DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2009 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE 

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

ROBERT E. ‘‘BUD’’ CRAMER, JR., Alabama 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

PAUL JUOLA, GREG LANKLER, SARAH YOUNG, PAUL TERRY, KRIS MALLARD, LINDA PAGELSEN, 

ADAM HARRIS, ANN REESE, TIM PRINCE, BROOKE BOYER, MATT WASHINGTON, B G WRIGHT, 

CHRIS WHITE, CELES HUGHES, and ADRIENNE RAMSAY, Staff Assistants 

SHERRY L. YOUNG, Administrative Aide 

PART 1 

Page 

Army Contracting Task Force .............................................. 1 

Government Accountability Office ..................................... 93 

Department of Defense Outsourcing .................................. 147 

F–15 Aircraft ............................................................................. 215 

Force Health Protection—Post-Traumatic Stress 

Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury ............................ 255 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 


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PART 1—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2009 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with HEARING
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2009 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE 

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

ROBERT E. ‘‘BUD’’ CRAMER, JR., Alabama 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

PAUL JUOLA, GREG LANKLER, SARAH YOUNG, PAUL TERRY, KRIS MALLARD, LINDA PAGELSEN, 

ADAM HARRIS, ANN REESE, TIM PRINCE, BROOKE BOYER, MATT WASHINGTON, B G WRIGHT, 

CHRIS WHITE, CELES HUGHES, and ADRIENNE RAMSAY, Staff Assistants 

SHERRY L. YOUNG, Administrative Aide 

PART 1 

Page 

Army Contracting Task Force .............................................. 1 

Government Accountability Office ..................................... 93 

Department of Defense Outsourcing .................................. 147 

F–15 Aircraft ............................................................................. 215 

Force Health Protection—Post-Traumatic Stress 

Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury ............................ 255 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

46–473 WASHINGTON : 2009 


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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin, Chairman 

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

JOSE ́ E. SERRANO, New York 

ROSA L. DELAURO, Connecticut 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts 

ED PASTOR, Arizona 

DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina 

CHET EDWARDS, Texas 

ROBERT E. ‘‘BUD’’ CRAMER, JR., Alabama 

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California 

SAM FARR, California 

JESSE L. JACKSON, JR., Illinois 

CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

MARION BERRY, Arkansas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

ADAM SCHIFF, California 

MICHAEL HONDA, California 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

STEVE ISRAEL, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas 

JERRY LEWIS, California 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

RALPH REGULA, Ohio 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia 

JAMES T. WALSH, New York 

DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio 

JOE KNOLLENBERG, Michigan 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

ZACH WAMP, Tennessee 

TOM LATHAM, Iowa 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

JOHN E. PETERSON, Pennsylvania 

VIRGIL H. GOODE, JR., Virginia 

RAY LAHOOD, Illinois 

DAVE WELDON, Florida 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas 

MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois 

ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida 

DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana 

KEN CALVERT, California 

JO BONNER, Alabama 

ROB NABORS, Clerk and Staff Director 

(II)


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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2009 

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23, 2008. 

ARMY CONTRACTING TASK FORCE 

WITNESSES 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL N. ROSS THOMPSON, MILITARY DEPUTY TO 

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY 

DANIEL M. QUINN, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MURTHA. We will welcome the two gentlemen to the Committee. All of us in the Committee are concerned about the stories 

we have read, but also the reports we have had about the corruption in the sole source contracting that we have seen. So we will 

be very interested to hear if there has been an improvement. I 

know I talked to Secretary Gates about it. And he said to me that 

he had complete confidence in Secretary Geren. I think the same 

way. I think Secretary Geren really has tried to get it under control. But we need, since we control the money, we need to hear 

from you what the situation is and how you see improvements. 

Last year, at the request of Moran, we put in 500 GSA contracting officers to shift over from GSA to the Army. I don’t know 

whatever happened to it in the bill itself, but we put it in the 

House side, and whether it got through the conference I don’t remember. But at any rate, we knew it was a problem last year, we 

tried to address it. But we are interested to hear what you have 

to say about it. But welcome to the Committee, and we will hear 

from Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I move that those portions of the 

hearing today which involve classified material be held in executive 

session because of the classification of the material to be discussed. 

Mr. MURTHA. We will call the role. The question is on the motion. Those in favor say aye. Aye. Opposed, no. The ayes have it. 

The hearing is closed. Any comments, Mr. Young? 

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I have no opening comments. What 

we are dealing with today is not a new problem. It didn’t start with 

these gentlemen that are here today. And it may not end with 

these gentlemen here today. But I think it is important that we do 


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review the issues thoroughly as we can. So I appreciate your scheduling this hearing this morning. 

Mr. MURTHA. Welcome to the Committee, General Thompson. I 

want you to know that General Cody made sure he told me what 

confidence he has in you. Colonel McCaleb has the greatest confidence in you. So with that, we will be interested in hearing what 

you have to say. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL THOMPSON

General THOMPSON. Well, sir, thank you, Chairman Murtha and 

Congressman Young, distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

(Cell phone rings.) 

General THOMPSON. The good news is it was not mine, sir. Joining me today is Mr. Dan Quinn. 

Mr. MURTHA. I will tell you a story. The first time I ever saw a 

telephone, a big telephone about this big, Cheney had one. And it 

was sitting when he was there, and the damn thing rang, and he 

did not know how to turn it on or off. It was about this big, if you 

remember the old telephones. Go ahead. 

General THOMPSON. Sir, with me today is Dan Quinn, who is the 

chief of staff for the Criminal Investigation Command in the Army. 

And he and I will try to address the questions that you have and 

the members of the Committee have. 

Mr. MURTHA. You have to speak right into the microphone, because this room is not the best. 

General THOMPSON. Is that better, sir? 

Mr. MURTHA. Yeah. 

General THOMPSON. Thanks for the opportunity to appear today 

before the Committee. And I am going to talk about the Army’s 

comprehensive and ongoing efforts to ensure that policies and procedures are in place for all joint, expeditionary contracting operations, not just today, but in the future. I have a written statement 

that I respectfully request be made part of the record for today’s 

hearing. 

Mr. MURTHA. Without objection. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL THOMPSON

General THOMPSON. And my opening remarks this morning will 

be brief. But Mr. Chairman, before I start, I would like to thank 

the Committee, its members, and the Committee leadership for 

your unwavering support of the men and women in uniform. Mr. 

Chairman, as you know, the Secretary of the Army created a special commission on contracting led by Dr. Jacques Gansler to look 

at long-term strategic view of the Army’s acquisition and contracting system to support expeditionary operations. In parallel 

with that effort, the Army Contracting Task Force, which I cochaired with Ms. Kathryn Condon, who is the Executive Deputy for 

the Army Materiel Command, looked together, along with the 

Gansler Commission, to look at current contracting operations. And 

we took immediate actions where necessary. The Gansler Commission had 14 recommendations for improvement. And they were consistent with the Army Contracting Task Force’s findings. And the 


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Army is making steady progress in addressing the structural weaknesses and shortcomings identified. 

GANSLER COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

In a recent assessment, the Army has taken significant or partial 

action on 21 of the 27 Gansler Commission recommendations that 

are specific to the Army. Some of the Gansler Commission recommendations of the total of 40 were specific to OSD. And we are 

working together with OSD to address those as well. My written 

statement outlines the major actions taken to date, which include 

accelerating plans to set up the contracting structure recommended 

by the Commission, and increase the size of the contracting workforce. The Army has approved a two star-level Army Contracting 

Command organization under the Army Materiel Command, and 

there will be two subordinate commands, a one-star expeditionary 

contracting command and a restructured one-star level installation 

contracting organization. 

ARMY CONTRACTING COMMAND

We have identified the individuals to lead those organizations. 

And in addition, we plan to grow our military contracting structure 

and our civilian contracting workforce in line with the Commission 

recommendations. As a result of the ongoing operations in Southwest Asia, the Army has increased its focus on contingency contracting. Up until a year ago, we did not have a defined structure 

to support expeditionary operations or to support a modular Army. 

We began about 3 years ago to identify the need for that structure 

and put all the processes and procedures in place to establish that 

structure. I will talk about that today during the hearing. We have 

got a contingency contracting structure that consists of Contracting 

Support Brigades. And these are very small brigades in number. 

The brigade headquarters is only 19 people. We have got contingency contracting battalions and four-person contingency contracting teams. And these are all military. We are beginning to fill 

with trained military contracting officers and noncommissioned officers the four brigades, six battalions, and 121 teams that were 

previously established. In the last 4 months, we have made the 

case inside the Army, and we are going to expand that structure 

by adding three more brigades, five battalions, and 51 additional 

teams. And we believe this will give us the military structure in 

order to meet the expeditionary contracting requirements. 

In the last year in Kuwait, the Army augmented the staff to 

make sure the commander there had the resources he needed to 

deal with the present workload. Part of that workload was the orderly transfer of existing and any future major contract actions to 

the Acquisition Center at Rock Island, Illinois, under the Army Materiel Command. At present, we have transferred from Kuwait contract actions valued at approximately $800 million. The Army has 

completed a comprehensive review of all of the Kuwait contract 

files from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2006. And any actions that 

were found with potential fraud indicators that had not already 

been under investigation by the Criminal Investigation Command 

have been turned over to CID for further investigation. 


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The Army conducted the audits and investigations into the oversight, the execution, and the management of contracting in the theater of operations. And these audits and investigations are ongoing 

today. The vast majority of our military and civilian contracting 

personnel who award and manage contracts perform well in extreme conditions, but the auditors and investigators did discover 

cases of potential fraud, and some of the worst cases originating in 

Kuwait. Mr. Chairman, upholding the highest ethical standards, 

while discharging our duties, is of paramount concern to the Acquisition Corps and to the Army. 

CONTRACTING WORKFORCE

Even though of we have confidence in the talent and professionalism of the contracting workforce, we must remain vigilant at 

all times. We are actively engaged with the Department of Defense 

efforts to eliminate all areas of vulnerability in contracting. A critically important issue is the size, structure, and training of the military and civilian contracting workforce. The acquisition workforce 

has declined significantly in the last decade. And the workload and 

the number of dollars associated with that workload have increased 

significantly. The Army has never fought an extended conflict that 

required such reliance on contractor support. 

We are addressing the need to expand, train, structure, and empower our contracting personnel to support the full range of military operations. We are developing a detailed contracting campaign 

plan to implement the necessary changes to contracting, incorporating improvements in doctrine, organization, training, leadership, and materiel. We are partnering with the Defense Acquisition 

University and State and local universities to incorporate the necessary contracting courses into their curriculum. In addition, 12 

professional military education courses inside the Army have new 

or enhanced subject matter on expeditionary contracting, with additional courses under examination for insertion of expeditionary 

contracting-related material. The Army is putting plans in place to 

capture expeditionary contracting lessons learned by formally 

interviewing units and individuals as they return from theater, and 

incorporating these findings into doctrine, training guides, and user 

handbooks. Our goal is to bring more qualified, trained individuals 

into the workforce at an accelerated pace, and ultimately perform 

at the journeyman level in a shorter period of time. We are working closely with OSD, and are in discussions with the leaders of the 

contracting communities in the Navy, the Air Force, and the Defense Logistics Agency to look at areas of increased collaboration 

and workload distribution. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening remarks, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The statement of Lieutenant General N. Ross Thompson follows:] 


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Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Quinn. 

Mr. QUINN. Mr. Chairman, I don’t have any opening remarks. I 

would just like to say that it is a pleasure to be here today. I am 

prepared to answer any questions on the ongoing investigations to 

the best of my ability. And as mentioned in the opening remarks 

from General Thompson, this is a team effort on auditors, investigators, and in the contracting command. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

CONTRACT OVERSIGHT

Mr. MURTHA. Let me ask you just a couple questions and then 

ask Mr. Young. Explain, we talked privately before the hearing 

started about the three different things that we are interested in, 

sole-source contracts, the corruption going on, the investigation 

itself, and you said there are three different things—oh, I know the 

arms. The arms problem we had with the small arms disappearing, 

whatever percentage it is. But explain what those three separate 

investigations are. 

WEAPONS ACCOUNTABILITY

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. The Gansler Commission and the 

Army internal Contracting Task Force were looking primarily at 

issues related to the fraud and the investigations. There has been 

a lot of media interest and congressional interest lately in the 

weapons accountability. And that is an area that we did not look 

at that is being looked at separately by the DOD IG, General 

Kicklighter. And then there was the other issue—— 

Mr. MURTHA, Let me ask you, were you involved in that, Mr. 

Quinn, at all? 

Mr. QUINN. We assisted General Kicklighter and his folks running leads for him over in theater, but it was really under their 

auspices that they looked at the weapons side of that, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. How did you find out in the first place that weapons were missing? 

Mr. QUINN. Mr. Chairman, CID started seeing weapons coming 

up missing as there were reported thefts out of depots and warehouses over there. I think we initiated six or seven different cases 

that showed the weapons losses. The DOD IG then picked up 

through other channels that there were some weapons leaking 

across the borders outside of Iraq and into neighboring countries. 

So they opened the investigation to see where these weapons were 

coming from. We then assisted them in taking a look and seeing 

if any of these weapons that were showing up in foreign countries 

were also weapons that had been stolen from Army depots or depots set up over in theater. That effort is still ongoing. And we 

have still got agents working with DOD IG. 

Mr. MURTHA. You have any idea what the percentage that were 

missing from the original numbers that were sent over there? 

Mr. QUINN. Mr. Chairman. I do not. The DOD IG may have a 

better handle on it because they are running it down the rabbit 

hole by serial number trying to get control over where they are at. 


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CONTRACT OVERSIGHT

Mr. MURTHA. Okay. Go ahead with the three areas. 

General THOMPSON. Sir, and the third major area is the issue of 

the private security contractors and the control of the private security contractors. And there has been a lot of work, collaborative 

work that has gone on between the Department of Defense and the 

Department of State to include a formal memorandum of agreement between those two government agencies. In December, enhanced procedures put in place by the Multinational Force Iraq to 

better get a handle on the private security contractors and their 

control. And again that is not an area that either the Gansler Commission or the Army looked at internally. That was done at the 

DOD level working directly with the State Department. 

SOLE SOURCE CONTRACTS

Mr. MURTHA. Do we have any idea at this point how many contracts are sole source contracts? 

General THOMPSON. No, sir. I could take that for the record. I do 

know that, looking at the information from the Joint Contracting 

Command in Iraq that about 25 percent of the contracts that they 

let in 2007 were sole source contracts. And the procedures were followed, as we do typically when we go—you know, the objective always is to do full and open competition. There are seven exceptions 

where you can use sole source contracts. 

Mr. MURTHA. If you would get for the Committee the percentage 

and the amount of money that was involved. 

[The information follows:] 

The Department of Defense has not awarded any Sole Source Private Security 

Contracts. All contracts have been awarded using full and open competition. 

General THOMPSON. All right, sir. 

EXAMPLES OF FRAUD

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Quinn, I think you said there were some 80 indictments so far in this investigation? 

Mr. QUINN. Congressman Young, no, we have got currently 87 

ongoing investigations that look at Kuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan that 

go into providing support to the soldiers over there in theater. So 

87 ongoing investigations. That is out of 135 that we have initiated. 

The remainder we have closed. Indictments, I believe the number 

is 19 individuals have been indicted so far. 

Mr. YOUNG. Can you give us a couple of examples of how the 

Army is being ripped off by these contractors? What type of fraud 

is being committed? How are they stealing? Give us a couple examples. 

Mr. QUINN. Congressman Young, it spans the gamut from what 

we have seen over there. We have seen bribes as low as $2,500 

being taken by individuals. We see double billing. We see product 

substitution, when we ask for product A and we get product B in. 

And we get the bid rigging of the contracts going over there because of bribery. The biggest thing that we have seen over there 

is on the bribery side of the house. It was just so much money, and 


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a lot of it in cash, that bribery is probably the number one issue 

that we have looked at. 

Mr. YOUNG. Who is bribing and who is getting bribed? 

Mr. QUINN. I mentioned, Congressman, that we had 19 individuals so far that have been indicted or arrested. That is military 

and civilian. That number may grow as high as a hundred that we 

are looking at over there. We are looking at military officers, enlisted, we are looking at civilians, government employees that have 

accepted bribes. And then we are also looking at contractors themselves that are offering bribes. And not only to the contracting officials, but also to unit level representatives that are maybe escorting fuel trucks and have them look the other way as fuel is diverted. The actual contracting officials that we are looking at is 

probably only 20, 25 percent. The rest of them are other individuals 

over there in the force. 

FRAUD PREVENTION

Mr, YOUNG. Well, General Thompson, what is the Army doing to 

try to prevent this? Any kind of quality control or—I am not suggesting that we put spies on every contractor to see who is doing 

what, but you know, what the problem is. What is the Army planning to do to correct this? 

General THOMPSON. Well, sir, I would say most of the investigations that are ongoing today were investigations that initiated from 

actions that were taken in the 2003 to 2006 time frame. So a lot 

of what is being cleaned up today are things that happened in the 

past. That does not excuse them in any way, shape or form, and 

I am not here to make excuses for any individual, because in my 

view, if you violate your ethics and take a bribe you should suffer 

all the consequences that come with that. In Kuwait in particular, 

when we saw the issues, the CID stood up a procurement fraud 

unit in Kuwait when they started to get evidence that there were 

issues there that came up from audits and from reports from individuals. And then they expanded and stood up a procurement fraud 

unit in Iraq. And those are permanent organizations. 

Mr. QUINN. Vice versa. 

General THOMPSON. Vice versa. Iraq first and then Kuwait. Systemically, the checks and balances were there. They were not always being followed. And I am talking particularly in Kuwait. We 

made sure that the checks and balances are now being followed. In 

Kuwait we put new leadership into Kuwait, with a colonel that was 

a certified contracting officer and was one of the best contracting 

officers we had in the Army. We augmented his staff. We gave him 

dedicated legal support. We sent augmentation over there to work 

through the more complex contract actions. 

Part of the help that is being done in Kuwait is this reach back 

support, taking the large dollar value contracts and moving them 

back to be dealt with at the Large Acquisitions Center at Rock Island. Chairman Murtha asked a question before the hearing started about, you know, does that work? And as long as the requirements are being met for the operational commander, if I can do the 

contract negotiation, the pricing, you know, the writing of that contract, and I can do that someplace other than in the theater, we 

will elect to do that. The key for us is making sure that the reVerDate Nov 24 2008 05:14 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046473 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A473P2.XXX A473P2

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quirement is being met and then the contract execution, the management of the delivery of that service or product is being evaluated so the government gets what it contracted for. 

CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION

Mr. YOUNG. The combat commanders, they are busy fighting a 

war, and they are busy planning the efforts, they are busy patrolling the situation. They are not the ones that are responsible for 

overseeing the conduct of these contractors, are they? 

General THOMPSON. The responsibility for making sure that the 

contract is overseen is the contracting officer. But the operational 

commander has responsibility as well. Once the contract is let, the 

administration of that contract is done either through a contracting 

official who has been, you know, trained to do that, but in most 

cases, it is the contracting officer’s representative, who is the compliance officer who is in that unit. 

And so if you are contracting for the delivery of water or trash 

pickup, you have to have a delegated representative on the ground 

to make sure if you say the trash is getting picked up three times 

a day, they come and pick it up three times a day. And those are 

the eyes and ears forward. So the operational commander does 

have a direct responsibility in making sure that what he or she 

asks for is what is being delivered. And they are part of the process. 

So it is not—and this is one of the educational things in the 

Army that we are addressing, to change the understanding and the 

culture that when half of your combat service support is through 

contractors, you have to pay attention to that, and you have to be 

involved not just on setting the requirement, but also making sure 

that what you ask for is what you are getting, and you are getting 

it at a fair price. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think we have a lot of work 

to do here. And the better job we do in helping the Army get some 

control over how this is all coming down, we make Mr. Quinn’s job 

a lot easier. And that is what I want to do is make Mr. Quinn’s 

job a lot easier so that he has less of a workload and less corrupt 

people to be dealing with. And thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. General, was your father in the Army? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. And as I talked to him last night, 

as I routinely do, he said to say hello to you today. And he said 

to thank you for your contribution. 

Mr. MURTHA. He led a couple relief efforts which the staff reminds me we funded. So we are great admirers of him. 

You are in his tradition. You tell him I said hello. 

General THOMPSON. Sir, I will do that. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks. 

FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS

Mr. DICKS. You talked about 87 investigations? 

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Where did they come from? How did you get those 

cases? 

Mr. QUINN. If I could go back a little bit, Army CID has got a 

thousand military agents that accompany the force wherever they 


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go. We police the force when it comes to felony level investigations. 

So when the force is deployed over into Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, 

we sent 120, 150 CID agents over with them, but they were all the 

military Special Agents. 

Mr. DICKS. What were the initials? Criminal Investigative Service? 

Mr. QUINN. Criminal Investigative Division is how we say it. 

Mr. DICKS. CID? 

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. 

Mr. QUINN. So we have the got the thousand military that accompany the force. We sent 125, 130 over into Iraq, Afghanistan, 

Kuwait. They started picking up indicators that there was potentially fraud going on over there. We also got leads coming in from 

other Federal investigative agencies on money transfers coming 

into the country, illegal moneys being brought back in. And so in 

the summer of 2000—— 

Mr. DICKS. Being brought into Iraq or being brought back into 

the States? 

Mr. QUINN. Into the States, Congressman, yes, sir. In the summer of 2005 then—— 

Mr. MURTHA. I think—would you go into a little more detail? As 

I remember, this came from somebody else to us. The fact these 

weapons and this stuff was missing and there was fraud. Do you 

remember that? 

Mr. QUINN. Mr. Chairman, yes. The bottom line is we get cases 

from a number of different sources coming in to us. There was a 

source that was a hotline complaint that went in through DOD IG 

over to Army, and then we picked up on that. That turned out to 

be a fraud case. But we have also had the military agents over 

there that were picking up indicators of fraud. In the summer of 

2005—also in Army CID we have 100 special agents that are civilians, and all they do is look at procurement fraud for the Army. 

We sent them over on two assessment teams in the summer. They 

did pick up on indicators of fraud in Iraq. 

By December of 2005, we established a fraud office in Iraq. And 

then by the spring, summer of 2006, we saw increased indicators 

of fraud down in Kuwait. So we have since established an office in 

Kuwait. And we now have one in Afghanistan as well. 

Mr. MURTHA. But didn’t we find that the Turks were being killed 

by weapons that we brought in? Is not that part of it? Just somebody was being killed by weapons that we brought in. 

Mr. QUINN, Mr. Chairman, that is correct. There were press reports coming out of Turkey that some of the missing weapons had 

gone across the border and were showing up on the streets of Turkey, Istanbul. And that is what brought the DOD IG in to look at 

that side of it. Of course, we in the Army CID were looking more 

at the thefts out of warehouses on the Army CID side. So it came 

to us from a number of different sources. As I mentioned, we have 

in all opened 135 investigations. 87 of them are still open. 60 percent of those cases have been passed from theater back into the 

United States. In other words, we sit down with Department of 

Justice on these cases. Department of Justice then works with our 

agents, and we decide a venue on where the trial is going to take 


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place, and the investigation is further investigated. And so then it 

is parceled out to our fraud offices in the states and U.S. Attorneys 

or Assistant U.S. Attorneys spread throughout the United States. 

We are working out in Bellingham, Washington, we have got some 

down in Atlanta, we have got them in Dallas. So we just kind of 

spread the workload out amongst all those U.S. Attorneys offices. 

Mr. DICKS. Is one of your sources the GAO, the General Accounting Office? 

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir. GAO, Army Audit Agency. When we got into 

Kuwait and the Kuwaiti contracting office and saw where there 

were some issues down there, we immediately partnered with auditors to come in and start looking at the books. So we do work with 

GAO and we do work with Army Audit Agency, as well as other 

Federal investigative agencies, the DOD IG, FBI. 

Mr. DICKS. How many of the cases are individuals versus contractors? Is there a percentage or—are these individual cases or— 

how many times do we have major contractors involved in questionable or illegal activities? 

Mr. QUINN. Congressman, the bulk of the cases that we are seeing over there are not the Halliburtons, they are not Brown & 

Roots, they are not the big major corporations. It is smaller companies, holding companies that started up over in theater, got access 

to do contracts, they partner with the Kuwaitis or other foreign nationals. They, I think, get some of the business because they speak 

English, they are able to get in the door. So you have got U.S. folks 

partnering with foreign-held companies. And so it is—but almost 

all of them, we have got a U.S. subject in the subject block. In 

other words, a U.S. Government employee, whether military or civilian that was on the other end of the fraud that took place in theater. 

Now, not all 87 that we still have ongoing are exclusively with 

a U.S. Government official in the subject block or being investigated. Some of them are contractors ripping off contractors. And 

of course a sub that is defrauding a prime, and then the prime is 

billing the U.S. Government. So we do go after those. 

EXPEDITIONARY CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT

General THOMPSON. Sir, if I can add just one thing, one of the 

systemic things that we took a look at as we looked at the structure for this, these brigades and battalions, is as we partnered with 

the auditors and with the criminal investigators to look at the historical files, we realized that there was a real value in having them 

present not after the fact, but at the beginning. And so we are looking at putting auditors and criminal investigators as part of that 

deployable structure, both to have that presence there from the beginning, and also to act as a deterrent. And that will be one of the 

changes that we put in place in the future. And that has been a 

result of the work that we have done in the last couple of months. 

Mr. DICKS. General, you said these cases were from 2003 to 

2006? 

Mr. QUINN. The bulk of the fraud that we have detected and investigated to date is in that 2003, 2006, maybe into 2007. We still 

open cases not every day, but every week or two weeks. But when 

we take a look at the span of when the majority of the incidents 


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took place in the cases that we have got ongoing, it is back in that 

2003–2006 time frame. But we still have folks—— 

Mr. DICKS. Now, is this because of a lack of personnel to audit 

or check or investigate? I mean how did we get so far behind the 

curve? 

Mr. QUINN. Fraud habitually comes to us late on investigations. 

Seldom do we catch it right there at the very start. And that is 

why we have gone to civilian fraud agents, because they can work 

these cases for years. Part of the reason why there was so much 

in that time frame, which were not unusual, was the lack of oversight and being overworked, a small office with just too many contracts to manage, too many contracts to cut. 

JOINT CONTRACTING COMMAND FOR IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

General THOMPSON. Congressman Dicks, if I could, one of the 

issues, the Defense Department was not organized to do expeditionary contracting on this scale. You did not have a deployable 

structure. And that is one of the systemic issues we are addressing 

not just in the Army, but also in the DOD. And so it was a pickup 

game. It was a pickup game from the very beginning. They added 

individuals, they built up a structure. There is about a 200-person 

structure, the Joint Contracting Command for Iraq and Afghanistan today. But that has been stood up over a number of years. 

And one of the reasons why we looked at a modular structure for 

contingency contracting in the Army is so you can get the people 

to train together. And when you have a contingency, no matter 

what size it is in the future, you will be able to deploy the right 

number of people with the right skill set to be able to deal with 

that issue. 

We are putting planners in with the combatant commanders 

right now in order to plan in the war plans and in the contingency 

plans how do you structure yourself to make sure that you are contracting what you need. We are working standard A statements of 

work. So you know, you do not get over there and realize I need 

dining facilities support. You have already got a scope of work that 

details, you know, what that is. And so you are not thinking about 

that after the fact. So the systemic issues from 2003 to 2006 was 

not organized for it, more complex workload than they anticipated, 

not enough people over there to deal with it, and it opened up the 

opportunities that unfortunately led to the fact that the Criminal 

Investigation Division has got that much workload from that time 

period. 

CONTRACT REVIEWS

Mr. DICKS. Is it possible to go back and review these contracts 

between 2003 and 2006 to see if we were ripped off? I mean, is 

there a way to go back? And I know you maybe have statute of limitations issues, but a lot of times the statute does not ring unless 

somebody knows about it. 

General THOMPSON. Sir, that is exactly what we have done. In 

Kuwait, there was about 6,000 contracts in that time frame. And 

Secretary Geren wanted to absolutely make sure that there was 

not a contract that was let during that time frame that may not 

have been picked up on already by an investigation. So between 


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August and December, we reviewed on a statistical basis, all of the 

contracts under $25,000 were reviewed in Kuwait, all the contracts 

that were over $25,000 during that time frame were shipped back 

to the Major Acquisition Center in Michigan. And with the auditors 

and with the criminal investigators, we went through those contracts. About 650 contracts that were selected statistically. Of those 

650 contracts, 41 or—— 

Mr. DICKS. So that means you did not do them all? 

General THOMPSON. We did not do them all, no, sir. But every 

place where we saw an indication that we needed to go look at another contract, we did. And of those 650, there was 41 that had evidence of maybe not fraud, but something as not done right. And 

those have been turned over to the criminal investigators to take 

a look at to see if it should lead to opening up a formal investigation. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired, but just 

one final thing. How many total contracts, the total number were 

there during that time frame? You picked 650 out of how many? 

General THOMPSON. There was about 6,000 contracts let in Kuwait in that 3-year period. And we got with the auditors and looked 

at the representative sample of those. And that was about 650. So 

a little more than 10 percent of the historical contracts were looked 

at. And these were ones that were not already subject to an investigation. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. I am going to be very lenient, because this is such 

an important subject. So feel free to follow up on your thoughts. 

Mr. Hobson. 

Mr. HOBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen. I 

have had a lot of problems with Army contracting before, as you 

know, General Thompson. 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. 

AMOUNT OF FRAUD

Mr. HOBSON. It was not very good when we started, especially 

on trucks. But let me say that how much dollar amount do you 

think we were involved here in the fraud—not in the overall contracts, but just on the fraud part, how much do you think? 

Mr. QUINN. Congressman, we think that at least $6 billion in 

contracts were touched by the fraud. But we do not believe there 

was that much fraud involved in it. But a portion of $6 billion in 

contracts we think there was some fraud involved in it. Now, that 

may have been the sergeant out there looking the other way as the 

fuel trucks were being delivered, but that is the size. 

Mr. HOBSON. Is it in certain areas more prevalent than others, 

like the fuel? 

Mr. QUINN. Congressman, I do not think I could put it in one 

area, whether it was fuel. It is goods, it is services, it is hauling 

contracts, it is food coming into theater, it is port-a-potties being 

cleaned. It is just that whole gamut of services that it takes. 

General THOMPSON. But Dan, one of the things, the total dollar 

amount of bribes that are part of the investigations to date is 

what? 


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Mr. QUINN. $20 million. We think $20 million in bribes was 

taken by different individuals. 

MISSING WEAPONS

Mr. MURTHA. Let me focus on just the arms thing, because I 

have heard figures as high as 50 percent disappeared. Now, do we 

have any idea of what percentage at this point of your investigation 

actually disappeared from the time they got to Kuwait until the 

time they got out in the field? 

Mr. QUINN. Mr. Chairman, I do not. I know the DOD IG is working that. Occasionally, we will get a report. 

Mr. MURTHA. We will get a report? 

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. What time frame was that? 

Mr. QUINN. The DOD IG was looking over the last 6 or 7 months 

when he went into theater and—— 

Mr. MURTHA. What was the time frame the arms went missing? 

Mr. QUINN. It went all the way back into 2003 time frame, when 

we were pushing weapons in to stand up Iraqi units. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Hobson. 

Mr. HOBSON. That is another point. Were these arms going—the 

arms that were done, were arms going to the Iraqi Army being contracted for to them? Is that where it happened? 

General THOMPSON. The arms were being purchased in order to 

stand up Iraqi Army and Iraqi police forces. When we looked at the 

contracts, the receipt of those weapons, we can go back through the 

contract files and show who received those weapons on what date 

and at what location. It is the accountability of those weapons after 

they were received by an Army individual or a U.S. Government 

representative, it is the accountability of those weapons from that 

point on that is the subject of the investigation of the DOD IG. 

CONTRACT SUPPORT SERVICES

Mr. HOBSON. Well, part of this, that is not new in a way. But 

part of what happened in the Army is—in the big Army overall, is 

that you got rid of, over a period of time, support services within 

the Army. You do not carry the same kind of capabilities that you 

carried in previous conflicts. So this idea that it would be smart to 

change and not carry these, and it would be cheaper to contract out 

with contractors all these support services. You did not used to 

have all those. Now we do. The problem is that apparently the 

Army or the Defense Department did not set up, when they contracted those out, a new set of controls. You had to look at how 

that was going to work. Apparently we did not learn any lessons 

in Bosnia and Kosovo, because that is what we did there, where 

we contracted out. 

We bought arms elsewhere in the world for other people, maybe 

not in this environment, but in other environments, we did. We did 

not seem to set up, until after the fact, the controls that we needed 

to have on that type of services, whether it be the chow hall services and those contracts. I ran into a problem when I tried to build 

a bakery once over there because KBR did not like it. KBR also 

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ting into the contracts that they had to supply food. There are 

some big people pushing back. I think you started to allude to this, 

that the Army, when it shifted from carrying these types of services, did not set up enough control. There was no idea of how that 

would work in the field when you got into a real conflict versus an 

operation like Bosnia and Kosovo? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, in the 90’s there was two things that 

happened. And it was not just in the Army. There was a philosophical shift in providing a lot of the services via contract. You 

know, not having soldiers in uniform of whatever service to do 

some of those things. Because it was looked at as a better value, 

so you could turn on that contracted support when you needed it 

and turn it off. You can argue both sides of that, but that was the 

general philosophical shift. 

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE DOWNSIZING

Mr. MURTHA. Why didn’t it work then? For instance, if you 

agreed with that, it seemed like—— 

General THOMPSON. Well, that is the second piece of it, Congressman Murtha. Simultaneously with that was there was a major 

downsizing in the acquisition workforce. And so you have got more 

contracted services and the acquisition workforce going down. So in 

the big picture, and it is a very simple conclusion, but you did not 

have enough people to be able to do that. So the workload that was 

contracted out went up, the contracting workforce went down. And 

that is one of the issues that we are facing today. And that is one 

of the reasons why the Army is going back, and the Gansler Commission recommended that the Army, the Army grow its military 

and civilian contractor workforce to be able to handle the workload. 

Mr. MURTHA. And have you budgeted for that in this budget? 

General THOMPSON. Not completely. Part of it, Mr. Chairman, is 

working that into the program, which is 10 and out. We have gone 

back on the military side and we have added since August 301 

military spaces for the contracting brigades and battalions and 

teams. And we are in the process of adding another 167. 

Mr. MURTHA. I understand. But is this because you can not get 

qualified people or because you are worried about the money because OMB cut you back? 

General THOMPSON. I think we can get qualified people, but it 

just takes—it just takes time. I do not—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, the question I am asking, do you have 

enough money to accomplish what you think needs to be accomplished in your request so that we can fund it? For instance, the 

supplemental. Is there funding that would help you with this problem in the supplemental, either CID or yourself? 

General THOMPSON. In the near term in the supplemental, there 

is not a request to do some of the training—— 

Mr. MURTHA. I am not asking if there was a request. Is there 

enough money, can we put money in the supplemental? Should we 

put money in the supplemental? This is our business here. 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. This Committee is in the forefront of so many different programs. We are way ahead of the military, or OMB, I 

guess you would call it. So you tell us—maybe you can not tell us 


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offhand, but you need to tell the staff if you need more money because we are right now negotiating with the Defense Department 

about what we are going to do for the supplemental. 

General THOMPSON. We will go back, and we will look at what 

is in the 2008 supplemental request and the 2009 supplemental request and make sure the things we need in the near term are in 

there. 

[The information follows:] 

The Army Contracting Task Force and DASA (P&P) identified funds for three 

major areas, Workforce Initiatives, Virtual Contracting Enterprise, and cost to hire 

1000 1102’s. FY 08 costs for the three areas: Workforce Intiatives—$1,860,300, Virtual Contracting Enterprise—$5,795,000 and Hiring Costs—$164,225,649. 

The attachments provide a detailed analysis of the Workforce Initiatives, Virtual 

Contracting Enterprise, and cost to hire 1000 Contracting Professionals. 


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Mr. MURTHA. Thank you. 

Mr. HOBSON. I have one last question. Right now you are talking 

about the Army, but you also alluded to the fact that that the other 

services, the Marine Corps, Navy, others may have a similar-type 

problem. Maybe you cannot speak for this, but is this something, 

Mr. Chairman, we should look at? If it is systemic here, is the Marine Corps facing the same problem in service contracts? Maybe not 

in supplying the military stuff. But what about the Navy? Is anybody looking at that? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir, we are. As a matter of fact, yesterday I spent 2 hours in a meeting with the senior officials in the 

Defense Department across all the services. And one of the things 

that the Gansler Commission recommended, and it is a requirement in the law, is that DOD report back in 120-days, as well as 

the Army reporting back in 120 days, on what they are doing to 

address the systemic issues. There are eight groups in the Defense 

Department right now with representation across all of the services 

looking at all of the systemic issues to make sure that we fix not 

just the Army, but all of the services. And that report will come 

back over to the Congress within the 120-day period from the time 

of the enactment of the Authorization Act. 

TRUCK CONTRACTS

Mr. HOBSON. Just one last comment. I am still concerned that we 

are just automatically renewing truck contracts for billions of dollars and not competing them. Because the last time not at the 

Army’s request, but at this Committee’s request that trucks be 

competed, we saved a lot of money. Still do not like the truck, but 

we saved a lot of money. We are not doing that today. I understand 

you people are going to do another, or already have done another 

$2 or $3 billion contract, noncompete rebuy on the FMTV trucks. 

And in my personal opinion, that is not good for the taxpayer. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Moran. 

CONTRACT PERSONNEL

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The frustrating thing is 

that it is now 2008, and the problems we are talking about have 

been going on for almost 5 years. And what I want to underscore 

is that the authorizing Committee primarily drove this reduction in 

acquisitions personnel. Acquisition personnel were cut by almost 50 

percent, not because of the Appropriations Subcommittee, but because of the authorizing committee. And yet there was not a 

squawk from any witness before this Committee until the subcommittee initiated the questioning. 

Even though this kind of stuff was going on and there was fraud, 

there was just incompetence, there was an enormous waste of 

money. And now we look back and we see, well, gosh, contract actions increased by almost 650 percent since the Clinton administration, the dollar value of contracts went up by 330 percent, and yet 

the number of contract personnel went down by 50 percent. And 

yet the military never asked for more people. I mean, you can look 

back in the testimony, and not that you are that young, General, 

but you know, you are relatively new to the scene, so I am not 


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holding you personally responsible, but it is frustrating that this 

stuff has been going on. 

And now we look back and say, oh, gosh, here is the Gansler report that says the obvious, and now we are starting to deal with 

it. Now that we should have already concluded this mess in Iraq. 

And the subcommittee has always been willing, the subcommittee, 

in fact, has always granted whatever was requested. Now, I know 

I am kind of lecturing here on a harangue; but that is the frustrating aspect of it. We look back, and the Gansler recommendations are pretty obvious. You need to increase contract personnel 

by 1,400 people. And you look back, well, what has the Congress 

done? You find that this subcommittee has done everything that 

has been done. 

It has not been enough. But you know, we added almost $50 million for the audit agency. We added—the staff can tell us—but I 

think all told, a few hundred million into contracting. And now you 

are responding. And that is the troubling thing, that it is so much 

after the fact, and this money has been wasted, and morale of the 

troops has been affected accordingly. 

For 4 years now, this subcommittee, and particularly in the last 

2 years, has asked how many contractors are there in Iraq? And 

we were given what, a round number of about 100,000 or something. But you would think, and I am sort of hoping that this is 

brought back to the folks who are still there now in their 8th year, 

that they would have gotten us an accurate number. I still don’t 

think we have an accurate number. And you tell us about this 

fraud, some of these people who committed the fraud are still getting contracts. And I do not know that we have a system for saying, look, there is accountability here. If you were involved in any 

kind of fraud in your contract, you do not get any more contracts. 

Do we have a policy like that? 

General THOMPSON. We have a system to do that. A couple of 

points, sir. 

SUSPENDED AND DEBARRED CONTRACTS

Mr. MORAN. Has it been implemented? Has anybody been actually blacklisted as a result? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MORAN. Who? 

General THOMPSON. Once an organization or a contractor is identified, they can go on the suspended or debarred list. And then the 

other thing that happens is before they get on the suspended and 

debarred list, which, in some cases, takes some time, their performance is evaluated by the existing contracts that they have got. And 

if they are bidding for a new contract, the contracting officer that 

is looking at them as a potential source for the new contract looks 

at their performance. And that is part of the consideration in 

whether they should be awarded a subsequent contract. 

Mr. MURTHA. That is a hypothetical answer. How many has that 

happened to? 

General THOMPSON. I would have to take that one again for the 

record, sir, to give you the specifics. But there are companies that 

are on the debarred and suspended list. There are companies 

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tracting community as they look to let future contracts. And we can 

go back and give you on an annual basis how many those numbers 

are that get added to that list. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. MORAN. Yeah. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I just want to ask, when you bar somebody, is 

that as an individual or as a company? Because so many of these 

people work through a shell of different corporations. 

General THOMPSON. It can be either/or. It can be either/or. 

Mr. KINGSTON. So you can actually follow the individual? 

General THOMPSON. Yes. 

Mr. MORAN. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, first of all, it is what we 

should be doing, but in many ways this is subjective. You know, 

it is one of the considerations to take into—it is one of the factors 

to take into consideration. The reality, unless we can be shown otherwise, is that these very same firms are still getting contracts. 

Maybe, you know, they took it into consideration and they were not 

the prime contractor, but the fact is they are still getting the contract. There has got to be some accountability. And I just do not 

see it coming internally. 

No offense to the witnesses, but you have got—I think you have 

got to show us some proof that you have gotten tough on these 

folks, because unless there is proof, they are going to continue. Because the message, the contractors know who has been abusing the 

system. And if they continue to get contracts, that is a message 

that is sent that the contracting officer is going to look the other 

way. 

Now, a lot of them have come to us and said, now, look, it is not 

so much they are looking the other way, but there are not contractors looking anywhere because there are not enough of them. And 

the really good ones we wind up hiring anyway, and we can pay 

them three times as much. And that is the other thing the Gansler 

report said, it is not just the quantity that we are missing, we are 

missing the quality. And there is not enough training and not 

enough compensation. And if we want to—and that is one of the 

things that was underscored in the Committee’s report last—that 

was released with the ’08 bill. 

[The information follows:] 

A number of persons and companies have been suspended or debarred. The attachment provides the most current list. 


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CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ

Mr. MORAN. And then it is accountability and getting some specifics. You know, if we asked you now how many contractors are 

in Iraq, I do not know that we would get any better an answer 

than the 100,000 we have been told before. 

General THOMPSON. The number today is about 133,500. There 

is a contractor accountability system in place now. It is called the 

Synchronized Predeployment Operational Tracking System, which 

is a database where contractors are put into, and they are also put 

into that database when they move inside of theater. Now is it perfect? I will not tell you it is perfect, Congressman Moran, but there 

is a system in place today to account for not just the number, but 

also the physical location of the contractors in theater. 

Mr. MORAN. So it is 133—— 

General THOMPSON. 133,500 in Iraq today. 

Mr. BISHOP. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. MORAN. Sure. 

Mr. BISHOP. That is 133,500 contractors for DOD. What about 

other agency contracts that overlap? For example, security contracts at the industries that are paid for out of other agencies like 

State? What about those? Do you have any way of interactive accountability for contractors that are working in theater alongside 

DOD contractors? 

General THOMPSON. That were hired by Agency for International 

Development (AID). 

Mr. BISHOP. That were hired by other agencies? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. I do not know about their specific 

systems. But one of the things that the Defense Department and 

the State Department have worked out as part of this December 

memorandum of agreement is to work together to account for the 

total contractor population that is in the theater. And I do not 

know where that specifically is, Congressman. 

Mr. BISHOP. But in addition to State, there is also Interior. There 

are Interior contracts. From the various agencies and—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me interrupt here. I want to make sure I am 

getting clear. The last I heard was 126,000. Now, we are not pulling troops out and putting more contractors in. 

General THOMPSON. I do not think. we are doing that, Mr. Chairman. I would expect that as the number of troops come down, the 

number of contractors there to support the troops would also come 

down. But there may be some cases where you replace troops with 

a contractor to do something that needs to be done. But in the aggregate, I would expect the proportion of contractors to come down 

as the troop level comes down. 

GSA CONTRACTING ASSISTANCE

Mr. MURTHA. I worry about the same things Mr. Hobson and Mr. 

Moran outlined. This subcommittee last time said take 600 people 

from GSA because we were so concerned about this problem. Well, 

I find out that in conference that we said, ‘‘we encourage’’ you to 

do that. Then we find out GSA was livid about it. They could not— 

what are you telling us about put some of our people over there in 

a combat area? We just can not do that. So in the end we put 


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money in. We can not solve this problem, General Thompson. You 

have got to tell us what you need to help you solve the problem. 

Now, if you, in your professional opinion, think it is better to 

have contract officers that you can surge—which did not seem to 

work—or you need more people in uniform or working for you, we 

need to know so we can fund it. That is our problem. I mean, I do 

not know what the OMB does over there. But every time we run 

into something it is always OMB’s fault. But you need to tell us 

so we can address the problem. At least help you with the solution. 

That is what we are trying to do. 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. 

FUNDING FOR CONTRACTING OFFICERS

Mr. MURTHA. And CID the same way. If you need more money, 

you need to tell us. 

Mr. QUINN. Mr. Chairman, you had asked earlier about money 

needs, personnel needs. The Army is giving us what we need. As 

I mentioned, we had 100 agents. They have authorized us to grow 

to 136. They are going to use the supplemental to pay for those additional 36 agents. And then in the next 2 months, we will be putting it into the Program Objective Memorandum and I have every 

assurance that we are going to get what we need when it comes 

to agents to investigate this. 

General THOMPSON. The biggest need—— 

Mr. DICKS. 5 years late. That is the problem. 

CONTRACTING PROCESS

Mr. MORAN. Yes, it is. And the chairman expressed what I was 

trying to say. You got the message. We have been trying to be responsive, and we are going to be held accountable here, for all this 

money that is spent and all this fraud that has taken place. And 

yet, I do not see that there is the kind of cleanup, fix-up, and confidence in moving forward that this situation is not going to continue. One problem is there is just too many contractors contractors 

over there. There is too much money being poured into it. And 

there is too little accountability. And so the Committee is interested in how you are going to fix this. I know that the leadership 

is determined to give you whatever you say will help fix the problem. But I am not sure we are hearing enough right now with the 

Gansler report. If it is being implemented is certainly a step in the 

right direction. 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. I do think it is a step in the right 

direction. I will share your concern that you have to appreciate contracting. And it is not just the contracting officers, it is the whole 

process from end to end. From setting a requirement on what you 

need, to contracting for it, to making sure it is delivered properly, 

to making sure it is properly paid for. You know. culturally. I will 

speak just for the Army, not across all of DOD, contracting was not 

valued as much as it should have been. I will tell you that Secretary Geren is dead serious about fixing this. I have spent probably 50 percent of my time over the last 6 months addressing these 

issues. Secretary Geren personally briefed the Secretary of Defense 

a week ago, I was there, to make sure the Secretary of Defense 

knew how seriously we were taking this. 


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I told you about the two-hour session I had yesterday with all 

the senior officials across the Defense Department. We are briefing 

the Gansler Commission this afternoon to show them the things 

that we are doing. I think we are on the right path to address this. 

I agree it should have been fixed a while ago. But, you know, I 

think we are on the right path. 

Mr. MORAN. Let me just say there is a bigger issue here that 

transcends this. And that is, should we really have as many contractors fighting a war as we have uniformed personnel? 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. MORAN. I want to finish my statement. 

Mr. MURTHA. Wait. Let us go to Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

Mr. MORAN. That contractors are getting paid more money. And 

it has got to be undermining the morale of our troops. And it is not 

the way to carry out a military action. But that is a larger issue. 

And it is not the policy issue you are responsible for. But I think 

the subcommittee is increasingly aware that that issue needs to be 

addressed as well. I am sorry, Steve. 

FUNDING FOR CONTRACTING OFFICERS

Mr. MURTHA. Let me mention in conjunction with this, you know, 

the budget process goes on, last year at somebody’s recommendation, I do not remember who it was, we put $21 million in for this 

particular area. It went to the Senate, they took it out. I mean, we 

had to come to agreement on a lot of different things. If you folks 

need money, you need to step in and tell the staff on the Senate 

side, hey, this is important. Because you know, we have so many 

things, when we are dealing with $459 billion, if somebody would 

step up and tell us, tell them it is important, we drop out some 

issues, I am sure, important to them, and they drop out some 

issues that are important to us. 

So you need to watch what we do and then tell the Senate staff so that we do not have a problem—I mean, $21 million is a lot of 

money in your field. So we do the best we can do. And it comes 

because subcommittee members themselves make the suggestions. 

So Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

CONTRACTING SUPPORT BRIGADES

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, 

thank you for you what you do. I am an optimist by nature. Just 

taking a little look back here, we have now joint contracting commands. In the future with these new Contracting Support Brigades, have they actually been activated? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. There are four brigades that have 

already been activated. There are five battalions that have been activated. And there are 120 four-person teams. Not all of them have 

been activated yet. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So they report to the existing military 

structure that is there? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir, they do. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. They do? 

General THOMPSON. They do. 

Mr. DICKS. Would the gentleman yield for just one quick question? 


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Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Yeah. 

Mr. DICKS. Is there 3,000 people in a brigade? 

General Thompson. No, sir. That is the point I made earlier. This 

contracting brigade, headed by a colonel, has a staff of 19 people. 

It is going to grow a little bit. So it is not like a Stryker brigade 

or an infantry brigade. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But inherent in the brigade is they will be 

working side by side with qualified civilians in a variety of auditing 

and other types of capacities. Is that what we are led to believe? 

General THOMPSON. In that brigade staff structure are the legal 

support necessary, the contracting expertise, the audit expertise, 

we will add the investigative expertise from the CID. So he has got 

what he needs. And you have a colonel—the military understands 

brigades and battalions. And so that is one of the reasons we structured it that way, so it was not a pickup game in the future. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So we are going to have Contracting Support Brigades, battalions, they are activated, they are going to be 

working side by side—— 

General THOMPSON. There is going to be more of them. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. More of them, side by side with their civilian counterparts. Is it true that only three percent of the Army contracting personnel are in military today? 

General THOMPSON. That is true. 

GROWING THE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So you are talking about depending upon a 

relatively small portion of the Army. And it has been drilled into 

me by all the Army chiefs that the Army actually brings to the battlefield everybody else that is responsible for the logistics and the 

overall footprint. Do you have enough people coming through the 

military, going through the training process? Are you yanking people out of the Pentagon? How are you actually building up these 

brigades? 

General THOMPSON. The acquisition workforce in the Army 

today, the military acquisition workforce is about 1,540. We are 

going to grow that by about 400 people. In addition to that, we 

also—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You have the resources to do that? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. We do. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You have the money to do that? 

General THOMPSON. We have the money to do that. It is part of 

the Army’s overall authorization on the active component side of 

547,000. 

Mr. MURTHA. Wait a minute. He asked you do you have the 

money to do that. You said something about supplemental. 

Mr. QUINN. CID. Yes, sir. 

General THOMPSON. I was coming to that. In the supplemental, 

Mr. Chairman, what we need to look at is do we have the money 

to hire the civilians. Because the military personnel account is adequate to pay for the military structure. It is do we have the O&M 

funds to pay for the increase in the civilians? 

Mr. MURTHA. You are going to tell the staff what money you 

need in order to fix this problem. 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. 


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Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Wait a second. You are confident that you 

have enough people in uniform with these types of military occupations and backgrounds and others in the pipeline to populate these 

Contracting Support Brigades? 

General THOMPSON. Congressman, I am not confident that I have 

got enough people today. But over the next few years as we stand 

up this structure and recruit the people, we will have what I think 

is an adequate structure to do that. But it is not there today. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Rothman wants to go in order and I 

will yield to him. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you Mr. Frelinghuysen. You mentioned the 

word ‘‘culture,’’ and it is related to Congressman Frelinghuysen’s 

question, but some earlier questions and comments too. The war 

has been going on for almost 5 years. Hundreds of thousands of our 

troops have been in and out of theater; maybe a million have been 

in and out of the theater. Why did it take 5 years for this stuff to 

come to light? And is it a problem of a culture of the services if 

in fact, for example, rank-and-file folks saw these things going on 

and did not report them—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I would like to reclaim my time, and maybe 

he can in your time be more—— 

Mr. ROTHMAN. It is related to whether this fix is going to be sufficient with adding a few thousand in the mix. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Reclaiming my time. I am interested in, obviously, the military component. But as others have pointed out, 

the DOD acquisition force has been reduced by 50 percent. The 

issue we have discussed is, from last year’s report and discussion, 

between now, or I think between 2006 and 2010, half of the Federal acquisition workforce will be eligible to retire. So not only do 

you have the issue of military institutional memory, you have the 

issues related to the DOD. 

Mr. MURTHA. What was that again? Half of what? What is that? 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. We were told in another hearing that half 

of the Federal acquisition workforce will be eligible to retire between now and 2010. And so if that is the case, you know, how are 

you going to marry this new initiative, which we compliment you 

on, with the reality of a workforce that is aging, that may want to 

get out and may not want to even go into theater; are you going 

to work on like the military recruiting retention bonuses, higher 

salaries? How are you going to marry all that? And more importantly, how are you going to pay for it? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir, There are a number of programs, 

intern programs, recruiting programs, and Ms. Ballard, who sits 

behind me, is the head of contracting inside of the Army and works 

on the Army Secretariat. But we have got those programs in place. 

One of the things I will commit to, Mr. Chairman, is go back and 

make sure they are adequately funded either in the base program 

or in the supplemental. Those numbers that you quoted, Congressman Frelinghuysen, on the members of the acquisition workforce 

that are eligible to retire, are accurate. We typically don’t see that 

number that actually do retire, but it is a concern out there. And 

we know we need to recruit over the next couple of years an adequate bench in order to replace those people. 


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JOINTNESS IN CONTRACTING

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, if they have to go to Afghanistan or 

Iraq, I am sure, like other Federal agencies, there is probably some 

reluctance. 

In my last question, since the time is limited, since you carry the 

burden in many ways for the other military services, getting them 

into the theater, you know, the overall footprint of all the contracting services, this is a pretty enormous workload. The structure 

that you are setting up here, is it going to be mirrored in any way? 

I know you have sort of answered that question by an equal number, equal contribution from the other services. Are the Marines 

going to have a small—I assume they have some sort of contracting 

contingent now. Navy does. Air Force. Is there going to be jointness 

in this initiative across the services? 

General THOMPSON. Very much so. One of the things that they 

are doing is making sure that the planning for joint expeditionary 

contracting is done at the combatant commander level, and that as 

you go into a theater, you use Iraq or Afghanistan or some other 

theater in the future, that you understand what that need is; and 

the actual workforce that does that contracting would come from 

all the services. And so there is that deployable structure not just 

in the Army but in the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marines as 

well. And we are sharing the doctrine. 

There is joint doctrine that is being developed right now. It is in 

the final stages. One of the things—and I brought this along. This 

is the Contingency Contracting Joint Handbook that has been developed across all the services in the last year to standardize those 

procedures as we go forward. And this is now being published and 

is given to all the contingency officers across all the services. 

The joint doctrine has been years in development. Arguably that 

takes too long, but it is in the final stages right now, and that will 

be published as a joint publication here within the next couple of 

months. But it is a joint effort, Congressman. And that is the way 

we are approaching it in the future. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I didn’t know you brought that with you. 

But it obviously speaks volumes of the issue of whether the services are working together on this issue. It can’t just be the Army 

doing the heavy lifting here. It needs to be shared. 

General THOMPSON. This is primarily an Air Force document 

that all the services then got together and said, This is really pretty good, let’s make sure we get all those thoughts in there. 

And this is just being published. As a matter of fact as I talked 

to members of the Senate staff last week, I had another copy, and 

I gave it away because they were interested in it. 

And the Army has the lead on the development of the joint A 

doctrine contributed to by all, of the services. So it is very much 

a joint effort and that is the recognition across the DOD. 

Mr. BISHOP. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I would be happy to. And then I will yield 

back. 


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DEFENSE ACQUISITION UNIVERSITY

Mr. BISHOP. To follow up on what Mr. Frelinghuysen was discussing, what is the role of the Defense Acquisition University in 

trying to address this age imbalance? And is it a cross-service effort? Have you all done any kind of assessments to determine 

whether or not there is sufficient personnel at the Defense Acquisition University to meet the demand for the new trainees, to address the retiree situation? 

General THOMPSON. The Defense Acquisition University, Congressman Bishop, has got the responsibility for training the acquisition workforce across the DOD. They also have responsibility to 

look at all the workforce trends in the acquisition across the DOD. 

They have expanded their course offerings and increased the course 

content for contingency contracting. They have got lessons learned, 

they are always looking at lessons learned and incorporating that 

into course content. And one of the things that works across the 

DOD is, looking at those workforce trends to do some of the things 

we talked about, is bringing in enough people with the right skill 

set to replace those that may retire in the next few years. But they 

have a very active role in that. 

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE RETIREMENTS

Mr. MURTHA. The time of the gentleman has expired. I am going 

to read something about Joint Contract Command. I am sure you 

have read this. ‘‘The Gansler Commission reports the Army is the 

DOD executive agent for contracting Iran, Iraq. and Afghanistan 

but is unable to fill military-civilian contract billets in either quality, quantity, or qualification.’’ 

What Mr. Frelinghuysen said worries me. You can contract out 

and it takes you a while to train your folks to do this business. And 

that is part of the problem we had in Iraq. If you have got that 

many people retiring, you had better give us a plan. 

You know personally. I think one of the big problems we have 

is we are living day to day. We are not living ahead. You need to 

give us a plan, so we don’t run into this problem down the road. 

I know personally, when it comes to health care, the Army does a 

hell of a lot better job than the Air Force does. The Air Force 

doesn’t know which end is up when it comes to contracting for 

health care, but the Army does a lot better job. 

General THOMPSON. Sir, just to give you some assurance that 

when we send this 120-day report back, part of how seriously Secretary Geren has taken this, he has got the Under Secretary of the 

Army, Mr. Ford, pulling together the action plan, the campaign 

plan to address this thing into the future. And it will address 

things doctrinally, organizationally, training, the materiel solutions. It is very comprehensive. 

Mr. MURTHA. This says here the Air Force is handling most of 

the complex contracting actions. Is that true? 

General THOMPSON. In Iraq and Afghanistan, in the Joint Contracting Command, about 25 percent of the presence there are 

Army. And then the others are shared across the services. A lot of 

the Air Force, because they have about 2,000 military contracting 

professionals in the Air Force, which is—— 


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CONTRACTING EXECUTIVE AGENCY FOR IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

Mr. MURTHA. If you are the executive agency coordinating it, and 

yet 67 percent of the money comes from the Air Force, which provides 67 percent of the Joint Contracting Command, according to 

the Gansler report. 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. And that is accurate. But then 

again, that is because we treat contracting as a joint operation. 

And so the Air Force has got more qualified and trained people. 

And therefore they are filling those requirements in the Joint Contracting Command. 

Mr. MURTHA. Should you not change the Air Force being an executive—— 

General THOMPSON. One of the things that we are discussing 

with OSD right now is, should the Army be the executive agent? 

If it is going to be treated joint, should DOD be the executive agent 

for contracting in the joint operation rather than delegated down 

to a service? That is under discussion right now. 

Mr. MURTHA. Okay. Ms. Kaptur. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Thompson, thank you and your family for your service 

to our country. 

General THOMPSON. Thank you, ma’am. 

CONTRACTED SECURITY FORCES

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Quinn, for your service as well. We 

appreciate your being here with us today. My interest, my greatest 

interest is in—I guess I feel like I am running after a herd of elephants that is stampeding across the plains and I am running after 

them and I can’t catch them. They are always ahead of me. And 

they are doing things that I can’t stop. 

My interest is in contracting, and in those members of the contracted forces who carry guns. The most troubling thing you have 

said this morning, more than once, is that there is an agreement 

being worked on between the State Department and the Department of Defense regarding contracted security forces, which is still 

not signed. 

General THOMPSON. No, ma’am, it is signed. 

Ms. KAPTUR. It is signed? 

General THOMPSON. It was signed in December. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Signed in December. 

General THOMPSON. And in December also were a comprehensive 

set of instructions put together by the multinational force in Iraq 

to pull together all the pieces to get their hands around the contracted security guards and the accountability of those: who is allowed to carry weapons, and all those procedures. And I don’t know 

if Mr. Quinn has got anything else to add to that. But those documents are there and can be made available to the Committee. 

Mr. QUINN. Yes, ma’am. The memorandum between the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of State was signed 

on 5 December; and then later in December, on the 22nd, is when 

the multinational forces-Iraq put out their instructions. They had 

instructions prior out there, but they pulled all these different 

agreements together and issued a fairly comprehensive set of inVerDate Nov 24 2008 05:14 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046473 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A473P2.XXX A473P2

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structions on how to get control over all the different agencies over 

there that may have private security contractors. 

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. Who has more under contract. DOD or 

Department of State? How many are there? And who has more 

under contract—which agency, which department? 

General THOMPSON. Private security contractors? I don’t have the 

answer to that, ma’am. We can again take that one for the record. 

That is a fairly easy question. 

[The information follows:] 

The Department of Defense is not privy to the number of Private Security Contractors employed by the Department of State. 

As of the end of the 1st Quarter 2008 (December 31, 2007), CENTCOM reported 

12,950 DoD-funded private security contractors; 9,952 in Iraq and 2,998 in Afghanistan. 


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Ms. KAPTUR. What is so interesting to me, is that we are in theater 5 years and some of us even went to Iraq to try to figure out 

under whose command and control some of these individuals were. 

We are now 5 years. That is why I feel the elephants are stampeding across the plain and I can’t catch up to them. I am wondering what this contract will provide, or this agreement. What will 

it tell us that we don’t—we don’t have answers now on how many 

they are. Will it tell us which countries these people are from? 

What percent of these contractors who carry guns aren’t U.S. citizens? Do we know? 

Mr. QUINN. No, ma’am. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Five years into a war, we don’t know that. 

Do we know how much—— 

Mr. QUINN. I don’t know, ma’am. The contracting organizations 

over in theater may very well. But I am speaking from the investigative side of the house where we go out and investigate any of 

these allegations. I am just not aware of those numbers. 

CONTRACTOR DISCIPLINE

Ms. KAPTUR. We don’t know how many are under State, we don’t 

know how many are under DOD. The two of them weren’t cooperating until last December. And I am not sure what this agreement 

will actually cover. 

I don’t have much time this morning, but it is troubling to me, 

you know, that we have to get to the fifth year in the war before 

we even begin to think about this. The Washington Post had a— 

and it isn’t that some of us haven’t tried. We have tried very hard 

to get this information. And I have asked myself about the decrease 

in contracting staff while the expenditures have exploded or the 

fact that you don’t have the staff you need, is that accidental or intentional? I don’t know the answer to that. But if you want to have 

certain things happen and you don’t want to have anybody look at 

it, you don’t provide the people to do the oversight. So the way I 

am looking at this world, it is intentional, it is not accidental. 

In The Washington Post in April, a year ago, there was an article 

entitled ‘‘A Chaotic Day on Baghdad’s Airport Road.’’ And the article said not a single case has been brought against a security contractor. And that confusion is widespread among contractors in the 

military over what loss, if any, applied to their conduct. 

Let me ask you. General, to your knowledge, who in the Army 

chain of command monitors contractor performance and takes action if the contractor’s conduct is inappropriate or illegal? 

General THOMPSON. Well, the operational chain of command 

monitors that, and the contracting officer also monitors the contractor’s performance. And part of what is in place in this agreement and in the instructions from the Multinational Force-Iraq are 

the accountability issues, both with the UCMJ and with the Federal statutes and with the military extraterrestrial jurisdiction and 

what they can and cannot do with the contractors. 

Ms. KAPTUR. But these 5 years now, none of this has gone on. 

None of it. It says not a single case has been brought against a security contractor. That means no case was brought under State— 

of course, we don’t know about State because the agreement is new 

so. You haven’t had a chance to really look at that, right? 


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And what about DOD? Any case been brought against a security 

contractor under DOD to your knowledge? 

General THOMPSON. Ma’am, I don’t know. Like I indicated earlier, that is an area that I did not personally look at. I know it is 

being looked at inside the DOD and with the State Department. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Do you have any idea how many contracted forces 

are under DOD’s purview within Iraq today? Do you know? 

General THOMPSON. Yes. That is the number that I quoted earlier. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Kaptur. 133,500. But of that, how many of them 

carry guns? Who are the security contractors? How many? 

General THOMPSON. I don’t know the answer to that. 

TRAFFICKING IN ARMS AND OIL

Ms. KAPTUR. The fact that we can’t get answers to this, and 

many of us have been trying, is very troubling. And it tells me, it 

leads me to believe that there are certain individuals in our government who are tying to set up a different type of operation over 

there down the road, largely based with contracted forces and not 

regular military. And that bothers me a great deal. 

Let me just ask—and my time may be up here. I am very interested in trafficking in arms and oil. I would like to know if any of 

the criminal investigations that are underway are targeted at the 

oil sector, and how much has been moved out of that country illegally? Who is doing it? Is there any way to get at that in the work 

that you are doing? And the same with arms. The Chairman referenced the U.S. arms, that have leaked up into Turkey. That isn’t 

the only shipment, obviously, that got out of the country. How do 

you get your hands on oil and arms and illegal trafficking out of 

Iraq? 

Mr. QUINN. Ma’am, Army CID does not have any open investigations ongoing on trafficking and oil. The closest that we have on 

the trafficking of oil would be deliveries that aren’t delivered to 

base stations or base camps out there where contractors, in collusion with the military members or somebody else, are taking bribes 

not to deliver it. But I think the oil you are talking about is the 

major movement of oil, out of the—out of Iraq. And we are not—— 

Ms. KAPTUR. Who would that be, Mr. Quinn? Who would have 

responsibility of oversight of criminal activity—— 

Mr. QUINN. Ma’am I believe that would probably be the FBI in 

conjunction with State Department. I don’t know that for certain. 

And it probably goes—ties back to the dollars involved, on any dollars moving back and forth that touch U.S. hands. If it is purely 

Iraqi oil and sovereign Iraqi movement of oil, then that—that 

would not probably be the FBI either, to be quite honest. 

Mr. DICKS. Would the gentlelady yield briefly for a second? 

Would the Iraqi Government be looking into this? Do they have 

any investigating—— 

Mr. QUINN. Congressman, they do. They do have investigators. 

They may very well look at it. They have got courts over there that 

they have established. We are working some cases with the Iraqi 

officials where they have been ripped off by contractors not delivering garbage trucks to Baghdad, et cetera. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you for yielding. 


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Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you. I think my time has expired. 

General THOMPSON. Ma’am, before—— 

Ms. KAPTUR. Yes, General. 

General THOMPSON. To your points about the jurisdiction. I am 

looking at my notes here. And back as early as 2004, they expanded the military Extraterrestrial Jurisdiction Act, which is anybody that commits a Federal offense outside the U.S. soil. They expanded that to contractors working for all Federal agencies, not 

just DOD. 

And then in 2006, there was a statute change that made contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan subject to prosecution for courts-martial violations of the UCMJ. 

So the changes have been put in place over the last few years 

to hold the contractors accountable. I don’t know how many have 

been prosecuted or how many are under investigation right now. 

Mr. QUINN. I think The Washington Post may have it right as 

far as private security contractors actually prosecuted. They are 

getting ready to do some prosecutions in the not-too-distant future, 

but the fact that there was no prosecutions—— 

General THOMPSON. At that point in time. 

Mr. QUINN. I would not want to infer that we didn’t go out and 

investigate. We did investigate maybe about a half dozen shootings 

out there conducted by private security contractors. Most of them 

got to the point on the use of force that we did not have enough 

information to actually go forward with the criminal indictment 

through either U.S. courts, or, in one case we even tried to go 

through the British courts because it was a British citizen. But 

again, it turned on the fine point of protecting one’s self. And it 

wasn’t an incident where, just flat on its face, you had a murder 

of Iraqi civilians by contractor guards. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Is it possible for you to provide for the record, to 

the best of your knowledge and as a result of this agreement total, 

contracted workers inside of Iraq: and of that number, both from 

DOD and from State, which of them are involved in armed activities, security, whatever-it-is-force, in each of those departments? Is 

that information available to you to provide us? 

[The information follows:] 

As of the end of the 1st Quarter 2008 (December 31, 2007) CENTCOM reported 

that there are approximately 163,590 DoD-funded contractor personnel in Iraq. 

There are approximately 12,950 DoD-funded private security contractors in Iraq, of 

which 9,212 are armed. 

The Department of Defense is not privy to the number of Private Security Contracts awarded by the Department of State. 

General THOMPSON. Ma’am, I think the information is available. 

Mr. QUINN. This agreement with—that the multinational forcesIraq published, it gets down to the point where when maybe a Department of State private security contractor is out there moving 

around, they have to notify the multinational forces that are in the 

area. If there is an accidental—if there is a discharge of a weapon 

that has to be reported, they have to do a spot report on it. So they 

are tightening it down to the point where we should have visibility 

across each other’s lines between Department of State and Department of Defense. 


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Mr. MURTHA. So the report is part of the defense report to the 

Army commander? 

Mr. QUINN, Yes, yes, sir. Reports go up both lines of the chain 

of command, Department of State. And we actually have a U.S. 

military over in Department of State’s emergency operations center, and they have one over in ours too. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I would like to request for the record just the numbers. Then I want to know how much they are paid versus regular 

force. I want to know their pay scale. 

Mr. MURTHA. I don’t understand the question. The question for 

what? 

Ms. KAPTUR. All right, Mr. Chairman. I would like to know from 

this agreement that was signed with the State Department back in 

December, I want to know for DOD and for the State Department 

how many total contractors are working in Iraq for each of those 

departments. All right. 

Then I want to know what subset of that total is armed force in 

any form, whether it is involved in some type of security operation, 

working with the Iraqi military, whatever. I want to know who 

they—I want to know how many there are, and then I want to 

know how much they are paid compared to regular personnel, regular force that we have in theater. 

Mr. MURTHA. Part of the problem is when I was there a year ago, 

they were falling all over each other, Blackwater people. And this 

is in the Green Zone, inside the military command. So I assume the 

Defense Department pays for that. Or does State Department pay 

for that? 

General THOMPSON. It is a combination. 

Ms. KAPTUR. See, that is what you can never find out. 

And then, Mr. Chairman, I would like to know how many are not 

U.S. citizens and where they are from. That is something else I 

would like to know. And I want to know the dollar amounts of 

those contracts. I want to know that. You would be the first people 

in the world that would give this member that information. Thank 

you. 

[The information follows:] 

The total dollar amount for contracts in Iraq for FY06 was $71,496,222, and in FY07 the amount was $179,465,170, resulting in a total of $250,961,392. 

As of 27 Feb 08, JCCI/A has 4,218 Iraqi businesses in the vendor database. The total dollars to Iraqi businesses for March 06–Jan 08 was $5.1B. 

As of the end of the 1st Quarter 2008, CENTCOM reported that there are approximately 163,590 DoD-funded contractors in Iraq. Of these, 132,266 or 81% are 

either third country nationals or host country nationals. There are 31,325 U.S. citizens employed as DoD contractors in Iraq accounting for 19% of the total. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Tiahrt. 

ARMY CONTRACTING TASK FORCE

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for serving 

the country. We have heard from earlier testimony that you could 

be doing something else for more money. So I am glad you are serving the country. And I appreciate it very much. 

General Thompson, you have been tasked with the Army Contracting Task Force. I heard you earlier say you have developed a 

plan to implement this. Is that plan complete? Has it been approved? And is it available? 


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General THOMPSON. No, sir. It is not complete yet. It will be complete, because that plan will be either referenced or attached to the 

report that we need to submit back to the Congress in 120 days. 

And whether we had that requirement in the authorization act or 

not, we would have done that because it is the right thing to do. 

ARMY CONTRACTING COMMAND

Mr. TIAHRT. And as part of our staff’s notes to us, it says that 

the action that has already been taken in response to the Gansler 

Commission was that you have established a two-star level command. And is one the expeditionary and one operational? 

General THOMPSON. There is a two-star level contracting command. And underneath that—— 

Mr. TIAHRT. One star. 

General THOMPSON. One star to focus on installation contracting, 

and then a one-star level focused on expeditionary contracting, and 

the one focused on expeditionary contracting will have the command and control of all the deployable brigade battalions and 

teams. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Also, there is a commitment to increase the Active 

Duty contracting personnel by 400 and the civilian by a thousand. 

Is there a timeline when you hope to achieve those goals? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. The exact numbers for the military, 

301 have been approved, another 167 have been recommended. I 

am optimistic they will be approved. And the exact number of civilians that we think we need to grow is not 1,000, it is 801. And it 

is the 801 that is the subject of are there the dollars there to pay 

for those? And that is what I owe the answer to the Chairman. 

