DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

NIKKI ALVAREZ-SOWLES, as Clerk and Comptroller of Pasco County,

Appellant,

v.

PASCO COUNTY, FLORIDA, a political subdivision,

Appellee.

No. 2D2023-0305

June 7, 2024

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

The motion for correction, clarification, and/or certification is 

granted to the extent it seeks correction of a scrivener's err. The prior 

opinion dated January 17, 2024, is withdrawn, and the attached opinion 

is issued in its place. In all other respects the motion is denied. No 

further motions for rehearing, clarification, or certification will be 

entertained.

I HEREBY CERTIFY THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE COPY OF THE 

ORIGINAL COURT ORDER.

MARY ELIZABETH KUENZEL

CLERK
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

NIKKI ALVAREZ-SOWLES, as Clerk and Comptroller of Pasco County,

Appellant,

v.

PASCO COUNTY, FLORIDA, a political subdivision,

Appellee.

No. 2D2023-0305

June 7, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco County; Emily A. Peacock, 

Associate Judge.

David M. Caldevilla of de la Parte, Gilbert, McNamara & Caldevilla, P.A., 

Tampa; and Dennis J. Alfonso of McClain & Alfonso, P.A., Dade City 

(withdrew after briefing); Nancy McClain Alfonso of Alfonso Hersch, P.A., 

Dade City (substituted as counsel of record), for Appellant.

Nichole "Nikki" Alvarez-Sowles, pro se.

Gregory T. Stewart, Kirsten H. Mood, and Matthew R. Shaud of Nabors, 

Giblin & Nickerson, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee.

BLACK, Judge.

This appeal concerns the obligations of Pasco County under article 

V, section 14, of the Florida Constitution and section 29.008, Florida 
2

Statutes, to "fund the cost of . . . existing multiagency criminal justice 

information systems"1 and to "pay reasonable and necessary salaries, 

costs, and expenses of the state courts system to meet local 

requirements as determined by general law." For the reasons stated 

below, we reverse in part and affirm in part the final summary judgment 

entered in favor of Pasco County.

In 2020, after the office of the Pasco County clerk and comptroller 

experienced a significant reduction in revenues, Nichole "Nikki" AlvarezSowles, in her capacity as the clerk and comptroller of Pasco County (the 

Clerk), initiated an investigation to determine if additional financial 

resources were available to her office. At the conclusion of the 

investigation, the Clerk determined that Pasco County is obligated to 

provide funding for the multiagency criminal justice information system 

and for the courthouse annex located in New Port Richey because it 

constitutes a local requirement.2 Thereafter, in April 2021, the Clerk 

submitted her budget request to Pasco County's Board of County 

Commissioners (the BOCC) for the 2021-2022 fiscal year. See § 

218.35(2), Fla. Stat. (2020). The budget request was significantly greater 

than the requests made by the Clerk's predecessor and included a 

request for funds to pay for the expenses incurred by the Clerk to operate 

and maintain the multiagency criminal justice information system and 

the expenses incurred by the Clerk related to the courthouse annex. The 

BOCC agreed to provide funds for the multiagency criminal justice 

1 We note that while "multiagency" is hyphenated in the Florida 

Constitution, it is not hyphenated in section 29.008. 

2 There is a courthouse located in Dade City, Pasco County's 

county seat, as required by statute. See § 138.09, Fla. Stat. There is 

also a second courthouse, referred to as the courthouse annex, in New 

Port Richey. 
3

information system but declared that it would phase in the funding 

request over a period of three years; the BOCC denied the request for 

funding related to the courthouse annex. 

On November 12, 2021, the Clerk filed a three-count declaratory 

relief action against Pasco County. Count I of the petition sought a 

declaration of the parties' obligations with regard to the funding for the 

multiagency criminal justice information system, count II sought a 

declaration of the parties' obligations with regard to the funding for the 

courthouse annex, and count III sought supplemental relief with respect 

to counts I and II. The Clerk moved for summary judgment on count I, 

and Pasco County moved for summary judgment on all counts. Despite 

the fact that the BOCC had agreed to provide funding for the multiagency 

criminal justice information system, Pasco County contended that it was 

not legally obligated to do so. Following a hearing, the trial court entered 

final summary judgment in favor of Pasco County. The trial court 

determined that since the 

Multiagency [criminal justice information system] in existence 

today is not the same Multiagency [criminal justice 

information system] as was in existence when [the pertinent 

constitutional provision] or section 29.008, were 

adopted[,] . . . under the express language of the 

constitutional provision and section 29.008, Florida Statutes, 

[Pasco] County may provide funding for the subsequently 

acquired Multiagency [criminal justice information system], 

but its mandatory obligation extends only to the existing 

system that was operating at the time of the adoption of the 

various provisions. 

