[Cite as Doherty v. Doherty, 2012-Ohio-4886.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF MEDINA ) 

RALPH F. DOHERTY, II 

 Appellant 

 v. 

CYNTHIA S. DOHERTY 

 Appellee 

C.A. No. 11CA0067-M 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO 

CASE No. 09DR0364 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: July 2, 2012 

 

BELFANCE, Judge. 

{¶1} Appellant, Ralph Doherty, appeals an order of the Medina County Court of 

Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, that overruled his objections to a magistrate’s 

decision and ordered him to pay spousal support. This Court reverses. 

I. 

{¶2} Mr. Doherty moved the trial court to hold his wife in contempt, and Ms. Doherty 

requested a modification of spousal support. On April 8, 2011, a magistrate recommended that 

Mr. Doherty’s motion to show cause be denied and that Ms. Doherty be awarded $85 per month 

in spousal support. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s recommendations and entered 

judgment on the same day. On April 21, 2011, Mr. Doherty filed “[p]reliminary [o]bjections” to 

the magistrate’s decision, noting that he would “supplement his objections upon receiving the 

transcript of proceedings which has been ordered from the court reporter.” On May 16, 2011, 

the trial court summarily “denie[d]” his objections, concluding that because Mr. Doherty had not 
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filed a praecipe for preparation of the transcript or paid the deposit against costs for its 

preparation, it was within the court’s prerogative to “presume[] that the Magistrate conducted the 

proceedings with regularity and adopt[] [her] findings of fact.” Mr. Doherty appealed, raising 

three assignments of error. Ms. Doherty did not file an appellate brief in response. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR PREJUDICIAL TO APPELLANT 

WHEN IT PREMATURELY DENIED APPELLANT’S OBJECTIONS. 

{¶3} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Doherty has argued that the trial court erred 

by denying his objections by application of Loc.R. 1.07 without notice and an opportunity to 

cure his failure to file a praecipe for preparation of the transcript and to pay the deposit against 

transcript preparation costs. We agree. 

{¶4} The Local Rules of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic 

Relations Division, contain specific requirements relative to obtaining a transcript of the 

proceedings and paying the court reporter for the transcript as well as the possibility of forfeiture 

of a litigant’s objections for failing to comply. Loc.R. 1.07 provides: 

A. If a transcript is required, a praecipe to the Court Reporter requesting a 

transcript of the proceedings must be delivered to and acknowledged by the Court 

Reporter at the time of the filing of the Objection * * *. Failure to timely file the 

praecipe may result in the denial or dismissal of an Objection * * *. 

B. A deposit of costs to secure the transcript must be paid to the Court Reporter 

within 7 days of the filing of the Objection * * *. If the deposit for the costs of a 

transcript is not made within 14 days of the filing of the Objection * * *, the 

Objection * * * may be denied or dismissed. Irrespective of whether a transcript 

is ordered for the purpose of an Appeal, Objection, Motion to Set Aside or other 

reason, the Court Reporter shall not commence the preparation of the transcript 

until the deposit has been made. 

(Emphasis added.) This Court recently considered the procedure required to implement the 

sanctions provisions contained in Loc.R. 1.07 in a similar case. See Lakota v. Lakota, 9th Dist. 
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No. 10CA0122-M, 2012-Ohio-2555. In Lakota, we concluded that in order to implement the 

sanctions provision of Loc.R. 1.07, the trial court was required to “provide the parties with some 

notice specific to the case at hand and a reasonable opportunity to cure the defect.” Lakota at ¶ 

13. As we explained in that case, 

[A]lthough we would not go so far as to say that Loc.R. 1.07 is invalid on its face, 

we are persuaded that, in light of the potential that a party may be deprived of the 

opportunity to object and to preserve error for appeal in a meaningful way, the 

trial court should give notice of its potential sanction in a manner that is at least 

consistent with the notice required under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii). Ruling on 

objections as a sanction during the thirty-day period for filing a transcript may 

deprive parties of the meaningful opportunity to file objections and preserve error 

for appeal, and consistent with the interests at stake, a trial court that does so 

should act with caution after notice. 

