail

244
Notes to Pages 156-60

Maj Francis Burns to Stephen Lofgren, 11 Oct 01, OpNE CMH; Bob Whitmer, "Per Rumsfeld's

Orders: The Briefing Will Go On;' 3, http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/Dec2002/a122602a.

html. For the Mall doors being open see interv Yantis, 18; interv Eggerton, 28 Nov 01, 8; pers acct

Stone, 10 Oct 01, 2-3.

23. Interv Newton, 4; interv McCormick, 18-19; interv Blevins, 13 Dec 01, 2; interv Bachus, 6; interv Irby,

8 (quote);"PENREN Report;' 5:4.

24. Video Recording, WUSA 9,9:41 a.m. to 10:55 a.m. (quote); interv McDonner, 13 Dec 01, 7; interv

Dossel, 28 Sep 01, 9-10; intervYantis, 35; interv Bass, 11 Oct 01, 12; interv Volk, 1 May 02, 19.

25. IntervJester, 31Jan 06,15,17,19; ibid, 19 Oct 01, 4,6, 8;"Arlington County After-Action Report;' C33, 35; interv Nesbitt, 7 Nov 01, 5; interv Harper, 14Ju1 06, 12; interv Pugrud, 4, 5.

26. "FEMA Fully Activated in Response to Apparent Terrorist Events:' 11 Sep 01, http://www.fema.

gov/news/newsrelease.femaid=5696; Federal Response Plan, Apr 99, foreword and table of contents;

sanitized PDD 39, 21 Jun 95, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm; FEMA Federal Response

Plan Notice of Change, 7 Feb 97, FEMA 229, chg 11, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39-frp.

htm. The federal response preceded the presidential declaration of disaster-allowable by law. The

president issued an emergency declaration for Arlington County on 13 September and declared the

Pentagon and the surrounding region a disaster area on 21 September. The Federal Response Plan

was later revised and renamed the National Response Plan.

27. "Terrorism 2000/2001;' 7 (definition quote); DoJ synopsis PDD 39, 1, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/

odp/docs/pdd39.htm; "CONPLAN: United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism

Concept of Operations Plan,"Jan 01, http://www.fbi.gov/publications/conplan/conplan.pdf. In 1998

Clinton signed PDD 62 which codified and clarified activities of U.S. agencies in combating terrorism and established the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and

Counter-Terrorism. See abstract of PDD 62 from Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness

Support, http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps9890/lps9890/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/osldps/lib-pdd62.

htm.

28. Interv Combs, 3-12; interv Schwartz, 25-26;'Arlington County After-Action Report:' A-20, 45,47.

29. Interv Combs, 7-8, 24-25; "Arlington County After-Action Report;' A-22; interv Eberhart, 15 Jan 02,

6-7. FBI members from both the National Capital Response Squad (NCRS) and thejoint Terrorism

Task Force (JTTF) arrived at the Pentagon within the hour. See"DPS After-Action Report:' [21J.

Combs was a member of the NCRS, consisting of evidence, SWAT, and weapons of mass destruction/hazardous material teams. The JTTFs, first established in 1980, brought together federal, state,

and local law enforcement agencies.

30. Interv Combs, 6, 25; interv Plaugher, 28-29; interv Rimrodt, 6-8; interv Ingersoll and Rimrodt, 12

Jun 02, 21-23, 27, 30-31, 36-37; interv Ingersoll, 9-10. A third person, identified as Sergeant Marshall

Paull, also took photographs. Joining the rescue effort, MSgt Morris gave his camera to Ingersoll. See

interv Ingersoll and Rimrodt, 22, 30.

31. Interv Combs, 7-8, 16; interv Holl, 28 May 02, 34; interv Panther, 28 May 02, 12-13; interv Hanfling,

16; interv Rimrodt, 9-11; interv Ingersoll, 10-11, 15; interv Ingersoll and Rimrodt, 24-25, 31-32, 34.

32. Interv Combs, 9, 16-17, 20; "DPS After-Action Report;' [16]; interv Jester, 31 Jan 06, 6, 23; interv

Gray, Gibbs, and Smith, 21 (quote); interv Plaugher, 30,43. Arlington County paid for the fence purchase and subsequently received partial reimbursement from FEMA. See interv Penn, 27.

33. Interv Combs, 25-26; interv Gray, Gibbs, and Smith, 17-18; interv Schwartz, 51-53; interv Penn,

24-26; "Arlington County After-Action Report;' A-68; National Disaster Medical System, Office of

Emergency Preparedness, Dept of Health and Human Services,'"Terrorist Attacks" situation report

#40, 18 Oct 01, 1600hrs EST, 2, http://www.911da.org/crr/documents/2928.pdf.

34. Interv Eberhart, 12, 22-23; interv Combs, 23; interv Jester, 19 Oct 01, 11; interv Rimrodt, 16-26;

interv Perryman, 2 Oct 01, 9; interv Boatwright, 6; interv Ingersoll, 16-21; 'Arlington County AfterAction Report;' C-35, 39, 54.

35. Interv Hanfling, 33; "Remarks of Carol Carmody, Vice-Chairman, National Transportation Safety

Board ... :'27 Feb 02, 1, http://www.ntsb.gov/speeches/carmody/cc020227.hrm; CNN transcript

245
Notes to Pages 160-65

aired 14 Sep 01, 06:33, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/14/se.47.htnil; DoD,

"Flight Data and Cockpit Voice Recorders Found";" War on Terror: Speed Likely Factor ..... 23 Feb

02, 2, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/02/25/attack/main501989.shtm1; H.R. 3336,"Safe

Aviation ... ," 19Ju1 05, 3, 109 Cong, 1 sess, http://thonias.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z.c1O9:H.R.3336.

IH:; illustration, "Pentagon First Floor-West," FBI Evidence Response Team, AttOfc EDVa; e-mails

Michael Lombardi (Boeing historian) to Diane Putney, 14Jun 06; NTSB, Vehicle Recorders Division,

"Specialist's Factual Report of Investigation Digital Flight Data Recorder," no. DCAO1 MA064, 31 Jan

02, http://www.ntsb.gov/info/AAL77-fdr.pdE

36. "Arlington County After-Action Report," C-49, 51, 52; interv Combs, 17; interv White, 32, 34.

37. InrervJester, 31 Jan 06, 13; e-mail John Pugrud to Diane Putney, 11 Oct 06; interv Austin and Pennington, 3-8. In March 2002 a few still images from one of the videos were supposedly "leaked" to the

press which widely publicized them. See http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12818225/print/1I/displaymode/1098/. On 16 May 2006 DoD released the two videos to the Judicial Watch organization,

which had submitted a Freedom of Information Act request for them in December 2004. DoD also

placed the videos on its Internet website. See"Videos of American Flight 77 Striking the Pentagon on

September 11, 2001;' OSD/JS FOIA Requester Service Center Reading Room, http://www.dod.

mil/pubs/foi/reading-room/. The videos are also exhibits for United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui.

(See prosecution trial exhibits, P200022, http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/notablecases/moussaoui/

exhibits/.) The date and time on the P200022 still images indicate when the still pictures were made

from the video. See interv Austin and Pennington, 8, 13-15.

38. Interv Eberhart, 5; timeline of FBI history, entry 11 Sep 01, http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/historicdates.htm; Michael E. Rolince (ActAsstDir, FBI) testimony before S Judiciary Cte, 24 jun

03, 3, http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress03/rolinceO62403.htm.

39. Interv Galey, 20 Nov 01, 3-10; interv Burchell, 5-14; Bill Line,"National Capital Region Contributions to September 11 th Help Efforts;' National Park Service, http://www.nps.gov/remembrance/

dcarea/dcQpress.html. All departures from the airport had been cancelled by the FAA directive issued

at 9:26 a.m., and at 9:45 a.m. the FAA ordered all civil aircraft to land at the nearest airport, diminishing the traffic into Reagan National. See FAA Historian's"Chronology," Doc 24, OpNE CMH.

40. 'Arlington County After-Action Report;' C-7; interv Hackney, 29; interv Holl, 15.

41. 'Arlington County After-Action Report;' C-6, 13-14, 16; interv Hackney, 4-5, 10-15, 18-19, 21-22.

42. Interv Flynn, 25, 32;"DPS After-Action Report," [3, 15]; interv Hackney, 6-8; intervJester, 19 Oct 01,

15;'Arlington County After-Action Report," A-6, C-8-9, 20, D-13; interv Gavin, 28 May 02, 8-9.

43. 'Arlington County After-Action Report," C-25; interv Holl, 32; ACPD "Incident History Detail;' 11

Sep 01 entries 10:03:11, 10:09:39, 16:35:11, DepChief Holl ACPD; interv Alt, 28 May 02, 7; interv

R. Carlton, 15 Apr 02, 8-13; interv Parsons, 13 Dec 01, 1, 32-37, 40-41. The motorcycle unit of the

Prince George's County Police Department also assisted on 11 September by escorting medical personnel in the morning and trucks carrying lighting equipment in the evening from Andrews AFB to

the Pentagon. See interv Weishaar, 23 Jan 02, tape recording.

44. 'Arlington County After-Action Report." D-13; interv Holl, 14; interv Ramsey, 22; interv Blevins, 13

Dec 01, 6; MDW Provost Marshal timeline, 11 Sep [01], SAIC, http://www.91 1digitalarchive.org/

crr/documents/2698.pdf; interv Eberhart, 9; interv Suvari, 21, 30; iisterv Pollygus, 33; interv Bohn, 8-

9 (quote).

45. Interv Holl, 7, 9; interv Flynn, 8, 16; interv Hackney, 20;"Arlington County After-Action Report." C6-7, 13.

46. "Arlington County After-Action Report;' C- 16, 21; interv Gavin, 21; "DPS After-Action Report;"

[16].

47. "2002 Annual Report;' VA Dept ABC, 14; ACPD "Incident History Detail," 11 Sep 01 entry

11:04:32, DepChief Holl ACPD; Covert, "Search and Recovery;" 20, 21; interv Holl, 17-18 (quote,

18).

48. Interv Ramsey, 4-10, 21-23.

49. Interv Hackney, 16-17, 35 (quote); interv Flynn, 39;'Arlington County After-Action Report;' C-24.

246
Notes to Pages 166-72

50. Summary of interv Col Egon Hawrylak, 1 Apr 02, [2], National Guard Bureau, "Comprehensive Reference Resource for September 11, 2001," September 11 Digital Archive, http://www.911da.org/err/

documents/5118.pdf; interv Jackson, 7Jan 02, 25, 27, 36.

