United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 22-11163

____________

Jessica Murillo, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

City of Granbury, 

Defendant—Appellee.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:21-CV-744

______________________________

Before Clement, Haynes, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Jessica Murillo appeals the district court’s grant of the City of Granbury’s 

motion for summary judgment for her FMLA retaliation claim. For the 

reasons set forth below, we REVERSE and REMAND on that ground for 

further proceedings.

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 2, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I. Factual & Procedural Background

Murillo became an employee of Granbury in 2017, and eventually began 

working in its public works department. In 2020, against the backdrop of the 

COVID-19 pandemic and Congress’s expansion of Family and Medical 

Leave Act (“FMLA”) protected leave access,1 Murillo reached out to Tracie 

Sorrells, Granbury’s human resources coordinator, and secured permission 

to take twelve weeks of FMLA leave because Murillo had lost childcare. 

Sorrells retroactively set the start date for Murillo’s leave to be April 1, 2020, 

and while Murillo’s return date was not filled out on her leave form, she

understood her return date to be in late June 2020.

Reviewing the facts most favorable to the non-movant, we note that 

during her FMLA leave, a number of Granbury employees communicated 

with Murillo. For instance, one of Murillo’s coworkers called her, 

purportedly at the behest of Rick Crownover, the head of the public works 

department, to inform Murillo that she needed to return to work. In addition, 

a different coworker periodically visited Murillo at her home to ask when she 

would be returning to work. Separately, during this period Granbury 

maintained a policy requiring employees to check in with their supervisors. 

In accordance with this policy, in early June 2020 Murillo reached out via 

_____________________

1 In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress passed the Families First 

Coronavirus Response Act (“FFCRA”), see Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178 (2020), 

which included the Emergency Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act (“EFMLEA”), 

see FFCRA §§ 3101 et seq. The EFMLEA temporarily expanded certain employees’ ability 

to take leave under the FMLA based on an assortment of COVID-related reasons. See

FFCRA § 3102(a). Most relevant here, “the EFMLEA expanded protected leave to 

employees who were unable to work or telework because their child’s school or place of 

care closed due to COVID-19, or their childcare provider was unavailable due to the same.” 

Clement v. Surgical Clinic, PLLC, No. 22-5801, 2023 WL 3035231, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 

2023). The FFCRA expired at the end of 2020. See FFCRA § 5109.

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email to Crownover, who responded, “Jessica, [a]re you coming back to 

work?” 

Murillo subsequently called Crownover to follow up on this email. 

According to Murillo, during this call Crownover was angry with her and 

demanded that Murillo, who felt threatened during this conversation, return 

to work before the end of her FMLA leave because he needed immediate 

assistance. In contrast, per Crownover, during this call Murillo inquired as 

to whether she could work part-time or take unpaid leave, to which 

Crownover responded that these were not options. Crownover also stated

that Murillo informed him during this call that she did not intend to return to 

work; Murillo disputes this contention.

Murillo then reached out to, and eventually spoke with, Sorrells to 

complain of Crownover’s behavior. Sorrells disagreed with Murillo’s 

characterization of the Crownover call and assured Murillo that nobody was 

threatening her job. Sorrells also informed Murillo that her FMLA leave was 

set to expire on June 23, 2020, and that she was expected to return to work 

on June 24. Murillo later acknowledged that she knew she was expected to 

return on June 24. 

On June 22, Murillo asked Sorrells whether she could use her vacation 

time to extend her leave and Sorrells informed her that this would not be 

possible. Murillo responded, asking to use accumulated vacation time or, 

alternatively, for an explanation for why the use of such time wouldn’t be 

permitted. Nobody from Granbury responded to this inquiry. Then, on June 

24, minutes after Murillo’s work shift was to start, Crownover informed 

Sorrells that “Jessica [was] not [t]here,” to which Sorrells responded, 

“Great! I was hoping she wouldn’t come in. Let’s term [sic] her.” 

Granbury terminated Murillo that day. In the termination letter, Granbury 

stated that it terminated Murillo because she failed to return to work after her 

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FMLA leave period had expired, which Granbury considered to be “job 

abandonment.” Per Crownover, there had been no issues with Murillo’s job 

performance prior to her FMLA leave, and Murillo was not normally late to

work. 