The trial court further found that since the BOCC has the authority to 

review and make modifications to budget requests of the various 

constitutional officers, including the Clerk, it necessarily has the 

authority to provide funding in phases. With respect to count II, the trial 

court determined as a matter of law that the courthouse annex was not 
4

established pursuant to either subsection 29.008(2)(a)1 or subsection 

29.008(2)(a)2 and therefore that it did not constitute a local requirement. 

Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that it was appropriate 

to find in favor of Pasco County on the Clerk's claim for supplemental 

relief. This appeal followed.3 

We review the trial court's final summary judgment de novo. Cole 

v. Plantation Palms Homeowners Ass'n, 371 So. 3d 413, 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2023) (citing Pio v. Simon Cap. GP, 366 So. 3d 1200, 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2023)). "Under the new [2021 amendment] summary judgment 

standard, summary judgment is warranted 'if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' " Id. (alteration in original) 

(quoting Pio, 366 So. 3d at 1203). Issues involving constitutional and 

statutory interpretation are likewise reviewed de novo. Fla. Hosp. 

Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478, 485 (Fla. 2008). 

I. Multiagency criminal justice information system 

The Clerk argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion 

for summary judgment and in granting Pasco County's competing motion 

for summary judgment with respect to count I. The Clerk contends that 

a reading of the plain language of article V, section 14(c), of the Florida 

Constitution and subsection 29.008(1)(h), Florida Statutes, dictates that 

Pasco County's obligation to fund the multiagency criminal justice 

information system did not cease when hardware and software that had 

comprised the system at the time of the amendment and enactment of 

the constitutional provision and statute, respectively, were replaced and 

3 Though the Clerk sought a declaration of the parties' obligations 

with respect to the funding at issue, the trial court only expressly 

addressed Pasco County's obligations or lack thereof.
5

that Pasco County is prohibited by article XII, section 25, of the Florida 

Constitution from providing the funding in phases over a period of years. 

We agree.4

a. Obligation to fund 

Pasco County's obligation to fund the multiagency criminal justice 

information system turns on the interpretation of article V, section 14(c), 

and subsection 29.008(1)(h). 

After the adoption of the Constitution's article V in 

1972, funding of the third branch of state government—the 

judicial branch—was largely borne by local government. The 

State had only a small share, section 14 of article V then 

providing only that compensation for judges would be the 

responsibility of the state by general law. In 1998, however, a 

new provision (known as Revision 7) was submitted to the 

electorate by the Constitution Revision Commission 

substantially and significantly revising judicial branch 

funding. The new plan for funding the judicial system 

primarily placed the burden on the state, with the share of 

the counties greatly reduced. The principal source of funding 

was to be general revenues and user fees and costs. It was 

adopted by the electorate in 1998 and became fully 

effectuated by 2004.

City of Fort Lauderdale v. Crowder, 983 So. 2d 37, 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2008). There are exceptions to the state's funding obligations, including 

4 Pasco County argues on appeal, just as it did below, that while it 

may provide funding for the multiagency criminal justice information 

system it is not obligated to do so. Because the determination as to 

whether Pasco County can provide that funding in phases depends on 

whether a legal obligation to provide funding exists in the first instance, 

the Clerk properly invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to declare 

whether Pasco County has a legal obligation to fund the multiagency 

criminal justice information system. See Ranucci v. City of Palmetto, 317 

So. 3d 270, 274 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (quoting Harris v. Aberdeen Prop. 

Owners Ass'n, 135 So. 3d 365, 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)).
6

those found in subdivision (c), which provides in pertinent part as 

follows: 

Counties shall be required to fund the cost of communications 

services, existing radio systems, existing multi-agency criminal 

justice information systems, and the cost of construction or 

lease, maintenance, utilities, and security of facilities for the 

trial courts, public defenders' offices, state attorneys' offices, 

and the offices of the clerks of the circuit and county courts 

performing court-related functions. 

