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S. HRG. 109–1044 

INHERENTLY SAFER TECHNOLOGY IN THE 

CONTEXT OF CHEMICAL SITE SECURITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 21, 2006 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://access.gpo.gov/congress.senate 
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

ANDREW WHEELER, Majority Staff Director 

KEN CONNOLLY, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

JUNE 21, 2006 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Bond, Hon. Christopher S., U.S. Senator from the State of Missouri ................ 5 

Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma .................... 1 

Jeffords, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont .................... 4 

Lautenberg, Hon. Frank R., U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey .......... 8 

Obama, Hon. Barack, U.S. Senator from the State of Illinois ........................... 12 

Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio ...................... 9 

WITNESSES 

Biden, Hon. Joseph, U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware ........................... 14 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 33 

Cott, Charlie, vice president, Plant Foods and Transportation, MFA Inc .......... 24 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 71 

Response to an additional question from Senator Jeffords ........................... 75 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 75 

Senator Voinovich ..................................................................................... 75 

Crowley, Philip J., senior fellow and director of National Defense and Homeland Security, Center for American Progress .................................................... 19 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 43 

Response to an additional question from Senator Jeffords ........................... 47 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 51 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 46 

Senator Voinovich ..................................................................................... 48 

Hendershot, Dennis C., staff consultant, Center for Chemical Process Safety, 

American Institute of Chemical Engineers ........................................................ 18 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 34 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 38 

Senator Jeffords ......................................................................................... 40 

Senator Obama .......................................................................................... 43 

Senator Voinovich ..................................................................................... 41 

Jackson, Lisa P., Commissioner, New Jersey Department of Environmental 

Protection .............................................................................................................. 23 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 65 

Response to an additional question from Senator Inhofe ............................. 68 

Response to an additional question from Senator Jeffords ........................... 68 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 71 

Senator Voinovich ..................................................................................... 68 

Moore, David A., PE, CSP, president and CEO, AcuTech Consulting Group, 

Chemetica, Inc ...................................................................................................... 21 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 53 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 62 

Senator Obama .......................................................................................... 65 

Senator Voinovich ..................................................................................... 63 
Page

IV 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL 

Letters: 

Dryvit Systems, Inc ................................................................................... 110-111 

Rust-Oleum Corporation ........................................................................... 95-96 

Reports: 

American Chemistry Council ................................................................... 193 

Center for American Progress .................................................................. 151-192 

Texas Engineering Experiment Station; Texas A&M University System College Station, Texas ................................................................... 77-83 

Statements: 

Greenpeace ................................................................................................. 136-150 

National Association of Chemical Distributors ....................................... 84-94 

Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association .......................97-109 

United States Government Accountability Office ................................... 112-135 
(1) 

INHERENTLY SAFER TECHNOLOGY IN THE 

CONTEXT OF CHEMICAL SITE SECURITY 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 21, 2006 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room 628, 

Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James M. Inhofe (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Inhofe, Bond, Voinovich, Chafee, Thune, Jeffords, Carper, Lautenberg, and Obama. 

Senator INHOFE. Consistent with our policy of starting on time, 

we will start on time, and Senator Jeffords is here on time. 

[Laughter.] 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA 

Senator INHOFE. Good morning. Today the committee will be examining a concept called Inherently Safer Technology and its relation, if any, to making chemical sites more secure against terrorist 

attacks. Last week the Homeland Security and Government Affairs 

Committee held a markup on S. 2145, a bill to require heightened 

security at our Nation’s chemical sites. During that markup, the 

subject of IST was hotly debated. An amendment to require IST 

was wisely voted down by a bipartisan vote of 11 to 5. Despite this 

defeat, I am certain this environmental concept will continue to be 

debated in the context of security, thus our hearing today remains 

important. 

IST is essentially the idea of giving the Federal Government authority to mandate that a private company change its manufacturing process or the chemicals that they use. We will hear today 

from witnesses about how IST applies in the real world, what it 

can do and what it cannot do. 

In the wake of 9/11, there was a realization that chemical facilities, which are critical to our Nation’s economy, could be targets for 

terrorism. Since then, the Bush Administration has made a determined effort to protect our Nation’s critical infrastructure against 

terrorists who aim to harm us. Congress, too, has acted by enacting 

into law the Marine Transportation Security Act, the Bioterrorism 

Act, and a comprehensive nuclear security package that was passed 

out of this committee. 

Congress also created the Department of Homeland Security 

vesting it with power and authority to protect the Nation’s infrastructure. DHS has worked diligently and quickly to address the 
2 

Nation’s security issues. In the chemical sector, they have deployed 

teams of counter-terrorism specialists to each identified high-risk 

chemical facility to work with management, local first responders 

and law enforcement, States and other Federal agencies to assess 

and address the security needs. DHS has also created several tools 

to help all chemical facilities, regardless of whether they represent 

high-risk locations. This all means that chemical facilities are more 

protected and we are all indeed safer than we were 5 years ago. 

This committee has twice tried to move legislation to require certain chemical plans to upgrade their security against terrorist acts, 

a move strongly supported by the Administration and DHS. Each 

time, we have been sidetracked by the insistence of some that any 

such legislation must include allowing DHS to mandate IST. This 

is an idea that is not supported by DHS, the Nation’s premier security experts. 

The idea of IST predates 9/11. This is very important. We talk 

about IST and relationship with the security bill. IST was an effort 

by several environmentalist groups to put in their demands and 

dictates to business and industry long before 9/11 occurred. Then 

now they have taken advantage of the fact that 9/11 is there and 

we are taking security measures, they are trying to put this on. So 

this is what we are dealing with. 

DHS Security Chertoff said, and this is a quote, ‘‘We have to be 

careful not to move from what is a security-based focus—into one 

that tries to broaden into achieving environmental ends that are 

unrelated to security.’’ IST is not a ‘‘thing’’ that can be readily identified in legislation and then measured and regulated. It is a philosophy of safe manufacturing that translates into a complicated, 

interrelated set of site and community-specific decisions made by 

engineers and safety experts. We will hear from these very engineers today. 

What the security experts at DHS have said that they support 

and need from Congress is a law requires facilities to achieve a 

level of security. They want a performance standard set by DHS 

that allows for industry to decide how to reach it. 

Over the past 5 years, industry has also taken great strides to 

protect their facilities and they did this voluntarily, in absence of 

a mandate to do so. For example, the Center of American Progress, 

who is testifying today, recently noted that 284 facilities in 47 

States examined their processes and made what the report characterized as IST-like changes. This proves my point; though I doubt 

that is what you had in mind. These companies did not operate 

under a Federal regulation when they made the changes. They 

made a business case decision. 

You know, it is kind of the idea that these companies, as some 

would say, they want to have insecurity, they want to have the 

threat that faces them. They don’t want that. That would cost them 

money. That would cost lives, that would destroy their property. 

Consequently, they are concerned about it, and I think that if 

you want to pursue the IST thing, that is fine, go ahead and do 

it. But do it on some other bill. Don’t do it in conjunction with security, because it has nothing to do with security. 

Senator JEFFORDS. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:] 
3 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR

FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Good morning. Today, the Committee will be examining a concept called Inherently Safer technology and its relation, if any, to making chemical sites more secure 

against terrorist acts. Last week, the Homeland Security and Government Affairs 

Committee held a markup on S. 2145 a bill to require heightened security at our 

Nation’s chemical sites. During that markup, the subject of IST was hotly debated. 

An amendment to require IST was wisely voted down by a bipartisan vote of 11- 

5. Despite this defeat, I am certain this environmental concept will continue to be 

debated in the context of security, thus our hearing today remains important. 

IST is essentially the idea of giving the Federal Government authority to mandate 

that a private company change its manufacturing process or the chemicals that they 

use. We will hear today from witnesses about how IST applies in the real world. 

What it can do and what it cannot. 

In the wake of 9-11, there was a realization that chemical facilities, which are 

critical to our Nation’s economy, could be targets for terrorism. Since then, the Bush 

Administration has made a determined effort to protect our Nation’s critical infrastructure against terrorists who aim to harm us. Congress, too, has acted by enacting into law the Marine Transportation Security Act, the Bioterrorism Act, and a 

comprehensive nuclear security package that was passed out of this committee. Congress also created the Department of Homeland Security vesting it with power and 

authority to protect the Nation’s infrastructure. DHS has worked diligently and 

quickly to address the Nation’s security issues. In the chemical sector, they have 

deployed teams of counter terrorism specialists to each identified high-risk chemical 

facility to work with management, local first responders and law enforcement, states 

and other Federal agencies to assess and address the security needs. DHS has also 

created several tools to help ALL chemical facilities regardless of whether they represent high-risk locations. This all means that chemical facilities are more protected 

and we are all indeed safer than we were 5 years ago. 

This committee has twice tried to move legislation to require certain chemical 

plants to upgrade their security against terrorist acts—a move strongly supported 

by the Administration and DHS. Each time, we have been sidetracked by the insistence of some that any such legislation must include allowing DHS to mandate IST. 

This is an idea that is not supported by DHS, the Nation’s premier security experts. 

The idea of IST predates 9/11 and has never been about security. IST is an environmental concept that dates back more than a decade when the extremist environmental community, Greenpeace and others, were seeking bans on chlorine—the 

chemical that is used to purify our Nation’s water. It was only after 9/11 that they 

decided to play upon the fears of the Nation and repackage IST as a panacea to 

all of our security problems. 

Of course I do not view Greenpeace as any sort of authority on security issues— 

I prefer to stick to the real security experts. And the real security experts at DHS 

have been crystal clear that they do not support IST requirements. DHS Secretary 

Chertoff has said: ‘‘We have to be careful not to move from what is a security-based 

focus into one that tries to broaden into achieving environmental ends that are unrelated to security.’’ 

IST is not a ‘‘thing’’ that can be readily defined in legislation and then measured 

and regulated. It is a philosophy of safe manufacturing that translates into a complicated, interrelated set of site and community-specific decisions made by engineers 

and safety experts. We will hear from these very engineers today. 

What the security experts at DHS have said that they support and need from 

Congress is a law that requires facilities to achieve a level of security. They want 

a performance standard set by DHS that allows for industry to decide how to reach 

it. 

Over the past 5 years, industry has also taken great strides to protect their facilities and they did this voluntarily, in absence of a mandate to do so. For example, 

the Center of American Progress, who is testifying today, recently noted that 284 

facilities in 47 states examined their processes and made what the report characterized as IST—like changes. This proves my point; though I doubt that is what you 

had in mind. These companies did not operate under a Federal regulation when 

they made the changes. They did a business case study of their operations and made 

their decisions weighing various factors. Despite what some interest groups would 

have us believe, chemical companies do not want an attack on their assets anymore 

than we do. They do not need the Federal Government coming in and telling them 

specifically how to manufacture products. Government’s role is to direct them to 

make their facilities secure and help them by providing the guidance and tools to 
4 

do it but not stifle innovation and economic opportunity by dictating to them how 

to it. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. JEFFORDS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT 

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Homeland security experts have referred to chemical plants as 

‘‘pre-positioned weapons of mass destruction.’’ Yet nearly 5 years 

since the September 11th attacks, the Bush Administration has 

done almost nothing to address this glaring vulnerability. 

I am pleased that the Senate Homeland Security Committee 

unanimously adopted legislation last week to address the widespread risks posed by chemical facilities. Over 15,000 chemical facilities nationwide store sufficient quantities of hazardous chemicals to likely cause death or injury to the surrounding communities 

if released. 

The chemical industry’s own data indicates that it in a worst 

case release, toxic chemicals could threaten more than 1 million 

people at over 100 facilities across the Nation. More guards in 

higher fences are not enough to protect our communities from the 

dangers posed by chemical facilities. Rather, owners and operators 

of chemical plants need to take practical steps to reduce the inherent hazards posed by their facilities. 

For example, swimming pool service companies have made their 

neighborhoods safer by switching from chlorine gas to bleach or 

chlorine tablets. Unfortunately, thousands of communities remain 

vulnerable because facilities in their towns have not chosen to implement such measures. For example, nearly 3,000 drinking water 

and wastewater treatment plants still use chlorine gas instead of 

liquid bleach or ultraviolet light. 

Should implementation of inherently safer technology be mandatory for all chemical facilities? No. That has never been my position. Rather, when I chaired this committee in 2002, we unanimously adopted legislation that would have required consideration 

of the implementation of inherently safer technologies ‘‘when practicable.’’ 

Senator Inhofe’s bill that passed out of committee during the last 

Congress also would have required implementation of alternative 

approaches ‘‘when practicable’’ in the judgment of the owner and 

operator. Likewise, Senator Lieberman’s proposal last week would 

require implementation of inherently safer technology only when it 

would significantly reduce the risk of serious injuries and was practicable. 

Some have suggested that inherently safer technologies merely 

shift the risk from one location to another. However, such technologies will be elevated on a case by case basis and implemented 

only if they would make the community safer. 

Let me also mention two other elements that are critical for effective chemical security legislation. First, to ensure public accountability, citizens and local officials must be allowed to determine if a facility in their community is in compliance and to challenge the Department of Homeland Security actions or inactions if 
5 

necessary. Second, Congress should preserve the right of States to 

implement more stringent laws as needed to protect their citizens. 

In conclusion, legislation addressed to the risks posed by chemical facilities is long overdue. I am looking forward to the hearing 

and will work to ensure that the Congress enacts a strong chemical 

security law. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Jeffords follows:] 

STATEMENT OF JAMES M. JEFFORDS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT

Homeland Security experts refer to chemical plants as ‘‘pre-positioned weapons of 

mass destruction.’’ Yet nearly five years since the September 11 attacks, the Bush 

administration has done almost nothing to address this glaring vulnerability. 

I am pleased that the Senate Homeland Security Committee unanimously adopted 

legislation last week to address the widespread risks posed by chemical facilities. 

Over 15,000 chemical facilities nation-wide store sufficient quantities of hazardous 

chemicals to likely cause death or injury to the surrounding communities if released. 

The chemical industry’s own data indicates that, in a worst case release, toxic 

chemicals could threaten more than one million people at over 100 facilities across 

the nation. More guards and higher fences are not enough to protect our communities from the dangers posed by chemical facilities. 

Rather, owners and operators of chemical plants need to take practical steps to 

reduce the inherent hazards posed by their facilities. For example, swimming pool 

service companies have made their neighborhoods safer by switching from chlorine 

gas to bleach or chlorine tablets. 

Unfortunately, thousands of communities remain vulnerable because facilities in 

their towns have not chosen to implement such measures. For example, nearly 3,000 

drinking water and waste water treatment plants still use chlorine gas instead of 

liquid bleach or ultraviolet light. 

Should implementation of inherently safer technology be mandatory for all chemical facilities? No. That has never been my position. Rather, when I chaired this 

Committee in 2002, we unanimously adopted legislation that would have required 

consideration and implementation of inherently safer technologies ‘‘where practicable.’’ 

Senator Inhofe’s bill that passed out of the Committee during the last Congress 

also would have required implementation of alternative approaches where ‘‘practicable in the judgment of the owner and operator.’’ 

Likewise, Senator Lieberman’s proposal last week would require implementation 

of inherently safer technology only when it would significantly reduce the risks of 

serious injuries and was practical. 

Some have suggested that inherently safer technologies merely shift the risk from 

one location to another. However, such technologies will be evaluated on a case by 

case basis and implemented only if they would make the community safer. 

Let me also mention two other elements that are critical for effective chemical security legislation. 

First, to ensure public accountability, citizens and local officials must be allowed 

to determine if a facility in their community is in compliance and to challenge Department of Homeland Security actions—or inactions—if necessary. 

Second, Congress should preserve the right of states to implement more stringent 

laws as needed to protect their citizens. 

In conclusion, legislation to address the risks posed by chemical facilities is long 

overdue. 

I look forward to this hearing and will work to ensure that Congress enacts a 

strong chemical security law. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Jeffords. 

Senator BOND. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI 

Senator BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding 

this hearing of the Environment Committee on Inherently Safer 

Technologies. 
6 

Attempting to change internal manufacturing processes to use 

and produce products that are less of a risk to the environment is 

a longstanding goal of environmental stakeholders. It is only natural that the Environment Committee reviews this latest reincarnation of its environmental issue. Proposals mandating so-called 

inherently safer technologies, in order to avoid risks to the environment, are not new. Bills have been around Congress, including 

those championed by our colleague from New Jersey, for a long 

time. 

After the tragic events of 9/11, environmental stakeholders saw 

an opportunity to dust off their old IST bills. Indeed, earlier 

versions of legislation with IST mandates consisted of nothing more 

than these old environmental bills with the addition of the words 

‘‘homeland security’’ sprinkled here and there. Well, it was a bad 

idea then, and it is a bad idea now. Not only is it bad policy, but 

it is most likely an impossible policy to implement in any successful way. 

If I didn’t make myself clear, I will go on and explain a little bit. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator BOND. Advocates throw out casual examples as if there 

are only one or two simple examples that cover everything. It is 

just like getting rid of chlorine in water treatment plants, they say. 

It is simple and no big deal. 

However, it is a big deal, if not an overwhelmingly impossible 

deal. Our modern life depends on hundreds of thousands of industrial processes to produce products we need for safety, health and 

prosperous lives. Medicines that save lives, fertilizers that help 

feed nations, even simple things such as laundry baskets and 

Tupperware don’t just grow on trees. They are made with complex 

industrial processes, using chemicals that are sometimes dangerous 

or hazardous. 

Manufacturing processes differ not only from sector to sector and 

product to product, but from plant to plant. How do we imagine the 

Government and the legal system would know how to operate these 

industrial plants better than plant managers themselves? Some 

proposals would include a review of alternatives using inherently 

safer technologies. Can you imagine that a Government bureaucrat 

would have the expertise to review these operations? 

How could someone in Washington be able to review a report and 

say that product A made on line B in plant C in the middle American town of D should have been made a different way? Even if 

they could, how could they conduct thousands of those complex reviews and make thousands of those decisions across this massive 

economy? Even if they could do that, how could they know that the 

alternatives they might recommend as inherently safer technologies were affordable, or would not cause plant closures, lost 

jobs? Would they even care? 

Other bills impose a general duty to employ inherently safer 

technologies. Is this something we want to leave up to attorneys to 

argue over and sue over? How many countless billions of dollars 

would be spent to avoid a legal liability, even if the risk of danger 

is remote? How many vital products would disappear from the market over liability fears, even if producers are fully complying with 
7 

the numerous health safety and security regulations already on the 

books? 

Yes, we must examine IST calls in the context of regulations that 

are already on the books, already generating reports, already informing responders and already forcing security changes. Operators 

responsible for safety are already taking action. Local Governments 

charged with response are taking action. Organizations representing industries, Federal agencies, congressional committees 

are all taking action. In addition, the Government Affairs Homeland Security has just rejected IST mandates as untenable. 

I am delighted, Mr. Chairman, that the committee will hear testimony on just how impossible an idea this is from a fellow Missourian. Charlie Cott was born and raised on a grain and livestock 

farm in Saline County, MO, where my grandparents grew up. 

Charlie is now with the Missouri Farmers Association, the regional 

farm cooperative, supply cooperative that represents 45,000 farmers in Missouri and surrounding States. 

Charlie is here today representing the Agricultural Retailers Association. He is the face of our farmers who bring food to the market, food we find in our grocery stores, in our pantries and on our 

dinner plate. He has first-hand insight into how broadly and how 

deeply a fundamental and comprehensive mandate, such as IST, 

would affect all our daily lives. 

You don’t have to take my word for it, and you probably won’t. 

But I ask you to listen to the people who are actually engaged in 

this field and make your judgment based on what they have to say. 

I thank Mr. Cott for joining us, and I thank my colleagues for their 

indulgence. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Bond follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, U.S. SENATOR

FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today in the Environment Committee on Inherently Safer Technologies. Attempting to change internal manufacturing processes to use and produce products that are less of a risk to the environment is a longstanding goal of environmental stakeholders. It is only natural that 

the Environment Committee review this latest reincarnation of this environmental 

issue. 

Proposals mandating so-called inherently safer technologies (IST) in order to avoid 

risk to the environment are not new. Bills have been around for many Congresses, 

including those championed by our colleague from New Jersey. 

After the tragic events of 9/11, environmental stakeholders saw an opportunity to 

dust off their IST bills. Indeed, earlier versions of legislation with IST mandates 

consisted of nothing more than those old environmental bills with the addition of 

the words ‘‘homeland security’’ sprinkled here and there. 

It was a bad idea then and it is a bad idea now. Not only is it bad policy, but 

it is most likely an impossible policy to implement in any successful way. 

Advocates throw out casual examples as if there one or two simple examples that 

cover everything. ‘‘It’s just like getting rid of chlorine at water treatment plants,’’ 

they say. ‘‘It’s simple and no big deal.’’ However, it is a big deal, if not an overwhelmingly impossible deal. 

Our modern life depends upon hundreds of thousands of industrial processes to 

produce the products we need for safe, healthy and prosperous lives. Medicines that 

save lives, fertilizers that help feed nations, even simple things such as laundry baskets and Tupperware don’t just grow on trees. They are made with complex industrial processes using chemicals that are sometimes dangerous or hazardous. 

Manufacturing processes differ not only from sector to sector or product to product, but from plant to plant. How do we imagine that the government or legal sys-
8 

tem would know how to operate these industrial plants better than the plant managers themselves? 

Some proposals would include a review of alternatives using inherently safer technologies. How could we ever imagine that a government bureaucrat would have the 

expertise to review these operations. How could someone far away in Washington 

be able to review a report and say that product A made on line B in plant C in 

middle America town D should have been made a different way? 

And even if they could, how would they conduct thousands of those complex reviews and make thousands of those decisions across our massive economy? And even 

if they could do that, how would they know that alternatives they might recommend 

as inherently safer technologies were affordable, or would not cause plant closures 

or lost jobs? Would they even care? 

Other bills impose a general duty to employ inherently safer technologies. Is this 

something we want to leave up to attorneys to argue over, or sue over? How many 

countless billions would be forced to be spent to avoid such a legal liability, even 

if the risk of danger is remote? How many vital products would disappear from the 

market over liability fears? Even if producers are fully complying with the numerous health, safety, and security regulations already on the books? 

Yes, we must examine IST calls in the context of regulations that are already on 

the books, already generating reports, already informing responders, and already 

forcing security changes. 

Operators responsible for safety are already taking action. 

Local governments charged with response are already taking action. Organizations representing industries are already taking action. Federal agencies are already 

taking action. Congressional committees are already taking action. Indeed, the Senate Committee charged with Homeland Security just rejected IST mandates as untenable. 

I am delighted that the Committee will hear testimony on just how impossible 

this idea is from a fellow Missourian. Charlie Cotts was born and raised on a grain 

and livestock farm in Saline County, Missouri. Charlie is now with the Missouri 

Farmers Association, 

a regional farm and supply cooperative representing 45,000 farmers in Missouri 

and surrounding states. 

Charlie is here today representing the Agricultural Retailers Association. Charlie 

is the face of our farmers who bring food to the market - food we find in our grocery 

stores, in our pantries, and on our dinner plate. He has first-hand insight into how 

broadly and how deeply a fundamental and comprehensive mandate such as IST 

would effect all of our daily lives. 

I thank him for joining us here today and I thank my colleagues for their indulgence. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Bond. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing to show how impossible the task would be to have 

IST in place. I really appreciate this opportunity. Thank you, Senator Bond. 

I have been involved with this issue for many years. I introduced 

the first chemical security bill in 1999. Since the terrorist attacks 

of 9/11/2001, I believe that it is even more important to improve 

security measures at facilities that manufacture or use dangerous 

chemicals. 

Now, my State of New Jersey is particularly vulnerable. We have 

our own IST standard, and because of the number of chemical 

manufacturing and transporting facilities, warehousing, et cetera, 

we have a great deal of concern about the safest way to deal with 

chemical safety and security. I think IST is a common sense approach, and I have been pleased to work with my colleague, Senator Obama, on the issue. We introduced a bill that requires IST 

for facilities storing large amounts of chemicals where practicable. 
9 

The last qualifier is important: where practicable. I listened to our 

colleague, and listened to how the IST idea strikes, carries his attention. It is nice that we have a disbeliever here. 

The question is, can it work? How can we bureaucrats, and I am 

only a junior bureaucrat, because I am only here a couple of years 

now, the fact is that how can we bureaucrats describe something 

to management? I think we did it with pesticides. I see Senator 

Biden here. I think we did it with pesticides, right? They were 

using pesticides and killing darned near everything in sight, not 

only animals, but humans as well. 

We insisted, we bureaucrats insisted that the industry change its 

materials. They did it, and you know what? There is more wildlife 

in the skies, more birds have come back, people live healthier now, 

everybody is going to something called organic I guess organic is 

an IST, right, inherently safer technology? It works. 

When we think about how difficult it is to enforce compliance, 

just think of IRS. How many of those returns are not examined, 

but violate the law in terms of necessity to file, necessity to be accurate? But we don’t throw our hands up and say, oh, it is too hard 

to monitor this. We just go ahead and we do what we have to. 

Now, even the chemical industry recognizes that IST can reduce 

risks. Again, remember the S is safety, that IST can reduce risks, 

and some facilities are voluntarily examining whether it will work 

for them. I am glad that these individual facilities are taking these 

voluntary steps. That is good corporate citizenship. 

That doesn’t mean that we can trust the entire industry to take 

prudent safety precautions. As public servants, our most important 

duty is the protection of the public. No physical security system at 

a chemical plant is foolproof. The best way to guarantee the safety 

of workers and nearby residents is to use safer materials and processes wherever we can in our chemical facilities. 

The National Research Council conducted a study of this issue 

for the Department of Homeland Security. Their study concluded, 

‘‘The most desirable solution to preventing chemical releases is to 

reduce or eliminate the hazard where possible, not to control 

them.’’ This is a strong recommendation for inherently safer technology. I think to ignore that recommendation is at our peril. 

Now, I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses. I especially want to welcome the Commissioner of New Jersey’s Department of Environmental Protection, Lisa Jackson. She works for another long-time champion of strong chemical security measures, 

Governor John Corzine, whom you all know well. We thank you, 

Ms. Jackson, for traveling here today to testify on an issue that is 

of such critical importance to our State, and frankly, I believe to 

States across this country. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator VOINOVICH. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OHIO 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this 

hearing today. The chemical industry is a critical component of our 
10 

Nation’s economic infrastructure. Securing it is of the utmost importance. 

I compliment your attention to this matter over the years. Your 

commitment to the issue helped to lay the groundwork for the legislation that passed out of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee last week. I look forward to working 

with you and all the other interested people to improve the legislation on the Senate floor and ensure that our Nation’s chemical sector is secure from the threat of terrorist attacks. 

The chemical industry contributes to our high quality of life, 

whether it is enhanced crop production, improved water 

chlorinization, effective household cleaners or advanced life-saving 

medications. However, these benefits do not come without risk. 

Where there is risk, we must assess that risk and take the appropriate action. 

I think we also have to weigh the threat versus the cost in securing our homeland. I think we should acknowledge that we already 

have the Marine Transportation Safety Act that is regulating many 

of these facilities in the most vulnerable places. 

We have to also recognize that the industry, through something 

called responsible care, is also doing everything that they can to secure their facilities. There is sometimes a tendency on the part of 

Members of Congress to not recognize the fact that if I own a 

chemical facility, I am going to do everything I can to protect the 

people who work in that facility, I am going to do everything I can 

to protect the investment in the facility, and I do care about my 

neighbors in the area where my facility is located. 

The concept of inherently safer technology originated in an environmental protection and occupational safety context. Safety and 

environmental concerns are already regulated by the Occupational 

Safety and Health Administration and by the Environmental Protection Agency through their risk management program. It should 

be noted that while the EPA encourages consideration of IST it 

mandates neither analysis nor implementation of IST in its risk 

management program. 

I must ask if the EPA does not see fit to even mandate the analysis or consideration of IST, then why should the Department of 

Homeland Security? 

While the concept of IST may be appropriate in the context of 

worker safety and environmental protection, it is both unprecedented and ill-conceived as a security measure. The definition of security is broadly understood to include such measures as employee 

background, identification checks, the limitation and prevention of 

access to controls, perimeter protection, the installation of intrusion 

detector sensors and other measures to prevent, protect against or 

deter a terrorist incident. In short, security enhancements are primarily made outside the fence. 