51. IntervJackson 18-22, 31-34, 40,49-51; summary of interv Hawrylak, [2-3].

52. IntervJackson, 12-13 (quote); summary of interv Hawrylak, [2].

53. Summary of interv Hawrylak, [2]; interv Cunningham, 7; interv Telgren, 2 Oct 01, 5,6; Shupe,"Operation Noble Eagle:" 7.

54. Interv Telgren, 5-6; interv Farrar, 14; interv Pugrud, 8; interv Haselbush, 17; interv K. Dooley, 2 Oct

01, 6 (quote); interv Norton, 25 Sep 01, 7;"Arlington County After-Action Report;' C-40.

55. Interv Brassell and Harris, 1 Nov 01, 4; interv Smith, 11;"Arlington County After-Action Report;' C40; interv Hurley, 11 (quote).

56. Interv Malmquist, 17-18; interv Corcoran, 8; interv Litchfield, 12; 'Arlington County After-Action

Report;' C-55.

57. Interv Malmquist, 18-20; interv Corcoran, 8-9; interv Boatwright, 10-11; interv Stout, 23 Jun 06, 16-

17, 19.

58. Interv Stout, 2-4; interv Harper, 6-7, 14;"DPS After-Action Report;' [9, 11, 26]; interv Jester, 31 Jan

06, 17-19; ibid, 19 Oct 01, 11; interv Nesbitt, 7 Nov 01, 6. On 11 September Major Koerber was the

on-site commander followed by Captain Stanley until Chief Jester asked Stanley to focus on security

for the leased facilities; Harper and Stout manned the day shift.

59. IntervJester, 19 Oct 01, 13-14; ibid, 31Jan 06, 22; interv Stout, 2; interv Nelson, 9 Nov 01, 10, 17-18;

MWAA Public Affairs Office, news release, 20 Jun 06.

60. Interv Nelson, 11-12; interv Holl, 34-35; interv Stout, 4, 14; "DPS After-Action Report;' [161.

61. Interv Alt, 15-16, 22;'Arlington County After-Action Report;" C-16, 21; Sandra Jontz and Patrick

Dickson,"Pentagon Employees Try to Resume Jobs Amid Disaster;' Stars and Stripes. 13 Sep 01,4,

http://ww2.pstripes.osd.mil/01/sep01/ed091301 m.html; interv Alexander, 10-11. There were other

temporary memorials near the Pentagon, and on 30 Nov 01 WHS arranged for a moving company

to package and move the items to storage. See DoD,"DoD to Preserve Mementos from Pentagon

'Memorial;" news release 606-01, 29 Nov 01, releases archive, http://www.defenselink.mil.

62. IntervJester, 19 Oct 01, 18; atchmt,"End of Tour Duty Report of 115th MP Bn MNG;' e-mailJoseph

Balkoski to Diane Putney, 24 Jan 07.

63. 'Arlington County After-Action Report; C-40-41; interv Stout, 4, 10-11.

64. 'Arlington County After-Action Report;' A-54, 56; interv Jackson, 44-46; Shupe, "Operation Noble

Eagle:' 11 (Jackson quote); interv Chandler, 25 Sep 01, 9; interv Corcoran, 12 (quote); interv Stout,

11.

65. IntervJester, 19 Oct 01, 10.

66. ACPD command post notes, 13 Sep 01, entries 0823, 1150, DepChief Holl ACPD; interv Stout, 6-8;

interv Combs, 20-21;'Arlington County After-Action Report;' C-23; e-mails LtJason Bower (PFPA)

to Diane Putney, 31 Oct, 1 Nov 06.

67. Interv Jester, 19 Oct 01, 11; "DPS After-Action Report;' [16-171; interv Combs, 21;'Arlington

County After-Action Report;' C-40. For the 4,000 estimate, see the reference to 3,700 while the issuance process was still under way in ACPD command post notes, 15 Sep 01, entry 0930 briefing, DepChief Holl ACPD.

68. Interv Combs, 21-22;'Arlington County After-Action Report;'C-58-59; "DPS After-Action Report,"

[17]; "Pentagon Site Access Badge Requirements... :' nd, DepChief Holl ACPD; interv Stout, 7-10;

interv Plaugher, 45 (quote).

69. Rossow, Uncommon Strength, 105-06; Shupe,"Operation Noble Eagle;' 9-10; interv Kelley, 25.

70. Interv Kelley, 25-26; interv White, 36-38; 'Arlington County After-Action Report;' A-68; interv

Smith, 11; interv Nesbitt, 7 Nov 01, 10; interv Fitzharris, 22. Sgts Christian Hale and Randall Peterson handled the escort service for DPS. See interv Stout, 20; interv Nesbitt, 7 Nov 01, 10.

247
Notes to Pages 172-80

71. IntervJester, 19 Oct 01, 11;"Arlington County After-Action Report,' C-35. Michael Copeland led the

DPS effort to recover and safeguard classified documents. See interv Stout, 20; interv Nesbitt, 19Jun

06,28.

72. Interv Pugrud, 5; Covert,"Search and Recovery:" 20-21; Shupe,"Operation Noble Eagle;' 10-11, 19;

"Arlington County After-Action Report," C-57.

73. Interv Cochran, 6-13; interv M. Dooley, 5 Dec 01, 8-19.

74. Interv Dennis and Byrd, 26 Nov 01, 8-9, 18-21; interv Nesbitt, 7 Nov 01, 10; interv Mascelli, 9Jan 02,

18-22;"DPS After-Action Report;' [183; DPS newsletter"911," 8. The HQ/HQ Detachment and the

118th Military Police Company (Airborne) of the 503rd Military Police Battalion (Airborne) arrived

at the Pentagon on 20 September 2001.

75. DPS newsletter"91 1;' 9; interv Friedl, 28 Oct 03, 18-19; DoD,"DoD Establishes Pentagon Force Protection Agency," news release 241-02, 9 May 02, releases archive, http://www.defenselink.mil. The 7th

Chemical Company from Fort Polk, Louisiana, arrived at the Pentagon in October 2001. See interv

Dennis and Byrd, 8, 21.

76. Arlington County,'Arlington Transfers Pentagon Site to FBI;' news release, 21 Sep 01, DepChief Holl

ACPD; Rossow, Uncomnon Strength, 96; interv Eberhart, 12, 32-33. Eberhart provided the 26 September date contradicting the 'Arlington County After-Action Report;' C-49; the MDW still had to

turn the command back to OSD's Washington Headquarters Service. See interv Haselbush, 24; interv

Jackson, 23-24; interv Fitzharris, 23.

77. Two of the F- 16s were armed with missiles and a loaded 20-mm. internal gun while the third F-16 carried no missiles because it was a spare aircraft. Gross, "9-11 and Operation Noble Eagle;' 9-11; 9/11

Commission Report, 26-34.

78. Interv Rielage, 29 Mar 02, 24-25 (quote, 25); e-mail Kathleen Heincer (Pentagon librarian) to Diane

Putney, 29 Nov 06; interv Young, 23 May 02, 30; interv Bohn, 9-10; interv Holl, 11; interv Slifer, 8

Oct 01, 11-12; interv Martin, 8-9; interv White, 18-19; interv Thumann and Zegowitz, 18-20; interv

Perez, 14-15; interv Heggood, 6 Feb 02, 11-12; interv McKinnon, 21-22.

79. For when and to whom the shootdown order was communicated in the chain of command see 9/11

Commission Report, 40-45.

80. Ibid, 44; Gross,"9-11 and Operation Noble Eagle," 11-15, 17, 29,45. See also Scott,"F-16 Pilots Considered Ramming Flight 93;'71-73.

81. 9/11 Comniission Report, 314; intervJester, 19 Oct 01, 14 (quote); ibid, 31 Jan 06, 2-3, 6.

VIII. CARING FOR THE DEAD AND THE LIVING

1. "Response to the Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon: Pentagon Family Assistance Center (PFAC) After

Action Report" (hereafter"PFAC After Action Report"), 63, C-4.4. The source of casualty officers for

the DIA personnel is not recorded; interv Bethke, Campbell, and Brown, 24Jan 02, 94-95.

2. "Arlington County After-Action Report," A-47, C-55; interv Durm, 21-22; interv Bethke, Campbell,

and Brown, 24Jan 02, 25; Rossow, Uncommon Strength, 93-94.

3. Interv Wagner, 1 Mar 02, 27.

4. Ibid, 8-9;"Arlington County After-Action Report;' A-47, C-5 1.

5. 'Arlington County After-Action Report;' C-55; Rossow, Uncommon Strength, 95; Ruggeri,"The Dover

Air Force Base Port Mortuary;' 72; interv R. Carlton, 15 Apr 02, 36-37.

6. Write-up of tour given to Naval Historical Center Pentagon Team, 14-15 Nov 01, Nav Hist.

7. Ruggeri, "The Dover Air Force Base Port Mortuary," 70; Peterson, "Psychological Intervention withMortuary Workers after the September 11 Attack," 84.

8. Interv Wagner, 2-3, 35.

9. Peterson, "Psychological Intervention," 84; Wagner and Kelly, "Operation Noble Eagle: Forensic and

Psychological Aspects," 81.

248
Notes to Pages 180-89

10. "After-Action Report, Operation Noble Eagle" (hereafter"AFIP After-Action Report"), End 1, Encl 2-

1; Hammonds and Kelly, "Operation Noble Eagle: DNA Laboratory Plays Key Role:' 4; Peterson, "Psychological Intervention:' 84.

11. Interv Wagner, 33; Rossow, Uncommon Strength, 94-95;'AFIP After-Action Report;' 2; Wagner and

Kelly, "Operation Noble Eagle: Forensic and Psychological Aspects:' 81; Kelly, "Operation Noble Eagle:

AFIP Responds to September 11th Pentagon Terrorist Attacks;' 1; Kelly,"Operation Noble Eagle:

Forensic Anthropologist Provides Expertise Following September 11 Attack;' 6.

12. Interv Arendt, 1 Mar 02, 16.

13. "AFIP After-Action Report:' 5,9.

14. Ibid, 10.

15. Interv Wagner, 31-32.

16. Wagner and Kelly, "Operation Noble Eagle: Forensic and Psychological Aspects," 81; Pemble, "Forensic

Dentistry and Forensic Dental Identification," 12; Kelly,"Operation Noble Eagle: Radiologic Pathology

Provides Dover Support:' 10.