Mr. TIAHRT. So there are two ways to look at this. One is how 

much can I afford. And the other is how much do I need. Are your 

numbers based on what you believe you need, or is it based on 

what you think—— 

General THOMPSON. No, sir. It is based on what I think we need. 

TRAINING OF CONTRACTING PERSONNEL

Mr. TIAHRT. Okay. Where will you set up the training for all 

these personnel? And will you train the Active Duty alongside with 

the civilian? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. The training is already there. It is 

there in the Defense Acquisition University and it is also there 

with the internal Army training. We do a lot of the training—— 

Mr. TIAHRT. Will this be a surge coming through—I hate to use 

that term because it is kind of confused, like the pig going through 

the anaconda. 

Is there more than normal going through your education system 

because of this? 

General THOMPSON. We will expand the course offerings and, the 

class sizes as we need to, to be able to handle the growth of people. 

Mr. TIAHRT. But you have the physical—— 

General THOMPSON. Physical space to do that? Yes, sir. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Okay. The other thing is that the Gansler Commission thought you were not adequately staffed. It said that part of 

the experience of being deployed was lacking. Are you going to 

change your curriculum to match some of the things that they have 


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pointed out and some of the things you have experienced in Iraq 

and Afghanistan? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. Like I said earlier, we are actively 

interviewing both the individuals and the unit leadership as they 

come back. And we are adjusting course content for all of our 

courses. The 12 in particular that I referenced earlier, that course 

content is being adjusted based on the lessons learned. 

Mr. TIAHRT. I am sorry. I missed that part of your testimony. I 

didn’t mean to make you repeat yourself. The other thing is part 

of the training is supposed to be contracting, going out and establishing the contract, the terms and conditions, making sure that it 

meets the requirements. And the other part is contract management, which is really a different task. 

But is your training going to train people separately where you 

have two different job descriptions? Or will they be the same individual that does the contracting, and then follows on and manages 

the contract? Because if you look in private sector, quite often they 

treat that as two different job codes, if I can use that term, and 

they make them two different specialties. 

General THOMPSON. It is a full-time job to be involved in contracting. On the military side, that is a 51 Charlie, either officer 

or NCO. It is an 1102 series code for the civilian workforce. The 

contracting officer representative is not a full-time job, but it is an 

important job. We have trained 4,700 contracting officer representatives over the last year time frame. I just want to make sure I 

have the time frame right. And those are the eyes and ears on the 

ground for the operational commander to make sure that the trash 

is picked up, the water is delivered, the fuel is delivered. 

There is an online course—online is not necessarily the answer 

to everything—that the Defense Acquisition University offers, that 

it would require all our contracting officer representatives to take. 

And in addition to that, we have augmented that with on-theground training that is specific to the job that they are going to do. 

So, for example, if I am the contracting officer representative, I 

am Lieutenant Thompson out there, and I have got to make sure 

the dining facility trash is getting picked up three times a day, I 

have to know what the specifics of that contract are. And that is 

an important responsibility for me. And one of the things we have 

to get across to the operational commanders and the individuals 

out there, it is not just an extra duty. It is a very important extra 

duty. 

One of the strategic points I would like to make to the Committee is my cochair on this Army Contracting Task Force, Ms. 

Conden, and the head of contracting for the Army Materiel Command, Mr. Jeff Parsons, a two star, SES, are over in theater today, 

meeting with the new three-star operational commander in Kuwait, 

who is very interested in making sure he understands what his 

roles and responsibilities are so he can become actively involved in 

making sure that the U.S. Army gets what it is supposed to get, 

and he fulfills his responsibilities as the senior mission commander 

in Kuwait. 

It is not to say that the previous commanders weren’t interested. 

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ership level to be addressed. And General Wickham did a really 

tremendous job, in my view, of making sure that we understood 

that there were issues out there that needed to be addressed. 

The seriousness that the Army has taken is Secretary Geren and 

the Chief of Staff are now going to have the general officers go 

through a course for a week focused on business issues. The inaugural course for the general officers is going to be the second week 

in February, and the 4-hour block on why contracting is important 

is going to be taught by me to the one stars, soon to be two stars. 

And that is a significant change in the way we viewed this from 

the past. and I think a positive change; and, to me, an indication 

of the seriousness that the civilian and military leadership and the 

Army are taking this. 

Mr. TIAHRT. I think it is very important that you are setting up 

the contract command, because in the past, it was just sort of a 

square to be filled by most officers on the way to the top. And so 

they filled their 2 years in contracting, however long it was. That 

made them available for promotion to something outside of contracting. And there was never a career path. So a lot of the Active 

Duty personnel didn’t see that as a way for them to move up. And 

so it was never treated, I think, with the seriousness that it needs 

to be treated with, as we are seeing with all this problem of fraud 

now. 

So I think it is the right path. I hope that the other services will, 

follow a similar path as well. In the way that you are first over the 

hill here, I think it is very important we do that across the services 

so we can keep the taxpayer dollars from being as part of fraud 

and part of the abuse that we have seen in the past. 

General THOMPSON. One of the things that the Secretary of the 

Army did is he gave specific guidance to the last brigadier general 

promotion board to select an individual for the general officer 

ranks that had a contracting background. And when that list is 

sent, over to the Congress and approved, you will see the name of 

that officer who has been selected—and also gave specific guidance 

to the colonel-level command selection board that just adjourned to 

pick the right people to fill these contracting brigade positions. And 

I know, because I worked it with the secretary. He personally made 

sure that those words reflected his intent to make sure this gets 

addressed and to create that leadership opportunity at the top, so 

it is a valued career field, so people will come in at the bottom and 

recognize it is not a dead-end career field. It is a career field that 

has got service in the service. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Rothman. 

REPORTING FRAUD

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Thompson, Mr. Quinn, thank you for your service to our 

country and thank you for taking on this important job. And I want 

to commend all my colleagues for great questions. 

I want to go at something completely different, though. I understand that we are fighting a war, and when we send our troops into 

battle it is to win a war, and we are sending warfighters. But I 

wonder is there a role or not for the private, the sergeant, the capVerDate Nov 24 2008 05:14 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046473 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A473P2.XXX A473P2

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tain, the major, if they see ammunition, guns and the rest of that 

stuff being stolen or diverted and they know it is happening? Is 

there a role for them to play? There are 100,000 of them over there. 

They are seeing this stuff. I understand they want to complete 

their mission, they want to stay alive. 

Is there any role for them, however, in this system of reporting 

abuse, fraud? And what happened? I am sure some of these rankand-file folks reported in since 2003 that they saw stuff going on. 

What happened to their complaints or their observations? 

Mr. QUINN. I would say, Congressman, that they have a responsibility to report when they see fraud, waste and abuse. And that 

is something that the Army preaches to soldiers. Some of the cases 

that we investigated did in fact come from soldiers coming to us 

and said, hey, I just think I got offered a bribe by a contractor 

down here. Are you all interested? And, of course, we are interested. 

So it is a responsibility. They have a means, with the CID agents 

actually out there with units. Now, we are not at every forward operating base. But commanders know how to get hold of our agents. 

But, yes. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Is this something that has just recently been 

brought to the attention of the troops? Or hate they always had 

this as part of their ethos as an American fighting person? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. It has always been a part of their 

ethos. 

Mr. QUINN. Exactly. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. But again, if it has always been part of the ethos 

of the American fighting person, then again, they want to complete 

their mission, they want to stay alive, and maybe it is too much 

to ask of them to do much more than that. This has been—this 

went on to some large degree for years. Did they not report in numbers? And I think it is important to know whether this instructing 

of the ethos has been effective. 

Maybe you need to beef up that part of the training. Unless you 

say, ‘‘Steve, they can’t do it. They have got enough to do their job 

and stay alive.’’ Which I will accept that if you tell me that that 

is the truth. But if you say it is important, it is in the mix for them 

to be doing, did they do it? And if not, you need to beef up your 

curriculum maybe to the troops and their training and the majors 

and sergeants and lieutenants and colonels all the way up, in addition to the separate thing that you are building to manage the contractors. 

So if they didn’t need to beef up the curriculum, and if they did 

report this, what happened to their complaints? And why were 

their observations/complaints buried? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, I don’t know what happened to their 

complaints. I would say that hearing from the DOD Inspector General who was looking at all of the issues related to the weapons accountability and complaints that were made and how those were 

investigated, I mean, that is something that, if the Committee desires, could be followed up on with the DOD Inspector General. I 

mean, that is the way I would answer that question. 

Mr. QUINN. Congressman, I would just like to add on, a lot of 

this wasn’t out in the open. I mean, these folks that were stealing 


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money or taking bribes, they didn’t advertise the fact. We are not 

seeing a lot of collusion between multiple individuals that all got 

in on this sweet deal to rip off the government. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. I am not saying there was collusion. And again— 

can’t say it enough—they need to complete the mission and stay 

alive. And I am not sure how much more capacity they have to be 

observers. But if it is supposed to be part of their responsibility, 

they must have seen this stuff going on. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Sure. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I just wanted to state that, remember when General Shinseki said we weren’t sending enough into theater at the 

very beginning, we wouldn’t be able to hold down Iraq? I would 

probably argue a lot of the theft and fraud that I am talking about 

on oil and arms occurred outside the sight of our soldiers and our 

commanding officers. And, in fact, if you looked at some of the contracts that have been signed like the AEGIS contract, for example, 

the logistical commands that are being handled by private contractors, our folks aren’t there. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. I think the gentlelady may well be correct on that 

category. I am wondering—and I think perhaps, Mr. Chairman, if 

you and the Ranking Member agree, we need to find out, did the 

rank-and-file folks have an opportunity to observe weapons being 

transferred, gasoline shipments not making it and seeing somebody 

get a—something. Just to find out if it occurred, and if it occurred 

and it wasn’t reported, do we need to beef up our curriculum for 

the rank and file? 

Mr. BISHOP. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. ROTHMAN. And if it was reported, what happened to it? And 

what in our structure allowed their complaints and reports to be 

ignored for so many years? 

General THOMPSON. One of the things that a contracting officer 

representative does—and I will give you two recent examples here 

in Kuwait. And that is that person is not a professional, but has 

that additional duty. We had two staff sergeants that were trained 

as contracting officer representatives. One of them observed that 

the fuel delivery records didn’t match the fuel they were seeing delivered. They reported that to the contracting officer. It was a subcontractor that was cheating the prime contractor. And the subcontractor is now being dealt with as a result of an investigation. 

There was another staff sergeant that said, we have too many 

copying machines for the mission, reported it to the contracting officer, and there was $100,000; $100,000 is not a lot of money, but 

it is an indication of—— 

Mr. ROTHMAN. It is to Mr. Tiahrt and I. 

General THOMPSON. In the big scheme of things. It is a big deal 

of money to me. And the point I would make to you, sir, is that 

the great majority of our people recognize right and wrong. And 

they know when they see something wrong that they need to report 

it through their chain of command and whatever the appropriate 

authority is. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. What happened when they reported it in 2003, 

2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, what happened to that? 

Thank you. 


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Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Can I yield to the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. 

Chairman? 

SECURITY CONTRACTORS

General THOMPSON. Can I answer the question to Representative 

Kaptur? And this is a little bit dated information, but we will update this for you. But this is as of July 2007, there were 6,400 private security contractors in Iraq. Approximately 5 percent were 

U.S. citizens, 54 percent were third-country nationals, and 41 percent were host country nationals. That doesn’t add up to 100 percent. But those are the approximate numbers. So that information 

is available, and we will update that. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Are you saying 64 as of when? 6,400. 

General THOMPSON. July: 6,400 as of July. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Did you say contracts or contractors? 

General THOMPSON. Private security contractors, 

Mr. DICKS. That is an individual, isn’t that correct, sir? One person. 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. That is an individual. One person. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Under DOD? Or is this State? 

General THOMPSON. DOD. 

Ms. KAPTUR. So we don’t know how many States? 

Mr. QUINN. But part of this fragmentory order (FRAGO) that 

went out—— 

Mr. MURTHA. We will ask the Foreign Operations Committee to 

give us that information. We may have to go to the other committee to get that information. 

Mr. QUINN. Quarterly they are required to report numbers, 

whether they are third-country U.S. national. That was part of that 

implementing instructions that just went out in December that 

pulls together all these numbers for us. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. May I yield to the gentleman from Georgia? 

Thank you. 

REPORTING FRAUD

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. Mr. Rothman was asking 

about the privates, the sergeants, and their participation in helping 

you reveal the fraud. Do you have built in and do you train your 

folks with encouragement to report fraud, waste, and abuse? And 

I say that because in my casework, I have had an occasion to have 

a civilian employee who was working on the base, who was 

inventorying. Part of his job was to inventory weapons parts. And 

he came in from outside, came into a situation, and he noticed that 

there were parts that were going out the door for various weapons, 

the rifles, a magazine here, so many dozens of various other parts, 

which were sufficient if they put them together to put rifles together. 

And he reported it to his civilian chain of command. And he was 

told to mind his own business. He continued to—he also discovered 

some live grenades that were coming back from recycled equipment 

from Iraq, that he also reported they were live and disabled. He got 

an award for that. 


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But he was subsequently disciplined, and he was determined to 

be, during his probationary period, unsuitable for continued deployment and therefore he was recommended for discharge. He was 

livid about that, simply because he was not going along with the 

status quo and looking the other way like he was encouraged to do. 

Consequently, it ended up in my office as a complaint, and we 

had to follow through with case work, ultimately getting this guy 

reassigned from the people he was working under, but also having 

that situation corrected. 

Do you have anything in place that will not allow disincentives 

like that, so that the people who are actually in charge will punish 

or retaliate against employees who do travel, do the right thing to 

stop fraud, waste, and abuse? 

General THOMPSON. Everybody who is seeing something not done 

properly is encouraged to report that to their chain of command. 

And in addition to that, if they don’t get the satisfaction, there are 

a number of hotlines. There are fraud hotlines, there are IG hotlines. And so if you don’t feel you are getting the proper action 

taken, there are those venues available, too. And a lot of the leads 

that come to the CID for investigation come from hotlines. And 

there is also law and policy out there that will punish the leadership if they take retribution against somebody for trying to report 

and do what is right. 

So those checks and balances are out there in the legal system 

to address that. I am very confident that that is there. 

Mr. BISHOP. This guy ultimately got pushed away and he just 

left. He resigned because of the pressure that he was put under because of those situations. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Kingston. 

PATTERN OF FRAUD

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Quinn, in the $6 billion, is there a breakdown or a pattern 

of where the fraud typically takes place? 

Mr. QUINN. No, sir. As I mentioned, it just runs the gamut 

with—whether it is double-billing for product substitution or bribery. In the past we have not seen an awful lot of bribery. It does 

take place out there. But that probably is the biggest area that we 

have seen in the investigations that we have opened so far, is bribery of government officials so that contractors can do the product 

substitution or things of that nature. Get the bid, double bill, 

things of that nature. 

Mr. KINGSTON. How much of that bribery is cultural? 

Mr. QUINN. Very good point, Congressman. And that is one of the 

issues that was brought up over there. When you are dealing with 

local nationals in Kuwait, Far East, Middle East—and I don’t know 

what the name of the term was—but, you know, you kind of grease 

the skids a little bit to get the contract, to get the introductions, 

to know the people involved. So some of it should be—may very 

well be cultural, but then when you focus on the U.S. citizen, the 

soldier, the DA civilian, they know better than that. They honestly 

do. 


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Mr. KINGSTON. What would be the breakdown between this being 

the American citizen’s corruption versus people within an organization who are non-Americans? 

Mr. QUINN. I couldn’t break that down for you, Congressman, because we do see third-country nationals involved. We see local nationals involved in the process. As I look over the personnel that 

we have got listed as the subjects of our investigations, it just 

seems that on both sides, whether it is the U.S. Government side 

or the contractor side, there is just an awful lot of Americans falling on both sides. 

Mr. KINGSTON, Is there a head of the snake—is there a beginning? Or is it just a circle? Can you tell if it is, say, American contractors leaping into this thing enthusiastically? Or is it Americans 

who are getting swept away by it? 

Mr. QUINN. I think on the government side, I think it is the 

being swept away with it. On the contractor side over there, in an 

effort to grab the money, you know, they were pushing it, they 

were pushing the dollars. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Is it low pay? Did you have to feel like you made 

your money on the side? Or is it just pure greed? 

Mr. QUINN. Congressman, I don’t know that we know. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I don’t know the justification. 

Mr. QUINN. I don’t know that we know. We have had a few plea 

agreements. I guess we could go back to try to see what their motivation was. But I just chalk it up to greed. The massive amounts 

of money involved, most of the bribes weren’t in the $2,500 range. 

Most of them were in the $100,000, $50,000, $250,000, things of 

that nature. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Are they squirreling the money away in a Swiss 

bank account? Where does this money go to? 

Mr. QUINN. Congressman Kingston, we are seeing all of the 

above. We are seeing them ship money back through the U.S. Postal Service, then going in, making deposits of $9,990, thinking that 

the banks aren’t going to report them. We are seeing safe deposit 

boxes over in third countries, Kuwait, that we are dealing with the 

Kuwaiti Ministry of Interior so that we can get search warrants 

over there. And we have even seen some of it moving into offshore 

accounts. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Aren’t most of these contractors former and recently retired military personnel, particularly Army? 

Mr. QUINN. I don’t think we can say that. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I saw the General—I don’t want to stop you if you 

want to say something. 

General THOMPSON. He can give you the specifics. But I wouldn’t 

draw that conclusion. I don’t think you can draw that conclusion. 

The facts don’t bear it out. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Not necessarily the corrupt ones. I am just saying, aren’t most of the contractors former military personnel? That 

is not the case? 

General THOMPSON. That is not the case. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Will the gentleman yield? How about CIA? 

General THOMPSON. Ma’am, I don’t know. I have no idea. 


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FRAUD DETECTION

Mr. KINGSTON. Then my last question is, it has been asked several times in several different ways, but I am still perplexed why 

we haven’t been catching this along and along and early on, and 

really cracking down. It seems to me that we are hearing action 

today which should have been going on the whole time anyhow. 

There has always been corruption, and particularly in purchasing, 

and particularly overseas. And it just seems to me like we are almost inventing the wheel that has already been thought of, and I 

know it had been. 

Mr. QUINN. I think part of the reason we didn’t catch some of 

this earlier is because I didn’t have my fraud agents over there in 

theater. And we probably should have known that because we see 

fraud in natural disasters in the United States. Hurricanes come 

through, and it is that rush to provide services to people so that 

they get shelter, they get food. And contractors then will try to rip 

off the government. 

We have made some improvements there by pushing out CID 

agents, because we support the Corps of Engineers in natural disasters in the United States. And we have dealt with contracting offices in Germany and in Korea. And it just—this amount of fraud 

just caught us by surprise, Congressman. We just did not expect 

something like that to happen. 

Mr. QUINN. Now, we are going after them, and we are going to 

get them, and we are going to get money back to the U.S. Government. Since 2000, in our fraud investigations, whether it is in the 

States or overseas, we brought back a billion dollars to the government on fines, forfeitures, renewal of contracts, things like that. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I think that might be the most surprising thing 

to me, and maybe other Committee members, that we are bewildered and somewhat shocked that you didn’t anticipate this and 

haven’t been cracking down on it the whole time, particularly since 

the President’s statement and, you know, the end of major conflict 

in Iraq, that would signal a time where—— 

Mr. DICKS. Mission accomplished. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Yeah. Mission accomplished. We are rebuilding, 

we are shifting into another gear during that period of time. I 

agree we should have been ready at Katrina. We have put in $120 

billion in the Gulf. Certainly we knew, and there has always been 

corruption with an infusion of government cash on anything that 

is being rebuilt. But it seems to me that particularly armed services, of all groups, should be proactive on the front end. 

Mr. QUINN. Sure. 

General THOMPSON. I know. And that is one of the reasons why 

I think we are actually putting the fraud investigators and the 

auditors out there at the beginning and not after the fact. I mean, 

that is one of the lessons learned. 

PENALTY FOR FRAUD

Mr. KINGSTON. And I will yield back. But I think from a bipartisan standpoint, if you really made some examples of people who 

were stealing money potentially—because that is money for bullets 

or money for fuel, for a tank, money for some medicine for a 


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wounded soldier—we feel that you really should be very severe on 

anybody who is—— 

General THOMPSON. And I personally hope that those that are 

beyond the investigation stage that have been indicted, when they 

are prosecuted and, if found guilty, I hope that the sentence they 

get is more than appropriate to the crime. Because I want it to 

send a message to the entire workforce. 

To me, I just don’t understand how anybody can think that they 

can cheat the United States government and get away with it. Because to me, it is just not a question of if you will get caught, it 

is just a question of when. So I just don’t understand how people 

can even think they will get away with it, even for a short period 

of time. 

Mr. QUINN. And the courts have made examples out of some of 

these individuals. We have had 12 sentenced to date. A Lieutenant 

Colonel got 21 months confinement, a Major got 10 years confinement, a civilian working for CPA got 9 years confinement. So they 

are cracking down on them hard when we catch them. 

And DOJ, we have gotten great support out of Department of 

Justice (DOJ) on it with U.S. attorneys to prosecute these cases. So 

it truly is a joint effort on this between the investigators, the auditors, and then the lawyers to take them to court. 

SOLE-SOURCE CONTRACTS

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. 

I have got one brief line of questions I would like to explore and 

that has to do with the sole-source contracts. I know that there 

have to be situations where sole-source contracting is appropriate, 

particularly when you have got an emergency and you have got unexpected needs that have to be met on a short-term basis. But the 

GAO reported in April of 2006 that DOD had awarded contracts of 

security guard services supporting 57 domestic bases. And of that 

57, 46 of them were authorized on a sole-source basis. And it also 

reported that those 46 sole-source contracts that were awarded by 

DOD recognized that they were paying 25 percent more than previously paid for contracts that were awarded competitively. 

Why would DOD contracting officials approve sole-source contracts that cost the taxpayer considerably more than those same 

services if they were competitively bid? And I am talking about not 

the theater deployment sole-source contracts, but I am talking 

about for domestic bases like Fort Benning or the Marine base in 

Albany, or various other of our bases here in the States. 

General THOMPSON. Sir, there are in statute seven provisions 

that allow other than full and open competition. The first recourse 

always is to do full and open competition. But there are the seven 

provisions, and I will quickly read them to you from my notes here. 

The first one is there is only one responsible source, and no other 

supplies or services will satisfy the requirement. Unusual urgency. 

Industrial mobilization or a research development engineering capability that only that individual organization or company has. An 

international agreement. It is authorized by statute. National security or the public interest. 

You cannot commence a negotiation for sole-source contract until 

you determine that that action is justified. You have to justify the 


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accuracy of that justification statement, making sure that you have 

got all the information. And you have to get the required approvals. 

And depending upon the dollar amounts of the contract action, 

those approvals, depending upon the dollar amounts, go up. And 

the dollar amounts specifically for anything not exceeding 

$550,000, the contracting officer can do that certification themselves. Between $550,000 and $11.5 million, they have to go to the 

competition advocate for that procuring agency. Above $11.5 million and less than $57 million, you have to go to the head of the 

procuring activity for that organization. And then above that level 

it goes all the way up to the agency. In this case, the agency would 

be the Department of the Army. So there are—you have to justify 

it. You have to document it. And then depending upon the dollar 

value, you have got to go get approval from higher for those solesource justifications. 

Mr. BISHOP. I understand very well that all of this has to be documented, and it has got to be approved, but apparently these 

things are being approved. And I am trying to understand why it 

is necessary for them to happen, particularly at a cost of 25 percent 

more. From what I observe with the security guard contracts, the 

majority of the activity that they perform, the majority of the contractors and employees are basically at the gate checking IDs for 

people who enter the base. And, you know, for those services, 

which, you know, are minimal, why would we be paying 25 percent 

more for that? And why could not that be competitively bid? 

It seems like there is a culture where if the local contractor has 

that kind of authority, that they have a good-old-boy system where 

they have preferred contractors. and so they just justify it in the 

paperwork. And there does not appear to be much oversight in that 

regard. 

General THOMPSON. In that particular case, those awards were 

made to Alaska Native corporations to replace military members 

that were deploying, and so it was done on an urgent basis. And 

then those competitions, those contracts were recompeted with full 

and open competition later. And there is where you saw the 25 percent savings that were quoted in the GAO report. 

Mr. BISHOP, Not savings; it was 25 percent excess, not savings. 

General THOMPSON. Well, when the contracts were renegotiated, 

they were negotiated at a price that was 25 percent less than they 

were paying when they were non-sole-source. I am not excusing the 

fact that it is 25 percent more. 

Mr. MURTHA, Mr. Young. 

CASH PAYMENTS

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Something has been bothering me all the way through this hearing, because at the beginning of the hearing, and I had asked several questions, and one of the responses that Mr. Quinn made was 

that part of the problem is there is so much cash in this system. 

Where does the cash come from? Do we pay a contractor in cash? 

Mr. QUINN. Congressman Young, in Kuwait it is not so much the 

problem on the cash side, but it was up in Iraq, where there were 

no banks, or the banks were nonfunctional. A lot of the personnel 

up there, either the contractors or the third-country nationals that 


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were working for us, were being paid in cash. There is a lot of dollars floating around over there. And that is what I was talking 

about. You get down into Kuwait and the contract actions in Kuwait, then they are going through banking process. I am sorry I 

misled you on that. 

Mr. YOUNG. Is this cash American currency, or is it Kuwaiti, or 

is it Iraqi? 

Mr, QUINN. Much of the bribes that we saw up in—well, to in- clude Kuwait, but up in Iraq, it is $100 U.S. bills. 

Mr. YOUNG. When the Army awards a contract, in the case of the 

Kuwaiti, Iraqi, the whole region, do you pay them up front, or do 

you pay them based on bills for services rendered? 

General THOMPSON. Generally it is paid bills for services rendered. 

Mr. YOUNG. So you do not advance a lot of cash? 

General THOMPSON. I mean, there are cases on specific contracts 

where money is advanced. On weapons systems contracts, mostly 

you advance money to buy, you know, long-lead materiel so you can 

begin to build something. But for service contracts, for the most 

part it is paid for services rendered, Congressman. 

Mr. YOUNG. Okay. If we pay contractors in cash, who is responsible for that? Who actually handles the money? Who is responsible 

to make sure that it is not siphoned off into a bribe or siphoned 

off into a pouch going back home to go in somebody’s personal bank 

account? 

General THOMPSON. There are disbursing officers that work 

under the comptroller that are responsible for the actual payment. 

The Defense Finance and Accounting Service has the responsibility 

for making payment to contractors. Once the contracting officer 

representative certifies that they delivered the product or service 

and authorizes that payment, then it is done by a separate organization, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. Where there 

are cash payments, it is done by an individual that does the financial transaction that is separate from the contracting officer for the 

most part. 

Mr. YOUNG. Are there any of the disbursing officers in the list 

of investigations ongoing or the indictments? 

Mr. QUINN. I do not know of any, Congressman Young. I can go 

back and take a look at to see if any of them were disbursing officers. We do have one case where some DFAS employees figured out 

how to rig the codes and were paying themselves, and I think they 

have been court-martialed. But the actual interaction between contractors and disbursing officers I will have to check for you, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, when there is cash around, there is always a 

concern about where it goes. 

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir. It is a full-time business for us. 

TRACKING DELIVERY OF SUPPLIES

Mr. YOUNG. I keep thinking about food deliveries that were not 

made and did not get to the right place, and weapons and ammunition. And Mr. Murtha and I had a briefing quite some time ago on 

a very closed—just the two of us were involved—about something 

very similar to what we are talking about here. And this strikes 

me FedEx, UPS and companies like them deal with millions and 


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millions of articles and items and packages, and they very, very 

seldom ever lose one. And you can almost trace it minute by 

minute. 

Should the military be talking to somebody at FedEx and asking 

them how they do it and how they keep track of everything without 

losing or having something misplaced? Very simple question, a rhetorical question. I do not even necessarily expect an answer, but it 

is something that goes through my mind. If FedEx can do it, why 

cannot the United States military? 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kaptur. 

AEGIS CONTRACT

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I just wonder if the general was aware of a company called Aegis, which apparently is on 

contract to the DOD to provide logistical coordination for all security contractors inside of Iraq. Was that part of the 6,400 number 

you gave me, gave us? 

General THOMPSON. Ma’am, I do not know. I am aware of a company called Aegis. I am not aware of the specifics of what contracts 

they have won. 

Mr. QUINN. Aegis does have some, or did have some, private security contractors working for them, because one of the investigations we did was on one of their subs. So they do have some. Now, 

whether they still have the contract business or they extended the 

contract, ma’am, I do not know. 

Ms. KAPTUR. As I understand it, this was a very important contract. And it was—I do not know the amount of it, but it was large 

compared to others. I am curious as to whether it was sole-source 

or not. And I am surprised the number you gave, 6,400. I would 

like to know what portion of those are Aegis contractors. The numbers you gave, over half are third-party nationals in 41 host country. That would mean Iraqis, I guess. 

General THOMPSON. Right. Or—yes, ma’am. 

Ms. KAPTUR. But what would be the nature of that Aegis contract? And who signed it at DOD? Could you find that out for me, 

General? 

General THOMPSON. As we look at the updated information from 

the information I gave you that was as of July, we can look at what 

Aegis has got as far as DOD contracts today. 

[The information follows:] 

The Department of Defense has not awarded any sole source Private Security 

Contracts. All contracts have been awarded using full and open competition. 

Ms. KAPTUR. And, Mr. Quinn, what was the nature of the investigation that went on relative to Aegis? 

Mr. QUINN. It was a shooting incident, ma’am, as part of a security of a convoy. We investigated to determine if it was within the 

rules of force or was not in the rules of force. I know it did not go 

to prosecution. And I do not know that we were able to establish 

that they violated the rules of force. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks. 


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DELIVERY OF INFERIOR SUPPLIES

Mr. DICKS. You mentioned in our discussion today making certain that the contractors supplied the equipment that was actually 

requested, that there was sometimes contractors provided things 

that were not asked for—— 

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS [continuing]. In an attempt to satisfy the contract. 

How big a problem is that? 

Mr. QUINN. We did not see that in a number of instances. We 

did see it—there was a contract for cell phones to be provided. 

They provided inferior cell phones. There was a logistics contract 

to move equipment, and they were required to give us a truck that 

was capable of carrying X amount of pounds, and they gave us 

lower quality. I do not know of any instance where they provided 

us something that put soldiers’ lives at risk. It was more on the 

logistical side of the house. 

CONTRACTING OFFICER REPRESENTATIVE

Mr. DICKS. Is that still a problem, or has that improved? 

Mr. QUINN. It has improved, sir. 

General THOMPSON. I think that is much less of a problem, especially when I go back to the comment I made about training 4,700 

contracting officer representatives to make sure that we are getting 

what we asked for. So I think that is probably significantly—— 

Mr. DICKS. Do they do inspections? 

General THOMPSON. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. They go out to see whatever it is arrives, check to see 

that this is what we have ordered? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Do they do that in Kuwait? 

General THOMPSON. They do that everywhere. 

Mr. QUINN. That was the COR responsibility to some degree, and 

that is a unit-level responsibility. And General Thompson mentioned the intensive effort over the last 6 months or so to get those 

CORs trained on what to look for out there, what kind of indicators 

of fraud so they can spot this. And they have spotted it and reported it to us. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Kingston. 

NUMBER OF PROSECUTIONS

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Quinn, you gave me the number of people 

who had been prosecuted earlier. Could you repeat that? I think 

you said 21 or 12 were in—— 

Mr. QUINN. No, sir, I think it was 19 that have been indicted or 

charged, government employees, and then I think it was 13 that 

have gone to court, both government employees and nongovernment employees. 

Mr. KINGSTON. That seems a little low for $6 billion. 

Mr. QUINN. Well, the $6 billion is the amount of the contract that 

was touched, not the amount of fraud that took place. And in the 

prosecution, the investigative side, moving into the prosecution 

side, we are still greatly in the investigation side. And there will 


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be a number of prosecutions over the next year or 2 years; as we 

move this mountain, as somebody mentioned, the pig through the 

snake, we will be processing all these through to completion. 

Mr. KINGSTON. How would you characterize the corruption? Is it 

widespread, or is it a persistent problem that is there, but, you 

know—— 

Mr. QUINN. Congressman, I would say persistent. You are always 

going to have some fraud and corruption out there. We saw a couple pockets of it, the Kuwait contracting office that was required 

to do so much with so few without the oversight. But persistent. 

As American dollars and contractors are involved, you are just 

going to have somebody take the bite at the apple. 

Mr. MURTHA, Mr. Hobson. 

COMMANDERS EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND

Mr. HOBSON. I do not know whether this still goes on or not, but 

when we first went over there, a lot of the generals and colonels 

liked this commanders’ funds they had. These were moneys that 

they had—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Was that cash, or how do they handle it? 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It is cash. 

Mr. MURTHA. Cash? 

General THOMPSON. Cash. Yes, sir. Commanders’ Emergency Response Fund. 

Mr. HOBSON. Well, and some of it was more—they found money, 

too, and they confiscated money, and they kept it. And they felt 

that they were very expeditious and cost-effective in passing that 

money out. However, the Army did not like it because they had all 

these other procedures, and some of the procedures were not followed. 

What I was trying to get at was how much of that is in any of 

this stuff that we are prosecuting or looking at? Was that a more 

efficient way of doing it and a better way of getting the services 

than going through all the bureaucracy? Just what worked and did 

not work? Because they liked it, but I know the Army pushed back 

on it. So I do not know what happened finally. And are any indictments going to be on those guys? 

Mr. QUINN. To my knowledge, no, sir. I do not know of any of 

our investigations that came out of the CERF funds, the emergency 

funds that were available to commanders. Most of what we are seeing is all on the contracting side of the house. 

Mr. HOBSON. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The money for the different commanders 

was if they wanted to build a water purification thing, the locals 

are not going to take a check. They wanted cash if somebody is 

going to put their shoulder behind the plow to do something about 

it. I think that they were pretty convincing that that money was 

pretty well spent and accounted for. The money that went in bundles to the ministries to sort of pay people who did not get a check 

to sort of keep those various ministries over, I think that is probably where most of that money disappeared. In other words, if it 

is the Oil Ministry, it is not to say somebody might not have taken 

it, but I assume a lot of it was to keep the operations open. 


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What exists now I do not know, but I assume when we first got 

there, things would have catapulted even worse if there had not 

been some money going out of the door. And I presume most of 

those were $100 bills. Do I presume right? I assume cash was king, 

probably still is. 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. You audited CERF funds, though. You are making 

sure—you know, when any type of cash is around, we do not want 

to get behind the eight ball there, because they are asking for more 

and more money in that particular area. 

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir. That is an item of interest on Army audit 

side of the house. And the Army has also made a big push lately 

on getting the lay people trained on what the law is on how to use 

the CERF funds and proper appropriation of funds. 

HIRING CONTRACTING PROFESSIONALS

Mr. MURTHA. Here is some advice. You are going to hire a lot 

more civilians than you are military. You say you are hiring those 

civilians because of the surge capability: You can get rid of them 

any time you want to. Here is the problem. They cost a hell of a 

lot more for civilians than it does for military personnel. 

Let us balance this out. When you come to us for a request, make 

sure you have a request that makes sense. Do not just add a lot 

of contractors because you can get them sooner. Because we have 

not done that now when we should have. In other words, the idea 

of this hiring contractors was we can surge when we need to, right? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. And yet we did not surge. So we are paying a lot 

more money, and we did not have—for some reason we did not 

surge. Now, what I am saying to you is you are going to hire two 

to one, it sounds like to me, for contractors, meaning civilian contractors versus military, which would be permanent. It costs a lot 

more. We need to know the difference in cost and the reason for 

that, and if you are going to get rid of them next year or the year 

after that as this thing winds down. Okay? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. Okay. Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned until this afternoon at 3:30. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Ms. Kaptur and the answers thereto follow.] 

AEGIS CONTRACTS

Question: I want listing and detailed info on ALL contracts let by DoD to AEGIS 

for ANY purpose during the Bush Administration. 

Answer: According to the DoD Federal Procurement Data System and queries 

with the existing Joint Contingency Contracting System (JCCS) database in Iraq, 

the following contracts have been let to AEGIS during the Bush Administration: 

Contract Number: W91GY007D0008 

Awarded: 21 Feb 2007 

Agency that advertised/signed contract: JCC–I/A 

CO that signed contract: Lt Col Bradley Riddle 

AEGIS CO that signed contract: William Curan, Deputy Program Manager 

Contract Value: $12M 

Period of Performance (Duration): 29 Feb 2008, Option 1 goes through 30 Aug 

2008 

Total number of Employees: 47 


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US: 6 TCN: 41 LN: 0 

Services Performed/Deliverables: Provides transportation and security to Iraqi 

military forces throughout Iraq, to include government vehicles and equipment from 

sites within the borders of Iraq, Kuwait, and Jordan. 

Sole Source: No 

Type of Contract: Fixed Price, Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity 

Contract Number: W91GY007C0004 

Awarded: 14 Feb 2007 

Agency that advertised/signed contract: JCC–I/A 

CO that signed contract: Capt Jeffrey Hooley, USAF 

AEGIS CO that signed contract: J.P.A. Day, Director 

Contract Value: $9.6M (w/option periods) 

Period of Performance (Duration): 28 Jan 2008, 2 six-month options remaining 

Total number of Employees: 25 

US: 0 TCN: 25 LN: 0 

Services Performed/Deliverables: Provides personal security for up to 5 principals 

from MNSTC–I. 

Sole Source: No 

Type of Contract: Firm Fixed Price 

Contract Number: W91GDW07D4021 

Awarded: 31 Jan 2008, Task Order 0001 

Agency that advertised/signed contract: JCC–I/A 

CO that signed contract: June Olmsted 

AEGIS CO that signed contract: Robert Lewis 

Contract Value: $475,000,000.00 

Period of Performance (Duration): 10 Sep 2010 

Total number of Employees: 1,372 

Services Performed/Deliverables: Provides security services, such as Reconstruction Operation Centers, personal security details, and static guards for the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Regional Division. 

Sole Source: No 

Type of Contract: FFP with Cost Reimbursable CLINs 

Contract Number: W91GDW07D4025 

Awarded: 27 Sept 2007 

Agency that advertised/signed contract: JCC–I/A 

CO that signed contract: Maj Damon Coon, USAF 

AEGIS CO that signed contract: J.P.A. Baker, Director 

Contract Value: $45,000,000.00 

Period of Performance (Duration): 27 Sep 2010 

Total number of Employees: 0 (currently no taskings have been issued on this contract) 

Services Performed/Deliverables: Provides theater-wide internal security services, 

such as entry control points, perimeter manning, tower security, and security of select facilities. 

Sole Source: No 

Type of Contract: Firm Fixed Price, Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity 

Contract Number: W911S04C0003 

Awarded: 25 May 2004 

Agency that advertised/signed contract: Army Contracting Agency, Northern Region Contracting Center 

CO that signed contract: Robert Winne 

AEGIS CO that signed contract: Unknown 

Contract Value: $447M 

Period of Performance (Duration): Base plus 2 one-year options (01 Jun 2004–31 

May 2007) contract extended one year to 31 May 2008 due to protest on the followon contract. 

Total number of Employees: 1,035 

US: 32 TCN: 675 LN: 328 

Services Performed/Deliverables: Provides security to reconstruction contractors 

and physical security protection to fixed facilities and personnel. 

Sole Source: No 

Type of Contract: Cost Plus Fixed-Fee 

Question: Is contractor or any subcontract, let with a non-U.S. Firm? 

Answer: AEGIS is a British Firm. Subcontracts are allowed on all AEGIS contracts, but AEGIS has privity of contract with its subcontractors and the US Government has privity of contract only with the Prime Contractor, AEGIS. ConVerDate Nov 24 2008 05:14 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046473 PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A473P2.XXX A473P2

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sequently, pricing data on competed contracts is not broken out by a percentage of 

the contract that has been subcontracted. 

Question: What due diligence was done prior to signing to assure reputability of 

contractor/subcontractor, and any of their employees? 

Answer: The contracting officers determined on each contract that AEGIS was responsible IAW Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 9, by ensuring that 

AEGIS was neither a debarred nor suspended contractor, verifying financial capability and evaluating applicable past performance in the source selection process. 

AEGIS CONTRACTS

Question: Who screened employees of contractor/subcontractor? 

Answer: AEGIS is required to submit the following documentation to the Contracting Officer Representative (COR): 

—Completed DD Form 2760 (or equivalent documentation) for each armed employee, indicating that the employee is not otherwise prohibited under U.S. law from 

possessing a weapon or ammunition. 

—One copy of a business license from the Iraq Ministry of Trade and one copy 

of an operating license from the Ministry of Interior. 

—An acceptable plan for accomplishing background checks on all contractor and 

subcontractor employees who will be armed under the contract. The contractor shall, 

at a minimum, perform the following (which will be specifically addressed in its plan 

and which will be documented and furnished to the COR upon completion): 

• Use one or more of the following sources when conducting background 

checks: Interpol, FBI, Country of Origin Criminal Records, Country of Origin 

U.S. Embassy Information Request, CIA records, and/or any other records available; 

• Verify with MNC–I Provost Marshall that no employee has been barred by 

any commander within Iraq. Additionally, Local Nationals are required to have 

background checks and must be vetted through a local hire vetting program. 

The contractor will utilize the standards within the MNF–I Access Control Policy to properly vet all Local Nationals as well as conduct a prescreening interview, in coordination with the Human Intelligence Support Teams, of potential 

employees to determine if any condition is present to preclude them from being 

hired. 

The contractor is screening and performing its own background checks on its employees and flowing down the same requirements to its subcontractors. The COR is 

verifying that the background checks were performed and validates the submitted 

paperwork, but does not actually perform the background checks. 

Question: What security checks were done? 

Answer: AEGIS is required to submit the following documentation to the Contracting Officer Representative (COR): 

—Completed DD Form 2760 (or equivalent documentation) for each armed employee, indicating that the employee is not otherwise prohibited under U.S. law from 

possessing a weapon or ammunition. 

—One copy of a business license from the Iraq Ministry of Trade and one copy 

of an operating license from the Ministry of Interior. 

—An acceptable plan for accomplishing background checks on all contractor and 

subcontractor employees who will be armed under the contract. The contractor shall, 

at a minimum, perform the following (which will be specifically addressed in its plan 

and which will be documented and furnished to the COR upon completion): 

• Use one or more of the following sources when conducting background 

checks: Interpol, FBI, Country of Origin Criminal Records, Country of Origin 

U.S. Embassy Information Request, CIA records, and/or any other records available; 

• Verify with MNC–I Provost Marshall that no employee has been barred by 

any commander within Iraq. 

Additionally, Local Nationals are required background checks and must be vetted 

through a local hire vetting program. The contractor will utilize the standards within the MNF–I Access Control Policy to properly vet all Local Nationals as well as 

conduct a prescreening interview, in coordination with the Human Intelligence Support Teams, of potential employees to determine if any condition is present to preclude them from being hired. The contractor is screening and performing its own 

background checks on its employees and flowing down the same requirements to its 

subcontractors. The COR is verifying that the background checks were performed 

and validates the submitted paperwork, but does not actually perform the background checks. 

Question: Do any of them have criminal records? 


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Answer: All contractor employees may not have been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral circumstances during the 5 year period preceding the 

date of the contract proposal. Additionally, employees may not have been declared 

incompetent by reason of mental defect by any court of competent jurisdiction. 

Question: Who performed them at DoD and for contractor/subcontractor? 

Answer: AEGIS is required to submit the following documentation to the Contracting Officer Representative (COR): 

—Completed DD Form 2760 (or equivalent documentation) for each armed employee, indicating that the employee is not otherwise prohibited under U.S. law from 

possessing a weapon or ammunition. 

—One copy of a business license from the Iraq Ministry of Trade and one copy 

of an operating license from the Ministry of Interior. 

—An acceptable plan for accomplishing background checks on all contractor and 

subcontractor employees who will be armed under the contract. The contractor shall, 

at a minimum, perform the following (which will be specifically addressed in its plan 

and which will be documented and furnished to the COR upon completion): 

• Use one or more of the following sources when conducting background 

checks: Interpol, FBI, Country of Origin Criminal Records, Country of Origin 

US Embassy Information Request, CIA records, and/or any other records available; 

• Verify with MNC–I Provost Marshall that no employee has been barred by 

any commander within Iraq. 

Additionally, Local Nationals are required background checks and must be vetted 

through a local hire vetting program. The contractor will utilize the standards within the MNF–I Access Control Policy to properly vet all Local Nationals as well as 

conduct a prescreening interview, in coordination with the Human Intelligence Support Teams, of potential employees to determine if any condition is present to preclude them from being hired. The contractor is screening and performing its own 

background checks on its employees and flowing down the same requirements to its 

subcontractors. The COR is verifying that the background checks were performed 

and validates the submitted paperwork, but does not actually perform the background checks. 

Question: Where are all those employee records available from contractor and subcontractor? 

Answer: AEGIS and its subcontractors are required to maintain administrative 

files, which must, at a minimum include personnel records, investigative records, 

and training records on all employees, for at least 6 months following the expiration 

of the contract. The contractor and its subcontractors shall make these records 

available to the Contracting Officer within 72 hours of a request. 

Question: Who performed and cleared their background checks? 

Answer: The agency performing background checks on its employees will depend 

on the country that the employee is from; however, the requiring activity/Contracting Officer Representative is responsible for verifying that a background check 

was completed. 

Question: Type of bidding process conducted for contract/subcontract? 

Answer: All contracts were awarded using Full and Open Competition with a Best 

Value Source Selection using technical, price, and past performance evaluation factors. 

Question: What oversight has there been for performance of the contracts? 

Answer: Each contract has, at a minimum, one appointed COR that evaluates the 

performance of each contract. 

Question: Which nations do non US citizens come from? What is their citizenship? 

Answer: The nationalities for AEGIS Defense Services active arming authorizations are as follows: 

Australia, Bosnia, Canada, Columbia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Iraq, 

Ireland, Nepal, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom. 

Question: Give me the compensation of each employee under contract and the 

death benefits for each. 

Answer: This type of specific company proprietary data, if at all releasable, would 

only be submitted when certified cost and pricing data was required for the acquisition. Certified cost and pricing data generally is required on non-competitive actions 

over $650K, but there is an exception when prices are based on adequate price competition, which is what occurred with the AEGIS contracts. Those contracts were 

competed on a full and open competition basis, and as such, cost or pricing data was 

not required. 

Question: What percent of the contract and subcontract is for administrative expenses vs. Employee compensation? 


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Answer: This type of specific company proprietary data, if at all releasable, would 

only be submitted when certified cost and pricing data was required for the acquisition. Certified cost and pricing data generally is required on non-competitive actions 

over $650K, but there is an exception when prices are based on adequate price competition, which is what occurred with the AEGIS contracts. Those contracts were 

competed on a full and open competition basis, and as such, cost or pricing data was 

not required. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Ms. Kaptur. 

Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow.] 

CONTRACT OVERSIGHT IN KUWAIT

Question: The Committee has seen press reports of fraud and corruption at the 

Army’s Kuwait contracting center and that as a result nearly $4 billion in Iraq war 

contracts has been shifted to the contracting office of the Army Sustainment Command at Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois. Does this remote contracting procedure comply with current contingency contracting doctrine? 

Answer: Yes. All Army contracting organizations share the same common vision 

of providing the best possible contracting support to their Warfighting customers. 

Exactly how each organization accomplishes that mission varies based on mission 

and resources. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) does not forward deploy any 

contracting resources and instead relies on dedicated CONUS contracting personnel 

to provide reach-back support. Some organizations send contracting support teams 

forward on a periodic basis (e.g., quarterly) to provide short-term support in theater 

and to better understand how things operate in the area of operation, (AOR), which 

should improve their ability to provide reach-back support when they return to their 

home station. The Army Material Command (AMC), Army Special Operations Command, and the Army Corps of Engineers primarily forward deploy their contracting 

resources. They have determined that is the best and most efficient way to provide 

contracting support to the Warfighter in an expeditionary environment. 

ARMY NEAR-TERM ACTIONS TO IMPROVE CONTRACTING

Question: The Secretary of the Army established the Gansler Commission in September 2007, to perform a strategic review of Army acquisition and contracting. 

Concurrently the Army Contracting Task Force was formed to review current contracting operations and recommendnmediate action where appropriate. What recommendations of the Army Task Force or the Gansler Commission has the Army 

implemented? 

Answer: Reforms and completed actions are as follows: 

• Established reach back capability at the Army Material Command to manage 

over $4B in active contracts. 

• Doubled the number of trained Contracting Officer’s Representatives (CORs) in 

Kuwait. 

• Establishing Army Contracting Command (ACC); a two-star level contracting 

command including two subordinate one-star level commands: Expeditionary contracting command and installation contracting command under the Army Material 

Command (AMC) to enhance Warfighter support, leverage resources, capitalize on 

the synergy of contracting personnel, and establish uniform policies. 

• Establishing the Army Contracting Campaign Plan (ACCP) under the A/USA. 

• Incorporating lessons learned into doctrine, training guides and user activity 

handbooks to include: Joint Publication (JP) 4–10, Army Field Manual 4–10, Commander’s Guide to Contracting, and Contracting Handbook for Requiring Activities 

(under development). 

• The Army worked with the Army Audit Agency (AAA), Criminal Investigation 

Division (CID), and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management 

and Comptroller in reviewing financial data to determine if appropriate disbursement and accounting of payments have been made. All actions found with potential 

fraud indicators have been turned over to CID for further investigation. 

• The Army is working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to develop several legislative proposals candidates where we will need legislative assistance from Congress to resolve certain issues. 

• Distribution of the new Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook as well as 

field manuals for Contracting Support Brigade (CSB)s and a Commanders’ Guide 

to Contracting and Contractor Management. 


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• Developed the Contracting Government Training Aid card on 15 November 

2007. This TRADOC/CASCOM generated training tool provides unit level contracting/contractor situational awareness. 

• Published and distributed 5,000 copies of the Joint Contingency Contracting 

Handbook to the Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, National Guard, Silver Flag 

and service courses and schools. This joint document was finalized on 1 December 

2008, is a single pocket-sized handbook that captures the joint contingency contracting environment and provides contingency contracting officers with the necessary tools for joint-service operations. 

Question: What recommendations have not been fully implemented and why? 

Answer: 

a. As recommended in the Gansler Commission report the Army should establish 

a separate Army Contracting Officer promotion board. The Army has determined 

that it is neither necessary nor required to establish a separate board just for contracting officers since each board can be tailored as required to meet the needs of 

the Army by establishing ‘‘floors’’ in order to ensure a sufficient, minimum quantity 

of highly qualified officers are selected to fulfill the Army’s needs. 

b. The Army has elected not to establish a separate, centrally managed; contracting Corps because the needs of the Army and the Acquisition Corps are best 

met though the existing Army Acquisition Corps. A separately managed Contracting 

Corps would require additional, redundant, administrative oversight that would not 

be necessary or cost effective. 

c. Increase Army Contracting personnel by 400 military and 1000 civilians is only 

partially agreed to. Further analysis is needed but it appears that a structure of 

301 military expeditionary plus 167 institutional military coupled to 804 civilian 

personnel is required to fulfill the recommendations made by the Gansler Commission. 

U.S. ARMY CONTRACTING COMMAND

Question: The Army has approved a two-star level Army Contracting Command 

under Army Material Command. The new organization has two subordinate one-star 

commands: One focused on expeditionary contracting; and the other focused on installation contracting. Who are the general officers selected for the new commands 

and what are their contracting credentials? 

Answer: The selections for these positions have not been made, but their credentials will be commensurate with the roles and responsibilities of these positions. On 

January 30, 2008, the Secretary of the Army directed the realignment of the Army 

Contracting Agency under the AMC and the establishment of the Army Contracting 

Command (ACC); a two-star level contracting command including two subordinate 

one-star level commands: Expeditionary contracting command and installation contracting command to enhance Warfighter support, leverage resources, capitalize on 

the synergy of contracting personnel, and establish uniform policies. On February 

8, 2008, the AMC established the ACC as a provision unit with the mission of providing responsive and effective contracting services to meet the Army’s requirements. 

Question: Please describe the structure and the number of people: Military, civilian, and contractor that will be in each command? Where will the new general officer commands be located? Will the general officers be ‘‘dual-hated’’ with responsibilities other than their contracting commands? 

Answer: The details are being discussed and a decision is forthcoming. 

ADDRESSING ARMY CONTRACTING PROBLEMS

Question: The Army Contracting Task Force examined current Army contracting 

operations and identified a number of serious problems. The Army has been working 

for several months to address these problems. High personnel turn over has been 

identified as a problem at forward deployed contracting organizations. Has the turn 

over problem been solved? 

Answer: It will remain difficult to attract and retain qualified personnel in any 

austere OCONUS environment. Such a situation exists in the CENTCOM AOR. 

There will be a continued need to provide rotational forces to supplement the Kuwait staff and to provide reach-back to CONUS based operations. Bottom line is 

only time will tell if additional benefits to attract and retain skilled contracting personnel are approved and indeed to help with retention before issues associated with 

manning shortfalls and an inexperienced contracting workforce are in fact alleviated. 


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Question: Are you confident that the necessary numbers of properly trained and 

certified contracting officers’ representatives have been appointed and are in place 

performing their duties? 

Answer: Contracting officers have been directed to appoint a trained Contracting 

Officer’s Representative (COR) for every service contract awarded with an estimated 

value greater than $2,500. To ensure that systematic quality assurance methods are 

used during contract administration, quality assurance surveillance plans must also 

be prepared and implemented. Additionally, a standard, minimum training requirement has been established for Army CORs. CORs must complete the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) on-line continuous learning module, ‘‘COR with a Mission 

Focus,’’ prior to appointment. As of November 1, 2007, over 4,500 Army personnel 

have completed this course. Also, acquisition leadership reiterated the requirement 

for contractor performance to be adequately documented and performance reports 

prepared, entered and maintained in our performance assessment systems. We will 

not allow poor performers to be rewarded with more work. A reminder was also forwarded to the entire Army Acquisition workforce addressing their responsibilities as 

public servants and stewards of the taxpayer’s investment and exhorting them to 

ensure that their actions remain above reproach, both in reality and appearance. 

JOINT CONTRACTING COMMAND IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN

Question: The Gansler Commission reports that the Army is the DoD executive 

agent for contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, but is unable to fill military or civilian contracting billets in either quantity or qualification. Although providing contracting support to the Army or Marine Corps is not an Air Force mission, an Air 

Force major general currently is in command of the Joint Contracting Command— 

Iraq/Afghanistan. The Air Force also provides over 67 percent of the Joint Contracting Command contracting personnel supporting ground forces, and the Air 

Force is handling most of the complex contracting actions. How have you changed 

the career path for Army contracting officers so that they spend enough time in contracting billets to be truly qualified as a contracting officer; to be a contracting expert? 

Answer: Changes to the Army Contracting Officer career path are being implemented. Army contracting officers will be accessed at the 5–6 year mark after their 

basic branch qualification. The goal is to have all officers complete the Army Acquisition Basic Course (8 weeks) and the Army Acquisition Intermediate Contracting 

Course (4 weeks) prior to their first contracting assignment. In addition, during 

their first year of assignment at a Directorate of Contracting an Acquisition Center, 

contracting officers will be ineligible for deployment. This action will help them acquire valuable acquisition experience before being placed in a deployed situation. 

INCREMENTAL FUNDING OF CONTRACTS

Question: The Gansler Commission Reported that contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan have been incrementally funded causing unnecessary work load and inefficient 

operations plus often limiting the contracting officer in efforts to achieve a better 

deal. Why are some contracts funded only monthly or at even shorter intervals? 

Answer: The incremental funding of contracts is generally a factor of the availability of funding. Incremental funding is most frequently used at the beginning of 

a new fiscal year when appropriations have not been enacted and DoD is operating 

under a Continuing Resolution (CR) or in advance of supplemental funding for contingency operations. A contract can be funded only for the duration of the CR and 

a contract modification must be issued adding incremental funding for the period 

of each subsequent CR. 

Question: Who makes the decision to incrementally fund contracts? 

Answer: The decision to incrementally fund contracts is based on the provisions 

of Continuing Resolution and/or the availability of funding. A CR generally establishes that no new projects or services can begin, and that continuing efforts can 

be funded only for the duration of the CR. The Contracting Officer cannot fund contracts without the appropriate funding available. 

Question: How can the Army solve the incremental funding problem? 

Answer: The Army cannot solve the incremental funding problem, since the requirement to have funds available is a fundamental tenet of government fiscal law. 

Incremental funding will continue to be a problem every fiscal year for which appropriations are not enacted and funds distributed prior to the start of the year. 

CONTRACTING OFFICERS’ REPRESENTATIVES

Question: Army contracting officers have been directed to appoint a trained contracting officer’s representative (COR) for every service contract awarded with an 


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estimated value greater than $2,500. Who are the people who serve as contracting 

officers’ representatives? 

Answer: ‘‘Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation (DFAR)’’ 201.602–2 requires 

that an individual who is to be designated a contracting officer’s representative 

(COR) must be a Government employee, unless other authorized in Agency regulations; must be qualified by training and experience commensurate with the responsibilities to be delegated in accordance with department/agency guidelines; and must 

be delegated in writing with the COR responsibilities clearly delineated and accepted in writing by the designee. Typically, the COR is nominated and is required to 

provide the Contracting Officer information concerning all relevant training and experience. COR’s training is offered by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) as 

well as by a variety of private training sources. Army CORs can be Army military 

or civilian personnel. 

Question: During contingency operations, how often do the typical CORs rotate or 

get replaced? 

Answer: The rotation or replacement of a COR (military or civilian) is not linked 

to their COR roles and responsibilities. CORs are rotated based on the normal rotational process for assigned soldiers or civilians. There are advantages and disadvantages to either extending or reducing rotations for. A COR should be familiar with 

the contract, the work requirements, and the contract history may provide a more 

experienced eye on contractor operations and performance; however, too much familiarity with an operation may make some CORs more complacent with the status 

quo. Generally speaking, the rotational rate does not, in and of itself, dictate the 

effectiveness of a COR. 

Question: In the cases of fraud researched by the Army Contracting Task Force, 

how many of those cases were reported by the COR, and in how many cases were 

the CORs complicit? 

Answer: The Army Contracting Task Force did not research the cases of fraud 

committed in theater as many of the investigations are still open. However, a review 

by Army CID of the 93 ongoing and 51 closed investigations of procurement fraud 

impacting operations in Iraq, Kuwait and Afghanistan, found that 5 CORs reported 

suspected misconduct and 21 CORs have been, or are currently being looked at, for 

offenses associated with the fraud. It should be noted that many of the cases are 

still ongoing and misconduct on the part of the 21 has not been proven. 

EXPANDING THE ARMY CONTRACTING WORK FORCE

Question: The Army acquisition work force has declined in numbers over the last 

decade, while the dollar amount of contacts being managed has grown by more than 

80 percent. Now the Army is attempting to grow the contracting work force. Please 

describe the Army program to increase the contracting officer work force, both military and civilian? What progress has been made? 

Answer: The decline in the acquisition work force and the potential losses of 

trained and experienced procurement personnel in the next few years due to anticipated retirements is an issue faced by DoD and the civilian workforce. The Gansler 

Commission recommended growing the non-deployable contracting workforce by 167 

Military and 804 Civilian positions which is being pursued. However, the level of 

trained and experienced contracting officer personnel currently in both the military 

and civilian workforce is a finite resource coupled with all of the government departments and contractors vying for the same individuals. Creative solutions must be 

developed to retain experienced personnel while recruiting and training new contracts professionals to replace and enhance the current numbers. Among the proposed innovations are changes to the current ‘‘rehired annuitant’’ restrictions, additional partnerships with colleges and universities to enhance the recruitment of 

graduates into the government workforce, and the development of more robust contracting internship programs. 

GROWTH IN CONTRACTOR PROVIDED SERVICES

Question: The Committee understands that the Department of Defense obligates 

more for service contracts than it does for supplies and equipment, including major 

weapons systems. In many cases, contractor personnel end up working along side 

of military personnel, doing much the same work, but the contractor costs the government three or four times the pay of a lower ranking enlisted soldier. How does 

that make fiscal sense? 

Answer: The pay of a Soldier and the total cost of a contract is not the appropriate 

comparison. The cost of the contractor is the complete cost to the government, but 

the Soldiers’ pay is only one cost component. The full cost of a Soldier includes: Nontaxable basic allowance for housing, Non-taxable basic allowance for subsistence, 


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health care costs, the GI bill, re-enlistment bonuses, the cost to train and recruit 

a Soldier, permanent change of station moves, and retirement accrual. 

The specific difference in cost of a contractor and a Soldier will vary depending 

on the type of work performed, but comparing pay of a Soldier to cost of a contract 

will always overstate the difference, and fails to consider operational priorities and 

limitations. 

The decision to use contractor personnel as opposed to military personnel is based 

on long-term cost rather than per hour cost, as well as availability of military personnel. When the decision was made to reduce the size of the standing Army and 

institute a volunteer force, it reduced the viability of the Army to operate in an 

armed conflict without the support of contractor personnel. Since the national defense cannot be contracted out, the majority of the support and logistics functions 

had to be contracted to free military enlisted and officers for the war effort. Each 

enlisted or officer performing an administrative function reduce’s the available 

forces. 

The fiscal analysis to employ as a comparative tool would require the comparison 

of the cost to sustain an Army on war footing throughout peacetime, to ensure that 

the capability exists to perform both the military and the administrative functions 

at the time of greatest need. 

CONTRACTOR DISCIPLINE IN COMBAT THEATERS

Question: The Washington Post reported in an April 15, 2007, article entitled ‘‘A 

Chaotic Day on Baghdad’s Airport Road’’, that ‘‘Not a single case has been brought 

against a security contractor, and that confusion is widespread among contractors 

and the military over what laws, if any, apply to their conduct.’’ Fortunately, there 

appears to be a significant reduction in the number of reports of out-of-control use 

of deadly force by security contractors. Is this a result of better oversight of contract 

security personnel, or is it simply related to an overall reduced level of terrorist activity? 

Answer: It is impossible to ascertain with any certainty the reason for a reduction 

in reports of ‘‘out of control’’ use of deadly force by security contractors. However, 

in the past several months, several changes have been implemented to facilitate 

greater oversight over Private Security Contractors (PSC). 

On December 12, 2007, the Deputy Secretaries of Defense and State Department 

signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) regarding United States Government 

(PSC). The MOA defines the authority and responsibility for the accountability and 

operations of private security contractors in Iraq. Consistency in the treatment and 

oversight of PSC should provide better understanding of the roles and responsibilities of all the parties to these contracts. 

Further, the Combatant Commander provided specific guidance on arming contractor personnel and private security contractors in the USCENTCOM AOR. PSC 

personnel are not authorized to participate in offensive operations and must comply 

with Rules on the Use of Force (RUF). Also, they must be properly licensed to carry 

arms in accordance with host nation law and must receive USCENTCOM/Coalition 

Forces’ approval of their operations. 

On November 5, 2007, the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC–I/ 

A) promulgated a mandatory special provision to be inserted in all JCC–I/A’s PSC 

contracts. The local provision, IA 25–3, ‘‘Compliance with Laws and Regulations’’ 

states: ‘‘The contractor shall comply with, and shall ensure that its personnel and 

its subcontractors and subcontractor personnel at all tiers obey all existing and future U.S. and Host Nation laws, Federal or DoD regulations, and Central Command 

orders and directives applicable to personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, including but 

not limited to USCENTCOM, Multi-National Force and Multi-National Corps fragmentary orders, instructions and directives.’’ 

On January 10, 2008, the ‘‘Defense Acquisition Regulation System (DARS)’’ issued 

a proposed rule to amend the ‘‘Defense Federal Acquisition Supplement (DFARS)’’ 

to address requirements for DoD contractors to institute effective programs to prevent violations of ‘‘Law of War’’ by contractor personnel authorized to accompany 

U.S. Armed Forces deployed outside of the United States. 

Finally, the National Defense Authorization Act of FY08 (Public Law 110–181) 

will allow the Secretary of Defense to define the ‘‘area of combat operations;’’ require 

standard the FAR language to be inserted in each PSC contract; and require specific 

contractor reporting requirements for discharge of weapons, training, and other related requirements. 

Question: What military or civil laws govern the conduct of contractors operating 

in Iraq and Afghanistan? 


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Answer: The DoD contractor personnel (regardless of nationality) accompanying 

U.S. armed forces in contingency operations are subject to Uniform Code of Military 

Justice (UCMJ) jurisdiction. Commanders can disarm, apprehend, and detain DoD 

contractors suspected of having committed a felony offense in violation of the rules 

for the use of force (RUF), or outside the scope of their authorized mission, and conduct the basic UCMJ pretrial process and trial procedures currently applicable to 

the courts-martial of military service members. 

Also, under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), federal jurisdiction exists over felony offenses committed outside the U.S. by contractor personnel 

of any federal agency or provisional authority whose employment relates to supporting the DoD mission. Implementing guidance under this Act is included in Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5525.11, ‘‘Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Employed by or Accompanying the Armed Forces Outside the United States, 

Certain Service Members, and Former Service Members,’’ and military department 

regulations. This instruction requires DoD to coordinate with the Department of 

Justice for the return of contractor personnel subject to MEJA to the U.S. for prosecution. 

Contingency contractor personnel are subject to the domestic criminal laws of the 

host nation, absent a status of forces agreement or international agreement to the 

contrary. 

Question: Who in the Army chain of command monitors contractor performance 

and takes action if the contractor’s conduct is inappropriate or illegal? 

Answer: It is the responsibility of all military and civilian personnel to ensure 

that any perceived illegal actions on the part of contractors or other government 

personnel is reported to the appropriate organization for investigation. 

However, the Contracting Officer (CO) is responsible to ensure compliance with 

the terms and conditions of the contracts. Generally, the CO will appoint a Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) to provide closer monitoring of service contracts. The CORs serve as the ‘‘eyes and ears’’ for the CO. The responsibilities and 

limitations of authority of the COR are stated in an appointment letter issued by 

the Contracting Officer. Based on the Army’s procurement policy, COs are required 

to validate the CORs’ contract records every 12 months and document the results 

of their review. The CORs’ responsibilities generally include verifying that the contractor performs the technical contract requirements in accordance to its terms, conditions, and specifications; maintaining direct communication with the contractor. A 

contract administration office is also assigned to provide oversight of the contractor’s 

performance. In addition to CORs, Ordering Officers may be appointed by a CO 

when appropriate. Advance training is also required for these appointments. Appointment of an Ordering Officer is generally limited to placing orders against contracts that contain ordering clauses. Ordering Officers are responsible for ensuring 

that all contract terms and conditions are met on the orders that they have issued 

and reporting any performance deficiencies to the CO. 

Question: How many individuals are performing contract services for the Department of the Army in Iraq, Kuwait and Afghanistan? 

Answer: Based on the 1st Quarter, 2008 CENTCOM Census Report (December 31, 

2007), there are 163,591 DoD-funded contractors in Iraq and 36,520 in Afghanistan. 

There are an additional 23,110 DoD-funded contractors in the rest of the 

CENTCOM Area of Responsibility. 

Question: How many contracts have been let to provide these individuals? 

Answer: The number of FY07 contract actions performed in Iraq was 2,477 that 

totaled $7,515,809,346. The number of FY07 contract actions performed in Afghanistan was 1,540 that totaled $2,266,426,110. 

Question: How many of the contracts are sole source? 

Answer: None. The DoD has not awarded any sole source contracts to PSCs in 

Iraq or Afghanistan (source: Testimony of LTG N. Ross Thompson III on January 

23, 2008 before the HAC). Competitive procedures were used for the award of 1,313 

of 1,540 (85 percent) of the total contracting actions in support of Afghanistan. A 

total of 1,937 out of 2,477 (78 percent) contract actions were awarded in support of 

Iraq operations. 

Question: What percentage of the individuals are U.S. National; Iraqi; Afghan; 

Kuwaiti; third country? 

Answer: The 1st Quarter USCENTCOM Census Report reflects the following for 

the private service contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan: 

• U.S. Citizens = 849 (6.5%) 

• Third Country Nationals = 7,620 (59%) 

• Local Host Country = 4,481 (34.5%) 

• Total: 12,950 

Question: How many of the individuals are security guards? 


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Answer: The USCENTCOM’s 1st Quarter, 2008 Contractor Census Report, dated 

December 31, 2007 reflects the following: 

• Iraq: 9,952 private security contractors of which 6,467 (65 percent) are armed. 

• Afghanistan: 2,998 private security contractors of which 2,745 (91.5 percent) are 

armed. 

Question: What percentage of the security guard personnel carry weapons? 

Answer: According to the 1st Quarter, 2008 CENTCOM Census, 65 percent of the 

DoD-funded private security contractors in Iraq and 91.5 percent of the DoD-funded 

private security contractors in Afghanistan are armed. 

CONTRACT OVERSIGHT PERSONNEL IN COMBAT THEATERS

Question: According to a recent GAO report, a common problem is the lack of adequate contract oversight personnel at deployed locations. Why does the Army not 

assign sufficient contract oversight personnel to the combat theaters? 

Answer: In 2004 and again in 2005, GAO reported that DoD did not have a sufficient number of trained personnel in place to provide effective oversight of its logistics support contractors on the battlefield, citing inadequate surveillance on 26 of 

90 contracts audited. In FY05, DoD obligated nearly $270 billion on contracts for 

goods and services which represented an increase of over 331 percent in dollars and 

over 650 percent in contract actions from FY00. At the same time DoD experienced 

a tremendous growth in workload associated with support for the GWOT, they also 

experienced a dramatic reduction in the capability to meet the contract oversight 

challenge. Due to the huge increase in contracting workload added to a significant 

shortfall of skilled professionals in the civilian and military acquisition workforce 

and difficulties in attracting more civilians to forward deploy, the Army has had to 

assume a greater risk for post award processes like contract quality assurance of 

service contracts until such time as the Army can attract and position more administrative contracting personnel into the combat theater of operations. 

Question: What is the deployment rotation policy for contracting oversight personnel? 

Answer. Deployment rotation policy: The Army, Air Force, Marines and Navy all 

employ different deployment rotation strategies for their military acquisition personnel based on service organization and mission requirements. Air Force and Navy 

deployments are typically for 6 months or less, while Army deployments are normally 12 months or longer. Army civilians are typically deployed on 6 month orders, 

but 3, and 6 month extensions are encouraged. The United States Army Corps of 

Engineers (USACE) offers an option of a 6 or 12 month deployment with a higher 

incentive bonus for longer commitments. 

The DCMA who performs the preponderance of contract oversight on the battlefield typically deploy their military service members for 6 months, but rotate them 

home and back again for another 6 months within a two year period. The DCMA 

civilians deploy similar to Army Civilians in 6 and 12 month increments. 

Question: What if any changes are needed? 

Answer: Military members have recommended that Air Force and Navy service 

members should all be on 12 month deployments. Longer deployments would make 

for smoother operations and would relieve those who stay for 12 months from the 

burden of training a continually changing workforce. 

An increase in the number of civilians could also improve oversight processes by 

increasing the number of people available to cover the gaps when troops rotate in 

and out. 

Based on discussions conducted by the Gansler commission the following legislative proposals have been submitted to increase incentives to attract more civilians 

to deploy and improve contract policy on the battlefield: 

• Optional Life Insurance Election Opportunity for Certain Federal Civilian Employees. This proposal will provide adequate life insurance benefits to next-of-kin of 

DoD civilian employees who are killed while serving in a combat zone. Benefits 

would be commensurate with those provided to members of the Armed Forces. 

• Authority to Waive Annual Limitation of Premium Pay and Aggregate Limitation on Pay for Federal Civilian Employees. This proposal will make permanent authority for the Secretary of Defense to increase the limitation on premium pay and 

the limitation on aggregate pay for DoD employees who perform work in connection 

with a contingency operation, national emergency declared by the President, or 

other emergency. 

• Expedited Hiring Authority for Defense Acquisition Positions. This proposal will 

authorize expedited direct hire authority for acquisition personnel. 

• Requirement for Use of Express Option for Deciding Protests of Contracts and 

Task and Delivery Orders in Support of Emergency Operations. This proposal will 


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allow for the use of the express option by the Comptroller General to adjudicate any 

protests registered in the case of such contract actions. 

• Authority to Acquire Products and Service Produced in a Contingency Theater 

of Operations Outside the United States. This proposal will authorize the Secretary 

of Defense to establish a preference for the acquisition of products and services in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. 