Art. V, § 14(c), Fla. Const. (emphasis added). Statutes were enacted to 

implement the new requirements of Revision 7, including section 29.008, 

which was enacted in 2000. See ch. 2000-237, § 8, Laws of Fla. Section 

29.008 provides in pertinent part as follows: 

(1) Counties are required by s. 14, Art. V of the State 

Constitution to fund the cost of communications services, 

existing radio systems, existing multiagency criminal justice 

information systems, and the cost of construction or lease, 

maintenance, utilities, and security of facilities for the circuit 

and county courts, public defenders' offices, state attorneys' 

offices, guardian ad litem offices, and the offices of the clerks 

of the circuit and county courts performing court-related 

functions. . . . For purposes of implementing these 

requirements, the term: 

. . . .

(h) "Existing multiagency criminal justice information systems" 

includes, but is not limited to, those components of the 

multiagency criminal justice information system as defined in 

s. 943.045, supporting the offices of the circuit or county 

courts, the public defenders' offices, the state attorneys' 

offices, or those portions of the offices of the clerks of the 

circuit and county courts performing court-related functions 

that are used to carry out the court-related activities of those 

entities. This includes upgrades and maintenance of the 

current equipment, maintenance and upgrades of supporting 

technology infrastructure and associated staff, and services 

and expenses to assure continued information sharing and 

reporting of information to the state. The counties shall also 

provide additional information technology services, hardware, 
7

and software as needed for new judges and staff of the state 

courts system, state attorneys' offices, public defenders' 

offices, guardian ad litem offices, and the offices of the clerks 

of the circuit and county courts performing court-related 

functions.

§ 29.008(1)(h) (emphasis added). A "[c]riminal justice information 

system" is "a system, including the equipment, facilities, procedures, 

agreements, and organizations thereof, for the collection, processing, 

preservation, or dissemination of criminal justice information." 

§ 943.045(13), Fla. Stat. Article XII, section 25(b), provides that "the 

amendment to Section 14 shall be fully effectuated by July 1, 2004."

In the late 1970s software was acquired for the purpose of 

implementing and developing a multiagency criminal justice information 

system in Pasco County. At that time and for several decades thereafter, 

the system's software applications and data were stored on Pasco 

County's IBM mainframe. The IBM mainframe not only hosted the 

software applications that permitted various agencies to access the 

criminal justice information but was also used by several other entities 

for the purpose of data storage and retrieval. The IBM mainframe 

eventually became so antiquated that it was difficult to operate, 

maintain, and repair. So Pasco County decided to replace the IBM 

mainframe with Microsoft Windows servers; the IBM mainframe was 

officially retired in 2019. 

Meanwhile, the Clerk's predecessor decided to replace the software 

that had been used by her office to interface with the multiagency 

criminal justice information system, which had also become antiquated. 

The Clerk's predecessor chose a Microsoft Windows based platform called 

CLERICUS, which became operational in 2016. CLERICUS is hosted on 

the Clerk's servers. It is undisputed that CLERICUS is used for the 
8

collection, processing, preservation, and dissemination of criminal justice 

information and that various criminal justice agencies interface with it. 

In finding in favor of Pasco County on the parties' competing 

motions for summary judgment with respect to count I, the trial court 

determined that because both the constitutional and statutory provisions 

expressly refer to "existing" multiagency criminal justice information 

systems and because the hardware and software components of the 

current Pasco County multiagency criminal justice information system 

did not exist at the time the funding obligation was initially imposed, 

Pasco County is no longer obligated to fund the system. In other words, 

the trial court determined that Pasco County's funding obligation 

extended only to the multiagency criminal justice information system as 

it existed at the time of the constitutional amendment and enactment of 

the statute. But this narrow reading fails to give effect to subsection 

29.008(1)(h) as a whole.

When construing a statute, we must give effect to the legislative 

intent. Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 101, 106 (Fla. 2008) (citing Bautista v. 

State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003)). "To discern legislative intent, 

a court must look first and foremost at the actual language used in the 

statute." Id. (citing Bautista, 863 So. 2d at 1185); accord Leftwich v. Fla. 