Furthermore, there is no precedent for including IST in a Federal 

security regulatory regime. The term is inconsistent with security 

precedent set by the Bioterrorism Act, the Maritime Transportation 

Act and the Atomic Energy Act, which regulates our 103 nuclear 

facilities in this country. These laws focus on enhancing physical 

security measures, not mandating private sector industrial process 

change. 
11 

The law most similar to the chemical facility security legislation 

that the Senate will be considering is MTSA, and MTSA requires 

security commensurate with risk, not the reduction or elimination 

of that risk. IST is largely defined as ‘‘the relocation, hardening of 

the storage or containment modification processing, substitution or 

reduction of substances of concern.’’ I feel strongly the Federal Government should not direct industry practice or procedure; rather, it 

should be left to process safety experts. 

The Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 

agrees with this position. An amendment that would have mandated IST for hundreds of chemical facilities was defeated on a bipartisan vote of 11 to 5. Additionally, I offered an amendment to 

ensure that no site security plan could be denied by DHS for the 

absence of a particular security measure. Therefore, no site security plan could be denied by DHS based solely on the absence of 

IST. That is in the law that passed out of the Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs Committee. That amendment was adopted by voice vote. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to remind my colleagues that the 

U.S. chemical industry is already experiencing economic hardship 

as a result of rising natural gas costs, which I believe this Congress 

is partly responsible for because of our unrealistic environmental 

policies. According to the American Chemistry Council, the U.S. 

chemical industry went from posting trade surpluses in excess of 

$20 billion in 1995 to becoming a net importer of chemicals with 

a $9 billion deficit in 2005. I want to tell you something, a lot of 

those jobs were lost in my State of Ohio. 

So I am interested in hearing what the witnesses have to say 

about this. I do not believe IST belongs in this chemical security 

legislation. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Voinovich follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF

OHIO

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today on Inherently Safer Technology and chemical security. The chemical industry is a critical component of our 

Nation’s economic infrastructure, and securing it is of the utmost importance. I complement your attention to this matter over the years. Your commitment to the issue 

helped to lay the groundwork for the legislation that passed out of the Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs Committee last week. I look forward to working 

with you and all of our interested colleagues to improve the legislation on the Senate floor, and ensure that our nation’s chemical sector is secure from the threat of 

terrorist attacks. 

The chemical industry contributes to our high quality of life, whether it is enhanced crop production, improved water chlorination, effective household cleaners or 

advanced life-saving medications. However, these benefits do not come without risk. 

Where there is risk, we must assess that risk and take the appropriate action. 

The concept of ‘‘inherently safer technology’’ originated in environmental protection and occupational safety contexts. Safety and environmental concerns are already regulated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and by the 

Environmental Protection Agency through the Risk Management Program. It should 

be noted that while the EPA encourages consideration of IST, it mandates neither 

analyses nor implementation of IST in its Risk Management Program. I must ask, 

if the EPA does not see fit to even mandate the analyses or consideration of IST, 

then why should the Department of Homeland Security? 

While the concept of IST may be appropriate in the context of worker safety and 

environmental protection, is both unprecedented and ill-conceived as security measure. The definition of security is broadly understood to include such measures as 

employee background and identification checks; the limitation and prevention of ac-
12 

cess to controls; perimeter protection; the installation and of intrusion detection sensors; and other measures to prevent, protect against, or deter a terrorist incident. 

In short, security enhancements are primarily made outside the fence. 

Furthermore, there is no precedent for including IST in a Federal security regulatory regime. The term is inconsistent with security precedent set by the 

BioTerrorsim Act, the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), and the Atomic Energy Act. These laws focus on enhancing physical security measures, not mandating private sector industrial process change. The law most similar to the chemical facility security legislation that the Senate will be considering is MTSA, and 

MTSA requires security commensurate with risk — not the reduction or elimination 

of that risk. 

IST is largely defined as ‘‘the relocation, hardening of the storage or containment, 

modification, processing, substitution, or reduction of substances of concern.’’ I feel 

strongly that the Federal Government should not direct industry practice or procedure; rather, that should be left to process safety experts. 

The Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee agrees with this position. An amendment that would have mandated IST for hundreds of chemical facilities was defeated on a bipartisan 11-5 vote. Additionally, I offered an amendment 

to ensure that no site security plan could be denied by DHS for the absence of a 

particular security measure. Therefore, no site security plan could be denied by 

DHS based solely on the absence of IST. My amendment was adopted by the Committee by voice vote. 

Mr. Chairman, I would remind my colleagues that the U.S. chemical industry is 

already experiencing economic hardship as a result of rising natural gas costs. According to the American Chemistry Council, U.S. chemical industry went from posting trade surpluses in excess of $20 billion in 1995 to becoming a net importer of 

chemicals, with a $9 billion deficit in 2005. 

With more than 100,000 American jobs displaced, the industry can ill afford additional regulation that could add enormous costs and further diminish its competitiveness while adding little additional security value. IST is adequately regulated 

by the appropriate entities: EPA and OSHA. Efforts to push further IST or process 

change requirements in name of security should be rejected. 

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that this information paper from the 

ACC be included in the record. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Voinovich. 

Senator OBAMA. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am looking forward to hearing from the witnesses. 

Just to pick up on something that Senator Voinovich said, Illinois 

has one of the biggest chemical industries in the country. We have 

900,000 people working directly in chemical facilities around the 

country, but 53,000 of them are in Illinois. So I have a great interest in seeing a strong and vibrant chemical industry. 

My hope was that we could not prejudge these issues. The reason 

that we were having a hearing, hopefully, was to learn something 

new, as opposed to simply dig in on our previous positions. I do 

wish that we could have held this sooner, before this committee 

passed what I believe is an insufficient wastewater security bill, 

and before the Senate Homeland Security Committee passed chemical plant security legislation that did not include strong IST provisions. 

I think that IST is an integral part of chemical plant security. 

I welcome a thorough debate of this issue, because I think that a 

lot of misleading arguments have been made about what IST is and 

isn’t, and it is important to clear up some of these misconceptions. 

For instance, we have heard that IST is in the early stages of 

development, even though it has been used in the chemical indus-
13 

try itself for nearly 30 years. Saying IST is in its infancy is a little 

like saying the personal computer is in its infancy. 

We have heard that IST is an environmental issue—that has 

been repeated already in some of the statements—not a security 

one despite the fact that the Departments of Justice and Homeland 

Security, and even though the American Chemical Council itself 

have embraced IST as part of chemical plant security in the past. 

Most recently, a National Academy of Sciences study commissioned 

by DHS endorsed the adoption of IST as ‘‘the most desirable solution to preventing chemical release from terrorist attack.’’ Time 

and again, experts have agreed that IST is the most effective approach to eliminating terrorist threats to chemical facilities. 

We have heard that IST is too expensive, but that does not have 

to be the case. A recent survey of nearly 300 facilities that switched 

to safer technologies since 1999 found that 87 percent spent less 

than $1 million and one half reported spending less than $100,000 

in applying IST. Thirty-four percent of survey participants actually 

expected to save money or improve profitability in part because IST 

reduces the need for barriers, secondary containment, security 

training and liability concerns. 

We have heard that IST merely shifts risks, rather than eliminates them. I understand that some of the witnesses today will 

base their arguments on the theoretical example of a facility that 

reduces its inventory of a dangerous chemical, but then has to 

make more frequent shipments, which in turn places more chemicals in the transportation system. 

In fact, there are hundreds of real-world examples of wastewater 

facilities switching from chlorine gas to liquid bleach, or manufacturing plants using lower temperatures or simplified processes to 

reduce risks. If anything, the theoretical examples cited by these 

witnesses only highlights the need for DHS to play a role in the 

IST decision, making the process to ensure that individual facilities 

are not making short-sighted decisions, that merely shift risks elsewhere. 

There is one thing that we can all agree on: any chemical plant 

security legislation should be comprehensive and rational. It should 

balance the need to keep us safe with the need to continue producing chemical products that are essential to our economy. I believe that the IST approach needs to be a part, not the whole, but 

a part of rational, comprehensive security legislation. Without it, 

we are leaving a huge gap in our ability to manage the risks that 

these facilities represent. 

Mr. Chairman, I just think that it is important before we move 

on to emphasize the risks. There are 111 facilities in this country 

where chemical release could threaten more than 1 million people 

under the worst case scenarios. There are more than 750 additional 

facilities where such a release could threaten more than 100,000 

people. These are not speculative. And every security expert that 

you talk to will tell you that in fact there are enormous potential 

risks. 

I am glad that the chemical industry has taken some of the steps 

that it has done on its own. The question is whether or not we can 

provide some additional measures that would improve safety with-
14 

out being an onerous burden on industry. That is what I am going 

to be interested in hearing today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Obama. 

Well, it has been the custom of this committee to allow any Senator who wants to be heard to testify before this committee. We 

have a request from the senior Senator from Delaware, Senator 

Biden. If you would take the bench and give us your testimony, we 

would appreciate it. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH BIDEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It reminds me of the good old days in the Judiciary Committee, 

we used to debate abortion. It is nice to be at a committee where 

it is so unified. 

Maybe what I should do is direct my comments—I don’t know 

which half of this outfit to direct it to. Folks, I would like to ask 

that my prepared statement be entered into the record in whole, 

if I may. 

Senator INHOFE. Without objection, so ordered. 

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I just want to begin by pointing 

out that I come from what used to be called the chemical capital 

of the world, that was our logo. I am not representing any environmental group, I am not a subversive. The way sometimes we talk 

about this, it began as an environmental, this idea began with environmentalist, is a little bit like it came out of Mein Kampf or 

some subversive doctrine. 

The only generic point I will make at the outset here is that initially, the reason why EPA didn’t have these types of rules or suggestions that we are talking about that has taken on the acronym 

we are all referencing is because the chemical plants in my State 

were safe for the workers, as long as they didn’t blow up. It wasn’t 

that they were going to spontaneously blow up, the chlorine wasn’t 

all of a sudden going to implode, or that the plant and the dangerous chemical there. So there was no need for, I say to my friend 

from Ohio, for environmental legislation relating to a facility that, 

absent some act of God and/or some terrorist act, could cause great 

damage. 

So I would argue we are comparing apples and oranges when we 

say that, look, if you don’t need this for the safety of the employees, 

why then do we need this for the safety of the community? They 

are fundamentally different questions. EPA looks at what is likely 

to occur if things are run as they are supposed to run, and to overstate it, it makes regulations related to those circumstances. It 

does not calculate if Osama bin Ladin and his boys climb across the 

fence in New Castle, Delaware and blow up a chemical plant that 

happens to be a chlorine plant. 

So there are two different issues in my point. The issue of inherently safer technologies, in my view, is in fact critically important 

to homeland security. I commend you all here on this committee for 

focusing on the issue. I hope that what I am about to say will add 
15 

some content to the debate, because if we do this right, I think we 

can advance the ball to enhance the safety of millions of people. 

I live in an area where there are 10 million people. Everybody 

looks at Delaware as a little, tiny State. We are a little, tiny State. 

We live in the Delaware Valley. Ten million people. We have more 

oil refineries and chemical plants in our general area than you do 

in any other place, including Houston or—add them all up. There 

are 10 million people in this area. So we are concerned about this 

issue. 

I believe that we have a greater obligation to protect our hometowns and to protect against what has now become unfortunately 

not a reasonable but a, if not predictable, a probable threat. Anybody thinks that terrorists have gone out of business and are not 

going to be hanging around, and if you are sitting out there, a terrorist, you say, OK, where do I get my biggest bang for the buck— 

no pun intended? Where do you do that? 

Well, I will tell you what, I would just take a 90 ton chlorine gas 

tanker, I would put some plastique underneath it, go, by the way, 

to any of the yards, you will see there are no cameras, there is no 

police, there is not much switching, not a hard thing to do. I would 

wait until it hit a populated area. I asked the Naval Research Center, what would happen if one of these tankers blew up in a populated area? They said, 100,000 people would die or be severely injured, 100,000 folks. 

We had a little amendment that said, to make the point, this is 

not just about inherently safer technologies. It is about inconvenience. I introduced an amendment that a number of States wanted 

to allow cities and States to force these very dangerous commodities to be able to go around cities, and it got voted down. Why? 

Because it will cost more money to take it around. It would cost 

more money. It would cost more money. 

I found that kind of amazing. If we simply require facilities that 

store and utilize large amounts of chlorine or other dangerous 

chemicals, to transition inherently safer technology wherever feasible, we could in fact completely or permanently eliminate known 

threats to our communities. This would allow us to focus our scarce 

resources on border security and other critical infrastructure. 

By the way, the Marine Maritime Act, which I voted for, I took 

last recess and I went to, I started off in Charleston and went 

down the ports of Miami, then I went to New Orleans, then I went 

to California, then I went to Seattle to talk to these guys. They 

don’t think this is secure. Talk to the people who have in fact had 

to implement the Act. We talk about this Act like it has done something. It has done something. But my, oh, my, you ought to go talk 

to the port directors in these ports as I did. Don’t take my word 

for it, check it out. 

So there is a whole lot of focus we need on greater resources on 

places which present threats which cost a lot more money to protect than if we in fact just were to make some of these changes. 

For example, in my little old State of Delaware, we had the Wilmington water pollution control facility, and it transitioned from 

gaseous chlorine to chlorine bleach. That decision eliminated a 

threat to 560,000 people, according to the security people. It cost 

$160,000 in capital investment. 
16 

Because the facility permanently eliminated the risk, it is no 

longer required to spend, I didn’t even calculate the number, they 

don’t need guards, they don’t need fences, and they don’t need security around the facility now. So I don’t know what the net cost is, 

but it is less than $160,000. Not only should we be supporting this 

type of decision, we should require it wherever it is practicable. 

That is the important word this legislation says. 

In my view, it is unacceptable that only 5 years after the attacks 

of September 11th, we haven’t made a decision to reduce the dangers posed by these gaseous chemicals at chemical facilities and 

water treatment plants. It is not like this is some kind of burdensome requirement that will kill industry. It has been pointed out, 

hundreds of facilities have made this decision without Government 

intervention. These facilities seem to be operating just fine. In addition, every proposal that I have seen provides for a transition 

only if it is practicable and it would allow a facility, not the Government, to determine what the alternative process should be. 

As always, another overriding concern for Government and for 

industry is the cost associated with the transition. According to the 

Department of Homeland Security, there are 300 chemical facilities 

that put over 50,000 citizens in danger. As a result, a report by the 

Center for American Progress, found 87 percent of these facilities 

reported that it would cost no less than $1 million, and one half 

of these—as my friend from Illinois—I am trying to get through 

this quickly—from Illinois pointed out, $100,000 was the cost to 

transfer these technologies. 

If we were to provide $1 million, a top-end estimate, for every 

chemical facility to transfer to safer technologies, we could eliminate the risk for $300 million. To eliminate the threat posed by 

roughly 100 water treatment facilities that threaten over 100,000 

individuals each, it would cost $125 million. This doesn’t even require that. Thus, an investment of less than half a billion dollars 

would eliminate the threat to nearly 60 million people. 

In contrast, we didn’t have any problem with the $35 billion profits this year for the oil industry, and God bless them, I am glad 

they are making profits. We didn’t have a problem giving an energy 

bill a $2 billion incentive. A $2 billion incentive. My dad used to 

say, and my friend Tom Carper knew him before he passed away, 

he used to say, hey, champ, if everything is equally important to 

you, nothing is important to you. If you don’t prioritize, it doesn’t 

matter. 

Tell me that spending $2 million to encourage the oil industry 

and gas industry is a higher priority than spending $125 million 

to take every single water treatment facility in America and make 

it—even if we paid it all, just outright, just outright. Wow. I don’t 

quite get that. 

Because the transition to safer technologies will result in savings 

by reduction of guns, guards, gates and bureaucratic expense, it 

seems to me that costs would even be lower. Quite frankly, gentlemen, in my view, this is a good use of Federal resources. If industry officials will work with us, I think we could devise a system 

where we could help fund capital investment with facilities returning the savings that result in out years. In the process, we protect 
17 

millions of Americans and reduce the strain on local law enforcement and first responders. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, and I really do appreciate your giving me the time, I know at least on my committees, when I chaired 

Judiciary for 17 years and Foreign Relations, if a colleague says 

they want to testify, and you go, oh, God, why does he have to come 

and testify, we have enough to do? So I understand that, having 

been chairman longer than any one of you up there combined. I get 

it. 

But let me conclude with this. The 9/11 Commission issued a report on their own nickel on December 15th of last year, 2005. It 

is just an interesting little sidelight, and I will get out of your hair. 

It says, part 1, homeland security emergency preparedness and response, it gives a recommendation and a grade. It is a category. 

Critical infrastructure risk and vulnerabilities assessment. Let me 

just read what it says and I will depart. 

‘‘A draft national infrastructure protection plan, November 2005, 

spells out a methodology and a process for critical infrastructure 

assessments.’’ Continuing to quote: ‘‘No risk and vulnerability assessments actually made. No national priorities established. No 

recommendations on the allocation of scarce resources. All key decisions at least a year away.’’ 

Continuing to quote: ‘‘It’s time we stopped talking about setting 

priorities and actually set some.’’ Folks, take the worst case scenario in the cost of water treatment plants, you are talking $125 

million. A hundred and twenty-five million bucks it seems to me 

is a higher priority here than it is for 50 things we could name, 

but I know resources are scarce and your time is scarce and you 

have real experts behind me here. 

So unless you have questions for me, I will get out of your hair. 

I am happy to answer questions, or attempt to. 

Senator INHOFE. No questions. Thank you very much, Senator 

Biden. 

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. 

Senator INHOFE. We would like to ask the second panel to come 

forward. Dennis Hendershot, with the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Center for Chemical Process Safety; Philip Crowley, 

Director, National Defense and Homeland Security, Center for 

American Progress; David A. Moore, President and CEO of 

AcuTech Consulting Group; Lisa Jackson, Commissioner, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection; Charlie Cott, Vice 

President of Plant Foods and Transportation, Missouri Farmers Association. 

Also I would like to say at this time, we would like to note that 

some groups, including the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association and the National Association of Chemical Distributors were not invited to speak, but have submitted comments 

on our topic. Without objection, we will include their testimony in 

the record. 

[The referenced testimony can be found on pages 97-109 and 84- 

94.] 

Senator INHOFE. We will start over here, Mr. Hendershot, with 

you and work across. We would like to encourage you not to exceed 
18 

5 minutes in your opening statement. Your entire statement will 

be made a part of the record. 

Mr. HENDERSHOT. 

STATEMENT OF DENNIS C. HENDERSHOT, STAFF CONSULTANT, CENTER FOR CHEMICAL PROCESS SAFETY, AMERICAN 

INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERS 

Mr. HENDERSHOT. Thank you, Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Jeffords and members of the Environment and Public Works 

Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important topic. 

My name is Dennis Hendershot, and I represent the Center for 

Chemical Process Safety, which was formed in 1985 by the American Institute of Chemical Engineers in response to the toxic gas 

release tragedy in Bhopal, India. CCPS advances chemical process 

safety through research, collaboration, education and promotion of 

process safety as a key industry value. 

I was a member of the committee which wrote the 1996 book, 

‘‘Inherently Safer Chemical Processes: A Life Cycle Approach,’’ and 

I wrote major sections of that book. Safety and security are good 

business. Incidents interfere with efficient manufacturing and good 

performance reduces risk and actual losses, increases productivity 

and improves community image for the company. 

Inherently safer design is one tool for safety and security. It is 

a philosophy for the design and operation of any technology, including chemical processing. As a design philosophy, it cannot be effectively mandated by regulation. Inherently safer design continues to 

evolve and specific tools and techniques are in early stages of development. CCPS, which wrote the book on inherently safer design, 

believes that there have been major advances in the area since 

1996 and we are working currently on an updated edition. This will 

certainly not be the final version. 

But inherently safer design is only one of many tools for chemical 

process safety and security. The objectives of process safety and security vulnerability management are safety and security, not necessarily inherent safety, and inherent security. It is possible to 

have a safe and secure facility with inherent hazards. In fact, this 

is essential for a facility where there are no technologically feasible 

alternatives. 

Also, the economic and societal benefits of the technology may be 

sufficient to justify safety and security management of a technology 

with inherent hazards. Air travel is neither inherently safe nor inherently secure, and cannot be made so. The benefits justify extensive safety and security activities to manage the well-known hazards. These activities are highly effective and flying is the safest 

way to travel, despite the inherent hazards. 

Similarly, chemical hazards can be managed in a highly effective 

manner. Inherently safer processes only partially address security 

issues and will not reduce the need for traditional security measures. A chemical plant must consider all security issues: toxic material releases, fires and explosions, theft and diversion of material, 

contamination, damage to the plant. It is highly unlikely that any 

technology can eliminate all hazards and a plant will need traditional security measures for any remaining hazards. 
19 

The chemical industry is a complex, interconnected ecology, really. There are dependencies throughout the system, and any change 

will have cascading effects. It is possible that a change in technology that appears to be inherently safer locally will increase hazards somewhere else. Such changes need to be evaluated by people 

who understand the system to anticipate all of the implications. 

In many cases, it may not be clear which technology option is inherently safer, and there may be disagreements. Chemical processes have multiple hazards. Different technologies will have different inherent safety characteristics with respect to each of those 

multiple hazards. For example, CFC refrigerants were thought to 

be inherently safer when first developed, and in fact they are, with 

regard to fire and acute toxicity hazards. But later information revealed environmental impacts which have resulted in the phase-out 

of many of these materials. 

Inherently safer designs cannot be invented by legislation. There 

are thousands of chemical technologies, and these can be operated 

safely and security, using an appropriate blend of inherent engineered and management strategies. Is it an appropriate use of our 

national resources to replace these technologies with inherently 

safer technologies if they in fact exist, if the risks of the existing 

technology can be managed? Resources devoted to replacement of 

existing technology, including technical talent and creativity, as 

well as financial resources, will be diverted from creation of new 

products and new technology. Society will lose the benefits of those 

new technologies, which in some cases may render existing technology obsolete. 

In summary, inherently safer processes are one tool for safety 

and security. They are not the only tool, and we must recognize 

that other approaches can be highly effective. Significant efforts on 

traditional security measures will still be required. 

The chemical industry is complex, and includes thousands of 

technologies. Most are unique, and changes will take significant 

time and resources. We believe that a requirement for inherently 

safer technology is not a cost-effective component of security legislation. Future invention and implementation of inherently safer 

technologies to address both safety and security concerns is best 

promoted by enhancing understanding of the concepts in the industry. Inherently safer design should be a way of thinking, not a one 

time activity to comply with a regulation, done once and then forgotten. 

Thank you for the opportunity. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Hendershot. 

Mr. CROWLEY. 

STATEMENT OF PHILIP J. CROWLEY, SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS 

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I am P.J. 

Crowley, I direct the Homeland Security Program at the Center for 

American Progress. We are grateful for all the endorsements of our 

recent report here in your opening comments. 

I should salute Paul Orum, who was the lead author of the report and is here in attendance today as well. 
20 

In our national chemical facility survey, the data demonstrate 

that inherently safer practices can reduce terrorism risks to millions of Americans. It also reveals that change is not occurring fast 

enough and that an appropriate role for Government in this area 

is to try to accelerate that pace of change before we are attacked 

again. 

I view this issue from a security standpoint based on my experience over three decades as an Air Force officer, a member of the 

staff of the National Security Council. I was working for the insurance industry on September 11th, four blocks from the World 

Trade Center. So I understand how terrorism risk affects the private sector. 

Almost 5 years after 9/11, the global jihadi movement is evolving. 

The Bush Administration’s rhetoric, that we are fighting terrorists 

in Baghdad so we do not have to confront them here, is at odds 

with the reality of successful attacks in Madrid, London, and the 

plot recently discovered in Canada. The next attack, and we should 

be clear that there will be other attacks, is likely to involve selfstarters, people inspired by Al Qaeda, but acting alone. Because as 

many of you have said, we cannot protect everything, our priority 

must be reducing the vulnerability of catastrophic terrorism. 

This is not an arbitrary judgment, but is specific to the threat 

we face: that terrorists will attack where they can kill as many innocent civilians as possible and have the most significant economic 

and political impact on our country. As a result, we must take 

measures to protect our critical infrastructure and chemical facilities must be made more secure. 

A risk-based chemical security strategy should include a number 

of items: better physical security and mitigation, but it must also 

emphasize risk elimination. The Secretary of Homeland Security is 

wrong to suggest, as he did in March, that inherently safer technology has little to do with security. Where more secure technologies are readily available, we have an obligation to remove 

these facilities and these communities from the terrorism target 

list. 

In our report, we surveyed 1,800 facilities, de-registered from 

Risk Management Planning Program. Among our key findings, and 

Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, 284 facilities have switched to 

less hazardous practices, reducing the terrorism threat to 38 million people. However, only 10 percent of those facilities represent 

the highest risk facilities in our Country. 

Senator Obama mentioned that our report shows that this is 

cost-effective. In a range of areas, particularly drinking water and 

wastewater treatment, alternatives involve common technologies, 

not new innovations. There is a fairness issue. While many cities 

across the country, Ohio and other places, have eliminated threats 

to their people, they remain at risk, for example, because hazardous materials are still transported through those cities to other 

locations that have not taken this initiative. 

I see a strategic double standard here. For example, the military, 

with support from Congress, is constantly exploring how to invest 

in new technologies that make us stronger around the world. Why 

would we not take the same approach to employ new technologies 

to make us more secure here at home? 
21 

We need a comprehensive national approach, not a series of disconnected local or regional actions. In my view, what needs to be 

done, the Department of Homeland Security should be granted authority to regulate chemical security. DHS should promulgate 

strong national standards regarding the manufacturer, use and in 

particular, the transportation of hazardous materials around the 

country. 

DHS, in conjunction with EPA, should establish a center of excellence, they have done this in a number of priority areas, and promote the development and broad adoption of inherently safer technologies where practicable. Chemical facilities should be required 

to do comprehensive annual security risk assessments, which 

should include an evaluation of safer alternatives. These findings 

should be reported to DHS, the EPA, and in my view, to shareholders of publicly traded companies. 

Finally, the Government should create incentives to encourage 

change, such as targeted grants, loans, and tax credits. To Senator 

Voinovich’s point, I see that there should be caps on liability for facilities that adopt safer approaches if a terrorist attack does occur. 

Our national security strategy must place greater emphasis on 

protecting the homeland. Since we cannot expect our security forces 

to intercept every attack, we must narrow the potential for terrorists to successfully exploit our critical infrastructure. Business as 

usual, in my view, is no longer an option. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Crowley. 

Mr. MOORE. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID A. MOORE, PE, CSP, PRESIDENT AND 

CEO, ACUTECH CONSULTING GROUP, CHEMETICA, INC. 

Mr. MOORE. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Senators, ladies 

and gentlemen. My name is David Moore. I am the president of a 

consulting group specializing in chemical process security and safety called the AcuTech Consulting Group. We are based here in Alexandria, VA. 

I come to you with a practical background of over 25 years working in industry, first in Mobil Corporation and then as a private 

consultant, assisting companies in managing risk, and in particular, risks that we have identified could be solved or not solved 

through inherently safer technology. 

In addition, I was selected by the American Institute of Chemical 

Engineers to prepare the chemical industry’s leading guidelines on 

how to conduct a vulnerability assessment, which mentioned IST 

but also mentioned other options for reducing risk. Lately, I have 

been hired by the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, as 

well, for the IST book project update that Mr. Hendershot mentioned. So I am deeply involved in inherently safer studies, having 

conducted them in California, where there is a regulation in Contra 

Costa County for safety purposes, as well as recently the prescriptive order in the State of New Jersey for homeland security there. 

I am also deeply committed to homeland security and safety and 

public protection. 

As a process safety professional, I have seen and witnessed many 

examples of inherent safety being applied and analyzed and stud-
22 

ied for years. In fact, inherent safety is a philosophy which is ingrained in chemical security and safety professionals in everything 

they do. So in other words, there has already been a great deal of 

inherent safety considerations in the infrastructure that is presently built. 