17. In the Army, personnel of the Casualty and Memorial Affairs Operations Center coordinated with the

families of deceased for the delivery of remains and return of personal effects; see Rossow, Uncommon

Strength, 91.

18. Interv Wagner, 22, 24; interv O'Brien, 2July 02, 36.

19. Interv Wagner, 14; Hammonds and Kelly,"Operation Noble Eagle: DNA Laboratory:' 4-5.

20. Interv Wagner, 19,40.

21. Pemble,"Forensic Dentistry:' 14-15, 18; Kelly,"Noble Eagle:' 7; interv Arendt, 5-7,9.

22. "AFIP After-Action Report:' 3, Encl 1; FBI list, ME Cause, 13 Dec 01, AttOfc EDVa; interv Wagner,

10; interv Bethke, Campbell, and Brown, 105; memcon Charles Pemble (DepDir AFIP) w/Rebecca

Welch, 19 May 06.

23. Interv Bethke, Campbell, and Brown, 79,87,89, 106.

24. Ibid, 39,87; interv Chaloupka, 8 Feb 02,4.

25. Interv Bond, 14 Nov 01, 2, 3;"After-Action Report NLO:' 2.

26. Interv Bethke, Campbell, and Brown, 6-7, 20, 35-36,41,45,82.

27. Ibid, 81.

28. Interv O'Brien, 15 Nov 01, 9, 24.

29. Interv Bond, 12.

30. Ibid, 8-9, 12, 15; "After-Action Report NLO;' 4, Appendix B, C.

31. Write-up of tour 14-15 Nov 2001, Nay Hist; interv Bethke, Campbell, and Brown, 89; interv O'Brien,

15 Nov 01, 11-13, 15; interv Bond, 28; interv Chaloupka, 11-14; memcon Pemble and Welch, 19 May

06.

32. Interv Falk, 8July 02,7, 12; interv Chu, 1 Feb 02,4.

33. "Arlington County After-Action Report;' D-9; interv Falk, 9-11.

34. Interv Falk, 16, 28; interv Chu, 5; 'Aggies and Local Residents Pause to Commemorate Sept. 11,

2001:' Aggie Daily, Texas A&M University, 11 Sep 02, http://tamu.edu/univrel/aggiedaily/news/stories/02/091102-12.html.

35. "PFAC After Action Report;' 4.

36. Ibid, 3; interv Falk, 7, 12.

37. "After-Action Report: The ACS's Response to the Attack on the Pentagon" (hereafter "ACS AfterAction Report"), 3; intervJohnson and Gifford, 14 Mar 02,7-8.

38. IntervJohnson and Gifford, 35.

39. Brinsfield,"Attack on the Pentagon: The Ministry of Army Chaplains:' 124-25.

40. Ibid, 1 19;"PFAC After Action Report;' 10, A-3.1; interv Falk, 15, 18; Lessons Learned from the USS

Cole Crisis (internal notes, nd) were made available to the staff (see Doc 45, OpNE CMH).

41. Interv BrownWahler, 30Jan 02, 6, 34.

42. Interv Stair, 9 Oct 01, 2,4,7, 10, 13-14, 18.

43. IntervJohnson and Gifford, 36, 38; 'ACS After-Action Report<' 17.

249
Notes to Pages 189-97

44. News releases, 13 and 14 Sep 01, releases archive, http://www.defenselink.mil.

45. "PFAC After Action Report," 9.

46. Ibid, 16, 20.

47. lnterv Chu, 5.

48. Brinsfield,"Attack on the Pentagon: The Ministry of Army Chaplains," 120; "PFAC After Action

Report," 12, 19; interv Falk, 13, 24.

49. 9/11 Comm ission Report, 327.

50. Rossow, Uncommon Strength, 115-16;"PFAC After Action Report," 4, 24, 25-26.

51. Hammonds, "Operation Noble Eagle: Helping Pentagon Families Who Lost Loved Ones, AFIP Personnel Staff Special Assistance Center;' 12.

52. John Molino (DASD Military Community and Family Policy), "Briefing on Casualty Notification:'

transcript archive, 26 Mar 03, http://www.defenselink.mil.

53. IntervJ. Hodge, 15 Nov 01, 5.

54. Rossow, Uncommon Strength, 116. As a result of the Federal Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act

of 1996, the National Transportation Safety Board, American Red Cross, and major air carriers developed an arrangement to care for families affected by aviation disasters; see"Remarks of Carol Carmody Vice-Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board ... "; Huleatt, "Pentagon Family Assistance

Center Inter-Agency Mental Health Collaboration and Response," 68 (Huleatt indicates that the

Marine Corps provided CAOs to Defense contractors, 69); interv Kuhn, 8 Feb 02, 21-22.

55. Interv Hodge, 9.

56. Interv Bethke, Campbell, and Brown, 99.

57. "PFAC After Action Report;' 28, C-4.12, 4.14.

58. Interv Chu, 9.

59. "PFAC After Action Report," 30-3 1; interv Brown Wahler, 11.

60. Interv Bethke, Campbell, and Brown, 91.

61. Brinsfield,'Attack on the Pentagon: The Ministry of Army Chaplains;' 81-82.

62. "PFAC After Action Report," 26, 28-29, 35, 37.

63. Ibid, 10-11, 35-36.

64. Ibid, 38-45, B-2.8; Brinsfield,"Attack on the Pentagon: The Ministry of Army Chaplains:' 121-22.

65. Rossow, Uncommon Strength, 116-19.

66. lnterv Falk, 19.

67. "PFAC After Action Report:' 44-45; Rudi Williams,"'Therapy Dogs' Help Relieve Stress for Families,

Staff, Volunteers;' news archive, 11 Oct 01, http://www.defenselink.mil.

68. About two weeks after the briefings began, on reaching a consensus with the families Van Alstyne cut

back the briefings to one per day. See interv Falk, 33-34.

69. Brinsfield, 'Attack on the Pentagon: The Ministry of Army Chaplains;' 58; "PFAC After Action

Report," 12-14,

70. "PFAC After Action Report," 125.

71. Ibid, 126.

72. Interv Falk, 16.

73. Ibid, 17.

74. intervJaworski, 39.

75. Brinsfield,"Attack on the Pentagon: The Ministry of Army Chaplains," 136.

76. Interv Kuhn, 19.

77. Interv Puryear, 24 Sep 02, 3-6,9.

78. Interv Falk, 26-27.

79. "PFAC After Action Report;' 21, 46-77; Brinsfield, "Attack on the Pentagon: The Ministry of Army

Chaplains,' 59; interv Falk, 26, 27; interv Perryman, 15; interv BrownWahler, 7-8.

80. Interv Falk, 35; the wounded were considered a medical responsibility and also excluded, which,

according to interv BrownWahler, 13, left them "out of the loop.

81. Brinsfield,"Attack on the Pentagon: The Ministry of Army Chaplains," 58.

250
Notes to Pages 197-205

82. Interv Falk, 29.

83. Ibid, 17; interv BrownWahler, 13.

84. Some staff expressed concern that the donations became excessive and commercialized and were inefficiently screened for security, distribution, and other purposes.

85. Interv BrownWahler, 16.

86. Interv Falk, 25.

87. Ibid, 32.

88. "PFAC After Action Report;' 18; interv Stair, 20, notes that a list of the volunteers required about 40

pages of Excel spreadsheets.

89. Memo DASD (Molino) for DASs Army, Air Force, PDAS Navy,"On-Going Support for Families of

Victims of the Pentagon Attack;' 5 Oct 01, Doc 30, and PRRO briefing, 10 Oct 01, Doc 49, both in

OpNE CMH.

90. SOP for PRRO, 1 Oct 01, Doc 48, and PRRO info briefing, 10 Oct 01, Doc 52, both in OpNE

CMH;'ACS After-Action Report," briefing 14 Mar 02, 19ff.; intervJohnson and Gifford, 51, 57-58.

91. A briefing stated that 66 percent of the "missing persons" had been positively identified as of 7 October

2001; see PFARRO info brief, 7 Oct 01, 2, Doc 55, OpNE CMH.

92. Rossow, Uncommon Strength, 97-98; interv Bethke, Campbell, and Brown, 106, 108; interv BrownWahler, 17.

93. Interv Kuhn, 29; interv Falk, 2, 3.

AFTERWORD

1. OSD, Status Report, 1 Mar 99, 57-59.

2. Memo Ralph Newton (DepDir Real Estate and Facilities) for AdminAsst to SecA et al, 24 Sep 01,

OSD Hist.

3. Public Statements: Rumsfeld 2001, 3:2162; Public Papers: Bush 2001, 2:1217.

4. OSD, Status Report, 1 Mar 02, ii, 17-19.

5. Ibid, 1 Mar 03,6, 17-19; ibid, 1 Mar 02, ii; ibid, 1 Mar 04,4; Gerry Gilmore, "Pentagon Phoenix Project Workers Are Heroes, Wolfowitz Says;' 11 Sep 02, AFPS News Articles, news archive, http://

www.defenselink.mil.

6. WHS Building Circular, PBM-01-1, 7 May 02, OSD Hist.

7. Kathleen T. Rhem, "Military Clergymen Dedicate Pentagon Memorial Chapel;' 12 Nov 02, AFPS

News Articles, news archive, http://www.defenselink.mil; Tara Bahrampour, "Pentagon Pulls Veil

From Hallowed Spot;' Washington Post, 11 Sep 05, 1.

8. OSD, Status Report, 1 Mar 04, 19-21; ibid, 1 Mar 05, 19; Timothy Dwyer,"9-11 Memorial to Reflect

Pangs of Loss, Recollections ofJoy,' Washington Post, 16Jun 06, BI.

9. Steve Vogel, "Lost, and Sometimes, Never Found;' Washington Post, 13 Sep 02, B1; Frank S. Murray,

"Pentagon Celebrates Rebuilding; Honors Dead;' Washington Times, 12 Sep 02, 1.

10. DoD,"Defense of Freedom Medal Unveiled," news release 463-01, 27 Sep 01, and DoD,"Department of the Navy Honors Pentagon Heroes;' news release 642-01, 17 Dec 01, both at releases

archive, http://www.defenselink.mil; Lisa Burgess,"FBI Turns Pentagon Crash Site Over to Army

for Rebuilding, Renovation Phase;' Stars and Stripes, 28 Sep 01, 1-2; Linda D. Kozaryn, "Pentagon

Honors First Responders for Valor," 6 Mar 02, AFPS News Articles, news archive, http://www.

defenselink.mil.