• Exceptions for National Security and Emergency Operations. This proposal 

would retain the fundamental domestic preference requirements of the law, yet, it 

would provide the flexibility needed for the Department of Defense (DoD) and its 

suppliers to better respond to fulfill the needs that arise in cases of national security 

and defined cases of emergency operations using either competitive procedures or 

other than competitive procedures, as may be appropriate. 

All of these proposals address weaknesses identified by the Gansler Commission 

and advance important Army and DoD legislative priorities. These proposals are urgently needed to provide the Army and the Department the tools needed to address 

the contracting challenges we face in a complex wartime operational environment. 

We have requested that these proposals be staffed within the Department of Defense and forward to the Office of Management and Budget for Congressional consideration in the FY09 legislative cycle. 

PLANNING FOR THE USE OF CONTRACTOR SUPPORT

Question: Although the use of support contractors at deployed locations has expanded, the military departments have struggled to capture lessons learned and to 

pass on those lessons learned in order to assist commanders in subsequent deployments. How does the Army capture lessons learned in providing battlefield contractor support, and how are lessons learned provided to new commanders as they 

prepare for deployment? 

Answer: We are capturing ‘‘expeditionary contracting’’ lessons learned by formally 

interviewing units as they return from Iraq/Afghanistan, incorporating lessons 

learned into doctrine, training guides and user activity handbooks. The Army Acquisition, Logistics and Technology Integration Office is developing mission specific 

Contingency Contracting Officer courses and incorporating lessons learned into mission rehearsal exercises. 

Question: How does the Army represent contract security and support personnel 

in the training scenarios during pre-deployment exercises at locations such as the 

National Training Center? 

Answer: Oversight in the Army is distributed: The activity awarding an individual 

contract has responsibility for oversight of that contract. Head of the Contracting 

Activity (HCA) authority resides in individual commands, generally at the two-star 

level. Contract administration can be delegated to DCMA at the discretion of the 

contracting activity, but they retain overall responsibility as Procuring Contracting 

Officer. In the case of a service contract, a Contracting Officer’s Representative (usually a technical expert from the customer’s organization) is appointed by the Contracting Officer in writing to oversee quality control and ensure that the work is 

performed satisfactorily. This individual reports to the Contracting Officer and has 

no authority to change the contract’s terms and conditions or request work other 

than spelled out in the contract. 

For acquisition approvals with higher dollar thresholds, and for general policy 

oversight, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics & Technology) 

and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) have cognizance. Compliance audits are performed by the Army Audit Agency, the Defense 

Contract Audit Agency, and Inspectors General at all levels can investigate contracts along with other matters. In recent years, the DASA P&P has revitalized the 

operational review function in the form of Contract Operations Reviews in order to 

provide closer oversight and assistance to contracting offices Army-wide. These reviews are done by teams of procurement professionals, with a goal of reviewing each 

contracting office every two years. A system of issuing formal reports and following 

up through Corrective Action Plans is being implemented. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


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WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23, 2008. 

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

WITNESS 

DAVID M. WALKER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MURTHA. We want to welcome the distinguished American 

GAO comptroller and his support staff. We see that we are starting 

to get—we put in reported language. For a while we weren’t getting what we had hoped we would get because you were so busy 

with other things. Not you necessarily, but different agencies. So 

we are now getting what we feel are more adequate reports on 

some of the suggestions or requirements that we make. 

I have been very concerned about the balance between contractors and between Federal employees. We had a contracting officer, 

acquisition officer—whatever we call them—this morning, Lieutenant General Thompson. And I voiced my concern that we have got 

too many contractors, and I worry that the reason they had the 

contractors is because—because they then would have a surge capability. You know, they had gotten rid of acquisition people, then 

they had the surge capability and it hasn’t worked is what it 

amounted to. But at any rate, we had a good hearing this morning, 

but I know we will be enlightened by your presence. I know that 

we will be scintillated by your presentation, and we will learn 

much from what you have to say. And I welcome you to the Committee and ask if Mr. Hobson has any opening statements. 

Mr. HOBSON. No, sir. I will pass. 

Mr. MURTHA. Do we have to close this thing or not? Do you have 

anything that is going to be classified? 

Mr. WALKER. No, Mr. Chairman. We have some material that 

hasn’t been released yet, but it is not classified. 

Mr. MURTHA. That is all right. We will leave it open. We will tell 

the news media, well, you didn’t—they will ask me a question, I 

will say it was open. Just a little thing between me and the news 

media. They complain because we have too many closed hearings. 

We had an open hearing; we just didn’t tell them. 

Mr. HOBSON. I apologize. I have to leave at 4:00 to catch an airplane. 

Mr. MURTHA. At 4:00? That is all right. Frelinghuysen will be 

here. Oh, this guy is the best. He doesn’t miss a trick. This may 

be a little longer than we would like. 

Okay. Go forward with your condensed statement and then we 

will get into questions. 


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SUMMARY STATEMENT OF MR. WALKER

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be back before the subcommittee. As you know, I have a 

full statement. Hopefully it will be submitted for the record. I will 

just summarize some of the highlights if I can. 

I share your concern with regard to what is happening in the 

government. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Moran is here. 

Mr. MORAN. I want to hear particularly from Mr. Walker. 

Mr. WALKER. I share your concern with regard to what is going 

on with regard to the use of contractors. As we all know, the government has to be able to achieve its many missions and important 

functions and activities through the combined efforts of what is referred to as the total force. In the case of the Department of Defense, the total force would include civilian, military and contractor 

personnel. We have seen a significant increase in the utilization of 

contractors. In some cases, that makes sense because it is a 

noncore function, or it is something that may be a one-time or temporary need. It may also be a situation where, because of government policies and practices, you can’t attract and retain enough 

people to be able to do the work. Finally, it could be a circumstance 

where otherwise it makes either sense to do it or for various reasons you have to do it. 

DECISION TO USE CONTRACTORS

However, one of the concerns that I have, Mr. Chairman, is we 

have seen a tendency to use contractors possibly as a first resort 

rather than through a considered process. Now, sometimes that is 

because there is a need that arises because of a contingency operation. For example, Iraq or Katrina. And because the government 

hasn’t taken enough steps to be able to deal with those kinds of 

situations, they are pretty much forced to have to use contractors. 

In other circumstances there is a tendency to use military personnel, frankly, instead of civilian personnel, because you can get 

people to a particular location to do a particular function very 

quickly, because you can order them to do that, whereas you may 

not be able to do that with civilian personnel. 

INCREASE IN OBLIGATIONS FOR CONTRACTORS

There has been a huge increase in the amount of contracting obligations since 2000. You are aware of what those numbers are. 

There has been a significant increase in the nature of services contracts, which are even more difficult to be able to help assure economy, efficiency, effectiveness; and to fight fraud, waste, abuse and 

mismanagement. Why? Because you need to do a much better job 

of pinning down what you are seeking, setting the requirements up 

front and making sure that there is adequate oversight as to cost, 

quality, performance. If you don’t do that, you can end up incurring 

a tremendous amount of waste. 

CONTRACT COMPLEXITY

We have other factors that are complicating this area because, as 

you know, while the amount of contracting activity has gone up 


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dramatically, the number of acquisitions and oversight personnel in 

many regards has gone down at the same time. And yet the complexity of some of the types of contracting arrangements that we 

are entering into today are much greater than they have been in 

the past. So that contributes to the possibility of additional waste, 

which is, frankly, a much bigger problem than fraud. 

My view is the time has come that we need to step back and reassess what type of functions and activities should be performed by 

contracting personnel versus government personnel. We also need 

to keep in mind with the Department of Defense, that part of that 

equation needs to be which types of functions and activities ought 

to be done by military personnel versus civilian personnel. 

PLANNING FOR CONTINGENCIES

I think we also have to think about what can be done to help preplan for contingency operations that we know will occur. We just 

don’t know when they will occur. An example would be if an operation like Iraq, an operation like Katrina—they are both contingency operations. One is a military conflict. One is responding to 

a natural disaster. We know things are going to happen from time 

to time. And there is a lot more that can and should be done to 

prepare for those contingencies, such that we engage in appropriate, competitive bidding up front and we have appropriate types 

of contracting arrangements up front. We can then draw down on 

those when those contingencies occur. 

FLEXIBILITY IN HIRING

We also need to think about whether or not the personnel rules 

can be changed to provide some additional flexibility for agency 

heads to be able to hire people on a temporary basis to perform certain critical functions and activities in lieu of automatically going 

out and contracting for it. 

And let me give you a perfect example. The Comptroller General 

of the United States, my position, has the ability to hire up to onehalf of 1 percent of our workforce at any time, at any level, for up 

to 3 years, to do whatever I think needs to be done. 

Mr. MURTHA. Is that the law? 

Mr. WALKER. That is the law. Now, in our case it says 15 persons, which is roughly one-half of 1 percent of our workforce. But 

that concept is a concept that I think has a lot of intellectual merit 

because there are occasions, such as the Iraq situation, such as 

Katrina, where it would have been nice for people to be able to acquire some talent and to do it expeditiously. Under the normal personnel rules for the Federal Government, that is virtually impossible. As a result, many times what ends up happening is you default to military personnel or you default to contractor personnel 

because you can get things done quickly. It may or may not be the 

right answer. But once you end up entering into that contract, we 

need to structure the arrangements properly, to balance risk and 

reward between the government and the contractor, and we need 

to have an adequate number of acquisition and oversight personnel 

to make sure that we are managing cost, quality and performance. 

One of the reasons that the government historically has used 

contractors is not just for noncore functions—which is a policy 


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issue—but also to try to save money. We are doing work right now 

to try to ascertain whether—and to what extent it in fact does result in saving money. And while we have more work to do, our preliminary findings—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Could you say that again? 

Mr. WALKER. We are doing work at the present point in time in 

order to test the assumption that it might be more cost effective 

to hire contractors to perform certain functions rather than hiring 

additional civilian employees to perform the function. And we are 

finding on a preliminary basis that such savings are not necessarily the case. 

Let me summarize by saying this: I manage an agency, and I will 

tell you what my philosophy is with regard to contractors, just to 

help the discussion. If it is a function that involves the discretion 

of government authority or discretion of government resources, 

then that needs to be done by a civil servant. If it is a function that 

is more of a support function, that is a noncore function, it is something that needs to be done but it is not integrally tied to mission, 

then that is something that I think we ought to be looking for contracting possibilities in order to benefit from economies of scale, in 

order to be able to benefit from investments in technology that can 

be leveraged by the private sector. The government hasn’t done a 

very good job of that. 

Furthermore, if it is a one-time need or a temporary need, then 

in that circumstance it may make sense to use a contractor, because you don’t necessarily want to build up your force with all the 

related overhead costs and infrastructure costs that result. Or if it 

is a situation where because of the classification or compensation 

policies of the Federal Government, you can’t attract and retain 

enough people with the requisite skills and knowledge—because we 

can’t pay them what they need to be paid—then in that circumstance, you may have to hire contractors. And in our case, we 

use contractors in such circumstances but only in one of these circumstances. 

In summary, I think that the time has come to step back and 

relook at when it is appropriate to use contracting, how to use it, 

and that it shouldn’t be something that we do as a first resort. 

Something should be done as a considered process, as part of a 

broader strategy for achieving the government’s mission in an economical, efficient, and effective manner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The statement of Mr. Walker follows:] 


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Mr. MURTHA. I will go to Mr. Hobson since he has to leave at 

4:00. 

FUNCTIONS OF THE ACTIVE-DUTY FORCE

Mr. HOBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I agree with 

most of everything you said. It seems to me—and I would like to 

know how you feel about what I am going to say here—it seems 

to me that the Army and the military in general made a decision— 

I don’t know exactly when—that there were certain types of functions that they weren’t going to carry in the Active-Duty force. 

Let me give you an example: Construction of large military 

bases, the funding of the support operations for those, such as carrying certain types of skill sets that they would have. A real example is they put a lot of stuff in the Reserve and the Guard that 

have historically been in the Active Duty, which they have now 

changed. For example, military police. Military police changed almost totally from Active Duty into the Guard and Reserve. 

PLANNING FOR CONTINGENCIES

There are other types of specialties, MOSes, that that has happened to. They did some, apparently, preplanning of equipment and 

materiel and putting it in various sites around the world in case 

there were contingencies. They also entered into some very large 

contracts with some very large people such as Brown and Root and 

Halliburton and a couple of these other people that they could 

guide all these things under in the beginning. That apparently 

wasn’t planned well, because they have already now changed a lot 

of those MOSes back into the service. But the planning side of 

these large contracts seemed to get out of whack. And that is 

where they then found out that they need—and what I am really 

wondering, all this comes back to one thing—we challenged the administration bipartisanly about the number of people that they 

were putting into Iraq in this Committee, time and time again at 

the beginning. And the more I think about this, I am wondering 

if part of this whole problem with all of these contractors goes back 

not only to that base set thing that they did at the time, but the 

fact that they didn’t put enough people into Iraq in the beginning 

and therefore subcontracted a lot of things out that they might 

have otherwise been able to do. 

LACK OF SKILL SETS AND PERSONNEL

So it is twofold. One, did they early on before this war, way back, 

probably even in the previous administration, make a statement to 

themselves—and this goes back to Bosnia and Kosovo—we are not 

going to carry—before that—we are not going to carry these sets. 

We are going to contract that out. And that, then, is exacerbated 

by the fact that they didn’t put enough people into Iraq to perform 

a lot of the services and then went out and hired a bunch of subcontractors to do things that they hadn’t done before, such as all 

these guards. And not just the Army, but the State Department 

has done this. A lot of other agencies have gone out and contracted 

out things that would have normally been theirs. 


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That is a rambling question. But do you agree with the premise 

that, one, they did change the concept? And, two, did we put 

enough people in? And did that cause some of this problem? And 

third, about those big—— 

Mr. WALKER. Sure. Well, I think you noted some of the problems 

that have manifested themselves over the passage of time because 

of actions that have been taken where people have had to do something different than what they planned because either, A, they 

didn’t plan or, B, the plan didn’t turn out to be effective. 

HUMAN CAPITAL STRATEGIC PLAN

Let me suggest this. Having been in the human capital business 

for a lot of years in the private sector, basically I think what needs 

to be done here is there needs to be a human capital strategic plan. 

Let’s take the Defense Department, which this subcommittee is 

concerned with, you have a mission. And you have certain things 

that have to be done to accomplish that mission. You then identify 

which ones of those activities are core and which ones are non-core. 

You then determine what type of skills and knowledge are necessary in order to achieve those functions. If they are non-core, 

then you are probably going to go to the private sector as a first 

resort. But if the concern is the core or something that is close to 

core, what kind of skills and knowledge are necessary? Is it a recurring need? In that circumstance, you need to make sure that 

you have civilians doing it as long as—or the military, depending 

on the circumstance—as long as our policies are adequate to be 

able to attract and retain enough people. I don’t think that has 

been done. 

You know, it is understandable, if you have an Iraq or a Katrina, 

that you may have a temporary need and you may have to surge 

up for a temporary period of time. On the other hand, I don’t think 

that we have done enough planning with regard to the basic recurring need. And as a result, in some circumstances people have defaulted to using the military to the extent that they can—of course, 

the size of the force has been contracted considerably in the last 

10 to 20 years. And in some cases, they have used contractors, because you can order the military and you can get a contract done 

fairly quickly, a lot quicker than you can hire people in the Federal 

Government. 

REDUCTION IN ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Mr. HOBSON. Well, this morning we heard that they didn’t have 

enough people to contract out. As we cut back in the military, one 

of the places they figured out they would cut back was in acquisition. I assume you would agree with that? 

Mr. WALKER. Yes. We have noted that there has been a significant reduction in the acquisitions workforce. I think you have to 

look at two issues there. Not just how many people but what kind 

of skills and knowledge did those people have? Do they have the 

right kind of skills and knowledge to deal with the current and prospective type of contracting we are going to be doing, rather than 

what we may have been doing 10 or 20 years ago. What we are 

contracting for is a lot different now. There are a lot more services 

arrangements than in the past. 


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MANAGEMENT OF CONTRACTING OFFICERS

Mr. MURTHA. Let me say the impression I got this morning. The 

Air Force hires contract officers, and they keep them in that line 

their whole career. The Army, on the other hand, puts officers in 

contracting for a while, then they go into the line, they go into different jobs, and then they come back to be contract officers. 

Now, we learned this morning that 67 percent of the contract officers in Iraq are Air Force. And the balance is the Army. And yet 

the Army is the executive director or agency for contractors. Now, 

it makes no sense to me that if the policy is we go to contracting 

in order to take care of a temporary situation, and yet when the 

temporary situation comes up, we don’t have enough people to 

oversee what is necessary. Now, General Thompson this morning 

admitted that they were slow in responding to these problems. But 

the point is that was what it was all about. 

Now my concern is, it costs—at least in my estimation—it costs 

more to hire civilians than it does to do the work in-house. I mean, 

that is—— 

Mr. WALKER. You mean the contractors. It costs more to hire 

contractors. 

COST OF CONTRACTORS

Mr. MURTHA. Right. I’m sorry. It costs more to hire contractors 

rather than civilian employees. And those civilian employees are 

dedicated, and, as you say, to do the core thing. But if you look at 

the circular from OMB, it says the policy of the Federal Government has been to rely on private sector for needed commercial services. Now, you can interpret that any way you want to. And I think 

that is part of the problem. I think they just—whether it is easier, 

don’t know. You have got people who retire from the service and 

then they go to work as a contractor. They get retirement pay in 

many cases and yet they are contractors. And it costs us more, usually, to hire contractors. 

We heard last year that the Budget Office was going to hire contractors to prepare a budget for us. I mean, they weren’t going to 

do it themselves. They were going to hire a contractor to prepare 

a budget. That is the Defense Department. 

Mr. WALKER. I would call that core myself. 

Mr. MURTHA. I would call that core. 

FUNDING FOR FEDERAL CONTRACTING OFFICERS

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, one last comment on that. I felt a 

reluctance by him this morning, and I just wanted the rest of the 

Committee to hear it, as to whether he has asked for enough 

money or if he is getting pushback from OMB on asking for the 

right number to fix this. And I don’t know whether this is the right 

forum to discuss that or not. But this is something that you might 

be helpful in in helping the administration or others to come to the 

right number. Because I got the impression that there is some— 

we find this all the time at OMB. But there seems to be—I sensed 

the hesitancy for him to give us a number where he felt comfortable that he was going to be able to hire the right number of 

people. 


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Mr. MURTHA. I think what Mr. Hobson is saying is true. Here is 

the thing. Mr. Moran said this morning the authorizing committee 

cut back. Well, they are quick to say we are going to veto a bill 

if the administration is not happy with it. So the authorizing committee would not have done that without the administration being 

satisfied with what they were doing; in other words, cutting back 

the number of acquisition people. It shows you how complicated 

this business is when we couldn’t find people. And now they are 

saying, okay, we are going to hire x number of civilian employees 

and we are going to hire x number of contractors. The contractors 

are double what they are going to hire in civilian employees, which 

is much more expensive during this period of time. 

So we need some work here. We need some advice about how we 

handle this so that the fraud and abuse that we see, the cash that 

was flowing over there, as Bill Young said this morning, that we 

stop that and we have better oversight over these things before it 

is too late. 

One of the minor things I talked about today is the surge 

money—or CERF money we give to the commanders. Now they say 

they have been auditing that. They say it is no problem. Let me 

tell you something. If there is cash flowing around, there could be 

a problem. So I suggest to them now to watch that very carefully. 

DECISION TO CONTRACT FOR SERVICES

Mr. WALKER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I come back to something I 

touched on before. First, what is the Department doing with regard 

to making the determination of when is it appropriate to use military versus civilian versus contractor personnel for ongoing recurring types of functions and activities, excluding contingency operations? 

Secondly, what plans are they making to be able to be in a position to respond in a more timely and effective manner when a contingency operation occurs, which they will from time to time, of different types? 

And then thirdly, recognizing that, if there is a temporary need, 

and it truly is temporary, it doesn’t necessarily make sense to hire 

or to use civilian personnel if it is truly temporary. 

On the other hand, we ought to be figuring out ways in which 

where the answer is we really ought to be using civilian personnel 

rather than contractors, we ought to be figuring out ways that we 

can end up doing it a lot quicker than we can right now, because 

I can tell you that there is little question in my mind that one of 

the reasons that military is used on occasion and contractors are 

used on occasion is because you can get it done quicker. And not 

necessarily better and not necessarily more cost-effective. It is 

quicker. 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, we would like you to give us some advice as 

we go through the legislative process about what guidance we can 

give to the various departments of the Army or services. 

LOGISTICS HEALTH INC. CONTRACT

Mr. WALKER. We will be happy to, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks. 


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Mr. DICKS. One of the concerns that we have had up here, and 

I know you have gotten into this. I believe the GAO is reviewing 

the Logistics Health Inc. contract. Are you involved in that one? 

Mr. WALKER. My understanding is we have a bid protest on that. 

I apologize, Mr. Dicks—we have dismissed it because the company 

that protested it was a subcontractor to—— 

Ms. COFFEY. Yes. Logistics Health was the contract subcontractor to the company that protested. 

Mr. WALKER. Okay. Logistics Health was the subcontractor to 

the company that protested. 

Ms. COFFEY. So it was dismissed. 

Mr. WALKER. So there wasn’t a third party involved to protest. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. We were told that on September 25, Logistics 

Health was awarded an $800 million contract despite the fact that 

at least one other company bid $100 million less. The award of the 

contract has been put on hold and pending—I guess it isn’t on hold. 

Dina Rasor, the author of Betraying Our Troops, talked about 

the destructive results of privatizing war, said it was likely—Dr. 

Winkenwerder was at the DOD and he left in June of 2007 to go 

to work with this Logistics Health Inc. And on June 30, DOD 

began accepting bids for a contract to give soldiers medical and 

dental exams before being deployed. Before leaving DOD, Dr. 

Winkenwerder had been in charge of the office that wrote the contract. 

So does anybody look into these kind of things? Or does the DOD 

IG have to look into this? 

Mr. WALKER. They would be on the first line of response to something like this. As you know—— 

Mr. DICKS. They don’t have a 1-year rule I take it, like we do? 

Mr. WALKER. A cooling-off period? Yes, there are cooling-off periods applicable to certain executive branch—— 

Mr. DICKS. So the question would be whether he was actually involved or not. 

Mr. WALKER. Whether he was directly and substantially involved 

is probably what the test is. 

Mr. MURTHA. I will tell you, if a Member of Congress were involved, it wouldn’t make any difference whether he was involved or 

not. The perception would have been and the perception is that he 

had something to do with it. That is part of the problem. I don’t— 

listen, I don’t want to stop anybody from making money. But when 

a sole-source contract is given, it makes it look to all of us like 

there is somewhat of a problem. But where are we with the contract, do you know? 

Mr. WALKER. No, I don’t, Mr. Chairman. I will try to find out 

something for the record. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—A response was not provided.] 

Mr. WALKER. Let me just say, Mr. Dicks, that I have said quite 

frequently that the law represents the floor of acceptable behavior. 

You definitely don’t want to violate the law. But there are moral, 

ethical, and other standards that rise above the law. And sometimes, one shouldn’t do something, even though it is not illegal. 

Mr. DICKS. Yeah. Well, again, I know Winkenwerder and I have 

met with him several times. I would be surprised, honestly, if he 


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would do anything that would be—that would not have been acceptable under the current rules. 

Mr. MURTHA. The point, Mr. Dicks, is that was an $800 million 

contract? 

Mr. DICKS. $800 million contract. 

Mr. MURTHA. And it is a sole-source contract. That is the thing 

that worries this Committee when we hear so much about competition with small contracts. 

Mr. DICKS. It says here—I don’t know if this is in the background from the staff—on September 25 Logistics Health was 

awarded the $800 million contract despite the fact that at least one 

other company bid $100 million less. So I think there is a question 

whether—if the awarding of the contract has been put on hold 

pending GAO review. 

Mr. WALKER. That was previous, prior to the dismissal. 

Mr. DICKS. Does this happen quite often where somebody that 

doesn’t bid—I am not always for giving contracts to the lowest bidders, because we have seen over and over again in the defense industry where people bid low, then they get the contract and then 

the prices escalate. I mean, I have seen some go up two or three 

times over what they bid. So I hope that somebody looks at—— 

I am thinking more of TRW and Lockheed, if you want to know 

the truth. You have your examples, I have mine, okay? 

CONFLICT OF INTEREST RULES

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Dicks, I think it would be of interest to you 

and the other members of the subcommittee that we have two engagements under way right now that we plan to issue in March 

and April, respectively, that deal somewhat with this issue. The 

first has to do with conflicts of interest, which we are doing work 

for the Senate Armed Services Committee to provide more information on the conflict rules that exist within the Department of Defense and those that apply to the contractors, and the differences 

between those two. 

REVOLVING DOOR

And then, secondly, we are doing some work, as required by statute, on the revolving door issues. And, to what extent do you have 

people who leave the Defense Department and end up going to 

work for major contractors where you could have either real or perceived conflicts of interest along the lines of what you are referring 

to? 

The first will be issued in March and the second will be issued 

in April, and we will make sure this Committee receives copies. 

SOLE-SOURCE CONTRACTS

Mr. DICKS. This morning we were also talking about sole-source 

contracts. And how do you view that? I mean in what situations 

are these justified? And when should there be competition? 

Mr. WALKER. Typically the circumstance in which you would expect to see a sole-source contract is where you have a critical need 

that is very time-sensitive, in which there is prior experience that 

can help inform that decision. Sometimes what will happen is you 


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might end up having to issue a sole-source contract when all of 

those criteria are met, but you then may want to compete it, you 

know, shortly thereafter. So, in other words, you might give it solesource—— 

Mr. DICKS. You don’t give it to them forever. 

Mr. WALKER. You don’t give it to them forever. You might do it 

initially. That happened in Iraq. There were circumstances where 

there were initially sole-source contracts that were granted. But it 

wasn’t forever. And then they were recompeted after a period of 

time. One of the things you have to be careful of is you don’t end 

up issuing sole-source contracts in circumstances where, if you had 

done planning that I mentioned before—like in the case of Katrina. 

If there are certain contingency operations that apply, if you know 

you are going to need certain services and capabilities at that time, 

then one of the things that I think the government needs to be 

doing more of is to anticipate that, to have a competitive process 

where you enter into a process whereby the government can issue 

task orders and draw down on that contract when that contingency 

occurs. We should be doing that to a greater extent than we are 

now. And that is something that we have noted not just with regard to the Defense Department but also with regard to the Department of Homeland Security in relation to the Katrina contingency. 

CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING

Mr. DICKS. So in other words, you could even stockpile; there are 

some situations where we have done this in the Defense Department. You have prepositioned ships. You could have prepositioned 

reserves of things that you know you are going to need around the 

country. I think we are doing that now, I believe. 

Mr. WALKER. Well, there are two issues, Mr. Dicks. I am saying 

two things. One, you are correct, we have ‘‘prepo’’ for military and 

for nonmilitary purposes, if you will. I am talking about something 

different from that. I am talking about where you don’t necessarily 

want to buy a lot of things and store it, because that costs money. 

Mr. DICKS. Right. 

Mr. WALKER. In some cases, Some things have a longer shelf life 

than others things. But what I am talking about is in addition to 

‘‘prepo’’ in appropriate circumstances, to enter into competitive bidding arrangements. Conduct competitive bids so that people can 

bid on certain types of products and services that we know we will 

need if a contingency happens. Therefore, you don’t actually buy it. 

Mr. DICKS. Give us an example. 

Mr. WALKER. Okay. Let me give you an example. Remember how 

we bought all these trailers of which we didn’t use many? Since we 

know that hurricanes happen, floods happen, tornadoes happen, et 

cetera, it might be nice if we thought about entering into a competitive bid arrangement among all the different potential providers that could provide trailers and have them bid against each 

other such that we have the right to buy trailers at a pre-stated 

price, if and when that contingency occurs. What happens is if you 

have a contingency occur, then you have a critical need, you may 

not have time to do competitive bidding. Since the contractor then 

knows you have a critical need, they don’t have a great incentive 


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to negotiate a great price in that circumstance. So we need to recognize that reality and think about employing some planning and 

contingency contracting-type approaches that historically we 

haven’t. 

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Mr. DICKS. In your judgment, did they cut back the acquisition 

force too far? And are they right now to put more people back into 

this? 

Mr. WALKER. What we have said is that we believe that the acquisition workforce is going to need more people with different 

skills and knowledge. We have not rendered a judgment on how 

many that might be. We have expressed concern. 

Mr. DICKS. And they have got this new plan. 

Mr. WALKER. We are looking at that plan at the present point 

in time, Mr. Dicks. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

ARMY CONTRACTING COMMAND

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Good afternoon. You said in your concluding remarks we must elevate the acquisition function within 

the Department. So you are not familiar with the Gansler Commission, obviously. 

Mr. WALKER. I am. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You are intimately familiar with their goals 

and objectives? I assume you are familiar with their recommendations. 

Mr. WALKER. I am somewhat familiar with the Gansler Commission, and I know that there have been steps that have been taken 

since 2006 in order to try to deal with some of the issues that we 

have raised and the subcommittee has been concerned about. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I sort of wondered, you know, we had some 

testimony from General Thompson this morning. They are sort of 

moving ahead with these contracting brigades which have, you 

know, a military top leadership, and then underneath is positions 

that are occupied by, you know, I won’t say people of your ilk, but 

people who are extremely knowledgeable about accounting and—— 

Mr. WALKER. Financial matters, contracting matters. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Things of that nature. But you actually 

haven’t had a chance to sort of review that, where they are going 

with this new structure here? 

Mr. WALKER. I haven’t had a chance to review it personally. No, 

I have not. My staff has had a chance to look at some of it. My 

understanding from the Gansler Commission is they talked about 

four things that need to be done: to increase the stature quality 

and career development of military and civilian contracting personnel, especially for expeditionary operations; to restructure the 

organization and restore responsibility, facilitate contracting and 

contract management in expeditionary and CONUS operations; to 

provide training and tools for overall contract activities and expeditionary operations; and to obtain legislative, regulatory, and policy 

assistance to enable contracting effectiveness in expeditionary operations. 


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As you know, sir, we have noted ourselves that in the training 

area, the Army really is lacking there; whereas the Air Force, 

which takes a more professional approach and has people really 

dedicated to this MOS and therefore spends a lot more time on 

training, tends to have a lot better results in this area. 

CONDUCT OF STUDIES IN THE COMBAT THEATER

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It is interesting that the Air Force has 

more people, while the Army, as we have discussed this morning, 

is really responsible for bringing everybody to the combat theaters, 

you know, is really responsible for much of the logistics footprint 

and basically the administration. 

I sort of would like to get your view of how you actually conduct 

your GAO studies in the combat theater. I know over the years we 

have been privileged to have your remarks. They are usually pretty 

much on target. How do you actually conduct your studies in the 

combat theater to arrive at the conclusions you have reached? 

Mr. WALKER. Well, first, I think it is important to keep in mind 

that we are one of many players —— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You are there with sort of the regular IG, 

and then you have got sort of another IG that we SIGig set up, 

SIGIR, and then you have got CID. There are quite a lot of 

operatives. And where do you come off in the overall scheme of 

things? 

Mr. WALKER. As you know, there is a Special Inspector General 

for Iraq. The DOD IG, the State IG, the USAID IG, lots of people 

on the field. The IGs and the Special Inspector General, including 

the Special Inspector General for Iraq, have more people in theater, 

on the ground on a recurring basis than we do. We just deployed 

three people to stay there for a full-time basis for up to 3 months, 

and we will rotate teams in and out, and then we project teams to 

go in to do audit work, as necessary, typically for a period of several weeks in order to be able to do our work. 

Most of the frontline contracting audit work, is being done by either SIGIR or by an inspector general. We do, however, do supplemental work that takes a broader look and doesn’t drill down as 

deep on individual contracts. That is what they are doing, but 

where we look more from the standpoint of the overall process and 

how it has been approached by the respective departments and 

agencies from a planning and execution standpoint overall, rather 

than drilling down on individual contracts. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Do you do surveys of soldiers? Do you do 

surveys of DOD people in the field? I mean, I sort of—you know, 

I just sort of wonder how you, you know, how you gather your data 

and—— 

Mr. WALKER. With regard to acquisitions and contracting, is that 

what you are saying? 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Yes. I know you reached some fairly 

weighty conclusions, and actually in the public’s mind the most 

egregious problems relating to contracting generally, people can 

complain about sole-source contracts. But in a contingency emergency situation, as you have emphasized, you have got to act pretty 

damn quickly. 

Mr. WALKER. Correct. 


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Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Even though we may have problems with 

these independent operators who were providing security, if they 

weren’t providing security—and God only knows some of them, I 

am sure, have crossed the line—probably a much larger contingent 

of soldiers would be required to provide that degree of security. So 

I just wondered who you have been talking to. 

Mr. WALKER. We have talked to people in theater, on the ground. 

I don’t believe we have conducted surveys per se. But we do talk 

to people in theater, on the ground, with responsibility in this area. 

And let me note—I think one of the biggest challenges is not just 

that not enough work was done in anticipation of the needs, but 

also in many cases the government has not been as specific as it 

should be in defining what its requirements are. One example of 

that would be the LOGCAP arrangement where you are contracting for a range of food and other support services for our 

troops. One of the things that one has to do is to try to define what 

the requirements are. What are you actually looking to get? And 

in the absence of doing that, then you are ceding certain authorities to the contractor to do it for you. And in that circumstance, 

there obviously can be additional costs incurred that may or may 

not make sense. 

But you are correct in also saying that sometimes we have to go 

to contractors because we don’t have enough force. We don’t have 

enough military to be able to do the job, and a job needs to be done. 

Therefore, what are your alternatives? And that is an example of 

where you may have to default to contractors, because you don’t 

have other viable options. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, the arguments around this table— 

and I don’t want to mischaracterize them—is why are we going to 

contracts, contractors, when in some cases many of those contractors—and it depends on what they are doing—are former military? 

And you know, compared to the soldier who has his or her life on 

the line, they are earning about six times more for that particular 

responsibility 

Mr. WALKER. I understand. And you see that in Iraq. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

MRAP CONTRACT

Mr. MURTHA. Have you evaluated the MRAP contract at all? 

Mr. WALKER. We are looking at it at the present point in time, 

Mr. Chairman, but we haven’t reported on it. 

Mr. MURTHA. I would be very interested because here was a priority contract that seemed to be handled very well. And it is the 

biggest contract, I think, we ever dealt with, $21 billion, at one 

time. So I would be very interested when you get done to evaluate 

that and let us know what you think. It was very competitive, a 

lot of people involved with it. My advice to a lot of companies was 

don’t get involved, because it is not going to last very long. But the 

point was, we had enough contractors to get involved that they 

seemed to have done a pretty good job. Mr. Moran. 

Mr. MORAN. That is interesting. I was at an awards ceremony for 

businesses in Northern Virginia. It turns out every single one of 

them was a government contractor. These were the businesses that 

had done the best over the last year. That is why I was late for 


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the hearing, actually. There were more than 100 of them that had 

done so well. One of them had just gotten a contract for $12.5 billion for MRAP. 

Mr. MURTHA. One just got a contract for $12.5 billion? 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am in the wrong place. 

Mr. MORAN. I had never met the guy. He had worked for 

DARPA. And you know, he had worked on that type of technology. 

And then he had somebody else that worked in another part of the 

government. They seemed to know what they were doing. But enormous contract. And it has come down to give him this Ideal Innovation Concepts or something. And BAE, British Aerospace Systems, 

is the other that is going to develop a phase 2 of MRAP. 

But the most striking thing about this, these government contractors, was that I—and it is not necessarily the case with the one 

I am talking about—but I talked to a great many of them. I was 

there for almost 3 hours. And invariably they were working on contracts to provide goods and services that they had previously been 

involved in when they were part of DOD. In other words, they 

knew the personnel at the Pentagon. They had been involved themselves, and they simply decided that it is time to, you know, make 

some money. We will set up a company. We know the folks that 

we are going to be dealing with. So they had an inside track. 

It doesn’t mean it wasn’t competitive. It didn’t mean it was the 

best product and service. But they did know exactly what their 

buddies were looking for. And now, again, it is not this group that 

I am referring to. But I talk to a lot of folks that—kind of neighbors in Northern Virginia who work for the Federal Government. 

And they tell you that over the last several years, there has been 

a real antipathy towards working for the—or toward Federal employees on the part of a lot of the political appointees in the Federal Government. And the idea is that we are going to reform the 

government by privatizing it. And so there is clearly a bias on the 

part—but I am saying particularly political appointees—a bias to 

contract out whatever can be, to really turn as much of the Federal 

Government over to the private sector. And I think we are seeing 

a lot of this because some of it just doesn’t make sense. 

For example, the cost estimated. You would think cost estimating 

of a contract is inherently governmental. I mean, if it is not, then 

you put the fox in the chicken coop. And yet you have done a report 

that showed us that 64 percent of space acquisition, for example— 

let me see, I have got the actual numbers, and you did a report on 

it. But 64 percent of the people who were doing the cost estimating 

were contractors. 

CONTRACTOR COST ESTIMATING PERSONNEL

Now, when you think about it, why should contractors be determining what the appropriate cost for a contract is? And yet we 

have contracted out the cost estimating function. 

Here it is. The GAO report on DOD Space Acquisition noted that 

at 11 of the offices in the Pentagon, contractors accounted for 64 

percent of cost-estimating personnel. That is one of your findings. 

Now, obviously, I am not being critical of you for finding it out. But 

it is kind of mind-boggling that—and in your report you said that 

they downsized the number of Federal civilian employees who were 


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performing the cost estimating function, and then contracted out 

for those same cost-estimating services. 

One of your colleagues is nodding their head. This is the stuff we 

are trying to get at. I mean, that is inherently governmental. 

CONTRACT OVERSIGHT

Another inherently governmental function that GAO has been 

very much involved in is contractor oversight. Of all the things that 

are inherently governmental, is the oversight of the contracts. And 

yet we are contracting with contractors to oversee other contractors. And then doing reports. 

Now I would like to ask you, I have several questions. Let me 

just break in at this point. Within DOD, are there private contractors performing contract management, the management of private 

contracts or oversight over those contractors? 

Mr. WALKER. There are. And also on the other issue, Mr. Moran, 

you talked about cost estimation. There are portions of the Defense 

Department that view that as inherently governmental and they 

don’t contract it out. You talk about one example where they didn’t 

view it as inherently governmental and they have contracted it out. 

So there are even differences of opinion within a particular government department. 

COST ESTIMATION

Mr. MORAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, just kind of an aside. 

There may be some of these functions that we may want to say, 

look, this is inherently governmental. You don’t contract this out. 

You don’t contract out the estimation of the cost of contracting this 

out and you don’t contract out the oversight of the contract. Otherwise—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me ask you, Mr. Walker, what do you think 

about that? 

Mr. WALKER. First, I think ultimately the responsibility for cost 

estimation needs to be the government’s responsibility. The question is whether or not you might have to contract for—— 

Mr. MURTHA. As a core responsibility? 

Mr. WALKER. I think the ultimate responsibility and accountability, I would say, is core. The question is, in certain unique circumstances, might you need to have some additional skills and 

knowledge to help in that process, to provide input to that process, 

but not to be responsible for it and not to it make the final decision? So in other words, you may have most of the people being 

government employees. You may occasionally have to hire somebody with a high degree of expertise in a particular area that you 

don’t have enough expertise internally in some cases, because you 

can’t pay them enough money to be able to keep it internally. And 

we do that at GAO. 

We have certain circumstances where we have to hire some outside specific expertise because we can’t hire them in the government. But the function itself, I think, is core. Most of the duties 

and responsibilities ought to be done by a government worker, absent the ability to hire people with those types of skills and knowledge. But if you are going to use a contractor there, they should 


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not make the judgments. They should be providing input, and ultimate judgments should be made by a civil servant. 

Mr. MORAN. I agree with you. But in your civil service report, 

you noted DOD fired the cost estimators, let them go, and then 

contracted out. You can always say, well, we didn’t have cost estimators. But if the reason is is because you let them go, I mean, 

that doesn’t hold a lot—— 

Mr. WALKER. I understand what you are saying. 

Mr. MORAN. This Committee, time and time again, has asked the 

simple question, how many contractors are there in Iraq? And after 

about 3 years, DOD set up this synchronized predeployment and 

operational tracker system, SPOT. And it is supposed to tell us 

how many contractors and subcontractors there actually are. It is 

supposed to track them. Is it doing that? Is it actually working? 

Mr. WALKER. We cannot attest to the reliability, because of financial management and other records problems at the Defense 

Department. But my understanding is, their latest estimate is 

129,000. 

Mr. MORAN. Okay. We were told 133,000 today. But that is close 

enough for government work. 

Mr. WALKER. Well I wouldn’t want to use that saying. 

Mr. MORAN. That is the result of the SPOT system. 

Mr. WALKER. That is my understanding. 

Mr. MORAN. 100,000 because of SPOT. We now figure it is 

129,000 or 133,000. 

Mr. WALKER. Around 130,000. Correct. 

Mr. DICKS. Is it 129,000 individuals? Or 129,000—— 

Mr. WALKER. Individuals. Correct. 

Mr. MORAN. The point we have been making, there are almost 

as many contractors there as military. I mean, who is fighting the 

war? 

Mr. DICKS. Maybe we will have a surge of contracts. 

CONTRACTING FOR SERVICES

Mr. MURTHA. Let me remind members, this all started with 

Gore’s initiative. Gore believed—and this is in the Clinton administration. Well, but I am just telling you this is where it started. I 

think we have gone too far. I think we have gotten to the point 

where we have to draw back. And, I don’t know how far along we 

were before this administration. But I see evidence that we are 

spending more money for contractors than we should be, because 

it is not balanced. 

Now, whether it is easy to hire them, whether it is poor planning, I don’t know what it is. But I certainly see evidence that we 

need to—we need advice from you as you go through your studies 

so that we can make recommendations and the subcommittee can 

look at it and say, okay, we need to look at this contract. We need 

to give direction to the agency. 

For instance, the Army said, we are actually studying whether 

we should have the executive agency in Iraq be the Air Force because they have 67 percent of the people are Air Force people, and 

they have more experts in the field. But that is the kind of stuff 

we need advice on because this is a big area, and I think we need 

to turn it around a little bit. 


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Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, as you know, I believe it was President Eisenhower who, might have preferred to be called ‘‘General,’’ 

as General Washington did, who first had the concept that the government should not be competing with the private sector in circumstances where it does not involve an inherently governmental 

or core activity. 

But what has happened over the years is, different departments 

and agencies have approached that differently, some in circumstances where there were contingency operations and they had 

to do certain things because of the circumstances. In others, they 

just have not done enough planning and proper execution even for 

ongoing activities. 

Mr. MURTHA. We do not argue with that. What I argue with is 

the planning process itself. They have not planned ahead in case 

something like this happened, whether it is Katrina or the war in 

Iraq. That is the problem we face. 

Mr. WALKER. We are in agreement, Mr. Chairman. There are two 

categories, one, what are we doing—steady state normal functions 

and activities for the Federal Government? Secondly, what are we 

doing for contingency operations? I think both are important, and 

we need to do both. 

COST OF CONTRACT EMPLOYEES

Mr. MORAN. It is not good management practice to have a civilian employee, a Federal employee, doing exactly the same job as 

a contract employee standing right side by side or sitting side by 

side with the exact same responsibilities, where the contract person 

is making two or three times the amount of the civilian employee. 

And the response is for the civilian Federal employee to simply go 

into the private sector and make the money. But you cannot manage a government that way; it is wrong. And we are finding more— 

I know of any number of examples. 

Incidentally, Mr. Frelinghuysen, the 133,000 is DOD contract 

personnel. It is not the foreign folks that—and it is not the other 

agencies. That is 133,000 DOD contract personnel. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Why do we not get that other figure? Do we 

have the other figures? 

Mr. WALKER. Their system does not have the other figure. I will 

check and see if there is anything else available. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—a response was not provided.] 

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION CONTRACTING SUPPORT

Mr. MORAN. Just one last question; and if the Chairman asked 

it sufficiently, then you do not need to go into it. But GSA, we tried 

to get GSA to pick up the contractor slack, and they said they could 

not do it, they did not—because they did not want to do it. They 

did not want to go to Iraq and all that kind of stuff. 

But you mentioned that there is opportunity for one agency to 

borrow from another agency when it has a shortage of skills. In 

your opinion, could GSA meet some of this need? 

Mr. WALKER. It is possible. We have not explored that directly, 

I do not believe. 

That is correct; we have not explored that directly. But I think 

that one of the things that we need to keep in mind is, as we look 


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at performing the functions of government, we have mission activities that are program related—and we have functional activities 

that are horizontal. Acquisitions and contracting, human capital, financial management, those are issues that are horizontal; they go 

throughout all of government. 

To the extent that we recognize that reality, when we face a need 

in one part of government, especially if it is a temporary need, one 

of the things we ought to be looking at is to what extent can we 

draw on other parts of government in order to meet that temporary 

need. 

Again, that is in a temporary circumstance. You cannot sustain 

that over the long term. But that is an example of contingency 

planning that needs to be pursued. 

Mr. MORAN. So you are agreeing, it was not unreasonable for us 

to look to GSA to see if they could not meet that contractor gap? 

Mr. WALKER. No. That is not unreasonable. 

Mr. MORAN. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Any time Mr. Frelinghuysen has any questions, 

just let me know, because you are outnumbered by the guys on our 

side. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I do not feel outnumbered. 

Mr. DICKS. We are all on the same team. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Since he brought up Eisenhower and you 

brought up Gore, I think we are even. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Cramer. 

COST OF CONTRACTING FOR SERVICES

Mr. CRAMER. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And this is a 

very valuable hearing for us. I want to, hopefully, just play off of 

what has been brought up already. 

I am curious and challenged by how we all perform oversight of 

contracting out: How you do it, what you do with what you do, and 

then how we find out what we want to find out. I come from a community that has a long contractor history with DOD, NASA, on the 

intel side as well. But with my committee assignments both here 

and on the Intelligence Committee, it is hard for me to get a 

straight answer from our agencies, especially intel agencies—NSA, 

CIA, and now even DIA—much less on the DOD side of the roster 

as to how much are we spending on contractors. 

And while the number of contractors is a challenge to get to 

know, also the amount of money that we are spending on those and 

how those cycles work. I would be interested in knowing that, too. 

But I would assume that one of the first—if not the first priority, 

one of the priorities for contracting out is cost savings or that—in 

that a particular set of personnel may be so temporarily used that 

you are motivated to look to contractors to provide those, mainly 

so that you will eventually save money. 

How much scrutiny of that are you giving toward a bottom line 

as to how much we had expected to save versus what we are saving? Because I think we are finding out the hard way that we are 

really not saving money. 

Mr. WALKER. Right. 


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Several things: First, there is not enough oversight going on with 

regard to contracting in the Intelligence Community. We can talk 

about that separate issue, and more needs to be done there. 

Secondly, some contracting is intended to save money. No question about that. And one of the things that we are doing right now 

is, we have some work under way right now that we will be issuing 

within the next several months to test that assumption in connection with certain types of contracting activities involving the 

Army’s contract agencies, Contracting Center for Excellence, and 

our preliminary findings are that they are not resulting in savings. 

So again, I think it really depends upon the facts and circumstances. And I will give you an example. In the Federal Government, my personal experience, having spent 21 years in the private sector and now about 16 in the Federal Government, is that 

there are certain functions and activities where you actually can 

make more money over time in the Federal Government than you 

can in the private sector because of the way the Federal Government ends up grading jobs and how it ends up paying its people. 

So there are certain support functions, noninherently governmental functions, in which the private sector found many years ago 

it is better to contract those out to achieve economies of scale, to 

leverage technology; and in many cases the government has not 

done that and should consider doing that, and it can result in savings. 

That is very different, though, than when you are talking about 

highly skilled and knowledgeable needs—scientific, technical, whatever else—where because of those same classification and compensation systems you just cannot hire the kind of people you want 

to hire for the money that you are willing to pay. 

And so, you know, it is individual facts and circumstances. You 

cannot expect, in some situations to save money. In some situations 

you should not expect to save money, because you need specialized 

skills and knowledge, and you are going to have to pay what it 

takes to get it. 

Mr. CRAMER. Well, as you review the functions and activities 

that should be contracted out, and as you look at what has been 

done, surely you can draw conclusions about certain activities that 

no longer make any sense to contract out, that they are and should 

be more inherently governmental operations. 

Mr. WALKER. Yes. And I think that is something—we can help 

provide some additional guidance, and we can provide some information to this Committee that might help you in your legislative 

process, especially in circumstances where we see differences between definitions of inherently governmental in different parts of 

government or within the same department, and especially in circumstances where we have seen, based upon our audit work, where 

there has been waste or abuse that has occurred as a result of engaging in certain types of contracting activities. 

Mr. CRAMER. Well, DOD’s obligations on service contracts rose from $92 billion from 1996 to $183 billion in the year 2006. Does 

that make sense to you? Service contracts. 

Mr. WALKER. No. I understand service contracts are the fastest 

growing type of contract; I would expect them to go up. But that 

is a very dramatic increase. In some cases, we have talked about 


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circumstances in which they have gone up, where you have people 

go from being, a military person or civilian person, and gone on the 

other side of the street to be a contractor doing essentially the 

same thing and making more money. That does not make sense in 

my opinion. 

Another concern that I have is we do not always enter into appropriate service contracting arrangements to be able to nail down 

what we expect to get to have an appropriate sharing of the risk 

and reward between the government and the contractors, and we 

do not have an adequate amount of oversight with regard to a 

number of those contracting arrangements. 

So those would be several factors that we are concerned about in 

services, especially given their tremendous growth. 

Mr. CRAMER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks. 

LOGCAP CONTRACT. 

Mr. DICKS. Early in our involvement in Iraq, contractor-provided 

services were delivered under the LOGCAP contract, a contingency 

support arrangement. How long was the LOGCAP contract used 

before a competition was held for contractor support as the U.S. involvement in Iraq continued over multiple years? 

Mr. WALKER. It has always been competed. 

Mr. DICKS. From the start? 

Mr. WALKER. LOGCAP has always been competed. 

Mr. DICKS. There was never any time when it was sole sourced? 

Mr. WALKER. That is my understanding. 

Mr. DICKS. Was it done before the war in Iraq started? 

Mr. WALKER. Yes, it was, 2001. 

Mr. DICKS. So, it was. 

Is a LOGCAP or other contingency contract device necessary, and 

what would be the preferred practice for transitioning to regular 

order contracting procedures? 

You are saying that they followed the regular order here. Is that 

right? Are they necessary? 

Mr. WALKER. In the case of LOGCAP. 

But there are other circumstances in which there were needs 

that arose because of a contingency operation that they had not already engaged in a competitively bid contract. 

As you know, LOGCAP is for forces that are stationed in various 

parts of the world. I mean, we still have people in Bosnia, we have 

people in Germany, we have people in other parts of the world. 

Mr. DICKS. Korea. 

Mr. WALKER. And so you can take an existing contract, and it 

just happens to apply in Iraq. There are other circumstances, however, where we have new needs that resulted from a contingency 

operation; and there are some situations in which they were done 

via sole source, but may have been bid later, after the passage of 

a period of time. 

Mr. DICKS. Use of contractors in a theater of operations allows 

the release of military units for other missions or to fill support 

shortfalls. Was that done here? Was that one of the reasons why 

they were using the contractors? Because of—— 


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Mr. WALKER. You mean for LOGCAP? 

Mr. DICKS. Yeah. 

Mr. WALKER. I think the military had made the decision they 

wanted to use contractors to perform those functions and activities, 

not just in Iraq, but in other parts of the world. And so I think it 

was merely an extension of what they had already decided to do 

in other parts of the world. 

As you know, Mr. Dicks, the force structure—— 

Mr. MURTHA. This started in the Balkans. And it was a conscious 

decision by the military—— 

Mr. WALKER. Correct. 

Mr. MURTHA [continuing]. That they would provide these services. 

Mr. WALKER. In the Balkans. 

Mr. MURTHA. Yeah. 

REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICITY

Mr. WALKER. Right. And so it was taking that concept and just 

using it in Iraq, because it started there. As you know, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Dicks, we have issued reports in the past that highlighted potential problems with regard to these types of contracts 

where the government does not specify adequately what it is seeking from the contractor. We have had those problems in the Balkans, and we have had those problems in Iraq as well. 

Mr. DICKS. So you have got to be careful about the specificity, or 

you will get something you did not ask for. 

Mr. WALKER. Absolutely, Mr. Dicks. It is not just a matter of entering into a competitive bid, it is a matter of being very specific 

about what you want them to provide—in what quantities, in what 

relative time frames—because if those issues are not nailed down 

and if that discretion is left to the contractor, it can result in additional acquisitions and additional costs that may or may not make 

sense. 

Mr. MURTHA. Now, let me ask you this question. Now, we talked 

about contractors making estimates for contracts. Now, is it possible that these contractors would also set up the specifications for 

the bidding that goes on in the LOGCAP contract? 

Mr. WALKER. Well, we know for a fact that people work together, 

between the government and the private sector, to try to come up 

with the statement of work. And one of the areas that I think one 

has to be concerned about is, who makes the ultimate judgments 

on that. All right. I mean, it is one thing if you end up getting 

input, but ultimately the responsibility and accountability for making the decisions needs to rest with a civil servant. 

Mr. MURTHA. And do you feel that in this case that is happening 

in LOGCAP? 

Mr. WALKER. Division of responsibility. 

Ms. COFFEY. It has gotten better, but—originally it was a bad situation, but it has gotten better. 

Mr. MURTHA. In what time frame—— 

Mr. WALKER. Just to restate for the record, Mr. Chairman, we 

had serious concerns. We had concerns early on as to whether or 

not there was an appropriate balance. It has gotten better in the 

case of LOGCAP. 


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Mr. MURTHA. What is the time frame you are talking about, from 

the Balkans on or from the Iraq war on? 

Mr. WALKER. Yes, from the Iraq war. We are talking about the 

Iraq war, from the beginning of the Iraq war. 

Mr. MURTHA. And again, I assume that came from poor planning. 

Mr. WALKER. Inadequate planning. 

Mr. MURTHA. Inadequate planning. 

A–76 PROCESS

Mr. DICKS. Let me ask you one other thing just briefly, and then 

we will get Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

What about the A-76 process? This is, you know, something that 

has been discussed over the years on contracting out. Do you think 

it works? Is it effective? 

Mr. WALKER. My understanding is, A–76 involves—less than 5 

percent of the jobs that have been contracted out. In other words, 

there has not been a whole lot of A–76 activity in recent years. As 

you know, what A–76 is about is competitive sourcing. 

Mr. DICKS. Right. 

Mr. WALKER. It is where the jobs are currently being done by 

civil servants, and you enter into a competition as to whether or 

not they should continue to be done by civil servants or contracted 

out. It does not cover new needs. It does not cover certain types of 

issues. 

Frankly, I think one of the things the Federal Government needs 

to do—and this is based upon my experience as being chairman of 

the Commercial Activities Panel at the request of the Congress several years ago—we need to figure out mechanisms where we can 

try to achieve most efficient organizations on an ongoing basis 

without having to go through an A–76 competition. It is really 

rather ridiculous that we have a system that only tries to achieve 

most efficient organizations through forcing a competitive process—— 

Mr. DICKS. And by the way—— 

Mr. WALKER [continuing]. Which does not get used very much. 

Mr. DICKS [continuing]. I think that is what Vice President Gore 

was trying to do. 

Mr. WALKER. I agree with that. 

Mr. DICKS. Not contract out necessarily. I think what his objective was was to try to get a more efficient organization of some of 

the elements of the government, which is totally understandable. 

Mr. WALKER. Yes. We need to do that, but we need to do it in 

much broader circumstances than just in circumstances where 

somebody is competing to be able to keep their job. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. 

Mr. WALKER. Because the vast majority of government will never 

go through an A–76 competition, and because the vast majority of 

government is performing inherently governmental functions. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

LEAD SYSTEMS INTEGRATOR

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to 

explore just for a few minutes the fairly recent phenomenon, that 


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of the lead systems integrator. I think you have some comments in 

your report. I mean, this is where contractors define the weapons 

system’s architecture, and then they manage the acquisition, and 

they integrate a variety of unbelievable technology, Future Combat 

Systems, Navy’s littoral ship. 

I know the Committee had some language in our bill relative 

to—LSIs. What are your views, pro and con? 

Mr. WALKER. Well, the lead systems integrator, I think to a great 

extent it depends upon to what extent are there known technologies out there in other words, how much discretion are you, in 

effect, really giving the contractor? 

In the case of the Coast Guard and Deepwater, the contractor 

was given a great degree of discretion, the lead systems integrator, 

because they were designing capabilities that did not exist, and 

also trying to help develop technologies that did not exist. The government did not have an adequate number of people with the right 

kind of skills and knowledge to be able to effectively manage or 

oversee the contractor. 

On the other hand, when you talk about some of the things that 

are going on on the border right now with regard to helping secure 

our border, there is a lead systems integrator effort going, underway at the Department of Homeland Security, with regard to that 

initiative; and in that situation, there are a lot of technologies that 

already exist. 

For example, the Marine Corps—which, Mr. Chairman, you are 

familiar with and I am familiar with—uses some technologies in 

order to be able to keep people off places where it tests weapons 

and does live-fire exercises. 

And so I think, you know, clearly the risk goes up when you employ that approach. It goes up even more when you are, in effect, 

having the contractor have to try to be able to make judgments 

about things that do not exist, and you do not have enough people 

to be able to oversee and effectively manage what they are doing. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So you would weigh in with where the 

Committee was providing some direction? 

Mr. WALKER. That is an affirmative. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. That is probably a good idea in these quarters here. No, I mean the complexity. I mean, I support the Future 

Combat Systems, and obviously, we have been through the drill 

relative to the littoral combat ship and the two main, you know, 

the designs. 

But I mean, some of this stuff is so incredibly complex. To some 

extent you have made a case for, you know, having, you know, 

that—somebody has that body of knowledge. Who does it? If we 

cannot—no one wants to be wholly dependent on the contractor, 

but surely somebody has to have the knowledge to make sure that 

whatever we have is fully integrated and working. 

Mr. WALKER. Whatever you decide to contract out, you need to 

have an adequate number of people with the requisite skills and 

knowledge to oversee what the contractor is doing. And if you do 

not, then everybody is at risk in many different ways. And in many 

cases, the government has not done that. 

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tract out, you have to have enough people to be able to effectively 

oversee what they are doing. 

And there is two other issues here. You know, there are issues 

dealing with defining requirements. That is something the government has to decide. And we have to look at Webster’s dictionary 

more than we have as to what ‘‘requirements’’ means. ‘‘Requirements’’ does not mean ‘‘wants’’; ‘‘requirements’’ means ‘‘needs’’. And 

you have to make sure the government is defining those requirements based upon real needs, and then turning those over to the 

contractor. Because if the contractor, in effect, has the ability to define ‘‘requirements,’’ you have a problem that has occurred from 

time to time in contracting. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

COST AS A FACTOR

Mr. MURTHA. I think there is one other consideration, particularly, the gentleman mentioned the FCS. My big concern has been 

long term and the ability of us to respond to the needs because of 

the cost. 

For instance, $140 or ¥50 billion, there is no question in my 

mind it saves money long term; no question in my mind it is less 

maintenance, it is more sophisticated, more integrated. 

But I am convinced that the budget will go down, whoever is 

elected next time, the defense budget will go down. And I have said 

to the military over and over again, be very careful, make sure you 

are integrating these new systems into the equipment you are fixing up, because if you do not, we are not going to have any equipment at all that is up to the standards you want. 

So it is a combination, not of technology, but also the money that 

we have available. And we are not going to have the money available. Our fleet of aircraft have gone from 8 years old when I came 

out of Vietnam to 24. Just on and on with the F–15s, a big percentage of them were grounded and so forth because of the age; the 

ships, we are never going to get to 313. 

So cost is such an important factor in this. I think you folks help 

us integrate that in. But one little thing that you mentioned, you 

have one half of 1 percent leeway in hiring temporary people. 

Would that help if we got that changed by talking to the authorizing committee or doing it ourselves? What would you recommend—— 

Mr. WALKER. Well, Mr. Chairman, my point is, I think it is okay 

for us, what I am suggesting, and we use it. 

Mr. MURTHA. Yeah. 

Mr. WALKER. What I am suggesting is, that is a concept that I 

think makes sense across government. It makes sense, for example—— 

Mr. MURTHA. What concept? 

Mr. WALKER. The concept of giving the agency head the ability 

to hire up to one half of 1 percent of their head count on a noncompetitive basis for up to 3 years. 

Mr. MURTHA. No. What I am asking is, do you believe it should 

be higher than that? That is what I am asking. 


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Mr. WALKER. I think it is adequate. It is adequate for us. We use 

it. 

Think what could have happened, for example, the Defense Department had that authority before Iraq. Think what could have 

happened if the Department of Homeland Security had that authority before Katrina. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Moran, do you have any questions? 

CONTRACTING CENTER KUWAIT

Mr. MORAN. Did you adequately cover, Mr. Chairman, the 

Army’s contracting center in Kuwait and all the evidences of fraud 

and criminal conduct? 

No? Well, I would like to ask a few questions about that, because 

that is one of the most extreme examples. And I am not sure that 

the solution is the best one either. 

About $4 billion in Iraq war contracts has now been shifted to 

the contracting office of the Army Sustainment Command in Illinois, so the decisions are being made in Illinois with regard to contracts in Iraq. But it is because the press reported that there are 

87 criminal investigations ongoing, and so far, 24 people have been 

charged with contract fraud. Have you looked into that? 

Mr. WALKER. We have not looked into that directly. No, we have 

not, Mr. Moran. 

Mr. MORAN. No one has asked you to? 

Mr. WALKER. To my knowledge, no. Not for fraud. Not to conduct 

a forensic audit or to look specifically for fraud there. 

Now, my question would be to what extent is one or more of the 

IGs looking into that at the present time? 

Mr. MORAN. Well, what I question—and, you know, I am not surprised there was fraud; $4 billion of contracts is a lot of money to 

be involved in this, so, you know—and I question these contracts. 

And 87 criminal investigations under anybody’s perspective is a 

whole lot of criminal investigations. 

But I question how you can oversee those contracts in Illinois. I 

mean, that is the kind of thing I would like to look at. So basically 

we have decided we cannot trust anybody down there in Kuwait or 

Iraq, so let us have the folks in Illinois. 

Now, granted, they are undoubtedly traveling to Kuwait. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me say the way I understood it: They have administrative oversight, but the people on the ground still have the 

responsibility. And the people in Rock Island, the way they portrayed it, at least I think, was that they would have adequate oversight from there because they would do the administrative work 

there. I mean, that is—and it would be better, they felt, more efficient. 

Now, I do not know—— 

Mr. WALKER. I think it depends to a great extent whether we are 

talking about contract surveillance and oversight, where you need 

to have more of a forward presence, you need to be there, versus 

contract award. If it is contract award, then you do not have as 

much of a need to be on the front line. 

On the other hand, if it is contract surveillance and oversight, 

then obviously—you have obviously more of a need to be there. 

There is a certain amount of information you can gain electroniVerDate Nov 24 2008 05:14 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046473 PO 00000 Frm 00132 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A473P2.XXX A473P2

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cally, but there is certain information you can only gain by being 

forward deployed. 

Mr. MURTHA. Does anybody remember what they said about 

that? 

Mr. MORAN. It is oversight. The word they use is ‘‘oversight.’’ 

Mr. DICKS. The DOD Inspector General is looking at possible 

criminal investigations on that. 

Mr. MURTHA. Yeah, but I think we have to go back and ask. I 

think that is a good point. 

AFFORDABILITY

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, you mentioned one thing that is 

very important, and that is the crunch is coming on the budget; 

and the Defense Department needs to do a much better job of reconciling wants, needs, affordability, and sustainability. 

They have way more in the pipeline than we can ever possibly 

buy. And one of the greatest concerns that I have is, when the 

crunch comes, we will have a lot of things that people wanted, but 

not enough of what we as a nation needed. 

Mr. MURTHA. We have been trying to address that. What we are 

trying to do is do two things. One is, rectify the shortages of equipment that we have at home, because we have no unit that can be 

deployed from home. 

Mr. WALKER. Right. 

Mr. MURTHA. The second thing, we are trying to look beyond 

Iraq, doing the things that we need to do to prevent a war or to 

sustain a deployment outside of Iraq and Iran. 

Now, we tried to start that last year with shipbuilding, and we 

are trying to buy at a rate where we get the most for our money 

at the earliest possible notion. That is why I have been so concerned about FCS, because it is such a long, you know, 4 or 5 billion a year for 10, 15 years. And they do not even deploy anything 

for, I think—what is it, 2013? 2015. 

Mr. MORAN. Future Combat Systems he is asking. 

Mr. MURTHA. So I agree with you, and I think we have—I have 

told the contractors over and over, I have told every industry group 

I talked to, I have said to them, folks, do not think this is going 

to go on because it ain’t going to go on. I have never seen it go on 

in all the years that I have studied or been here. 

So you and I have the same concerns, that it is going to come 

down dramatically, and we are going to be buying smaller quantities with a hell of a lot more money, or we are going to have to 

buy more efficiently, buying more and getting it as quickly as we 

can. 

These last 2 years I think are critical, because whoever is elected—the public wants to change direction of this country, there is 

no question in my mind about it, and it is going to happen. 

Personnel is our biggest problem, because the cost is so—you 

know, it is now 60 percent personnel. That leaves us no money for 

procurement. 

HEALTH CARE COSTS

Mr. WALKER. Well, health care costs are out of control, including 

in the Defense Department. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we for 


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the first time—I think it was 2 years ago—issued a report on the 

composition of compensation costs for the military. And it was 

shocking. I mean, we have an all-volunteer force, and it costs a lot 

of money to have an all-volunteer force. 

Mr. MURTHA. Two of us voted for the draft, so ain’t much chance 

of us getting a draft. 

No, I agree, we started in this Committee with a demonstration 

project for TRICARE; and yet when I announce this to any kind of 

a military audience, they get loud applause because—they like 

TRICARE, because it takes care of them. 

But it has gone from $10 billion, I think, to $40 billion now in 

a very short period of time. And so we are going to have to reduce 

personnel as well as buy less. At least that is the way I see it. 

Mr. WALKER. Yes. As you know, the Congress expanded eligibility for TRICARE benefits several years ago in ways that any employer who was thinking would encourage their employees who are 

members of the Guard and Reserve to get onto TRICARE. And obviously, you know, any of us as human beings would like something 

where we pay little to no of the cost. I mean, that is—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Some things—— 

Mr. WALKER. But somebody is going to pay. 

Mr. MURTHA. Some things the Congress cannot resist. It is like 

us trying to change Social Security now, when it should be 

changed. It is going to be a while before we get to it, I will tell you 

that. 

But thank you very much, Mr. Walker. We appreciate your coming, and your indulgence and your service to the country. 

Mr. WALKER. Thanks to all of you. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow:] 

MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE CONTRACT IN KUWAIT

The military services rely on contractors for a variety of logistical support functions in deployed location. Contractors at the Army’s Camp Arifjan in Kuwait refurbish and repair vehicles such as the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the HMMWV. 

However, in a report dated January 23rd, 2008, the GAO reported that supposedly 

repaired equipment often failed acceptance inspection and extensive rework was 

often required. From July 2006 to May 2007, 18 to 31 percent of equipment presented for acceptance failed government inspection. Since May of 2005 an additional 

188,000 hours or rework was required. 

Question: Administration and oversight of this contract is the responsibility of the 

Contracting Officer located at the Army Sustainment Command in Rock island, Illinois. What caused oversight to be lacking in this case? 

Answer: Inadequate oversight of this contract is the result of a fragmented chain 

of command, an insufficient number of oversight personnel, and delays in communications caused by the distance between personnel in Kuwait and the Contracting 

Officer located in Rock Island, Illinois. The following three sections describe the 

oversight process and issues we have identified. 

Oversight hampered by fragmented structure 

Numerous personnel and offices provide oversight of this contract; however, the 

Contracting Officer, who has ultimate responsibility for oversight, has not effectively 

consolidated the oversight results that have been documented. Having so many organizations involved in oversight of the contractor, along with the lack of centralized 

control over the various oversight organizations by the Contracting Officer, makes 

it difficult to monitor the overall status of the contract. The Contracting Officer, located at the Army Sustainment Command in Rock Island, has ultimate responsibility for oversight of this contract and has delegated contract administration to the 

Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) and has contracting officer’s representatives (COR) located at Army Field Support Battalion-Kuwait (AFSBn-KU). For the 


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High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) refurbishment effort under 

this contract, the ACO, with acknowledgment of the contracting officer, delegated 

contract administration to a Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) ACO. 

Day-to-day monitoring of the contractor’s performance is by on-site government personnel, including CORs and quality assurance inspectors; however, according to the 

Army, this oversight organization is not adequately staffed. 

A dual chain of command for ACOs in theatre has led to inadequate contract oversight. The Contracting Officer delegated limited oversight authority to the ACO. 

However, according to the Army, once in theatre, the ACO was under both the Contracting Officer’s and the AFSBn-KU Battalion Commander’s chain of authority. 

The ACO reports to the Contracting Officer on the contract but operationally reports 

to the Battalion Commander. It is difficult for the ACO to provide complete contract 

oversight because he reports to both the command and the contracting office, which 

have different priorities. 

There is also an Army officer who serves as the Contract Management Officer 

(CMO) and provides direct contract oversight. The CMO provides oversight of CORs 

in their functional areas and interprets the statement of work (SOW). He is responsible to the ACO and the Battalion Commander. He translates mission requirements 

from the Battalion Commander into specific tasks within the SOW and recommends 

any mission changes as needed. If there are any conflicts that arise between the 

mission and the SOW, the CMO modifies the requirements so that they fit within 

the scope of the contract. He also advises the Battalion Commander on the contract. 

Insufficient number of oversight personnel 

The Army has not filled all of its oversight positions. There are currently two 

ACO positions in Kuwait that are filled by the battalion and DCMA. In addition to 

the ACOs, the battalion uses both military and civilian personnel to provide contract 

oversight. Battalion officials told us that there were not enough trained oversight 

personnel to effectively oversee and manage the maintenance contract in Kuwait. 

At the time we visited the battalion in April 2007, two military quality assurance 

inspector positions, a civilian quality assurance specialist position, and a civilian 

property administrator position had been vacant and remained vacant as of September 2007. The vacancies included the quality assurance specialist responsible for 

such activities as performing analysis of quality processes and procedures, tracking 

and coordinating training for quality assurance personnel, updating quality assurance surveillance plans, and ensuring productive interaction between Army and contractor quality personnel. 

Distance between Kuwait and Rock Island, Illinois, affects communications 

Although the ACO communicates with the Contracting Officer through biweekly 

teleconferences, e-mails, and phone calls, the ACO told us that there are problems 

with the Contracting Officer being located away from the contract activity. On numerous occasions, decisions on the contract that needed immediate action were delayed because of time differences between Rock Island, Illinois, and Kuwait. As a 

result, personnel in the field have had to wait on the Contracting Officer to administer contract actions. For example, broken equipment needed to be replaced in 

order to commence with needed work. Since the ACO didn’t have the authority to 

add a contract modification for the replacements, the command had to wait on the 

Contracting Officer to approve the modification. According to the ACO, the Contracting Officer has been reluctant to give more authority to the ACO because of 

frequent turnover in ACOs. 

Question: In Kuwait, contract oversight and quality assurance personnel billets 

for support of this contract were vacant. Why did the Army not fill these positions? 

Answer: Command officials were unsure why the military quality assurance positions had not been filled and told us that the vacant civilian positions were advertised but the command had not been able to fill the positions with qualified candidates. An ACO told us that the quality assurance specialist position was filled for 

a short time in December 2006; however, the person was deemed unqualified and 

was assigned to another position. The Army solicited volunteers to fill critical positions with deployments up to 179 days and requested volunteers from the U.S. 

Army Reserve/U.S. Army Guard. Further, a ‘‘20 percent relocation incentive’’ was 

requested and approved for two of the critical table of distribution and allowance 

positions: the industrial property management and quality assurance specialist positions. Selections for both of these positions are currently being processed by the Civilian Personnel Advisory Center. The Army also has attempted to fill the positions 

by offering off-post housing to Department of the Army civilians in exchange for a 

1-year assignment, requested tax-exempt status for Department of the Army civilians serving in the Southwest Asia theatre of operation, and augmented military reVerDate Nov 24 2008 05:14 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046473 PO 00000 Frm 00135 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A473P2.XXX A473P2

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quirements with the mobilization of the U.S. Army Reserve Multi-Functional Support Command. 

Question: In May 2006, the Army awarded the contractor a major HMMWV refurbishment contract valued at $33 million, even though numerous incidents of poor 

performance had been documented. Why did the Army select a contractor that had 

performed poorly? 