The problem seems to be an over-emphasis, in my mind, on the 

expectation of the value of inherent safety for regulation. There are 

several problems that I think regulation has caused in the States 

and examples that I have worked with, as well as anticipating a 

national regulatory framework involving inherent safety for the 

chemical sector. The first is that it is a vague concept that is not 

a singular technology, as it applies, nor is there a single best practice that solves all problems. In fact, there is a great deal of judgment that is required. That means that it can be rather subjective. 

And subjectively evaluated, which ultimately would be the challenge that any regulators would have to face as to judge how safe 

or how secure a process is, and the fairness to that, particularly at 

a societal risk level. 

If inherent safety is forced onto industry as a mandate, I am expecting a great deal of questions and problems on the interpretation of it, technical judgments that would have to be made about 

various specific situations, the fairness of it to everyone involved, 

including society, and governmental liabilities that may develop, 

should Government interfere and force particular inherent safety 

technologies, at least in their mind. 

So obviously an obstacle to clear-cut regulation is that we don’t 

have, even as an industry, today in a voluntary sense, a very clear 

picture of inherent safety. Although it seems obvious, actually the 

book that Mr. Hendershot described has various strategies for inherent safety. The regulations that we have seen introduce more 

than just substitution of a technology. They look at minimization, 

substitution, simplification of processes and so forth. 

If the regulation in future was to be performance based, you 

could only imagine that clear metrics would have to be available 

in order for this to be clearly evaluated and for decisions to be 

made. Value is a key problem. What is inherently safer to you, to 

the people right near the plant, is not necessarily what is inherently safer to the community, or to the community that is producing larger capacities of products miles away. Perhaps it could 

lead to redistribution of risks as it could with transportation, for 

example. 

In fact, inherently safer is not even necessarily inherently more 

secure. I could imagine a great deal of effort invested in inherent 

safety in the interest of eliminating a technology, while the plant 

is not necessarily as secure as it may be. So my suggestion is to 

leave this to a voluntary process, and to encourage the voluntary 

understanding of inherent safety and make inherent safety far 

more clear for the future for the benefit of safety and security. 

Thank you. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Moore. 

Ms. JACKSON. 
23 

STATEMENT OF LISA P. JACKSON, COMMISSIONER, NEW 

JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 

Ms. JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning to you 

and members of the committee. 

I am Lisa Jackson, I currently serve as the Commissioner for Environmental Protection in the State of New Jersey. A member of 

my staff is here, our inherently safer technology expert, Mr. Paul 

Komosinski. As we said on the train down this morning, I am a 

chemical engineer by training, as is he, I am an environmentalist 

by practice in my everyday work. So I come here today on behalf 

of Governor Corzine and the people of the State of New Jersey to 

tell this committee how important this issue is for us, the issue of 

security, especially, our chemical standards and our inherently 

safer technology standards, which we have now in place and which 

we are implementing are vitally important to Governor Corzine, vitally important to the people of New Jersey. 

I would also like to say that our director of homeland security 

in New Jersey, Richard Canas, supports as well the idea of inherently safer technology as a vital part of homeland security for our 

State. 

You mentioned, Mr. Chairman, that it is the implementation of 

inherently safer technology that is of concern. I heard it in most 

of the speakers this morning, and it is understandable and right 

that implementation would be a concern. So I thought I would 

speak just a few minutes this morning about what is happening in 

the State of New Jersey. 

Our inherently safer technology program is a part of a proscriptive order that was issued to the facilities in our State that handle 

extraordinarily hazardous substances. So we have faith in the idea 

of inherently safer technology for new facilities as part of our Toxic 

Catastrophe Prevention Act. It is legislated for them in regulation 

as well. 

But via an order, an executive order, essentially, from a domestic 

security task force for other facilities in our State, those facilities 

were required to do several things, one of which is a security vulnerability assessment. But that vulnerability assessment came 

along with a requirement to evaluate. I want to stress that it is an 

evaluation of inherently safer technology that we are requiring 

from certain of the facilities in our State, 157 facilities to be exact. 

Those evaluations were scheduled to be done by March 21st of 

this year, pursuant to an order that was issued in November of 

2005. We are now in the process, as regulators, as public officials, 

as public servants, of evaluating compliance with those orders. We 

expect that we will see all facilities and evaluate them by July and 

have already seen 100. 

Compliance right now is excellent. And that includes the inherently safer technology part of the standard. I do agree with what 

I have heard this morning from some people that the chemical industry, the regulated industry as I see it from my perspective, from 

my chair, understands the importance of these standards and in 

fact has already, in our visits, embraced them, have for years. We 

are not mandating something, but we are putting the Government’s 

stamp of approval and more important, urgency at this time, on ensuring that all facilities that handle extraordinarily hazardous sub-
24 

stances meet the requirement to ask and evaluate inherently safer 

technology, to ask the right questions. 

In our business, it is the asking of the questions right now that 

are so important. There are experts in the field and in Government 

who can help ask those questions. As Mr. Moore said, he certainly 

has been involved, not only in my State, but elsewhere in the country in helping responsible companies to meet their mandates or 

their voluntary choices, their choice to implement inherently safer 

technology at this point. 

We go from here to looking at what we will do if and when we 

find companies who don’t choose to meet the mandates of our proscriptive order. As I said, that includes more than inherently safer 

technology. To date, that has not been the issue of greatest concern 

for us. 

I would like to sum up by saying that we see inherently safer 

technology as common sense, easy to implement, something that so 

far is a part of a regulatory and legislative program that makes 

perfect sense from a security and an environmental perspective. We 

would request that this committee maintain our ability to have 

more restrictive standards than those at the Federal level and 

would strenuously oppose any preemption in the area of homeland 

security. 

Thank you. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Ms. Jackson. 

Mr. COTT. 

STATEMENT OF CHARLIE COTT, VICE PRESIDENT, PLANT 

FOODS AND TRANSPORTATION, MFA INC. 

Mr. COTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of this committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify today on behalf of the 

Agricultural Retailers Association, the ARA, concerning the issue of 

inherently safer technology and chemical site security. 

I am Charlie Cott, vice president of Plant Foods and Transportation for MFA Incorporated, a regional farm supply cooperative 

headquartered and operating out of Columbia, MO. MFA was established in 1914 and has retail facilities in Missouri, Iowa, Kansas, Oklahoma and Arkansas. The goods and service provided by 

retail dealers include seed, crop protection chemicals, fertilizer, 

crop scouting, soil testing, custom application of pesticides and fertilizers, and development of comprehensive nutrient management 

plans and state-of-the-art IPM programs. 

ARA represents a significant majority of America’s agricultural 

retailers and distributors in Washington, DC. 

From some views being expressed in Congress, the general public 

might think that products that have been designated as hazardous 

material, hazmat, have very little regulations governing their safe 

use, storage and handling. However, that could not be further from 

the truth. Even before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, 

agriculture retailers have been one of the most heavily regulated 

industry segments in the country. We are also taking steps to improve onsite security and close any existing security gaps. 

There are countless Federal, State and local laws and regulations 

currently related to the safe handling, transportation and storage 

of agricultural crop inputs. For example, many ag retail facilities 
25 

that handle and store a threshold amount of listed substances, 

such as anhydrous ammonia, are required to comply with the 

EPA’s risk management program, RMPs. Because of the existing 

regulations that are working, ARA does not believe the Federal 

Government should be getting into the business of mandating inherently safer technology or alternative approaches for chemical 

processing, which is extremely complex and which differs from company to company. 

We do strongly oppose efforts by uninformed anti-chemical activist groups that are attempting to tie the new IST mandates to 

chemical facility security legislation. We agree with the views expressed by DHS Secretary Chertoff and Senate Homeland Security 

Committee chairperson Susan Collins that DHS should stay focused on security and not move into broader environmental issues. 

We are pleased that the Homeland Security Committee last week 

soundly defeated an amendment to the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act, S. 2145, designated to impose an inherently safer technology mandate on the industry, which would create new liabilities 

and financial burdens on many ARA members. It would be extremely difficult for a retailer or farmer to go through a costly analysis and demonstrate to DHS why certain crop input products 

should or should not be used. We believe that the Government 

agencies, such as the EPA, has already made determinations on 

product safety when they approve pesticide registrations. 

The EPA already requires extensive product testing on agricultural pesticides and MFA, like most retailers, also conduct our own 

field trials to ensure pest management efficiency. An IST mandate 

imposed on U.S. agriculture could jeopardize the availability of 

lower cost sources of plant nutrient products or certain agricultural 

pesticides used by farmers and ranchers. 

If MFA was forced to recommend less effective pest management 

products or plant nutrient products to our farmer customers, the 

net result would be lower yields, less quality, less farm revenue 

and potentially market shifts to foreign countries. Our Nation is 

making a strong effort to become more energy independent and less 

dependent on foreign sources of energy. ARA is a member of the 

25 by 25 Ag Energy Working Group, whose goal is for farms, 

ranches, forests and other working lands to provide 25 percent of 

the United States’ energy needs from renewable resources by 2025. 

Corn is a major component in the manufacture of ethanol, a 

clean-burning, renewable, domestically produced fuel, and is Missouri’s second largest crop in production, producing nearly 300 million bushels of corn annually. An IST mandate could force the use 

of less efficient fertilizer for corn crops, which in turn would directly impact crop yields. One bushel of corn yields about 2.8 gallons of ethanol. A reduction of one bushel per acre in corn production would reduce Missouri net farm income by $5 million, as well 

as less corn available to produce ethanol, which in turn would 

hinder the Nation’s effort to become more energy independent. 

America’s agricultural industry is already faced with numerous 

regulations which add to the daily cost of doing business. We are 

also faced with high fuel, fertilizer and transportation costs. Ninety-six percent of the world’s consumers reside outside the United 

States. With the current state of domestic and international agri-
26 

cultural markets, now is not the time for Congress to place additional burdens and costs on farmers and ranchers by limiting their 

product choices, increasing their input costs, lowering their crop 

yields and opening them up to frivolous lawsuits. 

An IST mandate imposed on chemical facilities in the name of 

security could drive many in agriculture out of business and increase our dependence on foreign sources of food and fiber, similar 

to what we now face with foreign oil. 

Thank you for your consideration today. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much, Mr. Cott. 

We are going to be having a series of votes coming up, it would 

be the desire of the Chair to take our questioning right up to the 

end of the first vote and that would have to conclude the meeting, 

because we will have a series of votes. So we will try to keep, and 

I will ask my colleagues to try to keep our times to the 5 minutes 

that we have allotted for questions. 

I have to observe that, as I was listening to the testimony here, 

that I see similarities between this and what the President has 

been trying to do with Clear Skies. The President had the most 

ambitious reduction in pollutants, 70 percent reduction in the period of time, no Democrat or Republican administration before has 

done this. That is in pollutants, SOx, NOx and mercury. Yet it has 

been held hostage, because you won’t include CO2, which is not a 

pollutant. 

I see the same thing happening here. We are losing opportunities 

to have good security measures and chemical security in saying, 

well, we can’t do it unless we include IST. So this is something that 

I see that bothers me a little bit. 

Let me ask you, Mr. Hendershot, to clarify something. Because 

I have a feeling it is going to be said again, and I have heard it 

many times, that you were an integral part of the committee that 

authored the National Research Council report. Many people use 

this report to justify a Federal policy mandating chemical facilities, 

that they use IST. 

I would just ask you to answer the question, did the National Research Council recommend that IST should be mandated by the 

Federal Government? 

Mr. HENDERSHOT. No. The report and the committee’s charter 

was to provide DHS with guidance in making research development and technology assessments. 

Senator INHOFE. It was my understanding also, and I think we 

are going to hear over and over again a misinterpretation of that 

National Research Council report. 

Now, in your testimony you state that specific tools and techniques for application of inherently safer design are in the early 

stages of development. I have here a paper from Texas A&M, 

which I at this point would enter into the record without objection, 

that calls IST subjective and states, and I am quoting from it now, 

‘‘a systematic methodology to measure inherent safety does not 

exist.’’ Let me repeat that, I am quoting now: ‘‘a systematic methodology to measure inherent safety does not exist.’’ 

[The referenced report can be found on pages 77-83 .] 
27 

Senator INHOFE. I would say, don’t you think it would be kind 

of rash and premature to impose some kind of a one size fits all 

definition if we don’t have the tools we need? 

Mr. HENDERSHOT. Yes, I believe it would be premature. There is 

no method for measuring the inherent safety of the process. Actually, I believe the one size fits all will never really be appropriate. 

Facility operators must be able to consider local factors in making 

these choices. 

Senator INHOFE. Another problem that I have is, any time that 

we mandate something or suggests something and we have not a 

well defined definition, this bothers me, because it can be interpreted by anyone to mean any other thing. There has been a lot 

of discussion about the ‘‘mandatory’’ consideration of IST, saying 

that, well, we are just going to mandate that you consider IST. 

Now, if you decide not to do it, then that is fine. 

But I would suggest to you, Mr. Moore, in your testimony, you 

talked about the problems of a value judgment when the regulator 

and the facility differ over what is safe and practicable. Would this 

not be a problem, then, for the consideration approach? 

Mr. MOORE. Yes. First, as I mentioned in my testimony, there is 

no particular metric, as was just confirmed by Mr. Hendershot, and 

Texas A&M, I am familiar with that study and agree to that. In 

addition, since we are unclear on exactly what is inherent safety, 

it further confuses the issue. So simply considering it means that 

we are working in a fuzzy set. 

Senator INHOFE. That bothers me. Ms. Jackson, what do you 

think about that, about a lack of definition? Or do you not see it 

that way? 

Ms. JACKSON. I think, as I stated, that there is a need to evaluate. Certainly there needs to be a test. The test that we use in our 

State is a practicability test. We heard a lot about that this morning. Practicality is also in our regulations and our legislation. So 

we have an ability to look at costs. Those evaluations, I think, encourage and inspire a lot of technology transfer, which is vital to 

any industrial operation continuing to grow and work well. 

So I think the role of many of our regulators is to encourage people to do the evaluation and then to share the information they 

have. 

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Cott, from your perspective, since you 

would be perhaps one that would have to be required to comply 

with something, do you consider that to be ambiguous? Are you 

concerned? 

Mr. COTT. Yes, sir. The ambiguity of a broad, sweeping document 

that is mandated like that would be difficult for us to deal with 

from a retailer’s standpoint. The challenge we see is, in our business it is not so much the chemical process, but the result of using 

certain products in a fashion that is environmentally and economically sound for the customer. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. I thank you. 

Senator JEFFORDS. Senator JEFFORDS. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the report by the 

Center for American Progress and testimony submitted by the General Accountability Office be entered into the record. 

Senator INHOFE. Without objection. 
28 

[The referenced report and testimony can be found on pages 151- 

192 and 112-135.] 

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Ms. Jackson, we heard testimony today that inherently safer alternatives are just an engineering concept that cannot be applied 

in the regulatory context. Yet I understand that 45 facilities in 

New Jersey recently completed inherently safer technology analyses. Based on your Agency’s initial review, is it feasible to require 

chemical facilities to consider safer alternatives? 

Ms. JACKSON. Thank you, Senator. Absolutely, it is, Senator. It 

is being done. The result of our evaluation is, it is being done, it 

had been done in the past. The costs are not astronomical. We have 

not had people coming forward and saying that they could not meet 

the requirement to do these evaluations. In fact, they have already 

done them when we check on them. These are facilities that are 

quite well regulated in many other areas, so they know that they 

handle extremely hazardous substances. They know they operate in 

the most densely populated State in the country and I think they 

take that responsibility seriously, as do we. 

Senator JEFFORDS. Mr. Crowley, some of the panelists have described inherently safer technologies as a concept rather than a 

practical tool. Yet the report issued by your group highlights hundreds of examples of facilities that have already implemented inherently safer technologies. Could you please describe some of the 

inherently safer alternatives that have already been implemented, 

making millions of Americans safer? 

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you, Senator. Three quick points, that in 

many cases, it is not significantly changing an existing process, it 

is changing the form of a chemical used within that process. Drinking water, wastewater treatment plants are a great example where 

in the majority of facilities highlighted in our report show that just 

by switching from chlorine gas, which if released, as Senator Biden 

said, has the ability to harm or kill 100,000 people in a relatively 

short period of time, switching to liquid bleach or to ultraviolet radiation in essence removes a terrorism threat. 

I think also you can look at gaseous ammonia, switching to a liquid form, and sulfur dioxide as three examples of where you are 

not fundamentally changing a process, you are changing the form 

within a process. 

Senator JEFFORDS. Mr. Cott, the Oklahoma City bombing and 

the recent arrests in Canada have reminded us about the potential 

impact of fertilizer as a weapon in the hands of terrorists. Does the 

Agricultural Retailers Association agree that fertilizer retailers 

that store thousands of pounds of potentially explosive ammonia nitrate are an attractive target for terrorists? 

Mr. COTT. Well, I don’t know if they are an attractive target. We 

are regulated with the product at this point to the point where we 

have to account for every pound that gets delivered and every 

pound that gets sold, or in most cases, we are already doing that. 

I don’t think that I would consider the retail system for agriculture 

to be a particular target in that. 

But there is a very high level of awareness, and we are, like I 

indicated, already documenting most of the transactions moving 

product in and out of any of our retail facilities. 
29 

Senator JEFFORDS. Mr. Moore, nearly 5 years after the September 11th attacks, almost 3,000 drinking water and wastewater 

treatment plants still use chlorine gas instead of liquid bleach or 

ultraviolet light. Why do you believe that voluntary measures are 

sufficient to address the risks posed by these facilities? 

Mr. MOORE. Because they have other options, Senator, besides 

IST, is my answer without knowing all the specifics. Each site has 

to be evaluated individually, and I would say that they probably 

did address this. They are familiar no doubt with inherent safety 

and to the extent that it was feasible to them, perhaps they did entertain that option. 

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Jeffords. 

Senator VOINOVICH. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Ms. Jackson, I am really interested in what 

you are doing in New Jersey. When did your law go into effect? 

Ms. JACKSON. Our proscriptive order went into effect in November of last year. Our TCPA law is, the program goes back to in response to Bhopal. So I don’t have the year, but I think it was the 

late 1980’s. 

Senator VOINOVICH. The order went out in November, and according to what I have here, the 45 facilities that have been required under the Act to conduct a review of the practicality and potential for adopting IST. From what you said to me, or what you 

said, it seems to me that these people are aware of the risks that 

they pose to the communities, and have tried to substitute chemicals. The reason I am asking the question is, they are also regulated under the EPA, and they are also regulated under OSHA. 

The OSHA regulations are made to protect their employees and the 

EPA in terms of their missions. 

I guess the point is, how many of these facilities do you think 

you are going to have to go in and mandate them to change their 

processes or the materials that they use in the manufacture of 

whatever it is they are manufacturing? 

Ms. JACKSON. Thank you, Senator. It is certainly my hope that 

it will be none of them. The information that we collect is confidential for the facility, because it includes process information. In fact, 

we leave it all at the facility when we visit, so that they don’t have 

concerns about important information of theirs being given outside 

of the Government. 

To date, I am happy to say that we haven’t found any significant 

instances of compliance. The Domestic Security Preparedness Act 

in New Jersey gives the task force and the Governor sweeping powers to take action. That would have to be based on a belief that the 

sum total of all the requirements in that order, of which inherently 

safer technology is one very important piece, led to a situation 

where the safety of our citizens was at risk. I know Governor 

Corzine would act then, immediately. 

Senator VOINOVICH. So in other words, are some of the facilities, 

are the 45 covered by MTSA, too? 

Ms. JACKSON. I am sorry, covered by what, Senator? 

Senator VOINOVICH. By the Maritime Transportation Safety Act? 

Ms. JACKSON. I would assume they are, but I don’t know the answer off the top of my head. 
30 

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman, one of the things that I don’t 

know when we are going to get this law passed, but from what I 

can tell here, we may not do anything this year. I think the New 

Jersey situation is one we should really look at, to see just how this 

is actually working out. So often, we legislate here and have no 

idea what it really means. 

So I would be real interested in keeping track of how this is 

going in your State. 

Second of all, and this is a subject that came up in the other 

committee that I am a member of, an issue of preemption. There 

is a lot of feeling that States should not be preempted. We have 

talked about alternatives, either one, silence, that is that we make 

no mention at all of preemption, and then let the Department of 

Homeland Security work it out with the respective jurisdictions, 

like for instance, the State of New Jersey. Or the alternative may 

be just grandfathering in States like yours that have things in 

place already. 

Do you have any opinion on that? 

Ms. JACKSON. Well, certainly I would like to see Federal legislation that mirrors what we do in New Jersey. But in the absence 

of that, I think it is very important, as you said, Senator, to allow 

States to learn as they go. I think this is very much an evolving 

field. As old as it is, people’s knowledge and fear of it I think will 

be addressed as we move forward and demonstrate that these 

things can be done. 

I also want to mention that our work was done cooperatively in 

our State with the New Jersey Chemistry Council. The best practices standards that we developed for the chemical industry and 

the oil industry were based on a cooperative process. They are now 

mandatory, but there was cooperation in the actual technical development of those standards. While I know we will have to go further, I think that is very important for us to remember as well. 

So I would like to see us keep the flexibility for States to move 

beyond it and not be limited if they weren’t grandfathered before. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. I would like to ask this of all our 

witnesses. To your knowledge, has IST ever been defined as a security measure in any Federal law? In the EPA, when they did their 

risk management plan, they concluded that inherently safer processes is a developing concept and is not ready for general application. IST frequently displaces risk rather than reducing it. Even if 

a few examples of workable alternative approaches do exist, there 

is not a rational basis for imposing an additional industry-wide regulatory burden. Last but not least, the concept is normally considered when designing new processes, a time when changes can be 

implemented cost effectively. 

So I guess the question is, has it been defined in any Federal law 

as a safety measure, IST? 

Mr. HENDERSHOT. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. CROWLEY. I don’t know. 

Mr. MOORE. No, sir. 

Ms. JACKSON. I don’t know, sir. 

Mr. COTT. No, sir. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. Has my time expired, Mr. Chairman? 
31 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, your time has expired. 

I think probably a better way to ask the question is, has it been 

defined at all. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Jackson, welcome again. I did mention that you would be 

here, and I was pleased that you are here to testify. I think our 

State of New Jersey kind of exemplifies what ought to be done. But 

we have done it on our own. We have established standards. 

Frankly, I don’t think that jumping into a national standard would 

be a wise idea, unless it absolutely, well, grandfathering was suggested, I am an expert at that, anyway. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LAUTENBERG. But the fact is, also, New Jersey was the 

first State to sign the Bill of Rights. So we are up there, we have 

longevity, man, have we got longevity. So grandfathering would be 

a step, a positive step. Frankly, I think that it ought to be the 

State’s right. If its standards are going to be stricter than a Federal law, then I think we should be allowed to do it. 

Very frankly, I am confused at times because people who are devout advocates of States rights here suddenly have a different view. 

So I just want to be sure that our situation is understood. 

Have any of New Jersey’s chemical security requirements caused 

any facilities to shut down or move out of State that you are aware 

of? 

Ms. JACKSON. No, not at all, Senator. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. No. As the Commissioner of the New Jersey, Department of Environmental Protection Security is also a 

part of your portfolio, is that right? 

Ms. JACKSON. Yes, sir, I serve as the Governor’s representative 

for chemical facilities, wastewater, water, on the task force, the Domestic Security Task Force, biotechnology, pharmaceutical. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. So do you think that IST is only therefore 

an environmental issue and not a security issue? 

Ms. JACKSON. Thank you, Senator. I don’t see how you can separate them at all. I don’t see why we would want to, frankly. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I agree. Do you think that the motivation 

behind the chemical industry’s push for State preemption in Congress might, well, that is kind of a loaded question. You don’t have 

to answer that. I know what the answer is. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, I don’t know the answer. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I would say, and I am sorry that our distinguished colleague from Ohio had to leave. Before we had a discussion there, I had a chance to challenge some of his views that 

the chemical industry is suffering because we have turned from a 

net exporter to a net importer. There is some small difference. But 

the growth of the industry has been terrific. It has grown with the 

GDP, of the country. If there are fewer people working, we don’t 

know whether that is technology-caused or otherwise. 

But the fact is that the volume of the business is far greater than 

it was. The one question that comes to my mind is whether or not 

chemical products may have brought, do they include employee protections in those facilities, or are they environmentally sound conditions in which they operate? For a long time, we have now dis-
32 

cussed whether or not companies, countries that export to us ought 

to be compelled to observe our environmental conditions. It is 

never, it is there in part, but not fully. 

We know that many countries are far less environmentally conscious than we are. So you can’t, I don’t think you can judge the 

success of the industry simply based on whether or not there is 

more tonnage one way or the other, because whatever they do to 

damage the environment gets to be our concern one way or the 

other. Whatever they do to damage the health and well-being of 

their employees is also inconsistent with the way America views its 

leadership in the world. 

One of the things that was said, and I have to challenge, and 

that is, no one who owns or runs a chemical business wants to injure the health of their employees. I would concede that, but I 

would also remind everybody that asbestos, which was prominently 

manufactured in my home town of Patterson, NJ, and where a fellow that I went to high school with died prematurely, because they 

worked part-time in the asbestos factory, those owners knew what 

was going on. When the records were examined, it was detected inside the industry way before the public was aware of the dangers. 

We have example after example of unsafe products being used. 

So I don’t think we ought to rely on just the judgment of the employer. I think we ought to do what we can and I know our chairman very well, I have great respect, although we have great differences. We don’t do things in small shots here. The fact is that 

no one wants to see employees’ health damaged, and employees 

ought to be involved when they are considering a standard for operations within the industry. 

So Mr. Chairman, thanks very much. I have questions that I will 

submit for the record. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator. Yes, we both know quite 

a bit about grandfathering. 

I have two letters from some Oklahoma companies, one 

Rustoleum, one Dryvit, that I would like to submit for the record 

at this point. 

[The referenced letters can be found on pages 95-96 and 110- 

111.] 

Senator INHOFE. I was reminded by Senator Thune that he has 

a statement to submit. 

Senator INHOFE. Also, I am sure there will be several members 

who will be submitting questions for the record. I want to thank 

all five of you for coming today and for your patience. I do apologize 

for the fact that we have votes that are starting right now, so we 

will have to draw this to a close. 

Thank you very much for your input. 

Senator JEFFORDS. Mr. Chairman, we do have some questions to 

add. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, they will all be included. 

[The information to be submitted follows:] 

[Whereupon, at 11:07 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:] 
33 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, U.S. SENATOR

FROM THE STATE OF DELEWARE

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Jeffords, and committee members, thank you for 

extending me the courtesy of making a statement this morning. The issue of inherently safer technologies is, in my view, critically important to our Nation’s homeland 

security efforts. I commend all of you here in the Environment and Public Works 

Committee for focusing on this critical issue, and I hope that I can add to the debate 

and that we can advance the ball to enhance the safety for millions of Americans 

that are threatened by toxic chemicals. 

Mr. Chairman I believe that we have no greater obligation than the protection 

of our home towns. In fact, I believe that this should be our number one priority 

here in Congress. Without security, little else we do here matters, and if we establish the right priorities, we can protect the homeland while preserving all that 

makes our nation great. 

We all know the dangers posed by gaseous, toxic chemicals. These chemicals, such 

as chlorine, were used as weapons in World War II and security experts have told 

us that they pose a threat that is comparable in scope only to nuclear and biological 

weapons. Today, these chemicals are in common usage in facilities throughout the 

nation and are being transported in 90-ton rail tankers over unprotected rails in 

communities throughout the Nation. 

If we simply required facilities that store or utilize large amounts of chlorine and 

other dangerous chemicals to transition to inherently safer technologies whenever 

it’s feasible, we could completely and permanently eliminate known threats in our 

communities. This would allow us to focus our scarce resources on border security 

and other critical infrastructure targets as well as allow our Federal, State, and 

local law enforcement and first responders to focus on other vulnerabilities. 