Granbury has a personnel manual that “provide[s] guidelines for 

management and employees regarding employment matters.” As defined in 

the manual, “job abandonment” is a “[f]ailure to report to work without 

notification for 3 consecutive days.” The manual also includes a progressive 

discipline policy that outlines graduated responses to non-egregious 

employee misconduct but provides for termination upon the first instance of 

sufficiently serious misconduct. Crownover confirmed in his testimony that, 

under these policies, an employee ordinarily would not be terminated 

immediately for a single unexcused absence. Crownover also testified that, 

in the case of such an unexpected absence, he would ordinarily try to contact 

the employee or her emergency contacts.

Murillo sued Granbury in June 2021.2 Murillo then submitted a first 

amended complaint against Granbury, alleging that Granbury (1) retaliated 

against Murillo for using FMLA-protected leave; (2) violated Murillo’s 

Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process by 

terminating Murillo’s employment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 

retaliating against her for being a working mother; and (3) conspiring to 

interfere with Murillo’s civil rights. Granbury moved to dismiss Murillo’s 

first amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), 

and the district court denied this motion without prejudice.

_____________________

2 Murillo also initially filed suit against a number of Granbury employees, though 

the parties later stipulated to, and the district court granted, the dismissal of these other 

defendants.

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Granbury then moved for summary judgment, which Murillo 

opposed. The district court granted Granbury’s motion, reasoning that 

(1) Murillo’s FMLA retaliation claim failed because she was no longer on 

FMLA leave when she was terminated; (2) Murillo’s § 1983 claims failed due 

to Murillo’s inability to identify a constitutional violation, or a policymaker 

responsible for an unconstitutional policy; and (3) Murillo’s conspiracy claim 

failed given the absence of the type of agreement between multiple people 

necessary for conspiracy. The district court accordingly entered final 

judgment. Murillo timely appealed. 

II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review

The district court had jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331. We in turn have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291.

We apply de novo review to a district court’s grant of a motion for 

summary judgment. Kerstetter v. Pac. Sci. Co., 210 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 

2000) (quotation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate where “the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

“A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Austin v. 

Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quotation 

omitted). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. at 328–29.

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III. Discussion

On appeal, Murillo challenges the district court’s grant of Granbury’s 

motion for summary judgment on her FMLA retaliation claim.

3

 Under the 

FMLA, employees are protected “from retaliation or discrimination for 

exercising their rights under the FMLA.” Mauder v. Metro. Transit Auth. of 

Harris Cnty., 446 F.3d 574, 580 (5th Cir. 2006). 

FMLA retaliation claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas4

burden-shifting framework. Wheat v. Fla. Par. Juv. Just. Comm’n, 811 F.3d 

702, 705 (5th Cir. 2016). Under that framework, the employee must first 

establish a prima facie retaliation case by demonstrating that she: (1) “was 

protected under the FMLA;” (2) “suffered an adverse employment action;” 

and (3) “was treated less favorably than an employee who had not requested 

leave under the FMLA or the adverse decision was made because [s]he 

sought protection under the FMLA.” Mauder, 446 F.3d at 583; see also

Campos v. Steves & Sons, Inc., 10 F.4th 515, 527 (5th Cir. 2021). “This final 

element requires proof of a causal link.” Campos, 10 F.4th at 527. If the

employee demonstrates a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the 

employer to present legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for the adverse action. 

Id. at 521, 528. “If the employer submits such reasons, the burden shifts back 

to the employee to show that those reasons are pretextual.” Id. at 521. 

_____________________

3 Murillo initially averred that the district court’s errors apply to FMLA retaliation 

and interference claims. However, Murillo later clarified that her references to Granbury’s 

purported interferences were in service of her retaliation claim. Therefore, our analysis is 

limited to Murillo’s claim of retaliation under the FMLA. Given the lack of an appeal as to 

the other grounds, we leave in place the § 1983 and conspiracy summary judgment 

decisions.

4 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

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In this case, the district court agreed with Granbury that “Murillo was 

not engaged in a protected activity because she was fired after her FMLA 

leave had expired,” and, as such, Murillo failed to establish a prima facie case. 