251
Selected Bibliography

Most of the information for this book was derived from the hundreds of

oral history interviews with participants in the events of 9/11 and the days that

followed. The interviews were conducted by the historical offices of the military

services and OSD; they are in the possession of the originating offices as indicated in the list below. Also of prime importance were a number of published

and unpublished reports that merit special acknowledgement. The published

reports include The Pentagon Building Performance Report; Thoe 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the

United States; and Uncommon Strength: The Story of the US. Army Office of the

Deputy Chief of Stafffor Personnel during the Attack on the Pentagon, 11 September

2001. Two unpublished reports were especially helpful: "Building Performance

Evaluation, The 9-11 Terrorist Attack-Pentagon" and the 'Arlington County

After-Action Report on the Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attack on

the Pentagon."

INTERVIEWS

Air Force Historical Support Office, Washington, D.C.

Beavers, Craig. Interviewed by George Watson, 6 December 2001.

Carlton, Paul K. Interviewed by Perryjamieson andJames S. Nanney, 4 December 2001.
Bibliography

Cayer, Richard. Interviewed by George Watson, 29 November 2001.

Smoot, Jacob. Interviewed by George Watson, 5 December 2001.

Weishaar, Daniel. Interviewed by George Watson, 23 January 2002.

Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Arlington, Va.

Alexander, Coneleous. Interviewed by Richard Hunt, 5 November 2001.

Austin, Brian and Steve Pennington. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 9 November 2006.

Brady, John. Interviewed by Richard Hunt, 5 November 2001.

Brassell, Kathleen and John Harris. Interviewed by Stuart Rochester and Roger Trask, 1

November 2001.

Breeden, Timothy M. Interviewed by Richard Hunt, 5 December 2001.

Bryant, Michael. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 31 October 2001.

Cambone, Stephen A. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, 8 July 2002.

Candido, Robert H. Interviewed by Richard Hunt, 12 December 2001.

Carter, Steven. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 19 November 2001.

Chu, David. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, 1 February 2002.

Clarke, Victoria. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, 2 July 2002.

Cochran, Marion,Jr. (Snake). Interviewed by Diane Putney, 3 December 2001.

Combs, Christopher. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg, Diane Putney, and Rebecca Welch,

11 July 2005.

Condrell, Stacie. Interviewed by Ronald Landa and Rebecca Cameron, 30 October 2001.

Conques, Anthony. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 25 October 2001.

Cooke, David 0. (Doc). Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg and Diane Putney, 18 October

2001.

Cox, Robert. Interviewed by Richard Hunt, 15 November 2001.

Davis, Aubrey and Gilbert Oldach. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 20 July 2006.

Di Rita, Lawrence. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg and Stuart Rochester, 27 June 2002.

Dooley, Michael. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 5 December 2001.

Evey, Lee. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg and Diane Putney, 22 October 2001.

Fitzharris, Rich. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg, Roger Trask, and Rebecca Cameron, 12

December 2001.

Friedl, Joseph. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Welch, 28 October 2003.

Giambastiani, Edmund P., Jr. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, 18

July 2002 and 1 August 2002.

Gibbs, Chuck. See Gray, Gibbs, and Smith.

Godfrey, Steven L. Interviewed by Richard Hunt, 7 November 2001.

Gray, Frances A. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 8 November 2001.

Gray, Randy, Chuck Gibbs, and Jerome Dale Smith. Interviewed by Rebecca Welch and

Nancy Berlage, 3 February 2006.

Greenwell, Kathryn. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 9 November 2001.

Harper, Randall. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 14 July 2006.

Haselbush, Paul K. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg Stuart Rochester, and Diane Putney,

19 October 2001.

254
Bibliography

Hilliard, Leroy. Interviewed by Richard Hunt, 6 November 2001.

Irby, John F. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 19 November 2001.

Jester, John. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg, Diane Putney, and Stuart Rochester, 19 October 2001.

. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 31 January 2006.

Judd, Nancy. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 29 October 2001.

Kelly, Jack. See Viner and Kelly.

Kilsheimer, Allyn. Interviewed by Ronald Landa and Rebecca Cameron, 29 October 2001.

Kuney, Donald and Brian McGuire. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 26 October 2001.

Luczak, Linda. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 7 November 2001.

McCormick, Charles. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 25 October 2001.

McGuire, Brian. See Kuney and McGuire.

Morris, Matthew. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 5 December 2001.

Murphy, DanielJ. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 28 November 2001.

Nelson, Rick. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 9 November 2001.

Nesbitt, Michael. Interviewed by Stuart Rochester and Roger Trask, 7 November 2001.

____. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 19 June 2006.

Newton, Ralph. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 19 November 2001.

Oldach, Gilbert. See Davis and Oldach.

Pennington, Steve. See Austin and Pennington.

Phillips, James. Interviewed by Stuart Rochester and Richard Hunt, 9 November 2001.

Pickens, Edwin. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, 23 October 2001.

Pugrud, John. Interviewed by Stuart Rochester and Roger Trask, 1 November 2001.

Rabogliatti, R. E. Interviewed by Richard Hunt, 5 November 2001.

Robinson, John. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 5 December 2001.

Rumsfeld, Donald H. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, 23 December 2002.

Smith, Dennis. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 29 October 2001.

Smith, Jerome Dale. See Gray, Gibbs, and Smith.

Stanton, Tom. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg, Diane Putney, Nancy Berlage, and Rebecca

Welch, 14 March 2006.

Stout, William. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 23 June 2006.

Sullivan, Michael. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg and Diane Putney, 18 October 2001.

Viner, William and Jack Kelly. Interviewed by Ronald Landa and Rebecca Cameron, 25

October 2001.

Wassel, Joseph M. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, 9 April 2003.

Wolfowitz, Paul. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, 19 April 2002.

Woodson, Alvina. Interviewed by Diane Putney, 8 November 2001.

Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, Va.

Blevins, Jeffrey. Interviewed by Fred Allison, 13 December 2001.

Bohn, Keith. Interviewed by Gary Solis, 19 November 2001.

Burroughs, Charles. Interviewed by Fred Allison, 5 December 2001.

255
Bibliography

Defina, Michael T. Interviewed by Fred Allison, 3 December 2001.

Drumming, Charles J. Interviewed by Fred Allison, 18 December 2001.

Durrer, John T. Interviewed by Fred Allison, 3 December 2001.

Farrington, Michael K. Interviewed by Fred Allison, 18 December 2001.

Garofola, TimothyJ. Interviewed by Fred Allison, 20 September 2001.

Henry, Cary. Interviewed by Fred Allison, 5 December 2001.

Hood, WalterJ. Interviewed by Fred Allison, 5 December 2001.

Howes, Charles Thomas. Interviewed by Fred Allison, 3 December 2001.

Lugaila, James. Interviewed by Fred Allison, 19 November 2001.

Martin, James B. Interviewed by Fred Allison, 12 December 2001.

McKethan, Gary. Interviewed by Fred Allison, 20 December 2001.

Mix, Ronald. Interviewed by Fred Allison, 13 December 2001.

Murphy, Michael K. Interviewed by Fred Allison, 5 December 2001.

Murphy, Peter M. Interviewed by Gary Solis, 19 September 2001.

Ramsey, Charles H. Interviewed by Fred Allison, 30 November 2001.

Schuetz, Dustin P. Interviewed by Fred Allison, 13 September 2001.

Thompson, Adrian H. Interviewed by Fred Allison, 12 December 2001.

Thumann, John and Richard Zegowitz. Interviewed by Fred Allison, 20 December 2001.

Tinsley, David. Interviewed by Fred Allison, 20 December 2001.

Vafier, James. Interviewed by Gary Solis, 8 January 2002.

Vera, Michael. Interviewed by Fred Allison, 20 September 2001.

Zegowitz, Richard. See Thumann and Zegowitz.

Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

Arendt, Douglas. Interviewed by Gary Hall, Carol O'Hagan, and Kathleen Wright, 1

March 2002.

Balisle, Phillip. Interviewed by Gary Hall and Michael McDaniel, 28 June 2002.

Bond, Gale Wallace. Interviewed by Gary Hall, Michael McDaniel, Carol O'Hagan, Karen

Loftus, Kathleen Wright, andJeff Luthi, 14 November 2001.

Braswell, Donald. Interviewed by Michael McDaniel, 30 October 2001.

BrownWahler, Yvette. Interviewed by Gary Hall, Carol O'Hagan, Karen Loftus, and Kathleen Wright, 30 January 2002.

Burchell, Kenneth S. Interviewed by Gary Hall, Michael McDaniel, Carol O'Hagan, Karen

Loftus, and Kathleen Wright, 20 November 2001.

Capers, Charles. Interviewed by Michael McDaniel, 2 November 2001.

Cole, Sarah. Interviewed by Michael McDaniel and Richard Fahy, 6 December 2001.

Cordero, Kathy. Interviewed by Carol O'Hagan, Robert Sawyer, and Kathleen Wright, 4

March 2002.

Crane Group #1. Interviewed by Gary Hall, Michael McDaniel, and Kathleen Wright, 25

February 2002.

Crane Group #2. Interviewed by Gary Hall, Michael McDaniel, and Kathleen Wright, 25

February 2002.

256
Bibliography

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2001.

Eberhart, Arthur R. Interviewed by Robert J. Cressman and Timothy L. Francis, 15 January 2002.

Falk, Mary Margaret (Meg). Interviewed by Randy Papadopoulos, Julie Kowalski, and

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Galey, Ronald. Interviewed by Gary Hall, Michael McDaniel, Carol O'Hagan, Karen

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Gonzales, Paul. Interviewed by Carol O'Hagan, Karen Loftus, and Robert Sawyer, 13 February 2002.

Gully, Steven. Interviewed by Michael McDaniel and Richard Fahy, 6 December 2001.

Hanfling, Daniel. Interviewed by Lara Bornstein, 7 December 2001.

Hazelwood, Kevin. Interviewed by Carol O'Hagan and Kathleen Wright, 28January 2002.

Henson, Jarrell. Interviewed by Michael McDaniel and Gary Hall, 23 January 2002.