Id. at ¶ 12. We concluded that “[t]he notice afforded by Loc.R. 1.07 itself is insufficient in this 

regard.” Id. at ¶ 13. We also concluded that the fact that a trial court adopts a magistrate’s 

decision and enters judgment before objections are filed does not necessarily mean that the trial 

court conducted an independent review sufficient to meet the requirements of Civ.R. 

53(D)(4)(d). Id. at ¶ 16. 

{¶5} As in Lakota, the trial court erred by overruling Mr. Doherty’s objections as a 

sanction for failing to follow the requirements of Loc.R. 1.07 without notice and an opportunity 

to cure the deficiency. Mr. Doherty’s first assignment of error is therefore sustained. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR PREJUDICIAL TO APPELLANT 

WHEN IT VIOLATED ITS OWN LOCAL RULE OF COURT WHICH 

REQUIRED AN ORAL HEARING ON OBJECTIONS. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR PREJUDICIAL TO APPELLANT 

WHEN IT FAILED TO CONDUCT AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE 

OBJECTIONS. 
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{¶6} Mr. Doherty’s second and third assignments of error, which argue alternative 

grounds for reversing the trial court’s decision, are moot. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). 

III. 

{¶7} Mr. Doherty’s first assignment of error is sustained. His second and third 

assignments of error are moot. The judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas is 

reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court so that Mr. Doherty may have the 

opportunity to proceed from the point that his objections were timely filed. 

Judgment reversed 

and cause remanded. 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellee. 

 

 EVE V. BELFANCE 

 FOR THE COURT 
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WHITMORE, P. J. 

CONCURS.

CARR, J. 

DISSENTING.

{¶8} I respectfully dissent. 

{¶9} I do not agree that Loc.R. 1.07 fails to provide adequate notice of the possible 

sanctions the trial court may impose for failure to comply with the requirements of the rule. 

{¶10} I would address the second assignment of error and conclude that there was no 

prejudicial error. 

{¶11} I would address the third assignment of error and conclude that the trial court 

conducted the proper review of the objections. When a party who objects to the magistrate’s 

factual determinations fails to provide a transcript of the proceedings in support of his objections, 

“the trial court may only examine the ultimate legal conclusions in light of the facts found by the 

magistrate.” In re Estate of Thompson, 9th Dist. No. 22403, 2005-Ohio-4261, ¶ 9. Because it 

necessarily already did so when it issued its pre-objections judgment, the trial court conducted 

the necessary review. 

{¶12} In this case, the trial court entered its judgment before Mr. Doherty filed his 

objections. Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e)(i) permits a trial court to enter judgment during the 14-day period 

allowed for the filing of objections. Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(c) only allows the trial court to adopt the 

magistrate’s decision in the absence of objections if it determines that there are no errors of law 

or other defects evident on the face of the magistrate’s decision. Accordingly, the trial court 

must necessarily review the magistrate’s application of the law to the facts as the magistrate 

found them before it may adopt the decision as its own judgment. It is presumed that the trial 
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court is aware of its obligations and that it applies the law accordingly. State v. RiveraRodriguez, 9th Dist. Nos. 07CA009154, 07CA009166, 2008-Ohio-1461, ¶ 38 (Carr, J., 

concurring in part and dissenting in part), citing Walczak v. Walczak, 5th Dist. No. 

2003CA00298, 2004-Ohio-3370, ¶ 22. I would conclude that the trial court properly conducted 

the required review of the magistrate’s application of the law to the facts when it first adopted 

the magistrate’s decision and entered its judgment. 

{¶13} Based on the above, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

APPEARANCES:

JOHN V. HEUTSCHE, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

S. FORREST THOMPSON, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.