Answer: According to the Army, the HMMWV refurbishment was awarded to the 

contractor in May 2006 as a contractually expedient response to the theatre’s need 

for refurbished HMMWVs. The Army said that no concerns were raised regarding 

the contractor’s capability to meet HMMWV refurbishment requirements, and the 

contract was initiated with confidence that the government was replacing a nonperforming contractor with a contractor with a good history of performance in theater. 

According to the Contracting Officer,- issues with-the contractor that replaced the 

nonperforming contractor have been experienced in the areas of supply, maintenance, operations, and accountability of government-furnished equipment/government-furnished property as well as in meeting monthly production for the HMMWV 

refurbishment. While it is true that this contractor was issued a Letter of Concern 

in March 2006 on another effort, which cited concerns with its ability to ramp up 

to full personnel strength and its QC processes, the government said that it had 

every reason to believe that the contractor was fully engaged in correcting the deficiencies. 

Currently, the only performance measure used to assess the contractor’s performance is the Contractor Performance Annual Report (CPAR) in which the Contracting 

Officer assesses different aspects of the contractor’s performance based on what each 

command reports to her. The CPAR results for the base year showed nothing less 

than a ‘‘satisfactory’’ rating in any element. The CPAR results for option year 1 

(September 30, 2005, through September 29, 2006) were ‘‘pending’’ and not yet a 

part of the official record. However, the CMO was surprised at the good rating that 

the Contracting Officer gave the contractor in the draft option year 1 CPAR because 

AFSBn-KU did not give an overall favorable report. The Contracting Officer was reviewing the contractor’s extensive rebuttal to the battalion’s assessment. 

For further information, see: 

Defense Logistics: The Army Needs to Implement an Effective Management and 

Oversight Plan for the Equipment Maintenance Contract in Kuwait. GAO–08–316R. 

Washington, D.C.: January 22, 2008. 

FEDERAL EMPLOYEE VERSUS CONTRACTOR MIX

Question: Please define a proper balance between federal and contractor employees in performing DOD missions? 

Answer: There is no one definition of a proper balance between federal and contractor employees. Agencies must determine the nature of the activity and available 

resources to provide effective oversight. However, there are several factors that 

agencies should use in determining the proper balance between government and 

contractor employees. Factors to consider include, but to which agencies are not limited, are the following: 

• Government’s policy that positions that are inherently governmental—those 

activities that are intimately related to the public interest—must be staffed by 

government employees; 

• Extent to which the activity is critical to the agency’s core mission; 

• The current agency capacity relative to the long-term demand for the activity and the time sensitive nature of the work; 

• Cost of government versus private sector employees and the availability of 

funding; 

• Match between the activity’s requirements and available workforce skills 

and the competitiveness of the agency as an employer for a service that is in 

high demand or requires an exceptional capability not available in the agency; 

• Government’s policy that new requirements for commercial services should 

generally be performed by contractors; 

• Extent to which the options under consideration would require adjustments 

to the agency’s budget, workforce and staffing plans, and authorized levels of 

full-time equivalent (FTE) government positions; and 

• Potential for organizational conflicts of interest created by a contractor’s 

role in the activity and the associated risk to the integrity and control of sensitive information. 

The number and capability of government employees to provide effective oversight 

of a contractor’s performance are important. For example on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) space acquisition programs, we identified concerns about whether the 


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numbers and qualifications of DOD personnel are sufficient to provide oversight of 

and insight into contractor cost estimates. 

For further information, see: 

Defense Contracting: Army Case Study Delineates Concerns with Use of Contractors as Contract Specialists. GAO–08–360. Washington, D.C.: March 26, 2008. 

Defense Contracting: Additional Personal Conflict of Interest Safeguards Needed 

for Certain DOD Contractor Employees. GAO–08–169. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 

2008. 

Competitive Sourcing: Greater Emphasis Needed on Increasing Efficiency and Improving Performance. GAO–04–367. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2004. 

Forest Service: Better Planning, Guidance, and Data Are Needed to Improve Management of the Competitive Sourcing Program; GAO–08–195. Washington, D.C.: 

January 22, 2008. 

Government Contractors: Measuring Costs of Service Contractors versus Federal 

Employees. GAO/GGD–94–95. Washington, D.C.: March 10, 1994. 

Question: Why has there been such growth in the percentage of the DOD budget 

for contracted personnel and a decline in the budget for federal personnel? 

Answer: DOD’s civilian workforce and its spending on service contractors have 

both grown since fiscal year 2001, while the active duty military has begun to 

shrink again after growing from 2001 through 2003. From fiscal years 2001 through 

2008, the total DOD budget for civilian pay has increased from $54.1 billion to $60.3 

billion and the civilian workforce provided for by the budget has increased from 

687,000 to 709,000. DOD active military personnel have decreased from 1.5 million 

in fiscal year 2003 to 1.4 million in fiscal year 2008. While DOD does not report 

similar data on the number of contractors in its workforce as a whole, we have reported that DOD has become increasingly reliant on contractors to fulfill its mission 

and support its operations. For example, after September 11, 2001, increased security requirements created an increased demand for personnel to perform securityrelated tasks at DOD installations and facilities. Initially, these requirements were 

filled at military installations with active duty and reserve component personnel. 

DOD reported that contracting for security guard services was deemed necessary 

and practical to allow it to simultaneously support increased demands for military 

forces and to meet heightened security requirements. In Iraq, contractors provide 

deployed U.S. forces with an almost endless array of services and support, including 

communication services; interpreters who accompany military patrols; base operations support (e.g., food and housing); maintenance services for both weapon systems and tactical and nontactical vehicles; intelligence analysis; warehouse and supply operations; and security services to protect installations, convoys, and DOD personnel. 

Factors that have contributed to the increase in contractors supporting deployed 

forces include recent reductions in the size of the military, an increase in the number of operations and missions undertaken, the need to fill positions for contingency 

operations, a lack of organic military capabilities, and DOD’s use of increasingly sophisticated weapons systems. 

For further information, see: 

Military Readiness: Impact of Current Operations and Actions Needed to Rebuild 

Readiness of U.S. Ground Forces. GAO–08–497T. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 

2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: Improved Management and Oversight Needed to Better 

Control DOD’s Acquisition of Services. GAO–07–832T. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 

2007. 

Defense Budget: Trends in Operation and Maintenance Costs and Support Services Contracting. GAO–07–631. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2007. 

Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing 

Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed 

Forces. GAO–07–145. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 2006. 

Contract Security Guards: Army’s Guard Program Requires Greater Oversight 

and Reassessment of Acquisition Approach. GAO–06–284. Washington, D.C.: April 

3, 2006. 

Question: What steps should DOD take to better assure a balance between federal 

and contractor employees in meeting DOD missions? 

Answer: DOD needs to position itself to have the right skills in all disciplines, including the acquisition workforce, to ensure that the highest quality of goods and 

services are obtained at the best value for the government and the American taxpayer and to properly manage the acquisition of those goods and services. To do so, 

DOD needs to take several steps. One key step is to assess the skills and capabilities of its current acquisition workforce as well as the critical skills and competencies needed in the future workforce over the next several years. 


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DOD’s recent human capital plan includes a list of mission-critical occupations 

needed for the current civilian workforce, but this list does not constitute the required assessment of skills of the existing workforce. DOD has begun taking steps 

to build data in preparation for such an assessment for its acquisition workforce. 

However, DOD also needs to identify gaps in the skills and capabilities it needs to 

fulfill its mission. DOD must determine whether it will fill those gaps through repositioning and retraining current employees, hiring new federal employees, or using 

contractor employees. The decision to hire federal employees or hire contractor employees for any particular activity should consider the issues discussed above. When 

contractors are used to provide services, DOD needs to take a proactive approach 

to managing strategic- and transactional-level service acquisition elements. The 

strategic level requires the leadership, processes, and information necessary for 

mitigating risks, leveraging buying power, and managing outcomes across the enterprise. At this level, we identified four key factors for improving outcomes: Strong 

corporate leadership and vision, results-oriented goals and metrics, defined responsibilities and support structures, and improved knowledge of spending. The strategic 

level also sets the context for the transactional level, where individual service acquisitions are executed. Key factors for good outcomes at the transactional level include 

clearly defined requirements, sound business arrangements, and appropriate contract management and oversight processes. At both levels, risks exist that can impair an organization’s ability to get desired service acquisition outcomes. A comprehensive management approach tailors the strategic and transactional factors to 

address these risks. 

GROWTH IN CONTRACTOR PROVIDED SERVICES

Question: The Committee understands that the Department of Defense obligates 

more for service contracts than it does for supplies and equipment, including major 

weapons systems. 

• Is the transition to contractor provided services the result of a strategic decision 

or is it more of a piecemeal response to downsizing that occurred in the military? 

For further information, see: 

The Department of Defense’s Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan Does Not 

Meet Most Statutory Requirements. GAO–08–439R. Washington, D.C.: February 6, 

2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: Tailored Approach Needed to Improve Service Acquisition 

Outcomes. GAO–07–20. Washington, D.C.: November 3, 2006. 

Answer: The growth in DOD service contracting is the result of practical considerations, policy decisions, and new requirements on DOD. In May 2007, we reported 

that DOD and military service officials cited several factors as having contributed 

to the increased use of contractors for support services. These factors included (1) 

increased operations and maintenance requirements for the global war on terrorism 

and other contingencies, which DOD has met without an increase in active duty and 

civilian personnel; (2) federal government policy, which is to rely on the private sector for needed commercial services that are not inherently governmental in nature; 

and (3) DOD initiatives, such as its competitive sourcing and utility privatization 

programs. 

To a large extent, the growth in DOD’s use of service contracts has not been a 

managed outcome. In November 2006, we recommended that DOD adopt a proactive 

approach to managing acquisition of services that leverages strategic and transactional elements. This approach should include establishing a normative position 

of how and for what services acquisition dollars are currently and will be spent (including volume, type, and trends); ensuring that decisions on individual transactions 

are consistent with DOD’s strategic goals and objectives; and providing a capability 

to determine whether the acquisition of services is meeting DOD’s cost, schedule, 

and performance objectives. 

When DOD identifies new requirements for services that can only be met with 

additional personnel, it should first determine the nature the service that will need 

to be performed, that is, whether the service is inherently governmental or commercial. If the services are inherently governmental in nature, they should be performed 

by government employees. If the services are commercial in nature, generally, DOD 

should expect to obtain those services by contract. However, there will be circumstances where the service in question, though it may be available in the commercial marketplace, may warrant performance by DOD employees for strategic reasons, for example, its criticality to DOD’s mission, the necessity for DOD to maintain it as an in-house core capability, or the role it plays in DOD’s decision-making 

processes. When this is the case, DOD should engage in a deliberate strategic assessment of its current capabilities, its new requirements, and the pros and cons 


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of its options before deciding between obtaining the service by contract or with government employees. DOD should determine whether it has the in-house workforce 

to perform the service, both in terms of skill set and the number of FTEs. If DOD 

determines the nature of the service warrants performance by government employees, but it does not have sufficient government personnel, part of DOD’s strategic 

planning should include criteria for identifying those instances in which it would request authorization of additional FTEs. Such criteria should include a comparison 

of the cost and time to obtain the services by contract with the cost and time to 

hire and train new government employees. Information necessary to make such a 

comparison is not routinely sought by DOD officials, even though when we asked 

agencies were able to generate relevant estimates for the few case studies we have 

conducted. Our limited work in this area demonstrates that the government incurs 

a higher cost for contract employees. 

For example, in a case study we did at the Army Contracting Agency’s Contracting Center of Excellence (CCE), we found that CCE has relied on contractor 

contract specialists since it began hiring them in 2003. In August 2007, contractors—who work side by side and perform the same functions as their government 

counterparts—made up 42 percent of CCE’s contract specialists. CCE is paying almost 27 percent more for its contractor-provided contract specialists than for similarly graded government employees. This comparison took into account government 

salary, benefits, and overhead and the loaded hourly labor rates paid to contractors. 

CCE officials cited difficulties hiring and retaining government personnel in light 

of the competition from government and the private sector for this competency. 

While CCE officials said that they prefer to use government employees, they have 

not considered the appropriate balance of contractor versus government contract 

specialists. The CCE example delineates a concern in today’s environment: Hiring 

contractors for sensitive positions in reaction to a shortfall in the government workforce rather than as a planned strategy to help achieve an agency mission. 

Similarly, we reported in 2007 that at DOD’s Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 

about 8,186 positions—not counting prime contractors—currently support the missile defense program. Only about 33 percent of the positions are set aside for government civilian personnel. Another 57 percent are support contractors supplied by 

44 different defense companies. The remaining 10 percent are positions either being 

filled, or expected to be filled, by employees of Federally Funded Research and Development Centers and university and affiliated research centers that are on contract or under other types of agreements to perform missile defense tasks. MDA officials explained that the utilization of support contractors is key to its operation of 

the Ballistic Missile Defense System because it allows the agency to obtain personnel with specialized expertise when needed, allowing them to develop weapon 

systems more quickly. Additionally, the officials told us that MDA’s approach is consistent with federal government policy on the use of contractors. MDA officials estimate that while the average cost for each of the agency’s government employees is 

about $140,000 per year, a contract employee costs about $175,000 per year. 

For further information, see: 

Defense Contracting: Army Case Study Delineates Concerns with Use of Contractors as Contract Specialists. GAO–08–360. Washington, D.C.: March 26, 2008. 

Defense Budget: Trends in Operation and Maintenance Costs and Support Services Contracting. GAO–07–631. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy Generates Results but 

Delivers Less at a Higher Cost. GAO–07–387. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Tailored Approach Needed to Improve Service Acquisition 

Outcomes. GAO–07–20. Washington; D.C.: November 9, 2006. 

Question: How does DOD achieve oversight of contracting that is accomplished at 

field locations around the world? 

Answer: Several long-standing and systemic problems continue to hinder DOD’s 

management and oversight of contractors at deployed locations, including the failure 

to follow planning guidance, have an adequate number of contract oversight personnel, systematically collect and distribute lessons learned, and provide 

predeployment training for military commanders and contract oversight personnel 

on the use and role of contractors. In order to perform adequate surveillance, regardless of where the work is located, oversight personnel must be properly trained 

in how to conduct surveillance, be assigned at or prior to contract award, be held 

accountable for their surveillance duties, and perform and document surveillance 

throughout the period of the contract. 

One of the reasons DOD contract management is on GAO’s high-risk list is because DOD’s oversight of its contractors is, at times, wanting. Our work has documented weaknesses in this area, including in field locations. We have identified instances where personnel who were responsible for overseeing the performance of 


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contractors were not adequately trained to properly exercise their responsibilities 

and instances where no CORs were on-site to monitor contractor employees’ work. 

In addition, as we discussed in our briefing, DOD has not allocated the organizational resources or assigned accountability to ensure that contractors effectively support deployed forces. There continues to be inadequate numbers of oversight personnel at the deployed locations and wide discrepancies in the rigor with which 

CORs perform their duties, particularly in unstable environments. 

These oversight challenges, along with others related to the management of contractor support, have led to negative impacts at deployed locations. For example in 

Iraq, to award contracts and begin reconstruction efforts quickly, DOD used 

undefinitized contractual actions; however, because DOD failed to definitize them 

within 180 days, as required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), DOD’s 

risk of paying higher costs was greater. Undefinitized contractual actions, which are 

authorized acquisition procedures, allow contractors to begin work before key contract terms and conditions, such as the scope of the work and its price, are fully 

defined and negotiated. Ideally the government negotiates the terms of a contract 

based on a contractor’s proposal; however, when the contractor performs work prior 

to the conclusion of price and scope negotiations related to that proposal, the government finds itself negotiating scope and price based on the actual work performed 

and the actual cost incurred by the contractor. The longer the undefinitized period 

last, the more work the contractor will complete prior to reaching a final agreement 

as to specific scope and price terms. The more work the contractor completes the 

less flexibility the contracting officer has to negotiate for lower prices or different 

contract terms using the contractor’s proposal; rather, the basis for finalizing the 

negotiations becomes the actual costs incurred by the contractor for actual work performed. In a September 2006 report, we found that DOD contracting officials were 

less likely to negotiate those parts of a contractor’s proposal that the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) had questioned, in those situations where the contractor 

then performed the work before the government finalized the negotiation. To the extent the contracting officer was able to use DCAA’s assessments of the contractor’s 

proposal in negotiations, before the contractor performed the work and incurred actual costs, the contracting officer had more flexibility and opportunity to control the 

contractor’s costs and conditions of performance. For this reason, in the few instances in which the government negotiated the terms before starting work, the portion of DCAA questioned costs which the contracting officer was able to negotiate 

out of the proposal was substantial. For example, in three audits related to a logistics support contract, DCAA questioned $204 million of the contractor’s proposal 

cost. Since the government and the contractor negotiated the terms prior to the 

onset of the work, the contractor had not performed any work or incurred any actual 

costs at the time of negotiations. This afforded the contracting officer total flexibility 

to change through negotiations the terms of the contractor’s proposal. DCAA calculated that $120 million of the $204 million in questioned proposal costs were removed by the contracting officer through negotiations as a result of its findings. 

We have made a number of recommendations aimed at strengthening DOD’s management and oversight of contractor support at deployed locations, and the department has agreed to implement many of those recommendations. However, we have 

found that DOD has made limited progress in implementing some key recommendations. 

For further information, see: 

Defense Management: DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance on Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight. GAO–08–572T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008. 

Iraq Contract Costs: DOD Consideration of Defense Contract Audit Agency’s Findings. GAO–06–1132. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2006. 

Contract Management: DOD Vulnerabilities to Contracting Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse. GAO–06–838R. Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2006. 

Contract Management: Opportunities to Improve Surveillance on Department of 

Defense Service Contracts. GAO–05–274. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005. 

OMB CIRCULAR A–76

Question: OMB Circular A–76 states: ‘‘The longstanding policy of the federal government has been to rely on the private sector for needed commercial services.’’ It 

seems that federal policy encourages contracting out of services, rather than encouraging finding the right balance between federal and contractor personnel. Do you 

agree? 

Answer: When the services being sought by the government are commercial in nature, it is true that federal policy, founded in law, has established a preference for 


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1The Acquisition Advisory Panel was authorized by Section 1423 of the Services Acquisition 

Reform Act of 2003, which was enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2004. 

obtaining such items and services by contracting with the private sector. The theory 

underlying this policy is that the forces of competition at play in the marketplace 

have already determined what the best price for a commercial service would be; 

therefore, the government should fulfill its requirements for commercial services, to 

the greatest extent practicable, on the same terms as the private sector. The idea 

is that by not using government employees to perform commercial services readily 

available in the private sector, government employees would be more available to 

perform an agency’s core missions and carry out activities that are inherently governmental in nature or so closely related as to warrant performance by government 

employees: Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A–76 contains provisions, implementing the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act, that require each 

agency to annually prepare two inventories to categorize all activities performed by 

government personnel as either commercial or inherently governmental. The circular provides agencies an opportunity to justify why certain commercial activities 

performed by government personnel should be exempt from private sector performance if a written determination is prepared by the agency competitive sourcing official. 

At GAO’s 2006 forum on federal acquisition challenges and opportunities, some 

participants noted that it might be more appropriate for agencies to develop guiding 

principles or values to determine which positions could be performed by contractors 

and which should be performed in-house. Forum participants further noted that 

many corporate organizations carefully deliberate up front and at the highest management levels about what core functions they need to retain, what noncore functions they should buy, and the skill sets needed to procure noncore functions. 

For further information, see: 

Highlights of a GAO Forum: Federal Acquisition Challenges and Opportunities in 

the 21st Century. GAO–07–45SP. Washington, D.C.: October 6, 2006. 

Competitive Sourcing: Implementation Will Be Challenging for Federal Agencies. 

GAO–03–1022T. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2003. 

Questions for Competitive Sourcing Hearing Record. GAO–04–155R. Washington, 

D.C.: October 3, 2003. 

Competitive Sourcing: Greater Emphasis Needed on Increasing Efficiency and Improving Performance. GAO–04–367. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2004. 

Question: How is the term commercial services defined? How should it be defined? 

Answer: Both Congress and the FAR have used the term commercial item, defining it to include both commercial products and many commercial services. Congress 

provided in law that services are commercial items if they are of a type offered and 

sold competitively in substantial quantities in the commercial marketplace based on 

established catalog or market prices for specific tasks performed under standard 

commercial terms and conditions. Congress required the FAR to include a list of 

laws that are inapplicable to contracts for the procurement of commercial items 

(both products and services), generally on the theory that when the government is 

buying commercial items it should be able to rely on competitive market forces to 

get the best value for the taxpayer. The Acquisition Advisory Panel 1 in its final report found the following: 

‘‘The current regulatory treatment of commercial items and services allows goods 

and services not sold in substantial quantities in the commercial marketplace to be 

classified nonetheless as ‘‘commercial’’ and acquired using the streamlined procedures of FAR Part 12. The panel recommended that the definition of standalone 

commercial services in the FAR should be amended to delete the phrase ‘of a type’ 

in the definition. Only those services that are actually sold in substantial quantities 

in the commercial marketplace should be deemed ‘commercial.’ The government 

should acquire all other services under traditional contracting methods.’’ 

In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110– 

181, Section 805), Congress addressed the issue by stating that ‘‘of a type’’ services 

may be deemed to be commercial items but only if sufficient information has been 

submitted by the offeror to allow for a price reasonableness determination for the 

services. 

Circular A–76 does not contain a definition of commercial services. Rather, the 

circular uses the term commercial activity, which it defines as a ‘‘recurring service 

that could be performed by the private sector . . . and is not so intimately related 

to the public interest as to mandate performance by government employees.’’ This 

definition of commercial activity recognizes that there are some services, even commercial ones, that should be performed by government employees. 


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For further information, see: 

Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the United States Congress. Washington, D.C.: January 2007. 

Question: Does DOD, in making decisions to contract for services, have sound decisionmaking processes to ensure that savings will result from using contractors to 

meet a mission requirement? If not, what should be done by Congress to get DOD 

to put such safeguards into place? 

Answer: Criteria that come into play when DOD is deciding whether to contract 

for services depend on the nature of the work. With regard to work that is inherently governmental in nature performance should be provided by government employees, and consideration of cost savings is not a determining factor. When considering work that is commercial in nature, and currently performed in-house to meet 

an existing requirement, a Circular A–76 competition is the process by which DOD 

determines whether to convert that work to performance by a contractor, and generally, the requirement to realize a particular cost savings is paramount. With regard to new requirements for services that are commercial in nature, DOD should 

generally obtain such services by contract awarded pursuant to the federal acquisition procedures. Because the requirement is a new one, not currently performed by 

government employees, there is no baseline by which to measure whether contracting for that requirement will realize a cost savings, per se. Rather, by contracting for commercial services using the federal acquisition process, ideally, DOD 

will take advantage of the competitive market forces to get the best value for the 

taxpayer. The likelihood of DOD realizing this benefit is increased when it uses an 

acquisition strategy that ensures robust competition, and when the commercial services it contracts for are in fact services commonly competed in the commercial marketplace. 

For further information, see: 

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address Inadequate Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments. GAO–08–568T. Washington, D.C.: March 

11, 2008. 

Competitive Sourcing: Greater Emphasis Needed on Increasing Efficiency and Improving Performance. GAO–04–367. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2004. 

Competitive Sourcing: Implementation Will Be Challenging for Federal Agencies. 

GAO–03–1022T. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2003. 

Questions for Competitive Sourcing Hearing Record. GAO–04–155R. Washington, 

D.C.: October 3, 2003. 

Question: The line separating contractor from government employees can be blurry and not well-defined on work that closely supports inherently government functions. What risks does DOD face with its growing reliance on contractors, and what 

steps can Congress take to reduce contracting vulnerabilities especially in contingency situations, such as occurred in Iraq when large amounts of money flow quickly to address pressing needs? 

Answer: When contractors perform work that closely supports inherently governmental functions, there is a risk that government decisions may be inappropriately 

influenced by, rather than appropriately independent from, contractor judgments. It 

is a challenge for agencies to define the roles and responsibilities of contractors visa`-vis government employees. Defusing the relationship between contractors and government employees is particularly important when contracting for professional and 

management support services since contractors often work closely with government 

employees to provide these services. This definition should begin during the acquisition planning process when contract requirements are determined. We have recommended that agencies define contract requirements to clearly describe roles, responsibilities, and limitations of selected contractor services. Well-defined contract 

requirements can also help minimize the risk of contractors performing inherently 

governmental functions. Yet contracts, especially service contracts, often do not have 

definitive or realistic requirements at the outset. Because the nature of contracted 

services can vary widely, from building maintenance to intelligence, a tailored approach should be used in defining requirements to help ensure that risks associated 

with a requirement are fully considered before entering into a contract arrangement. Equally important is the need to properly administer the contract and ensure 

that the distinction between the contractor employees and government personnel is 

maintained. 

Our work over the past 5 years has shown that well-defined requirements— 

matched with adequate resources, sound business arrangements, and the capacity 

to properly manage and oversee contractor performance—were often missing during 

specific Iraqi and Hurricane Katrina reconstruction efforts, in contracts to support 

deployed forces, and in our efforts to equip Iraqi security forces. The absence of 

these elements often contributed to unmet expectations, schedule delays, or higherVerDate Nov 24 2008 05:14 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046473 PO 00000 Frm 00142 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A473P2.XXX A473P2

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than-necessary costs, underscoring both the need to hold agencies and contractors 

accountable for outcomes and the challenges of doing so. Such issues are not unique 

to Iraq but reflect some of the long-standing and systemic issues confronting DOD. 

They are, however, magnified in a contingency situation such as Iraq or Hurricane 

Katrina. Furthermore, in our recent review of the Department of Homeland Security’s service contracts, we found that some contracts included requirements that 

were broadly defined and lacked detail about activities that closely support inherently governmental functions. We found instances in which contractors provided 

services that were integral to the department’s mission or comparable to work performed by government employees, such as a contractor directly supporting the department’s efforts to hire federal employees, including signing offer letters. 

Conditions such as these need to be monitored to ensure that the government 

does not lose control over and accountability for mission-related decisions and that 

it has the personnel and resources necessary to perform oversight. Congress can 

play an important role in reducing such risks by providing timely and persistent 

oversight and by asking if DOD’s authorized FTE levels are sufficient and, if not, 

whether DOD has a strategic plan identifying how the additional resources will be 

utilized. 

For further information, see: 

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address Inadequate Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments. GAO–08–568T. Washington, D.C.: March 

11, 2008. 

Defense Management: DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance on Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight. GAO–08–572T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008. 

Department of Homeland Security: Improved Assessment and Oversight Needed 

to Manage Risk of Contracting for Selected Services. GAO–07–990. Washington, 

D.C.: September 17, 2007. 

SIZE OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN CONTRACTING WORKFORCE

Question: In your opinion, is the current DOD acquisition or contracting workforce 

adequate to the task in terms of number of employees and the skill level of those 

employees? 

Answer: If you look at the increase in spending on DOD contracts since 2001 and 

the size of the acquisition workforce, one could easily conclude that the size of the 

workforce has not kept up with spending. However, overall, DOD does not collect 

the type of data that would allow for a broader assessment of the adequacy of the 

workforce. For example, DOD is aware of specific gaps but does not know how many 

contractors are supporting the acquisition function. Without data on the size and 

skills of this contractor workforce, DOD cannot conduct a realistic assessment to determine the right size and shape for its entire acquisition workforce. Even without 

a comprehensive assessment of its contracting workforce, DOD can take actions in 

the interim to address urgent workforce issues, such as those identified by the 

Gansler Commission. For instance, in line with the commission’s recommendations, 

the Army could take steps to increase the stature, quantity, and career development 

of the Army’s military and civilian contracting personnel, especially for expeditionary operations. Several of our reviews of DOD’s major space programs have cited 

shortages of government personnel as a key challenge that increases risk for the 

program, specifically in technical areas. In addition, during our review of DOD’s 

space cost estimating function, Air Force space cost-estimating organizations and 

program offices said that they believed their cost-estimating resources were inadequate to do a good job of accurately predicting costs. Because of the decline in inhouse cost-estimating resources, space program offices and Air Force cost-estimating 

organizations are now more dependent on support contractors. 

For further information, see: 

Space Acquisitions: Major Space Programs Still at Risk for Cost and Schedule Increases. GAO–08–552T. Washington, D.C.: March 4, 2008. 

DOD Acquisitions: Contracting for Better Outcomes. GAO–06–800T. Washington, 

D.C.: September 7, 2006. 

Defense Acquisitions: Role of Lead Systems Integrator on Future Combat Systems 

Program Poses Oversight Challenges. GAO–07–380. Washington, D.C.: June 6, 

2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy Generates Results but 

Delivers Less at a Higher Cost. GAO–07–387. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007. 

Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning. GAO– 

04–39. Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2003. 


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Question: How does the DOD contracting workforce compare with the contracting 

workforce at large private sector companies, in terms of the number of workers and 

the skill level of those workers? 

Answer: We do not have comprehensive data on the number and skill level of 

DOD’s contracting workforce or the contracting workforce at large private sector 

companies. More important, DOD does not have data on its contracting workforce. 

DOD is currently in the process of collecting data on its contracting workforce to 

identify skill needs and gaps. While we cannot compare the number and skill level 

of the DOD contracting workforce and large private sector companies, several important distinctions are clear. Successful commercial companies invest in maintaining 

a state-of-the-art acquisition workforce because they have come to realize its contribution to outcomes; in their case, it is the bottom line. Leaders from private sector organizations testified before the Acquisition Advisory Panel that their organizations employ highly sophisticated, highly credentialed, and highly trained business 

managers to carry out sourcing, procurement, and contract management functions. 

The panel noted that the government lacks comparable resources for these functions. To take advantage of the acquisition practices used by successful commercial 

organizations, the panel said that the government needs to close the gaps between 

these workforces by recruiting, training, and retaining sufficient numbers of procurement professionals with appropriate capability. We have ongoing work on the 

practices leading commercial organizations use to manage their acquisition 

workforces that may provide further insight on this question at a later date. 

For further information, see: 

The Department of Defense’s Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan Does Not 

Meet Most Statutory Requirements. GAO–08–439R. Washington, D.C.: February 6, 

2008. 

Question: Please comment on the so called ‘‘age imbalance’’ in the DOD contracting workforce. 

Answer: As mentioned by the Acquisition Advisory Panel, there appears to be a 

governmentwide shortage of contracting personnel with 5 to 15 years of experience. 

Data for DOD’s acquisition workforce show a similar picture. However, DOD’s current acquisition workforce tends to stay in their positions longer than the DOD 

workforce as a whole. Therefore, DOD may have a grace period within which it can 

hire and train the replacement workforce that it will need for that inevitable point 

in the not too distant future when its aging acquisition workforce will retire. It may 

have an opportunity to mitigate some of the risks posed by the age imbalance by 

continuing to retain key personnel in its existing workforce. 

Question: How can DOD manage its contracting workforce to achieve a better distribution by age? 

Answer: DOD must take some fundamental steps with regard to its human capital efforts before it can effectively address this and other workforce issues. For instance, in February 2008, we reported that DOD’s civilian human capital strategic 

plan does not include an assessment of current mission-critical competencies, future 

critical skills and competencies needed, gaps between the current and future needs, 

or specific recruiting and retention goals. Once an agency identifies the critical skills 

and competencies that its future workforce must possess, it can develop strategies 

tailored to addressing gaps in the number, skills and competencies, and deployment 

of the workforce and the alignment of human capital approaches that enable and 

sustain the contributions of all critical skills and competencies needed for the future. Strategies include the programs, policies, and practices that will enable an 

agency to recruit, develop, and retain the critical staff needed to achieve program 

goals. In short, developing such strategies creates a road map for an agency to use 

to move from the current to the future workforce needed to achieve its goals. During 

this process, it is also important for agencies to consider the full range of flexibilities 

available, such as recruitment and retention bonuses and allowances, special hiring 

authorities to recruit employees with critical skills, and the ability to hire retired 

annuitants to fill critical vacancies in the acquisition field. The Defense Acquisition 

University’s 2007 report on defense acquisition structures and capabilities also recommended the establishment of student or intern programs to help mitigate the impending departure of individuals in the acquisition workforce. 

For further information, see: 

The Department of Defense’s Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan Does Not 

Meet Most Statutory Requirements. GAO–08–439R. Washington, D.C.: February 6, 

2008. 


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PLANNING FOR THE USE OF CONTRACTOR SUPPORT

Question: How does DOD capture lessons learned in providing battlefield contractor support, and how are lessons learned provided to new commanders as they 

prepare for deployment? 

Answer: As we have noted in several reports, DOD lacks a process for capturing 

and sharing lessons learned regarding contractors on the battlefield. For example, 

in 2006 we reported that there was no organization within DOD or its components 

responsible for developing procedures to capture lessons learned on the use of contractor support at deployed locations, and lessons learned were not routinely gathered and shared. In addition, in October 2007 the Gansler Commission recommended that the Secretary of the Army capture expeditionary contracting lessons 

learned, incorporate them into systemic forums, and provide feedback to the force 

for continuous improvement. The report continued that these lessons learned should 

be considered in the development of curricula and be institutionalized in the Center 

for Army Lessons Learned. 

For further information, see: 

Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing 

Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed 

Forces. GAO–07–145. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 2006. 

Military Operations: DOD’s Extensive Use of Logistics Support Contracts Requires Strengthened Oversight. GAO–04–854. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2004. 

Question: How does DOD represent contract security and support personnel in the 

training scenarios during predeployment exercises at locations such as the National 

Training Center? 

Answer: Generally, DOD does not include contractors in its predeployment training. In 2006 we reported that some DOD officials we spoke with believed that their 

predeployment preparations, such as mission rehearsal exercises, should incorporate 

the role that contractors have in supporting U.S. forces in a deployed location. However, we found that most units we met with did not incorporate the role of contractor support into their mission rehearsal exercises. Moreover, we found no existing DOD requirement that mission rehearsal exercises should include such information, even for key contracts such as LOGCAP. Several officials told us that including 

contractors in these exercises could enable military commanders to better plan and 

prepare for the use of contractor support prior to deploying. In addition, in both 

2005 and 2006 we reported that U.S. military units are not trained, prior to deployment, on the operating procedures of private security providers in Iraq. 

For further information, see: 

Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing 

Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed 

Forces. GAO–07–145. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use of Private Security Providers. 

GAO–05–737. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve Use of Private Security Providers. GAO–06–0865T. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006. 

Question: What certifications do private contractors have to fulfill in order to work 

on contracts? 

Answer: DOD requires that its private security companies be licensed and registered with the Government of Iraq and that companies train their employees on 

the rules of the use of force and the law of armed conflict;. In addition, all contractor 

employees required to carry a weapon must have a weapons card and have approval 

of U.S. Central Command to carry a weapon. Furthermore, individual contracts may 

require particular skills and levels of training and require that the contractor document that the training has been successfully completed. Contracts may also require 

that the documentation be made available to the government for review: 

Question: How do you ensure that new commanders take advantage of the information that is available regarding oversight of contractor-provided support? 

Answer: In 2003 and again in 2006 we recommended that DOD develop training 

for commanders and other senior leaders who are deploying to locations with contractor support. Such training could provide information on the roles and responsibilities of DCMA and the COR and the role of the commander in the contracting 

process and the limits of the commanders’ authority. In addition, contractors should 

be included in predeployment training exercises. By including contractors in the exercises, their critical role is made clear early on and commanders are in a better 

position to understand their contract management roles and responsibilities prior to 

deploying to Iraq. Finally, DOD needs to develop a comprehensive program to capture lessons learned and input those lessons into predeployment training. 


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DATABASE TO TRACK THE NUMBER OF DEPLOYED CONTRACTORS

Question: Can the SPOT database track the number of deployed contractors and 

subcontractors? Do we track the nationality of contract personnel? Can we track the 

compensation level of contractors and subcontractors? 

Answer: The SPOT database was developed by the Army and designated by DOD 

as the mechanism to provide by-name accountability for contractor staff who deploy 

in support of DOD. The 80,000 employees represent only a portion of DOD’s contractor personnel working in Iraq. In addition, contractor employees who do not 

have access to U.S. installations are not included in the database, and contractor 

personnel working on small, short-term contracts (under $25,000 or less than 30 

days) are not included in the database. Information on the nationality of contractor 

employees is included in the database, but information related to individual compensation is not. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


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TUESDAY, JANUARY 29, 2008. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OUTSOURCING 

WITNESSES 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLAUDE M. KICKLIGHTER, (RET.), INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

MARY UGONE, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITING AND 

CONTRACTING, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

CHARLES BEARDALL, ACTING DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INVESTIGATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Young is tied up this morning, but our faithful 

member, who is always here, Mr. Frelinghuysen, is. 

Mr. Boyd, welcome to the early morning session here. 

And, General Kicklighter, welcome to the Committee. And we appreciate the work that you have done. We talked a little bit before 

the Committee started about Jack Marsh, and what a tremendous 

Secretary he was. He knew more about what went on in the Pentagon than anybody else. But we welcome you and look forward to 

your testimony. 

And, Mr. Frelinghuysen, do you have any comments? 

MOTION FOR EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. No comments. Would you like me to make 

a motion, Mr. Chairman? Is that appropriate? 

Mr. MURTHA. Please. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I move that those portions of the hearing 

today which involve classified material be held in executive session 

because of the classification of the material to be discussed. 

Mr. MURTHA. Is there any objection? 

So ordered. 

Well, if you will go forward with your—this is a closed hearing, 

and classification would be—well, whatever; it is a closed hearing. 

And if you would summarize your testimony, we will put your full 

statement in the record, and then we will get the questions. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL KICKLIGHTER

General KICKLIGHTER. Okay, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense. We appreciate the opportunity 

to come and appear before you and talk to you this morning. 

Also, I would like to introduce Ms. Mary Ugone, who is the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing for Defense. And also on my 

right is Mr. Chuck Beardall, who is the Acting Deputy Inspector 


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General for Investigations, and has oversight for all the criminal 

investigations in the Department of Defense. 

Our intention this morning is to focus primarily on munitions accountability and control, and to discuss contracting in the macro 

sense, but whatever degree you would like to. And our efforts regarding munitions control and accountability and contracting was 

triggered in December, 2005, when we received a hotline complaint 

and allegations of a senior Army officer receiving illegal gratuities 

from a DoD contractor. That has evolved into an extensive and ongoing criminal investigation that has involved millions of dollars in 

bribes and unfortunately, large numbers of U.S. military and DoD 

civilian personnel. 

LACK OF CONTROL OVER MUNITIONS

In December, 2006 and January, 2007, we began to get allegations from the Turkish National Police and from the Turkish Minister of Defense that weapons and explosives that we were shipping 

in to the Iraqi Security Forces were finding their way into the 

hands of insurgents, terrorists, and criminals in Turkey. We also 

began to find that some weapons that had been supplied to the 

Iraqi Security Forces were finding their way into the hands of insurgents, insurgent groups, and U.S. contractors in Iraq. Once we 

started connecting these dots, putting these facts together, we also 

found out that one of the contractors that was implicated in bribes 

and corruption in Kuwait was also in charge of running storage 

warehouses for weapons for the police in Iraq. 

We then briefed the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior Defense staff; and the Secretary asked at those briefings, could we put a team together and 

get into Iraq and take a look and find out exactly what the ground 

truth was. The Secretary also asked, and the Chairman, that we 

keep them fully informed and make sure that we keep the Congress and particularly the committees that work with Defense, informed about what we were doing. 

I briefed the Chairman—— 

Mr. MURTHA. You did that, yes. 

General KICKLIGHTER [continuing]. And Congressman Young. 

And your guidance to us was, get a team on the ground post-haste, 

and make sure that if we have got a crack in the barn door we nail 

that barn door shut. 

MUNITION ACCOUNTABILITY ASSESSMENT

As a result of those discussions, we assembled an assessment 

team on munitions accountability and control, and we picked a lot 

of people with skill sets from our office—Central Command, the 

Army Criminal Investigation Command, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Air National Guard, the Department of State; the Department of Justice had members on our team, and we had somebody out of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. 

The mission of our team was to determine whether DoD currently had adequate accountability and controls of the weapons and 

whether DoD had adequate control of weapons and ammunition 

that they were controlling as they arrived in country and retained 


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that control until they passed them over to the Iraqi Security 

Forces. 

We were also—with the Iraqis’ permission, we were going to take 

a look at how well the Iraqis could control and account for the 

weapons that they were receiving from us. 

The assessment team spent several weeks. We first went into 

Kuwait to take a look at how well they were controlling munitions 

from the time they arrived into port until they assembled the convoys and moved the convoys forward into Iraq. Then we decided 

that we needed to go into Afghanistan to take a look at how well 

they are controlling and accounting for weapons in Afghanistan. 

And after a week’s assessment there, we proceeded into Iraq, 

where we spent 4 weeks. 

Primarily, we looked at the arrival of weapons and ammunition. 

We looked at the transportation, delivery means, the storage, and 

the distribution from the port of entry until the arms and ammunition reached the hands of both the military and the police units. 

We went through many nodes, and we went to the end of the pipeline. 

Our preliminary finding was that DoD and the Iraqi Security 

Forces today have a system in place for controlling and accounting 

for weapons and ammunition being supplied to the Iraqi Security 

Forces. However, there still remains much work to be done; and 

many weapons that were lost in the early stages were lost to battle 

losses, police stations that got overrun, desertions, disintegration of 

units that had been poorly trained and committed to combat, and 

police officers and military personnel that were selling weapons 

into the black market. And we were also looking into possible pilferage coming out of warehouses. 

But the system they have in place today—and we will have a 

chance to talk more about that, I am sure, in your questions, but 

it is much improved during 2006 and 2007. As we left the country, 

we briefed the leadership there of what our findings were, and our 

observations and recommendations. The commanders, both 

Petraeus and General Dubik, who is in charge of the training command, agreed with all the findings and began immediate work, 

even while we were in country; as we began to uncover things that 

needed tightening up, they began to take action. 

And so I am happy to report that a great deal of progress has 

been made. We received a written report from Central Command 

about the progress that continues. 

That part of the team, that was phase one of the trip; and now 

we are finalizing that report, and in the next week or so we will 

send our final draft back to the DoD organizations involved. They 

will get a chance to review it, and then we will publish the report 

either in late February or early March. 

ACCOUNTABILITY ASSESSMENT PHASE TWO

The assessment team plans a phase two, and we plan to go back 

to Iraq, and Afghanistan as well, in March and April, and to take 

a look at what progress has been made, but also expand the net 

a little bit and look at something that we looked at on this trip. 

We looked at foreign military sales. And they are moving—in both 

Afghanistan and Iraq, they are moving to foreign military sales 


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procedures for procuring and bringing weapons into country; and 

they are also struggling to develop the Iraqi logistics support base. 

Both of these actions are important to control accountability of 

weapons. And we will be looking at that. 

We will also be looking at contract operations based on the plan 

the Army has put in place, recommendations that we provided to 

the Army. We will see how well contracting is maturing as we go 

back on this second look. 

The Defense Criminal Investigation Service (DCIS), the law enforcement arm of DoD, has been engaged in investigating DoD-related crimes pertaining to the Southwest Asia theater since the 

start of the war; and it greatly intensified, as I mentioned, when 

we started getting these calls in 2005. DCIS has 105 ongoing investigations related to the war effort. Most of these investigations 

were being conducted as part of a joint effort with other law enforcement organizations. 

We are an active participant in the National Procurement Fraud 

Task Force and the International Contract Corruption Task Force. 

The International Corruption Task Force was formed in 2006 specifically to target fraud and corruption in Southwest Asia and other 

global war on terrorist activities around the world, to pursue investigations leading to—we are investigating the loss of weapons that 

occurred in Iraq, and we are leading and we have a cell that we 

left in country that will continue to pursue all avenues to try to 

connect all the dots and find out how those weapons got out. And 

many investigations are ongoing in that regard. 

CONVICTIONS

As a result of closed and ongoing investigations, over 40 cases involving fraud and corruption have been referred for judicial action. 

To date, 25 individuals have been convicted of felonies, resulting in 

a total of 31 years of confinement, 32 years of probation. Thirtyseven individuals and companies have been suspended or debarred 

from government contracting; in all, about $14 million has been recovered for the United States, and many more prosecutions and recoveries are under way and are pending. 

REVIEW OF CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING

We are continually reviewing the contingency contracting in 

Southwest Asia, particularly with regard to adequate documentation and internal control procedures. Our ongoing work has generated efforts to improve collaboration between the support organizations outside of Southwest Asia and the forward deployed forces 

to help standardize procedures and improve the support in the war 

environment. 

The Government Accountability Office continues to designate 

DoD contracting management as a high-risk area, and has done so 

since 1992. And I think Mr. Walker discussed that with you in his 

appearance here last week. Since 2000, our office has issued over 

265 reports that have identified problems and made recommendations for improvements in the Department’s contracting and contract-related processes. 


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The Department continues to experience the management challenge to ensure that we have the right high-quality materials and 

services at the right place at the right time and in the right numbers to support the warfighter, at the same time, trying to make 

sure that we are doing everything we can to be good stewards in 

Defense and be cost-effective. 

The DoD acquisition workforce has not kept pace with the rapidly expanding demands for increased contract support, and I think 

you heard that from Lieutenant General Thompson, who was here 

last week. There are not enough contracting officers, administrative support, and contracting officer representatives, and there has 

been a lack of senior leadership on the ground to oversee the current contracting operations, and the contract staff is not properly 

trained. 

Thanks to this Committee and your support, we are now dedicating more resources from the DoD Inspector General’s Office to 

provide more oversight on munitions control accountability and acquisition and to expand our footprint on the ground in Southwest 

Asia. And we will continue to evaluate the lessons that we have already learned and do our best to help Defense not repeat the mistakes that we made in the past. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the chance to be here, and 

we will take your questions. 

[The statement of General Kicklighter follows:] 


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COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

Mr. MURTHA. Tell the committee about the command responsibility. For instance, we cannot expect the commander who is fighting a war to be responsible for things like this, and yet ultimately 

he is responsible. 

Now, tell me the chain of command, how these things happen 

when they do happen, and how the commander reacts to it in the 

process, as you have seen it. For instance, when those weapons disappeared on the dock, as I understand it—first, I am talking about 

what, 2003–2004, something like that? 

General KICKLIGHTER. Right. 

Mr. MURTHA. How did you find out about it? I know you talked 

about the Turkish response, the hotline, but what was the commander’s response? I am trying to get a feel here for how far we 

hold commanders responsible for what goes on in a situation like 

that. 

General KICKLIGHTER. The commander that has been tasked 

with the responsibility for training and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces, both the military and the police—initially, State had 

responsibility for the police, but some time later it was transferred 

to Defense. 

Defense now has that responsibility. The responsible commander 

on the ground that watches that on a daily basis and continually 

ensures that we are doing the right things is the training commander for the Iraqi Security Forces, which is Lieutenant General 

Dubik. He has been on the ground for about 6 months now, I think. 

In my opinion, he is very focused on this problem. He is taking a 

lot of action. 

He also has a couple of general officers. One is focused on training the military, and one is focused on training the police. They are 

doing their best to make sure not only are we doing all we can to 

control the weapons coming in and ammunition, but training the 

Iraqi forces, both the military and the police, to do the same thing. 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, what I am trying to figure out, in Abu Ghraib 

they ignored the comments they were getting from under—people 

were saying there was a problem and they ignored it. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Right. 

Mr. MURTHA. Are you saying here, as soon as they found out that 

the weapons were missing, the commanders immediately and decisively looked into it? 

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir. I am saying when this thing 

started unfolding, as soon as the picture began to clarify itself, we 

notified the senior leadership here, we notified the senior leadership at CENTCOM, who notified the senior leadership on the 

ground that there was a problem. We notified our committees. And 

then we put a team together to see what the size and gravity of 

the problem was. 

Mr. MURTHA. So the commander does not have to worry about 

knowing about it initially, but once he finds out about it, he has 

to implement a plan to get it under control? 

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir. But he should know about it initially. He should—— 


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Mr. MURTHA. When I say ‘‘initially,’’ I mean the reports do not 

necessarily go right to him. 

General KICKLIGHTER. No, sir, they do not. In fact, this came 

through the hotline and other ways that we began to hear that 

weapons were not being controlled as well as they should have 

been. 

MONETARY LOSS

Mr. MURTHA. What was the actual loss in money? I know some 

lives were lost because the weapons got in to whoever it was, al 

Qaeda’s or somebody’s hands. But what was the actual loss of 

money we are talking about here? 

General KICKLIGHTER. Mr. Chairman, I will have to get back to 

you. We do have those numbers, but I do not have them at my fingertips, what the numbers of—and I am not sure we know exactly 

how many weapons were lost. 

We know how many weapons were not properly accounted for, 

but we do not know—but we are attempting to find out how many 

weapons were lost, and we are also trying to put back together the 

circumstances that happened to let this occur and hold people responsible, even though it happened some time ago. We are trying 

to put that back together. 

RESOURCES FOR INVESTIGATIONS

Mr. MURTHA. But what we are trying to figure out, we put $48 

million extra in for this type of thing last year. What we are trying 

to figure out is if you need more money. 

Now, we also said—at Mr. Moran’s suggestion, we put GSA people into the position of contract officers, because of course they are 

trained. Well, we went to the Senate and they said, Let’s encourage 

them. So we did not get very far with that. 

But if you need money or resources, we need to know about it. 

That is what I am trying to get to. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir. 

Let me say that the funding that you did provide to us has greatly enhanced our ability for 2008 and beyond. We are going to add 

more auditors that will focus on audits of contracting. We have 

added more criminal investigators. We have added the support 

staff for that. We have added investigators, and we have upped our 

commitment to Southwest Asia, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, as 

a result of your support of the Department of Defense Inspector 

General’s Office. 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, I appreciate that. This was Bill Young’s suggestion, so we appreciate that that is what happened. 

Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

General, it is good to see you again. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Thank you, sir. 

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Mr. YOUNG. I know that last year you gave—Mr. Murtha and 

you and I sat down together and we went over some very interesting details about very similar issues that we are talking about 


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today. And I know you probably still cannot get into that any further here today, but I am interested in your comment that you had 

notified the senior leadership at CENTCOM and other command 

structures, and you said that you had issued, I think, 265 reports. 

Did anything ever come of any of that? Were there any changes? 

Were there any improvements, anything that you noticed that was 

done differently because of all of the work that you had done? 

General KICKLIGHTER. Let me, Congressman—let me answer 

that in two ways; and I will ask Ms. Ugone to join me at the tail 

end of this. 

I can tell you that the effort, as soon as we uncovered this problem of weapons and accountability and ammunition and explosives, 

there was tremendous activity taking place in the Department of 

Defense and great support from Congress. CENTCOM was very 

alarmed and concerned about this; and so was the senior leadership on the ground in Iraq, and as we began to go through this assessment, they had a person on the team with us, and we were frequently debriefing General Dubik and General Petraeus on the 

ground. And as they discovered things that they thought needed 

action to be taken, they moved out on it. 

Since we have returned, we have gotten a report from General 

Dempsey, who is a deputy commander at CENTCOM, a list of the 

actions that they have taken. There have been a great deal of actions in regards to this assessment. And as I said earlier, we are 

going to put the same team back on the ground in a few weeks to 

assess how well this progress has continued and look at a couple 

other areas in more depth. Foreign military sales and the 

sustainment base are two of those areas. 

Mary, do you want to talk about the results we have had from 

the audits we have conducted over time? 

AUDIT REPORTS

Ms. UGONE. Certainly. 

The 265 that you referred to are contract management audit reports we have issued since fiscal year 2000 or calendar year 2000. 

And those are systemic issues that have existed since 1992, when 

GAO highlighted those, and those systemic issues continue even in 

a wartime environment. 

What happens in a wartime environment, as you know, is, there 

is pressure, time pressure for results, so there is an increased vulnerability for those systemic issues to become magnified. 

Issues that we have identified to date in our summary of Southwest Asia audit reports, which is a combination of work done by 

GAO, SIGIR, Army Audit Agency, Air Force Audit Agency and our 

organization, highlight that those weaknesses are the same weaknesses or similar to the weaknesses we have identified since fiscal 

year 2000. So it has not changed. Those systemic weaknesses continue in requirements definition, in sourcing, in having proper delivery, in having appropriate funds management. Those continue 

even in Southwest Asia. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Congressman, let me add one other comment. 

Ms. Ugone has a team going back and looking at all the reports 

that we have issued on Southwest Asia, not just in DoD. But she 


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is looking at the Army Audit Agency, she is looking at SIGIR, any 

reports that have been done and what their recommendations are. 

And we are doing an analysis to see what trends there may be, and 

also what has been accomplished and what still needs to be accomplished. I think that is going to be very telling. And that is under 

way. 

Mr. YOUNG. When you have issued these reports, do you issue 

recommendations also on how they should be dealt with, what the 

situation should be? 

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir, we do. We make recommendations. 

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

Mr. YOUNG. Could you just—of the 265 just pick out one important recommendation that you made and what happened to that 

recommendation? Give us an example of how the powers-that-be responded to your effort. 

General KICKLIGHTER. I will let Ms. Ugone think for a minute, 

and I will tell you about recommendations that we have recently 

made on the trip to Iraq. 

One of the recommendations was that we conduct a joint inventory between the U.S. Training Command and the Iraqi Security 

Forces, both the military and the police, that they do 100 percent 

inventory so that we have a baseline and know exactly how many 

weapons are in the inventory by serial number. That effort is under 

way. I would say that they made great progress. 

They estimate that more than 50 percent of all the police weapons are now under control by serial number, and about 85 percent 

of all the weapons in the Army are now controlled by serial number. That is something we will look at again when we go back. But 

that is one example. And they were already doing a lot of work in 

that arena. 

INDUSTRY ACCOUNTABILITY TECHNIQUES

Mr. YOUNG. Just one more question. I asked this of the general 

in charge of Army contracting when he was here last week, and the 

Army Criminal Investigation Command. 

Why is it that we cannot learn from private industry? Why is it 

that we cannot take a look at how FedEx and UPS keep track of 

the smallest or the largest packages and can tell you where they 

are almost any hour of the day? Why cannot we have a system 

similar to what they do very, very successfully every day? 

General KICKLIGHTER. Sir, let me attempt to answer that. And 

I will ask you, Mary, if you want to add to it. 

The answer is, we can learn. The question is, have we learned? 

And the answer is, probably we have not learned near as much as 

we should have. And that is something we should look very hard 

at to see if we cannot find what they are doing that would improve 

what we are doing. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. UGONE. If I could just add, I think it is more than just contracting. The information from contracting needs to be integrated 


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with our financial management systems as well as our logistics systems. It is not a stand-alone process. You know, the private sector, 

commercial sector, they have integrated systems. 

If you take a look at the challenges in the Department of Defense, financial management is a high-risk area as well, and our 

ability to get financial systems ready to go and have accurate and 

reliable data. It is all integrated. 

In order to accomplish what we have to do, contracting is just a 

tool to get to where we need to, the goods and services; and much 

of those goods and services relates to logistics, logistics support of 

our warfighters, as well as the ability to equip and train the Afghan and Iraqi Security Forces. 

So financial management processes provide that highlight, provide that visibility, provide that asset visibility. We are not there 

yet with the financial management processes either. It is a complicated environment. 

Mr. BISHOP. Would the gentleman yield on that point? 

When the subcommittee was in Kuwait, we had an opportunity 

to meet with some of the troops there on Thanksgiving Day. One 

of the members of my unit, who was National Guard, the 1230th 

Transportation Unit, in civilian life actually works for UPS; and I 

asked him about his convoys and how they delivered various supplies and equipment. And he said it was highly, highly inefficient; 

and he said that UPS would fire anybody that did it the way that 

the Army was doing it. And I thought that was a very interesting 

comment that dovetails on what the gentleman just made. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you. 

I mean, we keep making mistakes. What do we have to do? I 

mean, we are here offering you help. I mean, that is what we do 

in this Committee. We took on the health care system in the military, and I think we have done some good. 

Now you need to tell us what you think needs to be done, and 

maybe not right now, but you need to sit down with the staff and 

lay out some guidelines of what you think needs to happen. 

I am surprised, frankly, that it is no different than it was. I 

mean, you know, you make the suggestion, nothing happens, it 

sounds like you are saying. Because the money is not there, because—I do not know. I frankly do not understand what the problem is. 

Can you explain what the problem is, why it is the same as it 

was no matter what, and why UPS does a better job than the 

Army? 

General KICKLIGHTER. Mr. Chairman, my opinion is that things 

are getting better, but they are not getting better as rapidly as 

they should. And there is a lot more that we can be doing. 

Mr. MURTHA. But is it resources? What is it that is causing this 

problem? 

General KICKLIGHTER. I do not believe it is resources. Management. 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, you need to give us some guidelines so that 

staff who are experts in this field can see if there is something we 

can do in order to change the mind-set. 


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Do any of you have a suggestion here? 

Ms. UGONE. If I could just—I mean, there has been progress in 

areas like interagency orders. That is something we have worked 

with the Hill on, Congress on, regarding parking of funds in other 

agencies; and there has been corrective action in that arena. That 

has been billions of dollars where DoD has used other vehicles inappropriately. 

But where—you know, one of the things, if you go back into the 

history of the procurement dollars, in fiscal year 2000 you have 

half of what we spent in 2007. $600 billion in 2007; in fiscal year 

2000, it was half of that amount. So part of it is the dollars are 

going up, and your workforce is either flattening or declining. So 

it is exacerbated by that situation. 

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Mr. MURTHA. The workforce where? 

Ms. UGONE. The acquisition workforce is pretty much steady or 

maybe declining somewhat. If you take a look at some of the DoD 

charts on that, you will see that the actual dollar amounts are increasing, but the flattening of the oversight arena. 

So I think that is part of it, as well, but some of it is systemic 

weaknesses that have continued since 1992. It has not gone off of 

the GAO high-risk area. And there is a reason for that, because 

these systemic issues continue. 

Mr. MURTHA. Okay. 

Well, we are going to take this on and we are going to try to see 

if we cannot work it out so it is more efficient. 

Mr. Moran. 

ACCOUNTABILITY INFORMATION

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You are going to find the 

entire subcommittee singing off the same song sheet on this. But 

your testimony is important because you have got a lot of experience, you have got good immediate staff; and I think you look at 

the situation in a systemic matter, and that is what we are looking 

for. 

It is troubling that, you know, 3 years into the war we find out 

the extent of how bad it has gotten in terms of oversight because 

of a hotline, a tip from an Army officer, who had to remain anonymous. And then you looked into it, and sure enough, you uncovered 

a great deal of fraud and waste and abuse. 

Similarly, the Turkish military tipped us off as to the fact that 

weapons that were supposed to be going to the Iraqi Security 

Forces were not getting there. They were going to the wrong people. And again it is tips that we get that tell us that some of these 

weapons that had gone to the Iraqi Security Forces were actually 

winding up in the hands of the insurgents, the people that are 

fighting us. They were our weapons they were using to shoot at us. 

And so you can understand why this is such a high priority for the 

Committee. 


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CONTRACT MANAGEMENT

I am glad you mentioned the fact that it is not necessarily resources, it is management. And if it is management, it means it is 

attitude, that this is just not a high enough priority. I mean, we 

have got hundreds of thousands of people. You are right that the 

one area that we have cut back on, probably the only area in the 

whole government that we have cut back on is oversight contracting workforce, acquisition workforce. So we probably need to 

talk to the head of procurement and see what is going on in terms 

of what they think. 

But you are making pretty clear in your statement and your follow-up comments that there is just so much in the way of contracting—particularly service contracting, we cannot get a handle 

on it. And while our numbers show that the number of contract 

personnel have gone down, perhaps what is more important, I 

think the quality has gone down. 

I think a lot of these defense contractors have actually hired the 

best people who are in the Pentagon, they bring them over, and 

then the people that we are left with are not necessarily the best. 

And the folks that are in the private sector can run rings around 

them in terms of getting what they want. 

So I do not know how we get at it. But you are probably the office we need to look to. 

Now, of that 48 million that the subcommittee just provided, it 

would be interesting to know how much has been obligated. But it 

would be even more interesting to know what you need for 2009. 

Because this is when, as you know, we start putting the budget together. And in terms of the top ranking Pentagon people, as far as 

I am concerned, they have lost a lot of credibility on this because 

it is not a high enough priority. 

So we need to know from you what we need to be doing to keep 

this momentum that you have been able to finally start going. 

What do you think we should be doing in this 2009 budget? 

General KICKLIGHTER. Let me answer that in a two-phase answer. One is that the point you made about proper management, 

I think—I hope that when Lieutenant General Thompson appeared 

before you last week, he talked to you of the findings of the Thompson-Condon review of contracting. He probably talked to you about 

the Gansler report. 

Mr. MORAN. Yes. 

ACQUISITION STAFFING

General KICKLIGHTER. Those reports—and it is the same data 

that we found, as well; we were looking at them looking at this. 

And we were woefully understaffed. We did not have the trained 

people, we did not have the numbers of contracting officers that we 

needed, we did not have the administrative support for that, we did 

not have the commanders on the ground that we needed to do this. 

And the Army, frankly, did not have the resources to measure up, 

to meet this requirement. And they were turning to the Air Force 

and many other services. 

They are going to expand their contracting. They are going to 

focus on contracting and do a great deal. So the plan is—and we 


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are watching that plan—they are going to increase the Army officers by 400; the civilian personnel are going to be increased by 

1,000; they are going to add three general officers that they do not 

have in the contracting arena. 

The structure and the focus and the talent and the experience is 

very important. That is part one. And they are dealing with that. 

We are watching to see how well that is going to unfold. 

And we are also going to look at it on the ground, not just listen 

to the briefings, but when we get back on the ground we are going 

to look and see what kind of improvements we made in overseeing 

the kinds of things we had to get through tips that we should not 

have. Great leadership on the ground was needed, and it was not 

there. 

The other part of the question about what we need for 2009— 

what you gave us in 2008 was exactly what we needed; what we 

need in 2009, we just—I am not prepared to give you an answer, 

but I will get back to you on what we need to expand the oversight 

that we need to do in this arena. 

[The information follows:] 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL GROWTH PLAN FOR INCREASING

AUDIT AND INVESTIGATIVE CAPABILITIES

In Senate Report 110–77, the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate (SASC) stated that, ‘‘The committee is concerned that funding levels for this important independent audit and investigative function is not keeping pace with the 

demands for Inspectors’ General services in the global war on terror.’’ The committee also noted that within the last three years there has been ‘‘exponential 

growth in the number and cost of Department contracts for operations, procurement, 

research, and construction within the United States and around the world.’’ During 

the three-year period from FY03 to FY06 DoD contracts have increased in value by 

$75.5 billion. 

The Senate report also notes that, ‘‘the nation’s annual defense costs have crossed 

the $500 billion mark, well beyond the annual budgets of just over $200 billion before the start of the global war on terror in 2001. Despite this growth, the personnel 

strength of the OIG has remained nearly constant. The committee is concerned that 

the capabilities of the OIG are not keeping pace, in terms of qualified personnel, 

with the growth in the size of the defense budget and the numbers of contracts.’’ 

As a result, the SASC recommended an increase of $10 million for FY 2008 for 

the OIG to start and accelerate the growth of the OIG. The DoD IG subsequently 

was provided additional funding in the amount of $24.0 million in the Fiscal Year 

2008 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, per House Report 110–434, to improve contract management oversight. 

In the language of Senate Report 110–77, the SASC directed the IG to, ‘‘provide 

to the defense committees, by March 31, 2008, an analysis of the current and future 

personnel, organization, technology, and funding requirements of the OIG.’’ 

This report, as directed by the committee, will also include, ‘‘a comprehensive and 

detailed master plan, with annual objectives and funding requirements, that provides the fastest possible increase in audit and investigative capabilities.’’ 

The report will contain an analysis of DoD IG future requirements to increase 

personnel by 490 full time equivalents (FTEs) above FY 2008 levels by FY 2015. 

This manageable level of growth will increase FTEs from the current level of 1,437 

to 1,927, and allow the DoD IG to increase audit and investigative capabilities to 

better keep pace with the growth of the DoD budget and number of contracts, and 

the increased demand for IG’s services in the global war on terror. This includes 

increasing FTEs by 235 in auditing, 125 in investigations, 28 in intelligence and intelligence oversight, 50 in policy and oversight, and 52 in the administrative and 

support functions. 

The majority of this increase, 360 out of 490 FTEs, will be for audit and investigative personnel to insure the fastest possible increase in audit and investigative capabilities as directed by the committee in the language of SR 110–77. The remaining 

130 positions largely consist of personnel in areas that support the audit, investigative, and oversight functions, such as inspections, evaluations, policy, procurement, 


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quantitative analysis, human resources, logistics, information technology, and training. 

The $24.0 million additional funding provided to the DoD IG in the Fiscal Year 

2008 Department of Defense Appropriations Act has allowed us to begin working 

towards our goals to increase our oversight capabilities by increasing our FTEs from 

1,387 in FY 2007 to 1,437 in FY 2008. Furthermore, we estimate that the President’s Budget for FY 2009 will allow for an increase to 1,474 FTEs in 2009. This 

would account for 37 of the 490 FTEs outlined in our growth plan through 2015, 

closing the gap to 453 FTEs, but falling 134 short of the 1,608 FTEs that we require 

for FY 2009 in order to provide the fastest possible increase in our audit and investigative capabilities. 

The following charts contain the DoD IG budget request above the President’s 

Budget for FY 2009. We will provide you with a copy of the completed Department 

of Defense Inspector General Growth Plan for Increasing Audit and Investigative 

Capabilities for Fiscal Years 2008–2015 once it is finalized. 


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HOLDING OFFENDERS ACCOUNTABLE

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Kicklighter, have we made a statement in terms 

of how important this is by holding some of these worst offenders 

accountable? 

You know, you have given us some pretty high numbers in terms 

of indictments, convictions and so on, but of those people that are 

responsible—and again it goes to the management in the private 

sector largely. I know, obviously, we are responsible for lack of 

oversight within the Federal Government, but the private contractors, are they still there? I represent a lot of them. We all do. I 

think that is one of the reasons we are on this subcommittee. But 

there are not many who cannot figure out a way to get around any 

kind of slap on the hand. Create a new subsidiary, whatever. 

How do we send a message that we take this seriously and that 

if you are going to be stealing from the government, if you are 

going to be involved in fraud, if you are going to allow some of your 

people to get bribed and so on, we are going to come down hard 

on you so you cannot do it again and you are going to lose your 

contracts with the government? 

Have we tried to do that? Have we done it? 

General KICKLIGHTER. We are attempting to do that, and we 

have investigations continually going on. I will ask you—— 

Mr. MORAN. Yes. 

Mr. BEARDALL. Yes, sir. Actually, I hoped the numbers we gave 

you are just a drop in the bucket, because at this stage, a lot of 

cases are pending going to court. 

The trouble with a lot of these cases, is they have so many ramifications. And the attempt is to use somebody that you have discovered and you have arrested to then build other cases and use that 

individual, it is a cobweb. 

Mr. MORAN. It is a swamp, basically. 

INVESTIGATION RESOURCES

General KICKLIGHTER. It is a swamp. 

Mr. BEARDALL. But I will tell you, the $40 million and what it 

is going to do to DCIS, we are extremely pleased. One of the big 

reasons was because after the war started, the Air Force Office of 

Special Investigations, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, 

and even a lot of the FBI, after September 11th, are now concentrating on war efforts. NCIS has a counterintelligence mission. So 

does OSI. And CID has a small group doing fraud. So the only one 

left in town, just about, was DCIS; and we had not grown since 

September 11th. 

With this amount of money for this year, we will bring on at 

least 30 new agents, which will make a big dent, and be able to 

look in areas that we have neglected, frankly, because of the crush 

of extra things. 

Besides that, DCIS has also been involved in technology transfer 

cases, which are key to protecting our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 

marines, and we have been devoting assets there. But the big thing 

was the fraud mission, from an investigative standpoint, dropped 

dramatically, too, because DCIS was almost the only game left in 

town. 


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General KICKLIGHTER. I think the Congress would be interested 

in what we are doing in the joint arena, as well, with other Federal 

agencies. 

Mr. BEARDALL. And that is how we have been able to succeed, 

with the synergy of getting others to join in, and organizations 

such as the International Contract Corruption Task Force, where 

we have everybody joining in, even the FBI. 

It is great because, that way, we can—we are trying to cut down, 

again be very economical with what we have. If we can then say, 

no, you travel here, you travel there, do not both travel to the same 

area. We are trying to deconflict assignments, deconflict cases so 

we are using our assets as most economically as possible. That is 

bringing some success as well. 

I have never seen such cooperation and the National Procurement Fraud Task Force that was started by Mr. McNulty, and is 

now headed by Alice Fisher, has been very helpful, too, in raising 

procurement fraud back up. But still, at times, the visibility gets 

up, but it is what you have then to actually do, the ground pounding that makes a difference. 

Mr. MURTHA. I think the gentleman’s time has expired. 

That is what we need to know. If you do not have the resources, 

you need to tell us. And every member of this Subcommittee is interested in this subject because it causes so much of a problem 

from a confidence-of-the-public standpoint. 

Mr. Lewis. 

NUMBERS OF INDICTMENTS AND CONVICTIONS

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Kicklighter, I appreciate very much your being here and 

setting forth the responsibility that IG and your fine support staff 

have responsibility for. I want to come back to what Mr. Moran 

was asking in a little different way. 

The IG has done extensive investigation regarding the munitions 

and equipment and accountability regarding bribery and illegal 

gratuities. It is suggested that general officers, noncommissioned 

officers, civilian officials have received millions of dollars in 

bribes—millions of dollars. And this series of investigations began 

as a result, apparently, of the hotline caller or a hotline call in the 

latter part of 2005. 

2005 is a long time ago. 

Mr. MORAN. December of 2005. 

Mr. LEWIS. It is a long time ago. 

In the meantime, this investigation, going forward, and we were 

talking about dozens or hundreds or—I do not know how many; can 

you tell me? 

While investigations are going on—and I know you have to be 

sensitive about investigations, et cetera. How many have gone beyond being charged, have actually been indicted, have actually 

gone to jail as a result of bribes involving millions of dollars? How 

many? 

General KICKLIGHTER. I think we have that number. 

Mr. BEARDALL. Yes, sir. Convictions are 25. 

Mr. LEWIS. Of those 25, how much money was involved, roughly? 


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Mr. BEARDALL. Well, I have it broken down by a total number 

of what we have recovered so far, which is about 14 million, which 

again is peanuts. It is a drop in the bucket, because we expect to 

have more things come up. 

And still, even this one case that we are talking about that came 

from the hotline and from investigators on the ground who were 

also following the same lead, it keeps on evolving, and we still find 

other people who we then are going to charge and arrest. 

But the case that has been the most celebrated case in the newspapers, Major John Cockerham, who himself was enriched by about 

$9 million, unfortunately we are still trying to get a hold of that 

because apparently he was smart enough to put his money in Kuwaiti banks, and so the Department of Justice is working to try to 

get that back. But there is still more out there that we are going 

to get. 

Mr. LEWIS. Well, it is suggested here that your investigations 

have looked at Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kuwait. I am still trying to 

get a handle on how many people have actually gone to jail. Has 

anybody gone to jail as a result of this yet? 

Mr. BEARDALL. I cannot break them out by individual, but we 

have a total of almost 31 years’ worth of confinement that has been 

adjudged, 32 years of probation. And again, the initial—— 

General KICKLIGHTER. We can give you a breakout. 

Mr. LEWIS. The statement says U.S. general officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilian officials. 

Mr. BEARDALL. Not general officers. Officers. 

Mr. LEWIS. Officers. All right. It does say military officers. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir. No general officers at this time. 

06s are the highest so far, several 06s. 

Mr. LEWIS. I frankly will want to have a lot more discussion 

about these, because it is absolutely unacceptable that people in 

these places of responsibility should be taking bribes directly and/ 

or otherwise, and literally—and frankly, newspaper reports do not 

help you a damn bit because most of them are uninformed. 

But the real nuts and bolts of what is going on in terms of your 

investigations, and the message that is being sent to those people 

who might even consider being so tempted is pretty critical. I 

would almost want to change your name from General Kicklighter 

to ‘‘Kickharder.’’ At the end of the hearing, General, I would appreciate your taking just a moment and coming and talking to the 

Chairman and myself privately for just a moment, and perhaps include Mr. Young in it. 

General KICKLIGHTER. It would be my pleasure. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Visclosky. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I am fine right now, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Boyd. 

Mr. BOYD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And General Kicklighter—— 

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir. 

PREVENTING FRAUD

Mr. BOYD [continuing]. I want to shift focus just a moment and 

try to focus on what we as a legislative body might do to prevent 

this from happening in the future. 


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You know, as long as we are dealing in money and at these large 

sums, you are going to have people that are going to be dishonest, 

who are going to try to scam the system and take bribes and things 

like that. But it seems to me that, as long as we have been doing 

this, we ought to have a good set of procedures in place that for 

the most part can prevent fraud and waste of the American taxpayers’ dollars. 