Humbert, Megan. Interviewed by Gary Hall, Michael McDaniel, and Karen Loftus, 4 January 2002.

Ingersoll, Jason. Interviewed by Carol O'Hagan, Robert Sawyer, and Kathleen Wright, 28

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Kern, Dennis. Interviewed by Gary Hall and Michael McDaniel, 24 January 2002.

Lescault, Randall. Interviewed by Michael McDaniel and Karen Loftus, 27 November

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Lewis, Charles. Interviewed by Gary Hall and Michael McDaniel, 25 April 2002.

Lhuillier, Jason. Interviewed by Michael McDaniel and Carol O'Hagan, 13 December

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Livingstone, Susan. Interviewed by Gary Hall, Michael McDaniel, and Randy Papadopoulos, 19 February 2002.

Lutgen, Deborah. Interviewed by Andre Sobocinski, 7 December 2001.

Masso, Edward. Interviewed by Michael McDaniel and Gary Hall, 11 December 2001.

Mathias, Melven. Interviewed by Gary Weir, 12 December 2001.

Mayer, Thomas. Interviewed by Lara Bornstein, 29 November 2001.

McAtee, Thomas. Interviewed by Randy Papadopoulos and Thomas Blake, 25 September

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McDonner, James. Interviewed by Gary Hall and Michael McDaniel, 13 December 2001.

McGuire, Jean. Interviewed by Andre Sobocinski, 7 December 2001.

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PERSONAL ACCOUNTS

U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.

Collier, Craig, 13 September 2001.

McNair, Philip, 29 October 2001.

Stauber, Ricky S., 11 October 2001.

Stone, Jeanette, 10 October 2001.

Wallace, Roy, n.d.

Virginia State Police, Area 45 Office, Arlington, Va.

Middleton, Michael S., n.d.

Wimbish, Myrlin, 23 November 2001.

AUDIO AND VIDEO RECORDINGS

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REPORTS

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UNPUBLISHED PAPERS AND MANUSCRIPTS

"Command Performance: County Firefighters Take Charge of the 9-11 Pentagon Emergency."

Paper by Pamela Varley for Arnold Howitt for Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness atJohn F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2003.

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Office. n.d.

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htm.

Pemble, Charles W., III."Forensic Dentistry and Forensic Dental Identification." Keesler Air

Force Base teaching manuscript. Updated 2001.

Rosenbaum, Eric, Sean P. Hunt, and Diane Pitts for Hughes Associates, Inc. Fire Science and

Engineering. "Review of 9/11 Pentagon Scenario from the Fire Fighters; Fire Marshal's and

Fire Protection Engineer's Perspectives:" Slide show printout. n.d.

Shirer, Frank. "MDW Engineer Company:' U.S. Army Center of Military History. n.d.

Titus, Leo J., Jr.'A Review of the Temporary Shoring Used to Stabilize the Pentagon after the

Terrorist Attacks of September 11th, 2001:' Paper submitted to the Department of Civil

Engineering, University of Maryland, May 2002.

266
Acknowledgements

It is impossible to acknowledge all those who lent advice, assistance, and

support to this endeavor. Those who made particularly noteworthy contributions,

in addition to those mentioned already in the Preface, include the following:

The leaders of the JCS and military service historical offices participated

in oversight and support of the project throughout, reviewing drafts, furnishing information, and offering encouragement. They are: Brigadier General David

Armstrong (USA Ret), Director, Joint Staff Historical Office; Jeffrey Clarke,

Chief Historian, U.S. Army Center of Military History; William Dudley, Director, Naval Historical Center; Rear Admiral Paul Tobin (USN Ret), Director,

Naval Historical Center; Richard Anderegg, Director, Air Force History; and

Charles Melson, Senior Historian, Marine Corps Historical Center.

At all stages of the project, particularly relating to the physical aspects of

the Pentagon building, Georgine Glatz, Chief Engineer of the Pentagon Renovation Program Office, provided constant guidance and invaluable advice including

close reading and review of drafts of the manuscript.

Stephen Lofgren of the U.S. Army Center of Military History directed

the extensive Army 9/11 oral history program and provided an insightful critique

of the original draft.
Ackno wle,ýgem nts

Catherine Zickafoose, Brenda White, and the staff of the OSD Graphics Office lent expert assistance with charts, photographs, and graphic elements.

Shannon Giles skillfully prepared the text and layout of the book.

Paul Dorsette of DoD's Document Automation and Production Service and Michael Barnes and Cheryl Hall of the U.S. Government Printing

Office provided critical help on procurement issues; GPO's Jeffrey Turner, Lottie Mitchell, Maureen Whelan, and Jennifer Wilson offered generous advice and

assistance on publication planning.

Elaine Everly of the OSD Historical Office performed the indispensable

and onerous task of checking citations for the documentation for the book, participated in the editing, and assisted with preparation of the appendices.

Ruth Sharma of the OSD Historical Office typed, checked, and tracked

numerous drafts of the manuscript with her usual skill and reliability.

Interviewees and interviewers who contributed to the project are listed in

the bibliography.

Among others who deserve mention, their names listed in alphabetical order, are: Regina Akers, Deane Allen, Fred Allison, Joseph Balkoski, Jeffrey Barlow, Pamela Bennett, Mattia Bernardoni, Robert Boyd, William Brazis, Jacqui Brown, Jaya Chaterjee, Anthony Conques, Graham Cosmas, Robert

Cressman, Sandy Doyle, Mark Evans, John Fox, Timothy Francis, Gerard Francisco, James Garamone, John Glennon, John Greenwood, Charles Gross, Caitlin

Hitt, Stephen Holl, William Hopper, Amy Hunt, Richard Hunt, Perry Jamieson, Erno Kolodny-Nagy, Julie Kowalski, Ronald Landa, Mark Langerman,

Kathleen Lloyd, Ted Lopatkiewicz, Philip Lundeberg, Megan Maples, Jackie

McGuire, David Novak, Diane Pitts, Sarah Roberts, Max Rosenberg, Aberdeen

Sabo, Robert Schneller, John Sherwood, Thomas Stanton, David Statter, Richard Stewart, Robert Stone, Carolyn Thorne, Roger Trask, Aurelie Trur-Nicli,

George Watson, Gary Weir, Mark Wertheimer, Kathleen White, Patricia Wilson, and Jason Witteman.

268
Index

Note: For ranks of military personnel, see corresponding text.

Adams, John, 160 (AWACS), 175; F-15, 10; F-16, 13, 110,

A-E Drive, 19, 25, 32, 34, 40, 42, 43, 53-55, 174

59, 60, 109, 120, 135, 138, 141, 142, 153, al Hazmi, Nawaf, 12

172 al Hazmi, Salem, 12

Afforder, Jeff, 68 al Midhar, Khalid, 12

Ahmed, Perry, 187 al Qaeda, 8, 9, 130

air conditioning, 4, 133, 137, 139-41, 202 alarm systems, 26-27, 41, 137-38, 153, 155-

Air Force Aid Society, 193 56

Air Force One, 64n, 129, 130 Alexander, Coneleous, 169

Air Force, U.S., 53, 110-11, 134, 186-87, 205; Alexandria (Va.), City of, 13, 76, 164, 171

and air defense, 174-75; Air Mobility Alexandria Fire Department, 67, 76, 89, 92,

Command, 180; Flight Medicine Clinic, 107, 110

54, 58, 107, 108, 113; Pentagon opera- Alexandria Hospital, 37, 115, 117, 118

tions center, 129, 133, 136. See also spe- alternate command sites, 129, 132-34, 135,

cific units 136, 144, 145,201

Air National Guard, 10, 174, 175 American Airlines, 188, 191, 196, 200

air quality, 132,142-43, 144, 160 American Airlines Flight 11, 9, 10, 24n, 174

air threat conference call, 13, 131 American Airlines Flight 77, 12-14, 15-19,

aircraft: Boeing 747, 9; Boeing 757, 9, 11, 23, 24, 27, 34, 36, 44, 53, 65, 111, 135,

12, 14, 16, 17; Boeing 767, 9, 17; Boeing 136, 161; passengers on, 12, 17, 24, 191

777, 9; C-130, 16, 110; C-141, 110; E-3 American Red Cross, 101,102, 119, 123, 125,

157, 170, 192, 193, 196, 199
Indcx

American Society of Civil Engineers, 16,19 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special

Andrews Air Force Base, 16, 64n, 145, 175 Operations and Low Intensity Conflict,

Arendt, Douglas, 180, 183 54

Arlington County (Va.), 2, 13, 35, 67, 76, 84,

95, 104, 160, 164, 186, 194 Bachus, Bruce, 135, 156

Arlington County Emergency Communica- badges, 170-71

tions Center (ECC), 66, 68, 70, 95, 107 Baker, Joe, 45-46

Arlington County Emergency Operations Baker, Marc, 154

Center (EOC), 100, 101, 102, 160 Balisle, Phillip, 59, 60

Arlington County Fire Department (ACFD), Barksdale Air Force Base, 129

49, 52, 66, 94, 100, 104, 110, 127, 132, Barrett, Gerald, 58

138, 142, 151, 153, 179; and initial barriers, 6, 8, 25, 34,47,144,167

response and incident command system, Barta, Aaron, 96

66-76,89-90 Bartos, Michael, 135

Arlington County Police Department Baxter, John, 58, 107, 108-09, 113

(ACPD), 68, 73, 151, 159, 162, 163, 165, Beans, Michael, 43

166, 171,173; SWAT team, 169 Becker, Dennis, 172

Arlington County Sheriff, 102, 163 Behe, Donald, 154

Arlington National Cemetery, 14, 36, 116, Beirut, attack on U.S. Marine barracks in, 9