Dep't of Corr., 148 So. 3d 79, 87 (Fla. 2014) ("The plain language of a 

statute is the primary method through which legislative intent may be 

discovered."); see also Fla. Hosp. Waterman, Inc., 984 So. 2d at 485 

("[T]he principles governing constitutional interpretation largely parallel 

those of statutory interpretation." (citing Zingdale v. Powell, 885 So. 2d 

277, 280 (Fla. 2004))). While the trial court considered the use of the 

word "existing" in both the constitution and statute, it failed to recognize 

that section 29.008 must "be interpretated to give effect to every clause 
9

in it, and to accord meaning and harmony to all of its parts." See 

Larimore, 2 So. 3d at 106 (quoting Jones v. ETS of New Orleans, Inc., 793 

So. 2d 912, 914-15 (Fla. 2001)). After all, "significance and effect must 

be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if 

possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere 

surplusage." Id. (quoting Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n v. Tampa Bay 

Downs, Inc., 948 So. 2d 599, 606 (Fla. 2006)).

As set forth above, "[e]xisting multiagency criminal justice 

information systems" is defined in subsection 29.008(1)(h) to include 

"upgrades and maintenance of the current equipment, maintenance and 

upgrades of supporting technology infrastructure and associated staff, 

and services and expenses to assure continued information sharing and 

reporting of information to the state." Turning to the first two clauses, 

we note that the term upgrades is not defined in the statute. However, 

when the legislature does not define a term, we may derive its meaning 

from dictionaries. Somers v. United States, 355 So. 3d 887, 891-92 (Fla. 

2022) (quoting Debaun v. State, 213 So. 3d 747, 751 (Fla. 2017)). 

Neither upgrades nor upgrade is defined in Black's Law Dictionary, but 

elsewhere upgrade is defined as follows: "to replace something (such as 

software or an electronic device) with a more useful version or 

alternative." See Upgrade, Merriam-Webster.com, 

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/upgrade (last visited Nov.

16, 2023); see also Upgrade, Dictionary.com, 

https://www.dictionary.com/browse/upgrade (last visited Nov. 16, 2023) 

(defining upgrade in part as "a new version, improved model, etc."); 

Upgrade, Britannica.com, 

https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/upgrade (last visited Nov. 16, 

2023) (defining upgrade—and its plural form upgrades—in part as "an 
10

occurrence in which one thing is replaced by something better, newer, 

more valuable, etc."). From these dictionary definitions we derive the 

meaning of upgrades to include replacements such that subsection 

29.008(1)(h) contemplates the replacement of equipment and supporting 

technology infrastructure.

Moreover, as to the third clause, the services and expenses 

pertaining to CLERICUS are clearly necessary to "assure continued 

information sharing and reporting of information to the state." See § 

29.008(1)(h). Reading all these clauses together, as we must, leads to 

the inescapable conclusion that the legislature intended the counties' 

funding obligations pertaining to multiagency criminal justice 

information systems to continue even after replacement of the equipment 

and supporting technology comprising the system, including hardware 

and software. Therefore, the trial court erred in determining that Pasco 

County is no longer obligated to fund the multiagency criminal justice 

information system and in granting summary judgment as a matter of 

law on that basis. 

b. Phased funding 

Having determined that Pasco County's obligation to fund the 

multiagency criminal justice information system has not ceased, we next 

consider whether Pasco County can phase in that funding over time. The 

answer lies in the Florida Constitution. 

Article XII, section 25, provides as follows:

(a) Commencing with fiscal year 2000-2001, the legislature 

shall appropriate funds to pay for the salaries, costs, and 

expenses set forth in the amendment to Section 14 of Article 

V pursuant to a phase-in schedule established by general 

law.

(b) Unless otherwise provided herein, the amendment to 

Section 14 shall be fully effectuated by July 1, 2004.
11

No exception to the funding deadline for multiagency criminal justice 

information systems has been provided, and as such a plain reading of 

this constitutional provision dictates that the funding obligation for those 

systems imposed by the amendment to article V, section 14(c), must be 

fully effectuated by July 1, 2004. Since that deadline has long passed, 

Pasco County is foreclosed from complying with its mandatory obligation 

to fund the multiagency criminal justice information system by providing 

that funding in phases over a period of years. 