I was shocked to hear you say, I think, that there were some 

number of weapons in Iraq, or out in the Middle East someplace, 

that you were trying to implement a procedure which you would 

record by serial number, an inventory by serial number. 

The question is twofold. One is, do we have those systems in 

place? Who is responsible for not seeing that they are implemented? And number two is, if we do not, what can the legislative 

body do to get those in place? 

General KICKLIGHTER. We do have procedures in place that we 

record the weapons by serial numbers. In the beginning—and this 

is not an area we focused on on this assessment—we were focused 

on how we are doing it today. And today we are bringing weapons 

in by serial number, and we are handing them over, and we are 

recording them in most cases—not all cases. 

But in the beginning, it was a rapid movement to get weapons 

quickly into the hands of the Iraqi Security Forces. And they were 

not issued by serial number, they were issued by crates, and numbers of weapons in crates, and they were handed over both to the 

military and the police in that manner in the beginning. That is 

not the case today. 

Mr. BOYD. Is part of your recommendation then, sir, that we do 

not do that in the future? 

General KICKLIGHTER. Absolutely. 

COMMANDERS’ RESPONSIBILITY

Mr. BOYD. Are we as a government holding commanders or people in the chain of command responsible who were responsible for 

seeing that these procedures and systems were followed? Are we 

holding them accountable? Or are we turning the other way because of the urgency of the war? 

General KICKLIGHTER. No, sir. When we find what we think is 

a discrepancy, we record it and we report it. And then that is dealt 

with by their chain of command. 

Mr. BOYD. Mr. Chairman, that is really all I have. I think the 

more important issue is, how do we see that the chain of command 

in the Defense Department require that the procedures that we 

have in place are implemented? If nobody wants to follow them because there is something more important to do, then we will always 

have this problem. 

Mr. MURTHA. I think the gentleman is right, as he knows, having 

been in Vietnam, how difficult it is. You are fighting a war, and 

these are not incidental things. And that is why I hope we will be 

able to work with you folks and the staff to come up with a procedure so that we get something done here, that we do not just talk 

about it every time something happens, we get it done. 

For instance, I cannot believe they would send those weapons 

over without serial numbers. I mean, anybody with any common 


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sense knows damn well those things are going to disappear, especially in that part of the world. 

Mr. Hobson. 

CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, you are right. I do not know why 

somebody—how fast it is or how slow it is to open a crate and write 

down a number. I think that is a lame excuse, the guy that gave 

you that. Somebody was not doing their damn job. 

That is not that slow to get it there. So when somebody tells me 

that, I have some credibility problems. 

Let me tell you, the other problem I have credibility problems 

with is, I have been on this Committee for—I don’t know, 10 years 

or so—and I have been yelling about systems that do not talk to 

each other within the Defense Department today. 

Personnel records is a simple example. We do not even have 

those coordinated, much less the coordination of equipment, which 

ought to be simple. But the whole Department is unaccountable for 

money, it is unaccountable for weapons. You cannot account for the 

people half the time because they do not have their records up to 

date. 

We put people on active duty from the Guard and Reserve, they 

have got different systems than the regulars. So the pay gets all 

screwed up. I mean, it is not money; it is the people and the responsibility of the people running the place. And what I find is, the 

damn guys who screw up get promoted. No wonder you have all 

these problems with 06s. They were probably incapable when they 

were in the other place, and they screwed up and they promote 

them. 

It drives this Committee out of its mind to deal with this stuff. 

Let me give you one example on a contract. In May of 2006—this 

is going to be trucks and HMMWVs, guys. Amazing, you know, 

that—— 

Mr. MORAN. Just shocking. 

Mr. HOBSON. In May of 2006, the Army awarded a contractor a 

major HMMWV refurbishment contract valued at $33 million, even 

though numerous incidents of poor performance had been documented—why did the Army select a contractor that performed so 

poorly; this was a contractor in theater—to refurbish it. 

They did not do them right, so they give them another one. 

General KICKLIGHTER. I know the contractor. 

CONTRACTOR EMPLOYMENT

Mr. HOBSON. Do you know that? I mean, somebody ought to look 

at this and say how do we do this? These people are incompetent. 

Who writes up the record of the guy that did this and promotes 

him? 

Or somebody else said it the other way. I ride on airplanes back 

and forth all the time with people, and I say where do you work? 

Well, I work for such and such contractor. I said, well, where did 

you work before? Well, I worked for the Department of the Army. 

What did you do? Well, same thing I do today, but I get paid more. 

Or the Air Force, whatever it may be, whatever service it is. 


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Mr. MORAN. And you are riding in First Class, I will bet. 

Mr. HOBSON. No, I am not. 

Mr. MORAN. Normally, they ride First Class. 

Mr. HOBSON. Well, now that I am not running again I can do 

that. This is a closed hearing, isn’t it? 

But those are simple things that need to be—you know, there 

is—I do not know that there is any delay. Like we have, if you 

come out of the Defense Department, the next day I guess, you can 

go to work for the contractor doing the same job at twice the price. 

And it is considered totally acceptable. 

But I would like somebody to tell me at some point, I will give 

you the question here on this company—— 

General KICKLIGHTER. We will look into it. 

Mr. HOBSON [continuing]. As to how can we go back and do that? 

General KICKLIGHTER. I will certainly look at that. 

Mr. HOBSON. But this is not an isolated case, sir. This happened 

over and over again. And the excuse seems to be—and I understand the fighting-the-war part. But I think that is used as an excuse when somebody does poor management. There is no reason 

that systems cannot be in place that can talk to each other, that 

can work together, and that people understand how to do it. 

You have a tough job, I understand, but what we keep hearing 

in this Committee is, Well, we are going to do it the next time. 

Well, we have been sitting here in this war for how many years 

now? Seven years and we have—— 

Mr. BOYD. Five. 

Mr. HOBSON. Five. And we have been hearing that same story 

over and over again, and we do not seem to get to the lessons 

learned. Do you think we are ever going to get there on the lessons 

learned at all? 

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir, we are. We are going to do our 

best to get to the lessons learned and do our best to make sure we 

do not repeat them in the future, as we keep doing. 

I could not agree with you more. We will certainly do our best 

to make sure we prevent some of the lessons learned as we go forward, and we will look at this case that you outlined. 

Mr. HOBSON. Okay. But I hope you are putting more people in 

jail that do this stuff, because the best preventive in this, the more 

people that go to jail that have perpetrated this, a lot less people 

are going to be out there trying to do it. 

General KICKLIGHTER. We are doing our best to do that. 

PUNISHMENT FOR FRAUD

Mr. HOBSON. If you run into problems, I think the chairman and 

the ranking member would be more than happy to help you if you 

get push back on putting people in jail. I mean, a couple times I 

have tried to put—when I was the chairman of Military Construction, I tried to put a couple guys in jail and I got a little push-back 

from the Defense Department. I even got push-back on taking a 

star away from a guy who had been taking money. He had a 33- 

year wonderful career, they said. 

I said, Yeah, but he was running the place that should be the 

best and he was playing with the money. And they said, Well, we 


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will put something in his file. I said, What good is that when he 

is retired. Take a star away, everybody says, Do not do that again. 

But we don’t do that. We do not do that. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks. 

Mr. DICKS. Why don’t you go to Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Bishop. 

CONTRACTING AND LOGISTICS TECHNOLOGY

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

What I understand from earlier hearings is that we were told 

that there were going to be high-level meetings with the Department of Defense and UPS and FedEx on their systems. And I know 

that this Committee has heard from countless witnesses that have 

sat where you sit with regard to this accountability, telling us that 

you need more personnel in contract management and oversight 

and auditing. And of course we have put the $48 million extra in 

there for that. 

But from what I am hearing, when you get the additional personnel, it seems as if they need to have better tools with which to 

conduct the business. And so my question is, how much or how effective are you in utilization of current technology, current commercial grade technology with inventory management such that is used 

by UPS and FedEx? 

And our grocery stores? You know, RFID technology where you 

take an item to the grocery counter and they automatically are able 

to account for that, they are automatically able to subtract that 

from their master inventory, they can account for what was bought, 

where it was bought, you know—— 

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP [continuing]. Wherever it is in the world in that 

chain the transaction was made; they have got that instantly. 

And so I am trying to understand why it is and to what extent 

has the Department of Defense utilized this RFID technology which 

would give these additional personnel and existing personnel the 

tools with which to do it almost instantly? 

We are criticized by the administration, and I do not recall that 

the Department really has asked for that RFID technology, which 

would be an incredible tool, but this subcommittee has done earmarks to put it in, for example, with the Marine Logistics Command. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Right. 

Mr. BISHOP. We did earmarks, but we are criticized by the administration for putting in earmarks that they did not ask for 

when this is—I mean, this is current technology utilized all across 

the world by all of the commercially successful businesses, and yet 

our Department of Defense is not doing it, not utilizing it. And 

then we get criticized because we try to push them by putting in 

earmarks to try to demonstrate that it works, and it will help your 

people do a better job of accounting for the taxpayers’ money and 

doing the job that they have to do, even delivering the materials 

and the convoys in Kuwait up through Iraq. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Right. 


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Mr. BISHOP. I mean, to what extent are you really utilizing that 

and to what extent is the Department requesting this kind of technology to give those tools to the people that you are now hiring as 

a result of the additional money that we are giving to get it done? 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me add to what the gentleman is saying. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir. 

ACQUISITION LEADERSHIP

Mr. MURTHA. I think maybe we have the wrong people to urge 

to solve the problem. You see the problem, you recommend the 

problem, but I think we get need to get Mr. Young in and talk to 

him about some sort of—for instance, staff here says to me we cannot find any regulations at the Defense Department level that says, 

Get this show together. 

I mean, here is what they have found, and here is what we 

should have: some kind of a similar acquisition program. 

So we need to get Mr. Young in and talk to him. You made the 

recommendations, you see the problems. What we need to do is find 

out from them, are they implementing them? 

Obviously, you say they are not. So we keep making mistakes. 

RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, do you recommend the utilization of 

technologies like RFID? Do you say that if you implement this that 

you could better account for the materials, the supplies, equipment, 

the weapons? 

I mean, having to do it by serial number is one thing. But if 

every item in a grocery store has a bar code on it and can be immediately identified, subtracted, or added to an inventory simply by 

running it across that scanner at the cash register, it seems to me 

that as much money as we put into the Department of Defense, 

that ought to be done and specific recommendations ought to be 

made on that. 

General KICKLIGHTER. I think that—if I could comment, Mr. 

Chairman, I think that what you are describing is exactly what we 

need for the weapons that we have been talking about, and also the 

ammunition. And we will go back and take a look and make the 

recommendations that you have outlined here. 

Mr. MURTHA. Make some recommendations to us so that if they 

won’t do it, we can put it in language in the bill that forces them 

to do what. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes. Let us look into that. But that makes 

a lot of sense. That technology is badly needed for what we need 

right now. It would greatly simplify what we are trying to do. 

Mr. BISHOP. I get beat up—I mean, we are getting beat up as a 

Congress and as the subcommittee for putting in earmarks to do 

that; and that is the same thing that I understand that you need. 

That would simplify the process. 

General KICKLIGHTER. I owe you an answer on this. 

[The information follows:] 

SUMMARY OF RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION PROJECTS

We are conducting two audits on Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)—the first 

on the implementation of passive RFID tags and the second on the security over 


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active RFID information. On July 30, 2004, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) issued policy requiring the use of passive and active RFID technology. For passive RFID, contracting officers are required 

to add a RFID DFARS clause to most contract for supplies issued on or after October 1, 2004, for delivery of material on or after January 1, 2005. Vendors shipping 

supplies to DoD must apply a passive RFID tag to all shipments (boxes)—primarily 

Defense Logistics Agency [DLA] depots—as well as, send an advanced shipping notice containing the quantity and description of the material being shipped (Project 

No. D2008–D000AS–0022.000). Contractors are not required to apply tags to boxes 

containing munitions and major end items. DoD is still in the process of testing the 

passive RFID technology for compliance with Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation 

to Ordnance. 

Any DoD cargo going to, from, or between overseas locations requires an active 

RFID tag on the freight containers or pallet. The active tag must contain the content-level detail of the shipment. PM J–AIT officials stated that shipments sent 

from the U.S. to an overseas location is typically divided into other shipments at 

its place of entry into a country and prior to reaching its final destination. PM J– 

AIT official stated, however, that a new active RFID tag is not always applied to 

the divided shipments as required. The active RFID tag information is stored in an 

automated information system called the Radio Frequency In-transit Visibility (RF– 

ITV) system (Project No. D2008–D000AS–0044.000). The Army’s Product Manager 

Joint Automatic Identification Technology (PM J–AIT) office is responsible for the 

security of the RF–ITV system and its information. 

CONTRACTING FOR SUPPLIES USING RFID (PROJECT NO. D2008–D000AS–0022.000) 

Objective. The audit objective is to determine whether DoD Components complied 

with policies on RFID. Specifically, whether DoD Components prepared and implemented plans to use passive RFID and to assess whether DoD contracts comply with 

the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) and contractors 

are complying with those contracts. We plan to issue a draft report in July 2008. 

SECURITY OVER RFID INFORMATION (PROJECT NO. D2008–D000AS–0044.000) 

Objective. The audit objective is to determine whether DoD implemented security 

controls to protect RFID information. Specifically, we assessed the implementation 

and effectiveness of the information assurance controls for the RF–ITV system. We 

plan to issue a draft report in June 2008. 

Mr. DICKS. National program, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. We are talking high-level stuff here. 

Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

CONTRACTING AND LOGISTICS TECHNOLOGY

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I won’t interrupt you. Let me endorse what 

Mr. Bishop ended up with and what Mr. Young started out with. 

It is inconceivable to most of us. Here we are promoting smart munitions and smart technology delivery systems, and we cannot keep 

an eye on the ball through using a variety of technologies. 

The fault is not yours, but I think that we have unity in our frustration here that we cannot come up with a better way to track all 

of these munitions and weapons in both Afghanistan and Iraq. 

Let me just focus on one part of your statement here, get a little 

bit of clarity. This is on—I do not see your pages numbered here, 

but on page 6, the bottom of page 6, and I quote, ‘‘Our preliminary 

findings are that DoD is improving control and accountability over 

weapons being supplied to the ISF; however, there remains work 

to be accomplished.’’ The area that I have concern about is, also, 

as the U.S. supply of munitions to Iraq shifts to the FMS, foreign 

military sales, the U.S. needs to put FMS on a wartime footing 

while assisting the ISF in building their logistical sustainment 

base. 


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Would you comment on the whole issue of putting the FMS on 

a wartime footing? And how we can accomplish that? How is that 

going to be accomplished? 

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

General KICKLIGHTER. The complaint in the field, in both Iraq 

and Afghanistan, but I will focus on Iraq, is that FMS is not responsive enough. It doesn’t provide the visibility that the host nation needs to know, and it is not resilient. 

Let me just make one comment that I think is extremely important, and that is that the Minister of Defense in Iraq has chosen 

foreign military sales to be their national strategy for modernizing 

and replacing weapons systems and sustaining their forces. That is 

a tremendous opportunity for the U.S. to ensure that all these 

arms dealers around the world don’t come in there and sell a bunch 

of arms that they don’t really need. 

It also builds strong relationships with the U.S. and the Iraqi 

military as we go forward to the future. And the system is very 

slow and it takes a long time to get something delivered, and they 

go through these bureaucratic steps that you have to go through 

to get approval to do that. Some of it is in Congress and some of 

it is in State, but a lot of it is in Defense. 

DoD has put together a task force trying to figure out a rapid 

way to cut through the bureaucracy and be more responsive to providing and anticipating what the combat needs are going to be of 

the Iraqi Security Forces, particularly the military, as they take 

over more and more of the fight over there. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, the nature of Iraq itself, obviously 

Iraq was an arms market when Saddam Hussein was in power. 

When Jerry Bremer was over there, to some extent obviously, there 

was a lack of controls and oversight. Of course, there is no guarantee that the minister you are referring to in a government which 

in some cases might be described as somewhat dysfunctional, that 

this is going to be carried out. 

Is this FMS going to be carried out and how can we be assured 

that we have enough oversight? 

General KICKLIGHTER. The FMS team that we had on the 

ground, in our opinion, was woefully short when we got there. I 

think they had 12 people managing a program of billions of dollars. 

We thought it should be something in the order of 60 or 70 people, 

and it ended up being a general officer. 

This is going to be the residual organization that stays behind. 

When our forces draw down, this will be an organization that continues support over there. They are moving now, they will have 

more people on the ground. They have a general on the ground. 

The Iraqi military also have to be trained. They don’t know how 

to use this system very well, but they have adopted it and are embracing it. They will turn away from it unless it is responsive to 

their needs. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So the Iraqis are going to embrace this system? 

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, they are—presently. But that won’t 

last if we don’t deliver what they need on time and give them the 


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training teams and learn how to maintain and operate those systems that you are taking in. 

IRAQI TRACKING OF WEAPONS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. What are we giving them in the way of resources? 

General KICKLIGHTER. Well, they are buying this. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. They are buying this, but obviously they 

still have to have some ability to track the very weapons that go 

into their system. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. They obviously have an inability to track 

the weapons they have now, as it appears our forces do. 

General KICKLIGHTER. They are doing a fairly good job of tracking the weapons they have now and also tracking the ammunitions 

they have now. That was not the case in the past. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So progress has been made? 

General KICKLIGHTER. Progress—significant progress has been 

made, particularly in ’07 to present. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you. 

General KICKLIGHTER. And it continues. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks. 

WEAPONS IN TURKEY

Mr. DICKS. On this issue about, you know, these weapons found 

in Turkey. I know you may have covered part of this before, but 

I would like to go back. It says, as a result, we assembled an interagency multidisciplinary assessment team of munitions accountability composed of subject matter experts from the Office of Inspector General, U.S. Central Command, Army Audit Agency, 

Army Criminal Investigative Command, Army Corps of Engineers, 

Air National Guard, Department of State and the Department of 

Justice Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. 

What came of this? Where are we in this investigation? 

General KICKLIGHTER. We spent 4 weeks in country assessing 

how well we are controlling and accounting for weapons and ammunition. We made a lot of findings and recommendations on the 

ground, and the command accepted the recommendations that we 

made, without exception. 

They moved out on a lot of the—on all of the recommendations. 

Since we have returned, they have provided us, through Central 

Command, an update on actions that they have taken. And we are 

in the process of finalizing that report, and we hope to have it back 

to them in final draft sometime in the latter part of this month. 

And then we plan to follow that up with another trip in about 6 

weeks. 

Mr. DICKS. One of the issues you got into was armed weapons 

and munitions which were given to the Iraq Security Forces. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. How does that work. Do you have to work with the 

Iraqi Government? 

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir. 


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CONTROL OF LOGISTICS

Mr. DICKS. How is that going? 

General KICKLIGHTER. It went extremely well. They opened up 

everything. They are eager to have a good system. They are eager 

to have a logistics base that will give them accountability control 

of their assets, particularly weapons and ammunition. 

They have built a national depot. They have built a national ammunition point. They have got regional logistics units. They have 

got division units that are trying to implement—although very 

fragile, implement a logistics base that will sustain their forces. 

They recognize—and they have done this before, sir. As you recall, they fought a 10-year war with Iran where they had corps in 

the field, so they had a logistics base before. It won’t be our logistics base, but it will be their base that we leave behind for them. 

Mr. DICKS. So you think this thing is under control now? 

General KICKLIGHTER. I think it is in much better control than 

it was in 2004, 2005 and early 2006. But it still needs work to be 

done. It is very fragile, and it has to continually have emphasis and 

support and advice from the U.S. 

IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS

Mr. DICKS. Now, as I understand it from our staff, we increased 

the amount of money to the Defense Contract Audit Agency by $10 

million, the Defense Contract Management Command by $14 million and the Defense Inspector General by $24 million. 

There is a question that seems to be whether the DoD—whether 

you understand that additional funds are to be used for more than 

just discovering and revealing needed improvements to contract 

management and oversight but also help accomplish these improvements. 

General KICKLIGHTER. I couldn’t agree with you more, sir. We do 

understand that. 

We think a very important part—and you have given us the ability to do that—is to force change and prevent making a lot of the 

mistakes that we continually make over and over again. 

Mr. DICKS. Are you working with the services on this so far? 

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir, we are. We are working with the 

services inspector general, but as the Chairman remembers and, 

Mr. Young, when I briefed this to you before, the Secretary of the 

Army was at my side and we did this together. We worked very 

closely with the services on this challenge, and you have enabled 

us to do that more effectively, I know. 

EXPANSION OF CONTRACTOR SUPPORT

Mr. DICKS. The question of all of us on these service contracts, 

in 1994 civilians accounted for 8 percent; contracted personnel 

counted for 17 percent of the total DoD budget. However, in 2008, 

civilian pay accounted for 5.5, or a drop of 2.5 percent, and contracted personnel accounted for 27 percent of the total DoD budget. 

I mean, that is shocking. 

General KICKLIGHTER. It is shocking. 

Mr. DICKS. Have we looked at why they are doing this? What is 

the explanation for this? 


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General KICKLIGHTER. There has been a great demand for expanding contract support in the contingency areas of Iraq and Afghanistan. We, to my knowledge—we, as in the inspector general’s 

office, have not looked at do we have the right balance, are we contracting out the right things. 

That is probably an area that we should take on. We have not 

taken it on, have we, Mary? 

Ms. UGONE. We haven’t taken on—you know, A–76 has been 

driven in the past many years due to the push to outsource more. 

We have not looked at the other side of it, which is have we done 

too much. 

Now, we did some work in late 2005 where we identified that 

there was no system to track or assess the cost of performing these 

functions under competitive sourcing, nor was there a system to 

track the quality of work done in-house versus through a contractor. So we started doing some initial work in the area, but we 

have not looked at the other side of the coin, which is something—— 

Mr. DICKS. Which is, I think you will find, is once these people 

get the contract, the cost goes up dramatically. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Over time. 

Mr. DICKS. I put in a provision years ago which they fought 

about and finally got repealed when the other party took control of 

the House on A–76 reviews. You had to have a post-contract audit 

to look at whether, in fact, you saved money or not, once you contracted it out. 

Mr. Chairman, I think we might want to consider putting that 

provision back in, because that is the only way you are going to 

really find out the truth of this. 

I think the truth is, once these contractors get in, a year or so 

goes by and the cost ramps up. If there isn’t a post-contract audit, 

there is no way to find that out. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think we have to be more basic. I think what 

you suggest is—you haven’t looked at this yet, contractors versus 

military personnel—what is the balance that we need? I certainly 

have been concerned since I found out how many contractors we 

had in Iraq. So we need to look at that. 

General KICKLIGHTER. We will, sir. Let me respond to that. 

Mr. DICKS. This isn’t just Iraq, is it? This is for services for the 

entire Defense Department. 

General KICKLIGHTER. No, this is not Iraq, this is throughout Defense. 

Mr. DICKS. You think about 27 percent. That is over a quarter 

of the budget on hiring service contractors. I mean, do you have 

service contractors in your outfit? 

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, we do. 

Mr. DICKS. How many? 

General KICKLIGHTER. But very few. I don’t know off the top of 

my head, but we have a few in the IT world. I think that is about 

the only place we have any. 

Mr. DICKS. What do they do? That is in information technology. 

That is more understandable. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir. But I think your point is extremely valid. I think when Mr. Walker talked to you last week, 


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the GAO is very concerned about this too, that we may have gone 

too far. I think we need to go back and look at functions and what 

functions should be performed by the military, what functions 

should be performed by the civilians, and what functions should be 

performed by the contractors. 

Let us take a look at that and come back to you. I think all the 

indications is it takes a very—it will take a very hard look. 

Mr. LEWIS. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. DICKS. I think my time is up. 

Mr. LEWIS. Let me just say, we all served on this committee 

when we went through any number of reinventions, the reinventing government. Now we play a significant role in cutting back 

the number of personnel for the slots that we are talking about, the 

kind that we need. There is pretty obviously a need to reinvent 

government again, because it is absolutely ridiculous that we find 

ourselves in these circumstances again, and we are talking about 

millions and millions of dollars. 

Mr. DICKS. Billions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we are going to send a letter from the Committee and give them directions. For instance, the contracting out 

in the Air Force, from what we heard in the one testimony, is a 

lot better than the Army, because the Army puts people in them 

awhile, they take them out for awhile, and yet the Air Force stays 

in. 

Yet I found health care service for the Air Force contract not 

worth a damn. I mean, they haven’t done near as good a job. So 

we need to get our handle on this when we are spending this much 

money on contracting. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir. I think this is a very fertile area. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Tiahrt. 

CONTRACTING OUT

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Peter Drucker said you should always be looking for improvements in the way you do business. I think it is a common practice 

now in most of corporate America, they are constantly trying to do 

a better job. We certainly can’t forget that, whether it is in the way 

we contract or the way we conduct business. I think that is very 

important. 

We have done some studies on different parts of the government, 

whether we should use our uniformed personnel, our military, 

versus contracting. The other areas where it doesn’t make sense, 

if you look at how much it takes to train someone in the military 

versus how much it takes to train somebody working in a cafeteria, 

obviously it costs more to train somebody in the military. So there 

are some jobs that we should be contracting out. It just makes economic sense. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TIAHRT. But being concerned about fraud and waste and 

abuse is something we all need to be vigilant in preventing. We, 

in the 2008 budget, put $48 million; $10 million of it was a bumpup for the DCAA, Defense Contract Auditing Agency. 

I know it is not your area, but could you just give me an idea 

of what their charter is? Aren’t they the post-contract award? 


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DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY

General KICKLIGHTER. Ms. Ugone has oversight for that organization. If you don’t mind, I will hand off with her. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Please. 

Ms. UGONE. We partner with the Defense Contract Audit Agency 

oftentimes, but their focus is they do preaward prior to contract. 

Mr. TIAHRT. They do preaward analysis? 

Ms. UGONE. Right. They service the contracting officer. They assist the contracting officer in arriving at some sort of negotiated 

price. 

Mr. TIAHRT. They are technical support, engineers? 

Ms. UGONE. Well, pricing analysts. They take a look at the pricing, the cost, and do a preaward survey about the contractor. They 

understand the contractor and the contracting system, so they are 

an adviser to the contracting officer. 

Mr. TIAHRT. They doing postaward auditing. 

Ms. UGONE. They also do postaward, which is mostly incurred 

costs, because what they want to do is determine whether or not 

costs are reasonable and allocable and allowable. That is their 

charter. 

We actually work more the entire process. We can look at any 

part of the contract management process, because you actually 

have three phases. You have the preaward, the award, and you 

have the postaward, which is normally contract administration, 

contract closeout. 

We can look at any part of that process, whereas DCAA actually 

concentrates more on the preaward and they do also postaward, 

any kind of advice that the contracting officer needs. 

Now, our chain is different. They report directly. The director of 

the DCAA reports directly to the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Comptroller, so their mission is different and their reporting chain 

is different as well. 

DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT COMMAND

Mr. TIAHRT. We also bumped up the Defense Contract Management Command $14 million. What is their charter? 

Ms. UGONE. Well, the Defense Contract Management Agency historically, when you take a look at it, they provide contract surveillance, contract oversight. 

Mr. TIAHRT. So this is postaward? 

Ms. UGONE. Right. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Until contract completion? 

Ms. UGONE. Or termination, depending on the situation on that. 

Historically they have been focused on weapons systems, you know, 

the major weapons defenses, major contractors. And part of the 

challenge for them is not necessarily the weapons system area; you 

have got this huge growth of services contract, so how do they play 

in that arena, so they traditionally—— 

Mr. TIAHRT. But they they looked at service contracts. 

Ms. UGONE. Right. But traditionally their focus has been on 

weapons systems and major service contractors. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Which is all supplying our troops other than substituting work for the troops, because weapons systems, for examVerDate Nov 24 2008 05:14 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046473 PO 00000 Frm 00200 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A473P2.XXX A473P2

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ple, are used for the troops but we traditionally don’t build them 

in our military. 

It looks at the contracts that provide goods and services to the 

military? 

Ms. UGONE. Right. They usually are colocated with a major defense contractor overseeing them, because they are usually colocated with major defense contracts. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Is DCAA also colocated usually? 

Ms. UGONE. They could be. I am not sure of their organizational 

structure. They could be colocated or closely located near the major 

defense contractors. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Okay. We know what the Inspector General’s Office 

is doing. I don’t have any questions about that. 

There was something that looked like this hotline tip came in 

from Southwest Asia rather than from Iraq. We have talked a lot 

about Iraq. 

But this December 2005, or—yes, 2005 phone tip came from the 

Southwest Asia area; that is right, Chuck? 

Mr. BEARDALL. Well, it is actually from Iraq. We just use the generic Southwest Asia, which includes Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait as our normal area. But it came from in-country, yes, sir. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Okay, so it came from Iraq. It was a little puzzling 

because we were talking about Southwest Asia and Iraq, but they 

are synonymous in this case. 

General KICKLIGHTER. The officer was located in Iraq, and the 

company was located in Kuwait but had activities going on in Iraq 

as well. 

Mr. TIAHRT. In your testimony, page 10 of your testimony, I 

think this was the ICCTP, the International Contract Corruption 

Task Force, it went through 700,000 payment records. 

Mr. BEARDALL. Different things. What you are talking about is 

700,000 invoices. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Invoices. 

Mr. BEARDALL. Invoices that we were going through at the Defense Finance and Accounting Service Office in Rome, New York. 

That is the office that is receiving all the invoices from Southwest 

Asia, for pay, for paying contractors, all that. What we are doing 

now is data mining to find other fraud, it’s getting all those vouchers, scanning them in and let analysts go through all of those and 

see if there are trends that sit there and say, well, why was this 

individual—just to use a soldier—why was this soldier getting so 

much money over this extended period of time? 

We find out it is theft, that the soldier has worked in the finance 

office and was paying himself extra money along the way, or a high 

dollar amount for a contractor that shouldn’t be providing items 

that cost that much. 

So we are going to be going through all of those. We have at the 

moment two DCIS agents up there, looking through those vouchers 

being analyzed, we’ll look at the vouchers if we find a crime, 

through the ICCTP they will be referred out to the appropriate law 

enforcement agency. 

Mr. TIAHRT. So the three investigations, three cases of investiga- tion of the $700,000, you guys are looking for a needle in a haystack. 


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Mr. BEARDALL. Yes, sir. 

General KICKLIGHTER. We are just beginning. 

Mr. BEARDALL. We are getting this stuff in, analyzing it right 

now. We have three referrals for criminal investigation. We expect 

that number to go way up. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Well, I am wondering if we have the money in the 

correct pots because this ICCTP, you guys, DOD-IG, Defense 

Criminal Investigative Service, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, Army CID, Office of Inspector General, Department 

of State, FBI, people from Iraq, there are a lot of people involved 

in this agency. 

Mr. BEARDALL. Actually, the three big players are DCIS, Army 

CID, and the FBI. The others are very small offices, but because 

they participate, we obviously mentioned them as well as partners 

in that effort. But it is a mainly DCIS, FBI and Department of Defense effort. 

Mr. BISHOP. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. TIAHRT. Yes. 

CONTRACT EMPLOYEES

Mr. BISHOP. Earlier on he asked a question about the functions 

of the Defense Contract Audit Agency and the Defense Contract 

Management Command in conjunction with the Defense Inspector 

General. You were asked about how many contract workers you 

had in your office. You said you had a few. 

But with regard to DCAA and DCMC, isn’t it true that they 

have, because of a lack of trained personnel and because of the 

enormity of the task, they have had to employ contractors to actually assist in the management of these contracts and in the auditing? Don’t they have extensive outsourcing of the contract management and the audit? 

General KICKLIGHTER. Let me answer up front, and I will ask 

Mary to follow on. 

Mr. BISHOP. I thought that is what GAO told us. 

General KICKLIGHTER. I visited DCMA and in both Iraq and Afghanistan on this last trip. In the briefings I received, I did not get 

any indication there were contractors involved in their operation. 

But I did get the knowledge that they were woefully understaffed. So this $14 million that you invested in DCMA is going to make 

a big difference of our management of contracts in the field. I think 

that is a wise investment for helping us prevent fraud and waste. 

Mr. BISHOP. I agree. But it seems like the GAO guy told us when 

he was here that they are having to utilize contractors in those 

functions. 

General KICKLIGHTER. We will look into that, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Tiahrt. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Chairman, the DCAA, if I could just inject this, 

the DCAA, which does very important work, there are some times 

when they do need to get outside expertise in a specific technical 

field. Mitre Corporation up in Boston has been very helpful, I 

think, in injecting some high-tech experts, especially in areas of 

stress and composite manufacturing. 

I think we shouldn’t put them in the same lump with a lot of 

other contracting that is going on to support our troops overseas. 


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The CHAIRMAN. I don’t think any of us object to supporting some 

contract, maintenance, perhaps that includes services on some 

services. What we need to do is get it under control, is what we 

need to do. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Visclosky. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much. Just a general question, 

because we find ourselves where we are today. In your testimony, 

you mentioned since 2000 your office had issued over 265 reports 

that identified problems, that made recommendations. Later in the 

testimony, you also indicated that you were summarizing about 

300 government accountability, IG, Army Audit Agency reports. So 

at this point we have got a lot of information. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir. 

IMPLEMENTING CONTRACTING IMPROVEMENTS

Mr. VISCLOSKY. We have had a lot of testimony and give-andtake. We appropriated additional monies for you for 2008. If you 

had the same amount of money, or more—and actually, what do we 

do today? Because in some areas apparently we are making some 

progress, but it seems like it is still a mess. 

What one or two things are we supposed to be focused on that 

we are supposed to do to bring DOD around? 

General KICKLIGHTER. What you have done has been a tremendous help for us in 2008, but what we have to do is figure out a 

way to sustain the increased capability that you have provided to 

us as we go forward. 

I promised the Chairman I would get back to him, what we 

would need to continue to sustain that. What we are doing in regards to all those former audits that we have conducted and investigations, we are trying to pull together and evaluate all those and 

try to find out what did we accomplish, what have we not accomplished, what are the trends, what can we predict for the future? 

How can we prevent fraud, or how can we prevent some of the mistakes that we have committed in the past as we go forward? 

Mary, is there anything you would like to add to that about those 

reports? 

Ms. UGONE. One of the things, the summaries, or two reasons 

why we did it that way, one is since 2000—those are DOD IG reports—what we have identified, and it was prior to the commencement of the wartime effort. 

Then we also decided to summarize from 2003 to present all the 

oversight, major oversight organizations and what they have looked 

at. We have taken about 300 reports, and we divided them into systemic issues of which one of them is contracting. 

That, together, using that information, we want to focus our resources on those major systemic issues. Right now, it has come to 

contract administration, so far to date. When we summarize those 

reports related to Southwest Asia, seems to be the number one recurring problem over and over again, which is postaward issues. 

So that is our strategy, is to take this and actually focus our resources on those key systemic issues. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. On that discrete problem. That is the largest 

problem you have? 


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Ms. UGONE. Right. That is our approach. We are going to be 

sharing that summary of Southwest Asia issues, identified with our 

joint planning group, Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group, which 

is made up of members from State, from SIGIR, from GAO, from 

Army Audit, Air Force Audit and Navy Audit so we can fan out, 

so we can actually leverage the rest of the oversight community to 

work together on mitigating and resolving some of these longstanding issues. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. So we should anticipate, if we are sitting here 12 

months from now, that you are going to be able to tell us you have 

made progress and there are less problems? 

General KICKLIGHTER. That we have been able to identify issues 

and make recommendations; that hopefully the Department can 

make progress and resolve. We make recommendations. The Department is the one that has to take the corrective action. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say to the gentleman, before—we 

learned before you came in, it is the same as it was. They make 

recommendations but nothing happens. 

So what I am saying to them is give us those recommendations. 

They have made some progress but not the kind of progress that 

we should see. We need to put it in language, in a bill that says 

okay, let’s get this act together. We have found the problem, but 

let’s correct the damn problem. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. The Department itself. 

The CHAIRMAN. The Department itself. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Sir, could I add one comment, if I could? 

The CHAIRMAN. Sure. 

General KICKLIGHTER. I think we can do a better job in driving 

those recommendations; not just following, making them, but putting on some follow-up and pressure and getting results. I think I 

committed to you earlier that we are going to do that from now on. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I guess that is part of my point is because you 

do have some responsibility. The Department clearly does. But 

summarizing reports and giving it to somebody who is not doing 

the proper job or, in fact, has engaged in nefarious activities, it is 

a paperweight for them. 

General KICKLIGHTER. We can do a better job at that and we will 

commit ourselves to that. 

CONTRACTORS WORKING FOR CONTRACTORS

Mr. VISCLOSKY. If I could, two more questions. You have a—we 

have a question about contractors doing government cost estimates 

for government contracts in one area in particular, for the Space 

Acquisition Program. 

My understanding, about 64 percent of the cost estimating personnel are contractors, doing the cost estimating for other contractors. Is there a danger involved in that? 

Ms. UGONE. I think the Federal Acquistion Regulation—and I 

can’t pull them all out—there is a list in the Federal Acquistion 

Regulation of what they consider appropriate to be able to contract 

out. 

The major distinction is you can do support work for the government, and that has covered the gamut from budget, from helping 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with HEARING
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to provide budget information, cost estimations. The distinction, 

the major distinction is you don’t make the decision. 

But that is where we are in this kind of situation with service 

contracts. That is where most of your service contracts are coming 

from is the service to the government in providing this information, 

the gathering of data which has been determined to not be inherently governmental. And that is rooted, that is in regulation right 

now in the Federal Acquisition Regulation. 

I haven’t looked at that specific issue. 

General KICKLIGHTER. But we will. 

Ms. UGONE. If you would like us to, we can. But there is a governing regulation that covers what is inherently governmental and 

what isn’t. The distinction seems to be data gathering, gathering 

information, as well as making a decision. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Frankly, I think that distinction is getting 

more blurred over time, and we need to take a hard look at that. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Here the case in this agency, 64 percent of the 

personnel doing cost estimates are contractors themselves, and I 

assume at least have enough sense that their firm is not bidding 

on the contract. It is a small community, everybody knows everybody, and I am doing the estimating and things could move along. 

I mean—— 

General KICKLIGHTER. Let us look at that and get back to you. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you. 

General KICKLIGHTER. I don’t want to assume that. 

SOLE SOURCE CONTRACTS

Mr. VISCLOSKY. The final question. And if somebody has asked 

this stop me. Sole-source contracting for 57 domestic bases has 

been identified. It has been estimated that 46 had awarded solesource contracts for security services. 

Is that healthy, and what are the standards for more than half 

being sole sourced? 

General KICKLIGHTER. There are times when sole sourcing is appropriate, but not normally, and certainly not because of bad prior 

planning. That sounds awfully high, and we need to look at that. 

Mr. DICKS. Will the gentleman yield for just a second? 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Sure. 

Mr. DICKS. I have been involved in this, and the problem has 

been the Defense Department has been unable to come up with a 

memorandum that is cleared through all the different deals. This 

is being managed out of General Clapper’s shop—Greg Torres is 

the person who in Clapper’s shop was supposed to be putting this 

thing together. 

So what has happened is we had this situation like Fort Dix 

where they did not have a system in place, but there are contractors out there who are providing a service. And that is why these 

things—each base has kind of done their own little competition between these various parties and picked the one that they thought 

was the best. 

My concern is we hope the DoD will come up with standards so 

that everybody will know how they are supposed to evaluate and 

make these decisions. 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with HEARING
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But what the bases have been doing is looking at the contractors 

and then picking one, and that is how it has worked. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Let us look into that. 

Mr. DICKS. The worst problem is just not to do anything. That 

is what happened at Fort Dix. They didn’t do anything. Let me give 

you one quick point. 

At Andrews, when this contract went into Andrews, they found 

like 1,200 people who were going on that base regularly who were 

not supposed to be on base, some of them which had criminal 

records a mile long. Many of them, I think, were going on just from 

some relative to go to the PX. But it showed you that there are a 

lot of people getting on these bases. 

We found the same thing at the Trident submarine base at Bangor, that people with long records were getting onto these bases because there was no effective check of their identification when they 

came on the base. So this is a real problem. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kingston. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Kicklighter, I am glad to be able to give you greetings 

from Tattnall County. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Well, good to see you again, Congressman. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, if you are a Kicklighter or a Dasher or a Dubeley or a Deloach in Tattnall County, you are related 

to clearly 75 percent of the people. So the general is an extremely 

popular guy in Glennville, Georgia. 

I would ask you for some Vidalia onions, but we would probably 

both get arrested in today’s climate. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Give me about an hour, and I can get you 

some. 

Mr. KINGSTON. On this sole-source contract issue, when is it appropriate to have one and when is it not? Because there is, as Mr. 

Visclosky pointed out, the number according to a GAO report in 

April of 2006 was that on 57 domestic bases, 47 of them—46 were 

done on a sole-source contract. 

I don’t need a specific, but generally when would they go sole 

source? That seems to be the case rather than the exception. 

General KICKLIGHTER. When there is an urgency and you have 

to move quickly, when there is only one source that does the service that you are looking for. 

Ms. UGONE. We can actually give you a list, but the three main 

ones you would think about, as Mr. Kicklighter said, is there is 

only one responsible source, which means somebody who can actually do the job. And the second one is urgent and compelling need. 

The third one would be you want to make sure you maintain industrial mobilization capability of a particular contractor. There 

are like three others in the FAR, Federal Acquisition Regulation. 

We can actually get you the list of when it is appropriate. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, when is it a really urgent and compelling 

need? 

It would seem to me, pre-9/11, some of the military post bases 

had security and some did not. And then suddenly 9/11 comes; it 

doesn’t seem like you would still be inventing the wheel, though. 

I don’t see where we would be in an urgent and compelling need 

at all. 


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Having gone in and out of military bases all my congressional life 

of 16 years, I can say pre-9/11 it was a little bit haphazard, but 

there still wasn’t the need to rush out and get it. Particularly now, 

we are talking 6, 7, 8 years down the road, so why would it still 

be urgent? 

Ms. UGONE. Well, prior, we have identified issues with sourcing 

for quite a bit, and we have had issues with sole sourcing too, because usually it was a substitute for inadequate planning. So, yes, 

it is similar to today’s environment. 

Previously, there was a citation of urgent and compelling because 

of the need to surge and those reasons. But it is the same issue, 

adequate planning versus sole source. We do continue to have 

sourcing issues. When we do our audits, the question is why not 

use more competition is really the reports that we have been 

issued, pre-OEF and -OIF and post-OEF and -OIF. 

Mr. KINGSTON. That doesn’t make any sense, because, you know, 

if you didn’t have security on the gate pre-9/11, why, suddenly, was 

there a panic? I could see, for example, Kings Bay Naval Base 

where you have nuclear—right in the middle of the base that is actually guarded by the Marines, which was always the case pre-9/ 

11—post-9/11. But that gate actually had security, but other bases 

did not. 

It is hard for me to believe that outside of the panic that this 

town always gets in when there is a rush to do something or being 

perceived as doing something, that much of this was really urgent 

as much as it is window decoration. 

But even saying, okay, it was urgent, you know, September 12, 

2001. But to me, I am flabbergasted that we would still be saying 

urgent and compelling would be a reason to use sole source. 

General KICKLIGHTER. We certainly would agree with you. We 

are very concerned about the sole-source contracting. There are 

cases that it makes sense, but they should be rare and the exception rather than the rule. We will certainly be glad to look into this 

issue and find out why we are still using that at this late date. We 

agree with you. We should be a free and open competition. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I don’t know if this comes into your jurisdiction 

or not, but illegal aliens going on military post bases, is that something that you have concern about, because—— 

CONTROL OF BASE ACCESS TO CONTRACTORS

General KICKLIGHTER. We are concerned about the security of all 

our bases, and if illegal aliens are going on—or if any criminals are 

going on, as pointed out by Congressman Dicks, we are concerned 

about that and something we should look into if we find that is a 

problem. 

Mr. KINGSTON. The President, by executive order, did sign an executive order last year that said that people who have employees 

on military bases need to verify their Social Security numbers, use 

E-Verify. Are you familiar with that executive order? 

General KICKLIGHTER. I am not, personally. Are you? 

Mr. KINGSTON. I think it was in August. 

General KICKLIGHTER. We will certainly look that up. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Yes. If you could find out about it and tell me 

how that has worked, and if that is something we need to do by 


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law in Congress, to expand on it or shore it up or correct it, I think 

we would be interested in it, because we have tons and tons of contractors coming in and maintaining the building, cutting the grass, 

picking up the laundry, serving food, all kinds of things like this, 

and the Social Security numbers of their employees aren’t verified 

consistently. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Let me just add one comment, and I will 

stop. But one thing we are doing that we hadn’t mentioned earlier 

is looking at control and accountability of contractors in Southwest 

Asia, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. We are trying to help 

everybody get their arms around how many contractors are there 

and should they be there? 

The way we are approaching it is through the CAC cards and 

making sure that they are legitimate, they should have them, and 

they should be there. If they are not, we will recommend to their 

commanders that they not let them have access. That is ongoing 

as we speak. 

CONTRACTORS AND MILITARY LAW

Mr. KINGSTON. Another question about Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Are those contractors subject to military laws or civil laws? You 

know, there is a criticism that they are outside military law because of conduct or whatever. 

Mr. BEARDALL. If they are U.S. contractors, then they are subject 

to our laws as well. Now, getting them back to the States may be 

the more problematic issue. 

In the case that we are talking about that keeps building, one 

of the main subjects is an American citizen has a home in the 

States but he lives in Kuwait and has not come back, and so that 

may be the problem. But, no, we can prosecute in Federal district 

court, crimes committed over there by U.S. citizens against Iraqis. 

Mr. DICKS. Will the gentleman yield for a very brief point, very 

brief? Are the laws adequate to deal with these contractors? 

Mr. BEARDALL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. In an overseas context? 

Mr. BEARDALL. It is the same violation whether it occurs over 

there or back here. False claims, bribery, theft, corruption all of 

those are provided for by U.S. statute and prosecuted. 

Mr. DICKS. What about the Blackwater situation where they are 

involved in some kind of almost combat in protecting people. Is 

that covered adequately? 

Mr. BEARDALL. Well, in the case of Blackwater, if you are talking 

about Blackwater injuring or killing civilians, that is really then a 

matter for the Iraqis, because there is no crime against the United 

States by Blackwater killing citizens of another country. 

The CHAIRMAN. Since that incident, the Defense Department has 

been more clear on rules for engagement for contractors. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Correct. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say and wrap this thing up, we don’t 

want to go too far here where it costs us more money. Sometimes 

you can standardize things to the point where you have competition, and it costs more than it did otherwise. 

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir. 


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The CHAIRMAN. We want a reasonable recommendation and see 

what this Committee can do. We are going to have Mr. Young over 

and Tina over, because they control this, and ask them if they are 

implementing these plans. Give us some advice and we will work 

on it. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, will you yield for a second on that 

question? 

The CHAIRMAN. A second? 

A–76 COMPETITIONS

Mr. BISHOP. Yes, sir. The Federal employees complain that when 

they are doing an A–76 contract, outsource, that the contractor has 

a right to appeal it, but the employees themselves don’t. And could 

we get the Inspector General to make a recommendation as to 

whether or not it would be fairer, in the best interest of overall efficiency and cost, if the appeal rights were equal on both sides? 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you understand the question? 

General KICKLIGHTER. I basically do, but I will talk to him right 

after the hearing. 

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure I understand what the gentleman 

wants, but we will try to work it out. 

General KICKLIGHTER. I will stay with you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. The Committee stands 

adjourned. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow.] 

IG’S ACTIONS TO IMPROVE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Question: The Committee added $48 million to the 2008 budget request in an attempt to improve accountability and management of contracted services. The funds 

were added for more robust staffing of contractor management and oversight personnel. Funding was added as follows: 

($ in millions) 

Defense Contract Audit Agency ............................................................ + 10 

Defense Contract Management Command .......................................... + 14 

Defense Inspector General .................................................................... + 24 

Total for Improved Management and Oversight ................................. + 48 

The DoD IG has the responsibility to improve contract management and oversight. The Inspector General’s Act of 1978 requires U.S. Federal IGs to: 

‘‘. . . provide leadership and coordination and recommend policies for activities designed (A) to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of, and (B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in, such programs 

and operations . . .’’ 

Mr. Kicklighter, of the $24 million provided to the DoD IG by the Committee to 

improve contractor oversight, how much has the DoD IG obligated? 

Answer: The additional funding was allocated within the agency to cover increased costs related to the increased hiring which translated to more FTEs; higherthan-budgeted pay raise; NSPS performance bonuses; increases in travel, communication, training, supplies, start-up equipment related to new hires; other fixed cost 

increases for rent and O&M minor construction at field locations, and additional 

GWOT-related premium pay and travel costs. 

As of March 25, 2008, we have obligated 47.7% of the total program funding, 

$113.940 million out of $239.089 million (total includes transferred counter drug 

funding). An additional $2.4 million (1%) is in commitment status. Payroll costs are 

increasing as new hires come on board. Current projections are the majority of new 

hires for Investigations and other mission areas should be brought on board during 

third quarter. A significant element of the Audit hiring strategy targets college recruitment so that a significant proportion of Audit new hires will come on board 

during the third and fourth quarters. 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with HEARING
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We are deferring the majority of equipment purchases until the enactment of the 

GWOT emergency supplemental funding. The GWOT request includes $4.394 million for the OIG. If we do not receive supplemental funding we will have to cover 

the incurred costs ($2.6 million to date) for GWOT reviews within our current funding. 

Question: How is the DoD IG planning to utilize the additional funds provided by 

this Committee? 

FY 2008 Estimate 

(in $ millions) 

PB08 Revised Delta 

Personnel Comp/Benefits ...................................................................................... 169,011 183,623 14,612 

Travel ..................................................................................................................... 7,515 8,714 1,199 

Transportation ....................................................................................................... 446 706 260 

Rent ....................................................................................................................... 16,312 17,948 1,636 

Communications/Utilities/Other ............................................................................. 2,679 3,172 493 

Printing .................................................................................................................. 107 200 93 

Other Services ....................................................................................................... 12,717 16,089 3,372 

Supplies ................................................................................................................. 3,235 3,697 462 

Equipment ............................................................................................................. 2,973 4,846 1,873 

Total O&M ..................................................................................................... $214,995 $238,995 $24,000 

The OIG is proceeding to hire 73 additional criminal investigators, auditors, inspectors and evaluators, and required support staff to meet the need of increased 

oversight, particularly enhanced contractor oversight. Five additional positions will 

be filled to meet the OIG initiative to improve training for combatant command and 

joint inspectors general. We funded permanent change of station moves, travel, communications, supplies, equipment purchases related to the new positions. 

We are funding the establishment of field activities at Combatant Command locations in Korea and Europe more efficiently support audits of contracts, logistics, and 

funds as force restructure occurs in the Pacific theater and as EUCOM transfers responsibilities to AFRICOM. 

The additional funding was needed to support the final approved pay raise rate 

and NSPS performance pay adjustments and bonuses which was higher than the 

budgeted level. We have a significant proportion of staff in the Washington Metropolitan Area so the pay raise rate was nearly 4.5 percent versus the 3 percent budget rate. If the additional funding had not been provided, the OIG would have to reduce staffing levels since personnel costs make up over 76 percent of our budget. 

We are funding the GWOT oversight costs out of the core appropriation until the 

additional supplemental funds are appropriated by Congress. 

We were faced with other mandatory cost increases for GSA lease renewals and 

office renovations. 

We are also gearing up to respond to the reporting requirements contained in the 

National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009. Specifically, Section 842, investigations of waste, fraud, and abuse in wartime contracting processes in Iraq and Afghanistan requires a series of audits. 

Question: How has the DoD IG reached out to the Services to make them aware 

of the contract management and oversight help that you can provide? Please be specific. 

Answer: DoD IG participates in various joint planning groups with the Services 

and GAO including a planning group on contracting and oversight to share ongoing 

and planned audit coverage. In addition, Program Directors conduct research on 

planned areas for future audit coverage and reach out to Senior Service officials for 

areas of interest. In addition we participate in the APEX Orientation. APEX is designed to improve executive job effectiveness through enhanced leadership skills and 

decision-making strategies. During the APEX orientation we traditionally provide a 

briefing regarding our office the general responsibilities of Senior Executive Service 

Members. In addition, each announcement letter issued by Audit also solicits additional areas that management believes should be covered. 

FEDERAL EMPLOYEE VS. CONTRACTOR MIX

Question: Mr. Kicklighter, how does DoD define a proper balance between federal 

and contractor employees in performing DoD missions? 

Answer: The DoD IG has no input into the decision making process involving contracting for services versus hiring Government employees to do the work of the DeVerDate Nov 24 2008 05:14 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046473 PO 00000 Frm 00210 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A473P2.XXX A473P2

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partment. However, when making a determination regarding the use of contractor 

support the following needs to be considered. • Is the requirement short-term (contractor) or a long-term recurring requirement 

(in-house) to meet the mission needs? • Is the contractor support cost-effective? • Is the requirement inherently Governmental or closely related to an inherently 

Governmental function? • Does management and control of the program need to remain in the hands of 

full-time Government officials clearly responsible to the President and the Congress? • Can the Department provide adequate surveillance over contractor personnel? 

GROWTH IN CONTRACTOR PROVIDED SERVICES

Question: DoD’s obligations on service contracts rose from $92 billion in fiscal year 1996 to $183 billion in fiscal year 2006 (per 2008 President’s Budget). 

Is the transition to contractor provided services the result of a strategic decision? 

Answer: For the past 20 years DoD has applied civilian manpower ceilings and 

not funding ceilings on the Services that basically allows the Services to hire contractors but not Government employees to perform the functions. In fact, for many 

years the DoD manpower ceilings were actually being cut and there have been many 

initiatives designed to contract for tasks readily available in the commercial marketplace. 

Question: How does the DoD achieve oversight of contracting that is accomplished 

at field locations around the world? 

Answer: The majority of DoD contract dollars are not awarded at field locations. 

Historically, the IG has tried to align resources with highest dollar awards to get 

the biggest bang for the buck for the taxpayer with our limited resources. 

OMB CIRCULAR A–76 

Question: The Executive Office of the President’s policy on the performance of 

commercial type activities, OMB Circular A–76, states: ‘‘The longstanding policy of 

the federal government has been to rely on the private sector for needed commercial 

services. To ensure that the American people receive maximum value for their tax 

dollars, commercial activities should be subject to the forces of competition’’. 

What is the definition of ‘‘commercial type activities’’? What should it be? 

Answer: The A–76 policy statement provides the following definition for ‘‘Commercial Activity’’: 

A recurring service that could be performed by the private sector. This recurring service is an agency requirement that is funded and controlled through a 

contract, fee-for-service agreement, or performance by government personnel. 

Under the A–76 policy statement, the Government must characterize the activities that are performed by Government personnel as commercial activities that 

could be performed by contractors or inherently governmental activities that must 

be performed by Government personnel. As noted in the A–76 policy statement: 

An inherently governmental activity is an activity that is so intimately related to 

the public interest as to mandate performance by government personnel. These activities require the exercise of substantial discretion in applying government authority and/or in making decisions for the government. 

In contrast, an activity may be provided by contract support where the contractor 

does not have the authority to decide on the course of action, but is tasked to develop options or implement a course of action, with agency oversight. 

Additional guidance as to what could be considered a ‘‘commercial service’’ is set 

forth in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (‘‘FAR’’). For example, the definition of 

‘‘commercial item’’ set forth in FAR 2.101 includes the following: 

‘‘Commercial item’’ means— 

(6) Services of a type offered and sold competitively in substantial quantities 

in the commercial marketplace based on established catalog or market prices 

for specific tasks performed or specific outcomes to be achieved and under 

standard commercial terms and conditions. 

The definition contained in FAR 2.101 of ‘‘inherently governmental functions’’ also 

indicates that: 

(2) Inherently governmental functions do not normally include gathering information for or providing advice, opinions, recommendations, or ideas to Government officials. They also do not include functions that are primarily ministerial and internal in nature, such as building security, mail operations, operation 

of cafeterias, housekeeping, facilities operations and maintenance, warehouse 

operations, motor vehicle fleet management operations, or other routine electrical or mechanical services. 


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FAR 7.503(d) provides a list of examples of functions generally not considered to 

be inherently governmental functions. FAR 7.503(d) further states that the list is 

not all inclusive and notes that services and actions that are not considered to be 

inherently governmental functions may approach being in that category because of 

the nature of the function, the manner in which the contractor performs the contract, or the manner in which the Government administers contractor performance. 

Question: Does DoD, in making decisions to contract for services, have sound decision-making processes to ensure that savings will result from using contractors to 

meet a mission requirement? 

Answer: Recent coverage by the DoD IG has found a variety of problems related 

to contracting for services. Areas where our reports have found problems include a 

lack of justification of price reasonableness and inadequate surveillance of contractor performance. 

Question: If not what should be done by Congress to get DoD to put such safeguards into place? 

Answer: Our audits have made recommendations for various improvements in 

contracting for services. Congress and DoD have taken actions based on our reports 

to improve safeguards. Our audit plans include additional audit coverage of service 

contracts. This coverage should disclose strengths or weaknesses in contracting and 

provide a basis for future recommendations for further improvements. 

Question: What risks does DoD face with its growing reliance on contractors, and 

what steps can Congress take to reduce contracting vulnerabilities especially in contingency situations, such as has occurred in Iraq when large amounts of money flow 

quickly to address pressing needs? 

Answer: Tradeoffs include balancing the need to retain a staff of exceptionally 

strong executives, scientists, engineers, and acquisition officials within DoD versus 

obtaining the expertise from contractors. Another tradeoff is the degree of control 

retained by the Government. The Government loses some degree of control when 

functions are contracted out. 

The following things need to be considered when making decisions about using 

contractor support. 

• Is the requirement short-term (contractor) or a long-term recurring requirement 

(in-house) to meet the mission needs? 

• Is the contractor support cost-effective? 

• Is the requirement inherently Governmental or closely related to an inherently 

Governmental function? 

• Does management and control of the program need to remain in the hands of 

full-time Government officials clearly responsible to the President and the Congress? 

• Can the Department provide adequate surveillance over contractor personnel? 

The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act of 2007 (Public Law 109– 

364) directed the DoD to convene a panel of senior leaders to conduct Departmentwide reviews of progress to eliminate areas of vulnerability of the defense contracting system that allow fraud, waste, and abuse to occur. The panel was to review the report of the Comptroller General required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006 (Public Law 109–163) related to these areas of vulnerability, 

and to recommend changes in law, regulations, and policy deemed necessary. 

The DoD IG representative is a member of the overall Panel on Contracting Integrity, a member of the subcommittee on Adequate Pricing, and is Chairman of the 

Procurement Fraud Indicators subcommittee. The Procurement Fraud Indicators 

subcommittee is identifying what these indicators are and how they should best be 

addressed and used for the contracting/acquisition workforce. 

DATABASE TO TRACK THE NUMBER OF DEPLOYED CONTRACTORS

Question: In January 2007, DoD set up a database called Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) to identify and track for DoD the number of 

deployed contractors. It is not clear if DoD is able to track the number of the private 

sector contractors who are deployed. 

Mr. Kicklighter, can DoD track the number of deployed contractors and subcontractors? 

Answer: We do not currently know the number of deployed contractors. On January 28, 2008, DoD issued guidance on a time phased implementation approach for 

input of contractor data into SPOT. All contractor personnel employed on any DoDfunded contracts being performed in Iraq is due May 1, 2008. All contractors employed on DoD-funded contracts being performed in support of contingency operations anywhere in the world is due September 30, 2008. Also, the requirement excludes (1) personnel hired under contracts that do not exceed $25K and for which 


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the period of performance is less than 30 days; and (2) Embarked contractor personnel, while afloat, that are tracked by the Diary Message Reporting System. 

On January 24, 2008, we announced and began an audit of controls over the contractor common access card life-cycle in SWA. Our ongoing audit of contractor common access cards will determine whether controls over common access cards provided to contractors are in place and work as intended. Additionally, by using the 

common access cards’ data repositories, hopefully, we will also be able to identify 

the number of contractors forward deployed to Southwest Asia. We will provide the 

committee with a copy of this review upon completion. 

Question: Can DoD track the nationalities of contractors and subcontractors performing service contracts? 

Answer: We do not currently know the nationalities of all contractors and subcontractors performing service contracts. 

Our ongoing audit of contractor common access cards will determine whether controls over common access cards provided to contractors are in place and work as intended. Additionally, by using the common access cards’ data repositories, hopefully, 

we will also be able to identify the number and nationality of contractors forward 

deployed to Southwest Asia. We will provide the committee with a copy of this review upon completion. 

Question: Can DoD track the contractors and subcontractors performing service 

contracts who carry weapons? 

Answer: We cannot currently track the contractors and subcontractors performing 

service contract who carry weapons. 

Our ongoing audit of contractor common access cards will assist the department 

in identifying all contractors, including those on service contracts, in Southwest 

Asia. That will enable the forward-deployed commanders to populate the SPOT 

database with contractor data such as those contracts authorizing contractors to 

carry weapons. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2008. 

F–15 AIRCRAFT 

WITNESSES 

GENERAL T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES 

AIR FORCE 

GENERAL JOHN D.W. CORLEY, COMMANDER AIR COMBAT COMMAND 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MURTHA. The hearing will come to order. Do we have a motion, please. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I move that the hearing be 

closed due to the nature of the subject under discussion. 

Mr. MURTHA. Without objection, so ordered. 

We want to welcome the chief to this hearing. Everybody in the 

Air Force must be F–15 pilots, because when we asked for F–15 pilots, they all held up their hands, some of them. So we were talking 

about maintenance problems, about the crew chiefs’, in particular, 

concern about the maintenance, not only F–15s, but the experiences we have had. I was out at Nellis and I heard the same thing. 

So we are interested to hear about alternatives, about how we are 

going to fund these things and get rid of F–15s, so that this Committee can help you with the supplemental. 

SUMMARY OF STATEMENT OF GENERAL MOSELEY

General MOSELEY. On behalf of our nearly 670,000 Airmen, I 

want to thank you for the opportunity to be here today to talk 

about our inventory of F–15 Eagle air superiority fighters. The 

proximate cause of today’s discussion is the catastrophic breakup 

last November of an F–15C during a routine flight belonging to the 

Missouri Air National Guard. We lost the plane. The pilot managed 

to eject safely. Although he was hurt, he survived. I am here today 

with an expert on the subject, my friend, John Corley who commands our Air Combat Command, for discussion on returning our 

pilots and their aircraft to their vital role of national defense. 

This is an emotional issue for me on a variety of levels. Since 

1976, I have flown F–15s and I have been around them for decades. 

I am also the father of an F–15C pilot. And as Airmen, we trust 

these airplanes and have faith that the weapons systems we fly 

will hold together. After this accident, our conviction is a bit shaken, so we are working this very hard. So as the pilot of this particular aircraft and the parent of a pilot, it is important for me to 

emphasize that the United States Air Force remains committed to 

providing our young women and men aircraft that are safe to fly 

to the limits of the design specifications. 


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We realize that flying is a dangerous business, always has been, 

always will be. And because the air superiority mission is arguably 

most physically demanding, we know there is extra risk associated 

with it. We mitigate that risk with an aircraft that, when designed 

in the 1960s, was the product of the finest engineers in the world 

and is still cared for today by Airmen who are the best maintainers 

in the world. These Airmen perform miracles every day. Aging aircraft issues will continue to challenge even them with the unexpected problems that inevitably accompany an inventory that is 

wearing out. 

The bigger picture, the F–15 Eagle’s longeron problem, has 

caused us to ground nearly 40 percent of the aircraft that are primarily responsible for America’s air superiority and fighters that 

guarantee America’s air superiority. 

Meanwhile, existing and emerging opponents are not sitting idle. 

The air superiority environment in which they operate is becoming 

increasingly stressful. New weapons and jammers give opponents 

unprecedented parity. In some cases, these air-to-air and surfaceto-air capabilities make legacy platforms like the F–15 obsolete. 

These events demand our aircraft generate and sustain performance that three, four decades ago we didn’t anticipate. 

Just to survive, you have to fly the F–15 at the limit of its capabilities. That, in turn, is going to mean surprises. We simply don’t 

know what is going to fail next. 

Mr. MURTHA. Say that again. 

General MOSELEY. We operate the F–15 to meet the existing 

threat at the maximum level of its capability. 

Mr. MURTHA. So what does that mean? 

General MOSELEY. As the aircraft ages, we simply don’t know 

what is going to fail next. 

Mr. MURTHA. So you are not talking about the systems; you are 

talking about the structural failure of the airplane possibility? 

General MOSELEY. Yes, sir. Now, we are confident we are not flying an unsafe airplane, nor would we put people into unsafe airplanes. That is a given. But as we look at the threats and this 

aging airplane, Mr. Chairman, we just don’t know what is going to 

break next on it. So the once impenetrable field is now beginning 

to crack. Unfortunately, we have similar stories we could share 

about other aircraft, but today’s topic is the F–15. So, recapitalization and looking at modernization are the things that General 

Corley and I worry about. And we have plans and programs in 

place to move us in that direction. And, more than you will ever 

know, we appreciate the Congress, and in particular, this committee’s consistently strong support for our Airmen to fly these airplanes and maintain these airplanes and serve as key members of 

the joint team, alongside Soldiers, Sailors, Marines and Coast 

Guardsmen. 

Now, sir, if you will allow me, with more details about the 2 November F–15 mishap and about our ‘‘Get Well’’ plan, I offer General John Corley—also an F–15 pilot and Commander of Air Combat Command. 


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F–15 MISHAP

General CORLEY. Thank you, Chief. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, in terms of the opportunity to be with you today along with 

the distinguished Members of Congress. 

As the Chief alluded to, F–15s really primarily have proudly 

watched over this Nation in terms of air superiority for more than 

three decades now. That remains kind of fundamental for the air 

defense and air dominance for the United States. Its previous durability was pretty much unmatched and had been unmatched for 

more than 6 million hours worth of flying time. But on 2 November—prior to 2 November, I would say—F–15 pilots were always 

confident that their aircraft was not going to snap in half. We have 

got to restore that confidence in terms of their tools they use to defend this Nation, sir. So here are the facts on the accident, sir. 

On 2 November, an F–15C out of St. Louis and our Missouri Air 

National Guard suffered catastrophic structural failure. It broke 

apart in flight. One of the first reports back to us was we had two 

major parts of this airplane separated by about half a mile, with 

other parts spread across the landscape a half mile wide by about 

three miles long. We are just extremely grateful, as the Chief said, 

that the pilot was able to get out of the airplane. He did suffer 

some fairly severe injuries, a dislocated shoulder, broken bones, 

surgery, some blood problems, some other related damage. He is 

lucky to be alive, sir. 

The incident, I guess, does highlight the risks that are inherent 

in terms of our fighting fliers, and it is a risk that we try to manage in the defense of this Nation and our pilots manage it every 

day. But that 2 November incident, sir, served us up a notice. The 

notice is: What happens when these aging fleets add risk to our 

ability to be able to perform the mission that this Nation asked of 

us? 

On the 3rd of November, right after that accident, we stood down 

the F–15s; a couple of days after that, I convened an accident investigation team so we could get at the root causes of this particular mishap. And from the beginning, we wanted to be transparent in terms of what was the cause. 

Really, and I would say it was a partnership in the investigation 

of the best, as far as minds, of our F–15 Logistics Center, the Air 

Force Laboratory, the Boeing Corporation, and academia all coming 

together to find out what caused this problem. We spent over 5,000 

hours sifting through the wreckage we found spread across; and 

the accident team did find a smoking gun for this particular airplane, 80–0034. It was a four-inch-long fatigued crack in the longeron. 

Now, a longeron is, really, it is the structure of the airplane. It 

is the backbone of the airplane. It is what the ribs connect to. But 

in this case, this aging airplane had brittle bones in it, and one of 

those brittle bones snapped. Those longerons connect the fore and 

aft sections of the airplane, and in this case this longeron and fatigue crack was in a place where it was about 60 percent too thin. 

Over time, that stress, that twist, that pulling, that pushing pulled 

in an area causing a crack. The crack grew until it eventually 

snapped, and so did this particular airplane. 


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Now, following the finding of what was at the root of this airplane accident, we took that accident team out and debriefed the 

recommendations of the Logistics Center, and we released 259 of 

the 441 A through D model F–15s back to flight. We put them back 

in the air. That left us about 40 percent. We did not—because as 

we inspected those airplanes, 40 percent were not to blueprint 

specification. And before we released them to flight, sir, we wanted 

to make sure, one, no cracked longerons; two, that the longeron 

thickness met specification; three, that there were no rough spots 

in those longerons that connect the ribs of the airplane. 

Now, the 40 percent that did not meet those criteria, including 

nine other airplanes that we actually found cracks in, cracks that 

would have also resulted in broken longerons and failed catastrophic airplanes, those are still pending further analysis. In fact, 

there is a meeting this week, sir, for all the engineers to come together to try to determine what can we do with that other 40 percent of the fleet, that other 162 airplanes that remain grounded. 

Operational impact to the ground, sir, is significant. These units 

are trying to get requalified right now with the limited number of 

airplanes they have. We are focused on safely returning to flight 

and focused next on homeland defense. And the third thing is 

meeting those war plans and meeting other training that is necessary. But it is going to take us months to get back, sir. 

Until those airplanes are returned or we have a way to meet that 

mission, we use other airplanes in the inventory: F–16s, F–22s, 

even Canadian CF–18s, to support homeland defense requirements. 

There is a cascade effect when you stand down that many airplanes, sir, that cannot meet their mission. For two plus months 

we had the entire inventory of F–15As through Ds stand down, and 

now we only have 60 percent that can fly. No one could have predicted this particular incident. 

[The joint statement of General Moseley and General Corley follows:] 


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Mr. MURTHA. Go back and say that again. Give me an idea of 

how it is, because you can’t fly airplanes, is there a threat to our 

security? 

ALASKAN AIR DEFENSE IDENTIFICATION ZONE PENETRATION

General CORLEY. Yes, sir, there is. Maybe coincidental, sir, but 

on 2 November, this airplane broke in half; now, on 6 November, 

three Bear TU–95 aircraft penetrated the Alaskan Air Defense 

Identification Zone. Maybe coincidental, sir, but what I find unusual about that is this time of year, Russian long-range aviation 

goes home for the winter because they fly out of places like TichI up close to the Arctic Circle and normally they are not flying. 2 

November, they turn around and on—6 November. Then they 

turned around towards the end of November and again on the 5th 

of December. 

Mr. MURTHA. So what intercepted them . . . F–22s? 

General CORLEY. Yes, sir. On the 5th of December and the 22nd 

of November, F–22s went up there and intercepted. 

Mr. MURTHA. They turned around when they saw the F–22s? 

General CORLEY. Correct, sir. Once they were intercepted on the 

6th of November by the Canadians, they turned around and went 

back home. 

General MOSELEY. Mr. Chairman, remember, under NORAD 

treaty, the Canadians and the United States do these things together. And so the ability from Canadians to help us when the F– 

15s were grounded is a testimony to this partnership we have had 

for more than 50-plus years. So the fact that the Canadians were 

able to do this is a testimony to standardized training. So it was 

a good thing to have partners. But it was those F–22s and CF–18s 

that did this since the F–15s were grounded. 

Mr. MURTHA. And what does your intelligence indicate to you 

why the Russians did this? 

General CORLEY. Sir, I don’t have that intelligence. I just find it 

remarkable that literally within days they had deployed assets forward, or began to make penetrations, which is totally out of character for this time of year. It is not just the operational impact or 

the impact on the ability to perform the impact. When I look out 

there at the young maintainers, that one has a worry for me, too. 

F–15 MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS

As I look just in the last 10 years, the number of hours we do 

in terms of maintenance for every flying hour has gone up 136 percent. Just in the last five or six years, the cost per flying hour to 

maintain these F–15s is up 87 percent. Our F–15s are requiring 

more maintenance. We are averaging over 800 additional hours 

every time we put one of those F–15s into depot status. 

Mr. MURTHA. They are requiring 800 additional hours? 

General CORLEY. 800 every time those planes go into the depot. 

Mr. MURTHA. This is before the catastrophic failure. 

General CORLEY. Yes, sir. And it shows you the systemic problems associated with trying to deal with and manage this old fleet, 

the number of times, or maybe the frequency to get at this one sir, 

in terms of maintenance actions. That frequency says I now have 


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problems occurring at twice the rate of what they were. For every 

day in the fleet of F–15s, I am getting a demand of three more engineering demands into the system to try to solve a problem I 

didn’t know about before. Those are just some examples of what we 

are doing in terms of the maintenance of these aircraft to try to 

keep them back in the air, redesigning additional patches that go 

onto the airplane, try to put in new doublers on parts of the airplane. 