I realize that the focus on this hearing is on chemical facilities in general, but 

I want to highlight a decision made by officials in my home town. Last year, the 

Wilmington Water Pollution Control facility transitioned from gaseous chlorine to 

chlorine bleach. This decision eliminated the threat to 560,000 citizens in the community—my constituents, family members, and I might point out. It cost the Wilmington facility $160,000 in capital investment—and because the facility permanently eliminated the risk, it no longer has to protect the facility with guards, and 

gates. It also eliminated bureaucratic expenses because it no longer has to file a risk 

management plan with the Environmental Protection Agency. 

Not only should we be supporting this type of decision, we should require it whenever it is practical. In my view, it is unacceptable that nearly five years after the 

attacks of September 11th, we haven’t made the decision to reduce the dangers 

posed by these gaseous chemicals at chemical facilities and water treatment plants. 

It is not like this is some over burdensome requirement that will kill industry. 

As has been pointed out, hundreds of facilities have made this decision without Government intervention. These facilities seem to be operating fine. In addition, every 

proposal that I have seen provides for a transition only if it is practicable and would 

allow the facility not the Government to determine what alternative processes 

should be used. 

As always, another overriding concern for the Government and for industry is the 

costs associated with the transition. According to the Department of Homeland Security there are 300 chemical facilities that put over 50,000 citizens in danger. A 

recent report by the Center for American Progress found that 87 percent of facilities 

reported costs of less than $1 million and one-half of these spent less than $100,000 

to transition to safer technologies. 

If we were to provide $1 million—a top end estimate for every chemical facility 

to transition to safer technologies we could eliminate this risk for only $300 million. 

To eliminate the threat posed by the roughly the 100 water treatment facilities that 

threaten over 100,000 individuals it would cost $125 million. Thus, an investment 

of less than 1/2 billion dollars would eliminate the threat to nearly 60 million Americans. In contrast, last year we gave $2 billion in tax incentives to oil companies 

that posted record shattering profits. A few months ago, executives from these companies testified under oath at a Judiciary Committee hearing that they do not need 

these incentives. In my view, we are not focusing on the right priorities. 

And, because the transition to safer technologies will result in savings by the reduction of guns, guards, gates, and bureaucratic expense, we can require—as the 

water facility protection bill that Senator Jeffords, Boxer and I have introduced 

would—facilities to return some of those savings to the Federal Government to help 

other facilities transition to safer technologies. This, in my view, is a good use of 

Federal resources, and if industry officials would work with us, I think that we 

could devise a system where we help fund capital investments with facilities return-
34 

ing the savings that result in the out-years. In the process, we protect millions of 

Americans and reduce a strain on local law enforcement and first responders. 

In conclusion, I would like to remind everyone of the 9-11 Commission report card 

issued last December. It found that with respect to our Nation’s critical infrastructure the following: ‘‘no risk and vulnerability assessments actually made; no national priorities established; no recommendations made on allocations of scarce resources. All key decisions are at least a year away. It is time that we stop talking 

about priorities and actually set some.’’ I believe that requiring chemical facilities 

to transition to safer technologies whenever it is practical should be a priority that 

we establish. Doing this would completely and permanently eliminate the threat to 

millions of Americans. 

STATEMENT OF DENNIS C. HENDERSHOT, STAFF CONSULTANT, CENTER FOR CHEMICAL

PROCESS SAFETY, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERS

The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) is sponsored by the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), which represents the Chemical Engineering 

Professionals in technical matters in the United States. CCPS is dedicated to eliminating major incidents in chemical, petroleum, and related facilities by: 

• Advancing state of the art process safety technology and management practices • Serving as the premier resource for information on process safety • Fostering process safety in engineering and science education • Promoting process safety as a key industry value 

CCPS was formed by AIChE in 1985 as the chemical engineering profession’s response to the Bhopal, India chemical release tragedy. In the past 21 years, CCPS 

has defined the basic practices of process safety and supplemented this with a wide 

range of technologies, tools, guidelines, and informational texts and conferences. 

CCPS’ output includes more than 70 guideline books, more than 90 university lectures, and a monthly e-mail process safety lesson delivered to more than 600,000 

plant personnel around the world in 16 languages. The CCPS book ‘‘Guidelines for 

Analyzing and Managing the Security Vulnerabilities of Fixed Chemical Sites’’ 

(2002) has been used by thousands of plants around the world to evaluate chemical 

facility security. Today, CCPS has more than 80 member companies in the US and 

around the world, with an active program to continue to advancing the practices of 

process safety. 

WHAT IS INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN?

Inherently safer design is a philosophy for the design and operation of chemical 

plants, and the philosophy is actually generally applicable to any technology. Inherently safer design is not a specific technology or set of tools and activities at this 

point in its development. It continues to evolve, and specific tools and techniques 

for application of inherently safer design are in early stages of development. Current 

books and other literature on inherently safer design (for example, by the Center 

for Chemical Process Safety, Trevor Kletz, and others) describe a design philosophy 

and give examples of implementation, but do not describe a methodology. The Center for Chemical Process Safety has begun a project to update its 1996 book on inherently safer design, and one of the objectives for this second edition is to propose 

one or more specific methods for implementation. 

What do we mean by inherently safer design? One dictionary definition of ‘‘inherent’’ which fits the concept very well is ‘‘existing in something as a permanent and 

inseparable element.’’ This means that safety features are built into the process, not 

added on. Hazards are eliminated or significantly reduced rather than controlled 

and managed. The means by which the hazards are eliminated or reduced are so 

fundamental to the design of the process that they cannot be changed or defeated 

without changing the process. In many cases this will result in simpler and cheaper 

plants, because the extensive safety systems which may be required to control major 

hazards will introduce cost and complexity to a plant. The cost includes both the 

initial investment for safety equipment, and also the ongoing operating cost for 

maintenance and operation of safety systems through the life of the plant. 

Chemical process safety strategies can be grouped in four categories: 

• Inherent—as described in the previous paragraphs (for example, replacement of 

an oil based paint in a combustible solvent with a latex paint in a water carrier) 

• Passive—safety features which do not require action by any device, they perform their intended function simply because they exist (for example, a blast resistant concrete bunker for an explosives plant) 

• Active—safety shutdown systems to prevent accidents (for example, a high pressure switch which shuts down a reactor) or to mitigate the effects of accidents (for 
35 

example, a sprinkler system to extinguish a fire in a building). Active systems require detection of a hazardous condition and some kind of action to prevent or mitigate the accident. 

• Procedural—Operating procedures, operator response to alarms, emergency response procedures 

In general, inherent and passive strategies are the most robust and reliable, but 

elements of all strategies will be required for a comprehensive process safety management program when all hazards of a process and plant are considered. 

Approaches to inherently safer design fall into these categories: 

• Minimize—significantly reduce the quantity of hazardous material or energy in 

the system, or eliminate the hazard entirely if possible 

• Substitute—replace a hazardous material with a less hazardous substance, or 

a hazardous chemistry with a less hazardous chemistry 

• Moderate—reduce the hazards of a process by handling materials in a less hazardous form, or under less hazardous conditions, for example at lower temperatures 

and pressures 

• Simplify—eliminate unnecessary complexity to make plants more ‘‘user friendly’’ and less prone to human error and incorrect operation 

One important issue in the development of inherently safer chemical technologies 

is that the property of a material which makes it hazardous may be the same as 

the property which makes it useful. For example, gasoline is flammable, a well 

known hazard, but that flammability is also why gasoline is useful as a transportation fuel. Gasoline is a way to store a large amount of energy in a small quantity 

of material, so it is an efficient way of storing energy to operate a vehicle. As long 

as we use large amounts of gasoline for fuel, there will have to be large inventories 

of gasoline somewhere. 

INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN AND THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

While some people have criticized the chemical industry for resisting inherently 

safer design, we believe that history shows quite the opposite. The concept of inherently safer design was first proposed by an industrial chemist (Trevor Kletz, of ICI 

in the UK), and it has been publicized and promoted by many technologists from 

petrochemical and chemical companies—ICI, Dow, Rohm and Haas, ExxonMobil, 

and many others. The companies that these people work for have strongly supported 

efforts to promote the concept of inherently safer chemical technologies. 

Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) sponsors supported the publication of 

the CCPS book ‘‘Inherently Safer Chemical Processes: A Life Cycle Approach’’ in 

1996, and several companies ordered large numbers of copies of the book for distribution to their chemists and chemical engineers. CCPS sponsors have recognized 

a need to update this book after 10 years, and there is a current project to write 

a second edition of the book, with active participation by many CCPS sponsor companies. 

There has been some isolated academic activity on how to measure the inherent 

safety of a technology (and no consensus on how to do this), but we have seen little 

or no academic research on how to actually go about inventing inherently safer technology. All of the papers and publications that we have seen describing inherently 

safer technologies have either been written by people working for industry, or describe designs and technologies developed by industrial companies. And, we suspect 

that there are many more examples which have not been described because most 

industry engineers are too busy running plants, and managing process safety in 

those plants, to go all of the effort required to publish and share the information. 

We believe that industry has strongly advocated inherently safer design, supporting 

the writing of CCPS books on the subject, teaching the concept to their engineers 

(who most likely never heard of it during their college education), and incorporating 

it into internal process safety management programs. Nobody wants to spend time, 

money, and scarce technical resources managing hazards if there are viable alternatives which make this unnecessary. 

INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN AND SECURITY

Safety and security are good business. Safety and security incidents threaten the 

license to operate for a plant. Good performance in these areas results in an improved community image for the company and plant, reduced risk and actual losses, 

and increased productivity, as discussed in the CCPS publication ‘‘Business Case for 

Process Safety,’’ which has been recently revised and updated. 

A terrorist attack on a chemical plant that causes a toxic release can have the 

same kinds of potential consequences as accidental events resulting in loss of con-
36 

tainment of a hazardous material or large amounts of energy from a plant. Clearly 

anything which reduces the amount of material, the hazard of the material, or the 

energy contained in the plant will also reduce the magnitude of this kind of potential security related event. The chemical industry recognizes this, and current security vulnerability analysis protocols require evaluation of the magnitude of consequences from a possible security related loss of containment, and encourage 

searching for feasible means of reducing these consequences. But inherently safer 

design is not a solution which will resolve all issues related to chemical plant security. It is one of the tools available to address concerns, and needs to be used in 

conjunction with other approaches, particularly when considering all potential security hazards. 

In fact, inherently safer design will rarely avoid the need for implementing conventional security measures. To understand this, one must consider the four main 

elements of concern for security vulnerability in the chemical industry: 

• Off-site consequences from toxic release, a fire, or an explosion • Theft of material or diversion to other purposes, for example the ammonium nitrate used in the first attempt to destroy the World Trade Center in New York, or 

for the Oklahoma City bombing • Contamination of products, particularly those destined for human consumption 

such as pharmaceuticals, food products, or drinking water • Degradation of infrastructure such as the loss of communication ability from the 

second World Trade Center attacks 

Inherently safer design of a process addresses the first bullet, but does not have 

any impact whatsoever on conventional security needs for the others. A company 

will still need to protect the site the same way, whether it uses inherently safer 

processes or not. Therefore, inherently safer design will not significantly reduce security requirements for a plant. 

The objectives of process safety management and security vulnerability management in a chemical plant are safety and security, not necessarily inherent safety 

and inherent security. It is possible to have a safe and secure facility for a facility 

with inherent hazards. In fact this is essential for a facility for which there is no 

technologically feasible alternative—for example, we cannot envision any way of 

eliminating large inventories of flammable transportation fuels in the foreseeable 

future. 

An example from another technology—one which much of us frequently use—may 

be useful in understanding that the true objective of safety and security management is safety and security, not inherent safety and security. Airlines are in the 

business of transporting people and things from one place to another. They are not 

really in the business of flying airplanes—that is just the technology they have selected to accomplish their real business purpose. Airplanes have many major hazards associated with their operation. One of them tragically demonstrated on 9-11 

is that they can crash into buildings or people on the ground, either accidentally 

or from terrorist activity. In fact, essentially the entire population of the United 

States, or even the world, is potentially vulnerable to this hazard. Inherently safer 

technologies which completely eliminate this hazard are available—high speed rail 

transport is well developed in Europe and Japan. But we do not require airline companies to adopt this technology, or even to consider it and justify why they do not 

adopt it. We recognize that the true objective is ‘‘safety’’ and ‘‘security’’ not ‘‘inherent 

safety’’ or ‘‘inherent security.’’ The passive, active, and procedural risk management 

features of the air transport system have resulted in an enviable, if not perfect, safety record, and nearly all of us are willing to travel in an airplane or allow them 

to fly over our houses. 

SOME ISSUES AND CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTATION OF INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN

• The chemical industry is a vast interconnected ecology of great complexity. 

There are dependencies throughout the system, and any change will have cascading 

effects throughout the chemical ecosystem. It is possible that making a change in 

technology that appears to be inherently safer locally at some point within this complex enterprise will actually increase hazards elsewhere once the entire system 

reaches a new equilibrium state. Such changes need to be carefully and thoughtfully 

evaluated to fully understand all of their implications. 

• In many cases it will not be clear which of several potential technologies is really inherently safer, and there may be strong disagreements about this. Chemical 

processes and plants have multiple hazards, and different technologies will have different inherent safety characteristics with respect to each of those multiple hazards. 

Some examples of chemical substitutions which were thought to be safer when initially made, but were later found to introduce new hazards include: 
37 

• Chlorofluorcarbon (CFC) refrigerants—low acute toxicity, non-flammable, 

but later found to have long term environmental impacts 

• PCB transformer fluids—non-flammable, but later determine to have serious toxicity and long term environmental impacts • Who is to determine which alternative is inherently safer, and how are they 

make this determination? This decision requires consideration of the relative importance of different hazards, and there may not be agreement on this relative importance. This is particularly a problem with requiring the implementation of inherently safer technology—who determines what that technology is? There are tens of 

thousands of chemical products manufactured, most of them by unique and specialized processes. The real experts on these technologies, and on the hazards associated with the technology, are the people who invent the processes and run the 

plants. In many cases they have spent entire careers understanding the 

chemistry, hazards, and processes. They are in the best position to understand the 

best choices, rather than a regulator or bureaucrat with, at best, a passing knowledge of the technology. But, these chemists and engineers must understand the concept of inherently safer design, and its potential benefits—we need to educate those 

who are in the best position to invent and promote inherently safer alternatives. • Development of new chemical technology is not easy, particularly if you want 

to fully understand all of the potential implications of large scale implementation 

of that technology. History is full of examples of changes that were made with good 

intentions that gave rise to serious issues which were not anticipated at the time 

of the change, such as the use of CFCs and PCBs mentioned above. Dennis 

Hendershot personally has published brief descriptions of an inherently safer design 

for a reactor in which a large batch reactor was replaced with a much smaller continuous reactor. This is easy to describe in a few paragraphs, but actually this 

change represents the results of several years of process research by a team of several chemists and engineers, followed by another year and millions of dollars to 

build the new plant, and get it to operate reliably. And, the design only applies to 

that particular product. Some of the knowledge might transfer to similar products, 

but an extensive research effort would still be required. Furthermore, Dennis 

Hendershot has also co-authored a paper which shows that the small reactor can 

be considered to be less inherently safe from the viewpoint of process dynamics— 

how the plant responds to changes in external conditions—for example, loss of 

power to a material feed pump. The point—these are not easy decisions and they 

require an intimate knowledge of the process. • Extrapolate the example in the preceding paragraph to thousands of chemical 

technologies, which can be operated safely and securely using an appropriate blend 

of inherent, passive, active, and procedural strategies, and ask if this is an appropriate use of our national resources. Perhaps money for investment is a lesser concern—do we have enough engineers and chemists to be able to do this in any reasonable time frame? Do the inherently safer technologies for which they will be 

searching even exist? 

• The answer to the question ‘‘which technology is inherently safer?’’ may not always the same—there is most likely not a single ‘‘best technology’’ for all situations. 

Consider this non-chemical example. Falling down the steps is a serious hazard in 

a house and causes many injuries. These injuries could be avoided by mandating 

inherently safer houses—we could require that all new houses be built with only 

one floor, and we could even mandate replacement of all existing multi-story houses. 

But would this be the best thing for everybody, even if we determined that it was 

worth the cost? Many people in New Orleans survived the flooding in the wake of 

Hurricane Katrina by fleeing to the upper floors or attics of their houses. Some were 

reportedly trapped there, but many were able to escape the flood waters in this way. 

So, single story houses are inherently safer with respect to falling down the steps, 

but multi story houses may be inherently safer for flood prone regions. We need to 

recognize that decision makers must be able to account for local conditions and concerns in their decision process. 

• Some technology choices which are inherently safer locally may actually result 

in an increased hazard when considered more globally. A plant can enhance the inherent safety of its operation by replacing a large storage tank with a smaller one, 

but the result might be that shipments of the material need to be received by a 

large number of truck shipments instead of a smaller number of rail car shipments. 

Has safety really been enhanced, or has the risk been transferred from the plant 

site to the transportation system, where it might even be larger? 

• We have a fear that regulations requiring implementation of inherently safer 

technology will make this a ‘‘one time and done’’ decision. You get through the technology selection and pick the inherently safer option, meet the regulation, and then 

you don’t have to think about it any more. We want engineers to be thinking about 
38 

opportunities for implementation of inherently safer designs at all times in everything they do—it should be a way of life for those designing and operating chemical, 

and other, technologies. For example: 

• Research chemists and engineers—inherently safer fundamental chemistries 

• Process development engineers—inherently safer processes based on 

those chemistries 

• Design engineers—inherently safer plant design using the selected technology and process 

• Detailed design engineers—inherently safer equipment details—minimize 

the length and size of pipes, vessels, and other equipment, make the plant 

design ‘‘user friendly’’ 

• Plant operation engineers and operators—develop inherently safer operating procedures, look for opportunities for enhancing inherent safety in existing facilities 

• Operators—look for inherently safer ways to do all of the tasks involved 

in the day to day operation of a plant Inherently safer design and operation 

needs to be the way everybody involved in chemical technology thinks, not 

just a one time exercise to comply with a regulation. 

• Inherently safer processes require innovation and creativity. How do you 

legislate a requirement to be creative? Inherently safer alternatives can not 

be invented by legislation. 

WHAT SHOULD WE BE DOING TO ENCOURAGE INHERENTLY SAFER TECHNOLOGY?

Inherently safer design is primarily an environmental and process safety measure, and its potential benefits and concerns are better discussed in context of future 

environmental legislation, with full consideration of the concerns and issues discussed above. While consideration of inherently safer processes does have value in 

some areas of chemical plant security vulnerability—the concern about off site impact of releases of toxic materials—there are other approaches which can also effectively address these concerns, and industry needs to be able to utilize all of the tools 

in determining the appropriate security vulnerability strategy for a specific plant 

site. Some of the current proposals regarding inherently safer design in security regulations seem to drive plants to create significant paperwork to justify not using inherently safer approaches, and this does not improve security. 

We believe that future invention and implementation of inherently safer technologies, to address both safety and security concerns, is best promoted by enhancing awareness and understanding of the concepts by everybody associated with the 

chemical enterprise. They should be applying this design philosophy in everything 

they do, from basic research through process development, plant design, and plant 

operation. Also, business management and corporate executives need to be aware 

of the philosophy, and its potential benefits to their operations, so they will encourage their organization to look for opportunities where implementing inherently safer 

technology makes sense. 

We believe that the approach that the Environmental Protection Agency has 

taken to promote Green Chemistry provides a good example of how the Federal Government can promote the adoption of inherently safer technology in industry. EPA 

has been active in promoting the principals of green chemistry, promoting incorporation of green chemistry into the education of chemists, and in sponsoring conferences and technical meetings on the subject. Each year a number of awards are 

given to researchers and to companies for outstanding examples of implementation 

of green chemistry. An effort like this for inherently safer design will increase its 

visibility for all chemical industry technologists, promote sharing of ideas and information, recognize important contributions, and encourage others to understand and 

apply the inherently safer design principles. 

RESPONSES BY DENNIS C. HENDERSHOT TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR INHOFE

Question 1. At the hearing, I entered into the record a copy of a letter from a company in OK called Dryvit. The letter expresses the belief that 

‘‘Every chemical process is unique. . . .Companies need to retain the direct authority to assess options and decide what is best for their business.’’ I’m concerned 

about substituting the judgment of a Federal bureaucrat for the chemical plant engineer. In your experience, who is best suited to fully understand and make decisions about the complex nature of chemical processes? 
39 

Response. The people most qualified to make decisions about the optimal chemical 

process are the local experts working for the facility operating the process, who have 

the most extensive expertise on all of the many factors which impact on the decision. This is not just a ‘‘business’’ issue—these local experts are most familiar with 

local conditions and concerns which can impact a decision—they live in the community and understand specific local factors. 

Question 2. Mr. Crowley argues that facilities that use chlorine for example, 

should be forced to switch to other alternatives, with stiff penalties for not complying. The city of Phoenix conducted a study on switching from chlorine to sodium 

hypochlorite, or liquid bleach. Because of the extreme temperatures in Phoenix, the 

city found that shipping the product in on a regular basis would not work because 

of the amount of product the City would need. Further, storing it onsite was also 

problematic because the city would need some means of cooling the sodium hypochlorite which loses potency in the heat and over time. Switching to liquid bleach 

is just not an option for the city. Under Mr. Crowley’s proposal, Phoenix would be 

in violation of the law and will have to jeopardize the health of its citizens in order 

to comply. Isn’t this why individual facilities are best equipped to make decisions 

about IST and security? 

Response. This is a good example of the point in Question 1—local experts understand how local conditions impact the decision. As I stated at the hearing—I do not 

believe that there is a ‘‘one size fits all’’ for most chemical technologies. 

Question 3. I also entered into the record a letter from Rust-Oleum, a manufacturer and employer in OK. This letter expresses concern about the effect of IST and 

the potential for quality consequence on downstream users of chemicals. Based on 

your experience in the chemical industry, can you elaborate on how IST affects the 

entire chemical supply chain? 

Response. One could probably get an advanced degree in economics by studying 

this question in some detail. Some examples of these impacts include: 

• Downstream Product impacts. The properties of many chemical products are 

significantly impacted by the manufacturing process and chemistry. This defines the 

spectrum of by-products and contaminants in the final product (nothing can ever be 

100 percent pure). These contaminants and by-products are the result of chemical 

side reactions, impurities and contaminants in the raw materials, and other process 

characteristics. If a manufacturer changes the process or chemistry for making a 

product, it will also unavoidably change the composition of the final product, and 

perhaps other special characteristics of the product (length of polymer chains, 

branching of polymer chains, etc.). These changes may impact the performance of 

the product to consumers, industrial customers who use it to make other materials, 

and consumers of the products of those industrial customers. Sometimes these 

changes could even result in safety hazards—minor contaminants can catalyze 

chemical reactions which could cause reaction hazards or generate hazardous products. A chemical manufacturer must understand, as a part of its management of 

change process, what the impact of changes in a raw material will be. They may 

require extensive testing of ‘‘new’’ raw material to confirm that their product made 

with the new raw material can be manufactured safely and that its performance is 

not adversely impacted. This can cascade throughout the supply chain. This impact 

of manufacturing process on product characteristics is well known for products 

where there is potential direct human consumption—intentional for pharmaceuticals 

and food products, and potential for agricultural chemicals. The regulatory process 

for such materials includes consideration at an appropriate level for the manufacturing process, and it can be difficult to change a manufacturing process without 

extensive product testing and regulatory involvement. Finally, customers may reject 

the ‘‘inherently safer’’ product for quality or performance reasons. For example, 

many people do not believe that water based paints work as effectively for exterior 

applications, and prefer to use oil based paints. 

• Large scale economic impacts. Changing the usage pattern for a major industrial chemical may have significant impacts on markets. Assume that Raw Material 

X is used as the feedstock for a major chemical Product P. A major manufacturer 

of Product P changes its manufacturing process to use Raw Material Y as a feedstock instead, perhaps because of improved technology or perhaps because somebody 

decides that the alternative process is inherently safer. If Product P is a large volume product, the process for manufacturing it may significantly impact the markets 

for Raw Materials X and Y. Following the laws of supply and demand, the price for 

Raw Material X, which will be in oversupply, will drop, and the price for Raw Material Y, which may be in shortage, will increase. Manufacturers, possibly overseas 

suppliers, using the old process (Raw Material X) may now find themselves with a 

cost advantage over those using the new process, even if it appeared that the new 
40 

process would have neutral or favorable economics based on costs before the change. 

Chemical companies have to deal with issues like this all the time, have expertise 

in chemical markets, and are able to predict these kinds of economic impacts and 

take them into account when making decisions. But it is highly unlikely that regulators will have the expertise or resources to properly consider these impacts. 

Question 4. In his statement Senator Biden cited the Wilmington Water Pollution Control Facility that was able to switch to sodium hypochlorite for $160,000. However, I have heard of numerous cities that spent far more than that including DC 

which spent nearly $13 million, a system in Pennsylvania spent $2 million; a third system in Cali- fornia spent $5 million to switch so indeed the cost to change technologies is significant. 

Response. Your examples illustrate that it is not possible to extrapolate the experience of one facility in making a conversion to all facilities. The specific local characteristics of any plant will impact the economics of making a change, and cost 

range can be very broad. Your example is in reference to a single, very simple technology—I would expect an even wider range for a very complex, multi-step chemical 

technology. Changing the chemical process may require the complete replacement 

of a plant if the chemistry is very different—you might not be able to salvage anything but the steel structure of the plant and some storage tanks. Even some 

changes that appear simple at first glance may become complex. Dilution is an inherently safer design approach. So, is it necessarily simple to take a process which 

uses a hazardous material at 100 percent concentration and change it to a process 

that uses the same material at 25 percent concentration in water? Assuming the 

chemistry still works, perhaps this means that the reactor will have to be 3 or 4 

times larger to hold all of the water which is now present. This will mean modifying 

a lot of piping because the reactor is a different shape and size. Or, perhaps the 

larger reactor will not fit in the building, or the building structural steel is not 

strong enough to support the larger and heavier reactor. So, you have to build a 

new building. You are now well along the road to completely replacing the plant. 

All decisions relative to that plant are now on the table. Perhaps the new plant 

should instead be located somewhere else, perhaps overseas. Perhaps the business 

does not have reinvestment economics—it makes money but does not earn sufficient 

return to justify investment of new capital, so the company decides to get out of the 

business entirely. In this example, another plant with a larger building or stronger 

structural steel might find this change relatively easy and cheap. 

Question 5. Senator Biden goes on to comment that Wilmington no longer needs 

to spend money on other security enhancements ‘‘they don’t need guards, they don’t 

need fences, they don’t need security around the facility now.’’ Mr. Hendershot, you 

stated in your testimony that IST, if even feasible in a particular instance, will in 

fact not decrease the need for traditional means of security. Can you elaborate? Do 

you agree with those who say the costs to switch technologies are minimal and that 

essentially the only security risk at a facility is the chemicals it stores? 

Response. I would assume that the Wilmington water treatment facility still has 

guards, fences, and security to protect the integrity of the water supply. Contamination and interruption of public water supplies is certainly a real concern with regard 

to potential terrorist attacks. Similarly, chemical facilities will always need guards, 

fences, and other security features. Plants must protect their equipment and infrastructure, they must protect products from contamination, and they must prevent 

theft and diversion of material for other purposes. 

RESPONSE BY DENNIS C. HENDERSHOT TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION

FROM SENATOR JEFFORDS

Question. Mr. Hendershot, you were a member of the National Research Council 

team that recently stated that ‘‘the most desirable solution to preventing chemical 

releases is to reduce or eliminate the hazard where possible, not to control it.’’ Do 

you agree with this statement? 

Response. I certainly cannot disagree with that statement since I signed off on 

the NRC report, and have made the statement myself many times. However, a 

chemical plant, like any other technology, must meet multiple objectives, and the 

optimum design must represent the best overall combination of characteristics to 

maximize the overall satisfaction with respect to all of the requirements. In most 

cases, that overall best option will not represent the ‘‘best’’ approach for any single 

objective, but rather the ‘‘best’’ option for ALL of the objectives taken together. This 

is the essence of all engineering—to understand the multiple requirements, understand how well various design options satisfy those requirements, and to be able to 
41 

select the best overall design. If the only objective of a chemical plant was to ‘‘prevent chemical releases’’ you would simply never build any chemical plants—there 

would never be any chemical releases from them. But then we would forgo all of 

the benefits associated with the plants—useful products, jobs, etc. I know how to 

build inherently safer automobiles—limit the engine size so no car could go more 

than about 5 mph. It would be very safe, but not very useful because I would have 

ignored all of the other requirements that automobile customers expect to have satisfied. 