121, 123, 167, 193, 196, 204 Benedict, Michael, 154

Arlington Urgent Care Center, 32, 107, 115, Benton, Douglas, 146

116,118 Bereznay, Timothy, 161

Armed Forces DNA Identification Labora- Berke, Brian, 162

tory, 180, 190 Bethesda Naval Hospital. See National Naval

Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP), Medical Center

178-81 "Big Voice," 26, 156

Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AFME), bin Laden, Osama, 8

180, 190, 199 Birdwell, Brian, 44, 58-59, 109n

Army Emergency Relief Society, 193 Blankenship, Ray, 100

Army, U.S., 4, 23, 113, 134, 183, 186, 188, Blecksmith, Robert, 158

198, 205; Band, 171; Central Identifica- Blevins, Jeffrey, 156

tion Laboratory, 180; Command and Staff Blunt, Ed, 68

College, 58; Community Service, 187, Boger, Sean, 27,64,65

189; Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Boggess, Corrina, 135

and Plans (DCSOPS), 44; Information Bohn, Keith, 82, 164

Management Support Center (IMCEN), Boiling Air Force Base, 117, 136

29; Medical Museum, 179; Pentagon Bond, Gale, 184, 185

operations center (AOC), 14, 129, 133- Bonzano, James, 75

35; Quadrennial Defense Review Office, Booth,John Wilkes, 180

52-53; Resource Services-Washington Border Patrol, U.S., 163

(RSW), 28, 29, 61; Surgeon General's Boyle, Allen, 23, 120, 155

Office, 180. See also Deputy Chief of Staff Brady, John, 243n64

for Personnel (DCSPER); specific units Brahman, Chris, 29

270
Index

Braswell, Dan, 48 Carter, Linda, 197

Breeden, Timothy, 243n64 Carter, Steven, 137-40, 142, 143, 243n64

Bridges, Dick, 104 casualties, 23-24, 29, 36n, 49, 104, 113, 117,

Bright, Mark, 152 118, 133-34, 143, 145, 194, 231n38

Brown, Albert, 184 casualty officers, 181, 190-91, 199

Brown, David, 140 Caswell, William, 24

Brown, Lorie, 108, 112, 113 Center Court, Pentagon, 2, 80, 83, 87, 109,

Brown, Prince, 184 111, 122, 138, 140, 153, 174, 178

Brown, Richard, 155 Centner, Bruce, 154

BrownWahler, Yvette, 188, 194, 198 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 150

Bruno, Eduardo, 30 Chada, John, 29

Bryant, Michael, 137, 143 Chaloupka, Richard, 184

Bryson, Robert, 183-84 Chandler, Michael, 170

Bucci, Suzanne, 113 change of command, 73, 104, 127, 174

Building Management Office, 137, 138, 139, Chapa, Rosa Maria, 34

142, 155 chaplains, 118-19, 124, 187, 192, 195, 196-

Building Operations Command Center 97

(BOCC), 137, 138, 142,143 Cheney, Richard, 61, 129, 131,171, 175

BukowskiJohn, 173 Chiarelli, Peter, 14, 134, 135

Burchell, Kenneth, 162 Chu, David, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Clark, Vernon, 133, 134

(ATF), 165 Clarke, Victoria, 145

Burlingame, Charles, 191 classified documents, 167, 172-73

Burroughs, Charles, 91 Cleary, Thomas, 58

Burrow, Laurie, 48 Clinton, Bill, 158, 245n27

Bush, George W, 64, 105, 128, 129, 173, 202 Clodfelter, George, 154

Coast Guard, U.S., 164

Cable News Network (CNN), 134, 137 Cochran, Marion (Snake), 173

Calderon-Olmedo, Jose Orlando, 40 Cole, Sarah, 33, 34

Camp David, 84 Collier, Craig, 26, 84

Camp Unity, 101,170 combat air patrols, 131, 174-75

Campbell, Charlie, 65 Combs, Christopher, 61, 62, 76, 82, 84, 103,

Campbell, Harold, 93, 183, 184, 191, 192 157, 158, 159, 160

Candido, Robert, 140, 243n64 command and control, 67, 72-77, 128, 130,

CanikJames, 190 158, 201-02

Capers, Charles, 33-34 communications, 75, 77, 82, 114, 131, 132,

Capitol, U.S., 9, 13, 163, 164, 165 153, 156-57, 168, 190

Carden, Martha, 41-42 Condrell, Stacie, 90

Cardenas, Sam, 48 Conques, Anthony, 146

Carlee, Ron, 101 continuity of operations, 128, 129, 132, 135,

Carlton, Paul,Jr., 55, 57, 109, 136 136, 139, 143

CarnahanJean, 197 Cook, Richard, 243n64

Carpenter, W. T., 154

271
Index

Cooke, David (Doc), 8, 143, 146, 152, 155, Department of Justice, U.S., 158, 165, 178,

157 188

Copeland, Michael, 248n71 Department of Labor, U.S., 143. See also

Corcoran, William, 170 Occupational Health and Safety AdminCordero, Kathy, 34-35 istration

Cornwell, Robert, 68, 73, 75 Department of State, U.S., 150, 164

Cox, Kenny, 55 Department of the Treasury, U.S., 163, 165

Cox, Richard, 13, 66 Department of Veterans Affairs National

Cox, Robert, 147 Center for Post-Traumatic Stress DisorCrane group. See Navy, U.S. der, 192

crime scene, 61, 144, 157-61, 167, 179 Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Army

crisis action teams, 117, 134,135, 136 (DCSPER), 36, 37, 40-43, 57, 115, 117,

Cruz-Cortez, Roxanne, 30 183

Crystal City, 70, 119, 146, 169, 186, 198 Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Family

Volunteer Group, 193

Daly, James, 162 DeVaughn, Jesse, 153

Dares Salaam, attack on U.S. Embassy in, 9 DeWitt Army Hospital, 113

Davidson, William, 146 Di Rita, Lawrence, 240n8

Davies, John, 58-60 Diaz, Abraham, 154

Davis, Aubrey, 130, 240n4 Dickerson, Jerry, 53

Davis, David, 123 DiLorenzo Tricare Health Clinic, 32, 43, 58,

Davison Army Airfield, 179 71,107, 108, 109, 111, 115, 138, 142

declaration of disaster, 101, 2 45n26 DiPaula, Michael, 82

Defense Condition, 131. See also Threat Con- disabled workers, 47, 48, 156

dition District of Columbia Fire and Emergency

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 34, 52, Services, 67, 69, 72, 78, 80, 85, 91, 104,

83, 183, 188, 189, 191,205 107

Defense Protective Service (DPS), 26, 63n, District of Columbia Harbor Patrol, 156,

82, 108, 114, 137, 149-51 155-57, 159, 164

173, 175, 176, 205; Communications District of Columbia Metropolitan Police

Center, 152-53, 157; and post-fire inves- Department, 125, 162, 163,165

tigation, 160-63, 166-73; Protective Ser- DNA, 182, 183, 190

vices Unit, 150; Security Services Branch, Dodge, Russell, Jr., 68, 69

156. See also Emergency Response Team dogs, 106, 125-27, 164, 169, 193

Defina, Michael, 69-70, 72, 79, 80, 89 Dolan, Robert, 55, 57

Delaney, William, 53 donations, 101-02, 170, 193,197-98

Dennis, Wade, 173 Dooley, Keith, 167

Department of Defense, U.S. (DoD), 3,4, 24, Dooley, Michael, 173

104, 127, 128, 132, 148, 150, 177, 178, Dorn, Alan, 68

186, 191,200, 201, 204 Dougherty,Jay, 188

Department of Health and Human Services, Dover Air Force Base, 127, 178, 179, 180,

U.S., 102, 160 181,182, 184

272
Index

Dover Port Mortuary, 127, 177, 178, 179, Falkenberg, Zoe, 195

180, 181, 185, 190, 191, 193, 199 Fallon, William, 133

Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), 169 Falls Church (Va.) Fire Department, 76

Drumming, Charles, 92 family assistance, 177, 187-200

Dulles International Airport, 9, 12, 16, 17,72, Farrar, Robert, 123, 125

76, 117,161, 188 Farrington, Michael, 124

DurrerJohn, 70, 85 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 10,

12, 13,62,131,132,165,174

Earhart, Edward, 31, 32 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 61, 73,

Eberhart, Arthur, 122, 158, 174, 239n47, 103, 104, 132, 149, 159, 160, 176, 183,

248n76 189, 191, 199; Joint Operations Center,

81st Dental Squadron, 182 103, 146, 161; National Capital Response

Eikenberry, Karl, 44-45 Squad, 76, 245; readmits Pentagon emelectrical system, 88, 133, 135, 137, 141-42, ployees, 170-72; and remains recovery,

147 120-23, 124-26; Washington field office,

Ellis, Donald, 243n64 62, 158. See also forensic investigation

Ellis, Thomas, 183-84 Federal Emergency Management Agency

Emergency Medical Services (EMS), 51, 52, (FEMA), 97, 99, 106, 119, 126, 157, 158,

67,68,73,85, 107,110,112 160, 166, 193; Incident Support Team,

Emergency Response Team, DPS, 150, 159 98

Emswiler, Thomas, 188, 192 Federal Employee Education and Assistance

England, Gordon, 133, 134, 197 Fund, 193

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Federal Facilities Division, 143, 147, 156

102, 143 Federal Law Enforcement Training Center,

evacuations, 26, 49, 60, 62, 80, 82-85, 91, 94, 150

108, 111-12, 140; and Defense Protective Federal Response Plan, 157-58. See also

Service, 60, 153, 155, 156 National Response Plan

Executive Support Center, 131, 132 54th Quartermaster Company (Mortuary

exercises, 69, 107, 108, 115, 137, 175; Cloudy Affairs), Army, 126

Office, 151; Global Guardian, 131 fire suppression doors, 46, 48

eyewitnesses: and crash, 15, 16,27,61,62,65, firefighting, 69, 70, 77-79, 80, 82, 85, 86-9 1,

111, 152; and low-flying plane, 13, 14,66 111

Fisher, Gerald, 36

Fairfax City (Va.) Fire Department, 76 Fitzharris, Richard, 90, 91

Fairfax County (Va.), 73, 76, 164,194 503rd Military Police Battalion (Airborne),

Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department, 173

76,89, 102, 104, 107, 117 512th Memorial Affairs Squadron, 179

Fairfax County Police Department, 73, 163, flags, 104-05, 174, 196, 198, 202

179 Flocco, Matthew, 31, 32

Fairfax Hospital, 115, 116, 117, 118 Flood, Glenn, 151

Falk, Meg, 186-87, 188, 193, 194, 196, 198, Flynn, Edward, 103, 151, 162, 165

199 Force Protection Condition, 152, 157, 168

Falkenberg, Dana, 204 forensic investigation, 178-83, 190

273
11dcx

Forest Service, U.S., 102 Grant, Regina, 40-42

Fort Belvoir, 96, 113, 119, 166, 179 Graphics, OSD, 167

Fort Belvoir Fire Department, 68,76 Graves, James, 242n40, 243n64

Fort Benning, 173 Gray, Randy, 75, 159, 234n32

Fort Bliss, 173 "Green Ramp" disaster, 110

Fort Bragg, 173 Greenbelt (Md.) Fire Department, 90

Fort Lee, 178 Greenwell, Kathryn, 137-38, 140, 142,

Fort McNair, 96, 110,165-66 243n64

Fort Myer, 76, 103, 106, 107, 110, 114, 118, Griggs,James, 155

120, 146, 161, 173, 195 Grunewald, Robert, 41-42

Fort Myer Military Community Fire Depart- Gully, Steven, 33, 34

ment, 66-70, 76, 78, 80, 84, 90 Gunhus, Gaylord T., 119

Fort Stewart, 173

Foster, Sandra, 34 Hackney, Rebecca, 162-63, 164, 165

436th Dental Flight, 182 Hadley, Stephen, 240n8

436th Services Squadron, 179 Hale, Christian, 247n70

Foust, Barry, 13, 66 Hale-McKinzy, Diane, 45

Frauman,Joshua, 124 Hamre,John, 2 43n3

Freeman, Anthony, 140, 243n64 Harper, Randall, 168, 247n58

fuel explosions, 16-17, 17, 20, 37, 40, 79 Harris, William, 69

Haselbush, Paul, 143-44, 152

Galey, Ron, 162 Hawkins, Kevin, 243n64

Gallop, April, 30 Hayden, Thomas, 243n64

Gallop, Elisha, 30 Hazelwood, Kevin, 90

Gargano, Michael, 243n64 Heating and Refrigeration Plant, 6, 136-37,

Garofola, Timothy, 45-46 139, 140

gas line, 2 42 n40 helicopters, 64n, 77, 114, 132, 135, 145, 153,

Geiling,James, 108, 113 161-62, 163

General Services Administration (GSA), 146 Heliport area, 27, 45, 51, 64, 65, 67, 69, 70,

generator for Wedge 1, 141-42 81, 88, 89, 90, 110, 130, 154, 161,204

George Washington University Hospital, 30, Hemenway, Ronald, 204

115, 116,118 Henry, Cary, 70, 85

Georgetown University Hospital, 44, 59, 116 Hensen, Chad, 138

Giambastiani, Edmund, 130 Henson, Darrell (Jerry), 56-57

Gibbs, Chuck, 68, 70, 75, 79, 82, 91, 2 34n32, hijackers, 9-10, 12, 131

235n53 Hilliard, Leroy, 243n64

Gilroy, Dennis, 68,69,80, 234n35 Hodge, Thomas, 51,68

Glasbrenner, Karl, 83 Hodges, Fred, 154

Glidewell,Jennifer, 108 Hoffman Building, 172

Godbehere, Eric, 96-97 Hogan, Wallace, 45

Golinski, Ronald, 204 Hogue, Robert, 45-46

Gonzales, Paul, 34-35 holes in C Ring wall, 19,25, 32, 33, 34, 53, 54,

Goodnight, Kenneth, 243n64 55, 59,65, 141,160, 172

274
Index

Holl, Stephen, 164, 165 Joint Operations Center. See Federal Bureau

Homer, Herbert, 24 of Investigation (FBI)

Hood, Walter, Jr., 78 Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), 245n29

Ho'opi'i, Isaac, 154, 244n16 Jones, James, 134

Horoho, Patricia, 109-10, 111 Jones, Thomas, 183-84

horsehair insulation, 92n Judd, Nancy, 144

Howes, Charles, 78, 85, 92 Jumper, John, 136

Hudson, J.B., 146

Huleatt, William, 192 Kaiser, Andrea, 66

Humbert, Megan, 33, 34 Keane,John, 135

Hymel, Robert, 34 Keesler Air Force Base, 182

Keevill, Richard, 163

Incident Command Post, 73, 76, 78, 82, 103, Kelley, Shawn, 103

157, 159, 169 Kelly, Sean, 52

Incident Command System, 72, 74, 77, 102, Kelly, William, 241n23

103, 175 Kensinger, Philip, 45

Incident Commander, 67, 73, 76, 104, 138, Kern, Dennis, 47-48

174 Khobar Towers, 9

Incident Support Team. See Federal Emer- Kidd, Jacqueline, 27,64,65

gency Management Agency (FEMA) Kilsheimer, Allyn, 100

Ingersoll, Jason, 159, 245n30 Kim, Yong, 243n64

Inova Emergency Care Center, 116, 118 KinnardJohn, 154

Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Knoblauch, Karl, 44, 57, 59

Operations Plan, 158 KoerberJames, 154, 157, 247n58

Internal Revenue Service, 193 Kuhn, Thomas, 195

International Monetary Fund, 69, 161 Kuney, Donald, 139-41,147, 242n40, 243n64

Irby, John, 137, 143, 156 Kurtz, Louise, 29

Ivanov, Sergei, 131

Ivory, Lacey, 36 La Raia,John, 146

Ladd, Brian, 68-69,70

Jack, Bryan, 24, 191 Lange, David, 104

Jackson, James, 51, 96, 103, 104, 146, 166, Langley Air Force Base, 10, 13, 174, 175

174 Lasher, Tim, 80

Jackson, Michelle, 170 legal assistance, 188, 192-93, 199

Jaley, Carl, 157 Leibner, Lincoln, 61-62

Jaworski, Robert, 28, 194 Leidig, Charles, Jr., 13

Jennings, Lorraine, 110 Lescault, Randall, 84

Jester, John, 143, 144, 150, 151-53, 156, 157, Levin, Carl, 145

159, 170, 176, 247n58 Lewis, Charles, 56

Johnson, Delores, 189 Lewis, Mark, 135, 241n23

Johnson, Dennis, 41-42 Lhuillier, Jason, 33, 34

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 4,129, 131, 145, Lincoln, Abraham, 179-80

155, 196 Lirette, Paul, 54, 55, 113

275
Liswell, Bernard, 169 McKinnon, William, 57-58, 83

Litchfield, Glen, 124 McNair, Philip, 41-43

Livingstone, Susan, 47-48 McNeil, William, 155

Logan International Airport, 9 Medairos, Robert, 162

logistics, 75, 100-02 Medal for the Defense of Freedom, 205

Long, Greg, 78 Medal for Valor, 205

Long, Stephen, 41, 42 memorial service, 11 October 2001, 173, 200,

Long, Susan, 33 202

Los Angeles, 9, 12 memorials, 169, 198,200,203-04

Loudoun County (Va.) Fire Department, 76 Metropolitan Washington Airports AuthorLugaila, James, 126 ity (MWAA), 66

Lutgen, Deborah, 107 Metropolitan Washington Council of GovLynch,James, 204 ernments, 73, 151, 164

Lynch, Terrence, 36 Mickley, Patricia, 34

Middleton, Michael, 244n17

Maguire, Brian, 140,141,243n64 Milam, Ronald, 36

maintenance of building utilities, 136-48, 202 Military District of Washington (MDW), 51,

Malmquist, Matthew, 125 172, 179, 185; engineer company, 95-100,

Mapp, Robins, 154 102, 106, 119, 166, 194; Engineer CoinMarine Corps, U.S., 4, 9, 51 53, 54, 120, 163, pany Initial Reconnaissance Team (IRT),

187, 205; in air defense, 175; Command 96-97.

Center, 133; photographers, 106, 121, military police, 149, 169-70, 173

159 Mint Police, U.S. (Treasury Department),

Marshal Service, U.S., 168, 171 163

Marshall, George C., 1 mold, 147, 167, 202

Marshall, Shelley, 34 Montgomery County (Md.), 76, 164, 194

Martin, James, 72, 87, 91 Montgomery County Fire Department, 76

Maryland National Guard, 195 Moody, Sheila, 28, 29

Mattson, Dean, 29 Moore, Linda, 44

Maude, Timothy, 36-37,41 Moqed, Majed, 12

Mausert-Mooney, John, 186 Morris, Matthew, 141-42

Maxfield, Betty, 40,42 Morrison, Christine, 35-36

Maxwell, Robert, 29 mortuary operations, 178-86, 190, 191, 193,

Mayer, Thomas, 117 199. See also Dover Port Mortuary

McAtee, Thomas, 133-34 Mott, Robert, 78

McCloud, Robert, 147, 243n64 Moy, Teddington, 29

McCormick, Charles, 138, 241n30, 243n64 Munoz, Gilbert, 124

McCoy, Steve, 66 Murphy, Daniel, 140, 243n64

McDonnerJames, 156-57 MurphyJames, 154

McGuire Air Force Base, 136 Murphy, Michael, 78,90

McGuire, Jean, 115 Murphy, Peter, 45-46

McKeown, Nancy, 31-32, 55 mutual aid agreements, 67, 73, 76n, 163, 164,

McKethan, Gary, 86 165

276
Index

Myers, John, 123 988th Military Police Company, 173

Myers, Richard, 131 North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), 10, 12, 131,175

Nairobi, attack on U.S. Embassy in, 9 North East Air Defense Sector (NEADS),

Nash, Gordon, 133 10, 13n

National Capital Region, 96, 115, 136, 146, Northern Virginia Community Hospital,

150, 166,199 116,118

National Capital Response Squad. See Feder- Northern Virginia Response Agreement, 67

al Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Nutbrown, Curtis, 41

National Command Authority (NCA), 128,

201-02 O'Brien, Stephen, 184, 185

National Geographic Society, 24 O'Brien, Steve, 16

National Medical Response Team (NMRT), Occupational Health and Safety Administra160 tion, 102, 143

National Military Command Center (NMCC), O'Connor, Thomas, 160

13, 129, 131, 132, 136, 139, 147, 155, Office of the Administrative Assistant to the

175 Secretary of the Army, 28

National Naval Medical Center (Bethesda, Office of Family Policy, OSD, 186, 189, 199,

Md.), 110, 180 200

National Response Plan, 245n26 Office of Personnel Management (OPM),

National Transportation Safety Board, 17n, 192

160, 191,213-25 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 4,

Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), 151,186,187, 189, 198,199