So in conclusion, sir, we are sustaining this fleet to the best that 

we can, but right now we are only sustaining about 60 percent of 

the fleet. And I hope to be better informed from the engineers after 

their meeting this week. 

These F–15s are trying to regain their pilot combat ready status, 

as I said, safely take off and land, then focus on the air sovereignty 

alert to protect the homeland, then move forward to their war on 

terror missions. But with only 60 percent of the airplanes to generate the sorties, I am woefully behind on getting my pilots back 

up to speed. But it will take months and months to regain that 

level of proficiency and competency to do their tasking, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

REMARKS OF MR. FRELINGHUYSEN

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you gentlemen for what you do. Sir, as I understand, the Canadians having 

met our needs where we were not able to put up aircraft to do what 

we traditionally did to protect our homeland, I assume, as complementing them? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, as a complement to them, though the 

numbers of airplanes they had to support us were small; they did 

what they could do. We used F–22s to fill in the vacancies on the 

F–15s in Alaska. And in Alaska we could have used F–16s, but the 

water temperatures and the conditions operating out of Alaska 

take you back to a bigger airplane with twin engines. So the F– 

22s were able to fill in, and the Canadians were able to help. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So that the F–16s weren’t in there. They 

didn’t scramble. 

General MOSELEY. We use the F–16s out of New Jersey and a 

variety of other places. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The question here, when you talk about 

crack and snap, these are not words we like to associate with any 

situation where your people are doing some pretty remarkable 

work. 

General CORLEY. Sir, could I add onto that. When I talk about 

a cascade effect. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. That is sort of where I am going. Because 

if you have all these planes grounded, and if the F–16 should fill 

the gap, the question might be, that obviously puts stress not only 

on those pilots but on those planes. 

General CORLEY. Absolutely. As I look across these units, you 

just look at Duluth in terms of the Air National Guard. We immediately moved them to pull some of this homeland defense responsibility, and then we moved them again. But the problem I am 

bumping up against is those same F–16s that are scheduled to go 

to Iraq and perform in Operation Iraqi Freedom. 


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Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And we are told and we know that those 

planes are being used to their maximum. I mean, pushing their 

hours way beyond whatever is normally. 

General CORLEY. And today we have got 63 of our Block 40 F– 

16s with cracks in the bulkheads. So we are increasing the rate 

that we are utilizing F–16s to backstop an F–15 fleet so we are 

putting additional stress on those aircraft at a faster rate and 

those two are starting to show systemic signs. 

General MOSELEY. Congressman, could I—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. This cascade issue. Yes, please. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, I tell you, this also goes without saying 

with this committee, members and staff, but I think it is useful to 

reinforce that the way the Air Force has done business over the 

years with our Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve and active 

duty, it is an imperceptible plug and play with our units because 

we hold all our units to the same training standards, to the same 

evaluation standards. 

So the ability for an F–16 unit to backfill another F–16 or an F– 

15, whether it is Guard, Reserve or active, this is the payoff that 

we get for 50 years of integration. And those units in Duluth and 

St. Louis are Guard units. We don’t even think of the differences 

in this when it comes to this air sovereignty thing. This is an equal 

plug-and-play relative to the people who do this. So this is another 

testament to the way we train. The same with the Canadians. 

LONGERON INSPECTIONS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Just on the maintenance issue here. You 

never defer maintenance, obviously, if you are putting lives at risk. 

But has there been deferred maintenance in one sense? I mean, the 

potential for catastrophe in this Missouri situation, that was—then 

you went out and found another 100-plus planes with the same defect? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, let me answer that, and then I will let 

General Corley get back to you. Sir, all the engineering data that 

we had on that part was it would last four times longer than the 

life of the airplane. That part also lives in a region of the airplane 

that you have to keep painted and you have to keep sealed, because 

that is where the canopy closes and the pressure seal on the canopy is on that part. So if historically we have been told that part 

won’t fail and you can’t see the cracks, then there has been no inspection on that part. Now that we know that one failed, General 

Corley and our experts and the engineering experts from Boeing 

have been helpful—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. What do you do, peel back that area? 

General CORLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And I just wonder, a lot of these planes, the 

older ones were inherited from a previous company. Is that right? 

General CORLEY. That is correct. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And I assume those designs are all public 

information and have been reviewed. 

General CORLEY. We asked the accident investigation board to go 

back and look at the records the best we could. Now, the reality 

is, when we talk about airplanes that were put together 30 years 

ago, the recordkeeping, the computerized data bases, of course, did 


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not exist. But we continue to dig through those files on microfiche 

at the present time. 

But your point is, this backbone, this longeron was perceived to 

have a life in excess of 32,000 hours. This one snapped at 5,800 

hours. This longeron where the cracks were, these can be microscopic and imperceptible cracks. In fact, what we have to do is remove the paint, remove the epoxy, and then we use dye penetrant, 

which uses a black light fluorescent way to get at it. And we also 

use other nondestructive techniques. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So you x-ray the wings? Or how you do describe? 

General CORLEY. We x-ray and use other ultrasound techniques. 

But every time we do that adds more hours worth of maintenance 

between flight hours. But we are not going to take the risk, if you 

will, of something that could result in a catastrophic failure and 

loss of aircraft or loss of one of our pilots. We do not defer critical 

maintenance. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am sure you don’t. 

General CORLEY. No, sir. But I will also tell you, on this fleet we 

are now up to 1,763 time compliant technical orders, which are 

problems that we know about at present. Those are modifications 

or problems that we have, including 56 just about the structures, 

sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It is horrifying to a layperson. 

General MOSELEY. Congressman, this airplane has been a part of 

my life for my entire career. The same with General Corley. It is 

a part of my son’s life. I love this airplane, but she’s a 1960s design, the production capabilities are 1970s technologies. Thirty 

years ago we made decisions on this airplane that have served us 

very well. This airplane has done everything that we asked the aircraft to do 30 years ago. And so finding things like this now with 

the number of time compliance technical orders is not that farfetched when you think about an airplane built in the 1970s, or 

production facilities in the 1970s with a 1960s design. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So in some ways, thank God there wasn’t 

loss of life. 

General MOSELEY. They built a good airplane, and it is a testament to the people who designed and built the F–15 that it has 

lasted this long. But now things are beginning to happen, and we 

don’t know what is going to happen next. I guess that is the simplistic way to say that. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks. 

AGING AIRCRAFT

Mr. DICKS. I think this is just a very clear example of a problem 

we have all across the Air Force; that is, aging aircraft. And we are 

not replacing these older planes as comprehensively as we would 

like because of financial considerations. Isn’t that the bottom line 

here, General? We need to be modernizing, and we are not getting 

it done because of the war and everything else that we are doing. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, part of the three priorities I have had 

since day one of becoming Chief of Staff is to fight and win the war 

on terrorism; take care of our people; and recapitalize, to get at the 


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things that you are talking about. We have done everything we can 

do inside the Air Force and the Department of Defense to recapitalize as best as we can. 

Mr. DICKS. Now, isn’t it true that the F–15Es all have been inspected and returned to service? 

General MOSELEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. So the newer airplanes have held up. 

General MOSELEY. F–15Es have a different structure from F–15C 

Eagles. 

Mr. DICKS. Also, I have from my staff that there were four incidents last year. Is that correct? The ones I have here are May 30, 

a Missouri Air National Guard F–15 crashed in southwestern Indiana during a training mission with the Indiana Air National 

Guard. June 11, an F–15C fighter collided in mid-air with an F– 

16C and crashed near Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska. And June 

26, an F–15 from the Oregon Air National Guard F–15 Wing went 

down in the Pacific Ocean during a training mission with another 

aircraft, killing the pilot. And then, of course, the one that you 

mentioned here today. So what did we learn from these other three 

events? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, we have lost five F–15s since last May. 

Three of those have been—— 

Mr. DICKS. That is right. This other is Missouri, broke apart mid 

air, injuring the pilot. And then Hawaii Air National Guard, that 

is the last one last Friday. 

General MOSELEY. Correct. The one that broke up in the air was 

the Missouri Air National Guard airplane. We got the pilot back. 

We have lost two other airplanes with apparent—one other airplane with apparent flight control issues. We don’t know what happened to the Hawaiian Air National Guard airplane last Friday. 

The board is investigating that. So while there is no connecting tissue to each of these five losses to an aircraft, some things that happened that cause us concern relative to flight controls and certainly 

the concern over the aircraft breaking up in the air. 

Mr. DICKS. Now, 161; one of these you have set aside for further 

inspection? 

General CORLEY. 162. 

Mr. DICKS. What is the status of the 162 aircraft? 

General CORLEY. All have at least one longeron—at least one 

critical portion of the structure that does not meet blueprint specification. It is either too thin, too rough, or had an undercut, which 

means it wasn’t built properly. 

What are we going to do about that? Today and through this 

week, the best and brightest of minds from an engineering perspective are meeting to try to give us an engineering assessment about 

the future life of those aircraft: How long will that last? If a crack 

did develop, how long would it take before that crack would propagate? If the crack propagated, how long before it would snap that 

longeron and break that aircraft in half? 

Also, sir, to your point about the numbers of airplanes capacity 

is something that I have to worry about. In that period of time 

from about 1975 to about 1990 or so, we were buying 250 fighter 

airplanes a year. Now we buy about a tenth of that many. So that 

does create a bit of a problem as airplanes get old and come down 


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and I don’t have the new airplanes to come on board to replace 

them. 

Mr. DICKS. Part of the problem is the cost of the new planes has 

been quite expensive? 

General CORLEY. Or buying them at an inefficient rate I would 

say might contribute to that. 

To your point on what are some of the things that my Chief mentioned about loss of control. Difficult to predict, difficult to have 

predictive tools to tell you what part is going to break next. But 

there are some canaries in the mine that help you. We have lost 

one airplane for sure back in May because of flight controls. Don’t 

know about this one that we lost on the first of February out of 

Hawaii. 

We know what the pilot said about control of the airplane, but 

we don’t know what caused it. But here’s what I do know. When 

I go back and look at the last ten years or so, and I look back at 

how often airplanes of this model used to go out of control, it was 

only about two for every 100,000 hours. Now, it is five. So I have 

got ten times the number of airplanes going out of control that I 

had only about a decade ago. 

Mr. DICKS. Now, is there anything you can do in terms of maintenance to deal with those kinds of problems? Can you look at the 

flight controls and have you be able to detect what in the flight 

controls is a problem? Or is it a multitude? 

Mr. MURTHA. In addition to that, you talk about all the airplanes 

or just about these F–15s when you say ten times? 

General CORLEY. Just the F–15 and just the F–15 models that 

we are talking about, sir. The A, B, C and Ds. 

General MOSELEY. And, Chairman, I would add a footnote to 

that. The pilots of today that are flying these airplanes are much 

better than the pilots were 10 or 15 years ago. And I include myself 

in that. They are much more technically capable, much more savvy. 

So the number of aircraft departures I would say is not relative to 

the pilot, it is relative to the aging airplane. 

General CORLEY. That is exactly right. 

Mr. DICKS. We have aging aircraft across the fleet. Our tankers 

are aging. We are hopefully going to do something about that. Almost every category of airplanes, you know, we have the new C– 

17, that is one. We are still carrying the C–5s which are very old. 

Some are very old. This is a problem across the Air Force. All the 

airplanes are getting older and older because we are not replacing 

them. So I just worry that we are going to have something happen. 

This could happen with the tankers or it could happen with airlift 

as well. I hope we are inspecting those as well. Learning a lesson 

from this is a problem of aging aircraft, and I hope we can get more 

of these airplanes and then better qualities. But I don’t know how 

we do all this and spend all this money on the war. 

General MOSELEY. Congressman, if you remember, we have given 

the committee and we have had a chance to talk to you over time 

about this body of work that we have, this Fleet Liability Board 

that is a group of experts that look at aging aircraft. And we have 

representation from the Navy, from industry, and representation 

from resource labs. We have looked at the C–5, KC–135, C–130, A– 

10, and last week—somewhere in the last couple of weeks—I have 


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directed them to take the F–15 now and go back and do what we 

did with the older airplanes. 

And it is a wonderful piece of work. It has told us much more 

about the KC–135, the C–5, and C–130. That goes straight into depots and maintenance and informs us much better. We have also 

asked Air Force Materiel Command to take two off the line and run 

a fatigue test on an airplane now, because we ran fatigue tests on 

the aircraft early in the their lives. 

So take one off the line and break it so we know what breaks 

would occur in airplanes, and then take another off the line and 

do a complete teardown. General Corley and our Air Force Materiel 

Command have engineers who are going to do that, plus the Fleet 

Viability Board, which will help us understand this airplane a lot 

better. So, sir, that work goes on every day, like we did with the 

tanker, C–5, C–130E and A–10. And those are all aging aircraft. 

Mr. DICKS. Again, we have been pointing out, with the lack of 

money in the procurement account and not being able to buy 

enough of the F–22s and delay in getting to the funding to the 

Joint Strike Fighter, the time it has taken to bring this on, I mean, 

this is what we are left with. And I think, as you all believe in and 

I believe in, air superiority is one of the most important aspects of 

our military capability. This has got to be a concern. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Visclosky. 

FUNDING

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Generals, I want to proceed in the same vein. In the testimony 

you mentioned you don’t just have problems with the F–15, but I 

think the F–16 modifications you find cracks in the bulkhead. And 

you talk about the A–10s and we have had the conversation. You 

also said that the remaining F–15s will have to be drawn down and 

replaced by fifth generation fighter platforms. How is that reflected 

in your 2009 budget? Are you proceeding with that in your budget? 

General MOSELEY. Yes, sir. The Fleet Viability Board gave us 

some incredibly useful work ahead on the A–10 as far as precision 

engagement, a modern cockpit, gun, landing gear, and wings. So 

we have that line laid in to take 356 A–10s and give them to a 

level where we can operate them for another decade. So the Fleet 

Viability Board helped us with the A–10. 

On the F–16s, the Block 40/42 version, which is our precision attack F–16s, we are seeing cracks in that bulkhead. We have redundant paths, so it’s not a safety of flight issue, but it is causing us 

more maintenance time. Because the bulkheads are cracking, we 

have to go in and work around that so we are not operating aircraft 

beyond our safety margin. It is just an aging aircraft. 

On the F–15, from the 2006 to the 2008 budget, we lost resources 

relative to the F–22 funding line. And so we were able in the 2008 

President’s budget to be able to get a multi-year approved through 

the Congress. And we appreciate all the help this committee did on 

getting the multi-year approval. We saved 411 million on the F– 

22. That delivers 28 years. We are now, in our world, inside the 

Department of Defense, we have an agreement not to shut the line 

down on the F–22. We are now going to be working inside our DeVerDate Nov 24 2008 05:14 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046473 PO 00000 Frm 00243 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A473P2.XXX A473P2

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partment on the long lead items to buy titanium, aluminum, and 

steel to build more F–22s. 

So our multi-year ends our bridge account. We have to work and 

we are working that inside DoD and I know that Congress will 

help us with some of this. And that opens the door then to continue 

to build F–22s, which is, I think, the challenge you are addressing. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. You are picking up some savings that, your part 

returns from these aircraft because of the additional maintenance 

to the old aircraft that remain. I assume it is almost a wash for 

you, not that much money. 

General MOSELEY. Yes, sir. The cost for flying aircraft goes up, 

the rates go up. So any savings is eaten up by the old airplanes. 

The same with the KC–135s and the C–5s and the C–130s. Sir, we 

have on our books right now retirement of 55 F–15As and Bs. So 

in the 2009 time frame, we will begin to retire bigger numbers of 

F–15s to accept more of that risk based on more F–22s. So there 

is a fine line. There is a given amount of capacity that we have to 

be able to present to the combatant commanders to maintain air 

superiority. And as the F–15s begin to age and cost more, the F– 

22s become more important. But those are separate discussion 

items relative to the health of the F–15 fleet and what we do about 

it and what we are talking to you today about. 

Mr. DICKS. Yield. None are stealthy, either. We are talking about 

F–22s and Joint Strike Fighters that are stealthy, which give you 

an enormous additional capability that you don’t get by spending 

your money fixing up old airplanes. 

General MOSELEY. Congressman Dicks, that is exactly right. It is 

not a fifth generation fighter. The F–22 and F–35 are those capabilities that will get us into the 21st century. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. The gentlewoman from Texas. 

F–22 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. I am very glad to be back. Let me just 

follow just to make sure that I understand on what you are saying 

about the other aircraft. Because the forecast for the F–22 is based 

on maintaining a fleet of F–15s at a certain level for the next 15 

to 20 years. So if that changes because of the problems you are 

having, then I assume that that is what you are looking at to 

change them, the level of the F–22s. 

General MOSELEY. Yes, Ma’am. That is where the challenges 

intersect. I will let General Corley go through the numbers, but we, 

in our planning, have laid in a number of F–22s and F–35s that 

we believe meets the demand signal from the combatant commanders plus allows us to operate our rotation rate so that we 

don’t get into high demand low density situations like we have 

with some. And it allows us to train our pilots and maintainers and 

go to Red Flag and continue composite force training while meeting 

the demands on a global scale. You have a number of F–22s and 

F–35s; that then is relative to the number of F–16s and 15s and 

how those are retired out. 

General CORLEY. You have this exactly right. To underpin the 

National Security Strategy inside of your combat Air Forces you 

need about 2,200 fighter aircraft. Out of that 2,200 fighter aircraft, 


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the floor was 381 F–22s plus 177 F–15s that we were hoping to 

keep viable for a few more years. That is being called into question 

right now. Plus, your Joint Strike Fighters. So, yes Ma’am, you 

have got those right. 

General MOSELEY. That is the floor for us. 

Ms. GRANGER. And this engineering meeting that is going to 

occur or is occurring, when do you expect the results of that? 

General CORLEY. I would expect by the middle of the month of 

February, but I can’t predict that. They should have more information to inform us. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Moran. 

HOMELAND SECURITY CONCERNS

Mr. MORAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Why is this a Homeland Security issue? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, I would offer air sovereignty and being 

able to identify aircraft or tracks that approach this country and 

be able to do something about that. Should the commander of US 

NORTHCOM or First Air Force be told to do something about that, 

that is a Homeland Security issue, because it offers the three dimensional defense of the country: Offers us alert against unknowns 

and against the Russian threat, which may or may not be the same 

as it was before. But when two airplanes hit buildings in New York 

and an airplane hits a building in Washington, then airplanes flying through the air and hitting things does become an issue. 

Mr. MORAN. Those were commercial airplanes that were hijacked. I mean, talk about the Russians flying over Alaska being 

a comparable threat, I am not sure I buy that. But I won’t belabor 

that issue. Is there any liability in terms of manufacturing that 

have been addressed? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, we have got lots of folks looking at that. 

That is outside my expertise. I am not a lawyer and I am not willing to cast dispersion or blame. I think we need to let people look 

at what this part is and let that work its way through. 

Mr. MORAN. That is fine, except it is a financial matter. It would 

be in terms of what needs to be appropriated. But it seems to me 

it is relevant when we make an appropriation request. 

General CORLEY. Can I go back to the comment of Homeland Security. Just since 9/11, inside Operation Noble Eagle, just the air 

sovereignty alert piece, the United States Air Force has flown over 

50,000 sorties. Every day somebody takes off and penetrates an 

area, and we don’t know who they are, friend, foe, threat, not 

threat. Of those 50,000, 32–plus thousand times, we have done that 

to go up and confirm that. Just over the Super Bowl overnight we 

intercepted airplanes. So it is happening every day, sir. 

Mr. MORAN. What percent constituted a potential threat of those 

32,000 you say violations? 

General CORLEY. Those are all the air sovereignty alert mission 

and sorties that have flown out. And additional locations as far as 

helicopter based aircraft, not counting up in Alaska. As we sit here 

today in our lowest, if you will, posture for air sovereignty level, 

we have got 50 on alert. 

Mr. MORAN. What percentage of those 2,000 violations? 


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General CORLEY. I can take that for the record and go back and 

give you the exact detail. 

[The information follows:] 

All intercepts are potential threats. To date, we are unaware of any Operation 

NOBLE EAGLE intercept of an actual threat such as an explosive laden aircraft. 

As the attacks of 9/11 have shown us, any aircraft can be used as a weapon. The 

aircraft used by the terrorists on 9/11 were not equipped with additional explosive 

or other devices. The kinetic energy of the aircraft itself, combined with the fuel 

load on board, produces a destructive force. This is why we take all airspace violations seriously. If an aircraft flies into restricted airspace, is intercepted, and subsequently maneuvers out of the restricted airspace, we do not know if the pilot was 

testing our response, was deterred from malicious intent, or was simply lost. 

Mr. MORAN. I would be curious, one out of 32,000. 

General MOSELEY. There is another part of this that is a lot like 

a Coast Guard mission. If there is an aircraft in distress, we launch 

to go out and see to assist. If there is someone lost, you go out and 

see. That is a part of this. I wouldn’t tell you that I wake up in 

the middle of the night worrying about a threat to the country that 

we have to go engage off the coast of Massachusetts, but I do worry 

about our ability to provide air sovereignty and live inside the FAA 

and International Aviation Civil Authority and be able to do things 

that are of assistance to Airmen in distress. 

Mr. MORAN. I don’t argue with you on that score. And I think 

it is important to have air sovereignty. I do wonder whether this 

is the most efficient way of maintaining that, to be using an F–15 

to check out an inadvertent violation of air space, which I suspect 

is the case in 99 if not 100 percent of the cases that we are investigating. And this strategic policy was initiated during the time of 

the Cold War. And I think it is—— 

Mr. DICKS. It was after 9/11. The Cold War was over. 

Mr. MORAN. I am talking about the F–15. I thought the F–15 

was, would be regarding Russian air space, was a different climate 

during the Cold War. Am I wrong that we only started this after 

9/11? 

General MOSELEY. Congressman, we have had air sovereignty 

and air defense alert from the Cold War all the way through today. 

The higher levels have been since 9/11 because of the unknown, 

the uncertainty about commercial tracks and where they go, and 

also the notions of defending—‘‘defending’’ is the wrong word— 

being able to cover airspace like Washington, New York, major population centers, and key sites. 

CONCURRENT THREATS

Mr. MORAN. I know we stepped up a lot of our defense posture 

after 9/11, but it seems to me this was initiated during the Cold 

War environment. I just wonder whether we adjusted for the fact 

that the Cold War is not a threat anymore. I don’t like the idea 

of the Russians taking advantage of the fact that the F–15s aren’t 

able to patrol as much, but the Russians are not likely to represent 

an immediate attack threat. 

Again, these are not things I want to belabor. I am just wondering whether the F–15 is the best way to address what it has 

been used for, which is to investigate violations of airspace, which 

I expect in 100 percent of the cases is not represented as a potenVerDate Nov 24 2008 05:14 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046473 PO 00000 Frm 00246 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A473P2.XXX A473P2

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tial threat and, through radio communication, we can also determine what it is. 

Anyway, I won’t belabor that anymore. What we are most concerned about is the immediate concern, is the implication for the 

2009 budget. 

Mr. Visclosky got into that a bit. We have additional O&M requirements within the 2009 budget to address this. I would assume 

that you would argue those are fully adequate. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, with what we know, we believe the approach being adequate, but until we get the engineering data back 

on the 162 airplanes and until we get the tear-down and fatigue 

test and until we know more about that from the Fleet Viability 

Board, I don’t know that I can answer you. 

Mr. MORAN. But you wouldn’t have any anticipation of putting 

any additional request in the supplemental or anything like that? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, not as of 11:00 this morning. 

Mr. MORAN. There was a question that alluded to this. There 

must have been some savings, in the sense that there is less flying 

going on, less fuel being used. It wasn’t necessarily anticipated or 

wanted, but there must be some savings that offset. 

General MOSELEY. I guess, as the Air Force Chief of Staff, I 

would say I was amused by that question because the follow-on to 

get my pilots recurrent and to get the airplanes flying may, in fact, 

cost me more. Once the pilot doesn’t fly for a month, especially a 

young lieutenant, it is not going to be an easy path to get that lieutenant back to being combat-capable in the airplane. So not flying 

for a month is not necessarily a savings in the next month or the 

six weeks or two months to re-qual my pilots. 

So folks that say, ‘‘You didn’t fly, so you saved money,’’ perhaps 

don’t understand the second order question of when we start flying, 

it is going to take perhaps four to six months to get the pilots back. 

GOLDEN EAGLES

Mr. MORAN. Is this an opportunity to upgrade the Golden Eagle 

program? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, that is ongoing. 

Mr. MORAN. Yes. But now that we grounded them, which was not 

anticipated when you first developed that initiative, can we see this 

as an opportunity to upgrade? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, let me defer to General Corley, but I 

think there are 62 of the 177 airplanes that we have identified by 

tail number to be the ones that we keep alongside the 381 F–22s 

and the 1,763 F–35s. That is the force structure, 1,763, 381, and 

177, but—I will be corrected, but I believe 62 of the 177 are still 

grounded. 

General CORLEY. Exactly right. 

Sir, to your first point, once you have lost currency, once you 

have lost proficiency, it takes you more sorties to regain that than 

it does to maintain that. So in terms of sorties lost during this 

grounding period, we will expend more dollars to get those aviators 

back up. 

Number two, when those F–15s were not performing in that 

function, they were being backstopped by F–15Es, F–22s, F–16s, et 

cetera. So we are also consuming dollars and resources there. 


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On the 177 Golden Eagles, I think you are right, sir. We have 

to go back and look at the viability of those airplanes and find if, 

for those numbers of dollars, we may no longer be able to afford 

the capability enhancements that we wanted. To make them more 

military-utility and viable for the mission, we may have to put 

structural enhancements into them just to keep them in the air. 

So I might have an airplane that I have got a structure that can 

last, but I may have to sacrifice its mission capability once it is up 

there. 

CHANGES TO METRICS TO MEASURE AIRCRAFT AGE

Mr. MORAN. I understand that. 

The only last question I would have is that, given what has happened, I wonder if you have reassessed your—I don’t know what 

the proper term for it is, but you do a depreciation analysis of all 

of your equipment, particularly planes. This was not anticipated, 

even though that—and I am probably using the wrong term, but 

it is basically an assumption of depreciation of the equipment. An 

analysis was mistaken, probably too optimistic. 

Have you reassessed that? Have you gone back and decided we 

need to plug in different numbers because this didn’t give us what 

we encountered? 

General MOSELEY. Let me answer from my perspective, then ask 

General Corley to answer, since he is the operating commander. 

Yesterday, I asked our logistics experts and engineers to accelerate as much as we can the Fleet Viability Board investigation of 

the F–15 so we will know on a fleet-wide, systemic notion what 

does this mean to us. 

I also asked to standardize our flying hour metric. We say 8,000 

hours or 4,000 or 12,000, but we say it in different ways. So I have 

asked, let’s standardize the notion, effectively a depreciation metric 

that says when you hit that certain number, we ground the airplane. And I don’t have that answer. 

We say the airplane was built for a 4,000-hour life. Then we said 

we have done some work to it so it is an 8,000-hour life. We talk 

about logged flying hours and equivalent flying hours. 

So I said, simplistically give me a number so that when we approach that flying hour number, we either ground the airplane or 

fly it, based on what—— 

Mr. MORAN. Then check it out. It can go back up in the air again, 

I assume. 

General MOSELEY. Perhaps. 

AIRCRAFT WARRANTIES

Mr. MORAN. Is there such a thing as a warranty that the manufacturer provides when you purchase planes like this? Can you demand it? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, we have, effectively, warranties on contract logistic support on new airplanes because they don’t have to 

go into depot for a while. So we have partnered with, in the case 

of the C–17 and some others, to be able to do that. I don’t think 

in the case of a new car or a house, we don’t have that same sort 

of warranty capability. 


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Mr. MORAN. I am just curious because most manufacturers, when 

you buy something, a warranty accompanies it for at least a guaranteed useful life. I guess we don’t do that. I am curious why. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, I will go back and ask our lawyers, Do we 

have a warranty? In my experience, I don’t think so. 

Mr. MORAN. I doubt it too, but it might be interesting to find out. 

It is relevant to the liability issue. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, of course, we buy the airplanes to fight 

in combat with, so there would be an issue about combat losses. 

There is a graduated scale of just parking the airplane and not 

touching it versus taking it out and having it shot at. 

Mr. MORAN. If it is shot, I think the warranty would probably be 

less valid. A lot of these are not shot at, as you know. 

Thank you very much, General. 

[The information follows:] 

The current C–17 Multi-Year Procurement contract (P–121 thru P–180) and the 

indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity for the Fiscal Year 2007 GWOT + 10 (P–181 

thru P190) include warranties for both Boeing manufactured items and passthrough of all warranties offered by C–17 suppliers. For Boeing manufactured items, 

material and workmanship defects are covered for the two year period following aircraft acceptance. All supplier warranties are passed to the United States Government with the same terms obtained by Boeing. The United States Government 

works directly with the companies that provided the warranties (either Boeing or 

the supplier) to resolve warranty claims. There is also a specific performance warranty tied to range payload. Boeing warrants that at the time of delivery all aircraft 

shall meet the range payload performance as identified in the C–17 system specification. There are no engineering design warranties on the contract(s). 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Bishop. 

AIR SOVEREIGNTY MISSIONS

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, gentlemen. Let me salute the men and 

women who fly these aircraft. I had the challenging experience of 

going up in one of those and feeling the g’s and realizing just what 

kind of stress, physical and mental, they have to undergo. 

Let me ask you this question: The problems with the F–15 seem 

to have highlighted a related issue with regard to the Air Sovereignty Alert Mission. It is my understanding that the Air Sovereignty Alert Mission is a 24/7, mostly Air National Guard mission, where the pilots sit at a designated location 24/7, ready to 

launch their jets within minutes if there is a notification of a strategic threat, something like 9/11 which—you know, anything can 

happen again—which seems like a very, very critical-type mission. 

It is my understanding that DoD has not historically fully funded 

the personnel that are needed to do the mission. So my question 

to you is whether or not there are any plans to fully fund and to 

normalize these critical missions in future programmatic cycles, 

and if not, tell us how this committee can help to address that 

issue. 

General MOSELEY. Congressman, let me take that on in a macro 

sense, and see if General Corley either has information to correct 

me or reinforce. 

Historically, this is not just an Air National Guard mission, this 

involves the Active, Reserve and Guard. So there are Active units 

that sit alert, as well as Reserve units and Guard units. So that 

is a Total Force piece of our operation. 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with HEARING
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Sir, also the funding to support Air Sovereignty Alerts comes out 

of our operations and maintenance appropriations accounts which 

we fund by the units and by the major commands. I will have to 

go back and see if there has been any degradation from DoD relative to the O&M accounts. Sir, I don’t know that. 

Mr. BISHOP. You fund the personnel out of O&M? 

General MOSELEY. You have a personnel account that the people 

are paid for, but the operations are paid for out of the O&M account, because it is flying hours and maintenance. 

Mr. BISHOP. I know the flying, that would basically go for maintaining the equipment, wouldn’t it? 

General MOSELEY. And the flying hours. The personnel account 

pays for the pilots and crew chiefs. Those are in the units now. So 

whether it is an Active, Guard or Reserve unit, they are actually 

in those units now, sitting alert. 

So I am curious. If you will please allow me to take that for the 

record, I will go find and see if there has been any degradation of 

that, because I am not aware of that. 

Mr. BISHOP. I would be interested to find that out. 

[The information follows:] 

The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) air sovereignty alert (ASA) 

mission has been performed without degradation to the Air Force military personnel 

account. The ASA mission is a 24/7 requirement for operations from several fixed 

alert sites, supported by a Total Force of Air National Guard, Active, and Air Force 

Reserve pilots, crew chiefs, maintainers, security forces, and weapons personnel. 

Since December 2002, NORAD has stabilized the mission to support programming 

and budgeting actions; the operation has been funded, and normalized upon execution during each fiscal year. During the two years following September 11, 2001, the 

ASA mission was covered by mobilization of Air National Guard personnel. After 

2003 and the end of their two-year mobilizations, the Air Force’s corporate structure 

worked the Air National Guard leadership and the Air Combat Command to identify 

the appropriate mixture of active-guard-reserve (AGR) billets and drilling reservists 

for the mission. 

The United States Air Force is committed to protecting our Nation from all 

threats as directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense, and has provided 

a Total Force (ANG, AFRC, and Active Duty) solution for totally supporting the 

NORAD air sovereignty alert mission. This support has been provided without reliance on other Services’ air assets since the inception of this steady state activity. 

Mandays are resourced and executed throughout the fiscal year. To sustain maximum flexibility, Air Force major commands balance the needs of combatant commanders with the requirements on a quarterly basis. We continue to search for fiscal solutions for ASA just as we do all other missions to counter the asymmetric 

threats we face as a sovereign nation. 

Mr. BISHOP. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. 

CAMPAIGN AIR PLAN

Mr. MURTHA. I appreciate you coming before the committee, both 

of you. I think you have given us a good idea of how bad shape the 

air situation is. 

For instance, when I left Vietnam, it was 8 years old, the airplanes, and now they are 24 years old. In 1943, we built 86,000 aircraft. This year we are going to build 409—a big number of those 

are UAVs, and 114 helicopters. The Navy is buying 200. The Air 

Force is buying 89 airplanes. We are not going to get where we 

want to get. 

The thing that worries this Committee, and this Committee has 

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yond Iraq, because if we don’t look beyond Iraq, we are going to 

have somebody threatening us. 

Just like you talked about the Bears coming in, or whatever that 

Russian airplane is, coming into Alaska, they are going to keep 

probing to see how weak we are. If we don’t have the airplanes to 

put up there, we are going to have a real problem. 

We are going to help you in every way we can. I know there are 

budget constraints, but we are going to face a $330 billion supplemental in this next year—in other words, 130–200, I am convinced. 

So we have got a chance here to move beyond and buy some stuff 

in the future. This is the key. 

I tell you, another thing I think you have to do to help us, Chief, 

is, I think you have to reassess this cap and all this flying you guys 

are doing. Maybe you have to do it. But you ought to reassess it, 

look at it again, see if there is any way we can save some money 

there. Get rid of some 15s, get rid of these C–5s, and give us a 

chance to buy some new stuff. 

We need your help. We are going to do everything we can to help 

you, but we need to look ahead. 

I see—and I have said this over and over again—I see us competing for oil for years. I see China coming up long before they are 

predicting they are going to come up. They miscalculated Korea, 

they miscalculated in World War II. The Chinese miscalculated in 

Vietnam. We can’t afford a miscalculation. 

AIRCRAFT RETIREMENTS

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, just one point. 

You brought this up last year, and we tried to help you, about 

the issue of having airplanes that you want to send to the boneyard, but Congress, through legislation, prohibits you from doing 

that. 

Can you refresh us on where we are on that? 

General MOSELEY. Yes, sir. We have had some progress in this 

last bill, but we still have a percent of our desired aircraft retirements on congressional restrictions: the KC–135E, C–130, and C– 

5. 

Mr. DICKS. I mean, there are billions of dollars right there 

that—— 

Mr. MURTHA. It is not billions. But we asked the authorizing 

committee, and they did give the Air Force the ability. But there 

are still some political problems there that we can’t overcome. I 

would like to. 

Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

AIRCRAFT BLUEPRINT SPECIFICATIONS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. General, will you clarify for the record your 

statement that 40 percent of the planes we are talking about were 

not built to blueprint specifications—for the record? I mean, that 

seems to me that if this group is tearing things down, looking at 

fatigue—I mean, blueprints mean that somebody has inherited 

some blueprints. If you could, clarify for the record. 

Mr. MURTHA. Say that again. I didn’t catch that. 


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General CORLEY. We had a specification. The specification was 

for how thick these longerons were supposed to be, what the surface smoothness was supposed to be; and of this fleet of airplanes, 

approximately 40 percent of the longerons in them, or in those airplanes, had at least one longeron that did not meet that specification. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So it was milled improperly? 

General CORLEY. Sir, it could have been a problem with the milling machine; it might have been a problem with the operator who 

set it into the milling machine, left or right of where he should 

have. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I understand. If you can’t see the damn 

thing, you can’t see it. When you have blueprints, one has to assume whoever prepared those blueprints did what they should 

have done. Sort of gets to the issue of residual responsibility. 

Mr. MORAN. Liability, some sense of warranty that this is according to blueprints. When 40 percent are not according to blueprint, 

you have to wonder, are we making the manufacturer sufficiently 

accountable. 

General CORLEY. Sir, I think we will continue to examine that 

in great depth inside of the Air Force. However, my one caution on 

this is, when we put the first F–15 on contract, we specified a 

4,000-hour safe life for it. This is the combination of fatigue on a 

part, on an old part. So these aircraft, this particular one that 

came apart, had 5,800-plus hours on it. 

So we specified an airplane that would last 4,000 hours of safe 

life, and then this one came apart at 5,800 hours. So that also is 

a contributing effect. 

Mr. MORAN. I think what we are getting at is, we plan for the 

future, if we might not look at that to guarantee that what we are 

getting is built according to blueprint. If it is not, there is some inherent liability. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Just as alarming as your comment—and I 

don’t mean to take it out of context—10 times the number of planes 

that are going out of control than perhaps had happened in another 

period of time. I mean, that obviously is due to a lot of the factors. 

Mr. MURTHA. The pilots are better than these old guys sitting 

here. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, the pilots are better than these old guys. 

Sir, can I add one more thing? 

The committees have helped us with the retirement of the airplanes. In this last bill, we got more, and Congressman Dicks, you 

know we have been working our way through this to retire airplanes so we can take the money we don’t have to spend on the 

old ones and reinvest. So we have made some progress, but we still 

have restrictions. 

As we come back to the committee—— 

Mr. MURTHA. What are the restrictions, B–1s and C–5s? 

General MOSELEY. C–5 restrictions are still there, some C–130s, 

and some KC–135s. Sir, when we come back for the posture hearings, I will be happy to provide a specific update. 

Sir, the last thing I would ask the committee to help us think 

through is, we look at not just the retiring of old airplanes but the 

production and capacity of the new equipment. To me, this is not 


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just about an air force, this is about an American aerospace industry. This is about engineers, this is about incentivizing engineers 

to want to be in this business. This is about production facilities. 

This is about economic order quantities. This is about air frames, 

avionics, integration, engines. This is about our production lines 

and how do we economically deliver. 

Mr. MURTHA. We are with you. We are with you. We are trying 

to solve the problem. 

This subcommittee has been in the forefront of doing the best we 

can, and we are going to go beyond that if we can. So you are 

preaching to the choir. This subcommittee is in the forefront of trying to add newer airplanes, newer inventory. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, I guess I am thanking the choir. 

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you, very much. The Committee adjourns 

until 1:30 p.m. 


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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2008.

FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION POST-TRAUMATIC 

STRESS DISORDER AND TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY 

WITNESSES 

S. WARD CASSCELLS, M.D., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 

HEALTH AFFAIRS 

ELLEN P. EMBREY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 

FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION AND READINESS 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MURTHA. Dr. Casscells, we welcome both of you to the Committee. 

We appreciate your coming before the Committee and look forward to any remarks. We will put your full statement in the 

record, without objection. 

Do you have any opening statement Ms. Granger? 

Ms. GRANGER. No, I do not. 

Mr. MURTHA. Dr. Casscells. 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Thank you very much for the opportunity to give 

you update on what we are doing. We appreciate this chance to 

visit with you—Ms. Embrey and I and our great Surgeons General—to tell you what we are doing together to address this pressing issue and to recognize right up front that you have made possible what I think is an unprecedented energy, excitement and enthusiasm for collaboration and coordination with our service providers and particularly these leaders with me today. 

As you know, we have a duty to protect our servicemembers. To 

do our best for prevention, for diagnosis for treatment, for recovery 

and, in some cases, to help them transition to the private sector, 

take off the uniform, fill out the DD–214, get their care at the VA 

or private sector and so forth. 

That is our duty, and you make it possible. 

We really appreciate very much this partnership and we appreciate the guidance. Our ears are wide open, so we take very seriously the suggestions that we have gotten, and I hope that you will 

find that we have acted on those suggestions in the past several 

months. 

We face the challenges of a long war, an unprecedented length, 

and it is wearing some of our people down; and these are some of 

the best people on Earth, some of the strongest people, some of the 

best-trained people, and it is a tough time. 

We are faced with a rising suicide rate in the Army, which has 

borne the brunt of the fighting. This is particularly true of the 

longer and the repeat deployments. So we have got—we are 

pleased that Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 

and the SECDEF, Dr. Gates, are doing everything they humanly 


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can to build our Army with your help and to shorten those deployments. Maybe there are other ways to shorten them, too; we are 

brainstorming that. 

We also face a high rate of PTSD, post-traumatic stress disorder, 

as we have done in every conflict. This goes back 1,000 years. 

We also—and that is going to be the focus of most of my comments, but we also have what some are calling the signature injury, traumatic brain injury—others call it a concussion—just a 

heck of a lot of them; twice as many—whether, in this war because 

of the body armor, we have got twice as many amputations, the 

amputations are twice as high a percentage of the injuries; and 

head injury is even a higher figure, several times beyond that. 

Most traumatic brain injuries are mild; 80 percent of them, they 

recover. Called ‘‘mild TBI,’’ that is how you will hear it mentioned, 

these are concussions where people are just dazed a little bit. They 

see stars. They are confused. They may be dizzy. About a third of 

them, which is about 5 percent of all the soldiers coming home and 

the Marines—about a third of them have actually been knocked out 

cold. Then you have a higher incidence of depression, and a higher 

incidence of PTSD. 

About 40 percent of them get PTSD, which is higher than the average. On average, about 10 to 15 percent of our soldiers have 

PTSD when they return. The figure is lower than that in the Navy 

and the Air Force. 

So in terms of the numbers, the biggest problem we face is 

PTSD. Shell shock, combat stress. Not the same as depression, but 

there are a lot of aspects they have in common. And these people 

are at higher risk of suicide. It is imperative that we find them. 

Skeptics will tell you that there is no treatment for them. Well, 

there are treatments. There is no proven treatment. The fact that 

you don’t have data proving something works does not mean it is 

a failure. A lot of these treatments have never been studied. So we 

have got to study them. 

Secondly, we have got to make the diagnosis early. If you have 

somebody suffering with PTSD, and they are shaking it off and the 

battle buddy says, Are you okay, Jones? You don’t seem yourself. 

I am fine; get out of my face. Well, he will go on and do something 

dumb and get in trouble. 

And so we need to get out there and reach that soldier or marine 

or sailor or airman and wrap our arms around him and say, We 

are taking you in to see the chaplain or the psychologist, and you 

don’t have to tell me if you have received a ‘‘Dear John’’ letter from 

your wife; you can tell that to them. But I am taking you in there; 

otherwise, you are going to do something stupid. You are going to 

lose your security clearance, you are going to lose your weapon, you 

are going to go home and you are not going to like it. 

So you have got to sometimes put some tough love on these guys. 

And let me tell you, the Army is all over this. They took 800,000 

soldiers—Congressman, thank you for coming—Ward Casscells, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs—talking about the 

Army stand-down day a few months ago. The Army made everybody take this course where they got a refresher, no battle buddy 

left behind. 


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It is your duty to get help if you need help. It is your duty to 

get help for your buddy if your buddy needs help. And it takes 

strength to ask for help. These messages are coming loud and 

clear. The Commandant of the Marine Corps is giving the same 

message. General Schoomaker will tell you more about that, and he 

is doing a superb job on this. 

Backing up for one second. The Military Health System which, 

with your generous support—and I am the main coach and cheerleader—we are held to an incredible degree of accountability. Dr. 

Gates, the Secretary, takes your guidance extremely seriously and 

tells me on a regular basis, Dr. Casscells, I am holding you accountable and you must hold other people accountable for the quality of the care that we deliver. He is absolutely got a dead aim on 

this. 

And we have defined in regular terms what ‘‘quality of care’’ is. 

This is not just for TBI, this is for the whole environment of care. 

And competent care, we define it as compassionate, confidential, 

comprehensive, coordinated, communicated clearly, controlled by 

the patient as much as possible. That is a little bit of a culture 

change for the military, but it is the way the whole country is 

going—courteous, computable, convenient and cost-effective. 

We seek to find an environment—and Dr. Chu works hard at 

this with his people—where families are supported, where education is supported, where benefits are protected—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Who was that? Who was that that supports this? 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Dr. David Chu, the Under Secretary for Personnel Readiness, focuses on reminding us that health care is a 

part of a larger picture, sir, that involves educational opportunities, 

benefits and the like. And to this end, we want to recognize that 

our line leaders have a big responsibility and a big opportunity 

here. 

And some of them just step up and can’t do enough for soldiers 

and marines and sailors and airmen. This year we gave, for the 

first time ever, a big award to one of our line leaders for this, the 

General Leonard Wood Line Leadership Award, and it went to 

General Magnus, Bob Magnus, the Assistant Commandant of the 

Marine Corps. We need help from the line on this. 

Let me say that when we last spoke to you, we had the report 

of the mental health task force led my Admiral Don Arthur. Two 

big tasks came out of that sir, reducing the stigma associated with 

getting help and, two, providing more access. 

On the stigma side, the result of MHAT–5, Mental Health Assessment Team 5—it is an Army study, very gratifying—people are 

now saying in this survey that they feel more comfortable asking 

for help and getting help for a buddy; that they are less concerned 

about losing their advancement, about losing their weapon, about 

losing their security clearance, about a less-than-honorable discharge—all the things that people, when they are depressed, worry 

about, things that wouldn’t worry them at a normal time. They get 

obsessed with things, and it is terribly important to get this stigma 

thing reduced. 

On the access side, the Army has hired 129 psychological caregivers; we have about another 100 to hire. And these people are not 

all psychologists, they are not all psychiatrists, but they are all 


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people who are trained and have had recent training in this and 

they know how to do it—how to talk to soldiers, how to help people 

transition through to the VA and so forth. 

Let me talk for a second about the Center of Excellence which 

you have made possible. And that is with the—last year you gave 

us an additional $900 million for TBI and PTSD; of that, 600 million was for care, 300 million for research. Ms. Embrey will talk 

about the process that has distributed most of these funds to the 

services, with the Army as the executive agent for competitive process, working with the best of breed in the university and industry 

community in a transparent competitive way; and we feel good 

about that. 

I will say that in my experience in the academic world—I have 

put together two major successful multiuniversity research consortiums, and I have never seen something put together as quickly or 

with the energy and enthusiasm and the goodwill that this has 

been done, with thanks to my colleague, Ellen Embrey, and Brigadier General Sutton, who is with us also, who is leading this now. 

In particular, one of her challenges is to take the Defense Veterans Brain Injury Center, add to it the efforts of the Fisher Family Foundation, who are trying to raise funds for a new center and 

to create the Defense Center of Excellence in TBI and PTSD. So 

we want to acknowledge Arnold Fisher and his family and their 

generosity in committing to raise these funds; and he and Deputy 

Secretary England signed this letter last week. 

Going forward, sir, we are in the start-up phase of a 3-year program, development research effort; and you have before you our request for the fiscal year 2009 supplemental appropriation request 

of $797 million. 

And per your query to me just before the meeting started about 

unmet needs or new and emerging needs, there are two in number. 

In terms of new science, in November we had a big breakthrough— 

General Schoomaker may allude to it. You can now use your own 

skin cells, and they can be instructed in the petri dish to revert to 

fetal tissues which could be used to treat your own burn, a skin 

graft of your own skin which would not be rejected—or kidney or 

heart or spinal cord tissue. And as you know, sir, we have got 

about 150 kids who are blind and about 150 that are paraplegic 

from their injuries in Iraq alone; and this gives them enormous 

hope that did not exist before November. We respectfully request 

assistance in this area. 

And we need help within the military, the neurostem cell effort 

which will help the spinal cord, brain, and eye, and to develop the 

companion excellence in neurosurgery, neurology, and 

neuroradiology. It is going to be about $95 million, if we could get 

your request there. 

Sir, one other thing that Ellen Embrey has wisely retained some 

funds to invest in programs that are particularly promising as we 

reassess at the 1-year mark and 6-months mark, and we are starting to do that. 

And there are some programs that are really hitting the ground 

running. There are also some needs that have not previously been 

identified, and I will just mention these for the record. 


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Patients come to us asking that we treat them with things that 

they have got a good feeling would help. Music therapy, certain nutritional therapies, dance therapy, art, meditation, things like this. 

These may be very effective and they may not. They deserve study. 

So we respectfully would like your opinion, but my inclination 

would be to task our staff, working with the best epidemiologists 

and clinicians, within the military and without, to get a better handle on some of these complementary and alternative therapies, 

some of which could be terrific. And one thing for sure, patients 

have great interest in them. So we want to look into that in the 

coming months. 

Sir, there are some things for which we don’t need funds; they 

are just a question of leadership. So, for example, when you go to 

sick call, I have asked our commanders in theater—I went back to 

Iraq for a visit a couple of weeks ago. I have asked our commanders to consider that when someone comes into sick call—they 

are often complaining of a headache or a bad back or sore throat, 

but really—they could have toughed it out, but really want some 

guidance, some counseling. They are upset about something; they 

may not even know it. 

I have asked our commanders there, medical commanders, to 

think about putting at the top of the sick call questionnaire just 

a statement that we care about mental health, and you have to let 

us know if you have got a buddy suffering or if there is something 

that we can do for you. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and other members of the 

Committee for this opportunity to give you some idea of where we 

are going with the Defense Center of Excellence. I do think that 

in this area, with the right facilities and the right people—and we 

are on the way on both counts—that the military will be the 

world’s best in psychological care of head injuries and of stress in 

general. And this is an area that is the number one priority for us 

at Health Affairs. 

Thank you, sir. And members of the Committee, thank you very 

much. 

[The statement of Dr. Casscells and Ms. Embrey follows:] 


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Mr. MURTHA. I am going to ask Mrs. Embrey to put her comments in the record so that the members have a chance to ask 

questions of the Surgeons General who are here with us also. 

A couple of things that I wanted to talk about. 

At Fort Hood, I think I see the work that you have done and the 

Army has done. I saw the best screening process, the most effective 

counseling that I have seen since I have been visiting the hospitals; 

and I was very impressed by how that is working. 

I am a little concerned. Yesterday, I met with a doctor, a military 

doctor, who told me he is an expert in diabetes; and he recommends that people don’t go to the war zone if they have diabetes. And yet when I was in Afghanistan at my table were two people with diabetes. 

If we are so short that we have to send people against the advice 

of the doctors into a war zone, I think we ought to relook at that. 

I know that it may not necessarily be your problem—I am going 

to bring it up with the chiefs—but diabetes is very difficult to keep 

under control. Both of these people were not overweight, and it just 

worries me that we have lowered the standards to the point where 

we have got people against the doctor’s orders going to a war zone. 

But as a whole—one other issue, when you talk about stress: 

This morning I made a speech, and the State Department guy got 

up and said, I want you to know that 75 percent of the time spent 

by the adjutant general in Iraq is on divorces. So obviously there 

is tremendous stress at home. And when I was in Afghanistan this 

past weekend they talked about the divorce rate, and they talked 

about the stress at home. 

So I think we are all saying the same thing, and we are going 

to do everything in this subcommittee, as we have done in the past 

under Bill’s leadership and Jerry’s leadership and my own leadership, to try and make sure that we make up for some of the things 

that happened in the past where the chiefs felt like the budget constraints kept them from being able to maintain a level of expertise 

that we should have. 

So we are going to consider the recommendations. We ask you to 

go out and look at the military construction work that needs to be 

done, the infrastructure work that needs to be done. And certainly 

we will take a look at this Center of Excellence, and I think the 

subcommittee will be very favorably disposed to take care of those 

things. 

Mr. Lewis. 

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman, I came in a little late. Would you go 

to my friend at my right? 

Mr. MURTHA. I certainly will. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I appreciate the comment. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

We have about 3,500 New Jerseyans deploying in mid-June. Obviously, when they are called up, their anxiety level goes up pretty 

high. In some ways, you start the process of actually deploying before you get over there. 

What do we have on the front end, taking a look at the needs 

of soldiers? And some of the soldiers, pardon the expression, are 

not exactly spring chickens. Some of them are National Guard, 

they are all citizen soldiers and volunteers doing a great job. 


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What do we have on the front end and the committee has discussed over the years on the back end? When they come back they 

don’t go to the base. They may not go to Fort Hood or somewhere. 

You know, they go back into the citizen population. 

The stigma—it is a legitimate issue, but in reality you want to 

get out of the uniform pretty quickly. What do we have on the front 

end and the back end this time around, as opposed to maybe a year 

ago or several years ago? I know that you have made considerable 

progress, but where do we stand today? 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Sir, thanks for that. The services have that Title 

10 function as you know, and our Surgeons General will address 

that. But I want to say that it is amazing that in this long war 

they are still recruiting these people who, as you say, from all ages, 

men coming in midlife like I did to the Army. And it is a credit 

to the cause that these—the people serving the country here behind 

me here, who—it is not a matter of politics, it is not a matter of— 

it is just a matter of patriots. That there are that many out there 

it is a fantastic thing. 

Now, Health Affairs, Ellen Embrey, to my right, has got a different oversight role, which is to make sure that from start to finish, from start to retirement, psychological health, psychological 

readiness are not forgotten and do not take a back seat to physical 

fitness and so forth. So I would like to ask you to address that. She 

has done something unprecedented in the predeployment assessment and post-deployment health assessment. 

Ms. EMBREY. I will try to be brief. 

The Department has been concerned since the first Gulf War in 

the 1990s to make sure that we had a good baseline understanding 

of the health and fitness of the individuals. So we instituted a 

predeployment health screening process where we evaluate the individual’s physical and mental health status prior to deployment, 

to evaluate whether they should go or not and to document that. 

In addition, we have a fairly rigorous health assessment program 

ongoing where we capture health encounters in theater, and we 

maintain data about the types of visits and the types of counseling 

that exist; and that is also documented. 

When the individuals return from theater, there is a policy to 

evaluate, within the first 30 days of return from deployment, the 

status of that individual and to screen for health concerns, be they 

physical or emotional. 

Because many of them were anxious to get home and chose not 

to volunteer, that they were having some concerns, we instituted 

a reassessment process within the first 3 to 6 months following deployment. And, again, that is an outreach to all those who have returned from deployment where we ask the question, how are they 

doing. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Just to make it clear for the committee, you 

do something within 90 days and we learned last year you do something automatically within 6 months. Is that voluntary on their 

part? 

Ms. EMBREY. It is mandatory for contact. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I do think obviously people, once they go 

back into civilian life, but there is no mandated—— 


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Mr. MURTHA. What I saw at Fort Hood was that they took them 

back in—it was a very short period of time; had a chance, 30 days 

back home—and they took them all in and started screening them. 

I don’t know what the time was. 

You are saying? 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I was wondering, is it voluntary? I am talking particularly about Guard and Reserve, not to take anything 

away from active duty. They have continuing problems of that nature. 

Ms. EMBREY. It is for Guard and Reserve, anybody who is deployed—redeployed. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Do they have to come forward after 6 

months? 

Ms. EMBREY. The requirement is for us to contact them and ask 

them how they are doing. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. How would you characterize the response, 

to date, if this is a relatively new policy? 

Ms. EMBREY. I would defer to the Surgeons because they are the 

ones that execute it, but I think that we are getting good response. 

It took a while to get the program going, which was full steam 

about a year ago. And the ability to contact and capture how people 

were doing in that 3-to-6-month period after going home is a challenge for the Guard and Reserve, and they have been working on 

improving those processes. But I would say it is improving steadily. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So they are working on it. But do you know 

actually how they are doing? 

Ms. EMBREY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So how are they doing? Besides your saying 

they are improving on it, are there statistics to back up the number 

of people that have gotten help and contacts that have been made? 

Ms. EMBREY. What I am looking at is the outcome of the screening process, not the percent of folks that we were unable to contact. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. We are on your side here. 

Mr. MURTHA. I think what he is saying is, it should be mandatory. 

Ms. EMBREY. It is mandatory. 

Mr. MURTHA. It is mandatory. Okay. And you say you contact 

them and they have to come in? 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The contacts are mandatory, but those who 

have come back—— 

Mr. MURTHA. They should have to come in, I think. Everything 

we have heard in this committee was, the longer they wait without 

care, the worse it gets. We want to get them in and get them some 

care, right? 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Yes. So could you clarify your response? I 

mean they are not mandated to come in now; is that right? 

Ms. EMBREY. It is mandatory for us to ask the questions. They 

can decline to answer the questions. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So how would you say the response has 

been? Somebody must have a general idea. 

Dr. CASSCELLS. I will take a crack at that. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. We understand the issues of stigma and 

people want to get back to their lives. But it is surprising how 

many people, besides marital problems, have post-traumatic stress 


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syndrome, and we all wring our hands about how we are going to 

address it. 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Let me just say that 75 percent of the people fill 

out the post-deployment health reassessment. And we feel that by 

asking it a little sooner—3 months, 6 months—we will get a higher 

rate. But we are concerned that a quarter of them are not answering. Those lost sheep are the ones that we have do go out and find. 

We have asked our chaplains to organize a program to do that, 

the chaplains and retired chaplains because they can call a serviceman and say—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Wait a second, when I was in the Army, 

the chaplains were not necessarily the people I wanted to talk to. 

I am talking about medical issues here, bona fide people with mental health bona fides reaching out to Army National Guard people, 

Reserve people that have been there 12 months, 15 months. 

Ms. EMBREY. Yes, sir, we have a program that the Reserve components have underwritten which has—it is a Reserve component 

readiness program which is centrally managed out of our office. 

And they are responsible for making the contact and evaluating the 

individual’s concerns and referring them for care if they are identified. 

And they are—if they are eligible for care in our system, if they 

are within that first 6 months or if they signed up for TRICARE 

Reserve Select, then we can refer them and care for them in our 

system. If not, they are referred to the VA for care or follow-up. 

And that is how we engage with the Guard and Reserve community. 

We also are responsible—mandatory review on an annual basis. 

Mr. MURTHA. May I interrupt? I think we need to pursue this. 

Because this, to me, especially National Guard people who are—the 

job back—they are getting back. We do have drill days, and so we 

need to get some—we need an answer for the committee exactly 

how this thing is working. 

I was satisfied at the base, but I don’t know about the National 

Guard. As I have said here before, I have a young fellow working 

for me who has really struggled getting back into real life, and he 

has had counseling and he is still struggling a little bit. 

I think we need to get some more details, maybe from the Surgeons General, or privately the committee needs to hear exactly 

when we require them to come in, if we need an earlier time to 

come in, and what kind of treatment they are getting in the National Guard and Reserve, in particular, because it looks like they 

are doing on the bases. 

Mr. Dicks. 

Mr. DICKS. Secretary Casscells, you have been before the committee last May, and you and I had a couple of exchanges outside 

of that. The focus of our conversation had to do with whether or 

not DoD would be proceeding last year with the request for proposals to recompete the TRICARE contracts, especially given all 

the examination that was going on into DoD and VA health care 

systems at the time. 

You agreed to look into this, but in the end I understand that 

DoD determined to proceed with the solicitation for new TRICARE 


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contracts. Now, it is my understanding that DoD has not yet released an RFP for new TRICARE contracts. 

Will you please tell us where DoD is on its plan to recompete the 

TRICARE contracts? 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Congressman Dicks, thank you. If I did not get 

back to you personally about that, which I think I did—— 

Mr. DICKS. You sent me a letter and said we weren’t going to do 

it until we looked at the issues from the Presidential Commission 

and the other commission. And then it came up, and all the sudden 

the decision was made, and then nothing happened. 

I am asking for a status report. 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Yes, sir. Of the contracts—the request for proposals have gone out in phases and some went out just yesterday. 

All of these contracts are going to be competed, or recompeted in 

the case of incumbents, in a transparent process. 

What we have done, and the reason for going back at it again 

is, we have increased the focus on collecting data to measure the 

quality of care; and we have reorganized some of our requirements 

so that this is more transparent, so that the emphasis on quality 

of care is increased. 

We have shifted the focus a little bit for more choice for the 

servicemembers. So, in other words, our requirements changed 

enough that we felt it was important to recompete the contracts. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. Let me ask you this. 

One of the things I was concerned about was how DoD and your 

office is incorporating the findings and recommendations from the 

DoD task force and the President’s Commission into the new 

TRICARE contracts. 

Were any of their recommendations taken into account as you 

proceeded with this recompete on the TRICARE contracts? 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Yes, sir, in particular, the recommendations of 

the task forces which are largely in agreement, the six major task 

forces, really require us to coordinate better, to share information 

faster and completely, and to pay attention to what the patients’ 

choices are and to pay attention particularly to the psychological 

aspects of care and well-being. So all of that is emphasized in these 

new contracts. 

Who the winners will be, I don’t know, because my job is to set 

the policy and then stay far away from the competition. I don’t 

even know who applies. I don’t take phone calls or meet with competitors, don’t sit in on the process, but I do have people sitting in 

whose only job is to make sure that the process is competitive, and 

that quality—they meet our goals. 

Mr. DICKS. I would also like to know how DoD’s response to posttraumatic stress disorder and TBI injuries is going to be reflected 

in the TRICARE program. 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Sir, the programs, what we call the ‘‘downtown 

care’’ or ‘‘purchased care,’’ the private sector care has gotten out in 

front of this. They are all offering, in house, or through nearby providers TBI and PTSD care. 

The quality issue here though is important because many of our 

soldiers, marines, airmen and sailors they go back to small towns 

and many are reservists, as Congressman Frelinghuysen points 

out. So making sure that they go to a center that meets quality criVerDate Nov 24 2008 05:14 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046473 PO 00000 Frm 00277 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A473P2.XXX A473P2

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teria and continues to meet those criteria on an ongoing basis to 

meet those standards, that is very important. Anybody can put up 

a sign saying, We are specialists in head injury; the question is 

whether they really are. 

This is an effort for us, and we are going to have to—we are 

blessed by the fact that General Granger walks the deck, he visits 

all of these places that win contracts. And he holds their feet to the 

fire. He goes around and talks to the patients. He calls it ‘‘trooping 

the line,’’ an old-fashioned Army term for finding out what is really 

going on. 

I feel good about it. I don’t have the data, Congressman Dicks, 

to tell you about these contracts because they are not awarded yet. 

Mr. DICKS. How long is this process before a decision will be 

made? 

Dr. CASSCELLS. October, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. So it is going to be about 6 months? 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. In talking to people out there in the field. They tell 

me that one of the major problems is, there are not enough psychiatrists, that we do not have enough psychiatrists to deal with this 

problem, which is a very significant shortfall. 

Are we doing anything about that? 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Yes, sir. We, of course, are trying to beef that up 

with the Uniformed Services University to improve our training. 

And what this committee has done to support the Health Professions Scholarship Program, to support the retention of specialists— 

and I think that General Roudebush will talk about this later—this 

is very, very important and very appreciated. 

In the short term, we try to use every available resource. And 

you may realize that it was in the military that group therapy 

began, because of the constraints Congressman Murtha alluded to 

earlier which is, as a country, we have never paid, perhaps, enough 

attention to mental health. And particularly there has been a lesser priority in the military, a lot of big priorities. 

So we are talking about PTSD and health care in general, not 

overfunded in the military by any means. And then you take an 

area that is chronically underfunded like trauma and another one 

like psychological care. I mean, that is all the least-funded areas 

together there. 

So we have got to work on that, and we are putting our finger 

in the dike with things like telehealth and telepsychiatry. 

Mr. MURTHA. We are trying to give you the money to help. 

Mr. Lewis. 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Casscells, Secretary Embrey, we appreciate very much 

you being here. This is such an important topic to all of us. And 

as men and women serving us now in the Middle East are coming 

home, to say the least, the pressure on all of our institutions is just 

horrendous. 

The Jerry Pettis Veterans Hospital is in my district, located adjacent to Loma Linda University; and there—veterans, of course, go 

there for service, but the freshly new-sworn-in veterans, those who 

have just come back, go for services, and there is absolutely a 

shortfall in terms of people available, qualified to deal with quesVerDate Nov 24 2008 05:14 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046473 PO 00000 Frm 00278 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A473P2.XXX A473P2

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tions like PTSD and the variety and mix of challenges that affect 

their families and the like. 

So what are we doing to actively coordinate with those veterans 

hospitals and the professionals who are there with the work that 

you are doing, to try to make sure that we are getting to these 

peoples’s need for services early and often? 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Congressman Lewis, we have been engaged in 

the process called the SOC, that stands for Senior Oversight Committee, which have been led by Deputy Secretary Gordon England 

and VA Deputy Secretary Gordon Mansfield. 

You have heard a little bit about this, but in terms of the coordination on TBI, Under Secretary Mike Kussman and I at the VA 

have worked closely. We talk almost every day about this. Our 

overall leaders are Ms. Embrey here and Colonel (Promotable) Sutton to my left, and they work with the VA every single day on this, 

sir. 

We would be delighted to supply you with more details because 

this is something we are feeling very good about. And, in fact, the 

VA has been way out in front of us in PTSD. They cared about this 

a long time ago, and we have learned a lot from this interaction 

with them; I want to acknowledge that. We will continue to learn 

from them and develop joint projects. 

Mr. LEWIS. Specifically, at this veterans hospital, I have had a 

lot of interaction regarding these questions, in no small part because in a territory like my own you can drop four Eastern States 

in my desert alone, and that is a long way away from the hospital. 

So delivering services away from the VA for certain veterans and 

others, which involves needed contracting services with people in 

Barstow, which is 80 miles away, what are we doing in connection 

with that and how do we begin to touch the numbers of people, professionals, that we need to care for those services? 

Ms. EMBREY. Sir, it is a combination of initiatives. In terms of 

providing support to rural areas, specifically, with the generous 

amount of dollars that have been given to us, we are working with 

the VA to set up a telehealth network that will allow us to take 

experts in one place and do a face-to-face consult with clinicians in 

rural areas to help them understand the case at hand and to evaluate and to help that individual treat the persons in those places 

and refer them, when necessary, to higher specialty areas. 

So telehealth is an important part of that ability. 

Secondly, we are recruiting individuals and there is a nationwide 

shortage of mental health professionals in the civilian and military 

world. Notwithstanding, we are increasing our plans to increase 

our own staff by more than of 750 individuals, health providers. 

Mr. LEWIS. That you are hiring? 

Ms. EMBREY. We are hiring them, either civilians or in a contract 

arrangement. 

We are also working with our TRICARE network providers and 

have asked them to ensure that their networks are expanded so 

that they have a ready list of individuals that our beneficiaries can 

call. And to the extent they are not able to bring them into the network, they are maintaining current lists of providers who are not 

in the network so that if they cannot get care in our network, they 

can be referred for action within our access for standards. 


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It is multitiered set of initiatives. 

Mr. LEWIS. All of our members, I think, are concerned about the 

impact of these conditions of people returning from service, the impact it has had, their service in the first place, has had upon their 

families. 

Are we interplaying with the service needs for some of those families beyond just alcohol abuse or otherwise? Tell me what I don’t 

know about that. 

Ms. EMBREY. Well, one of the recommendations of the mental 

health task force to the Department was for us to evaluate the preclinical and nonclinical aspects of the continuum of care for emotional health, as Dr. Casscells said, building resilience. Not all individuals have the same emotional resilience and learning to understand what that is and building it up to have better coping mechanisms for all types of stress is important. 

And leveraging the preclinical and family support programs is an 

important part of that capability. And one of the recommendations 

was for us to establish directors of psychological health at all of our 

installations; and those directors at the National Guard bureau and 

in every State and in several OSD staff offices, policy offices, to 

make sure that we are doing that synchronization of preclinical 

and clinical programs for emotional resilience and treatment. And 

we are implementing that. 

We have identified the dollars, established the requirements, and 

have been working with the services to actually begin filling these 

positions, and that is the way we are going to try to make that 

happen. 

The challenge right now is that the funding that we have received went to the Defense Health Program and not to the Family 

Support Program. So we probably will have to evaluate and reinform you about the non-Defense Health Program dollars that will 

be needed to fund the preclinical and nonclinical programs, to 

make sure that we have a full continuum of support. 

Mr. LEWIS. To say the least, the task before all of us is almost 

overwhelming, and I can’t figure out in my head where you are 

going to get the numbers of people that you need. You say you are 

contracting with 750 or so. But when you look at the suicide rates 

alone for people who have been serving in the Middle East, they 

are double the standard population rates. That is an indication of 

the effect it is having on the individual members of the service who 

are leaving the service perhaps, but on their families as well. 

Ms. EMBREY. Our network providers that support us have reported that they have hired over 3,000 mental health professionals 

to augment our purchased care networks—and that is quite an accomplishment—since last May. 

Mr. MURTHA. I don’t understand. Tell me—Mr. Dicks just pointed out you spent 53 million. 

Mr. MORAN. That is obligated money, too, already obligated. 

Ms. EMBREY. The process for hiring individuals under contract 

and under the Civil Service Merit System does take time. 

Mr. MURTHA. That is something we ought to look at, because I 

tell you I went down to a couple of hospitals recently; they said, 

We hire a doctor, but by the time we okay it, they are gone; they 

go someplace else. 


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The authorizing committee or somebody, you folks, ought to look 

at your regulations and make a recommendation on how we could 

change that idea. 

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman, not to extend this, but we had an individual case where we are trying to help a guy be placed within 

this veterans system, and we made a lot of effort saying, Why 

aren’t you doing this, and were about to crack the door when the 

right people from DoD came to us and said, This guy had a problem up here. It was the wrong guy to force them to hire, if you will. 

They have to take some time and spending the money is an important piece. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Can you tell us, of the $53 million, is it all for personnel; or can the money be 

used for any other possible avenue for treatment? 

Ms. EMBREY. I am not sure which 53 you are talking about. 

Mr. DICKS. We are talking about the $600 million that was appropriated by Congress in the supplemental, and out of that only 

$53 million has been expended. 

Ms. EMBREY. It is for a variety of objectives, a large portion of 

which is to hire personnel. But it is also to build and establish new 

programs and policies for resilience, for prevention, communication, 

education, outreach, several other—surveillance. Many of the 

things that Dr. Casscells referred to. It is more than just people; 

it is setting up capability in a system that did not exist before as 

well. 

Mr. DICKS. Why such a long delay? Or are we doing fine? I mean, 

53 out of 600—out of 900 million does not seem to me to be a very 

aggressive program, especially with the magnitude of the problem. 

Ms. EMBREY. We had to make sure—one of the criticisms of the 

Department, working with the VA, was to make sure there was 

consistency and standard and easy transition from DoD to VA care. 

It is important when you are spending money and you are building new programs and capabilities that you have a common agreement on the goals, the standards, and the desired outcome and 

that you work together to define that. And once you have that common vision, you can begin to implement it. And it took us a while 

to get that common vision. 

Mr. DICKS. For the record, would you give us a breakdown of how 

the 53 million was spent and any plans you have for the future? 

Ms. EMBREY. Yes, sir. 

[The information follows:] 

Although our expenditures may not have occurred as fast as some people might 

prefer, the Department is following a detailed plan and executing a prudent and 

careful approach to assure we use the funds provided by Congress to maximize the 

benefit to our service members. The following slides show the details through January 2008, when the expenditure amount exceeded $64 million. 


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Mr. MURTHA. Let me add something else. This committee, according to the staff, increased the direct hire authority in the fiscal 

year base bill to include additional mental health hires. So, as Mr. 

Lewis says, we don’t want to hire people prematurely, but having 

said that the committee added 167 million to 232 million budget to 

fiscal 2008 for the Family Advocacy Program, totaling 400 million. 

I see the administration cut that—Dr. Chu cut that—by 39 percent. Our favorite guy. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you for yielding. 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Congressman, I want to thank you. We will look 

into that 39 percent figure. If he is using that money to streamline 

the—— 

Mr. MURTHA. We are going to add it back because we don’t agree 

with that figure. That figure is going to be added back. 

Mr. Moran. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The basic problem—you guys are doing a great job. And, Dr. 

Casscells, I have tremendous respect for you and your background; 

I know Ms. Embrey is equally dedicated. 

But this is not the fiscal year 2008 supplemental; this was the fiscal year 2007 supplemental. And we provided $900 million because we had gotten a lot of testimony; and it was for treatment, 

access and research—600 million for operation and maintenance, 

300 million for research. 

And now for us to find out, basically a couple of years later, that 

only 53 million is obligated is troubling. The reason is that this is 

not a matter of purchasing weapons or whatever; these are human 

beings who are deeply troubled with mental health issues, and they 

need immediate care. 

So at an obligation like that, so much damage is going to be done 

within their families and their communities, while we are still figuring out how to process the money—because we are really talking 

about process, and it is the process that has held us back. 

I mean, that is less than 10 percent; it is, what, 6 percent? Four 

percent of the money has not been used, and these kids are really 

struggling is what we understand. 

Now, at Children’s Hospital, just down the street off North Capitol Street, there have been 100,000 kids who have come to that 

hospital, children of military families primarily with mental health 

problems. Those are kids, primarily children of the men and 

women we are trying to deal with. 