RESPONSES BY DENNIS C. HENDERSHOT TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR VOINOVICH

Question 1. Across the entire chemical manufacturing industry in the United 

States, how many of the chemicals listed on EPA’s Risk Management Plan list have 

scientifically proven alternatives that increase safety, reduce risk, and operate at 

least as effectively, in terms of both cost and end product, as the chemical compound 

that is being replaced? 

Response. It is not possible to provide a general answer to this question without 

extensive research. Most of the chemicals on the EPA RMP list are major, large volume industrial chemicals and they are used in many different applications. In my 

35-year industrial career, I have probably seen 50 or so different uses of ammonia, 

for example. In some cases, there were alternatives—although the alternatives were 

not as ‘‘good’’ or they would have been selected to begin with. Chlorine is used for 

water disinfection, and this is probably the largest single use, but it is also used 

in thousands of chemical processes to make a wide range of products from plastics 

to pharmaceuticals. It would require a major study to understand the potential to 

replace chlorine in all of these applications, and to understand the economic consequences of such a change. In general, if a process existed that met the criteria 

of the Senator’s question, and if investment and economics were not factors, chemical facilities would already be using it. 

Question 2. Who or what body should determine what IST is? Should it be defined 

by Government, industry, or academia? If Government does define it, which agency 

should be responsible for that? 

Response. I believe that the experts in a particular technology are best qualified 

to make judgments about the inherent safety characteristics of their process. They 

have the most knowledge of the process, and the multiple impacts of any change 

on safety and the environment throughout the chemical supply chain. It should not 

be defined by Government or academia. Who is better qualified to understand the 

safety of a chemical process—a group of engineers and operating personnel who 

have worked with the process for many years, or a Government regulator who, at 

best, spends a few weeks or months studying a process and likely no time at all 

actually operating the technology? I believe that the ‘‘hands on’’ operating experts 

are clearly best qualified. 

I do not believe that there is any existing Government agency qualified to define 

inherently safer technology for the chemical industry. I am not sure this will ever 

be possible. I have worked for 36 years in the chemical industry, and, as a result 

of that, I am qualified to make inherently safer technology judgments for a limited 

number of technologies, those in which I have extensive experience. I am not qualified to make these judgments for most of the industry because I am not an expert 

in those technologies. I can offer ideas and suggestions for consideration by experts, 

but I am not qualified to make the decisions. 

Question 3. To your knowledge has IST ever been defined as a security measure 

in federal law? 

Response. To my knowledge IST has never been defined as a security measure 

in Federal law. 

Question 4. The EPA has concluded that: 

• ‘‘Inherently safer processes’’ is a developing concept and is not ready for general 

application; 

• IST frequently displaces risk rather than reducing it 

• Even if a few examples of workable alternative approaches do exist, there is not 

a rational basis for imposing an additional industry-wide regulatory burden; and 

• The concept is normally considered when designing new processes, a time when 

changes can be implemented cost effectively. 

Do you agree with the above assessments? In that context, do you believe that 

IST a concept that is ready for broad implementation as a regulatory requirement? 
42 

Response. Yes, I agree with the EPA statements. I do not believe that IST is 

ready for broad regulatory requirements. The philosophy of inherently safer design 

should be broadly taught to chemical engineers and chemists (and all other technologists—the philosophy applies to any technology, and is not something that only 

applies to the chemical industry). Because it is not possible to measure IST, or to 

objectively quantify it, it will be extremely difficult to regulate. I believe that a regulation could even be counter-productive, making inherent safety something that is 

done once to meet a regulation and then forgotten. 

Question 5. Mr. Hendershot, I would argue that the reason that we are securing 

chemical facilities is to protect the processes and products that are produced there. 

For instance, there are some facilities that are so critical to the economic vitality 

or the national security of this nation, that any interruption in processing could be 

detrimental to the national economy and security. If it is the process and the product that we want to protect, why should Government mandate changing the process? 

Response. For some products, the Government actually makes it difficult to 

change the process. For example, where the Government is the customer, product 

specifications may include specification of the manufacturing process, making 

changes very difficult, and any changes may have to be negotiated with the Government customer. For pharmaceuticals and products which may be consumed by people, process changes may be heavily regulated. In this case, even if you are able to 

use a completely inherently safe process (and, if you consider all hazards, I do not 

believe there is such a thing), you still need to secure the facility because the product or service produced is important. 

Question 6. Mr. Hendershot, according to your testimony, ‘‘there has been some 

isolated academic activity on how to measure the inherent safety of a technology 

(and no consensus on how to do this), but we have seen little or no academic research on how to actually go about inventing IST.’’ If this is the case, how would 

the Government mandate IST and measure compliance with IST? 

Response. I do not believe there is currently an effective means for measuring 

IST, or for confirming compliance with any regulation. Any system for measuring 

IST will necessarily have to include somebody’s judgment about the relative importance of different kinds of hazards. Which is the inherently safer refrigerant—CFCs, 

ammonia, or light hydrocarbons? 

• CFCs—not acutely toxic, not flammable, long term environmental damage 

• Ammonia—flammable, acutely toxic 

• Light hydrocarbons—not acutely toxic, highly flammable 

Any system to measure IST will have to be able to resolve issues like this, and, 

in fact, there is no ‘‘right’’ answer. The answer depends on the relative importance 

which is placed on the different hazards, and, even today, many people do not agree 

on the relative importance of different hazards associated with different materials 

for use as refrigerants. Anybody who attempts to measure inherent safety considering all potential hazards must incorporate this value judgment into the measuring 

system, and there must be some way to ensure that value judgments truly reflect 

the national sense of values. 

Question 7. Mr. Hendershot, in your testimony you note that hazardous or abrasive chemicals are often the most useful. Gasoline is a good example of this. The 

very value of many chemical products is found in the complex processes that 

produce them, such as milk bottles, nylon seat belts, or military jet fuel. Are there 

currently alternative chemicals that can be used to make many of these specialty 

products without sacrificing quality or cost-effectiveness? 

Response. I do not believe that it is possible to answer this question without significant investigation and research. There are tens of thousands of chemical products in commerce. I am sure that there are alternatives for most of them—the economy seems to get by when there are supply disruptions such as those caused by the 

Gulf coast storms in 2005. But these alternatives may not be inherently safer, and 

most likely would result in some sacrifice in quality or cost effectiveness. Over time 

the market will drive all users to the most cost effective technology, and this will 

change as technology evolves and improves. 

I am not aware of any study which has ever been done to understand the answer 

to this question. I would say that it is not a good idea to make such a potentially 

far reaching change in the technology of the chemical industry in the United States 

without conducting a thorough study to understand the economic impacts. 
43 

RESPNOSES BY DENNIS C. HENDERSHOT TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR OBAMA

Question 1. Department of Homeland Security officials told EPW staffers in preparation for this hearing that if left to their own devices, individual facilities might 

make IST decisions that decrease risk at one plant, but increase risk system-wide. 

What are your thoughts on that assertion, and of DHS’s potentially helpful role in 

coordinating IST at the most dangerous facilities? 

Response. I believe that this is a possible outcome. Those making the decision for 

a single plant may not understand the system wide impacts, because they may not 

even have access to the information required to understand those impacts. These 

impacts may occur in other companies, in other industries, and in other parts of the 

company. DHS potentially can help an individual plant to understand these broader 

impacts. 

This question leads me to think about an interesting conflict that a plant might 

have. Even if the plant understands that a change would increase risk to society 

as a whole, even though it would decrease the risk to that specific plant, why would 

they want to accept that additional risk locally even if the result is reduced overall 

risk to society as a whole? For example, if society thinks that it is better for a large 

inventory of hazardous material to be stored at Consumer Plant A, rather than Supplier Plant B, how do we convince Consumer Plant A that this is a good idea and 

make it attractive for Consumer Plant A to do this? DHS may have an important 

role here, with an opportunity to work with the parties involved and work out a 

solution, and perhaps back up the solution with financial or other incentives. 

Question 2. In March of this year, Secretary Chertoff said he was open to the idea 

of requiring high-risk facilities to consider safer approaches. This is a position the 

industry opposes. What is your view on requiring high-risk facilities to consider 

IST? 

Response. Of course we encourage every engineer to consider inherently safer approaches in the process of invention, development, and design, but I believe that it 

would be very difficult to write and enforce a meaningful regulation to require facilities to ‘‘consider’’ safer approaches. If you are a regulated facility, how do you know 

whether or not you have demonstrated ‘‘consideration’’ of safer approaches in a way 

that the regulator will accept? What does appropriate documentation of ‘‘consideration’’ consist of? Who is to evaluate the ‘‘sincerity’’ of the consideration? In the end 

I do not believe such a regulation will be effective in driving any change. For those 

regulated facilities that believe in the concept of inherently safer design—its value 

and effectiveness—they do not need a regulation and will be applying inherently 

safer design principles already. For those that do not believe in the concept, they 

will generate paperwork that shows that shows that they have considered inherent 

safety, perhaps demonstrate some relatively small improvements, and continue to 

operate the same way they did in the past. I suspect that any good lawyer would 

have no trouble ‘‘proving’’ compliance with such a vague and ill defined regulation. 

If the objective is real change in the chemical industry, we have two laboratories 

right now—Contra Costa County, CA, and the state of New Jersey. Perhaps we 

should wait a few years, then go back to these places and see what real impact the 

regulations have had—not just ‘‘how difficult it was to comply with the rules?’’, but 

rather, did the rules actually result in any real reduction of hazards? 

Many of the leading chemical companies strongly encourage engineers and chemists to think about inherently safer, and look for opportunities to incorporate inherent safety features into plants. We need to encourage engineers and chemists at all 

companies to encourage this kind of thinking, but regulation is not an effective way 

to accomplish this. Inherently safer design is a creative activity, done in the mind 

of engineers and chemists who believe in the value of the philosophy, and not easily 

measured or regulated. In other areas the Government has developed policies and 

programs to encourage creative thinking—for example for pollution prevention (the 

Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/p2home/p2policy/ 

act1990.htm) and for ‘‘Green Chemistry’’. A useful approach might be statement of 

a policy, followed by creation of mechanisms to educate and provide incentives. 

STATEMENT ON PHILIP J. CROWLEY, SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL

DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRAMS

Good morning. I am P.J. Crowley. I direct the homeland security program at the 

Center for American Progress. I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss with you 

the challenge of chemical security and the opportunity—and indeed the security im-
44 

1. Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, Remarks at the American Chemistry 

Council National Chemical Security Forum, Washington, DC, March 21, 2006, available at 

http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=5494. 

perative—to employ inherently safer technology, materials and processes to make 

our society and economy less vulnerable to terrorism. 

I will also briefly discuss the findings of a recent survey the Center for American 

Progress conducted of a wide range of chemical facilities across the country. The 

findings suggest both good news and bad news. The good news is that many facilities have successfully and economically switched to less acutely hazardous chemicals 

and processes. The survey data demonstrate that inherently safer technologies 

should be viewed as a viable and necessary component of chemical security. It reduces and in many cases eliminates terrorism risk to millions of Americans. It does 

not need to be studied. It needs to be embraced by the Department of Homeland 

Security and pursued as part of our national security strategy to protect the homeland. It should be specifically incorporated into legislation being considered by the 

Congress, because the bad news from our survey is that, while change is occurring, 

it is not happening fast enough. 

At the outset, I should mention that I view this issue from a security vantage 

point, based on my experience over three decades as an Air Force officer, staff member of the National Security Council and national security analyst at the Center for 

the past two and a half years. I was working for the insurance industry in New 

York on September 11, four blocks from the World Trade Center. I understand the 

nature of terrorism risk and how it affects the private sector. From that experience, 

I do not view national security and economic productivity as competing priorities. 

We must do both. 

We are approaching the fifth anniversary of 9-11. We can all be grateful that 

through the combined efforts of our military, our intelligence services and police, we 

have not been attacked again. In many respects, we are safer, but we are not safe. 

The threat to the United States is growing more dangerous and less predictable. 

There is equal risk that we as a country are losing our sense of urgency and becoming complacent. We need to use this intervening period before we are attacked again 

to make our society and economy as secure as they can be. 

The Bush administration’s rhetoric—that we are fighting terrorists in Baghdad so 

we do not have to confront them in my native Boston or Cleveland—is at odds with 

the reality that can be seen from successful attacks in Madrid and London and the 

plot that was recently foiled in Canada, employing common, yet critical infrastructure against us. 

The global jihadi movement is evolving. The next attack—and we should be clear 

that there will be other attacks—is more likely to be perpetrated by individuals who 

are ‘‘self-starters’’—inspired by al Qaeda, linked to the movement through the Internet, but acting on their own. These people are likely to be newly radicalized and 

will be extremely difficult to detect. They may well already be here in the United 

States. The people of Oklahoma understand all too well that terrorism involves both 

domestic and international threats. 

We also recognize that we cannot protect everything. The United States is a target-rich environment. We have to set priorities, something the Department of Homeland Security has yet to effectively do. The emphasis should be to protect infrastructure that, if attacked, represents the greatest risk to human life or would generate 

the most significant economic loss to the United States. Chemical and petro-chemical facilities fit both of these criteria, particularly those in or near major metropolitan areas. The emphasis must be on preventing or reducing our vulnerability to catastrophic terrorism. This is not an arbitrary judgment. It is specific to the threat 

we face—that terrorists are most likely to attack where they can kill as many innocent civilians as possible and have the most significant economic and political impact on our country. 

The Department of Homeland Security says it is pursuing a risk-based strategy. 

In that context, both DHS and the Congress are appropriately focused on security 

at chemical facilities across the country. But it was disappointing to hear Secretary 

of Homeland Security Chertoff, in comments in March to the American Chemistry 

Council, suggest that inherently safer technology is an environmental interest that 

has little to do with security.1 He is wrong. 

A risk-based chemical security strategy should be integrated and multi-dimensional. It requires better physical security, an area of particular emphasis with the 

Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and voluntary standards promoted by 

the American Chemistry Council. But physical security by itself is not enough. In 

some cases, it requires risk mitigation, which might involve changes in on-site storage and manufacture or facility relocation and consolidation. This too is not suffi-
45 

2 National Academy of Sciences, Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology (BCST) 

,‘‘Terrorism and the Chemical Infrastructure: Protecting People and Reducing Vulnerabilities 

(2006)’’, available at http://darwin.nap.edu/books/0309097215/html/9.html. 

cient alone. We must also pursue risk elimination. Where safer and more secure 

technologies already exist and are readily available, we have an obligation to address these known vulnerabilities and in essence take as many chemical facilities 

and communities as possible off the terrorism target list. As a National Academy 

of Sciences report highlighted earlier this year, ‘‘The most desirable solution to preventing chemical releases is to reduce or eliminate the hazard where possible, not 

to control it.’’2 This is the potential value of inherently safer technologies and manufacturing processes. 

The Center for American Progress, with assistance from the National Association 

of State PIRGs and National Environmental Trust, conducted a survey of a wide 

range of facilities—1,800 in all—that deregistered from the Risk Management Planning (RMP) program. Among the key findings: 

284 facilities in 47 states have dramatically reduced the danger of a chemical release into nearby communities by switching to less acutely hazardous processes or 

chemicals or moving to safer locations. This action reduces or eliminates a clear terrorism threat to at least 38 million people. For example, the Mill Creek Wastewater 

Treatment Plant in Cincinnati, Ohio eliminated the danger of an off-site chlorine 

gas release to an area encompassing 860,000 residents by switching to liquid bleach 

for disinfection. Likewise, the Water Pollution Control Facility in Wilmington, Delaware made a similar change, eliminating the danger to 560,000 nearby residents. 

Change can be accomplished economically. Of respondents that provided cost estimates, 87 percent spent less than $1 million and roughly half reported spending less 

than $100,000 to switch to safer alternatives. 

Our survey revealed that alternatives already exist in a range of applications: 

drinking water, wastewater, manufacturing, electric power production, hazardous 

waste management, and agriculture and oil refineries. In virtually all cases, change 

involved the adoption of common technologies, not new innovation: for water treatment, a shift from the use of chlorine gas to liquid bleach or ultraviolet radiation; 

in manufacturing, the use of liquid rather than gaseous ammonia; for electrical utilities, the use of aqueous rather than anhydrous ammonia or solid rather than anhydrous sulfur dioxide. These and other changes do not need to be studied. They are 

already in use and need to be more widely adopted. 

The most common reasons cited for making changes included the security and 

safety of employees and nearby communities, as well as regulatory incentives and 

business opportunities. These facilities also saw opportunities to cut a variety of 

costs, requiring fewer physical security measures and hazardous material safety devices, making these operations more efficient and productive. This also took a significant burden off surrounding communities in terms of disaster planning and response. 

While our survey results demonstrated that effective change can take place, it 

also revealed limitations in a purely market-driven response. For example, of the 

284 facilities that adopted some form of inherently safer practices, only 10 percent 

represented the highest risk facilities—those that put 100,000 or more people at potential risk. At this pace, it would take another 45 years to eliminate this substantial risk to the American people. We do not have that much time to act. 

There is also a fairness issue by relying on ad hoc local action rather than a national approach. Chemical security involves the transportation of hazardous materials, not just their manufacture and use. Many communities where change is taking place are also vital transportation hubs Wilmington, DE; Jacksonville, FL; Indianapolis, IN; Baltimore, MD; Omaha, NE; Cleveland and Cincinnati, OH; and Philadelphia, PA. They have taken the initiative to eliminate threats to their people, but 

potentially remain at risk because hazardous materials are still transported through 

these cities to neighboring states and communities that have not taken similar action. 

With this in mind, what then is the proper role of Government to help promote 

change within communities and the private sector? As a security analyst, what is 

most important is to accelerate the pace of change and measurably reduce the risk 

of catastrophic terrorism to our society and economy. When it comes to our extraordinary military, we are constantly exploring how to invest in and employ new technologies that make us stronger. Why is it that we would not take the same approach 

to invest in and employ new technologies to make us more secure here at home? 

I think our citizens and our first responders deserve the same consideration that 

we rightly give our men and women in the military. 
46 

Voluntary actions should be encouraged, but the experience of the past 5 years 

shows that voluntary actions alone are not adequate to fully address this vulnerability. Government has the a responsibility to set strong safety and security standards, identify better alternatives, require needed security assessments and reporting, and create incentives for the private sector and cities and states to take action. 

We need a comprehensive national approach, not a series of disconnected local or 

regional actions. 

To give one example of how this might work, consider the approximately 3,000 

drinking water and wastewater treatment plants across the country that still use 

chlorine gas. DHS should identify the manufacture, transportation and use of chlorine gas for disinfection as posing an unacceptable risk to our society, when inherently safer alternatives clearly exist. But local officials and facility operators should 

determine how to best eliminate this risk, whether to convert to the use of liquid 

bleach, ultraviolet radiation or other process. Water treatment facilities represent 

an excellent starting point to implement a genuine risk-based approach to chemical 

security. 

What needs to be done? 

The Department of Homeland Security should be granted authority to regulate 

chemical security and move high-hazard facilities to inherently safer technologies 

where practicable. 

With that authority, DHS should promulgate strong national standards to improve chemical security, including the manufacture, transportation and use of acutely hazardous materials. Particular emphasis should be given to the proximity of 

these acutely hazardous materials to major population centers across the United 

States that present the highest risk if successfully attacked by terrorists. 

Chemical facilities should be required to do comprehensive annual security risk 

assessments and report those findings to DHS and EPA. These risk assessments 

should include a thorough evaluation of less acutely hazardous alternatives. In the 

case of publicly traded companies, an assessment of risk and summary of actions 

taken should also be reported to shareholders. 

DHS, in conjunction with EPA, should embrace the adoption of inherently safer 

technology and processes as a key component of a risk-based national security strategy to protect the homeland. DHS should establish a Center of Excellence to promote the adoption of inherently safer technologies more broadly. 

The Federal Government should create a variety of incentives to promote change. 

This might include a mix of targeted grants, loans and tax credits. Rewards for facilities that meet or exceed stronger national standards should also be explored, including caps on liability if a terrorist attack does occur. Aggressive DHS enforcement would also involve sticks for those entities that do not meet stronger security 

standards. 

The course that we have followed in the first five years of the war on terror cannot be sustained indefinitely. There will always be a need to aggressively but judiciously employ military force to intercept terrorists before they can strike the United 

States. But as we have seen over the past couple of years, offensive action by itself 

is not enough. Over time, our national security strategy must place greater emphasis on homeland security. But again, as good as our intelligence and police forces 

may be, they cannot be expected to anticipate and intercept every attack. 

We must adapt our society to this new security environment. We must reduce our 

vulnerability to terrorism and narrow the potential for terrorists to successfully attack us here. We cannot create a risk-free environment, but that should not be used 

an excuse for inaction. The security of the United States should not be subject to 

the lowest common private sector denominator. Business as usual is no longer acceptable. 

RESPONSE BY PHILIP J. CROWLEY TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR INHOFE

Question. You have written about your concerns over the Nation’s rail and transit 

security. However, one of the primary concerns in mandating IST, for example, is 

reduction of on-site inventories of chemicals. This would shift the security burden 

to rail and transit systems. How do you reconcile your support for IST which reduces inventories and requires more frequent shipments with your concerns about 

rail and transit security? 

Respones. Senator Inhofe, you are absolutely correct to link the security of chemical facilities and security of our rail system, particularly the flow of hazardous materials through the center of many large and vital cities. We really do have to think 

of them together, which is why the matter of chemical security does not end at the 
47 

chemical facility fence line. Even if one could envision perfect security at a chemical 

manufacturing facility, for example, hazardous materials must be transported from 

the manufacturing facility to the user. This route will typically involve transit 

through one or more major cities. That combination—a hazardous material in a middle of an urban and economic center—creates a terrorism target of opportunity. 

As you have pointed out, IST, or more accurately inherent risk reduction, is not 

one thing. It is a concept that offers a range of potential solutions to security challenges. It might include inventory reduction or separation, hardened storage, justin-time manufacturing or materials substitution. Ideally, the Government would not 

be proscribing a specific solution, but it would mandate a process by which the Department of Homeland Security, Environmental Protection Agency, State agencies, 

industry groups and facility operators would collectively evaluate options that, if undertaken, would mitigate or eliminate the threat of terrorism. 

So, in the scenario you highlight, the optimal solution would not be reducing the 

quantities of chlorine gas at a particular location—necessitating more frequent shipments of reduced quantities—but shifting from chlorine gas, which can be exploited 

by terrorists, to liquid bleach, which cannot. But in other cases where substitutes 

are not readily available, we cannot dismiss options that reduce our vulnerability 

to terrorism, even if they do not reduce the risk to zero. 

RESPONSES BY PHILIP J. CROWLEY TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR JEFFORDS

Question 1. Why is physical security at a chemical facility not enough to protect 

against terrorist attacks? 

Response. Physical security at the point of manufacture or use is important. Many 

facility operators are improving physical security, including fences, lighting, video 

cameras, guards and access controls. One of the reasons this is a homeland security 

issue is that, while a number of facility operators are taking concrete steps to improve security, too many are not. 

However, physical plant security only addresses part of the security challenge. Security plans that Congress may require as part of chemical security legislation must 

take the transportation of applicable hazardous substances into account. It does not 

matter how secure the bank vault is if the Brinks truck never makes it to the 

bank—or if the bank’s computer system is vulnerable to a hacker. 

Terrorists watch what we do and consciously exploit vulnerabilities. Despite our 

best efforts, certain activities can be safe, but not secure. For example, a HAZMAT 

car on a rail siding may be considered safe. But if that HAZMAT car has graffiti 

on it, it is not secure because someone somewhere had unauthorized access to that 

car. If they can write on it, they can place an explosive device next to it. A HAZMAT 

car in the middle of Montana may well be safe and secure. A HAZMAT car in the 

middle of Washington, DC may be safe, but it is not secure because it presents an 

inviting target to a terrorist organization that attacked once and is determined to 

try again. 

Question 2. As you know, members of Congress have debated for years whether 

all chemical facilities should consider and implement, where practicable, inherently 

safer alternatives to make their communities safer. One compromise approach to 

move passed this impasse would be to tailor the requirement to evaluate safer alternatives to the risk posed by the facility, so that facilities that DHS believes pose 

the highest risk would be required to undertake a more rigorous evaluation than 

facilities that pose less risk. Would you support such a compromise? 

Response. Yes. Such an approach has two dimensions that I believe are important. 

First, I support the concept of tiering where we devote increasing attention to security where the threat and consequence of an attack are most significant. We do 

not necessarily have to protect everything in society to the same standard. When 

looking at critical infrastructure, increased risk can be based on what a facility does, 

where it is or the value that our society places on it. This will vary among economic 

and industrial sectors or even within sectors. The emphasis must be preventing catastrophic terrorism. As the potential for catastrophic terrorism rises, security standards need to increase, including the need to evaluate more secure alternatives. 

Second, I do not think that Government needs to mandate a specific solution to 

a security challenge. I agree with those who say that facility operators are in the 

best position to make decisions on how to change. But there needs to be a mandatory process where facility operators are informed about security risks and required 

to evaluate options that can reduce or hopefully eliminate those risks. So, to use 

the example of a wastewater treatment facility, it is an appropriate role for the Gov-
48 

ernment to identify chlorine gas as a substance that poses an unacceptably high security risk, particularly if the facility is situated near a major population center or 

if the chlorine gas is transported through an urban center to that facility. The facility operator can determine whether a switch to liquid bleach, ultraviolet radiation 

or some other process is the most appropriate solution to the security challenge. 

What is important is that there is a process that encourages risk mitigation or 

elimination and mandates serious consideration of secure alternatives where they 

exist. As part of this process, there should also be Government incentives, such as 

tax credits, matching loans or grants, to accelerate the pace of change. 

Question 3. There was not much discussion during the hearing on the security 

risks faced during transportation of chemicals. Yet I have heard horror stories about 

the potential consequences if a rail car full of chlorine gas were to explode near the 

US Capitol or near a major city. What is the risk of a terrorist attack during the 

transportation of chemicals and how does this influence our discussions of chemical 

facility security? 

Response. We must continue to focus on the actual terrorist threat we face. The 

9/11 perpetrators intended to attack the Capitol, Why should we give them another 

opportunity using a 90-ton HAZMAT car? 

The U.S. Capitol is a great example of why chemical security needs to incorporate 

both physical security and transportation. I have no doubt that the CSX Corporation 

can safely operate on the freight rail line that flows through the heart of Washington, DC and in the immediate vicinity of the Capitol and other key Government 

structures, including the Pentagon. However, putting a 90-ton HAZMAT car next to 

the Capitol can never be made completely secure. Safety and security are fundamentally different concepts. 

In recent weeks, whether these plots were mature or not, or feasible or not, those 

who identify with al Qaeda’s radical ideology are focused on destructive acts in the 

heart of major cities—Toronto, Chicago, New York and so forth. Regardless of where 

the chemical facilities are actually located, our major freight rail lines pass through 

the heart of our urban and economic centers, creating targets of opportunity. If a 

HAZMAT car filled with chlorine gas ruptured due to an attack, it could potentially 

kill 100,000 people in 30 minutes. Rerouting may be an option in some cases, such 

as Washington, DC, but the best option is to get the hazardous material off these 

freight rail lines. The rail industry cannot do that; only the chemical industry and 

its customers can. 

In fact, on June 13th Edward R. Hamberger, the CEO of the Association of American Railroads, told the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee the 

‘‘Railroads agree, and strongly support efforts aimed at finding and utilizing ‘inherently safer technologies’ as substitutes for hazardous materials, especially TIH.’’ 

RESPONSES BY PHILIP J. CROWLEY TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR VOINOVICH

Question 1. Across the entire chemical manufacturing industry in the U.S., how 

many of the chemicals listed on EPA’s Risk Management Plan list have scientifically 

proven alternatives that increase safety reduce risk, and operate at least as effectively, in terms of both cost and end product, as the chemical compound that is 

being replaced? 