Sheppard & White, P.A. v. City of Jacksonville, 827 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 

2002), further supports our reading of the constitutional provision. In 

that case, the supreme court considered the appropriate hourly rate for 

the services of appointed counsel, the funding obligation for which was to 

be borne by the state. As part of the supreme court's analysis, it stated 

the following: 

We must express our serious concerns as to how the system 

for compensating conflict counsel may develop in the very 

near future. Florida is coming to a crossroad regarding its 

system for the representation of indigents in capital cases. 

By constitutional amendment, the State will probably soon 

assume the full responsibility of funding for conflict counsel no 

later than 2004.

Id. at 932 (emphasis added) (citing art. V, § 14; art. XII, § 25, Fla. 

Const.). Relying on the same two articles of the constitution that are at 

issue in our case, the supreme court surmised that the funding 

obligation imposed by constitutional amendment (referred to as Revision 

7) would become the full responsibility of the state no later than 2004. 

We in turn believe that it is appropriate to interpret those constitutional 

provisions, for purposes of this case, to require Pasco County to have 

assumed full responsibility for funding of the multiagency criminal 
12

justice information system no later than July 1, 2004, such that phasedin funding is not permitted. 

The trial court therefore erred in failing to enter summary judgment 

in favor of the Clerk on count I and in granting summary judgment in 

favor of Pasco County on count I.

II. Courthouse annex

In count II of the petition, the Clerk sought a declaration of the 

parties' respective rights and obligations with regard to the funding of the 

Clerk's court-related functions at the courthouse annex in New Port 

Richey. The Clerk argues that the trial court erred in determining that 

the courthouse annex does not constitute a local requirement as 

contemplated by article V, section 14(c), and subsection 29.008(2). We 

disagree.

Article V, section 14(c), provides in pertinent part that "[c]ounties 

shall also pay reasonable and necessary salaries, costs, and expenses of 

the state courts system to meet local requirements as determined by 

general law." When section 29.008 was enacted in 2000, it did not define 

local requirements and merely reiterated the language of the 

constitutional amendment. See § 29.008(2), Fla. Stat. (2001). But that 

changed in 2003 when the legislature amended section 29.008. See ch. 

2003-402, Laws of Fla. And since that amendment went into effect in 

2004, section 29.008 has provided in part as follows: 

(2) Counties shall pay reasonable and necessary salaries, 

costs, and expenses of the state courts system, including 

associated staff and expenses, to meet local requirements.

(a) Local requirements are those specialized programs, 

nonjudicial staff, and other expenses associated with 

specialized court programs, specialized prosecution needs, 

specialized defense needs, or resources required of a local 

jurisdiction as a result of special factors or circumstances. 

Local requirements exist:
13

1. When imposed pursuant to an express statutory directive, 

based on such factors as provided in paragraph (b); or

2. When:

a. The county has enacted an ordinance, adopted a local 

program, or funded activities with a financial or operational 

impact on the circuit or a county within the circuit; or

b. Circumstances in a given circuit or county result in or 

necessitate implementation of specialized programs, the 

provision of nonjudicial staff and expenses to specialized 

court programs, special prosecution needs, specialized 

defense needs, or the commitment of resources to the court's 

jurisdiction.

(b) Factors and circumstances resulting in the establishment 

of a local requirement include, but are not limited to:

1. Geographic factors;

2. Demographic factors;

3. Labor market forces;

4. The number and location of court facilities; or

5. The volume, severity, complexity, or mix of court cases.

Subsection 29.008(2)(a) instructs that a local requirement exists either 

when it is "imposed pursuant to an express statutory directive, based on 

such factors as provided in paragraph (b)," see § 29.008(2)(a)1, or when

the circumstances set forth in subsection (2)(a)2 are met. 

With respect to an "express statutory directive," the legislature has 

provided that 

[t]he following shall be considered a local requirement 

pursuant to subparagraph (2)(a)1.:

(a) Legal aid programs, which shall be funded at a level equal 

to or greater than the amount provided from filing fees and 

surcharges to legal aid programs from October 1, 2002, to 

September 30, 2003.