Now, it is an enormous burden that falls on the rest of the health 

network. I don’t want to be lecturing; the problem is, we made the 

money available, but who is bearing the brunt of this? It is these 

hospitals in rural areas; they are not getting reimbursement. 

And it is even a facility like Children’s Hospital. I mean, they are 

inundated with problems already, and because of this war and our 

inability to deal with the problems we have caused, they now have 

100,000 children’s visits because of mental health problems, primarily as a direct result of what is happening, the post-traumatic 

stress disorder that their parents have incurred. 

Again, I hate to be in a lecture mode here, but real problems are 

happening; and when we see that only 6 percent of the money has 

been obligated of fiscal year 2007 money, we think, what is the 


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point of making the resources available if it is going to be 2, 3, 5, 

6 years before we address it and, in the meantime, an awful lot of 

damage has occurred? 

Now, you may want to—while I have been ranting and raving 

here, you may have come up with some thoughts to calm us down 

a little bit. 

Do you have anything to say about that? 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Congressman Moran, we are on the verge of getting—well, the hiring is up now. We have 129 hired. General 

Schoomaker may have a more up-to-date number. 

Mr. MORAN. How many people are you going to need? 

Dr. CASSCELLS. We need 253 just on the psychological care provider side. We are more than halfway there. 

We are about halfway there. So this has taken a long time because of the very difficult bureaucracy. And—— 

Mr. MORAN. The problem is bureaucracy? 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Yes, sir. A lot of problems right in our building. 

The bureaucracy is tedious; and it is put together—it is a patchwork quality of hiring and so forth. 

And in the midst of this we are moving to a new process in SPS, 

a performance-based system which ought to make sure that everybody is working hard and working smart. But this process is ongoing just as we are trying to rush these new hires through. 

We are very concerned about hiring the wrong people. It only 

takes one bad counselor can do a lot of harm to a fragile servicemember. So making sure we have got the right people is important. 

But I would have to admit that a big problem is the bureaucratic 

maze. And it is no one person’s fault, but the bureaucracy seems 

to grow. 

I find very challenging all of these rules, and whatever guidance 

you can give—and Congressman Murtha says maybe it should be 

done on the authorizing side. There have been a number of bills to 

streamline the Pentagon bureaucracy; you are well aware of them. 

Mr. MURTHA. Will the gentleman yield? 

Let me remind you, the committee added—the committee increased the direct hire authority because we saw this problem before. I am not—you have got to go through a procedure where you 

hire the right people. 

But the fiscal year 2008 base bill, which was signed—when, November—to include additional mental health providers—in other 

words, we gave you authority in our bill in law that you would be 

able to be more effective and not take so many bureaucratic—you 

are not being held up by the bureaucrats above you, are you? 

I mean, this is purely—you have got a problem; purely, you don’t 

have enough people because you can’t find them. But the authority 

we give you, does that help cut through some of the red tape? 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Yes, sir, it does. We have, though, lost a number 

of people, as Congressman Lewis said. 

When I was down at Fort Bragg, I talked to people who said, I 

was about to hire this terrific psychiatric nurse and we trained her. 

She spent a year, and we couldn’t get the paperwork done in time; 

and she said, I am not sure this is going to happen, I got a job in 

an HCA hospital. 


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Mr. MURTHA. You tell us what you need, and we will try to work 

it out. 

Mr. MORAN. The problem is, there is little we can do without the 

executive branch having the will to implement it. 

Now, I will give you an example. You have got a guy by the name 

of Al Edwards. He is here, isn’t he? He seems to be hiding there. 

Now, we had asked, this Committee, when we talked about the 

fact that you have got a very substantial medical facility with mental health capability in Northern Virginia and you have got enormous need right here. Maybe we could coordinate. 

Well, the Army was tremendously resistant. I have given him 

some credit because he has been pushing through all of that bureaucratic resistance. 

But part of the problem, I don’t think we ought to be necessarily 

hiring every shrink in the country to work for the military, but we 

need them and maybe we ought to be trying to figure out—I am 

normally not somebody who suggests that we try to outsource everything, but maybe we are in a situation where we need to be reimbursing clinics that can provide this care in the rural areas 

where you just said their kids are going to. They shouldn’t have to 

travel 200, 300 miles to a central facility, because we need them 

working, we need them with their families. But we need somebody 

that is there to counsel them. 

I don’t know how the military is going to be able to provide what 

we envision needs to be done. I suspect you have got to figure out 

a way at least to reimburse, but also to alert those clinics in the 

communities where these kids are going back to, to watch them, to 

help them. To help them reintegrate into their community, to find 

a job, to keep the job, and to be good parents and spouses. 

So I am wondering whether we really need to be pushing the bureaucracy to hire thousands of psychologists and psychiatrists who 

are probably not going to get access to the kids where we need 

them to get this care. 

Have you thought about that, Ms. Embrey? 

Ms. EMBREY. Yes, sir, I think about it every day. Actually, sir, 

we have programs in place for treatment, and we have a lot of 

Family Support Programs in place for reintegration and counseling 

and support that is not clinical. 

With the money that was provided to us, we tried to build new 

capability that we did not have and to expand the number of resources where we had the risk, the force projection platforms. 

The normal population is there on a day-to-day, peacetime basis. 

When you are at war and you are redeploying, you need a surge 

of capability to deal not only with the redeploying servicemembers, 

but with the families as well, you know, throughout that deployment. 

Having the capacity there that is a partner between the clinical 

and the nonclinical programs is where we are trying to build up. 

They already have programs. They are just not big enough to handle the demand. 

Part of that also will be increasing because one of our objectives 

is to reduce the stigma of seeking care. So, if we are successful in 

that, which we are spending a lot of resources on doing, then we 

are increasing demand in our own system because of that. So we 


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need to be capable of doing that, and we are working on that as 

well. 

So building capacity is different. New capacity is different than 

expanding old capability. We want to prevent things from occurring 

and build capability to—— 

Mr. MURTHA. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, if I could, not that I want to continue 

the precedent that has been established, but let me just make a 

point. 

Of all of the horrible things that have happened as a result of 

this war, there may be some silver lining in this area, because they 

tell me that a majority of the homeless men in this country are 

Vietnam vets. We really dropped the ball there in a really unconscionable way, so this may be—at least let us not do what we did 

to the Vietnam vets with these Iraq and Afghanistan vets. 

That is all. Thanks. I am sorry. 

Mr. MURTHA. We are going to have one more questioner for Dr. 

Casscells. Then we will go to the next panel, and we will start with 

the next folks—with the Surgeons General, who have not asked 

questions, unless Mr. Hobson wants to go to the Surgeons General. 

Mr. HOBSON. I have got one question for them, but I would like 

to talk generally about what—just real quick. 

Mr. MURTHA. Do you want to go to the Surgeons General? 

Mr. HOBSON. Well, if it is all right, yes. 

Mr. MURTHA. It is up to you. 

Mr. HOBSON. That is all right. 

Can you stay and listen for a second? 

Dr. CASSCELLS. We are here. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me say that one of the things that works 

right—we will change panels, but one of the things that has 

worked right is the amputee center out at Walter Reed. This young 

major—stand up there, Major. 

This is Major Rozelle. This young fellow, who is an amputee himself, took on this job of coordinating the effort and putting together 

the amputee center, which cost a lot less. I said when we dedicated 

it, that it was $20 million. He said it was only $11 million. It is 

just as good as the one out there that they spent $58 million on, 

right? 

Major ROZELLE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. It is the one time the military did it for a hell of 

a lot cheaper than—he knows. 

Let us get the Surgeons General up here. Because of the time 

constraints, if you do not mind, we are going to put your comments 

in the record, and we will go right to Mr. Hobson. 


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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2008. 

SURGEONS GENERAL OF THE ARMED SERVICES POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER AND TRAUMATIC 

BRAIN INJURY 

WITNESSES 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ERIC B. SCHOOMAKER, SURGEON GENERAL 

OF THE ARMY 

VICE ADMIRAL ADAM M. ROBINSON, SURGEON GENERAL OF THE 

NAVY 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL (DR.) JAMES G. ROUDEBUSH, SURGEON GENERAL OF THE AIR FORCE 

REMARKS OF MR. HOBSON

Mr. HOBSON. All right. First of all, let me make a comment for 

all the panel. I have a $90 million VA-enhanced clinic being built 

in Columbus, Ohio, one of the most underserved areas for VA services in the country. And soldiers—when the first soldiers came back 

from Haditha Dam from Lima Company, they got very poor treatment at the VA because they were told that they were not eligible 

for treatment. They were not treated as heroes, as they should 

have been, so we had to take some action there to get some people 

kicked out and retrained. 

The other problem with the VA and treating soldiers both in Columbus, Ohio, and elsewhere—Mr. Ortiz has this same problem. I 

am building a clinic. When we originally started to build the clinic, 

we were told under the previous Secretary that we would stop 

sending people, except for extraordinary treatment, hundreds of 

miles away in Ohio or elsewhere for treatment and that we would 

contract out in the community for beds and other services that 

might be in Dayton or Cleveland or Cincinnati. It is not, in my 

opinion, cost-effective to send them there nor, as studies show, is 

it good health care. 

We continue to do that, and—the military should be upset with 

that; the retirees should be upset with that. And there is pushback. 

At the very time that we are trying to develop this kind of network—which is more cost-effective, by the way—the VA wants to 

expand some of their facilities elsewhere, using those same numbers, which does not make sense to me. 

So that is something, I think ought to be—it is a model that the 

VA under Principi thought was good. I am hoping under the current general, former Army general, that this will be taken into account better. But I want all of you aware of that. 

Secondly, do all of you have your SmartCard with you today? If 

someone were to come in here today, or you were on the battlefield, 

can anybody get your card out? Can you tell me your meds and 

what you are allergic to and all of the other stuff? When you move 


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from base to base, can they plug it into a system and tell you 

where your records are? 

I have got mine. Have you got yours? No, sir? 

Do you have yours? 

General SCHOOMAKER. I have mine with my ACU, sir. I cannot 

wear it here. 

Mr. HOBSON. But does it work? 

General SCHOOMAKER. It works, sir, right now in—— 

Mr. HOBSON. In a card. That is not the way it was supposed to 

be. 

When Dr. Blank, I think it was, was here, we funded money to 

do a program for the Army to do that. It is not done yet, and it 

should be done. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me see that card. 

Mr. HOBSON. I have got my card. Do not read it out loud or they 

will know everything about me. 

Mr. MURTHA. No. No. I just want to see what it looks like. 

So this is not a card that you can read into a computer, is it. 

Mr. HOBSON. No, but it is the closest thing I can—no, this is the 

Federal Government. It will not do that, but they are supposed to 

be able to do that; and we funded the money for that. So I hope 

you get to that. 

I only have so much time. 

I went to an event and gave a speech for an Air National 

Guardsman who had received service awards for meritorious service in the war. The kid sitting next to me was getting one of those 

awards, a guardsman not from my State, and he pled with me for 

help, mental health help. 

The Guard is not equipped, nor are the services equipped, to give 

the best continuing service to these guardsmen when they come 

home. This kid did not go over there with an AFSC. They talked 

about kicking in doors and shooting people and holding people 

when they were shot. He had a totally different AFSC, but he got 

assigned to a unit that did that, so he did his duty. 

When he came home, he was getting out of the service. His wife 

got out of the service. I think they have got family problems. And 

I am still trying to follow up to see what happened to that kid because—he basically told me his story because he wanted help. 

I went to the adjutant general and said, You guys have got to 

take care of this. And I still do not know the total answer on that 

yet, but I am sure there are hundreds of stories like that within 

the service. 

The last thing—and I have a long question for you. This relates 

to the mental health situation over there and PTSD and other 

mental health problems for children. Information provided to the 

committee through news reports and visits to military bases indicates that children of military members are increasingly suffering, 

as you heard earlier about this. For example, last year in D.C., he 

talked about the visits. 

Mr. Secretary, we think there are trends in children’s illnesses 

related to the war, and they can serve as an important basis for 

potential additional access by this committee. 


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Are there any notable trends that you people know, or the Secretary knows, that relate to children’s illnesses related to the war? 

Does anybody know anything about that? 

Well, I would suggest that it would be good if there were some 

initiatives, and I think someone needs to tell us about the effects 

of PTSD on children of military members suffering from this disease. Is there a correlation of children and spousal abuse and 

PTSD? 

I know, in my local community, I have a rather large Air Force 

base. We are doing a children’s AFSC center; it started with Mr. 

Cramer nationally. It is a wonderful program because, mainly, we 

found out there is a lot of children abuse and spousal abuse going 

on in those communities. 

Of the amounts appropriated for PTSD, could any of these funds 

be used to help children? 

So that is really what I wanted to ask both panels today. You 

can answer my other one, too, if you want, General. 

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, sir. I am the Army Surgeon General, 

Eric Schoomaker. 

First of all, the PIC Card you talked about, the Personal Information Carrier, we did do research and continue to do research on 

that. We actually have done a pilot in Afghanistan with its use. It 

is a digital card; it has been hardened against the elements and 

hardened against being worn by a soldier. 

We have learned a lot about it. It can interface with our 

handheld, PDA-like medic device, and we are working also with 

how to couple that with our current electronic health records so 

that we can forward information. 

Mr. HOBSON. When you were not a general—I know now that 

does not happen—but when you were like Rodney and me, enlisted 

guys, your stuff got lost. Your health records do not travel with you 

all the time. 

General SCHOOMAKER. It gets lost as a general, sir. 

Mr. HOBSON. Well, I do not know about that. 

It is the same way with your personnel records and the same 

way with your pay records. All that stuff needs to be standardized 

and digitized, so that whether it is Guard or Reserve—when the 

guardsmen come in, they are told, Your records do not match our 

records. 

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, sir. We are working—— 

Mr. HOBSON. I have been on this committee for 12 years, and we 

are still complaining about that. 

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, we are doing the work to try to 

digitize the medical record on the battlefield so that we can move 

through the echelons of care and—— 

Mr. DICKS. Do you have your microphone on, General 

Schoomaker? 

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, I do. 

Mr. DICKS. Pull it a little closer. Thank you, General. 

General SCHOOMAKER. Okay. Is that better? 

Secondly, what I will just talk to really quickly, because it was 

referred to earlier as well, is about support of the Guard and Reserve. 


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We totally concur with the concerns about both the mobilization 

and demobilization steps, especially since we are moving, as you 

know, as an Army, from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve. In using the Army Force Generation Model, every demobilization, in a sense, is restaging for the next mobilization. 

So the Army is very, very keen on this; and we are working very 

hard at demobilization to find and fix the problems of every soldier 

so that they can return to uniform in a future deployment. 

The last comment was about the children of military members. 

I do not have specific information with me today about trends in 

children’s health, but this came up earlier in questions about mental health, especially services for children. 

This is one area where I think we are facing a national problem. 

We have inadequate child and adolescent psychiatrists in the country, and we are working to hire psychiatrists, social workers, psychologists. One area that my psychiatry consultants have alerted 

me to is the difficulty in child and adolescent psychiatry. It is not 

purely restricted to the military; it is a national concern. 

Mr. HOBSON. Does anybody want to answer or make a comment 

about the VA and service in the VA? I know Mr. Ortiz has the 

same problem. I have a problem. There are other members who 

have the problem of people who cannot get care in their communities. 

There is no military base, for example, in Columbus, Ohio. I have 

got one at Wright-Patterson, a hospital that I know stays open. But 

they have to go all the way to Dayton or to Cleveland or to Cincinnati to get the treatment. With TRICARE, they do not want to 

do that; they want to get it in the local community, both the retirees and the returning people. 

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, I cannot speak specifically to Columbus or to any of those communities that you mentioned. I will say— 

and my colleagues, perhaps, can join in with their perspectives— 

we are working extremely closely with the Veterans Administration. 

As Ms. Embrey and Dr. Casscells mentioned, we are very closely 

aligned with them. I have met with Secretary Peake myself, personally. I have met with his senior medical staff. We are exchanging at the senior-most levels, liaisons, to work issues. We have 

moved VA liaisons into our warrior transition units and hospitals 

at many sites. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me say that we have been working with Dr. 

Casscells in trying to come up with an administrator who will follow caseworkers the whole way through. I think that may help the 

situation. 

For instance, this committee—after we funded it, we keep trying 

to figure out how do we get past just the Wounded Warrior Program. How do we get down and eliminate that problem that all of 

us have in the VA? 

We think we are getting there. We think the caseworker, the administrative caseworker, the specialist in finding where problems 

are and telling them who to go to, may be the answer to this very 

difficult problem between how we get help for them; and we have 

had some good examples of it. 


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So it is just too early to tell because the bill was only signed into law on the 6th. And they asked for $700 million; we put $900 million in there. So we are going to get there, and this committee has 

been in the forefront under Bill and under Jerry and myself and 

under all of you folks who have supported everything we have tried 

to do. 

We also ask that you give us a list of shortfalls in the military 

area for military construction, for military implementation. We are 

going to work that out, and then the Center of Excellence they 

have talked about. So we are getting there slowly. 

One of the things, though, that came up just recently to me is 

somebody who has TRICARE for Life said that when they go overseas, they are not covered. Now, this is true with Medicare also. 

We need—and maybe Dr. Casscells needs to think about this. 

TRICARE for Life does not cover you if you go overseas, according to the information I have. We need to look at an insurance policy or something that people can buy, and we need to inform them, 

if they go overseas and if something happens to them, they are not 

covered; and so they can buy this insurance policy for a very reasonable amount, or work something out. As it is, people are going 

to be overseas and not covered is what it amounts to. So we need 

to work something out there. 

Mr. Boyd. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. Can we ask somebody to respond to that? I think that 

is a very serious problem. 

Can somebody there tell us, is that a fact? 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, I think that is Dr. Casscells’ line. 

Dr. Casscells, do you know what I am talking about? 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Yes, sir. TRICARE for Life, you know, sir, is primarily a supplement to Medicare. So, since Medicare is generally 

not covering people when they travel overseas—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, we want to change it, so we want you to suggest to us how we can change it, whether it needs a policy or whatever it needs, okay? 

Mr. Boyd. 

Mr. BOYD. Mr. Chairman, I waive my time. 

Mr. MURTHA. Okay. Mr. Rothman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and for your service. Being 

at the end of the line here, I get to say that I associate myself with 

the questions and with the remarks of my colleagues, so I do want 

to follow up a little bit on some of the earlier points and then extend the point of someone else. 

Dr. Casscells, on the 25 percent lost sheep, I would encourage 

you—and I know Congressman Frelinghuysen and the chairman 

have mentioned this, as well—to require, that 25 percent respond 

to you would be a good first step. I understand from Ms. Embrey 

that the contact is mandatory, but we ought to make the responses 

mandatory, for 100 percent. 

I did want to follow up on a comment of my colleague, Mr. 

Moran, about the children and about the burden of children of veterans and also about the burden on local hospitals and health care 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with HEARING
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providers. As Mr. Hobson said, there are not VA clinics or military 

hospitals nearby; the local community bears the brunt of that. 

So, firstly, is there a mechanism to reimburse—let us say a veteran or the spouse of a veteran or a child of a veteran goes to a 

hospital and demonstrates some illness or disorder that can be 

identified as coming from their service. 

Is there a reimbursement mechanism now, Dr. Casscells or Ms. 

Embrey? 

Ms. EMBREY. For the servicemember, yes. For anything that is 

incurred as a result of service, we have a process that identifies 

and documents health issues associated with deployment. It is a 

line-of-duty documentation. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. So a nonmilitary facility would be reimbursed? 

Ms. EMBREY. Through our network, that is correct. We would get 

the bill and reimburse them, or the VA would be responsible for 

providing care. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Typically, does the nonmilitary facility, in their 

initial questionnaire on entry, determine whether this person is a 

veteran, and do they know to contact you for reimbursement? 

Ms. EMBREY. In the clinical practice guidelines, in the 

postdeployment clinical practice guidelines, which are widely dispersed, since the beginning of this war, one of the first questions 

to be asked of an individual is, Are you here as a result of your 

deployment for a health concern related to your deployment? Based 

on that, there is other administrative paperwork that is done. But, 

yes. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. In a nonmilitary hospital? 

Ms. EMBREY. They would have to be—— 

Mr. ROTHMAN. In other words, if you walked into a community 

hospital as a veteran, are they going to ask you, Are you a veteran 

and is this combat-related? 

Ms. EMBREY. I would have to check and follow up with you for 

the record because, frankly, I know the process and how it works 

for people who are entitled to care in our system. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Right. 

Ms. EMBREY. I am not clear about who are entitled to care in the 

VA system. 

[The information follows:] 

Service members and their families are covered under our military healthcare 

plan, TRICARE. TRICARE works very much the same as any other health insurance plan in the civilian community. When a patient seeks care outside of the military medical treatment facility, the doctor or clinic always asks about insurance coverage. I know of no healthcare provider or facility that fails to ask about insurance 

coverage before it sees the patient, regardless of the patient’s veteran status. Our 

military members, retirees, and family members provide their TRICARE coverage 

information and the bill is sent to the appropriate TRICARE claims center for payment. TRICARE covers all active duty and retired military personnel and their immediate family members, including children through age 23, if they are continuing 

in school. 

For Reserve component personnel who are to be activated in support of a contingency operation, TRICARE coverage for them and their families may begin up to 

three months before their activation date, continue during their active duty period, 

and remain in effect for an additional six months after deactivation. In addition, Select Reserve members may qualify to purchase TRICARE coverage through 

TRICARE Reserve Select (TRS) for ongoing health coverage. To date, less than 5 

percent of those who qualify sought to continue their TRICARE coverage through 

the TRS program. Again, the same process applies in terms of insurance claims submitted. 


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For Reserve component personnel, we deliver or authorize treatment for all 

healthcare conditions incurred or aggravated in the line-of-duty. If treatment is authorized for delivery in the private sector, the claim is processed through the 

TRICARE claims system at no cost to the individual, just as any other TRICARE 

claim for Service members. A line-of-duty authorization is provided to Reserve and 

National Guard members who receive referrals from the Post Deployment Health 

Reassessment process that takes place three to six months after return from deployment. 

In addition, under TRICARE, patients can access mental health care directly. Our 

access policies specify that a new mental health appointment should be available 

to all patients within seven days of the date of request. No referral or 

preauthorization is needed for a family member or a covered Reserve component 

member to make a mental health appointment. After the first eight visits, authorization is needed for TRICARE to continue to cover the costs, but again, no referral 

is required. For active duty members, the process is a bit different. We encourage 

all active duty military to be seen for all health care needs, including mental health 

care, in the military medical treatment facility, and we strive to ensure that sufficient providers are available to see them in the military mental health clinic. Again, 

they do not need a referral to go directly to the military mental health clinic for 

care; they can go directly and are entitled to the same seven-day access standard. 

Only if there are insufficient resources to meet the seven-day access standard would 

an active duty member be referred to a civilian provider in the TRICARE network. 

In that case, the claims process would still be the same as for any other patient 

seen in the civilian sector. 

Another counseling service available to our military community is the Military 

OneSource program. This excellent program offers counseling for everyday problems, emotional issues, and work-life adjustment issues. It provides up to six sessions per person per problem and is available to active duty and their families as 

well as Reserve component members and their families. Military OneSource also 

will assist individuals in accessing care through their health care benefits if they 

are not aware of how to do so. In addition, we are establishing a call center in the 

Defense Center of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury 

to assist individuals who are uncertain of how to access care or what their benefits 

may be. Further, we provide mandatory briefings to all military personnel returning 

from deployment to inform them about their health care benefits in both the military health system and in the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) system. We 

partner with VA and other federal and civilian organizations to provide Transition 

Assistance Programs for military members when they separate or retire from the 

military to ensure they are fully aware of their benefits following military service. 

For veterans who have separated from the military (not retired or medically retired) for longer than six months, the VA Medical Centers and Veteran Centers provide care for those individuals. The VA reports that few veterans are more than 50 

miles from some kind of VA facility. Preauthorization and special health care vouchers are required for a veteran who seeks care funded by the VA in a non-VA facility. 

Most VA medical centers are also part of the TRICARE Network, allowing 

TRICARE patients who may not be veterans to seek care in a VA facility with 

charges paid through the TRICARE claims center. Family members are not eligible 

for care in the VA Medical Centers, but may be seen with the veteran for family 

treatment or in the Vet Center for some counseling programs, such as grief and loss 

counseling. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I might, Congressman Moran 

and Congressman Hobson raised the issue of nonmilitary health 

care providers, hospitals and others, who are taking care of veterans, veterans’ spouses, and children in the absence of close facilities related to the military. 

My question was, being in a State where hospitals are going 

bankrupt, is there a requirement or an awareness of these local 

hospitals to ask, Are you a veteran; is this service-related, so that 

they can go to the military to be reimbursed? Ms. Embrey said that 

there is a reimbursement policy for the veteran, him- or herself. 

So would it be possible, Mr. Chairman, to find out if there is this 

connectivity between nonmilitary hospitals, so that they can ask 

those questions and get reimbursed? I ask that just not completely 

rhetorically, but—— 


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Mr. MURTHA. I know what the gentleman is asking, and I know 

all of us have the same problem. Every time we get beyond the 

military or we get out into the countryside, we have a problem. I 

have tried for years to have a clinic in a hospital put money in, and 

the VA never would figure out how to do it. There is no question 

about it. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. But is there a way to get these hospitals to ask 

the question and then have a system whereby the military reimburses? 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, if they have TRICARE or TRICARE for Life, 

they get reimbursed. Sure. Yes. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. If the hospital asks them, Are you a veteran, and 

if the hospital files the paperwork with the military. 

I will move on to my next question. Staff, if it is possible to look 

into that, that would be great. 

The other point—my last point was on the issue of homelessness 

that Mr. Moran—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Wait. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. The staff says, if the hospital is enrolled in 

TRICARE, they are automatically reimbursed. In other words, they 

would be reimbursed by TRICARE. According to Sarah, if the hospital is in the TRICARE network, they are automatically reimbursed. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Maybe there is no problem of veterans going to 

non-TRICARE hospitals. Maybe there is no such problem, but 

maybe it is worth looking into. 

Mr. MURTHA. But veterans is different than, I mean, the active 

duty, the retired Reserve. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Okay. So, for non-TRICARE then, that may be a 

real issue. The question, though, is about homelessness. 

Can anyone on this panel or on the other panel address the belief 

amongst some that we are seeing a repeat, if not an increase, in 

homelessness amongst the returning soldiers, veterans from this 

conflict, as we saw from Vietnam? Is that true? Are we doing any 

better? Are we doing any worse? What did we learn from the Vietnam experience with regards to the subsequent numbers of homeless whom we see? 

General SCHOOMAKER. Let me just take on something really 

quickly. 

I cannot speak to the homeless statistic specifically. I think the 

Vietnam veteran number is one in four. That is what I have heard 

quoted; one in four homeless are Vietnam veterans. 

I completely agree with the earlier comment that if there is a silver lining in this, it is that we are recognizing and are attempting 

to prevent as well as screening and managing much earlier in the 

course of a soldier’s, sailor’s, airman’s, Marine’s, Coast Guardsman’s experience following deployment the signs and symptoms related to both concussive injury, from mild traumatic brain injury, 

or concussive injury as we call it now, as well as post-traumatic 

stress. In fact, our ambition and, I think, our experience now is 

that we attempt to screen and identify and manage the symptoms 

of post-traumatic stress before it becomes a disorder. So this is 

really post-traumatic reaction. 


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I will talk quickly, if I might, Congressman. I will follow up with 

the figures earlier. 

How many lost sheep out there are there? We have had a mandatory post-traumatic, postdeployment health reassessment since 

January of 2006, 2 years now. This was based upon experience in 

one of the earlier mental health assessment teams that went out 

in the field and realized—and the work that followed that, from Dr. 

Hoge and others, that the symptoms of post-traumatic stress in a 

redeploying soldier emerged 3 to 6 months after redeployment, not 

at the moment of redeployment. 

Currently, in the total Army, 87 percent of all redeployed soldiers 

have been screened through the postdeployment health reassessment tool, 93 percent of the active component, 87 percent of the 

Army National Guard, and 78 percent of the Army Reserve. Those 

are the current figures. That includes people who are still in the 

window that they can go in and complete it and still meet the 

timeline. 

So I would submit that for the Army, which constitutes the largest group of deployers, we are doing pretty well in terms of compliance with this mandatory screening. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Congratulations on those significant numbers. 

The obvious question is, what happens to the other 23 percent 

or 17 percent? Because, given the number of bodies we sent over 

there, that would constitute a large population in and of itself. Why 

aren’t we getting 100 percent? 

General SCHOOMAKER. I share with Dr. Casscells the concern 

that we reach out to each and every one of these people, and I 

think why we are not reaching them is because of movement away 

from the service. 

As I said before, it is 3 to 6 months after, so if you leave the service almost immediately upon redeployment, it may be difficult to 

track you down and find you. But that is our ambition, and that 

is certainly our mandate. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Your mission is to reach out, but it is not their 

duty to respond—heretofore, I mean—until now; is that right, Doctor? 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Yes, sir. When the reservists go home, of course 

they take off the uniform; they have got civilian jobs. 

We are brainstorming this, Ms. Embrey and I, right now. We will 

get with the Surgeons. There may be ways that we can require 

that, to get points as they are drilling reservists and so forth, that 

they first get this requirement filled and so forth. There may be 

other incentives we can come up with. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Putting it in the initial contract, too? 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Yes. Thank you for your service and for these 

great ideas. 

Again, those are great percentages. Of course, we are just looking 

to make it 100 percent. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General ROUDEBUSH. Sir, if I may just add to that point, we have 

relatively similar experiences, although our Reserve numbers are 

lower than that and not where they need to be. They are trending 

up, certainly, but this is a shared responsibility among the medical 


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capability to contact these folks and to solicit and elicit with that 

questionnaire—which, by the way, is overly sensitive to emotional 

and stress issues, so if there is anything going on, it will trigger. 

But the command and the line authority with these folks is also 

heavily engaged, enlisting the commanders, the first sergeants, the 

unit commanders to do this. In fact, in the Air Force, we are utilizing the incentive of, unless you are doing this, you do not get the 

points to do that. 

So we are moving in the correct direction, but it is a shared responsibility and one that we work with the line very closely on to 

be sure that we get this done and with the families who, in fact, 

may be the first harbinger of, you know, ‘‘My husband just is not 

the same since he came back.’’ 

So it is a network. It is not one simple contact, one simple response. It is a network. It is a shared responsibility. It is a real 

outreach effort that is trending up, but there is much work to be 

done. 

Admiral ROBINSON. From the Navy and the Marine Corps perspectives, we are not as good as the Army. We have an additional 

problem. 

The Marine Corps units that are deploying actually have good 

PDHA and PDHRA results, so the deployment and the return. It 

is not 100 percent, but it is still good. 

The Navy also has a great deal of individual augments, so we are 

finding that individual augmentees, men and women who are deploying as individuals with other groups, have other challenges, because the lack of unit cohesiveness hampers the ability to get a 

unit to get a PDHRA or to get a postdeployment read. 

So, for that reason, there is a little bit more challenge there. It 

does not mean that we are any less concerned or any less responsible for getting it done, but it does produce a little bit of a different challenge. 

Many people coming back, as Dr. Casscells has said, are going 

back into their civilian lives. They do not know that they have a 

problem necessarily when they are coming back, and they do not 

want anything to stop their return, so the thought of having a positive response on a postdeployment assessment that could stop 

something or do something is something that many do not want to 

do. 

The key is that they, in fact, do get the treatment because, as 

Dr. Schoomaker has said—the Army Surgeon General—to take 

care of traumatic stress before it becomes a syndrome or an illness, 

to take care of those stress symptoms, will prevent the long-term 

effects. 

I think many of those effects are responsible for some of the 

homelessness issues with the Vietnam veterans who had never had 

their traumatic stress identified and who had then never received 

treatment for it. I think what you are seeing is—if you were doing 

a longitudinal study, which we are not, you are seeing the end result of untreated traumatic stress in a combat population 25 years 

after the fact. So a lot of what we are seeing is, I think, a result 

of traumatic stress that was not treated or was not treated effectively, because we were not geared into that. 


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So one of the nice things now is, not that we are doing it completely correctly, but we are, in fact, trying to identify that. 

Mr. MURTHA. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I 

apologize for not being here at the beginning. We were in another 

subcommittee meeting with the top enlisted leaders of the military 

services; and they are a pretty interesting group to talk with, so 

I tried to hear as much of their testimony as I could. 

Admiral Robinson, I just was very interested in your recent comments now about PTSD. We spent the weekend at Camp Pendleton, and specifically, at the Wounded Warrior battalion where a 

lot of the marines who have gone through Bethesda or Walter Reed 

are spending time, there at the Wounded Warrior battalion now. It 

is interesting that one of the things that we heard so much of from 

those marines was on the subject of PTSD. 

There are a lot of different angles on this concerning PTSD. One 

of them is the fact that the protocols appear to be that you will not 

treat the PTSD if they are having a drug-related program, for example, until the drug-related program is solved. Many of them felt 

that there should be a dual approach to it and treat PTSD and the 

drug programs, or whatever else it might be, at the same time. 

Is that something that would be practical to change into the protocol? 

Admiral ROBINSON. Congressman Young, you are catching me as 

a surgeon in the psychiatry end of business, but I would say this. 

I think that since care is not—care is not monolithic; in other 

words, you do not necessarily—you are not capable of treating one 

part of the disease or one thing now, and then tomorrow we will 

worry about the second part, and then Thursday we will worry 

about the—I think then the answer is, there really needs to be a 

combined approach to making sure that the traumatic stress symptoms are treated in conjunction with the other symptoms in which 

case drug abuse occurs. 

This is what we also know. We also know of alcoholism, alcohol 

being probably the oldest anxiolytic that is known to human kind. 

We know that drug abuse, or drug dependence, are usually things 

that patients are using to self-treat the anxiety symptoms that are 

often coming about because of the traumatic stress. So it is a complex problem. It is going to require more than just one treatment, 

and I think that there needs to be a combination approach that is 

taken. 

I will add this, too. There is also the approach that needs to 

occur with the family because child abuse/spouse abuse is also related to traumatic stress, to anxiety, to depression, to a lot of the 

things that also precipitate drugs and alcohol. 

So—it is a multifaceted, multifactoral problem, so there is going 

to have to be a concentrated effort and a multicentric approach to 

the problem. That means then that we are going to need to make 

sure that we treat not only the individual but the family, and make 

sure that the family receives the kinds of counseling and care they 

need in order to make sure that the traumatic stress syndrome, 

which may affect an individual directly, but affects a family as a 

result, is taken care of, too. 


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Mr. YOUNG. Well, I want to go back to your opening response to 

my question, where you had a disclaimer that you were not much 

into that issue, but I would say that I have seen you counsel 

wounded soldiers and marines and families and a lot of people. I 

think you do a pretty good job at counseling, but now here is the 

problem. 

We have a lot of kids who have been hurt badly. They might not 

really recognize that they have a post-traumatic stress problem; or 

they may think that they do, and maybe they are being told that 

they do not by somebody in the system—and I am aware of cases 

like that. 

But in the long term, this is going to go on beyond your hospitals; it is going to go on into the VA system, where you move 

these young folks into the VA system, but I do not think we have 

enough professionals dealing with them. 

For example, some of the VA hospitals are telling me that the 

best they can do is give a veteran who needs psychological help and 

counseling 15 minutes. I am not a psychologist either, but I think 

if I had a mental problem—and I am sure there are those who 

think that I do—I would not think that 15 minutes is enough, but 

if you have more patients than you have professionals, you have 

got to limit that time. 

So what do we do to get more professionals available to your 

wounded soldiers and marines and sailors and airmen and whoever 

else might be hurt? What do we do to provide them a type of counseling? 

This is addressed to all three of you, if you do not mind, because 

if there is something that we can do to help, we would like to do 

that. 

I am thinking about reenlistment bonuses. I understand that 

psychologists, for example, do not get anywhere near a reenlistment bonus like some other members of the medical profession. 

So I know I am hitting you with a lot of issues all in one question, but they all run together, and it is not something that is going 

to go away. It is not something we can sweep under the rug. It is 

something that, every day, it is becoming more evident is a growing 

problem. 

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, if I might just respond, first of all, I 

have to commend Admiral Robinson’s description of what, I think, 

the services are attempting to do to prevent the next generation of 

PTSD. 

Mr. YOUNG. General, could you speak closer to the microphone? 

General SCHOOMAKER. I said, I am just going to commend Admiral Robinson on his description of what we are attempting to do to 

prevent the next generation of PTSD patients who have well-established and almost refractory psychological consequences of unrecognized early symptoms of post-traumatic stress. He nailed it. It is 

confounded by drug and alcohol and family discord. 

So a lot of our efforts in the military right now are to, first, sensitize every deploying soldier, sailor, airman, marine, and coastguardsman that this is a risk. This is what we call the ‘‘human dimension of combat.’’ You can anticipate that you might experience 

symptoms, when you come back, of sleep problems, of problems 

with relationships, of hypervigilance. Things that might have been 


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even helpful for you while you were in a combat zone are no longer 

helpful when you are at home. 

And to avoid problems with drugs, alcohol and family discord— 

a couple comments about that—what the Army has done, led by 

our Secretary and by the Chief of Staff of the Army, is to do an 

unprecedented leader-teach program that we have completed that 

went from the top of the Army and included the Sergeant Major 

of the Army, whom you just talked to, down to the last soldier on 

active duty, educating them about the signs and symptoms of concussive injury, as well as post-traumatic stress, and alerting them 

to watch their buddies—help them avoid alcohol and drug problems, help them recognize that some of their behaviors are related 

to combat-related stress. 

The second thing I would say speaks to this problem of professionals available for mental health. A fundamental part of that has 

got to be at the primary care provider level—the family medicine 

doc, the nurse practitioner, the pediatrician, the general internist— 

who is seeing and treating our patients probably most commonly. 

A lot of our programs are powered down to them to recognize the 

signs and symptoms of post-traumatic stress and concussive injury 

and to intervene and, if necessary, to elevate them to the specialists. 

General ROUDEBUSH. Yes, sir. I think you touched right at the 

heart of what we are attempting to do. How do we get these individuals to the right care at the right time and in the right fashion? 

To tag on with General Schoomaker’s comment, I am a family 

physician, and I can tell you that 70 percent of the patients whom 

I see, or the problems that I see just on average, have an emotional 

or a behavioral or a psychological component to it, so there is the 

opportunity to leverage all of the primary care providers as well as 

the surgeons. 

I mean, any provider who is seeing these individuals needs to be 

aware that there are those issues that are at play. Get the individual to the right capability, if that is required—although, as a 

family physician, I can provide a great deal of that care; but I can 

get the individual to a psychologist or to a psychiatrist at the point 

when that becomes appropriate. 

I will go back to the network overlay of this. Within the Air 

Force, our Chief of Staff and our Secretary have made it a priority 

to take care of our people. 

One of the programs we have is a Wingman Program, which does 

two things: One, it causes us to look out for each other, but it also 

destigmatizes the act of asking for help. So you institutionalize an 

ethic and a sense that it is okay to get help when you need it, and 

we support each other in doing that. Then you begin to get at the 

family support, as well, for our Airmen who are deployed on the 

ground in combat. 

I mean, it really does go deeply, but it is the network that provides that. For us, our outpatients, we embed mental health providers in our family practice clinics both as a consultant and outreach. But as one who sets the tone, that this is how we go about 

it. So I think there is an opportunity to get this. 


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That said, I think we still are going to need more specialists— 

psychiatrists, psychologists. I think we need to prime the pipeline 

and be sure that we facilitate the bureaucracy. 

I do not diminish the challenge there to help us bring those folks 

on board. So, with your help in our doing that, certainly through 

the supplemental and the dollars that we have received, we are expanding the access and the capability. So we think that is a huge 

piece of it as well. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I agree with what you just said. 

I am just wondering, you know—I know, in working with the 

American Red Cross, that your hospitals can have volunteer medical doctors who give of their time to help our wounded troops, but 

I am not aware of any program like that with psychologists or psychiatrists. 

I am just wondering, if we developed a program like that, 

wouldn’t it help ease the burden on those who are overworked now 

and who do not have enough time to deal with all of these kids or, 

at least, maybe give them whatever time they needed rather than 

just a block of 15 minutes and you are done? 

General ROUDEBUSH. Yes, sir. 

As to the opportunity to bring in those who would wish to volunteer and to provide their services, we have that capability right 

now. We can credential them, in fact, as Red Cross volunteers, so 

we can do that. 

I am not aware of a specific program to go after mental health 

providers. I will tell you that the Public Health Service has offered 

and is providing a number of mental health providers to the DoD, 

and we are taking advantage of that in order to expand our capabilities. I am not aware of a Red Cross program, but I think that 

certainly merits very strong consideration. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, of all of the issues that are going to hit us as 

a nation postwar, I think this issue of PTSD is going to hit us really hard, and I am not sure that the country is ready for it, because 

I know that once they leave your system—you do a pretty good job 

in your system, but when they leave your system and get out into 

the public or go to the VA system, I think it is going to come on 

and hit us really hard, and we need to be prepared for it. 

I think everybody on this committee would agree that we want 

to do whatever we can to help you provide whatever it is that you 

need to try to avoid the problems that these young folks might 

have later on because of their exposure to what they are exposed 

to in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Go ahead, General. 

General ROUDEBUSH. Sir, you have raised a very good point, and 

I think we have talked on it in other discussions. 

The DoD has, certainly, the accountability and the responsibility 

to take care of the individual on active duty and then transit him 

into the VA, if that is appropriate. The third part of that, out into 

the great parts of America where there is not a military facility or 

a VA readily accessible, is, how do we leverage the local community 

care in order to provide that; and that part of a systematic approach is not there yet. 

So I think that is an area where much work remains to be done. 


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Mr. YOUNG. Yes. If anybody else does not care to respond, Mr. 

Chairman, I am prepared to yield back. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kaptur. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome. I am so glad to have you here, and I am so glad to be 

in Congress at a time when we can deal with these issues, and I 

thank our chairman for scheduling special hearings on this critical 

subject. 

I wanted to mention just a few observations as we think through 

this together, and I wanted to offer any help I can give, as one 

member of this subcommittee, on a set of questions I care very 

much about. 

One is the culture within the military that comes home to a district like mine where we have returning troops—this is northern 

Ohio—who do not return home to a base, as in Sanford’s district, 

and they exhibit these issues. I mean, they have PTSD, they have 

bipolar conditions; and they know they have them. Not all do, but 

I mean, the ones who do have come up to me when they get together, but they are afraid to get help because it will hurt their 

promotion, so they do not seek care. 

I was told that the Army had adopted some type of policy, saying 

that if you do not get care, you will not be promoted. I am wondering—I just want to say a few things, but have you comment on 

a couple of them. One of them is this promotional issue. 

How do we get at the question of a commanding officer—I had 

a commanding officer come up to me. He goes, I know I have got 

it, Marcy, but I am not going because I will not get any promotion. 

So there is this cultural bias against getting help. That is number one, culture. 

Number two, the people, the medical specialists. We know that 

in any one of these illnesses, 90 to 95 percent of diagnoses that are 

done by qualified physicians are incorrect, incorrect by qualified 

physicians. 

If you go to a psychologist, it is only correct—I mean, it is wrong 

90 percent of the—I have got that wrong. It is wrong 95 percent 

of the time if a psychologist diagnoses you. It is wrong 90 percent 

of the time if it is by a qualified physician, because we do not have 

enough really qualified people in these areas. So if you do require 

medication—I am not just talking about PTSD, but PTSD plus 

other symptoms sometimes. If you are incorrectly medicated, you 

are never going to be helped anyway. 

So, to me, in looking at this, my question is, how do we get more 

qualified people in the system to do the diagnoses? How do we get 

what I view as the most important people networking with that vet 

and his family? That would be a psychiatric nurse and a chaplain. 

All right. Now, we know we are short on our chaplains all over 

the country, but those are really the—they are at the firing line for 

these people. 

We have a series of questions we could submit to the record 

about how many such personnel in those categories do we have. 

Certainly, neuropsychiatrists, but psychiatric nurses so that there 

is continuing care, and chaplains, we are very short; we are underhanded all across the system. When you get down to the Guard and 


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Reserve, whom I tend to represent much more than my colleagues 

who have active duty bases, boy, does it get short down there. 

General Roudebush, I would reference to you that in Ohio, we 

have been working with our adjutant general in trying to somehow, 

in a big State like Ohio, network these resources in a reasonable 

way. It is very hard, because you have got Wright-Patterson Air 

Force Base over on the western side of the State. You have got all 

of these Guard and Reserve units coming in from every place. You 

have got your VA clinics scattered all over. You have got the VA 

service centers. You have got the State Guard down there coming 

to see me, ‘‘Hey, we need more TRICARE.’’ 

The problem is, when these units come home, there are not the 

right people there to diagnose properly and to follow them on a 

continuing basis. The one center we have in the north, which is a 

nursing home, a VA State nursing home, there is a chaplain. He 

had me over there a couple months ago. The guy is so shorthanded, 

dealing with not just the returning Iraqi vets, but with all of the 

other vets from the first Persian Gulf War and prior conflicts. He 

said, Marcy, I am just telling you. He said, This thing is not working, and he was in the military for 20 years and is a chaplain. 

So how do we work with you to get a more systemic approach 

in a State to get the proper personnel on the ground—a 15-minute 

interview is not good enough—and proper follow-up in serious illnesses like these that continue and come up at odd times? 

It is not like a broken leg. How do we get those personnel deployed—how do we get people trained in the pipeline? How do we 

do that now and then get it organized to hit the ground in a place 

like Ohio? As our people are returning now, they are not getting 

the help that they need. How do we do that? 

Admiral ROBINSON. I am going to address, first, the stigma question because that is a major question, the culture in the military 

and the stigmatization. 

Unfortunately, in this country and in many countries, but in this 

country, there is a stigma associated with mental illness and mental health in the entire country, so many people do not want anyone to know that they are seeing a mental health provider. So that 

is the first overview. 

The second one is, as we get into our different positions, whether 

that is private sector or military, we certainly do not want our 

bosses to know that we are seeing a psychiatrist, because that very 

often will affect promotion, and it will affect advancement; and 

even if it does not, we think that it does. 

Then you hit the military, which has a rather stoic culture 

amongst those who wear the uniform. The stoicism then becomes 

even much larger with mental health issues, because now it is not 

a broken leg or something that you can see; it is something that 

you cannot see. Also, you are malingering or you are faking it, or 

you just do not have the gumption or the spirit or the backbone to 

continue. All of those things are utterly untrue, but still, that 

sometimes is the perception of members who are there. 

One of the things that we are doing is making sure that members—officers, enlisted, everyone—realize that going to seek mental 

health counseling is a sign of strength, not of weakness. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Do you think that is permeating in the ranks? 


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Admiral ROBINSON. I do not think that it has permeated into the 

ranks completely, but you know, we have to start someplace, and 

I think that—I will only draw this to your attention. When you go 

to the civilian sector, there are a lot of people who will never let 

you know they are seeing a psychiatrist. That is why there are so 

many psychiatric offices that have very private waiting areas. In 

fact, they will sometimes allow you to leave through entrances different than from where other people are coming in. 

My point here is not to—I am not trying to off-lay this and say 

that it is not a problem for us. What I am saying is that it is a 

problem because stigmatization in mental health is a problem. 

In the military, the worst problem that we have is not the warrior; it is the health care professional. The health care professionals 

are the worst. People like me—doctors and nurses, psychiatric 

nurses who have mental health problems—they are the worst at 

coming and seeking help, because that becomes a real problem for 

us. 

That surprises many people, but it actually is true for those who 

are actually in the field, as I am, and know that. 

With that said, one of the things you have to do is, you have to 

walk the talk, and you have to just let people know. I have to 

admit to you that it may be one person at a time. It is sort of like 

the old starfish story. We can get the policies out, but it is about 

walking and talking and making sure that people realize that seeing a psychiatrist is not going to keep you from getting your promotion or from doing the things that will enhance your career. 

Ms. KAPTUR. From what you know of the Navy, it prevents you 

from promotion, though, doesn’t it? 

Admiral ROBINSON. No, it does not. As a matter of fact, if we can 

keep you alive and keep you from killing yourself, you have a much 

better chance of being promoted. 

Mr. MURTHA. The time of the gentlewoman has expired. 

Mr. DICKS. There was a question that was not answered. 

Do you agree with her numbers on the improper evaluations? 

Admiral ROBINSON. I do not know if the numbers are correct, and 

actually—and I am not disinterested. I will tell you that the diagnosing can be problematic, but one of the issues that goes with diagnosing is—and I was happy you used both the professional and 

the primary care because, really, the problem we are having is a 

national shortage in mental health providers. 

This is not a military shortage; this is a national shortage. It is 

not just child psychiatry. It is across the board. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me say what we have been trying to do. 

We have been trying to add money. We have been giving them 

the authority to hire people faster, this committee. We have also 

asked them to get administrative people who could work with individuals the whole way through, not only at Walter Reed or Bethesda, but down through the VA system so that one caseworker 

would handle them. 

I have just been out at Fort Hood, and I saw an example of how 

much better they are handling things today than they were a few 

years ago. The commanders themselves are urging the members to 

come forward if they have a problem. In other words, they are trying to eliminate this stigma which you were talking about. 


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We are far from it. I mean, the military over the years has not 

liked stigma because you can use that as an excuse not to be in 

battle; so it is a very delicate balance, but I think we are making 

progress. 

As you know, I have been involved in this health care business 

for a long time, trying to get it moving in the right direction. I 

think we are moving in the right direction. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Yes. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Might I just say for the sake of the fine men who 

are here today, in Ohio—I can only talk about Ohio—General 

Wayt, who is our adjutant, has been working diligently to try to 

find a better way to provide these services as people come home. 

Congressman Hobson has been a leader on this since he was in the 

State legislature. There is a Dr. Joseph Calabreeze. 

I do not quote those statistics, Norm, lightly. Those statistics 

came from work we have been doing in Ohio, and they came from 

Dr. Joseph Calabreeze from Case Western Reserve Medical Center 

and in working with General Wayt. So that is where those numbers come from. 

Mr. DICKS. I was shocked by them, to be honest. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I was shocked by them. It turned my thinking inside out. 

So we have made some headway on the ground in Ohio, but not 

enough because we do not have the plug-in at the national level. 

So that is why I am just raising this, so that they can pay attention. 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, this is what it was all about. This is what 

we have talked about all day long, and we are getting there, I 

think. We are making some progress. It is not going to be perfect. 

They have given us some recommendations. The committee is 

going to consider them, I think, probably very, very favorably. But, 

you know, we are making a little progress. 

Mr. Tiahrt. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think all of us who have VA hospitals see that there are still 

Vietnam vets struggling; and one has to wonder if part of it was 

not the rejection that they got when they came back home following that conflict. 

I know that my own cousins said that they were spit on on occasion because some people rejected what was going on in Vietnam. 

And I fear for our Nation now when communities like Berkeley reject our troops today and what impact that is going to have on our 

troops who are returning to those communities. 

The stigma is something that, I think, is probably the greatest 

challenge you are going to face. We have heard stories about the 

officers. I know, in the Marines, that there is some kind of an inherent stigma that is just not from the leadership or from the officers corps; it is mostly just the machoism that, I think, a lot of the 

soldiers are feeling. 

I am concerned about that because I think we ought to find a 

way to overcome that, and perhaps everybody has to go through 

some kind of a pre/post-screening. 


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I know that some psychological experts, like Dr. Faulk at the KU 

Med Center, have identified the need for predeployment counseling 

to sort of prepare them for some of the things they are going to be 

facing. I think that is good advice. It gives them sort of a preparation, or something that they can expect; and that will help them, 

I think, deal with the situations as they occur. Subsequently, when 

they return home, it will give them a better way of coping with it. 

The Dole-Shalala Commission noted that the VA is noted as a 

leader in PTSD, but they also stated that there is difficulty in their 

transferring that information back to the active duty services and 

to other facilities, even within their own network. I hope that there 

is some way, some mechanism—and I do not know what that mechanism would be, whether it would be periodicals or seminars. 

I do not know what mechanisms you have of taking the information that comes out of the system and dispersing it to all in DOD. 

So I would like you to tell me what the system is. 

Let me just mention one, or a couple of other things; and I will 

just turn you loose, because I do not want to drag on a lot. Some 

providers have called TRICARE ‘‘charity care’’ because we are just 

not keeping pace with the current cost of providing health care. I 

think in the area of reimbursement for PTSD, it may be charity 

care. We may not be a good economic model in getting the kind of 

care that these folks need. 

General Roudebush and Admiral Robinson, you both mentioned 

the families, and it was also mentioned by members here, too—Mr. 

Hobson and Ms. Kaptur. I think that is very important because 

they do suffer. When somebody comes home with PTSD, it affects 

everybody around them, so we need to have a way of including 

them. 

Perhaps when you get this precare and the postcare and include 

the families, it will become more economical in some fashion. I do 

not know. 

I hope that you can address the way we disperse information 

amongst DoD that is gained from the knowledge of treating PTSD 

even amongst the services, and then also how we can handle the 

families. I mean, is there a mechanism to touch the families as 

well? 

Admiral ROBINSON. I will take the first—by the way, I appreciate 

your comments on stigma, because I think that is a problem, and 

we will have to deal with it. 

As to the experts in PTSD and their spreading the information, 

there are two answers. The first is the Center of Excellence for 

stress, for traumatic stress, that is actually coming up at the National Military Medical Center for which Colonel (Promotable) Sutton, who is sitting behind me, is the director is actually building. 

That is going to be a center that has Army, Navy, Air Force, VA, 

and civilian academic centers that are going to have—in a sense, 

it is a multifaceted group, and it is all together. I think that is one 

way we are going to get the word out and actually dispense and 

disperse. 

The other way is through the way we are doing casualty care at 

both Bethesda and Walter Reed and the C5 in Balboa and at the 

Wounded Warrior brigades and at the Wounded Warrior in Pendleton and Lejeune. That is to make sure that we have connections 


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with the polytrauma centers on the VA side—and we do, and we 

talk on a daily basis with them—and that we have an interaction 

with the polytrauma centers around the country. We have it regarding amputation. We have it regarding traumatic stress. We 

have it regarding mental health, blindness, spinal cord rehabilitation. So there are a multitude of things. 

General SCHOOMAKER. I would say, for the Army, several things. 

First of all, for sharing medical information among medical professionals, I think Adam has addressed a couple of the ways we are 

doing that already around polytrauma centers, for example, and at 

our centers of Warrior Care. 

We do a lot of our clinical guideline development with the Department of Veterans Affairs. For example, guidelines around the 

management of traumatic brain injury were developed in concert 

with the Veterans Administration through the Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Program, which is now incorporated into Colonel (Promotable) Sutton’s Center of Excellence for TBI, that Admiral Robinson referred to, that is going to be stood up at Walter 

Reed National Military Medical Center in Bethesda. 

As far as for our soldiers and their families, what the Army has 

done—and I alluded to this earlier, I think, in talking to Congressman Dicks. The Army leadership, starting with our Secretary and 

the Chief of Staff, last year did a leader-teach program that went 

from the top to the very bottom of the Army. 

And I think everybody at this table would agree that the key to 

stigmatization, breaking the stigma, lies with the line leadership. 

That is where our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines look to. They 

look for the example of their leadership, and our leaders are stepping forward to say exactly that. 

I do not know where the impression came from, that the congresswoman mentioned, that you will not get promoted if you go to 

a mental health provider except that that is embedded within the 

culture of the society. I mean, this is not only resident in the military, and I think we all remember major figures within even Congress whose mental health problems became a problem of stigmatization in the past. This is something—— 

Ms. KAPTUR. Excuse me, General. 

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Since you mentioned my name, that was said to me 

by more than one soldier from my district. 

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, ma’am, and I am not denying that 

that is there. I am just telling you, as Admiral Robinson said earlier, how deeply embedded and ingrained this notion is and how 

difficult it is going to be to change it. 

What we are doing in the Army is, in every military training experience that an enlisted soldier or an officer gets throughout their 

career, there will be elements of continuous training around the 

recognition of the symptoms of both concussive injury, as well as 

psychological responses to combat. It will be a part of everything 

we do to continue to develop our leaders and to develop soldiers. 

Then, finally, we have a whole group—in fact, in your support for us, in the moneys that you have provided in that $600 million, 

O&M dollars, that are going to be directed toward the care of patients and their families, we have a large body now of training maVerDate Nov 24 2008 05:14 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046473 PO 00000 Frm 00310 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A473P2.XXX A473P2

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terials under the brand of Battle Mind Training that is addressed 

toward children; and that is addressed toward families to sensitize 

the force, that of predeployment to get them prepared to go and 

that of postdeployment to sensitize them to what symptoms they 

may experience as a consequence of that deployment. 

Ms. KAPTUR. General. 

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Excuse me. I am going to put this on the record, 

and I will just ask my colleagues to bear with me. 

This is from an Army Reserve unit, a returning soldier who was 

wounded in Iraq. He suffered serious head trauma—teeth, a broken 

neck—and his life was saved. He came back home to northern Ohio 

where we have no hospital, Army hospital. He was made to go to— 

and he suffers terrible headaches and everything; plus, he developed epilepsy—all right?—after combat, so they sent him up an 

hour away to get medical care. 

Of course, he lost his job. There he is—right?—up in the hospital. 

So then they sent him back home to the little town that he lives 

in. He reports back to his Reserve unit for an event that they had 

there, which is how I met him, and he came up, and he says, Congresswoman, can you help me? 

He even looked yellow. I mean, he did not even have good coloring, right? 

I said, What is wrong, sir? He says, They tell me I cannot get 

any benefits because my epilepsy relates to that I played high 

school football. He said, I never had epilepsy until I went in the 

military, until I went to Iraq. He said, I have been in this Guard 

unit for 15 years or something. 

Here is a situation. I am only telling you because something is 

not right when someone who has given so much and who comes 

home cannot be cared for near where he lives. He has got to go 

somewhere else, and he has PTSD. He has them all. 

Something has to change in the system. So I just put one life on 

the record during this hearing. 

I know you respect what I am saying. I respect what you are 

doing. 

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, ma’am. I completely agree with you. 

If that is happening to that soldier, your staff needs to give me the 

name of that soldier so I can find out how to help him. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Bishop, I remember when I was down at the 

end of the line myself. 

Mr. DICKS. That was a long time ago. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. That is very 

consoling. 

I have been very interested in the concerns that have been 

raised. One is the lack of access. And all of you seem to indicate 

that there are not enough professionals to deal with these mental 

health issues; and PTSD is really becoming exacerbated as a result 

of the current involvement. 

One of the things that we did in the last appropriations bill is, 

the committee was kind enough to fund a pilot program utilizing 


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a civilian hospital in the area of PTSD to do research and treatment, particularly in an area where there are not military hospitals, like Ms. Kaptur is referring to, and to develop a Center of 

Excellence where we have a number of reservists and National 

Guard people who have been deployed and who are coming back. 

We also have people who returned from their deployments to the 

main base, but who do not live in the community where that base 

is located, where the hospital is located, so they return to their 

rural outpost communities. So here we have now the opportunity 

for a civilian hospital to provide a Center of Excellence dealing 

with PTSD and these issues. 

That is just an isolated case, and I guess I would like to get you 

to comment on whether you think this is a good approach and if 

watching the development of this might suggest that we might 

need to do that elsewhere across the country, given the tidal wave 

of these kinds of incidents that we will have following this engagement. 

Then, the other thing I want to raise is the issue at Fort Drum 

that was reported recently on NPR where the soldiers at Fort 

Drum who had returned from their deployments decided that they 

would get assistance in making sure that their disability claims 

were properly and systematically documented. They went to the VA 

and got assistance from some of the VA employees to help them in 

the preparation. 

The Army auditors decided that they were too successful, so they 

ordered the VA to cease and desist from providing that service to 

active duty personnel, which provides a problem for me. Given the 

fact that, General Schoomaker, one of your predecessors, General 

Kiley, and I had some extensive conversations in years past about 

the predeployment and postdeployment self-assessed questionnaire 

that the personnel utilize, personnel who often do not get diagnosed because, as Admiral Robinson indicated, they want to get 

home, and they want to get back to their families. 

Either they do not know that they need assistance or that they 

need help, or they do not want to take the time to get it because 

they would much rather be back home with their families, of 

course, which exposes their families to the risk of the side effects 

of PTSD. 

So would you comment on those two things, please? 

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, sir. Let me take the second first. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me interrupt for just a minute, General. 

Here is what we envision with the money we put in. We envision 

a Center of Excellence which does the research on PTSD. We have 

done so little research on it. 

Now, what you have heard the Surgeon Generals talk about is 

what we know about it today. What we believe should happen is 

that—before they leave, we are hopeful at some point we will be 

able to measure whether these people are vulnerable to PTSD and 

then be able to treat it beforehand, or screen them and counsel 

them enough that we can eliminate the problem. 

But we need a Center of Excellence to do the research, I think. 

I think that is what this committee is recommending. So, as to that 

part of the question, I think this committee has recommended to 


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them to do that kind of a thing. I think, with their recommendation, as long as we can provide the money, that will help. 

Now, that will not help us in the rural areas, but at least we will 

know the procedures. 

Right now, we are kind of in the dark about exactly how to handle it. We have not the ability to measure exactly what is wrong 

with the person, and that is part of our problem. 

The rest of the question I leave up to them, but I think we are 

in the forefront. This committee has been at the forefront of developing and providing money for health care for a lot of years, and 

I think this continues. We are very visionary on this committee 

with what we have done, and I think this is just a continuation of 

that. 

Admiral ROBINSON. Mr. Chairman, the Center of Excellence will 

not only provide that research, but it will also provide, for lack of 

a better word, the practice guidelines that can be utilized in the 

community hospitals that may, in fact, be stood up to take care of 

people in remote areas in which there is no other care available. 

So then they are not caring for them based upon nonmilitary and 

noncombat stress disorders; they are actually folding into what we 

have learned from the Center of Excellence here. 

Mr. BISHOP. Let me follow up. Thank you. I appreciate that very 

much. It is consistent with what my expectations were, and I appreciate that very much. 

General Schoomaker, there was an incident—and I hate to report 

this—where there was some research being done that was authorized through the military’s research authorization protocols. It indicated that—the premise was that they were going to be able to determine which individuals, based on some blood tests, were most 

likely to succumb to PTSD. 

During the course of that research, because of some alleged protocol violations, the study was stopped; the doctor who was conducting it was disciplined and had a letter put in his personnel 

record. A civilian who was military, but who felt forced to retire because of being associated with the study, was investigated for prosecution when it appeared as if this could possibly have led us to 

some revelations on when to expect and under what circumstances 

to expect individuals to be susceptible to PTSD. 

We can, perhaps, talk about that after the hearing and off the 

record, but I was very disturbed by that. The individual, a professional doctor, had an otherwise clean record, but now he has a notation in his record. The other individual, who was a psychologist 

or a social worker, now was denied his privileges at the hospital, 

and he was forced to retire. 

It appeared to me that the implications of that were that it could 

possibly hinder recruitment, and higher command determined that 

we do not want to know these things because it will stop us from 

meeting our recruitment goals if we know in advance that these 

people will not make it because of their susceptibility to traumatic 

stress. 

Somehow I wish that we could continue this research and make 

sure that we can learn everything we need to learn about it. Maybe 

the Centers of Excellence will be able to provide that. 


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These were people who were training for combat, some of whom 

went to combat, who returned from combat, and they believed that 

the people who were conducting the study believed that they could 

get their enzymes and blood chemistry and be able to determine 

whether or not they were likely to have it or not. 

General SCHOOMAKER. I think the chairman got it right on target, sir, that we are in the dark still, and we are learning every 

day more about the nature of post-traumatic stress, what leads to 

its evolving, as Admiral Robinson outlined earlier, into a disorder 

that may leave one with a lifetime disability that we want to 

avoid—how it overlaps with other elements of either injury or exposure. 

For example, last week, Army researchers who have been studying post-traumatic stress and concussive injury published a terrific 

paper in the New England Journal of Medicine that is beginning 

to tease apart what we call TBI–PTSD as if it is one thing. It is 

not one thing. 

One, traumatic brain injury, is a physical injury to the brain that 

results from forces directed to the brain, usually from debris that 

is thrown against the soldier or marine or from being dashed inside 

a vehicle or thrown to the ground or rapid acceleration/deceleration 

that you would experience, let us say, in a motor vehicle accident. 

The other is a late-emerging set of symptoms that may overlap 

with those that accompany the concussion but are caused by two 

different things. 

What this researcher out of the Walter Reed Army Institute of 

Research and his colleagues have shown is that the concussion 

itself, the brain injury which is not unlike what you would get on 

the sports field or what you may get in a motor vehicle accident 

on our highways—which occurs much more frequently, frankly, 

than in combat—is not in and of itself the cause of late-emerging 

symptoms. 

It is probably the context in which that injury occurred. You had 

a concussion not on a sports field where you wake up with a crowd 

of cheering fans, but where you wake up in combat, maybe with 

your buddies being killed or injured. That then leads to a very high 

predisposition to late-emerging symptoms. 

This kind of work and lots of work like that is going to be the 

result of the research that you all are sponsoring. Frankly, we have 

had an enormous outpouring of interest in research projects. 

One thing I will reassure you of, Congressman—and that I know 

you are interested in—is, although this is being conducted in the 

military, we will not violate any of the rules that govern how we 

do research on human subjects. And we are very meticulous about 

observing all international and national standards for the conduct 

of research on human subjects. Just because we are in uniform and 

just because our subjects may be serving in uniform themselves, we 

will not take shortcuts. We will not violate protocols. We will not 

take risks that may throw us into a different light with the American public. 

Mr. BISHOP. Yes, sir. I appreciate that, and that is absolutely appropriate. 

This particular study was about to go for publication, and it was 

joint work with the Army as well as with the CDC and with a uniVerDate Nov 24 2008 05:14 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046473 PO 00000 Frm 00314 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A473P2.XXX A473P2

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versity up in Virginia, I believe. They were just requesting permission to publish the study. 

Then all of a sudden, the protocols which—of course, this poor 

doctor, you know, just was told what he needed to do, and he did 

it and thought it was done. They said, no, the protocols were not 

proper, so now this cannot be studied, this cannot be published, 

and the study has to be stopped. 

General SCHOOMAKER. With respect, sir, I am familiar with the 

study, and he violated the protocol. 

Let me just say quickly, because I spent the morning with a National Public Radio correspondent about the Fort Drum event, that 

I deeply regret that we had miscommunication between the team 

that went up there and talked to the VA counselors and the Army 

group at Fort Drum. 

In fact, the Fort Drum visit by our tiger team, in looking at the 

process of disability adjudication and our warm handoff to the VA, 

visited Fort Drum as the last of 11 site visits, and they found that 

that was probably one of the best sites that they had visited. They 

were highly complimentary and openly laudatory about what VA 

counselors were doing for our soldiers. They came back ready to 

make recommendations that this be best practice. 

I do not understand how the miscommunication developed. I regret that I did not have the internal VA memo that recorded their 

perception that we were telling them to cease and desist, because 

I talked personally to people who were there on the Army team, 

who said this was a terrific collegial relationship and meeting; and 

we left very buoyed by what we saw up there and encouraged them 

to continue. 

Mr. MURTHA. I appreciate that. Let me just say one thing about 

what Ms. Kaptur said about diagnosis. 

We found an article here today that talked about diabetes, and 

you know how much they stressed losing weight and how much it 

would enhance your life. 

Now, after years of saying that, we found out, if you lose weight, 

you have more risk of having a heart attack, not by losing weight 

but by reducing your blood sugar. So diagnosis is a hell of a problem. 

I mean, the military or the civilian side has a hard time. But we 

appreciate your time. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Chairman. Thirty seconds, Mr. Chairman, 

please. 

Mr. MURTHA. Thirty seconds. 

Ms. KAPTUR. If I had not worked on it for 25 years, I would not 

care. 

I just wanted to mention to Admiral Robinson that in your testimony, sir, there are two professional groups not mentioned that I 

do believe are important—psychiatric nurses and chaplains. I just 

wanted to point that out. 

Also, Mr. Chairman, you referenced Centers of Excellence, and I 

know we have funded Centers of Excellence in the neuropsychiatric 

area. Senator Boxer has. There are different pieces. I do not know 

if you intend to tie that together with whatever this is, but I just 

thought I would mention that bureaucratic issue. 


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Finally, I would ask, for the record, if it is possible for each of 

the services to tell us what percent of individuals treated under 

your care have actually been diagnosed with bipolar-related mental 

conditions—schizophrenia or obsessive compulsive disorder or alcoholism. Not all together; I am just saying in those categories because we have been talking about PTSD and TBI, but I would be 

very curious to find out what percent—I just had a soldier from my 

district who presented with bipolar, and I am just curious—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Marcy, you went over 30 seconds. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Did I? Okay. 

Mr. MURTHA. The Committee is adjourned. Thank you very 

much. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Question submitted by Ms. Kaptur and the answer thereto follow:] 

Question. What percent of individuals under care are diagnosed and treated for 

biploar condition, alcoholism, neurological disorders. 

Answer. What follows provides counts of individuals who were seen one or more 

times for the conditions you mentioned (bipolar condition and alcoholism). It is difficult to address the issue of ‘‘treatment’’ from centrally accessible electronic records. 

Treatment does not necessarily involve medication. Psychological therapy frequently 

involves talking, accomplished during a visit to the clinic or as part of communitybased groups that do not report to the Department. As a surrogate, the data include 

some information regarding how many people were seen for these conditions in consecutive years, which provides an indication of follow-up. The data also reflect how 

many individuals received medications that can be used for the treatment of bipolar 

condition. However, many of the medications can be used for other purposes. 

Similarly, the data identify cases of alcoholism based on an ICD–9 code, but medical records are not the primary source of alcohol-related problems because the alcohol and drug abuse program is not a medical program. These individuals frequently 

attend Alcoholics Anonymous, Vet Centers, or other community-based services that 

do not report to the Department of Defense. 

‘‘Neurological disorders,’’ is a very broad category, especially from the standpoint 

of treatment. The data provide information about Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 

(PTSD) because that seems to be of great interest to members of Congress and the 

media, but PTSD is not a ‘‘neurological disorder.’’ 


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[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of question submitted by Ms. Kaptur. 

Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto follow:] 

LONG TERM CARE FOR MILITARY SERVICE MEMBERS

Question: With regard to TBI, as we all know, some of our soldiers and Marines 

are returning home with severe TBI and neurological problems and head and neck 

injuries. For some of these heroes, going home to a life they knew before is not an 

option, at least in the short term. As a result, they wind up in nursing home settings where professional staff can assist their family members in giving them the 

care they need and deserve. But this care is often given in VA nursing facilities 

where they are with older veterans and not more people their age. Those I have 

talked to say their outlook on life might be better if they were in a setting with 

others their age. Have you given any thought to centralizing the long term care of 

these soldiers and Marines so they are being cared for together with others their 

age and in similar situations? 

Answer: The care location of our wounded warriors returning home with severe 

injuries is based on their medical diagnosis and care needs as determined by their 

interdisciplinary health care team. The care location is also dependent on several 

other factors, such as the capability of medical services being offered within a medical treatment facility, complexity of the Service member’s medical care plan, and 

consideration of personal and family preferences. 

The joint efforts to develop and implement improvements for the care of the 

wounded, ill, or injured Service members on issues such as care continuity are being 

addressed by the Department of Defense (DoD) and VA Senior Oversight Committee, Line of Action (LOA) #3 for Case/Care Management Reform led by Dr. 

Lynda Davis (Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Military Personnel Policy) 

and Ms. Kristin Day (VA, Chief Consultant, Care Management Services). This LOA 

item is to standardize case and care management processes for the transition of 

wounded, ill, and injured Service members and their families from recovery, through 

rehabilitation, and to reintegration across the DoD and VA. 

The DoD military health system is committed to providing high quality, safe, and 

timely care across the health care continuum that is seamless and enhances the severely injured and wounded Service member’s, and family’s quality of life, and is 

working in collaboration with Senior Oversight Committee, LOA #3 for Case/Care 

Management Reform. 

Question: We have centers of excellence for various conditions such as the Center 

for the Intrepid at Brooke and the Wounded Warrior Battalions at Camp Pendleton 

and Camp Lejeune. Should we have a long term care facility for military service 

members at some common location? 

Answer: Our nation must be dedicated to take care of those Service members who 

have sacrificed for us. Providing long-term care for military Service members certainly would support that, but I would not recommend a single facility. Perhaps 

such care would be better placed under the capable hands of the Department of Veterans Affairs, whose primary mission is to provide long-term care for injured veterans who are no longer able to serve on active duty. 

Question: Finally, I am hearing good things about the improvements that have 

been made in helping our soldiers and Marines through the paperwork required to 

med board them out of the services and into the VA health care system. One of the 

substantial improvements, especially for those with TBI/PTSD conditions, is the 

joint military/VA physcal. Can you talk about that change and do you have other 

recommendations for ways in which our committee can help improve the process? 