Response. The member companies of the American Chemistry Council, the trade 

association of the chemical manufacturers only represent about 11 percent of the 

14,000 facilities under the EPA’s Risk Management Program (RMP). The large majority of chemical facilities that pose a threat to local communities are chemical 

users, not makers. Both chemical makers and users can convert to safer technologies. Our analysis of RMP data showed that chemical users are switching to 

safer technologies more quickly. However, chemical manufacturers are also innovating. Major manufacturers such as BASF, Dupont and Cargill are investing in 

vegetable based (PLA) plastics instead of chlorine based vinyl. 

For the most part, the process change that would make us more secure involves 

not the hazardous substance, but its form. We could make significant progress if we 

start with just three toxic-by-inhalation (TIH) gases—anhydrous ammonia, chlorine 

and sulfur dioxide. According to the EPA, these account for more than 50 percent 

of all categories of chemical processes that threaten communities nationwide. A shift 

to aqueous ammonia, liquid bleach or ultraviolet light and solid sulfer dioxide or liquid sodium bisulfite (depending on the process) or other less hazardous forms would 

be significant. 

Are there up front costs to such process changes? Yes, but as our report Preventing Toxic Terrorism shows, the costs are manageable—87 percent of respond-
49 

ents reporting $1 million or less, the majority of those $100,000 or less. Additional 

savings were realized through the avoidance of a range of costs, including specialized protective gear, evacuation and response planning and training and compliance 

inspections. 

Question 2. Who or what body should determine what IST is? Should it be defined 

by Government, industry, or academia? If Government does define it, which agency 

should be responsible for that? To you knowledge has IST ever been defined as a 

security measure in Federal law? 

Response. The EPA routinely gives credit to facilities for hazard reduction techniques. That is why many facilities have been allowed to de-register under the EPA 

RMP program. Our survey of RMP data focused on the hundreds of facilities that 

have de-registered since 1999. 

The adoption of secure alternatives would involve a process led by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), with the participation of EPA, state and local 

authorities, industry and academia. The first step would be to identify substances 

(and forms of those substances, particularly gaseous forms) that have the potential 

if exploited by terrorists to kill or harm thousands of people. DHS would establish 

a Center of Excellence (as it has with other homeland security priorities) that would 

identify existing alternatives or promote research to develop viable and cost-effective 

alternatives where none currently exist. Even if IST initially evolved as an environmental rather than security concept, risk elimination, not just risk management or 

control, must be part of a viable chemical security strategy. 

Question 3. The EPA has concluded that ‘‘inherently safer processes’’ is a developing concept and is not ready for general application; IST frequently displaces risk 

rather than reducing it; even if a few examples of workable alternative approaches 

do exist, there is not a rational basis for imposing an additional industry-wide regulator burden; and the concept is normally considered when designing new processes, 

a time when changes can be implemented cost effectively. Do you agree with the 

above assessments? In that context, do you believe that IST is a concept that is 

ready for broad implementation as a regulatory requirement? 

Response. Over the years the EPA has had many opinions on this subject. In February of 2000 the EPA issued a security alert to the industry advising them that 

one of the ways they could reduce security hazards was through design changes at 

facilities. The EPA was reminding these facilities of their general duty under the 

Clean Air Act (Section 112r) to prevent a catastrophic release of regulated chemicals. In June of 2002 the EPA drafted guidance and regulations calling for hazard 

reduction through various techniques including the substitution hazardous substances. All of these actions are efforts by the EPA to advance inherently safer technologies, processes and plant designs to minimize the impact of a terrorist attack 

on a chemical facility. 

Given the threat to our critical infrastructure, we need a comprehensive chemical 

security strategy. Such a strategy must incorporate the manufacture, use, physical 

security, storage and transportation of acutely hazardous materials. Risk elimination through the adoption of secure alternatives or inherently safer processes, 

whatever term one wants to use, should be an essential tool to reduce our vulnerability to terrorism. 

IST is a concept, but it is a concept that belongs in our approach to chemical security. 

Given the clear danger, and the mixed market-based response within the chemical 

sector, it is appropriate to grant the Department of Homeland Security regulatory 

authority. Obviously many within the chemical sector favor industry-wide security 

regulation to level an uneven playing field. 

Promoting IST does not mean dictating one-size-fits-all solutions to every facility 

and every chemical. But regulation should establish a security framework where the 

adoption of inherently safer or more secure alternatives is a leading option. Facility 

operators, as is the case in New Jersey, should be required to evaluate alternatives 

and report those judgments to federal and state authorities. I do not believe that 

this places an arduous burden on the private sector. But if it does, then the Federal 

Government should not only regulate, but also provide incentives that help the private sector adapt more rapidly to this new security environment we face. 

Question 4. Mr. Crowley, in the study Preventing Toxic Terrorism, how many of 

the 284 facilities referenced were actual chemical manufacturing facilities? How 

many of those chemical manufacturing facilities actually substituted or modified the 

chemical process? How many others relocated their facilities or modified the transport of the various chemicals? Given the small number of facilities that actually 

changed their processes, how can this study be viewed as a sweeping endorsement 

of IST for chemical manufacturing facilities? 
50 

Response. The vast majority of facilities cited in Preventing Toxic Terrorism involved chemical users rather than manufacturers, such as the drinking water and/ 

or wastewater treatment facilities in Cleveland, Columbus and Cincinnati, Ohio 

that all switched from chlorine gas to liquid bleach disinfection, making millions of 

Ohioans more secure as a result. The Helena Chemical Company of Coldwater, OH 

switched from the use of anhydrous ammonia gas to alternative forms of fertilizers. 

Anhydrous ammonia is also a key ingredient used in illegal methamphetamine labs. 

Such a change improves both security and law enforcement. 

Preventing Toxic Terrorism, using a sample of facilities from the Risk Management Program, proves the viability of the concept. Just like clinical studies, we can 

use a test sample to validate a concept for wider adoption. This is no different. What 

our report really showed was that market-based solutions are not viable absent a 

more aggressive federal role. An electric power producer uses anhydrous ammonia 

in air pollution control devices. The manufacturer sells it to them. The railroad is 

required to transport it—probably through a major city. At no time under the current system are the three of them required to jointly consider more secure alternatives. The federal Government needs to change this dynamic 

Question 5. Mr. Crowley, I understand that the majority of the changes that occurred were the substitution of hypochlorite (otherwise known as bleach) for chlorine or other similar substitutes at water treatment facilities. Though the water 

treatment facilities will have less chlorine on site wouldn’t the bleach manufacturers 

have increased amounts of chlorine on site, in order to keep up with the increased 

demand for bleach? Isn’t this simply displacing risk to both the rail lines and the 

bleach manufacturing facilities? Have you considered the entire chemical industry 

supply chain in your analysis? 

Response. Senator Voinovich, viewing chemical security in the context of the entire chemical industry supply chain is exactly how we should evaluate this issue. 

We must take a system-wide approach that looks at manufacturers, transporters 

and users collectively, not individually. 

Security involves the management of risk. It will never be zero, particularly when 

we are talking about the presence of chemicals such as chlorine that our society 

does rely on every day. In the process of managing risk to reduce the threat of terrorism, there may be some displacement of risk as you say, but that displacement 

can mean a broad lowering of risk. For example, here in Washington, DC, CSX’s 

current rerouting of HAZMAT cars away from the U.S. Capitol shifts that risk to 

a rail line that flows through, for example, Hagerstown, MD. That al Qaeda wishes 

to attack Washington, DC again is self-evident. It is unclear that an attack on Hagerstown, MD would achieve the same impact that their attack on 9/11 did. From 

a national security standpoint, this rerouting reduces the probability of an attack 

and is a prudent course of action. 

A second legitimate security goal is to reduce the number of targets. Since there 

are at least two proven and reasonably economical alternatives to chlorine gas at 

water and wastewater treatment facilities, encouraging the shift to hypochlorite or 

better still ultraviolet radiation takes these facilities off al Qaeda’s target list. The 

storage and transportation of liquid bleach does not remove all risk—there could 

still be environmental damage—but it eliminates the risk of catastrophic terrorism 

associated with the transportation and use of this hazardous substance (in its more 

dangerous form, gas). 

The risk would still remain at the point of manufacture, but this is where the 

physical security measures come into play—better fencing, lighting, guards, access 

controls and other potential inherently safer processes, such as hardened storage, 

small storage quantities, just-in-time manufacture and so forth. By taking such a 

system-wide approach, looking at the entire process to include the manufacture, 

transportation and use—and incorporating more secure alternatives where they 

apply—we are able to significantly reduce the potential for terrorists to attack the 

United States using deadly chemicals such as chlorine as a weapon. 

Question 6. Mr. Crowley, in your conclusions, you note that where safer alternative chemicals and processes are available, each chemical facility should make the 

appropriate modifications. You have also called for legislation that includes the use 

of IST. I am not aware of a list of currently approved IST substitutes for the chemicals found on the Risk Management Program (RMP) list. Could you please list the 

approved alternative technologies? Is this list approved by EPA? DHS? Academia? 

Response. ‘‘The EPA’s process of de-registering facilities that eliminate or reduce 

chemicals below RMP reporting thresholds recognizes the advantages of significantly reducing or eliminating the number of people at risk from a chemical release. 

Based on our survey of these facilities, those who switched to safer technologies 

since the 9/11 attacks, 45 percent told us they switched for security reasons. 
51 

As was stressed at the hearing, IST is an umbrella term to include many things— 

the substitution of one chemical compound for another safer alternative; a shift from 

one form of a chemical that can spread, endangering many, to another form that 

does not spread, endangering only a few; or changes in a manufacturing process, 

producing a chemical as it is required; the manner or volume of storage; or the location of the facility. For example, a facility is removed from the RMP program if it 

closes. This is not an action being advocated. If facilities adapt, they are less likely 

to be attacked. They are thus more likely to prosper. These are not competing priorities. 

There are a range of proven and available alternatives to chemicals and processes 

that, if promoted and adopted, will make us less vulnerable to terrorism. I am not 

aware of an approved EPA list, but the application of the IST concept to homeland 

security would result in an overlapping, but not identical list. The central RMP criteria, such as volume of a substance in a particular location and the number of people in the surrounding area who are potentially threatened, are certainly valid in 

the security context as well. 

For each segment of the chemical sector, I would expect a list of approved alternatives to be developed by DHS, working with the EPA, academia, chemical manufacturers, transporters, users, industry groups, environmental groups and other 

stakeholders. 

RESPONSES BY PHILLIP J. CROWLEY TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR BOXER

Question 1. A document published in 2000, titled, ‘‘Chemical accident risks in U.S. 

Industry—A preliminary analysis of accident risk data from U.S. hazardous chemical facilities’’ demonstrates that four extremely hazardous chemicals (Anhydrous 

Ammonia, Chlorine, Sulfur Dioxide and Hydrogen Fluoride) account for 55 percent 

of the processes that threaten communities across the country. Please describe the 

processes that use these chemicals in wastewater and drinking water plants, refineries, and power plants. 

Response. Chlorine gas continues to be widely used for disinfection at drinking 

and wastewater facilities. Anhydrous sulfur dioxide is used to remove chlorine after 

treating wastewater, as well as treat other industrial wastes. The same chemicals 

are used in electric power plants, anhydrous sulfur dioxide in air pollution control 

equipment and chlorine gas to prevent fouling of cooling towers. Anhydrous ammonia gas is used for fertilizer. Refineries employ hydrofluoric acid in the production 

of gasoline. 

Question 2. Please describe the number of known substitutes for these chemicals 

when used in wastewater and drinking water plants, refineries, and power plants. 

Response. The recent survey conducted by the Center for American Progress, Preventing Toxic Terrorism, provided several examples of common technologies that are 

viable and cost effective alternatives. Sodium hypochlorite (or liquid bleach) and calcium hypochlorite can be substituted for chlorine gas at drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities. Ultraviolet radiation provides additional advantages. 

Thousands of water utilities already use liquid bleach or ultraviolet light. Dozens 

of power plants already use aqueous ammonia rather than anhydrous ammonia in 

pollution control equipment; a few use even safer solid urea. The electric grid will 

always be a potential terrorism target, but use of a safer solid form of sulfur dioxide 

eliminates off-site risks at power plants if one is attacked. Liquid or granular fertilizers not only pose less risk than anhydrous ammonia, but eliminate a substance 

used in illegal methamphetamine labs as well. Some two-thirds of the Nation’s refineries already use safer alternatives to hydrofluoric acid, primarily sulfuric acid. 

Newer solid acid catalysts are in the demonstration phase at refineries in Europe. 

Using sulfuric acid does not remove all hazards, but eliminates the potential for catastrophic terrorism. 

Question 3. Please describe the number of communities and people that would 

have reduced or eliminated levels of risk as a result of the facilities described above 

using these substitutes. 

Response. The Center for American Progress survey documented that 284 facilities in 47 States have adopted inherently safer practices, the vast majority involving 

these substitutes. As a result, at least 38 million people are at a lower level of risk 

of catastrophic terrorism. That is the good news. Of these facilities, only ten percent 

represent the highest risk facilities, those that put 100,000 or more people at risk. 

At this pace, it would take another 45 years to eliminate this vulnerability. The 

threat is much more urgent than that. 
52 

As of 2004, some 3.5 million Americans lived in danger of serious injury or death 

from 225 power plants that use extremely hazardous substances. Just two-dozen 

power plants account for two thirds of the people in danger. (Source: Unnecessary 

Dangers, Working Group on Community Right-to-Know, 2004.) 

As of 2003, some 19 million Americans lived in danger of serious injury or death 

from extremely hazardous substances used at approximately 1,300 wastewater 

treatment facilities. Just 45 of these facilities each endangered any of more than 

100,000 people. (Source: Eliminating Hometown Hazards, Environmental Defense, 

2003.) 

As of 2005, some 17 million Americans lived in danger of serious injury or death 

from extremely hazardous substances used at 50 refineries in 20 different States. 

(Source: Needless Risk, U.S. PIRG Education Fund, 2005.) 

These power plants, wastewater facilities, and refineries could all but eliminate 

these hazards by using more secure chemicals or processes. 

Question 4. Upgrading business infrastructure and modernizing management 

processes is commonplace in business. Particularly viewed against the backdrop of 

terrorist threats and community safety concerns, reducing a facility’s risks by substituting dangerous chemicals or processes for safer alternative would appear to be 

a cost of doing business. Please provide me with a description of whether you believe 

that the costs of using alternative chemicals or processes can be amortized over 

times. Any case studies that you would have would be greatly appreciated. 

Response. The Center for American Progress survey clearly demonstrated that 

chemical facilities can economically change to more secure alternatives. Of the 284 

facilities documented in the Preventing Toxic Terrorism report, 195 reported cost 

data. Of those, 95 (49 percent) reported changes cost less than $100,000. Most of 

these were drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities. Another 75 (38 percent) reported costs between $100,000 and $1 million. Twenty facilities (10 percent) 

reported costs as high as $10 million. The remainder was higher than that. Facilities reporting higher costs in many cases incorporated alternative technologies and 

processes as part of major facility upgrades. 

A previous study conducted at four facilities in Europe identified more than twodozen opportunities to reduce chemical hazards, the majority with a payback period 

of less than two years. (Source: ‘‘The Feasibility of Encouraging Inherently Safer 

Production in Industrial Firms,’’ by Gerard I.J.M. Zwetsloot and Nicholas Askounes 

Ashford, 2001.) 

Question 5. Please provide me with a description of the types of costs to communities and individuals that cannot be amortized as a result of an uncontrolled release from a facility regulated by section 112 (r) of the Clean Air Act. 

Response. The impacts of 1984 Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal, India are still 

being felt today. According to a June 2006 National Academy of Sciences report, 

3,000 to 7,000 people were killed immediately with 20,000 cumulative deaths and 

200,000 to 500,000 injuries as a result of the release of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas. 

A similar U.S. plant in Victoria, Texas changed its processes so as to use up methyl 

isocyanate as soon as it is produced, all but eliminating potential for an off-site release. 

A July 2004 Homeland Security Council report estimated that an attack on a chlorine facility in the United States could result in 17,500 fatalities, 10,000 severe injuries and 100,000 hospitalizations. They predicted, ‘‘An overall national economic 

downturn is possible in the wake of the attack due to a loss of consumer confidence.’’ 

The presence of acutely hazardous chemicals place significant burdens on citizens 

and Governments in surrounding communities. Those communities need to have 

specialized response capabilities. Local police may be burdened with additional duties monitoring high hazard facilities or frequent theft of anhydrous ammonia. Contingency plans need to be developed and publicized to local citizens. They in turn 

need to have their own personal plans in case an evacuation is required. All safety 

measures are subject to regulation, certification and compliance inspections. Many 

of these costs would be reduced or avoided entirely if facilities switched to more secure alternatives. 

Facilities may not have insurance adequate to compensate the large number of 

people who could be harmed in a worst-case release. Indeed, the Association of 

American Railroads (AAR) recently called the current environment for rail transportation of extremely hazardous substances ‘‘untenable,’’ stating that ‘‘The insurance 

industry is unwilling to insure railroads against the multi-billion-dollar risks associated with highly-hazardous shipments.’’ 

Question 6. Please provide me with a description of the types of costs to businesses that could result from an uncontrolled release from a facility regulated by 

section 112 (r) of the Clean Air Act. 
53 

1 Guidelines for Managing and Analyzing the Security Vulnerabilities of Fixed Chemical 

Sites, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, August 2002 2 ‘‘Security Vulnerability Assessment for the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries’’, American Petroleum Institute, August, 2004. 3 Moore, David A., ‘‘Experiences in the Regulation of Inherent Safety’’, Mary Kay O’Connor 

Process Safety Center, Texas A&M University System, 2002 Annual Symposium, Beyond Regulatory Compliance, Making Safety Second Nature, October 29-30, 2002, College Station, Texas. 4 Bollinger, R. E., D. G. Clark, A. M. Dowell, R. M. Ewbank, D. C. Hendershot, W. K. Lutz, 

S. I. Meszaros, D. E. Park, and E. D. Wixom (1996). Inherently Safer Chemical Processes: A 

Life Cycle Approach, ed. D. A. Crowl. New York: American Institute of Chemical Engineers. 

Response. Given the on-going threat of terrorism to our society, the greatest potential cost to a acutely hazardous chemical manufacturer, user or transporter is the 

potential liability. For example, the release of chlorine gas from a HAZMAT car if 

ruptured because of a terrorist incident in the middle of Washington, DC could kill 

or harm 100,000 people within 30 minutes. Any business associated with such an 

attack risks bankruptcy, since such high-risk insurance is subject to limits and copayments. Shareholders of publicly traded companies that confront such risk and liability deserve to know how the company assesses the terrorism threat and a summary of actions taken to reduce the risk. Such a market-based approach would serve 

as a strong catalyst for change. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID A. MOORE, PE, CSP PRESIDENT & CEO ACUTECH CONSULTING

GROUP CHEMETICA, INC

INTRODUCTION

Good morning, Mr. Chairman. My name is David Moore and I am the President 

and CEO of the AcuTech Consulting Group, a security and safety consulting firm 

based in Alexandria, VA. I have an extensive background in chemical safety and security with a specialty in the application and regulation of inherent safety for chemical plant security. 

I was the lead author of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) 

Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS®) ‘‘Guidelines for Managing and Analyzing the Security Vulnerabilities of Fixed Chemical Sites’’1 and the American Petroleum Institute (API)/National Petrochemical and Refiners Association (NPRA) Security Vulnerability Assessment Methodology2. These are the most highly used security vulnerability analysis guidelines in these industries. 

I completed a project in January, 2006, as the Sector Coordinator for the petroleum refining, chemical manufacturing, and liquefied natural gas sub sectors for the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiative to develop a common strategic 

vulnerability analysis process called ‘Risk Analysis and Management for Critical 

Asset Protection (RAMCAP)’. We currently have other efforts ongoing in support of 

industry and Government to reduce homeland security risks in the chemical sector 

including ongoing consultation to DHS for the chemical comprehensive review program. 

My firm is actively involved in chemical process security consulting and training 

and in conducting Inherently Safer Technology (IST) studies for safety and security, 

some of which are done to address current regulations in effect in Contra Costa 

County, CA, and the State of New Jersey. I have been consulting in chemical process safety since 1981 and formally in inherent safety regulation since 1999. Prior 

to that time there wasn’t a regulation that required IST, but I was practicing the 

principles of inherent safety routinely. I was formerly a Senior Engineer with Mobil 

Corporation, who condoned the principles of inherent safety in every decision we 

made, and before that I was a Research Engineer with the National Fire Protection 

Association. 

In particular, I have assisted companies in understanding the concepts of inherent 

safety through our consulting and training assignments, and have conducted dedicated and integral inherent safety analyses on chemical facilities and other industrial facilities handling hazardous materials. I have published twelve papers on inherent safety, the regulation of inherent safety3, and inherent safety consideration 

in chemical security. I have made numerous presentations on the topic at professional conferences, training forums, and Government venues. 

Because of our experience we were selected by the AIChE CCPS® to update their 

classic book on inherent safety4, which we are in process of at this time. For that 

I am working with the leading inherent safety specialists in the United States and 

internationally from industry and academia who serve as advisors to our team. I 

am a strong proponent of inherent safety, the ultimate goal being to see all compa-
54 

5 Center for Chemical Process Safety, Inherently Safer Chemical Processes: A Life Cycle Approach, Center for Chemical Process Safety, AIChE, 1996. Collins Bill, Chemical Security Act 

of 2005, 

nies applying inherently safer principles throughout the design and operating 

lifecycle of projects. 

INHERENT SAFETY TECHNOLOGY BACKGROUND

Inherent Safety (IS) is emerging as a key process risk management issue. Process 

safety professionals have embraced the concepts voluntarily for years and it is an 

established method for addressing process risks. Any chemical company could point 

to inherent safety considerations they have implemented, whether for a regulation 

or not. This is because it is a general philosophy rather than a science, and it is 

imbedded in the thought process of chemical and safety engineers as they design 

and operate safe plants. They could also speak to many other process risk management techniques that are effective at risk reduction, including passive, active, and 

procedural layers of protection. They tend to employ a mixture of these strategies 

for optimal risk reduction as is appropriate. 

Inherent Safety is a well recognized process safety concept; a collection of basic 

strategies focused on process safety improvement through the reduction of hazards. 

‘‘Hazard’’ is defined as a physical or chemical characteristic that has the potential 

for causing harm to people, the environment, or property.5 The IS concept is based 

on the belief that if one can eliminate or moderate the hazard, not only is the risk 

reduced, it may be possible to remove the risk altogether from consideration. Alternatively, an inherently safer system would make the hazard less likely to be realized and less intense if there is an accident. 

It is a not necessarily a change in ‘technology’ that the term IS is referring to— 

it may involve less dramatic ideas than a change in technology such as a simplification of operating controls. I therefore refer to it as Inherent Safety (IS) to be inclusive of the full range of inherently safer strategies that were originally in mind. 

Technology may be mistaken to mean only process chemistry or the material used, 

rather than other aspects of IS. 

IS includes four basic strategies for safety engineers to apply for process safety 

and risk management of chemical manufacturing plants, namely substitution, minimization, moderation, and simplification. These four strategies could be independent 

ideas or they may relate to one another, depending on the case by case situation. 

There is no defined and agreed upon way to consider them in a formal analysis 

methodology. Engineers are encouraged to consider them to the extent possible, but 

given the innumerable situations where they may be applied there cannot be a rule 

on what is an adequate consideration of IS. 

In 1996 the AIChE CCPS® published the book ‘‘Inherently Safer Chemical Processes—A Concept Book’’, to clarify the concept and to help provide examples. Today 

it remains one of the leading practitioner’s guides to understanding and applying 

inherent safety concepts. It is the leading reference mentioned in various regulatory 

actions and proposed actions. 

ISSUES WITH INHERENT SAFETY

Inherent safety is a challenge for all parties—the owner, chemist, operator, design 

engineer, regulator, and the public. There are limitations of inherent safety and 

technical and business constraints to its usage. There are examples of where inherent safety has been very useful and where opportunities may exist, but since it is 

a concept the blanket requirement of inherent safety poses issues. 

Undocumented considerations 

IS is not new but regulation of IS is new. Most of industry is already practicing 

it but not formally documenting how they use inherent safety as a strategy for risk 

management. Engineers tend to make orderly, inherently safer decisions by practice 

for the most part. This has been expected of industry as a matter of principle, and 

there is evidence it is being practiced but without a degree of measurement of their 

actions or the benefits. One of the suspected reasons for this is the lack of formal 

and agreed IS analysis approaches, and the other is that these requirements simply 

haven’t existed until recently to document the considerations. 

Requires judgment and is potentially subjective 

It is precisely because IS is vague and involves considerable judgment that it is 

very difficult to define and implement to any degree of uniformity and objectivity. 

This is particularly true in the chemical sector where the diversity of chemical uses 
55 

and processes and site specific situations prevents clear characterization of the industry and a one-sized-fits-all solution. 

IS can also be very subjective—how ‘safe or secure’ is ‘safe or secure enough’ is 

a decision of the analyst conducting the study. There are no clear and objective 

guidelines on how to make these decisions as it is considered both a concept to apply 

as one sees fit and as opportunities arise. 

The CCPS® book itself is indeed a concept book and it does not provide a clear 

delineation of what is inherently safer or how to judge whether an inherent safety 

analysis is comprehensive and complete enough. The reason for this is that the topic 

is so diverse that it is, in some cases, even ambiguous. There is an entire section 

of the book explaining the numerous conflicts and risk: risk tradeoff problems of IS. 

Also the state of the practice is not perfectly clear on how it should be defined, conducted, analyzed, assessed, or judged as adequately performed. The book doesn’t 

solve the classical problems with IS of trying to objectively decide ‘what is inherently safer’ and how to measure whether a process is safe enough. This sums the 

state of the practice with IS and is an underlying basis of the problems of attempting to regulate it and to apply it to security issues. 

In actual practice this has proven to be problematic because IS, at this stage in 

its development, is more of a conceptual methodology rather than a codified procedure with a well established and understood framework for evaluation and implementation. This is somewhat a function of the state of the art of our understanding 

of IS. 

Value and Perspective 

What is inherently safer to one person is not necessarily inherently safer to another—it is a matter of perspective. If one takes an insular view of what is inherently safer, it may not be the most inherently safe decision for society as a whole. 

For example, if a plant decides to lower its risk at a given fixed chemical plant site 

by reducing inventory or making an alternative product, this could simply either 

transfer the risk to more of the public through increased shipments of hazardous 

materials in the community or move the same operation to another location which 

may be more problematic. 

Companies may be unclear on the value of IS or may be unable to easily prove 

that IS is beneficial to employ. Methods to prove the value of IS and to quantitatively measure whether a given process is ‘as inherently safe as is practicable’ 

are generally unavailable or unproven. Case studies showing the economic and other 

benefits are not available for a wide array of industrial situations. 

Depending on the goals, the perspective may be that it is safe or secure enough 

as it is. For example, the plant is designed to operate at a given capacity and has 

been optimized through careful engineering design to produce the product safely, efficiently, and cost-effectively. Many IS-type considerations have already gone into 

the design or operating philosophy of the plant. When confronted with the need to 

conduct an IS study, they often find that there are few opportunities to improve on 

that design, short of a complete change of ‘technology’, even if another technology 

exists that is inherently safer. If it does exist they find it troubling to consider 

changing the technology when the gains may be questionable for safety or security. 

As such the net change may be limited. 

Safety and Security Conflicts 

The need to introduce inherent safety as a strategy at all facilities subject to such 

a security regulation is questionable. This would result in a great deal of analysis 

to consider a single strategy has been applied, thereby causing a very large documentation problem and undoubtedly many technical and legal dilemmas. This is 

contrasted with a preferred approach of allowing industry to set security objectives 

to determine the relevant issues and vulnerabilities and make appropriate risk 

management decisions. It should be considered as a potential strategy rather than 

the first priority and allow the most effective homeland security strategies to be applied rather than force a particular one or a change in every technology. 

In fact, what is inherently safer is not necessarily what is inherently more secure. 