(b) Alternative sanctions coordinators pursuant to ss. 984.09 

and 985.037.
14

§ 29.008(3). The Clerk has failed to point to an express statutory 

directive indicating that a secondary courthouse facility, such as the 

courthouse annex, shall be considered a local requirement for purposes 

of the constitution and section 29.008, and we have found none. We are 

therefore left to consider subsection 29.008(2)(a)2. 

Subsection 29.008(2)(a)2 describes alternative circumstances 

under which a local requirement may come to exist. However, local 

requirements under this subsection "must be determined by the . . . 

method" prescribed by subsection 29.008(2)(c). But it is undisputed that 

subsection 29.008(2)(c) has no applicability to this case. Therefore the 

trial court correctly determined as a matter of law that the courthouse 

annex does not constitute a local requirement as contemplated by article 

V, section 14(c), and section 29.008. Entry of summary judgment on 

count II in favor of Pasco County was therefore proper.5 

III. Supplemental relief

In count III of its petition the Clerk also sought supplemental relief. 

See § 86.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2021) ("Any person seeking a declaratory 

judgment may also demand additional, alternative, coercive, subsequent, 

5 In addition to determining that the courthouse annex was not 

established pursuant to either subsection 29.008(2)(a)1 or subsection 

29.008(2)(a)2 and therefore that it did not constitute a local requirement 

under the constitution or statute, the trial court made an alternative 

finding that the courthouse annex was not a local requirement as 

contemplated by the statute based on facts for which there was no 

evidentiary basis. But because the trial court entered summary 

judgment in favor of Pasco County on count II for the independent 

reason that the circumstances set forth in subsection 29.008(2)(a)1 and 

subsection 29.008(2)(a)2 had not been met, it is proper to affirm the final 

summary judgment with respect to this count. 
15

or supplemental relief in the same action.").6 The Clerk's request for 

supplemental relief is dependent upon the outcome of her claims in 

counts I and II. See City of Newberry v. Alachua County, 366 So. 3d 

1176, 1179 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (explaining that supplemental relief "is 

ancillary to and dependent upon the existence of a declaratory 

judgment"). Once a declaratory judgment is entered in favor of the party 

seeking declaratory relief, that party's request for supplemental relief 

becomes ripe for determination. See McAllister v. Breakers Seville Ass'n, 

41 So. 3d 405, 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). Because the trial court erred in 

failing to grant summary judgment in favor of the Clerk on count I, it 

likewise erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Pasco County 

on count III to the extent that count III sought supplemental relief related 

to count I. 

IV. Conclusion

6 We note that section 86.061 directs that "[t]he application [for 

further relief based on a declaratory judgment] shall be by motion to the 

court having jurisdiction to grant relief." Here, the Clerk did not seek 

supplemental relief by motion but rather included a claim for 

supplemental relief in her petition for declaratory relief. On appeal, 

Pasco County does not contend that the Clerk erred in seeking 

supplemental relief by petition rather than by motion, nor do we believe 

that she did. See, e.g., Mac Assocs. v. LaMontagne, 556 So. 2d 460, 461 

(Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (relying on the 1987 version of section 86.061, which 

mirrors the 2021 version of the statute, when stating that supplemental 

relief should be sought by petition). We understand that under certain 

circumstances when a statute (or rule) requires that relief be sought in a 

pleading, a motion will not suffice. See, e.g., Stockman v. Downs, 573 So. 

2d 835, 837-38 (Fla. 1991). But that is generally due to concerns about 

proper notice. And we do not believe any shortcomings with respect to 

notice exist here where the inverse has occurred—seeking relief in a 

pleading when the statute calls for a motion. By including a claim for 

supplemental relief in the petition for declaratory relief, the Clerk 

afforded Pasco County more notice than would have been afforded by a 

motion filed after the initiation of the declaratory relief action. 
16

We affirm the final summary judgment with respect to count II. 

However, we reverse the final summary judgment to the extent the trial 

court found in favor of Pasco County on count I and remand for entry of 

final summary judgment in favor of the Clerk on count I. We also reverse 

the final summary judgment to the extent the trial court found in favor of 

Pasco County on the Clerk's claim for supplemental relief related to 

count I and remand for further proceedings. 

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

NORTHCUTT and KELLY, JJ., Concur.