Answer: The Department of Defense (DoD)/VA joint medical evaluation of Service 

members in the Disability Evaluation System (DES) focuses on the Service member 

while still providing valuable information required by both departments. Building 

a comprehensive network of qualified providers who can perform these disability 

exams will take time, resources and cooperation between VA and DoD. Qualified 

providers may have to come from a variety of sources (DoD, VA, TRICARE, contractors, or joint). All options for delivery and funding of these exams should be available to pilot expansion planners. Integration of the VA Benefits Administration, VA 

Health Administration and DoD information systems is also key to success. Many 

have focused on the clinical information systems but the DES includes information 

sharing in and outside our clinical domains. Continued efforts toward integration 

of benefits and clinical information focused on the Service member will help improve 

the process. Formalized collaboration of DoD and VA rating experts to allow for DoD 

and VA medical experts to discuss VA Schedule for Rating Disabilities issues during 

any changes or updates is another recommendation to help improve the process. In 


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regards to this program, no additional action is requested from Congress at this 

time. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Young. 

Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow:] 

OBLIGATION OF FUNDING

Question: This Committee provided $900,000,000 to increase the mental health 

services available to service members. 

Of the $600,000,000 provided in operation and maintenance, $453,000,000 has already been distributed to the services and TRICARE Management Agency. Only 

$53,000,000 has been obligated. 

Why is there such a low rate of obligation? 

Answer: The Department is following a detailed plan and executing a prudent and 

careful approach to assure we use the funds provided by Congress to maximize the 

benefit to our Service members. 

In the summer of 2007, the Department developed a strategic plan and guiding 

principles. In the summer and fall, we solicited proposals from the Services that 

would support the guiding principles. We reviewed over 300 submissions from the 

Services and selected programs that adhered to our strategic intent and distributed 

the funding in three phases. The first distribution went out in August 2007. While 

the Services have worked to obligate in accordance to their plans, they have encountered some unforeseen obstacles, such as overwhelming their contracting offices, the 

difficulty of hiring contractors on one-year contracts, attracting applicants to remote 

or less desirable locations, and competing with civilian agencies for the same finite 

pool of health professionals. Additionally, fiscal law constraints denied the use of 

Defense Health Plan dollars for several of the Reserve component programs. 

Question: A large part of the funding provided was to hire additional staff. Where 

are you in executing a hiring plan? 

Answer: The Army has hired 138 of the 302 psychological health personnel requirements, which matches their plan. The Navy has hired 8 of the 175 they require, but has a contract for an additional 51. The Air Force plans to hire 97 providers and expects to have their contract awarded soon and an overseas contract 

awarded in July. 

CENTER OF EXCELLENCE

Question: It seems that the Department’s ‘‘Center for Best Practices’’ is a topdown solution to a bottom-up problem. While I understand the need for a ‘‘Center 

for Best Practices’’ and might even say that it is long overdue, I do not think it addresses the immediate concern about increasing access to services for individuals. 

This demonstrates the process side of the what is being done to address the issue. 

What action, not PROCESS, have you been taking for 31⁄2 years? 

Answer: The Department of Defense (DoD) has a broad range of programs designed to sustain the health and well-being of each and every military and family 

member in the total military community. Services available at military installations 

include: health and wellness programs, stress management, family readiness and 

community support centers, family readiness groups, ombudsmen, volunteer programs, legal and educational programs, and chaplains, among many other community programs. Early intervention and prevention programs include pre-deployment 

education and training, suicide prevention training, Military OneSource (1–800– 

342–9647), the Mental Health Self Assessment Program, National Depression and 

Alcohol Day Screening, and health fairs (kits available at 

www.mentalhealthscreening.org). 

DoD has formed a strong partnership with the Department of Veterans Affairs 

and other federal agencies and professional advocacy groups to provide outreach and 

prevention programs that are available to Reserve and National Guard members. 

A Post-Deployment Health Assessment and education process is conducted upon returning from deployment to identify health concerns that might have arisen. An additional Post-Deployment Health Reassessment with additional education takes 

place 90 to 180 days after deployment to identify any issues that might arise in that 

timeframe. Periodic health assessments are also conducted to identify any health 

issues a person might have prior to entering the pre-deployment cycle. In addition, 

a Mental Health Self-Assessment is available 24 hours a day 

(www.militarymentalhealth.org, 1–877–877–3647) as an additional tool for family 

members and Service members. 


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Question: How many mental health professionals will be seeing patients in the 

new Center? 

Answer: The precise staffing model for the National Intrepid Center of Excellence 

(NICoE) is being developed. There will likely be substantial inter-facility sharing of 

staff with the NICoE and the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center located 

adjacent to the NICoE. The staffing plan will include psychiatrists, neurologists, 

neuroradiologists, neuropsychologists, neuropsychology technicians, physical medicine physicians, physical therapists, occupational therapists, audiologists, nursing 

personnel, and administrative and research support staff. 

Question: Will there be in-patient beds? 

Answer: The National Intrepid Center of Excellence (NICoE) will contain no inpatient beds. The NICoE will provide extensive and intensive outpatient evaluation, 

diagnostic clarification, education and treatments for returning warriors and their 

families using state-of-the-art technology and clinical models. 

Question: What type of utilization capacity will the Center have? 

Answer: The currently proposed concept of operations for the National Intrepid 

Center of Excellence (NICoE) includes evaluation, diagnostic clarification, and treatment of twenty patients and their families in an intensive outpatient program at 

any given time. The program will be individualized to the needs of the patients and 

their families, but will generally last approximately two weeks. In addition, the 

NICoE will provide detailed patient-centered referrals for ongoing care and will provide telemedicine follow-up for those patients who may not have adequate treatments in their communities. Depending on their response to treatment and ongoing 

functional status, some patients and their families will be brought back to the 

NICoE for reevaluation. The NICoE will also provide consultative and referral services to patients, families, and clinicians using telemedicine technology. 

Question: How much of the funding provided will be designated for the Center? Answer: The Defense Center of Excellence has been designated $45 million in Op- eration and Maintenance funds and $45 million in Research, Development, Testing, 

and Evaluation funding. These were provided in Fiscal Year (FY) 2007/2008 multiyear funding from Title III of Public Law 110–28, United States Troop Readiness, 

Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of FY 

2007. 

Question: How much of the funding provided will be designated for the Defense 

and Veterans Head Injury Center? 

Answer: According to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008, Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center (DVBIC) is to remain independently funded through 2013 with funds that supplement not supplant those for the 

Defense Center of Excellence (DCoE). As such, DVBIC has been funded $28.4 million for the nine-month interval beginning March 17, 2008. This funding includes 

$5.1 million from the Program Objective Memorandum and $7.3 million from global 

war on terror supplemental funds and $16 million from DCoE funds. These allocations support network expansion and the increased responsibility as the designated 

office of responsibility for Department of Defense traumatic brain injury surveillance, pre-deployment cognitive testing, as well as the congressionally directed 15- 

year study and congressionally directed Family Caregiver Panel. 

Question: How will returning service members and their families in rural parts 

of the country access the new center? 

Answer: Returning Service members and their families will have multiple means 

of accessing the resources available through the Defense Center of Excellence 

(DCoE) for Psychological Health (PH) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI). These resources, currently in development, include: 

• The DCoE website, which affords any warrior, and those involved in their 

support and care, the ability to obtain current information regarding PH and 

TBI 

• A 24-hour a day Call Center, which supports the questions, concerns, and 

informational needs of warrior families 

• The ability to engage in community discussions via electronic discussion 

board (website) 

• The ability to email a consultant on PH and TBI issues (via website) 

• Video teleconferencing consultation capability for Service members in remote locations. 

Question: What are the anticipated operating costs of the center and how will they 

be funded? 

Answer: The Defense Center of Excellence (DCoE) for Psychological Health and 

Traumatic Brain Injury will be funded through Supplemental Appropriations 

through Fiscal Year 2009. Currently, the DCoE is operating on a budget of approximately $128 million, distributed between operations and maintenance and research, 


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development, test, and evaluation funds. Specific cost relating to the National Intrepid Center of Excellence is not possible at this time, but it is estimated that it 

will cost approximately $30 million annually to operate. 

LEGISLATIVE DIRECTION

Question: In the Committee’s language it was very clear that DoD should increase 

its reach and to work with commercial entities to increase capacity of the mental 

health system as well as the breadth of programs available to individuals. I am not 

convinced that this has happened. We have not asked for increased bureaucracy, we 

have asked for increased services. 

As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continue, how many certified mental health 

providers will the Department require in the next 24 months to handle the increasing issues that are prevalent of PTSD/TBI? 

Answer: The bulk of the increase in mental health professionals for the Services 

will be borne by the Army because it provides services to the largest number of 

Service members. By the end of calendar year 2008, there should be 574 mental 

health providers for all the Services plus another 200 Public Health Service mental 

health providers. This target was developed using a staffing model that accounts for 

changes in demand resulting from the war. The targets will be monitored and further refined to ensure we are able to meet the demand for services. 

Question: How many is the Department planning on hiring? 

Answer: The Army is hiring 302 mental health providers and 15 support personnel. They have requested 127 Public Health Service (PHS) mental health officers 

for placement across the Army and 275 additional providers in the continental 

United States. Current contracts in place will have all providers hired by September 

2008. The Navy is hiring 175 mental health providers and 78 support personnel. 

The Navy and Marine Corps requested 37 PHS mental health providers. The Air 

Force is hiring 97 behavioral health providers at 76 installations and placing 32 

PHS mental health providers across the Air Force. 

Question: How long will that take? 

Answer: We expect the process to take up to a year, although it varies by Service. 

Mental health providers are in short supply across the Nation. Hard to serve areas, 

such as Fort Hood, Texas, and other rural locations make staffing a challenge. To 

serve these areas, we are partnering with the Public Health Service (PHS), which 

provides uniformed mental health providers to the Department of Health and 

Human Services (HHS). PHS has committed to provide the DoD with 200 mental 

health providers of all disciplines. Based on the Services’ input, we will place those 

providers in those hard to reach areas. We expect to begin sending these providers 

to medical treatment facilities across the country as soon as the memorandum of 

agreement is signed. 

While all Services are aggressively pursuing hiring actions, the contracting process is very lengthy and has affected our ability to hire rapidly even where providers 

are available. The Army, which had some existing contracts in place, is actively hiring in accordance with their plan to add their full requirement of providers by the 

end of July. The Navy, which has had to establish all new contracts, will soon let 

a contract. However, the normal hiring timeframe is 90–120 days. Its estimate is 

that the Navy may not meet its required goal of the end of September. The Air 

Force should have its 50-state contract in place in April and its overseas contract 

in July. The amount of time necessary to bring on new contractors indicates that 

the Services will still be trying to find and hire qualified providers late this year. 

Question: What is your deadline? 

Answer: There are near- and long-term staffing plans to meet mental health requirements of the Force. In the near-term, we are using government civilian hires 

and contracts for mental health professionals. We have active contracting and civilian recruitment programs ongoing. Hospital commanders have the authority to adjust staffing as required to meet the demand for services. Financial resources are 

not a constraint at any level, except for personnel in State National Guard headquarters staffs. The Defense Health Program appropriation is not available for that 

purpose. 

The long-term plan includes recruiting military (uniformed) mental health staff 

in Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009. New resources will be allocated to keep pace with 

increasing behavioral health needs. Initiatives such as the Army’s retention bonuses 

and loan repayment programs are attracting and retaining military staff in behavioral health specialities. 


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REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Question. During deliberation of the fiscal year 2008 Defense Appropriations bill, 

(House Report 110–279) this Committee required the Department to report by January 15, 2008 on the state of mental health experts available across the military, 

both Military Treatment Facilities as well as the availability of care in the private 

sector. 

Question: What is the status of this report? 

Answer: An interim report was generated in late February and is pending coupling with another agency’s section that is part of the report. 

Question: Why is the report late? 

Answer: The report is late for the following reasons: 

1. A substantial section of the report requires an accounting of research funding 

addressing gaps in knowledge regarding Post Traumatic Stress Disorder identified 

by the congressionally directed Medical Research Program. The final of three program integration phases will occur the first week of March 2008, and disposition 

of funding for a variety of awards will be announced in late March 2008. At that 

time, an accounting of the distribution of resources will be known. The Medical Research Material Command will then be able to generate a final report addressing 

the last half of the reporting requirements requested by House Report 110–279. 

2. Inter-departmental coordination is required to complete the total report. 

3. The barometer of the Department’s success in meeting the standard for access 

to mental health care providers is dependent, in part, upon a new TRICARE program developed to measure compliance with this standard in addition to enhancing 

beneficiary support procuring such care. In the fall of 2007, a TRICARE Behavioral 

Health Provider Locator function was created, staff was hired by each TRICARE region, and training was conducted. The service was initiated on December 21, 2007. 

By April, the results of the ability of these locators to assure beneficiary initial access to network mental health care providers will be through this new modality. Incorporating these results into the final report will provide a baseline upon which 

to judge subsequent quarters in terms of beneficiary access to network mental 

health providers. In addition, we will be including data from the Services regarding 

initial access to mental health providers in the direct care system, as well. 

OBLIGATION OF FUNDING TO THE SERVICES

Question: Of the $453,000,000, 45% went to the Army, 15% went to the Navy, 10% 

went to the Air Force, and 30% went to the TRICARE Management Agency for Joint 

Support. 

This Committee has heard that the Services are weary of obligating the funding 

for fear of a sizable funding ‘‘tail’’ in fiscal year 2009 that will not be supported by 

Congress. Could each witness comment on this statement. 

Answer: The Services have encountered problems attracting contractors to oneyear contracts, so follow-on funding is an issue the Department has to address. 

Question: What other programs or initiatives are the Services looking at to improve access to care for soldiers and their families? 

Answer: There are near- and long-term staffing plans to meet mental health requirements. In the near-term, we are using government civilian hires and contracts 

for mental health professionals. We have active contracting and civilian recruitment 

programs ongoing. Hospital commanders have the authority to adjust staffing as required to meet the demand for services. Financial resources are not a constraint at 

any level. 

The long-term plan includes recruiting military (uniformed) mental health staff 

in Fiscal Year 2009. New resources will be allocated to the force to keep pace with 

increasing behavioral health needs. Initiatives such as the Army’s retention bonuses 

and loan repayment programs are attracting and retaining military staff in behavioral health specialties. Regarding the TRICARE network, over 3,000 care providers 

have been assigned across all three regions, with over 2,500 in the West, 389 in the 

North, and 146 in the South. 

Another significant program is telehealth. The intent is to use technology, particularly in underserved and remote locations. In addition, the TRICARE Management 

Activity has established a Health Care Finder for family members to allow them to 

call for assistance in locating a mental health provider. For traumatic brain injuries 

(TBI), we established standard capability packages that the Services are implementing to assist in screening and caring for Service members with TBI. 

Question: Of the Army’s 45%, the bulk of it is for access to care for psychological 

health and traumatic brain injury. 

How is the Army obligating the funding provided? 


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Answer: The Army is obligating the largest proportion of funding for PH and TBI 

access to care against both mental health and primary care provider and support 

staff contracts. These contracts include a wide variety of providers and medical staff 

to include: behavioral health providers (e.g., psychiatrists, psychologists, psychiatric 

nurses, social workers, and neuropsychologists); primary care providers (e.g., physicians, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants); rehabilitation providers (e.g., 

physical therapists, occupational therapists, speech language pathologists, and physical medicine and rehabilitation physicians); neurologists; nurse case managers; and 

licensed practical nurses. The remaining funding is being obligated against such 

things as non-staff requirements for outpatient programs, telehealth initiatives, and 

semipermanent buildings for the provision of TBI care and rehabilitation. 

Question: How much has been obligated to date? 

Answer: As of January 31, we have obligated $64.1 million of the $600 million 

in operation and maintenance funding and $10.2 million of the $300 million of research development test and evaluation funding. 

Question: Are mental health professionals being hired in a timely fashion? 

Answer: All the Services are reporting that hiring mental health providers is challenging. The Army had most of the contracts in place before receiving the funds and 

they are on their plan for hiring. However, the Navy and Air Force did not start 

the contracting process until they received the funds. Completing the contracting 

process is time consuming; therefore, we expect the hiring process to be extended. 

Question: Are there any contracting issues with current hiring policies? 

Answer: Yes. The one-year operation and maintenance funding level limits incentives to hire mental health staff. Regional disparity in availability, quality, and 

types of mental health staff exist. Additionally, there is a national shortage of qualified providers, and we are operating in a very competitive market. We have overloaded our contracting offices with hiring actions, and other psychological health 

and traumatic brain injury initiatives, as well, and it will take them some time to 

work through the backlog. 

Question: Will you be able to obligate the funding by September 30, 2008? 

Answer: We are taking steps to reallocate dollars to better support the continuum 

of care. This will also provide flexibility and enhance our ability to obligate funds. 

In addition, we are monitoring the Services’ implementation of their programs to 

prepare for midyear review where we can shift funds to programs where they can 

be more rapidly executed. However, it is important that we strive to ensure we are 

creating a standardized and consistent program across all the Services, and that requires prudent decisions on spending funds, not just for the sake of spending quickly. 


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Question: The Navy spend plan called for obligation of 70% of the funding provided by February 2008. How much has been obligated to date? 

Answer: The Navy spend plan has been revised to reflect the January release of 

an additional $42.4 million in supplemental funding. This Phase 3 funding increased 

the Navy total from $68.6 million to $110.95 million. The overall obligation rate as 

of March 06, 2008, for the Navy psychological health and traumatic brain injury 

program is 13.2 percent or $14.7 million. The current committed rate is 32.5 percent 

or $36 million. Of the committed amount, $6.2 million is pending award within the 

next week and was delayed due to differences in contract negotiation. In addition 

to the committed amount, $1.1 million has been assigned to the Defense Travel System/Travel and will be fully obligated by September 30, 2008. 

Question: Are mental health professional being hired in a timely fashion? 

Answer: All the Services are reporting that hiring mental health providers is challenging. The Army had most of the contracts in place before receiving the funds and 

they are on their plan for hiring. However, the Navy and Air Force did not start 

the contract process until they received the funds, completing the contracting process is time consuming. Therefore, we expect the hiring process to be extended. 

Question: How has the money been obligated? 

Answer: As of March 5, 2008, $396,000 has been obligated to support training initiatives. Over 50 percent of the remaining unobligated funding is pending award of 

a contract to hire 97 mental health providers. 

Question: Has the funding been used for existing programs or new initiatives? 

Answer: Some of the funding was used for an existing Post Traumatic Stress Disorder clinician training program, which had previously been an unfunded requirement. Three psychological health (PH) initiatives were built as concepts/training 

programs, but were not funded until the red cell funding became available. The remaining PH and traumatic brain injury programs are new initiatives. 

Question: Of the TRICARE Management Agency’s (TMA) 30%, most of the amount 

is for the Center of Excellence and for surveillance. The plan was to spend $36 million in November but little to none has been spent and nothing subsequently. 

Why has there been no obligation of these funds? 

Answer: TMA received a total of $139.16 million for Phase I and II requirements/ 

initiatives, 33 percent ($45.88 million) designated for the Defense Center of Excellence (DCoE) and 13 percent ($17.94 million) designated for the Automated Behavioral Health Clinic (ABHC) Program Surveillance. It is projected that the majority 

of the funds will be disbursed during the last two quarters of Fiscal Year 2008, as 

the staff finalizes programmatic review of requirements. ABHC requirements are 

similarly underdeveloped due to lack of comprehensive programmatic review. 

Question: What new initiatives has TMA been looking at for enhancing care and 

treatment? 

Answer: The TMA has been working on two new initiatives: 

(1) A comprehensive, Service member centric post-deployment mental health 

website (afterdeployment.org) is scheduled to go live in the summer of 2008. When 

afterdeployment.org is complete, Service members can be referred by their primary 

care provider (PCP) to confidentially complete additional online self-assessments 

and review comprehensive information on Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 

and other mental health conditions. As a result, should the Service member wish 

to receive medical care for such conditions, the Service member can share their assessments as well as information related to the self-help activities available on the 

web portal to their PCP to assist with treatment planning. 

(2) TMA has been working with the Army to implement a primary care mental 

health program known as Reengineering Systems of Primary Care Treatment in the 

Military (RESPECT-Mil) that aims to improve the detection and treatment of PTSD 

and depression among Service members in Army primary care. The program routinely screens Service members for PTSD and depression at the same point in the 

primary care visit as when blood pressure and pulse are checked. Service members 

screening positive on this initial screening complete further tests, allowing the PCP 

to make rapid preliminary assessments for these disorders and initiate treatment 

for them, as appropriate. 

Preliminary results from the Army’s RESPECT-Mil primary care mental health 

program shows that it is very effective at screening Service members for depression 

and PTSD in the primary care setting, and that, in 75 percent of visits where a 

Service member screened positive for either depression or PTSD, the Service member was either referred for mental health care or already engaged in mental health 

care. 

The program is coordinated through the Army Office of the Surgeon General and 

is currently in the process of being implemented at fifteen sites, comprising 51 clinVerDate Nov 24 2008 05:14 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046473 PO 00000 Frm 00326 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A473P2.XXX A473P2

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ics, in the Unites States and overseas. Evaluation of this program will be available 

in late 2008. 

SPEND PLAN

Question: Can you update this Committee on your spend plan? 

Answer: Attached is our spend plan, which includes budget execution data 

through the end of January 2008. We are in the process of reassessing our requirements and will share the updated spend plan with you once it is finalized. 


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Question: Does the Department and the Service have the internal capacity to obligate the funding provided? Please explain. 

Answer: The Department is following a detailed plan and executing a prudent and 

careful approach to assure we use the funds provided by Congress to maximize the 

benefit to our Service members. In the process, we have overloaded our contracting 

offices with hiring actions and other psychological health and traumatic brain injury 

initiatives, and it will take them some time to work through the backlog. 

Question: What issues exist that are hindering the Department in executing these 

funds? 

Answer: The Department is following a detailed plan and executing a prudent and 

careful approach to assure we use the funds provided by Congress to maximize the 

benefit to our Service members. We are moving quickly, while taking care not to 

move recklessly. In the process, we have overloaded our contracting offices with hiring actions and other psychological health and traumatic brain injury initiatives, 

and it will take them some time to work through the backlog. 

HOTLINE FOR MENTAL AND BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES AND COUNSELING

Question: What is the number of service members and their family members, and 

especially Guard and Reservists that have used the Military One Source hotline for 

mental and behavioral health services and counseling? 

Answer: In Fiscal Year 2007, Military OneSource made almost 2,000 warm-handoff referrals to TRICARE for mental health care. Further, Military OneSource arranged for a monthly average of 5,000 nonmedical, situational counseling sessions 

for Service members and their family members. 

Question: How many suicide calls have the Military One Source and the other 

services hotlines received? Please break down by component. 

Answer: In Fiscal Year 2007, Military OneSource received 126 calls in which the 

caller expressed a danger to self. Breakdown by component is difficult because when 

emergency systems are activated for acutely suicidal individuals, the goal is to keep 

the person on the phone and not ask them a series of questions regarding their affiliations (not all are Service members). While a record review may indicate the 

presence of a nearby military installation, it may not indicate the branch of Service 

of one who may happen to be a Service member. 

The Services refer suicide calls to the national suicide hotlines (same network): 

1–800–273–TALK 

1–800–SUICIDE 

The advantage of this system is that Joint Commission certified and American Association of Suicidology certified regional networks are established across the country to which these national telephone calls are directed automatically (Substance 

Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration facilitated). Therefore, local support affiliations are activated that are well known to the hotline system responding. 

The Department of Veterans Affairs Hotline has a veteran option. Three to ten 

Service members per week use it. 

Various Reserve and Active component Service hotlines exist for non-acute situations, in addition to those for various local community services or volunteer organizations. 

Question: What is the mechanism for followup with a service member or their 

family members following a call to Military OneSource? 

Answer: Military OneSource staff includes a dedicated team of consultants assigned to conduct follow-up calls with Service members and family members. Follow-up calls are conducted to ensure the client received the services or materials requested and to ensure satisfaction with the services received. With the client’s permission, a minimum of two follow-up calls are conducted. The initial follow-up call 

is conducted within five business days and at a mutually agreed upon time of day. 

The second call is conducted prior to the 30-day mark from the date of the original 

call to Military OneSource. Subsequent follow-up calls are conducted as appropriate 

for the needs of the Service member/family member. 

Question: How many mental health TRICARE claims have been submitted in the 

past 6 months? 

Answer: The summary of mental health claims submitted by Managed Care Support Contractors to TRICARE Management Activity in the last six-month period for 

mental health services was 1.54 million. This represents a 6.5 percent increase from 

the same six-month period one year ago. 

Question. You are forming partnerships with the Public Health Service to provide 

200 uniformed public health service mental health providers of all disciplines. 

What is the time frame for contracting with the 200 health officials? 


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Answer: Rather than a contract, we will have a Memorandum of Agreement 

(MOA) with the PHS. The Department has concurred on the MOA and PHS is completing a legal review before signing. An initial group of about 50 officers are awaiting assignment to key medical treatment facilities nationwide immediately following 

the signing of the MOA this spring. We will bring on and assign other PHS officers 

throughout the rest of this fiscal year and into next fiscal year. 

Question: How can Public Health Service commit to this number? 

Answer: The 200 PHS officers come to military medical treatment facilities 

(MTFs) through three distinct processes. One group will make permanent change 

of station moves from their current PHS assignments. At present, the number of 

these officers is limited by the ability of the losing agencies (e.g., Bureau of Prisons 

and Indian Health Service) to replace those officers in a timely manner. Over time, 

additional officers on active duty in the PHS boost these numbers. The second 

source of PHS officers will be those behavioral health providers who had previously 

announced their intention to separate from the military services. These officers have 

stated their preferences to remain within the military health system and have elected to move from their respective Service into the PHS. In some cases, those officers 

will remain in their military positions in PHS uniforms, where they will not be subject to deployment. The third source of PHS officers will be direct accessions. The 

PHS has a stated goal of augmenting significantly in the near-term, and will leverage Department of Defense money to enhance their recruiting program. The PHS 

will partner with the Army and Air Force to provide non-licensed, postdoctoral psychologists at MTFs where they can get the necessary supervision for licensure. In 

some locations, licensed PHS officers will augment Army and Air Force psychology 

internship training faculty. 

MENTAL HEALTH AND MILITARY FAMILIES

Question: Information provided to the Committee through news reports and visits 

to military bases indicate that children of military members are increasingly suffering from behavioral and mental health problems. Declines in school performance 

and increases in disciplinary problems have surfaced at major bases throughout the 

country. For example, last year alone the Children’s hospital here in D.C. had over 

1,000 visits from children of military service members, many of which were suffering from mental health problems. Getting information about the trends in children’s illnesses related to the war would serve as an important basis for potential 

additional action by the Committee. 

Mr. Secretary, are there any notable trends in children’s illnesses related to the 

war? 

Answer: The impact of military service, especially deployments, has repercussions 

upon their entire social network, especially their family members. However, we 

must be cautious not to over generalize the nature of military families who are often 

portrayed stereotypically, when in reality our families reflect great diversity. That 

being said, studies have shown that interpersonal conflict may increase in association with deployments and during reintegration upon returning home. It has been 

demonstrated that child maltreatment may increase in the absence of a Service 

member who is deployed, and upon reunion, should there be substance abuse or domestic violence. 

When parents are deployed, especially if both parents must leave home, children 

may be worried not only about their parents’ safety, but also their own stability as 

they are tended to by other family members or caregivers. Thus, wartime stressors 

do not always involve those related to the traumatic stressors of combat itself. 

While much is anecdotal in this regard, there is increasing national interest 

among family and child mental health experts regarding these issues, and a general 

consensus that we must be prepared to deal with the consequences of war, addressing both the seen and unseen injuries among our Service members and their families. 

Question: If so, what initiatives have been funded by the Department and what 

are potential future programs that should be considered? 

Answer: In 2006, the Department established the United States Military Site of 

the National Child Traumatic Stress Network, based at the Uniformed Services 

University’s Center for the Study of Traumatic Stress. This program is responsible 

for developing knowledge related to military childhood experiences, developing effective public education materials, and expanding and studying effective intervention 

strategies, all using a strength-based approach. The Center for the Study of Traumatic Stress conducts research, education, consultation, and training on preparing 

for and responding to psychological effects and consequences of traumatic events. 

Program scientists are recognized nationally for their expertise related to the health 


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and wellbeing of military children and have published and presented extensively on 

the topic. 

Current research is focusing upon a comparison of the effects upon family members of a Service member who returns from deployment wounded versus those who 

were not injured. Congressionally mandated research funding has recently been provided for research on the effect of deployments upon children, to be characterized 

in the final report covering research grants made in recent months and to be completed in late March 2008. Research consortium centers for psychological health 

(PH), traumatic brain injury (TBI), and both PH and TBI, will be established in 

three locations in the United States. Each will be affiliated with local study sites 

at major medical centers across the country engaging the finest scientific minds to 

fill gaps in research, including research on families and children of Service members 

who deploy. 

Sustained funding for research will be necessary in order to more completely characterize the near- and long-term effects of sustained war efforts upon our families, 

as well as the effectiveness of enhanced preventive family support, and clinical 

interventions for those who experience severe distress and psychiatric disorders. Establishing baseline funding for the Military Child Traumatic Stress Network and 

sustaining the increased level of research initiated by generous congressional research funding in Fiscal Year 2007 will be necessary as long as repercussions of sustained deployments persist. 

Question: What does research tell us about the effects of PTSD on children of military members suffering from this disease? 

Answer: Research regarding Vietnam veterans described negative impact, including reduced family cohesion, interpersonal expressiveness, and ability to problem 

solve; and an increase in interpersonal conflict. Vietnam veterans have reported 

that the PTSD symptoms of avoidance, in affiliation with co-morbid anger and depression, negatively affected their family functioning, while their spouses identified 

anger as the most damaging. Thus, identifying and treating PTSD early may reduce 

the potential negative impact to families of struggling Service members and veterans. Question: Is there a correlation between child and spouse abuse and PTSD? 

Answer: Previous studies do not specifically quantify the effects of PTSD per se 

upon actual documented maltreatment/neglect. 

A robust study, underway now, will improve upon prior research by specifically: • Describing the characteristics of neglect for substantiated Army child neglect cases during the period 2001–2006 • Identifying child, parent and family-based risk, and protective factors for 

child neglect cases • Identifying possible military community risk and protective factors for child 

neglect cases 

• Identifying civilian community risk and protective factors for child neglect 

cases 

It will also include, as family-based factors, Service member injuries (including 

PTSD). The technical feasibility of further quantifying the relative risks of particular Service member psychiatric diagnoses upon family maltreatment is being 

discussed. 

Question: Of the amounts appropriated for PTSD, could any of these funds be 

used to help children? 

Answer: Military families, including children of all ages, are specifically included 

in our planning for use of the Fiscal Year 2007 Supplemental Appropriations. The 

following initiatives represent highlights of activities that are targeted specifically 

to the children of our military community. 

• For young children, we funded a new Sesame Street workshop that teaches children and their parents how to discuss changes, injuries, and illnesses, that a Service 

member may have experienced as a result of the combat deployment. It also helps 

children deal with multiple parental deployments. The first Sesame Street workshop 

was nominated for an Emmy and over 400,000 kits including Digital Versatile Discs 

(DVDs) and training materials were distributed to military families. This second 

workshop will include the DVD of the first along with the new training materials 

and will be available in DVD kits as well as on the Internet. 

• For older children, we expanded our Mental Health Self Assessment Program, 

‘‘Signs of Suicide,’’ training curriculum for the Department of Defense (DoD) schools 

and for public schools with high concentrations of military children. This program 

provides education in mental health conditions as in signs and symptoms of selfinjurious behaviors (to include potential suicide) for children, parents, and teachers. 

It is the only evidence-based prevention program available for this age group and 

has received rave reviews from DoD teachers and others in the field. 


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• We initiated several demonstration programs, to include specific family assessment and counseling programs on high-deployment military installations. We also 

are increasing the presence of behavioral health providers in primary care settings, 

to include pediatric clinics. Three additional school-related projects have been implemented in Hawaii, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and at a telehealth system at Walter 

Reed Army Medical Center serving the Fort Bragg, North Carolina school system. 

These programs bring mental health providers directly to the schools to identify and 

treat any emerging psychological conditions in military children. 

• An important part of the psychological health program is the research agenda. 

Family issues, including children’s issues, were included in the funded research 

projects, including examining the impact of a parent’s PTSD condition on the children. 

• The Defense Center of Excellence (DCoE) for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury is currently in the formative process. A key division of the DCoE 

is an outreach center and clearinghouse designed to collect, develop, and disseminate educational materials for families and to identify and make recommendations 

to fill any treatment gaps that are present in the military health system or family 

support system related to families and children. In addition, an important part of 

assisting children is assisting parents and the family as a whole to function effectively. To reach out to families in remote or hard-to-serve areas, we are expanding 

our tele-mental health system to bring mental health specialty care directly to those 

families in need, especially Guard and Reserve families. 

• Finally, we are implementing a Director of Psychological Health governance 

system. This system will be placed at every installation and at the National Guard 

Headquarters. Its function is to ensure that the needs of all members of the community are met and to bridge the gap between health care and family support functions 

and the line leadership. 

DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS AND OUTSIDE ENTITIES

Question: Psychological health is an overarching concept that covers the entire 

multi-dimensional continuum of psychological and social well being, prevention, 

treatment and health maintenance. An approach of this type would be more complete by using new and innovative companies and approaches. 

How many outside entities, companies and individuals have you met with outside 

the military that specialize in behavioral health programs? 

Answer: My staff and the service representatives who supported the development 

of our strategic plan from June to the present consulted many times with outside 

experts in more than 70 different companies, universities, and associations, including the following: 

4SC AG Dr. Reddy’s Labs Mind Research Network 

Advanced Liquid Logic Drexel University Mystic Pharmaceuticals 

AFrame Digital, Inc Embera 

NeuroTherapeutics 

Neuro Vision Technology 

(Australian) 

Akers Biosciences Entegrion Neurolinguistic Programming 

American Group Psychotherapy Association FirstWatch Novo Nordsk 

American Pain Foundation Frontier Pharm, Inc. Nucleonics, Inc. 

ANSER Genocea Biosciences Paladin Data Systems 

Arbor Vita Corp Halo Sciences Corp Penn State College of 

Medicine 

ARES Co. Harvard University Perlegen 

BioForce Nanosciences Healthy Functions LLC PhotoThera, Inc. 

BioLargo Technologies IBIS Therapeutics PlasmAcute 

BioWarn Industrial Municipal 

Equipment, Inc. 

(TechMark) 

Project Hope 

Biox/AlphaProTech Ingenious Technologies Purdue University 

Bone Coalition INRange Systems RG Medical Diagnostics 

Cardio-Kinetics Intranasal Therapeutics Rib-X Pharmaceuticals 

Cepheid Kirk Strosabl Group 

Health 

Spaltudaq Corporation 


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Ceridia Knopp Neurosciences Tissue Regeneration 

Technologies 

Conquest International Knowledge Networks Triosyn Corp 

CytoGenix, Inc. Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute Uridynamics 

Dermal Research Lab Magellan Behavioral 

Health 

Vanderbilt University 

Dial Soap Medlmmune Vaxlnnate Corp 

Diamond Healthcare Medinox World-AM 

Downey Data Mentor Network Zassi Medical Evolutions 

Question: How many of these programs demonstrated capabilities that the Department currently does not have the ability to execute? 

Answer: Thirty demonstration projects featuring limited use of new or emerging 

clinical procedures, clinical management techniques, or assessment methodologies to 

fill gaps in the continuum of care. For psychological health (PH), the focus is on prevention and PH promotion, with emphasis on reducing stigma and identifying and 

strengthening resilience. For traumatic brain injury, the focus is on screening tools, 

cognitive assessment tools, and diagnostic techniques. 

Question: Can you provide a list of all mental health, behavioral health program, 

demonstration project, and pilot project Requests for Proposal (RFPs) that the Services or Force Health Protection have issued since the FY2007 supplemental was enacted? 

Answer: A list of initiatives planned for the FY 2007 Supplemental Appropriation 

funds follows: 

Service Type Initiative Program 

Army ............................ Psychological Health ... Access to Care ............ A102: Hire Staff. 

Army ............................ Psychological Health ... Access to Care ............ A204: Hire Staff to Staffing Model. 

Army ............................ Psychological Health ... Access to Care ............ A205: Headquarters Mental Health (MH) Management Staff Office. 

Army ............................ Psychological Health ... Access to Care ............ A208: Telehealth—Care Delivery. 

Army ............................ Psychological Health ... Access to Care ............ A313: Walter Reed Army Medical Center 

(WRAMC) School Program. 

Army ............................ Psychological Health ... Access to Care ............ A314: Tripler Army Medical Center (TAMC) 

School Program. 

Army ............................ Psychological Health ... Access to Care ............ A325: Staff (consolidated 311, 312, 317, 319, 

322). 

Army ............................ Psychological Health ... Access to Care ............ A319: Out Patient Programs (other than 

staff). 

Army ............................ Psychological Health ... Quality ......................... A202: Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)/ 

Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI)Training Package. 

Army ............................ Psychological Health ... Quality ......................... A103: Virtual Reality Equipment for PTSD

treatment. 

Army ............................ Psychological Health ... Quality ......................... A324: TAMC Psychology TBI & PH Proposal.

Army ............................ Psychological Health ... Quality ......................... A315: PTSD Training program. 

Army ............................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... A101: Family Resilience Building. 

Army ............................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... A203: Fort Campbell School Program. 

Army ............................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... A323: Warrior Resiliency Program (rework of 

316). 

Army ............................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... A320: Reengineering Systems of Primary Care 

Treatment in the Military. 

Army ............................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... A318: Care Team. 

Army ............................ Psychological Health ... Surveillance ................. A206: Soldier Assessment Physical Health Assessment. 

Army ............................ Psychological Health ... Surveillance ................. A207: Suicide Risk Management Office. 

Army ............................ Psychological Health ... Surveillance ................. A225: Madigan Army Medical Center Suicide 

Event Report. 

Army ............................ Psychological Health ... Transition .................... A201: Case Management for TBI and significant PH needs. 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Access to Care ............ A104: Hire Staff. 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Access to Care ............ A215:Inpatient Care. 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Access to Care ............ A218a: Small Site Staffing (previously known 

as (Proponency office for TBI). 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Quality ......................... 218b: Regional Medical Center Education 

Tools. 


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Service Type Initiative Program 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Quality ......................... 218c: Proponency Travel for staff assistance 

visits. 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Access to Care ............ A221: Rehabilitation. 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Access to Care ............ A224: Surge Teams. 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Access to Care ............ A304: Telemental Health Support for TBI Patients. 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Quality ......................... A105: TBI Training Conference. 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Quality ......................... A209: Clinical Practice Guidelines Development Army Quality Management Office. 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Quality ......................... A210: Custom helmets. 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Quality ......................... A211: Drug therapy monitoring. 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Quality ......................... A212: Fabrication of sunglasses. 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Quality ......................... A217: Occupational Therapy (0T) Rehabilitation life skills equipment pilot. 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Quality ......................... A219: Physical Therapy (PT) and OT Rehabilitation equipment. 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Quality ......................... A220: Radiology equipment. 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Quality ......................... A222: Rehabilitation equipment. 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Quality ......................... A302: TBI Education Programs. 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Quality ......................... A303: TBI On-Line Training for all providers. 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Quality ......................... A301: Site Certification. 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Surveillance ................. A223: Screening Teams for TBI (Surge). 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Resilience .................... A306: Marketing strategy development & Implementation. 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Surveillance ................. A213: Pure Edge Tool (Formerly ICD–9 Coding

Implementation). 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Surveillance ................. A214: Initial Treatment Teams. 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Surveillance ................. A216: Neuro-cognitive assessment. 

Army ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Transition .................... A305: Personal tele-recovery for TBI patients. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Access to Care ............ Hire Staff. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Access to Care ............ 102: Headquarters MH Management Staff Office. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Access to Care ............ 101: License Training for Substance Abuse 

Counselors (Hazelden). 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Access to Care ............ 100: Telehealth. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Quality ......................... 12: Neuro-cog combat stress toolbox. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Quality ......................... 94: Combat Stress First Aid and Combat Loss. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Quality ......................... 48: Combat/Operational Stress Control (COSC) 

Training for Non-mental health medical 

Staff. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Quality ......................... 7: PH Training for Shore Primary Care Providers—Phase I segment. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Quality ......................... 63: Operational Stress, Control and Readiness 

Immediate Training. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Quality ......................... 7: PTSD Training for Primary Care Providers— 

Phase II segment. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Quality ......................... 3: United States Navy Center for Study of 

Combat Stress. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Quality ......................... 6: COSC and Psych Health 1st aid for mental 

health caregivers. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Quality ......................... 48: COSC and Psych Health 1st aid for nonmental health caregivers. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Quality ......................... 98: Training for caregivers in the areas of 

TBI, Resilience, morale/Psych injury, and 

Family Care. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... 57: Family Resilience Training (FOCUS). 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... 66: Promoting resilience in the face of combat loss. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... 67: Combat Stress First Aid. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... 11: Assessment of Family Function. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... 65: Promotion Recovery from Combat Stress 

Injury for Marines. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... 93: SEAL Family Care. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... 109: Training & Curricula for Operational 

Stress Control and Readiness. 


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Service Type Initiative Program 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... 51: Caregiver Resiliency Multimedia Production. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... 64: Marine Corps Warrior Transition Videos. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... 11: Assessment & Treatment of Wounded 

Warriors Families. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... 53: Caregiver Resiliency Focus Group. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... 91: Returning Warrior Workshop. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Surveillance ................. 89: Navy/Marine Corps Combat Trauma Registry Deployment Health Database. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Transition .................... 95: Case Management for Wounded Warrior 

Battalions. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Transition .................... 96: PH/TBI Coordination Office Headquarters. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Transition .................... 60: Wounded Warrior Outreach Center. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Transition .................... 90: Navy Reserves PH and Department of 

Public Health Coordinators. 

Navy ............................ Psychological Health ... Transition .................... 31: Case Managers. 

Navy ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Access to Care ............ Hire Staff. 

Navy ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Quality ......................... 76: TBI Training Conference. 

Navy ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Quality ......................... 119: Frame of Choice (Glasses). 

Navy ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Quality ......................... 85: Portable Computed Tomography Scanner. 

Navy ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Quality ......................... 84: TBI Training Digital Versatile Disc (DVD). 

Navy ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Quality ......................... 82: Clinical Pastoral Care EBP for TBI/PTSD 

patients. 

Navy ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Resilience .................... 49: Compassion Fatigue Training. 

Navy ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Surveillance ................. 52: Surveillance of Naval PH and TBI at Naval 

Health Research Center. 

Navy ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Surveillance ................. 110: Naval Special Warfare Special Operations 

Forces Mild TBI Field Screen. 

Navy ............................ Traumatic Brain Injury Transition .................... 108: Headquarters United States Marine Corps 

Management Staff. 

AF ................................ Psychological Health ... Access to Care ............ AF204: Clinical care for domestic violence. 

AF ................................ Psychological Health ... Access to Care ............ AF207: Hire Staff to Staffing Model. 

AF ................................ Psychological Health ... Access to Care ............ AF208: Headquarters MH Management Staff 

Office. 

AF ................................ Psychological Health ... Access to Care ............ AF212: Telehealth Care Delivery. 

AF ................................ Psychological Health ... Access to Care ............ AF328: Air Force Reserve Command Director of

PH. 

AF ................................ Psychological Health ... Quality ......................... AF105: Virtual Reality Equipment for PTSD 

treatment. 

AF ................................ Psychological Health ... Quality ......................... AF209: PTSD Clinician Training. 

AF ................................ Psychological Health ... Quality ......................... AF210: PTSD Training Materials. 

AF ................................ Psychological Health ... Quality ......................... AF325: Seats at Center for Deployment Psych. 

AF ................................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... AF101: Alcohol Abuse Education & Training. 

AF ................................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... AF102: Community Resilience Grants. 

AF ................................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... AF103: Culture of Responsibility-Resilience 

Training for Service members. 

AF ................................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... AF104: Leaders Education on PH and Pocket 

Guide. 

AF ................................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... AF205: Community Based Support for Deployment. 

AF ................................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... AF206: Family Reintegration Workshop. 

AF ................................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... Behavioral Health Optimization in Primary 

Care Program. 

AF ................................ Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... Motivational Interviewing Training. 

AF ................................ Psychological Health ... Surveillance ................. AF201: Cognitive Assessment Devices. 

AF ................................ Psychological Health ... Surveillance ................. AF202: Surveillance Expertise. 

AF ................................ Psychological Health ... Surveillance ................. AF203: Baseline psychological testing for recruits. 

AF ................................ Psychological Health ... Surveillance ................. AF211: Substance Abuse Training Tool. 

AF ................................ Traumatic Brain Injury Access to Care ............ AF215: Telehealth Care Delivery. 

AF ................................ Traumatic Brain Injury Quality ......................... AF106: TBI Training Conference. 

AF ................................ Traumatic Brain Injury Quality ......................... AF214: Outpatient Neuro-cog rehab training. 

AF ................................ Traumatic Brain Injury Surveillance ................. AF320: Web Based Neurocognitive Screening. 

AF ................................ Traumatic Brain Injury Transition .................... AF213: Case Management. 

TMA ............................. Psychological Health ... Access to Care ............ D209: Center of Excellence—Telehealth. 

TMA ............................. Psychological Health ... Access to Care ............ D210: Public Health Service Officers. 


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Service Type Initiative Program 

TMA ............................. Psychological Health ... Access to Care ............ D211: TRICARE Healthcare Finder. 

TMA ............................. Psychological Health ... Joint Support ............... D201: Center of Excellence. 

TMA ............................. Psychological Health ... Joint Support ............... D204: Red Cell Support. 

TMA ............................. Psychological Health ... Quality ......................... D205: Training for TRICARE Providers. 

TMA ............................. Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... D212: Sesame Street. 

TMA ............................. Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... D306: Suicide Prevention and Risk Reduction 

Committee Conf and anti-stigma. 

TMA ............................. Psychological Health ... Resilience .................... D307: State Directors of PH. 

TMA ............................. Psychological Health ... Surveillance ................. D202: Automated Behavioral Health Clinic 

Program. 

Psychological Health ... Surveillance ................. D213: Study-Population Based Staffing Model 

for MH Services. 

TMA ............................. Psychological Health ... Surveillance ................. D305: TRICARE Management Activity Patient 

Satisfaction Survey for Programs funded by 

Supp. Funding. 

TMA ............................. Psychological Health ... Transition .................... D301: TRICARE Regional Office North: Recurring town hall meetings. 

TMA ............................. Traumatic Brain Injury Joint Support ............... D207: Red Cell Support. 

TMA ............................. Traumatic Brain Injury Surveillance ................. D206: Integration of Neuro-cog tool into Theater Medical Information Program. 

TMA ............................. Traumatic Brain Injury Surveillance ................. D208: TBI Registry into Center of Excellence. 

TMA ............................. Traumatic Brain Injury Surveillance ................. A216: Neuro-cognitive assessment. 

Question: Are you engaging the States to assist in closing gaps that exist? 

Answer: The Chief fo the National Guard Bureau identified a Public Health Service officer, Captain Joan Hunter, to serve as the ‘‘Director of Psychological Health’’ 

beginning in early March. Her responsibilities will be consistent with those recommended by the Mental Health Task Force. She will be instrumental in working 

with the States and in identifying gaps in services and coordinating resources and 

effecting policies to help close those gaps. 

In addition, the Defense Center of Excellence (DCoE) for Psychological Health and 

Traumatic Brain Injury has developed a strategy that includes interacting with the 

States through their Reserve component affiliates, medical and academic organizations, and State and local government stakeholder organizations. The Reserve components were actively involved in a recently conducted DCoE strategic planning conference, where the strategy for engaging State National Guard and Reserve units 

through telehealth was planned. As the DCoE expands its network of affiliates, both 

State and local governmental organizations will be invited to participate. 

WOUNDED WARRIORS

Question: As part of its efforts to improve Wounded Warrior care, the Army established 32 Warrior Transition Units to provide a unit in every medical treatment facility that has 35 or more eligible service members. Challenges have emerged in filling these 2,410 positions. As of September 13th, only 35% have been permanently 

assigned, 19% have been temporarily borrowed from other areas with in the Army 

and the remaining 47% remain unfilled. 

How is the remaining 47% being filled? 

Answer: To date, the Army has established 35 WTUs. On February 1, 2008, senior 

commanders at all installations with WTUs reported that all 35 WTUs had attained 

full operational capability. The Army expects to have approximately 2,586 military 

and civilian personnel assigned or attached as cadre to these WTUs by mid-March. 

Of this number, 267 (10.3 percent) represent borrowed military manpower (BMM). 

This compares to 20.5 percent BMM as reported by the Government Accountability 

Office in its September 2007 testimony before the House Committee on Oversight 

and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. 

Although combined authorized strength for all WTUs is 2,434, we have assigned an 

additional 152 personnel. These additional personnel demonstrate the Army’s commitment to maintain established ratios of staff to warriors in transition to ensure 

provision of the best possible care. 

Question: What are your plans to accelerate the hiring of ‘‘fulltime’’ people for 

these positions? 

Answer: Our 35 Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) will be staffed with 2,586 personnel, which exceeds the authorized strength of 2,434 by 152 personnel. These additional personnel demonstrate the Army’s commitment to maintain established ratios of staff to warriors in transition to ensure provision of the best possible care. 


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Only 267 positions (10.3 percent) are being filled on a temporary basis by borrowed 

military manpower. All civil service positions not permanently filled are being actively recruited as preferred positions on the Office of Personnel Management’s 

USAJOBS website. For health care professional positions, the enhanced hiring authority authorized by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2008 provides the Army the opportunity to better compete for these critical positions. Additionally, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs recently established a team to develop effective strategies for successfully recruiting and retaining WTU staff. 

Question: Is there any correlation to the soldiers ‘‘falling through the cracks’’ and 

the lack of fully assigning the 2,410 positions? 

Answer: The Army currently has an additional 152 personnel assigned as Warrior 

Transition Unit (WTU) staff over the combined authorized strength for WTUs of 

2,434. These additional personnel demonstrate the Army’s commitment to maintain 

established ratios of staff to warriors in transition to ensure provision of the best 

possible care. 

Question: What issues are surfacing with establishment of the Warrior Transition 

Units? 

Answer: The most significant challenge in establishing WTUs is the recruitment, 

assignment, and development of a fully-trained and committed staff for all 35 

WTUs. It has taken a great deal of effort over a short period of time to ensure that 

each member of the WTU staff understands the unique demands and challenges of 

caring for wounded, ill, and injured Service members requires, as well as possess 

the courage, commitment, compassion, and dedication required to meet these challenges. The Army remains committed to meeting these challenges by providing the 

resources, facilities, and training that WTU staff, warriors in transition (WT), and 

their family members require to recover, rehabilitate, and reintegrate to continue 

military service or, as veterans, prepare to be productive and successful citizens. 

Forecasting and managing the growth of the WT population has been challenging. 

The population of WTs has grown substantially over the past year. The current 

Table of Distribution and Allowances for the WTUs was based on a total population 

of 10,000 WTs. We forecast that the population could rise to 11,600 WTs within the 

next few months and are taking steps to meet the new demand. We will continue 

to pursue preferred hiring of civilian positions; and hope to leverage the hiring authorities established in the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. 

We are currently performing an in-depth manpower audit to determine WTU staffing requirements. This systematic approach will form the basis for future staffing 

determinations and will ensure optimum staff ratios based on actual patient acuity. 

In addition to the ongoing challenge of sustaining and improving this program, 

there remains a requirement to fund and complete necessary construction of accessible housing, adequate administrative facilities, and Soldier Family Assistance Centers, all developed in close proximity to each other and to the military treatment 

facility to create WT complexes. These complexes will provide WTs and their families ease of access to the care and support they require. 

INTERVIEW WITH MILITARY MEDICINE/NBC TECHNOLOGY

Question: Dr. Casscells, in your interview with Military Medicine/NBC Technology 

(Jan/Feb 2008) you state ‘‘in December 2007 the Department announced the enterprise-wide release of enhancements to the systems that allow DoD to share electronic health information with the VA, namely the Bidirectional Health Information 

Exchange and the Clinical Data Repository/Health Data Repository Interfaces.’’ 

Are you telling this Committee that since your appointment as Secretary in April 

2007 you have only accomplished two initiatives? 

Answer: In the article, I mentioned a range of undertakings that military medicine has successfully accomplished since April 2007, from the ongoing gallant and 

often heroic efforts of health care providers in Iraq and Afghanistan to humanitarian medical missions in Bangladesh, South America, and the Caribbean region. 

Moreover, the progress in sharing a patient’s medical information electronically between the VA and DoD since April 2007 can be gauged by the number of successful 

initiatives that have taken place since then. Of these initiatives, the Bidirectional 

Health Information Exchange and the Clinical Data Repository/Health Data Repository Interfaces are two. Other successful initiatives have been: 

Federal Health Information Exchange (FHIE) 

• The transfer of medical information to the FHIE repository increased from 

over 3.6 million patients to over 3.9 million patients’ medical information 

Deployment Health 


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• Pre- and Post-deployment Health Assessments and Post-deployment Health 

Reassessments (PDHRA) available to the VA increased from more than 1.4 million to over 1.7 million forms • Assessments increased from over 604,000 to over 706,000 individuals • Began PDHRA monthly data transmissions • Began PDHRA weekly transmissions for individuals to be referred to VA 

for care or evaluation • New Capabilities 

• PDHRA Implementation • DoD/VA Wounded Warrior Medical Image and Scanned/Electronic Document (ISDS) Sharing Initiative-Electronic Transfer of Radiology Images and 

Scanned Medical Records from Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC), 

National Naval Medical Center Bethesda (NNMC), and Brooke Army Medical 

Center (BAMC) to the VA Polytrauma Centers (Tampa, Richmond, Palo Alto, 

and Minneapolis) in support of the most severely wounded and injured Service 

members transferring to VA Polytrauma Centers for care • DoD started sending radiology images and scanned paper medical records 

electronically from WRAMC, NNMC, and BAMC to the VA Polytrauma Centers • WRAMC, NNMC, and BAMC transferred images for 33 patients to VA 

Polytrauma Centers • WRAMC and Bethesda transferred 38 scanned medical records to VA 

Polytrauma Centers 

Laboratory Data Sharing Initiative (LDSI) • LDSI operational sites increased from 7 sites to 9 sites • Anatomic Pathology and microbiology testing completed at El Paso, San Antonio, and Pensacola • National Defense Authorization Act San Antonio demonstration site became 

operational with Anatomic Pathology and Microbiology • New Capabilities: 

• Electronic order entry and results retrieval of anatomic pathology and 

microbiology 

DoD/VA Joint Inpatient Electronic Health Record • A contract to perform a study for the Joint DoD/VA Inpatient Electronic 

Health Record (EHR) Project was awarded to Booz Allen Hamilton. The study 

will assess the new clinical and business application in VA and DoD requirements inventory relevant to the inpatient EHR for potential joint application. 

Specifically, the study will assess VA and DoD business and clinical processes, 

design features, and system constraints relevant to the inpatient component of 

an EHR. An analysis of alternatives will then be conducted to develop a recommendation for the best technical approach. The results of this analysis are 

due in June 2008. 

Other data sharing accomplishments included: 

• Development of high-level requirements and cost-estimates for 18 information technology requirements in support of business Lines of Action 

• DoD made theater clinical care data accessible to VA providers. The ability 

to view theater clinical data from both outpatient encounters and inpatient 

stays further ensures continuity of care for our wounded warriors 

• The capability became operational for Providers to view ambulatory encounters/clinical notes, procedures, and problem lists via the Bidirectional Health Information Exchange. Increasing the number of shared patients with real-time, 

bidirectional information available to DoD and VA providers enhances continuity of care for patients treated by both Departments 

• Inpatient discharge summaries from Landstuhl Regional Medical Center 

(inpatient mental health) became available to VA providers for those patients 

transferred to VA 

• The capability enabling the exchange of computable outpatient pharmacy 

and medication allergy data was made available to all DoD sites. The exchange 

of computable outpatient pharmacy and medication allergy data enables drugdrug interaction checking and drug-allergy checking using consolidated pharmacy and allergy data from both Departments 

• DoD expanded available Veterans’ Group Life Insurance/Service Members’ 

Group Life Insurance benefit eligibility data to Reserve and Active members. 

Question: In the same interview you stated that the Department will spend $43 

billion from the Defense budget on health care for our service members, family 

members and retirees. 

Is the $43 billion from the base bill? 

Answer: The $43 billion reflects the military health system’s total Unified Medical 

Program. The specific amounts that comprise this number are included in the table 


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below. The Defense Health Program (DHP) Appropriation includes operation and 

maintenance, research, development, test and evaluation, and procurement budget 

activities. The assumed savings, based on the Task Force on the Future of Military 

Health Care Benefit Reform recommendations, were included as a legislative proposal. Costs outside of the DHP include military construction, Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund Normal Cost Contributions, and salary for military personnel. 

Appropriation 

Fiscal Year 2009 

President’s 

Budget 

(millions) 

Operation and Maintenance ...................................................................................... $23,117 

Procurement ................................................................................................................ 304 

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation .......................................................... 194 

Military Construction ................................................................................................. 514 

Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund ........................................................... 10,351 

Military Personnel ...................................................................................................... 7,100 

Task Force Recommended Savings for Health Care Benefit Reform ..................... 1,184 

Total Cost of Military Health Care .................................................................... 42,764 

Question: What will the $43 billion provide? 

Answer: The funding will provide the capability for the military health system 

(MHS), which consists of the medical services of the Army, Navy (including health 

care support for both the Navy and the Marine Corps), and Air Force, the TRICARE 

Management Activity, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Health Affairs to perform its primary missions, which are: (1) deliver quality health 

care benefits to approximately 9.2 million eligible beneficiaries—Active, Reserve and 

National Guard service members and their family members, plus military retirees 

(including those eligible for Medicare) and their family members; (2) protect the 

health of the Armed Forces; and (3) deploy a trained and ready medical capability 

for the full range of worldwide military operations. The MHS’s commitment to be 

a world-class health care system is evident through measurable and sustained efforts of providing a fit and protected force; optimizing deployable medicine; ensuring 

wounded warriors are receiving the best care, treatment and support throughout recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration; satisfying beneficiaries; and building 

healthy communities under a world-class health benefit. Details on the $43 billion 

total Unified Medical Budget are included in the table below. 

Appropriation 

Fiscal Year 2009 

President’s 

Budget 

(millions) 

Operation and Maintenance ...................................................................................... $23,117 

Procurement ................................................................................................................ 304 

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation .......................................................... 194 

Military Construction ................................................................................................. 514 

Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund ........................................................... 10,351 

Military Personnel ...................................................................................................... 7,100 

Task Force Recommended Savings for Health Care Benefit Reform ..................... 1,184 

Total Unified Medical Budget ............................................................................. 42,764 

Question: You also state that the Department is hiring, training and empowering 

case managers and patient advocates. 

How many case workers and patient advocates have actually been hired? 

Answer: The military health system’s (MHS) clinical case managers are registered 

nurses or social workers. The numbers available represent a mix of military, civilian, and contract case managers. Following are the number of MHS clinical case 

managers: 

Air Force: Number of available clinical case managers: 147 (for all types of beneficiaries) 

Army: Number of Warrior Transition Unit case managers: 470 

Navy: Number of available clinical case managers: 133 (for all types of beneficiaries) 

The Department of Defense (DoD) MHS case management (CM) initiatives reflect 

the DoD’s commitment to providing the assistance and support required to meet the 


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challenges that confront our severely injured and wounded Service members and 

their families. The goal of our CM effort is to improve the delivery of safe, high 

quality, and timely medical care to wounded, ill, and injured (WII) Service members 

through the seamless provision of CM services in both the DoD and Department of 

Veterans Affairs systems. 

The TRICARE Management Activity (TMA), Military Service-designated CM representatives, and Health Affairs developed DoD clinical CM policy for WII Service 

members (‘‘Interim Policy for Implementation of Clinical Case Management,’’ Draft 

2008). Major policy elements include WII identification criteria, description of the 

Federal Recovery Coordination Program, data capture requirements, reporting, 

training, and CM documentation guidance. 

As part of the DoD CM policy, TMA and Service representatives have established 

medical expense and performance reporting System evaluation and management 

codes for clinical case managers across all three Services. This will allow for the 

identification and tracking of clinical case managers using the Management Analysis and Reporting Tool. Furthermore, this will ultimately capture the total number 

of case managers throughout the MHS, number of patients receiving facility-based 

case management care, and number of Active component personnel receiving case 

management care through Service-specific wounded warrior programs. 

Question: How many are physically located at installations helping soldiers transition? 

Answer: Presently, the TRICARE Management Activity and Health Affairs are 

gathering additional data on the distribution of clinical case managers from the 

military services. This information should be available mid-April 2008. 

QUESTIONS FROM STATEMENT

Question: In your collective statement, you state that the Department has established a comprehensive plan of action based on a vision for the future and a strategic plan with five guiding principles. 

Can you outline this plan for the Committee? 

Answer: The Department of Defense’s strategic plan for providing excellence in 

protection, prevention, diagnosis, treatment, recovery, and care transition for our 

Service members and their families who experience mental health conditions or 

traumatic brain injury as a result of the global war on terror is based on five guiding principles: 

1. Furnish strong, visible leadership and the resources necessary to provide for 

Service members who experience traumatic brain injury (TBI) or psychological 

health (PH) concerns and conditions; 

2. Create, disseminate, and maintain excellent standards of care across the Department; 

3. When best practices or evidence-based recommendations are not readily available, conduct pilot or demonstration projects to better inform quality standards; 

4. Monitor and revise the access, quality, and fidelity of program implementation 

to ensure standards are executed and quality is consistent; and 

5. With constant attention to the needs of our Service members and their families, 

construct a system in which each individual may expect and receive the same level 

of service and quality of service regardless of Service, Component, status, or geographic location. 

We developed seven major initiatives consistent with these guiding principles. The 

initiatives will turn strategy to action and include: 

1. Leadership and Advocacy—The health of the force and the community is a leadership responsibility. We are working first and foremost to build a strong culture 

of leadership and advocacy. 

2. Quality of Care—Quality care requires that we develop and ensure consistent 

standards and excellently trained clinicians both in our military treatment facilities 

and in the TRICARE provider network. 

3. Access to Care—Ensuring easy, timely access to the full continuum of care, regardless of location, calls for an increase in health care providers and expanded telehealth services for hard-to-serve areas and populations. We have funded Servicespecific telehealth initiatives and will coordinate standards and expand access 

through a centralized focus on telehealth and technology incorporated into the Defense Center of Excellence. 

4. Resilience Promotion—Our goal is to build strong minds and strong bodies. 

That requires solid prevention and protection, in addition to diagnosis and treatment. For this reason, we focus on PH, which includes the full continuum—removing or mitigating organizational risk factors, strengthening individual and family 

health and wellness, and traditional clinical diagnosis and treatment. 


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5. Screening and Surveillance—Our objective is to ensure early identification for 

individual conditions and concerns to afford the earliest possible intervention; identify trends as they emerge in the community so population-based changes may be 

made; and provide a solid structure for information management. 

6. Transition and Coordination of Care—We are partnering with federal agencies, 

including the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Health and 

Human Services, as well as our TRICARE managed care support contactors, to ensure there are no gaps in care as patients transition through various systems of care 

or transition to different duty stations or geographic locations. 

7. Research and Development—We have expanded the research opportunities for 

PH and TBI to establish a strong foundation of medical and cross-functional research. We will continuously improve as researchers report findings and new information that shapes and reshapes our vision of the future. 

Question: What has been accomplished to date? 

Answer: The following is a short list of the recent major accomplishments in the 

area of psychological health (PH), Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injury (TBI): • Enhanced and coordinated leadership: The Department formed a Senior Oversight Committee, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Defense and 

the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). This high-level 

committee meets weekly and established Lines of Action items to develop and implement detailed plans to address TBI and PTSD. The committee continues to provide 

oversight to ensure success in execution. • In November 2007, the Department established the Defense Center of Excellence (DCoE), which commenced operations. • Planning for the National Intrepid Center of Excellence (anticipated completion 

in fall 2009), a building funded by the Intrepid Fallen Heroes Fund to house the 

DCoE that will be located on the Bethesda, Maryland campus adjacent to the new 

Walter Reed National Military Medical Center. • TBI training course attended by more than 800 providers, including VA providers. • Aggressive hiring efforts designed to increase staff by more than 750 mental 

health providers and about 95 support personnel across the Department. All funds 

for these providers have been distributed to the Services for their execution. They 

will be a mix of civil service and contract personnel. The military treatment facility 

commanders have direct hire authority and will be increasing their staff through 

local means to meet any unique demands in their community. • The managed care support contractors have added more than 3,000 new mental 

health providers to the TRICARE network across the three regions. • Added questions to both the Post-deployment Health Assessment and Post-deployment Health Reassessment to facilitate TBI screening. 

• Deployment of initial identification teams at high-density deployment platforms 

to ensure screening is accomplished in a consistent manner and to further evaluate 

and treat those who screen positive. 

• The Marine Corps created a robust call center within its Wounded Warrior 

Regiment to follow up on Marines diagnosed with TBI and PH concerns to ensure 

they are successfully maneuvering the healthcare system until their full recovery or 

transition to the VA. 

• The Navy is hiring PH coordinators to work with their returning reservists, and 

the National Guard is hiring Directors of PH to put at each State headquarters to 

help coordinate the care of guardsmen who have TBI/PH injuries or illness related 

to their mobilization. 

• Completion of scientific peer review of all submitted proposals and programmatic review for several awards, including a recommended priority list for 

funding. 

Question: When will this plan and process been turned in to action and care for 

the soldiers and their families? 

Answer: We are already taking action on many fronts to implement our strategic 

plan. The following are a few highlights of recent accomplishments: 

The Defense Center of Excellence (DCoE) for Psychological Health (PH) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) opened its doors in November 2007 and is already: 

1. Mounting an anti-stigma campaign projected to begin this Spring through a national collaborative network that includes partnering with the Uniformed Services 

University for the Health Sciences, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 

Agency, our coalition partners, and others in the public and private sectors; 

2. Establishing effective outreach and educational initiatives, including creating 

an information clearinghouse, public web site, a wide-reaching newsletter, and a 24/ 


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7 call center that will allow any Service member or family member who needs assistance in navigating the system of care to get help with a single phone call. The 

call center would equally serve clinicians across the Department with questions concerning clinical practices, training, or standards of care in the area of PH and TBI; 

3. Promulgating a telehealth network for clinical care, monitoring, support, and 

follow-up; 

4. Coordinating an overarching program of research that is relevant to the needs 

of the field, in coordination with other Department of Defense organizations, VA, 

NIH and other partners; 

5. Providing training programs aimed at providers, line leaders, families, and 

community leaders; and 

6. Designing and planning for the National Intrepid Center of Excellence (anticipated completion in Fall 2009), a building funded by the Intrepid Fallen Heroes 

Fund to house the DCoE that will be located on the Bethesda campus adjacent to 

the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center. 

Our quality of care initiative is progressing as evidenced by the following activities. We funded a TBI training course attended by more than 800 providers, including VA providers. We will repeat this training in 2008 to provide a basic level of 

understanding of mild-TBI to as many health care providers as possible. Over the 

coming months, we will be consolidating and standardizing these training efforts 

under the DCoE umbrella. In 2008, we will be updating clinical practice guidelines, 

and enhancing screening, diagnosis, and recovery support for Service members and 

their families. 

Another key initiative, access to care, has received focused attention. In 2007, we 

issued new policy that reiterated that patients should be scheduled for initial primary appointments within seven days of request. 

In terms of civilian and contract providers, we are increasing our mental health 

staff by more than 750 mental health providers and about 95 support personnel 

across the Department. All funds for these providers have been distributed to the 

Services for their execution. They will be a mix of civil service and contract personnel. The military treatment facility commanders have direct hire authority and 

will be increasing their staff through local means to meet any unique demands in 

their community. 

Within the past few months, the managed care support contractors have added 

more than 3,000 new mental health providers to the TRICARE network across the 

three regions. 

In an effort to identify all who need care the screening and surveillance initiative 

promotes the use of consistent and effective assessment practices along with accelerated development of electronic tracking, monitoring, and management of PH and 

TBI conditions and concerns. 

We added questions to both the Post-deployment Health Assessment and Post-deployment Health Reassessment to facilitate TBI screening. We also are supporting 

initial identification teams at high-density deployment platforms to ensure screening is accomplished in a consistent manner and to further evaluate and treat those 

who screen positive. 

We will move toward incorporating baseline neurocognitive assessments into our 

lifecycle health assessment procedures from access through retirement. 

Several key programs are supporting our transition and coordination of care initiative. The Marine Corps created a robust call center within its Wounded Warrior 

Regiment to follow up on Marines diagnosed with TBI and PH concerns to ensure 

they are successfully maneuvering the health care system until their full recovery 

or transition to the VA. The Navy is hiring PH coordinators to work with their returning reservists, and the National Guard is hiring Directors of PH to put at each 

State headquarters to help coordinate the care of Service members who have TBI/ 

PH injuries or illness related to their mobilization. 

Information sharing is a critical part of care coordination. The DCoE is also 

tasked with implementing telehealth and technology systems that will assist in documentation and in sharing of information, as well as tracking and coordinating care 

for war-fighters and their families as they transition back to their hometowns. 

Our research and development initiative resulted in the Post Traumatic Stress 

Disorder (PTSD)/TBI Research Program, which challenged the scientific community 

to design innovative research that will foster new directions for, address neglected 

issues in, and bring new investigators into the fields of PTSD- and TBI-focused research. 

We recently completed scientific peer review of all submitted proposals and programmatic review for several awards, including a recommended priority list for 

funding. The Department is pleased that the response to this solicitation for research was very robust. 


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The final programmatic review for the Clinical Consortium, Advanced TechnologyTherapeutic Development and Multidisciplinary Research Consortium Award mechanisms will occur in early March 2008. This timeline for execution is on schedule 

with the time period briefed to Congress in September 2007. 

Question: You also discuss a Senior Oversight Committee headed by the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Veterans Affairs that meets weekly to plan and monitor the work being accomplished. 

What are they monitoring if nothing has been implemented and you have only 

spent $53 million? 

Answer: The Senior Oversight Committee oversees nine Lines of Action (LOAs) 

items, each addressing some of the recommendations of the various task forces, such 

as the ‘‘The President’s Commission on Care for America’s Returning Wounded Warriors.’’ It keeps apprised of the progress of all the initiatives in each LOA for wounded, ill, and injured Service members, not just issues related to psychological health 

and traumatic brain injury (Line of Action #2). 

The initial focus of this Committee was to make decisions on the approaches for 

integrating and accommodating the many recommendations received from the outside commissions and task forces on wounded warrior care. The current focus is to 

provide oversight on progress in implementing these decisions including evaluating 

and redirecting efforts to ensure compliance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 provisions for wounded warrior care. 

Question: Who does the Committee report to? 

Answer: The Secretary of the Department of Defense and the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs. 

Question: How are their findings and changes implemented? 

Answer: The Department of Defense (DoD) will revise policy, prioritize projects, 

recommend changes in legislation, and align and coordinate efforts between the DoD 

and the Department of Veterans Affairs. 

Question. You have established a spend plan monitoring program and a monthly 

reporting requirement. 

What does this report provide and to whom? 

Answer: We provide to the House and Senate Appropriations Committee staff a 

monthly update of the spend plan for the supplemental appropriations funding we 

received for psychological health and traumatic brain injury. That spend plan includes a monthly plan for expenditure along with the amount actually obligated and 

disbursed. A copy of the most recent report follows: 


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Question: How does the planned rate of expenditure compare to actual expenditure? 

Answer: The actual expenditures are lower than planned. 

[Clerk’s note.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


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W I T N E S S E S 

Page 

Beardall, Charles ..................................................................................................... 147 

Casscells, S. W ......................................................................................................... 255 

Corley, General J. D. W .......................................................................................... 215 

Embrey, E. P ............................................................................................................ 255 

Kicklighter, Lieutenant General C. M ................................................................... 147 

Moseley, General T. M ............................................................................................ 215 

Quinn, D. M ............................................................................................................. 1 

Robinson, Vice Admiral A. M .................................................................................. 291 

Roudebush, Lieutenant General (Dr.) J. G ............................................................ 291 

Schoomaker, Lieutenant General E. B .................................................................. 291 

Thompson, Lieutenant General N. R ..................................................................... 1 

Ugone, Mary ............................................................................................................. 147 

Walker, D. M ............................................................................................................ 93 

Æ 


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