For example: 

• Moderation—a process that successfully applied an inherently safer technology 

may have changed a catalyst to end with a ‘moderated’ process—one that is operated at a lower pressure and temperature. This is commendable for safety, but may 

have little to do with security. The process may be disabled just the same, which 

is an issue of economic security, or it may release a flammable or toxic cloud which 

is just as significant. 

• Minimization—In another case an owner may have reduced the inventory of a 

feedstock in a tank to reduce the consequences of an attack. The feedstock is a toxic 
56 

6 Collins Bill, Chemical Security Act of 2005. 

substance, so this appears sensible, but the material is also a ‘dual purpose’ chemical that could be used to make an improvised chemical weapon. In that case simply 

reducing the volume may not matter for the threat of theft of the materials—in fact 

smaller quantities may be more man-portable thereby accommodating theft. The 

plant may need for frequent deliveries of the material, which also increases the 

chance of theft. 

• Simplification—An owner may invest considerable sums of capital to improve 

the simplicity of the control system, thereby lessening the chance of human error 

as a cause of an accident. This may result in a control system that is easier to compromise. 

• Substitution—A petroleum refiner may substitute hydrogen fluoride catalyst 

with sulfuric acid for alkylation (along with substantial process changes). While the 

individual offsite impacts may be reduced from storage the opportunities for disruption of the transportation chain are increased due to the additional deliveries of acid 

that are required. Besides the number of additional volumes of materials transited 

throughout the community, the site has increased vulnerability each time a vehicle 

has to enter the perimeter. Generally speaking security professionals try to find 

ways to reduce penetrations through a secured perimeter. 

IS REGULATORY PROPOSALS AND COMPLICATIONS

Inherent Safety is a common phrase from the chemical industry and is being considered and debated as a chemical process security concept for inclusion in proposed 

chemical security regulations6. IS is being considered by legislators as the first security strategy industry should use for reducing terrorist risk in the chemical sector. 

The newly appreciated concerns for terrorism have naturally highlighted the issue 

of the potential for attack on facilities handling hazardous materials. Out of this 

concern first sprung a potentially far-reaching proposed act titled the Chemical Security Act of 2001, S.1602. The Act was introduced on 10/31/2001 by Senators 

Corzine (D; NJ), Jeffords (D; VT), Boxer (D; CA), and Clinton (D; NY). Since then 

there have been several other proposals. 

The proposed series of Chemical Security Act bills generally state that there are 

significant opportunities to prevent theft from, and criminal attack on, chemical 

sources and reduce the harm that such acts would produce by reducing usage and 

storage of chemicals by changing production methods and processes; and employing 

inherently safer technologies in the manufacture, transport, and use of chemicals; 

These proposed regulations would have sweeping applicability and significant implications for design and operation of facilities handling hazardous materials. Many 

of the facilities mentioned to be included are from the USEPA Risk Management 

Planning regulated sources (40 CFR Part 68), which may not be either highly consequential or attractive to terrorists. Any new initiatives such as this have to be 

rational, measured, cost-effective, and fully justified. 

The anticipated regulatory benefit seems to be that IS can remove the hazard entirely or reduce hazards to de minimis levels to where there is no interest in causing 

the attack. It is often expressed to be a possible strategy for security risk management, and sometimes is mistaken as a relatively obvious and simple approach to 

execute or regulate. Other proven security measures are often seemingly weighed 

as less effective or reliable. 

These existing and proposed regulations typically end in a goal of IS consideration 

‘to the extent practicable’ and sometimes allow cost or feasibility as a basis for justifying a change is ‘practicable’. There is no standard measurement of what this 

means. While companies may believe they are moving toward inherently safer processes, they often find obstacles to the theoretically possible complete application of 

the four IS strategies. 

Homeland security is not that simple and the implementation of IS is not that 

easily accomplished or even necessary for that purpose in all cases. 

PROBLEMS WITH REGULATION OF IS

Holistic security v. singular issues 

The problem is not IS, but the expectation of the value of regulation of IS. It 

forces industry to focus on a few safety strategies to the possible detriment of the 

complete approach to risk management. There seems to be an overemphasis of inherent safety as a singular strategy for security assurances in many of the proposed 

regulations. 
57 

Inherent safety has to be considered in light of other security risk management 

approaches where one is not necessarily preferable over another. That decision 

should be made on a case by case basis rather than blanket regulatory requirements. Most security experts would agree that it is about providing sufficient layers 

of security, combined with an understanding of the threat and risk-based approaches to limiting access to possible assets of interest to adversaries that is the 

desired homeland security approach. 

Both chemical process security and inherent safety are complex topics that are not 

easily mandated. To isolate inherent safety as a particularly necessary one is good 

practice but not necessarily good Government regulation. IST is not the panacea. 

It is not a ‘‘thing’’ that can be measured. It is a process towards safe manufacturing. 

It is a system of interdependent values and not something that can be distilled into 

a legislative definition and then regulated. Security management itself isn’t a singular strategy. Furthermore, IS cannot be regarded as the sole design or operating 

criteria as it must be integrated with other considerations. The real issue is risk, 

whether safety or security risks, that IS can be applied to. 

Degree of regulatory compliance effort 

If IS is forced onto industrial facilities, there could be considerable dilemmas in 

interpretation, technical judgment, fairness, and liabilities. It isn’t possible for everyone to fairly be dictated as to what is inherently safer. If the degree of inherent 

safety is left to discretion, there could be a very uneven treatment of the issue. 

If the regulator was to make the judgment of what is practicable or the extent 

of practicality, there could be numerous issues develop. Do we want outside third 

parties to force changes in technology or operating philosophy on a company and 

to take on the liability of that decision when they may clearly lack the expertise 

for making this decision? 

Since you can’t measure it, how could you ever comply. . . how much IST is 

enough. . . what is compliance. . . how can you ever demonstrate that you adequately considered something so that it met some arbitrary definition. IST for every 

facility is not even feasible as there fewer options for some sites (where substitution 

of chemicals isn’t possible since it is the only way or decidedly the best way or common practice for a given process). 

No one is sure, therefore, of the degree of difficulty that requirements such are 

being proposed will cause but there will be, no doubt, considerable confusion due 

to the degree of ambiguity involved. 

Diversion of scarce resources needed for homeland security 

Regulatory impacts may cause a possible diversion of attention to the complete 

set of security measures available to the industry given the threat, consequences, 

and vulnerabilities. It provokes an enormous effort with possibly little to no additional gain, possibly at the detriment to security as resources are expended on less 

critical issues. It may not get at the heart of the matter—the degree of risk primarily caused by the degree of vulnerability of the industrial facilities. 

This is process for chemical engineers together with safety experts to examine on 

a case-by-base basis, not in a sweeping edict from Congress. I am very concerned 

that rather than addressing true homeland security issues of the chemical sector, 

many hours of effort and resources would be diverted to proving the a process was 

already inherently safe as is practicable. The potential for litigation trying to 

‘‘prove’’ you considered something is enormous. 

Although a process or plant can be modified to increase IS at any time in its life 

cycle, the potential for major improvements is greatest at the earliest stages of process development. At these early stages, the process engineer has maximum degrees 

of freedom in the plant and process specification. The U.S. infrastructure that is 

being considered for chemical security regulation initially under any future regulation that requires IS is existing plant. 

Judging adequacy and effectiveness 

There is little guidance on how to judge effectiveness and completeness of inherent safety, particularly in a meaningful, fair and equitable way to all parties. This 

could prove to be a major dilemma for both industry and regulators as they try to 

justify that ‘enough’ inherent safety has been applied to be considered ‘in compliance’ with inherent safety requirements of security regulations. Experience has 

shown that regulators and industry have a difficult time interpreting inherent safety and agreeing on adequacy of efforts. 

Given that inherent safety is a rather subjective concept, it makes the matter a 

difficult one to understand, implement, and regulate. Companies should be knowledgeable of inherent safety and actively encourage the use of it at every turn in a 

holistic approach to risk reduction. 
58 

7 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (1996). ‘‘Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under Clean Air Act Section 112 (r) (7).’’ Federal Register 

61, 120 (June 20), 31668-730. 8 Moore, David A., ‘‘Experiences in the Regulation of Inherent Safety’’, Mary Kay O’Connor 

Process Safety Center, Texas A&M University System, 2002 Annual Symposium, Beyond Regulatory Compliance, Making Safety Second Nature, October 29-30, 2002, College Station, Texas 

EXPERIENCE WITH IS REGULATIONS

In actual practice IS implementation has proven to be problematic. The reason is 

that IS, at this time, is more of a theoretic concept rather than a codified procedure 

with a well established and understood framework for evaluation and implementation. Furthermore, it cannot be regarded as the sole design criteria as it must be 

integrated with other considerations. Industry 

Today there is only one example of an implemented IS regulatory requirement for 

process safety and that is part of the Contra Costa County, CA, local Industrial 

Safety Ordinance (ISO) enacted in 1998 which effects only eight chemical sites. As 

for security, the only one that exists is in New Jersey where the Governor enacted 

a Prescriptive Order in November of 2005 which includes the need to consider IS 

for chemical security for certain sites in the state. Neither regulation goes so far 

as to require a change in technology due to the enormous challenges and liabilities 

associated with that move. 

Contra Costa County, CA, Industrial Safety Ordinance 

The Contra Costa County, CA, Industrial Safety Ordinance (ISO) became effective 

January 15, 1999. The ordinance applies to eight oil refineries and chemical plants 

that were required to submit a Risk Management Plan to the U.S. EPA7 and are 

a program level 3 regulated stationary sources as defined by the California Accidental Release Prevention (CalARP) Program. 

Part of the ISO requirements is the need for the regulated stationary sources to 

consider inherently safer systems when evaluating the recommendations from process hazard analyses for existing processes and to consider inherently safer systems 

in the development and analysis of mitigation items resulting from a review of new 

processes and facilities. Contra Costa Health Services completed and issued a 

Contra Costa County Safety Program Guidance Document on January 15, 2000. 

This document included a definition of inherent safety and some rules for implementation of the ordinance. 

Lessons Learned from the Contra Costa County, CA, implementation of inherent 

safety requirements for their Industrial Safety Ordinance were presented in 2002 

(Moore, 2002)8. 

• Companies found IS to be difficult if not infeasible to accomplish, particularly 

for existing processes; 

• There are different perspectives on what is reasonable and what is feasible 

when it comes to decisions on the need for implementing IS; 

• The guidance provided to ensure that IS was being considered consistently and 

fully was not informative enough, so there was some confusion and an education 

gap; 

• The public and regulators often mistrust industry if anything less than a total 

technology change is implemented despite that IS includes a wide variety of ideas 

to meet the four strategies of minimization, substitution, simplification and moderation; 

• Application of IS at only the most purely inherent level (first principles) is often 

at odds with practical and cost effective risk reduction, especially for existing construction; 

• Guidance/training is needed for a team to know how to apply IS effectively. 

New Jersey Prescriptive Order 

On November 21, 2005, the State of New Jersey became the first State to require 

chemical plant security measures to protect against terrorist attacks. Acting Governor Richard J. Codey set new requirements for the 140 facilities that must comply 

with the Prescriptive Order, 43 of which are subject to the state’s Toxic Catastrophe 

Prevention Act (TCPA) program. As part of the new requirements, these 43 facilities 

must review the potential for adopting inherently safer technology (IST) as part of 

their assessment. 

This is very significant for three reasons—it sets precedent for State mandate of 

security of the chemical industry, it incorporates the need to evaluate IST more 

widely than any other regulation in the United States, and it forces industry to 

prove compliance to security ‘best practices’ they developed. 
59 

In 2003, the New Jersey Domestic Security Preparedness Task Force approved 

best security practices that were built upon the security code of the American 

Chemistry Council’s responsible care program and the American Petroleum Institute’s security guidelines, respectively. The best practices were developed by the 

Task Force and its Infrastructure Advisory Committee, which includes representatives of the State’s chemical and petroleum industry. Many New Jersey-based facilities have voluntarily begun to implement these practices. The Prescriptive Order action clarifies that the best practices for chemical facilities are now mandatory. 

The 43 chemical facilities in the TCPA program must analyze and report the feasibility of: 

• reducing the amount of material that potentially may be released; 

• substituting less hazardous materials; 

• using materials in the least hazardous process conditions or form; and, 

• designing equipment and processes to minimize the potential for equipment failure and human error. 

Best practices included provisions for the facilities to prepare an emergency incident prevention, preparedness and response plan and outline the status of implementing other security practices. The State standards also now require worker participation in the development of the security assessments and prevention and response plans at each facility. 

Under the new requirements, chemical facilities had 120 days to develop an assessment of facility vulnerabilities and hazards that might be exploited by potential 

terrorists. The assessments must include a critical review of: 

• security systems and access to the facility grounds (including the regular testing and maintenance of security systems); 

• existing or needed security measures outside the perimeter of the facility that 

would reduce vulnerabilities to an attack on the facility; 

• storage and processing of potentially hazardous materials; 

• employee and contractor background checks and other personnel security measures; and, 

• information and cyber security; 

The Prescriptive Order timing is critical as the nation struggles with how to more 

completely manage terrorism risks and to sort out the need for regulations for industries that are otherwise unregulated today. At this point the effectiveness of this 

rule is still in question. What is clear is the degree of change that most complex, 

existing plants will incur due to the identification of IS opportunities will be very 

limited based on personal experience. 

RESEARCH ON THE EVALUATION OF INHERENT SAFETY

Some methods have been proposed to provide a benchmark for inherent safety. 

Most of these involve indices or fuzzy logic. While these are excellent developments 

in the right direction, they are not fully validated or comprehensive enough to assure that the aforementioned issues are satisfied. 

There is a need for metrics and rules for how to evaluate inherent safety before 

regulations can be effective. Without a fair and legitimate way to measure the total 

risk balance created by changes in the name of inherent safety it will be subjective 

and possibly unfair. 

Complex process systems, particularly with a long history of safe performance, 

cannot suddenly be dictated that a system is inherently safer without a great deal 

of individualized risk-risk tradeoff evaluation. Inherent safety is not fully understood, so regulating it and forcing change against typical engineering practices (with 

a strong empirical basis of success) is not recommended 

There have been many experts recognize that this may be creating many other 

problems by overly relying on one strategy vs. a holistic approach. Facilities should 

be given that flexibility all the while bounded by appropriate layers of safety to reduce risk to an acceptable level. 

PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF INHERENT SAFETY

Often inherent safety is seen as ‘obvious’ and ‘common sense’ when in reality the 

issue may not be that simple. Risk-risk tradeoffs can have unfortunate results if not 

properly evaluated. Priorities to inherent safety may mean compromises elsewhere. 
60 

1Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, ‘‘Risk/Risk Tradeoffs in Pesticide Regulation: Evaluating 

the Public Health Effects of a Ban on Organophosphate and Carbamate Pesticides’’, George M. 

Gray and James K. Hammitt, Harvard Center for Risk Analysis And Department of Health Policy and Management, Harvard School of Public Health 718 Huntington Ave, Boston, MA 02115, 

August 6, 1999. 9 Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) (1993). Guidelines for Engineering Design for 

Process Safety. New York: American Institute of Chemical Engineers. 

Efforts to reduce risks often neglect the possibility that measures to reduce the ‘‘target risk’’ may introduce or enhance ‘‘countervailing risks.’’1

An important point is that we need to consider risk management interventions, 

not a single risk reduction strategy alone. Like medications, any intervention can 

have side effects. Instead industry and Government should advocate a proactive, holistic approach rather than heuristic, piecemeal reactions to homeland security. 

BARRIERS IDENTIFIED FOR IMPLEMENTING IS

A workshop was held on the challenge of IS at the 17th Annual CCPS International Conference & Workshop on Risk, Reliability and Security in Jacksonville, 

Florida, on October 11, 2002, to address the concerns of implementing IS. Speakers 

from the USEPA, AIChE, Contra Costa County, and industry presented their experiences on the issue. In summary of that discussion, the audience agreed that there 

were barriers for effectively 

implementing IS, and issues and challenges for any regulation of IS. Some of the 

constraints were reported to be as follows: 

Adoption and implementation of IS by industry: 

1. Existing facilities vs. new facilities—one dilemma is that the majority of the 

applications for IS are with the existing industrial installed base whereas the feasibility of applying IS to the fullest diminishes as the facility is actually built. This 

leaves many companies where new processes (and particularly new technologies) are 

rarely implemented resulting in few occasions to practice the methods. 

‘‘Although a process or plant can be modified to increase IS at any time in 

its life cycle, the potential for major improvements is greatest at the earliest stages of process development. At these early stages, the process engineer has maximum degrees of freedom in the plant and process specification. The engineer is free to consider basic process alternatives such as fundamental technology and chemistry and the location of the plant. Imperial 

Chemical Industries (ICI) describes six stages of hazard studies, including 

three during the process design phase and three during construction, startup and routine plant operation. The identification of inherently safer process alternatives is most effectively accomplished between the first and second process design hazard studies (Preston and Turney 1991). At this stage 

the conceptual plant design meets the general rule for an optimization process—that a true optimum can be found only if all of the parameters are allowed to vary simultaneously (Gygax 1988).’’ (CCPS, ‘‘Guidelines for Engineering Design for Process Safety, 1993)’’9

2. Unproven Value—Companies many be unclear on the value of IS or may be 

unable to easily prove that IS is cost-effective and worthwhile to employ, particularly for security. Methods to prove the value of IS and to quantitatively measure 

whether a given process is ‘as inherently safe as is practicable’ are generally unavailable or unproven. Agreed upon and practical tools for systematically conducting 

IS reviews under repeatable methodologies are not available with the exception of 

checklists or adaptation of safety analysis methodologies. Case studies showing the 

economic benefit are not available for a wide array of industrial situations. 

3. Unclear vision of scope of IS—One can take a broad or a narrow view of IS. 

The narrow viewpoint only credits major changes in the degree of hazard whereas 

the broad viewpoint of inherent safety finds any change by the application of IS 

principles to be an advantage. All of the proposed regulations are very vague in 

their definition of inherent safety and industry experts themselves have mixed opinions on this point. Is reducing some inventory IS or is it only IS if the material hazards was substituted, which is the IS strategy that seems to be of most interest for 

the regulatory proposals reviewed? 

REGULATION OF IS

The constraints to the regulation of IS include many of the concerns above plus: 

1. Criteria for making compliance decisions—An obstacle to clear cut regulation 

is the lack of consensus on appropriate IS metrics. Assuming that the regulation is 
61 

10 Mannan, M.S., ‘‘Challenges in Implementing Inherent Safety Principles in New and Existing Chemical Processes,’’ White Paper, Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center, College Station, Texas, August 2002. 11 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (1996). ‘‘Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under Clean Air Act Section 112 (r) (7).’’ Federal Register 

61, 120 (June 20), 31668-730. 12 61 Fed. Reg. 31699 (June 20, 1996). 

performance-based, there must be metrics for consistent regulation. These criteria 

are very hard to define with a broad conceptual topic such as IS for the wide variety 

of chemical processes to be regulated. This dilemma was recently described by the 

Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center—‘‘Regulation to improve inherent safety 

faces several difficulties. There is not presently a way to measure inherent safety. 

Process plant complexity essentially prevents any prescriptive rules that would be 

widely applicable. It would seem that legislation could explicitly require facilities to 

evaluate inherently safer design options as part of their process hazard analysis. 

But inherent safety would be almost impossible to enforce beyond evaluation because there are unavoidable technical and economic issues.’’ (Mannan, et.al, 200310) 

2. Need to consider risk rather than only hazard—There is little sense to the idea 

of imposing a requirement for ‘change for the sake of change’, i.e., requiring that 

every hazardous situation be made inherently safer. Industry is interested in referencing a measure of acceptable risk which limits the need for additional risk reduction since beyond that level resources may be better spent on other matters. 

3. Unclear how to measure performance or compliance—Will regulations require 

only fundamental strategies to be employed, such as a site reports it reduced some 

materials onsite, or will it be based on vulnerability to the chemicals that remain? 

The factors and process to measure the effectiveness of IS regulations is not defined 

so it becomes very subjective.—Inherent safety regulations would have to show 

measurable benefit. If there was a reduction or increase in the number of incidents 

it could be incorrect to infer whether IS was the leading factor or whether other 

measures were involved. It is, therefore, difficult to measure the effectiveness of IS 

regulations. 

The USEPA representatives at the workshop reported that the EPA intends to include IS in their analysis of the effectiveness of the Risk Management Plan (RMP) 

regulation (USEPA, 1996)11 when they review the next submittals of registrations 

and hazard assessments. This is likely to be challenging given the state of implementation of IS and EPA’s own admission on their expectation for inherent safety 

in the Risk Management Planning regulation. When EPA promulgated the RMP 

rule, some commenters asked EPA to require facilities to conduct ‘‘technology options analyses’’ to identify inherently safer approaches. EPA declined to do so, stating that ‘‘PHA teams regularly suggest viable, effective (and inherently safer) alternatives for risk reduction, which may include features such as inventory reduction, 

material substitution, and process control changes. These changes are made as opportunities arise, without regulation or adoption of completely new and unproven 

process technologies. EPA does not believe that a requirement that sources conduct 

searches or analyses of alternative processing technologies for new or existing processes will produce additional benefits beyond those accruing to the rule already. 

(FR, 199612) 

4. IS means different things to different audiences—One person’s opinion of IS is 

not another person’s necessarily, and as a result risks could be simply transferred 

to others. 

5. Macro v. Micro benefit—If IS regulations encourage individual plants to take 

the most inherently safe position to them, that is not necessarily the most inherently safe (or secure) position for the community they operate in thereby potentially 

increasing the societal risks. A common example is that of transportation risk, 

where the increased number of transits caused by lowering the onsite volume of a 

required feedstock increases the number of transits through the communities in the 

distribution chain. In addition, though, is the prospect that the total societal risk 

from a wide collection of inherently safer individual decisions leads to a redistribution of risk across the country—the analog of squeezing a balloon. 

6. Economic Security—Another example of this concern is the possible lack of appreciation of the economic security of the chemical infrastructure in legislative discussions on inherent safety. At a national, State or local level, the economic impacts 

of an attack or disruption of the chemical infrastructure should be a key concern. 

If the plant is disabled for any reason, such as a distribution chain disruption, the 

lack of inventory may make the plant inoperative for a longer period of time than 

if it had accumulated and secured supplies necessary to function. It is more likely 

that plants will face supply issues due to natural or manmade disasters than be at-
62 

1 Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, ‘‘Risk/Risk Tradeoffs in Pesticide Regulation: Evaluating 

the Public Health Effects of a Ban on Organophosphate and Carbamate Pesticides’’, George M. 

Gray and James K. Hammitt, Harvard Center for Risk Analysis And Department of Health Policy and Management, Harvard School of Public Health 718 Huntington Ave, Boston, MA 02115, 

August 6, 1999. 

tacked and so the macro view of homeland security is compromised at the expense 

of a local viewpoint. These goals need to be balanced from a risk perspective with 

other hazard reduction goals. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Rather than attempt to regulate a vague and creative safety concept for chemical 

security, it should be left to industry and Government to work together to consider 

the full spectrum of available security risk management strategies and to meet performance standards for security based on site specific needs. Inherent safety should 

not be seen as the most important strategy to implement. Risk should be the measure of security preparedness given consequence, vulnerability, and threat considerations. 

RESPONSES BY DAVID A. MOORE TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR INHOFE

Question 1. ‘‘As you may know, 2 years ago we has elevated levels of lead in 

Washington DC’s drinking water. Subsequently studies indicate that the changing 

of chemicals switching from chlorine to chloramines was to blame. Isn’t this one of 

the big problems if the Federal Government seeks to mandate IST? Unintended adverse consequences? What happens when the federal Government is wrong?’’ 

Response. Government intervention on the design and operating practices of 

chemical facilities has a high potential to cause inadvertent safety or security consequences. History is ripe with past ideas which, in retrospect, didn’t reduce risks 

as intended or caused other parties to be exposed to higher risks. At one time the 

following technologies were considered ‘safer’: 

• Underground storage tanks (later found to cause environmental problems); • Freons as a refrigerant gas (later found to contribute to ozone depletion, and 

then replaced primarily with anhydrous ammonia, the most popular chemical used 

prior to the introduction of freons); 

The design of plants is based on years of experience in chemistry and engineering, 

and plant operating practices are established that are commensurate with the design and operating parameters of the plant. Change is not necessarily healthy for 

a plant especially abrupt changes after years of successful and safe operation. Most 

accidents occur during startup, shutdown, changes, and maintenance to a plant. If, 

in someone’s opinion, a global change of technology would be inherently safer and 

this was to be mandated, it may be that arbitrarily forcing a change on a facility 

could have one of the following example effects: 

• A plant that was forced to minimize feedstock inventory, such as a reagent, 

could result in less flexibility for operators to manage an emergency; • A plant that was forced to use an alternative chemical may be less familiar with 

the technology resulting in a higher chance of an incident or less experience in control of the process in an excursion. • A chemical could be ‘inherently safer’ from the perspective of toxicity or flammability, but be much more difficult to process leading to higher risk of incidents. 

Inherently safer doesn’t necessarily mean zero risk—it may be that the hazard 

is simply different. Efforts to reduce risks often neglect the possibility that measures to reduce the ‘‘target risk’’ may introduce or enhance ‘‘countervailing risks.’’1

An important point is that we need to consider risk management interventions, 

not a single risk reduction strategy alone. Like medications, any intervention can 

have side effects. Instead industry and Government should advocate a proactive, holistic approach rather than heuristic, piecemeal reactions to homeland security. 

Question 2. ‘‘In his opening statement Senator Obama pointed to the need to process to ‘‘ensure that individual facilities are not making short-sighted decisions that 

merely shift risks elsewhere.’’ You talked extensively about this dynamic in your 

testimony. Senator Obama also points to wastewater treatment facilities that have 

switched from chlorine gas to liquid bleach as an IST approach that has worked and 

is relatively easy too. Aside from the cost of such a change, one major utility spent 

$13 million, liquid bleach, or sodium hypochlorite has a very short shelf life. It must 

be produced within the vicinity of the treatment works. Further, gaseous chlorine 
63 

is used to make sodium hypochlorite. While the treatment works may not be storing 

gaseous chlorine, another facility in the near community must be in order to supply 

the sodium hypochlorite. Therefore, isn’t switching to liquid bleach essentially shifting some of the risk somewhere else?’’ 

Response. That is correct. Sodium hypochlorite (NaOCl) is a solution made from 

reacting chlorine with a sodium hydroxide solution. Since the manufacturing of sodium hypochlorite depends on gaseous chlorine and if a plant was to supply a larger 

quantity of sodium hypochlorite to a wider market area, it is conceivable that the 

manufacturing plant could increase the frequency of transits and quantity of chlorine required in order to meet demand. This could increase the societal risk of the 

community near to the plant and the workers involved. 

Also please note that sodium hypochlorite is not without hazards. People have 

been seriously injured as a result of the chlorine released when sodium hypochlorite 

solutions are accidentally mixed with acids or acidic materials. Sodium hypochlorite 

is incompatible with many acids, ethylene glycol, propane, metals such as copper 

and nickel, and reducing agents such as sodium sulfite, and hydrogen peroxide to 

name a few. 

Question 3. ‘‘To follow-up on a question from Senator Jeffords about the use of 

chlorine by the nations water and wastewater utilities, in January 2005 report on 

security at wastewater utilities, the GAO estimated it would cost a utility $12.5 million to switch from chlorine to sodium hypochlorite. According to a March 2006 GAO 

report, after careful review of cost, technical feasibility and safety considerations, 

and without the presence of a federal mandate on technology, 116 of the 206 largest 

POTWs switched from gaseous chlorine to another technology, most likely sodium 

hypochlorite. In that same report, GAO found that another 20 plan to switch to a 

technology other than chlorine. Nearly two-thirds of the nations largest POTWs are 

not using chlorine. Those who continue to use chlorine have taken steps to ensure 

that chlorine is secure. In your view, have these utilities gone though the appropriate process and decided, without a federal IST mandate, to continue using chlorine based on their individual systems’ needs and is this not the best way to make 

these decisions? In your experience developing site security plans and vulnerability 

assessments, so you believe companies will consider IST even if we don’t create a 

mandatory federal IST program?’’ 

Response. The water treating industry is well aware of the options for biocides. 