133, 167, 170, 172 Office of Space Policy and Acquisition,

Navas, George, 90 WHS, 146

Navy Annex, 14, 133, 134, 141,152, 153, Offutt Air Force Base, 130, 132

154, 169 Ogletree, Natalie, 58-59

Navy Command Center (NCC), 30, 32, 34, Olaes, Dalisay, 39-40,42-43

55,60, 120,121, 129, 133, 171-72 Oldach, Gilbert, 130, 240n4

Navy Federal Credit Union, 193 Oliver, Darrell, 52-53

Navy, U.S., 4, 30, 53, 55, 59, 183, 186, Olson, Barbara, 230n14

191, 205; Bureau of Naval Personnel 115th Military Police Battalion, Maryland

(BUPERS), 184-85; Casualty Assistance National Guard, 169

Calls Office, 189; Chief of Naval Opera- O'Neill, Mark, 123

rions Intelligence Plot, 33-34; Fleet and Otis Air Force Base, 10

Family Support Center, 187-88; photographers, 121, 159; Surface Warfare Pace, Art, 119

Group, Crane, Indiana, 47-49 Parham, Ann, 37

Nesbitt, Michael, 151, 153 Park Police, U.S., 77, 82, 114, 161, 162, 164,

Newark Liberty International Airport, 9, 17 165, 167

Newton, Ralph, 143-44 Parks, Will, 84

Nieder, Alvin, 135 Parsons, Jeffrey, 163

978th Military Police Company, 173 Paull, Marshall, 245n30

277
Index

Pemble, Charles, 182 Polk Building, 199

Penn, Mark, 100-01, 102, 115, 120, 123 Powell, Craig, 55-57

Pentagon, attack on, 14-17; collapse, 20, 22, Powell, Scott, 29

48, 49, 80-82; conception, 1-2; construc- Presidential Decision Directive, 158, 234n24

tion, 2-3; diagrams of damage to, 21, 38, press conferences, 104, 145

81, 88, 94; on National Register of His- Prince George's County (Md.) Fire Departtoric Places, 4; reconstruction, 202-03; ment, 76

renovation, 4, 6, 8, 202; windows, 8, 22, Prince William County (Va.) Fire Depart45, 90, 150; workforce, 3, 6, 23 ment, 76

Pentagon Athletic Club (PAC), 108, 111, public relations, 104, 131-32, 145, 181, 189,

112,119 190

Pentagon Child Development Center, 83, Pugrud,John, 152, 156, 157

144, 165, 243 Punches, Jack, 56

Pentagon City, 157, 169 Purple Heart Medal, 185, 205

Pentagon Emergency Action Team, 241 Puryear, Cortez, 195

Pentagon Family Assistance Center (PFAC),

177, 187-92, 195-99 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 52, 53

Pentagon Family Assistance Resource and

Referral Office (PFARRO), 188, 198- Rabogliatti, R. E., 14

200 Rader Army Health Clinic, 107, 110, 114,

Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA), 116,118

173. See also Defense Protective Service Ramsey, Charles, 165

(DPS) Rasmussen, Rhonda, 204

Pentagon Metro station, 150, 154, 169, 173 Real Estate and Facilities Directorate

Pentagon Renovation Program Office (RE&F),WHS, 143, 144, 146, 147, 151,

(PENREN), 6, 90, 99, 100, 102, 135, 152,205

142, 146, 172, 202-04 Rearden, Roger, 68-69,78

Pentagon Reservation, 2, 150, 151, 162 recovering remains, 106, 119-27, 179, 195

PENTTBOM, 161 relocating workers, 146, 202

Perez, Samuel, 60 Remote Delivery Facility, 8, 71, 153, 154, 178

Perrell, Keith, 112 Reynolds, Joel, 124

Perrin, Mark, 52-53 Richon, George, 58

Personnel and Health Management Policy Rielage, Dale, 174

Office, Army, 110 Riley, Sandra, 152

Peterson, Randall, 247n70 Rimrodt, Kevin, 121-22, 159

Petrovich, Michael, 39-40,42-43 Robinson, John, 41-42, 243n64

Phillips, James, 152 Robinson, Raymond, 39

Phoenix Project, 202-03 Roche,James, 136

Pickler,John, 166 Rodriguez,Juan, 243

Pierce, Holly, 115 Roemer, Eileen, 126-27

Plaugher, Edward, 76-77, 102, 104, 132, 144, Rojas,Jose, 154

160, 166, 170, 171 Ronald Reagan Washington National AirPolasek,Jesse, 33, 34

278
Iuicdx

port, 13, 62, 89-91, 103, 162; firefighters, Sincock, Cheryle, 44

66-67,78-80,84,85 Skipper, Mark, 65-66, 69, 85

roof fire, 91-95, 97, 144, 145, 146 Skowronski, Matthew, 142

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 2 Smith, Dennis, 140, 241n30, 243n64

Rosati, Arthur, 154 Smith, Gary, 36

Rose, Tony, 40,42 Smith, Jerome Dale, 51, 68, 75, 80, 83, 139,

Roser, John, 110 232n1, 234n32, 235n53

Rosslyn, 67 Smithsonian Institution, 180

Rumsfeld, Donald, 61, 62, 93, 105, 128, 130- Social Security Administration, 193

32, 136, 139, 143, 144, 145, 146, 157, SpiveyJames, 188,194,196, 198

166,173,175,197, 202, 240n6 sprinkler system, 26, 27, 31, 41, 42, 43, 44,

Ruth, William, 40, 59 57,86

Stair, Elizabeth, 189

Sabin, Charles, 34 Starter, David, 19n, 84, 156

Safety and Occupational Health Branch, Stevens, Lois, 41,42,43

WHS, 142 Stokes, Steven, 123

Salvation Army, 101, 102, 125, 170, 193 Stout, William, 168, 247n58

Santiago, Juan Cruz, 29 Strategic Command, U.S., 130, 131

Scales, David, 40 Strickland, Larry, 36

Schuetz, Dustin, 53-54 Surette, Bruce, 68

Schwartz, James, 52, 67, 79, 80, 90, 95, 104, Sweeney, MaryJo, 134

114, 138, 157, 160, 166, 168, 174; and

EOC, 101, 102; and evacuations, 62, 77, Tarantino, David, 54-57

82, 84, 91, 111, 158; and ICS, 72, 73, 75- Taylor, Sandra, 44

77, 79; and JOC, 103; and roof fire, 91, Teepe, Karl, 34

92, 93; and searching and shoring, 95, 96, Tenet, George, 130

97, 98, 101, 119; and unified command, 10th Legal Support Organization, Army, 192

102-03 Therapy Dogs Incorporated, 193

SCIF, 33 3rd Infantry Regiment, "Old Guard," Army,

Secret Service, U.S., 13, 129, 150, 162, 165, 51, 106, 170, 174; briefing victims' fami168, 171, 173, 174 lies, 194, 196; and remains recovery, 120-

security cameras, 16, 153, 161, 162, 244n11 25, 178; security role, 166-67

Selves, Michael, 29 Thomas, David, 55-57

Sepulveda, Noel, 111 Thomas, Larry, 41

Serva, Marian, 37, 43 Thomas, William, 142

Shaeffer, Kevin, 32-33, 115 Threat Condition, 137, 151-52

Shanksville, Pa., 10, 62 311th Quartermaster Company, 178, 195

Shanower, Dan, 33-34 Thumann, John, 85-86, 89

Shelton, Hugh, 131, 145 Thurman, John, 59

Sheraton Hotel, 186, 189, 190, 192, 196, 198 time of impact, 13, 16

Sherman, Antoinette, 24, 61, 120, 177 Tinsley, David, 86

Shinseki, Eric, 134-35 Toti, William, 61, 65

Sinclair, William, 154, 244n16 Tracey, Patricia, 133, 134

279
Index

triage areas, 32, 44, 58, 62, 68, 71, 107, 108, Washington Headquarters Services (WHS),

109,111,112,119,138 6,129,137,142, 143,152, 174

TRICARE, 192 Washington Hospital Center, 33, 44, 116,

293rd Military Police Company, 173 117, 118, 162

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit

unified command, 102-03, 166, 168 Authority (WMATA/Merro), 144, 150,

United Airlines Flight 93, 10, 62, 174,175 173

United Airlines Flight 175, 9, 10, 23, 31, 136, Washington Navy Yard, 133, 134, 189

151 Wassel, Joseph, 240n6

United Services Organization (USO), 193 Weaver, Michael, 39-40

Urban Search and Rescue (US&R), 97, 99- Webb, Tracy, 39-40, 42

101, 119, 126; Fairfax County Team, 92, Webster, David, 154

95, 97-99, 119, 126; Memphis Team, 98; Weddle, Donna, 197

Montgomery County Team, 95, 97-99, White, John, 51, 75, 85, 101-02, 103, 111,

119; New Mexico Team, 98; Virginia 112, 113,236n57

Beach Team, 98 White, Maudlyn, 53

USS Cole, 9, 187,190 White, Thomas, 135, 145, 166, 197, 241n21

White House, 9, 13, 64n, 72, 132, 145, 163,

VafierJames, 110-11, 112,113 165, 174, 175

Valenzo, Vance, 68, 77, 78 Willcher, Ernest, 36

Van Alstyne, John, 187, 188, 189, 193-94, Williams, Christina, 56

195, 197, 198 Wills, Marilyn, 41-43

Vera, Michael, 53-54 Wimbish, Myrlin, 244n17

Veterans Benefits Administration, 193 Wirick, Gail, 47-48

Virginia, Commonwealth of, 101, 133, 154, Wolfe, Rob, 125

163, 164, 173, 178, 179, 183, 193 Wolfowitz, Paul, 132, 135, 156, 203, 241n21

Virginia Hospital Center, 35, 36, 43, 62, 68, Wood,John, 44-45

115,116, 117, 118 Workman, Donald, 115

Virginia State Police, 13, 154, 163, 173, 179 World Bank, 69, 161

Volk, Mark, 157 World Trade Center, terrorist attack on, 9, 10,

13, 17, 20, 23, 24n, 25, 26, 32, 33, 37, 41,

Wagner, Glenn, 178,179,180,181,183 43, 45, 53, 65,129,130,132,134,136,

Wagner, Karen, 40, 59 137

Wallace, Alan, 65-66,68, 69, 85 WUSA 9 News, 19n

Wallace, Roy, 49, 58

Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 32, 35, Young, Dennis, 65-66, 69

43, 59, 108, 110,115,116, 118, 180

War Department, 1, 2,4 Zappalla, Stephen, 39

Ward, Marion, 41 Zegowitz, Richard, 85

WarnerJohn, 145 Zitterkopf, Joan, 46

warnings of a second aircraft attack, 45, 49,

60, 62, 78, 82, 83, 84, 91, 94, 109, 140,

141, 157, 158, 162

280