However, as we have previously explained, an employee can still establish an 

FMLA retaliation claim even if the adverse employment action takes place 

after the end of FMLA leave. See Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC, 277 

F.3d 757, 768–69 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The FMLA’s protection against 

retaliation is not limited to periods in which an employee is on FMLA leave, 

but encompasses the employer’s conduct both during and after the 

employee’s FMLA leave.” (emphasis added)), abrogated on other grounds by 

Wheat, 811 F.3d 702; Campos, 10 F.4th at 527–28. This is made clear by the 

fact that temporal proximity between the end of FMLA leave and an adverse 

employment action can substantiate a causal connection for purposes of 

establishing a prima facie case. See Mauder, 446 F.3d at 583. 

Here, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Murillo, 

see Austin, 864 F.3d at 328–29, we conclude that Murillo satisfied her prima 

facie burden. Neither party disputes that Granbury allowed Murillo to go on

FMLA leave, which demonstrates that Murillo was “qualified for FMLA 

leave” and satisfies the first prong. See Campos, 10 F.4th at 527–28. 

Murillo’s termination constitutes an adverse employment action that 

satisfies the second prong. See id. at 528. Finally, Granbury terminated 

Murillo the day after Murillo’s FMLA leave expired, and indeed minutes into 

the start of her work-shift on the first day she was supposed to return while 

commenting on how glad they were to terminate her. This “degree of 

temporal proximity” clearly “support[s] a causal connection for purposes of 

a prima facie case.” See id. (“Here, the adverse employment action occurred 

approximately one month after [appellant’s] FMLA leave expired, and we 

conclude that a month is close enough in time to create a causal 

connection.”).

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The burden thus shifts to Granbury to offer legitimate, nonretaliatory 

reasons for Murillo’s termination. See id. Granbury stated that it fired 

Murillo because she failed to report to work on the day after her FMLA leave 

ended and therefore had abandoned her job. Of course, this position is not 

consistent with their own personnel manual, so it seems questionable. 

Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that this reason is legitimate, Murillo 

has sufficiently raised a factual issue regarding whether it is pretextual. See 

id. at 521. Sorrells stated she was “hoping” Murillo would not return to work

and suggested firing Murillo just nine minutes after Murillo’s shift started. 

Murillo was terminated later that day. This reaction runs contrary to the 

progressive discipline policy in Granbury’s personnel manual,5 particularly 

given that Murillo had no previous job performance issues and was not 

normally late to work. Murillo’s sudden termination also conflicts with the 

ordinary reaction to unexpected absences, wherein Crownover would have 

first attempted to contact Murillo or her emergency contacts. Such 

deviations can be evidence of pretext. See, e.g., Goudeau v. Nat’l Oilwell 

Varco, L.P., 793 F.3d 470, 477 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[W]hen an employer opts to 

have a disciplinary system that involves warnings, failure to follow that 

system may give rise to inferences of pretext.”). 

Further, Murillo’s failure to show up for work on one day does not 

meet the Granbury personnel manual’s definition of “job abandonment,” 

which requires three consecutive days of unexplained absence.6 Murillo also 

_____________________

5 Granbury’s assertion that the personnel manual does not provide Murillo a right 

to progressive discipline is inapposite. Rather, Granbury’s decision to terminate Murillo 

in a way that did not align with its progressive discipline policy may suggest that Murillo 

was terminated as retaliation for taking FMLA leave, in violation of the FMLA. See 

Mauder, 446 F.3d at 580; Goudeau v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 793 F.3d 470, 477 (5th Cir. 

2015).

6 Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted to be setting a rule for all cases that 

an employee who does not show up for work after her FMLA leave expires and is fired 

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presented evidence that Granbury wanted her to return to work before her 

leave was over, which she would not do. Viewed in the light most favorable

to Murillo, these facts could lead a reasonable jury to find that Granbury’s 

proffered reason for terminating Murillo was pretextual. See Austin, 964 F.3d 

at 328–29. 

We therefore conclude that the district court erred in determining that 

Murillo failed to satisfy her prima facie burden. Furthermore, a genuine issue 

of material fact exists, at a minimum, regarding whether Granbury’s reason 

for terminating Murillo was not pretextual. Accordingly, we conclude the 

district court erred in granting summary judgment on Murillo’s FMLA 

retaliation claim and REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

_____________________

because of that unexcused absence can successfully bring an FMLA retaliation claim solely 

on the basis of that termination. The specific facts in this case as detailed above support 

Murillo’s arguments about causal link and pretext. Thus, this case is decided on the 

specifics of these facts.

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