The GAO report you cite seems to be evidence of the fact that inherent safety is 

being practiced where practical and feasible. Industry has been using inherent safety philosophy for years before they coined the term ‘inherent safety’. Engineers naturally optimize designs and strive to achieve performance with efficiency and safety. 

The elimination of chlorine simply due to its inherent hazards is not always feasible or necessary. Chlorine is used due to the long history of success in achieving 

the end goal—the effective and safe disinfection of water. Chlorine chemistry is also 

important to the production of pharmaceuticals, medical devices, safety equipment, 

computers, automobiles, aircraft parts and crop protection chemicals in other processes. 

Companies may balance their safety and security needs by a number of strategies 

besides inherent safety, so it is possible that even those that chose to keep chlorine 

have addressed security and safety in other ways. In addition, it may be that some 

of the facilities had lesser public consequences in the event of a release due to quantity stored or the density of population in the neighboring area. 

RESPONSES BY DAVID A. MOORE TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR VOINOVICH

Question 1. ‘‘Across the entire chemical manufacturing industry in the U.S., how 

many of the chemicals listed on EPA’s Risk Management Plan list have scientifically 

proven alternatives that increase safety, reduce risk, and operate at least as effectively, in terms of both cost and end product, as the chemical compound that is 

being replaced? 

Who or what body should determine what IST is? Should it be defined by Government, industry, or academia? If Government does define it, which agency should be 

responsible for that? To your knowledge has IST ever been defined as a security 

measure in Federal law? 

Response. Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires EPA to promulgate 

regulations for the prevention and mitigation of accidental releases of extremely 

hazardous substances. Under this rule, 77 specific toxic substances and 63 specific 

flammable substances were regulated. According to Mr. Jim Belke of EPA in a pres-
64 

2 Belke, James, USEPA, RMP 2004 Update, AIChE CCPS Technical Steering Committee, November 9, 2004. 

entation he gave in 20042, approximately 14,600 active RMPs were filed with EPA 

in 2004 involving some 20,000 processes including about 17,150 that contain toxic 

chemicals and 7,700 that contain flammable chemicals. These represent a wide variety of industry facility types from Food and Beverage, Energy, Water and Wastewater, Agriculture, and Chemical Manufacturing. Even for any given industry or 

chemical there it is difficult if not impossible to say that there is a single ‘technology’ substitution or inherently safer strategy that could be universally employed. 

Each process has a specific use for the chemical substance and it is far too complex 

to find a magic bullet solution, let alone risk reduction may not justify the action. 

The feasibility of an inherently safer strategy must be individually evaluated. 

In most cases it is not feasible to substitute the basic chemicals manufacturing 

process. For example, anhydrous ammonia or chlorine manufacturing will have 

those chemicals involved as end products. These are fundamental building block 

chemicals that may not have substitutes depending on their case by case use. 

Question 2. ‘‘Who or what body should determine what IST is? Should it be defined by Government, industry, or academia? If Government does define it, which 

agency should be responsible for that? 

Response. I believe the definition of what is inherently safer for any given plant 

must be made by a site specific analysis. Industry is in the best position to make 

this judgment given their intimate knowledge of all of the risk factors that are involved in this determination. 

Question 3. ‘‘To your knowledge has IST ever been defined as a security measure 

in federal law? 

Response. I have not seen IST requirements in any Federal law regarding security. Security regulations address reducing vulnerabilities to threats through security strategies including deterrence, detection, delay, or response activities. 

Question 4. ‘‘The EPA has concluded that: 

• ‘‘Inherently safer processes’’ is a developing concept and is not ready for general 

application; • IST frequently displaces risk rather than reducing it; • Even if a few examples of workable alternative approaches do exist, there is not 

a rational basis for imposing an additional industry-wide regulatory burden; and • The concept is normally considered when designing new processes, a time when 

changes can be implemented cost effectively. 

Do you agree with the above assessments? In that context, do you believe that 

IST a concept that is ready for broad implementation as a regulatory requirement?’’ 

Response. My testimony contained similar conclusions to the USEPA so I am in 

complete agreement with this statement. Also, as stated in my testimony, regulation 

of a concept is not credible as we lack objective measures of inherent safety’s value. 

It is precisely because IS is vague and involves considerable judgment that it is very 

difficult to define and implement to any degree of uniformity and objectivity. This 

is particularly true in the chemical sector where the diversity of chemical uses and 

processes and site specific situations prevents clear characterization of the industry 

and a one-sized-fits-all solution. 

IS can also be very subjective—how ‘safe or secure’ is ‘safe or secure enough’ is 

a decision of the analyst conducting the study. There are no clear and objective 

guidelines on how to make these decisions as it is considered both a concept to apply 

as one sees fit and as opportunities arise. 

Question 5. Senator Voinovich asked: ‘‘Mr. Moore, you mention that ‘‘reduction of 

risk’’ may actually increase ‘‘countervailing risk.’’ Can you explain this in greater 

detail?’’ 

Response. A countervailing risk is one that is created (expectedly or unexpectedly) 

by the action of implementing an inherently safer strategy (minimize, substitute, 

simplify, or moderate) that has an opposing or neutralizing effect to the desired end 

goal (which was reduction of risk). Every action taken has the potential for this effect. For example, by decreasing onsite inventory a plant increases the amount and 

frequency of transportation of chemicals. If a chemical is substituted the new chemical may have other unexpected hazards to have to manage that may or may not 

be known. If a process is simplified, redundancy or reliability may be decreased 

rather than increased leading to the higher likelihood of a release. 

Question 6. ‘‘Mr. Moore, I would gather from your statement that you feel that 

without incentives, the innovation and development of IST standards is too heavy 

a burden to place on industry. You seem to suggest that Government could be re-
65 

sponsible for researching and developing standards for IST. Could you please elaborate?’’ 

Response. Government’s role should be to fund research on fundamental challenges that implementation of IST faces today: 1) defining exactly what it is and 

isn’t; 2) how to evaluate IST benefits v. risks gained 3) IST applications and examples 4) education of managers and engineers and Government officials on the appropriate use, expectations, and limitations of IST. 

RESPONSES BY DAVID A. MOORE TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR OBAMA

Question 1. ‘‘Department of homeland Securities officials told EPW staffers in 

preparation for this hearing that if left to their own devices, individual facilities 

might make IST decisions that decrease risk at one plant, but increase risk systemwide. What are your thoughts on that assertion, and of DHS’s potentially helpful 

role in coordination IST at the most dangerous facilities? 

Response. While I am not familiar with the conversation involving DHS I would 

offer that DHS’s role should be to participate in the suggested Government research 

and education needs mentioned in response to question No. 6 above and for investigating the security benefits of IST in particular. Also, I believe it would be extremely difficult if not impossible for DHS to make these judgments fairly and technically given their complexity. All of the reasons listed in my testimony as to why 

IST is a difficult regulatory scheme applies to the DHS as well. 

Question 2. ‘‘In march of this year, Secretary Chertoff said he was open to the 

idea of requiring high-risk facilities to consider safer approaches. This is a position 

the industry opposes. What is your view on requiring high-risk facilities to consider 

IST?’’ 

Response. I believe industry should be left to prove that security risks are adequately addressed in total rather than to digress into academic exercises proving a 

negative in many cases, i.e., that IST isn’t feasible. This is especially true with security where the emphasis should be on security strategies rather than safety strategies and Government should prioritize reducing vulnerabilities rather than focusing 

on changing technology. To me this is equivalent to requiring the airline industry 

to handle less passengers, fly smaller aircraft, or to not fly over populated areas 

since the inherent hazards are that there could be an accident. Following 9/11 the 

airline industry implemented security measures and accommodated commercial 

needs for the conveniences and necessity of passenger travel. 

STATEMENT OF LISA P. JACKSON, COMMISSIONER, NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

Good morning Chairman Inhofe, ranking member Jeffords and Members of the 

Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. I would like to thank the 

Committee for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the role of inherently 

safer technology in United States chemical plant security legislation. 

Chemical plant security is a subject that Governor Jon S. Corzine and every New 

Jersey resident regard with urgent concern. We view our Chemical Standards, including requirements for inherently safer technology evaluation, as vital to providing New Jersey with an accurate reflection of our current state of security preparedness, as I will further outline in my testimony. 

Our residents live in the shadow of the attacks of September 11, 2001, which 

claimed the lives of 674 New Jerseyans and transformed our northern waterfront 

into an evacuation zone. New Jersey also was the launching site for the first major 

bio-terror attacks on United States soil resulting in fatalities, when a still-unknown 

terrorist mailed anthrax-laden letters that severely contaminated the United States 

Postal Service facility in Hamilton, NJ. 

New Jersey’s very strengths create particular vulnerability to acts of domestic terrorism. Our chemical, petroleum and other industrial plants that support the economy of the Nation are clustered around well- developed transportation infrastructure linking the New York and Philadelphia metropolitan regions. The Port of New 

Jersey and New York is the entry point for more than 4 million cargo containers 

and 55 million tons of bulk cargo valued at over $100 billion. New Jersey is home 

to Newark Liberty International Airport—one of the busiest airports in the country 

serving more than 30 million passengers annually. My state is well-known as the 

center of pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and other life science industries targeted by 

violent and extreme animal rights activists. All of these infrastructure sites and 
66 

more are potential targets for terrorists, and all lie in the most densely populated 

State in the Union. 

I shall begin with a brief overview of New Jersey’s domestic security preparedness 

activities, and then turn to the specific reasons why the evaluation of inherently 

safer technologies in the chemical industry is of vital importance. 

Overview of New Jersey’s Domestic Security Preparedness Effort 

New Jersey’s unique vulnerabilities have made us a leader among states in initiating and implementing measures to counter potential terrorist operatives, to reduce the risk of attack at critical infrastructure facilities, and to reduce the potential impacts to public health and safety if any such attacks should occur in the future. New Jersey undertakes these efforts through our Domestic Security Preparedness Task Force (Task Force), chaired by Director Richard L. Canas of our Office 

of Homeland Security and Preparedness (OHSP). 

As Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), I serve 

as the Task Force lead for the pharmaceutical and biotechnology, chemical, nuclear, 

petroleum, wastewater, and dam safety sectors of our critical infrastructure. I share 

responsibility for the water sector as well in cooperation with the New Jersey Board 

of Public Utilities. Through the Task Force and the OHSP, I also participate in New 

Jersey’s preparedness and response effort for other sectors. 

The Task Force has undertaken a comprehensive program to reduce terror risk, 

to ensure preparedness at critical infrastructure facilities, and to test the efficacy 

of both public agencies and the private sector in responding to acts of terrorism. 

Every Task Force agency and every sector of our critical infrastructure has developed, through a public-private collaboration, a series of ‘‘Best Practices’’ for domestic 

security. Each set of Best Practices was reviewed and approved by the Task Force 

and the Governor. Every Task Force agency and every sector of our critical infrastructure has also participated in appropriate exercises to test the strengths and 

limits of terror detection and response capability. 

New Jersey’s current challenge is to ensure full implementation of security ‘‘Best 

Practices’’ across all sectors, consistent with a policy of ‘‘Zero Tolerance’’ for noncompliance, and to identify those additional regulatory and other measures that are 

appropriate to contend with emerging threats and challenges. Throughout this process, DEP is working with OHSP, State Police, Attorney General’s Office and private 

companies within our sectors to reduce or eliminate specific threats that we have 

identified on a case-by-case basis. 

New Jersey’s Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act (TCPA) Program 

The Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act (TCPA) program was created in 1986 as 

a result of a chemical accident in Bhopal, India that killed thousands of nearby residents. Several chemical facilities in New Jersey had experienced minor accidents 

prior to this time, clearly indicating that a similar risk existed in New Jersey. The 

TCPA requires facilities that handle extraordinarily hazardous substances above 

certain inventory thresholds to prepare and implement risk management plans. The 

plans must include detailed procedures for safety reviews of design and operation, 

operating procedures, maintenance procedures, training activities, emergency response, process hazard analysis with risk assessment and self-auditing procedures. 

An extraordinarily hazardous substance is defined as a substance, which if released 

into the environment would result in a significant likelihood of causing death or permanent disability. 

In 1998 the program adopted USEPA’s 112(r) Accidental Release Prevention Program (40 CFR 68) by reference. This program included additional toxic substances 

and highly flammable substances. It also required each facility to complete a worst 

case scenario analysis. The worst case scenario models the resultant toxic cloud to 

a predetermined concentration. The USEPA end point concentrations are approximately one-tenth of the concentration that would cause death to persons exposed. 

On August 4, 2003, the readoption of the TCPA rules added reactive hazards substances to the list of extraordinarily hazardous substances covered under the program. Industrial accidents in New Jersey resulting from reactive hazards demonstrated the need to include reactives under the TCPA program. Owners and operators having listed reactive hazard substances in quantities that meet or exceed 

thresholds are required to develop risk management plans to reduce the risk associated with these unstable substances. In addition, and the focus of this testimony, 

this readoption included a requirement that owners and operators evaluate inherently safer technology for newly designed and constructed covered processes. 

Chemical Sector Best Practices Standards 

New Jersey recognizes that facilities in the Chemical Sector are diverse in size, 

complexity, and potential for off site impacts to the community and therefore a blanket approach to addressing security concerns may not be practical. The Best Practices represent a risk-based approach to security consisting of a site-specific vulner-
67 

ability assessment that evaluates threats to a facility’s operation, its particular 

vulnerabilities and likely consequences of a chemical release, and the physical and 

procedural security measures already in place. The Chemical Sector Best Practices 

were predominantly derived from the Security Code of the American Chemistry 

Council’s Responsible Care program. 

Subsequently the Task Force determined that additional measures were necessary 

to ensure that appropriate prevention and response measures are implemented by 

the chemical sector to address emerging domestic security threats. As a result, 

Chemical Sector Best Practices Standards (Standards) were put in place on November 21, 2005. 

The Standards require chemical sector facilities to, among other things: 

• comply with the Chemical Sector Security Best Practices; • conduct a terrorism-based security vulnerability assessment; and • develop a prevention, preparedness, and response plan to minimize the risk of 

a terrorist attack. 

In addition, chemical sector facilities subject to TCPA are required to conduct a 

review of practicability and potential for adopting inherently safer technology. 

Inherently Safer Technology 

Facilities required to conduct an inherently safer technology review must evaluate: • reducing the amount of extraordinarily hazardous substances materials that potentially may be released; • substituting less hazardous materials; • using extraordinarily hazardous substances in the least hazardous process conditions or form; • and, designing equipment and processes to minimize the potential for equipment failure and human error. 

I must emphasize that the inherently safer technology requirement under the 

Standards represents a practicability test; it is not mandatory that a covered facility 

implement IST, only that they evaluate. The results of the evaluations are held at 

the facility site, and are made available to DEP inspectors during an on-site visit. 

Compliance with the Standards was required within 120 days of the effective 

date, March 21, 2006. DEP staff are on schedule to complete inspections to evaluate 

compliance at all the 157 facilities subject to the Standards by July 31, 2006. Of 

the total 157 facilities, 45 are regulated TCPA facilities required to perform IST 

analysis. It is important to note that with the majority of the inspections completed 

to date, compliance with the Standards has been excellent with a small percentage 

of exceptions. To date, we have inspected about 100 facilities subject to compliance 

with the Standards and over half the TCPA universe. In all cases, facilities required 

under the Standards to conduct IST review have done so. It is expected that Task 

Force orders will be generated to address any cases where gross non-compliance is 

determined. I believe that our compliance results clearly indicate that the evaluation of inherently safer technology is not overly burdensome on industry and is an 

effective tool for critically evaluating the risk reduction opportunities available at 

a specific facility. 

But these measures alone are merely a starting point. Our knowledge of both the 

threat and the appropriate response is evolving daily. As we implement the ‘‘Best 

Practices’’ and work with facilities on site-by-site review of security vulnerabilities, 

we also have begun a public process to review what additional regulatory measures 

may be appropriate to harden potential targets, to reduce risk to surrounding communities, and to involve workers and communities in the process. 

While New Jersey is doing its part, we renew our call for federal standards and 

protections that will reinforce our work, ensure a level playing field for firms operating in New Jersey, and provide equivalent protection from facilities that operate 

near our borders. The Standards, including the inherently safer technology evaluations, are vital to providing New Jersey with an accurate picture of the current state 

of preparedness within the Chemical Sector and provide a foundation to move forward with the appropriate actions necessary to safeguard our citizens. 

CONCLUSION

Added Federal safeguards in these areas would complement New Jersey’s tradition of strict rules to ensure safety at major chemical facilities and to protect surrounding communities. 

But we remain persuaded that both security and interstate fairness would be advanced significantly, and with far less economic impact, if State measures were coupled with a Federal framework of regulatory protections. New Jersey is prepared 

to work with all members of the committee to achieve appropriate legislation to es-
68 

tablish that framework. Finally, I must emphasize that given New Jersey’s demonstrated attractiveness as a target for terrorism our State must have the discretion 

to impose stricter requirements, when necessary, to adequately safeguard our citizens from potential acts of terrorism. Therefore, we strenuously oppose the prospect 

of Federal preemption in the area of homeland security. 

RESPONSE BY LISA P. JACKSON TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION FROM SENATOR INHOFE

Question. Whose judgment prevails if the decision not to implement Inherently 

Safer Technology (IST) is made? How do you envision dealing with difference of 

opinion between a compliance inspector and a family about the decision that something is not practible? 

Response. On November 21, 2005, the Governor approved Best Practices Standards for TPCA/DPCC Chemical Facilities, pursuant to the authority found in the 

New Jersey’s Domestic Security Preparedness Act of October 4, 2001. These Best 

Practices require that an IST review must be conducted and must include an analysis of whether adoption of IST is practicable and the basis for any determination 

that implementation of IST is impractical. To interpret ‘‘practicable and the basis 

for any determination that implementation of 1ST is impractical,’’ the Department 

of Environmental Protection intends to use a definition of ‘‘feasibility’’, which would 

include such factors as whether the implementation of IST is ‘‘capable of being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable period of time, taking into 

account economic, environmental, legal, social and technological factors.’’ 

Should the Department determine that the review/analysis required by the Standards did not appropriately incorporate the factors detailed above and a facility resists steps to remedy these deficiencies, the New Jersey Domestic Security Preparedness Act provides compliance and/or enforcement mechanisms. The New Jersey Office of Homeland Security & Preparedness would initiate steps aimed at requiring the recalcitrant entity to come into compliance with the Standards. 

RESPONSE BY LISA P. JACKSON TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION

FROM SENATOR JEFFORDS

Question. Why is it important for States like New Jersey to be able to implement 

their own chemical security programs? 

Response. The residents of New Jersey live in the shadow of the attacks of September 11, 2001, which claimed the lives of 674 New Jerseyans and transformed 

our northern waterfront into an evacuation zone. New Jersey also was the launching site for the first major bio-terror attacks on U.S. soil resulting in fatalities, when 

a still-unknown terrorist mailed anthrax-laden letters that severely contaminated 

the U.S. Postal Service facility in Hamilton, NJ. 

New Jersey’s very strengths create particular vulnerability to acts of terrorism. 

Our chemical, petroleum and other industrial plants that support the economy of 

the Nation are clustered around well-developed transportation infrastructure linking the New York and Philadelphia metropolitan regions. The Port of New Jersey 

and New York is the entry point for more than 4 million cargo containers and 55 

million tons of bulk cargo valued at over $100 billion. New Jersey is home to Newark Liberty International Airport—one of the busiest airports in the country serving 

more than 30 million passengers annually. Our State is well-known as the center 

of pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and other life science industries targeted by violent and extreme animal rights activists. All of these infrastructure sites and more 

are potential targets for terrorists, and all lie in the most densely populated state 

in the country. 

The concentration of critical infrastructure and density of our population may 

have no comparison in the United States. Clearly, our circumstances are vastly different than those of most other States. A ‘‘one size fits all’’ standard can not work 

across our diverse Nation. New Jersey, and all States, need to retain the ability to 

go beyond any threshold Federal security standards to ensure that our preparedness 

is measured in line with our potential vulnerabilities. 

RESPONSES BY LISA P. JACKSON TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR VOINOVICH

Question 1. How many of the chemicals listed in BPA’s RMP rule have scientifically proven alternatives that Increase safety, reduce risk, and operate at least as 
69 

effectively, in terms of cost and end product, as the chemical compound that is being 

replaced? 

Response. Information is not available to folly answer this question. However, examples of IST successes include substituting sodium hypochlorite for chlorine for 

wastewater disinfection, substituting anhydrous ammonia with aqueous ammonia in 

air pollution control systems, substituting broroochlorohydantoin for chlorine for 

treating cooling water. In addition, replacing a chemical compound, or substitution, 

is only one of the inherently safer technology principles or techniques. Other IST 

techniques include reducing the amount of hazardous material that potentially may 

be released, using extraordinarily hazardous substances (EHSs) in the least hazardous process conditions or form, and designing equipment and processes to minimize the potential for equipment failure and human error. For a particular process 

or chemical product being manufactured, substitution may not be a feasible alternative, but use of one or more of the other three IST techniques could provide a 

feasible reduction in risk. 

Question 2. Who or what body should determine what IST is? Should It be defined 

by Government, industry, or academic? If Government does define it, which agency 

should be responsible for that? 

Response. A generic definition of IST should be provided through Government regulation. In the New Jersey Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act (TCPA) rule, the definition of 1ST is ‘‘the principles or techniques incorporated in a newly designed and 

constructed covered process to minimize or eliminate the potential for an Extraordinarily Hazardous Substance (EHS) accident that include, but are not limited to, 

the following: (1) reducing the amount of EHS material that potentially may be released; (2) substituting less hazardous materials; (3) using EHSs in the least hazardous process conditions or form; and 4) designing equipment and processes to 

minimize the potential for equipment failure and human error.’’ In our country, this 

definition is widely recognized by industry and organizations such as the Center for 

Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers. 

It is difficult to provide a defined list of required specific inherently safer technologies or equipment because each chemical process must be evaluated individually. Also, many processes are proprietary. However, it is possible to provide guidance on technologies or equipment for consideration by facilities in their process. 

This guidance could be prepared with input and assistance from academia, Government, industry, and organizations such as CCPS, the American Chemistry Council, 

and the American Petroleum Institute. 

We believe that the Federal Government should be the lead in establishing regulations, defining 1ST, and providing or coordinating guidance for IST. However, New 

Jersey, and all States, must retain the ability to go beyond any threshold Federal 

security standards to ensure that preparedness is measured in line with potential 

vulnerabilities. 

Question 3. To your knowledge has IST ever been defined as a security measure 

in Federal law? 

Response. To our knowledge IST has never been defined as a security measure 

in Federal law. However, in Guidelines for Analyzing and Managing the Security 

Vulnerabilities of Fixed Chemical Sites. August 2002, published by the CCPS of the 

American Institute of Chemical Engineers, CCPS states that security risk reduction 

at a site can include inherently safer systems, to the extent that they can be designed and installed practically, particularly for existing processes. CCPS further 

states that the concept of inherently safer approaches to chemical processing and 

the design of plants can be directly applied to the security of hazardous materials. 

If a process is run under more moderate conditions, or a chemical is used in lesser 

amounts, the risk associated with one of the four malicious acts (theft/diversion, release, use as a contaminant, 

Question 4a. Do you agree with the following conclusions from the EPA: ‘‘Inherently safer processes’’ is a developing concept and Is not. ready for general application? 

Response. The concept of IST was first introduced publicly by Dr. Trevor Kletz, 

a noted process safety expert, approximately 30 years ago. Since that time, IST 

studies have been widely performed by industry. In Inherently Safer Chemical Processes. A Life Cycle Approach. 1996, the CCPS discusses various methods and techniques on how to perform an IST study. In fact, Dennis Hendershot, who also gave 

testimony at the June 21 Hearing, has published several papers and case studies 

during his industry career detailing IST studies that he has conducted, the IST alternatives that were implemented as a result of those studies, and how the decision 

for feasibility to implement those IST alternatives was supported using risk assess-
70 

ment techniques. Therefore, we strongly believe that IST evaluation is a well-established concept that is ready for general application. 

Question 4b. Do you agree with the following conclusions from the EPA: IST frequently displaces risk rather than reducing it? 

Response. We do not agree with this conclusion. It is true that for any change 

that is ever made to a chemical process, the change roust be evaluated carefully to 

ensure that a new, unintended, or unforeseen risk is not being introduced. We 

strongly believe that facilities should perform IST evaluations to search for feasible 

alternatives that will reduce the risk of a release to the surrounding community. 

Question 4c. Do you agree with the following conclusions from the EPA: Even if 

a few examples of workable alternative approaches do exist, there is not a rational 

basis for Imposing an additional Industry-wide regulatory burden? 

Response. We disagree with this statement. We reiterate that facilities should 

perform IST equations to search for feasible alternatives that will reduce the risk 

of a release to the surrounding community. 

Question 4d. Do you agree with the following conclusions from the EPA: The concept Is normally considered when designing new processes, a time when changes 

can be implemented cost effectively? 

Response. We disagree with this statement It is true that it is most cost effective 

to evaluate and implement IST during the design stages of a new process. However, 

CCPS states in its Inherently Safer Client Processes. A Life Cycle Approach on page 

16, ‘‘It is never too late to consider inherently safer alternatives. Major enhancements to the inherent safety of plants which have been operating for many years 

have been reported (CCPS, 1993a; Wade, 1987; Camthers et al., 1996).’’ Also, continuing to perform IST evaluations in the later stages of a plants life cycle is valuable because new technologies may be available that were not available when the 

plant initially was designed and constructed. 

Question 5. Do you believe that IST is a concept ready for broad Implementation 

as a regulatory requirement? Do you believe that IST is a mature process that can 

be cost-effectively Implemented across the broad range of chemicals used in this 

country? 

Response. From the responses above and the responses to Senators Inhofe’s and 

Jeffords’ questions, we believe that IST evaluations can and should be broadly implemented as a regulatory requirement. We believe that the IST evaluations and determinations of feasibility of IST alternatives can be done cost-effectively. These IST 

evaluations should be performed by the facilities handling the most hazardous 

chemicals above specified threshold quantities, such as in New Jersey’s TCPA rule 

or the EPA’s Accidental Release Prevention rule, 40 CFR 68. 

Question 6. Under New Jersey’s Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act, certain facilities are required to conduct a review of IST. Of the 45 facilities that have been required under the Act to conduct a review of practicability and potential for adopting 

IST, how many have actually implemented or intend to implement IST? Of that 

number, how many were actual chemical manufacturing facilities (as opposed to 

water treatment facilities)? How does New Jersey DEP measure the implementation 

of IST and compliance with the Act? 

Response. The 45 facilities that are referred to are those that are subject to the 

Best Practices Standards, adopted November 21, 2005, under the authority of New 

Jersey’s Domestic Security Preparedness Act of October 4, 2001. These 45 facilities, 

which are a subset of the total 102 regulated under New Jersey’s TCPA rule, 

N.J.A.C. 7:31, are all chemical manufacturing facilities defined and selected by their 

North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) or Standard Industrial 

Classification (SIC) codes. Pursuant to the Best Practices Standards, these 45 facilities were required to complete an IST evaluation by March 21, 2006. During the 

course of our inspections at these facilities, they all have stated that they have implemented past IST or other risk reduction measures. Approximately one-third have 

provided a schedule to implement additional IST or risk reduction measures, and 

about one-third have identified additional IST or risk reduction measures but have 

not yet scheduled their completion. About one-third had no additional recommendations. It should be noted that these are facilities that have been regulated under 

our TCPA program for many years. 

Question 7. Has your department or any other Agency of the New Jersey Government tried to assess the financial impact on the New Jersey chemical industry of 

studying and possibly implementing 1ST? If so, what was the conclusion? Is New 

Jersey concerned about losing chemical Industry Jobs? You Indicate that the evaluation of IST is not overly burdensome on Industry—who is making that Judgment? 
71 

Response. Our department has not performed a formal financial impact assessment on the New Jersey chemical industry of studying and possibly implementing 

IST, and we do not know of any other New Jersey Agency that has done so. In our 

experience so far under the Best Practices Standards, facilities primarily have completed the IST review with in-house personnel with backgrounds in chemistry, engineering, process controls and instrumentation, maintenance, production and operations, and chemical process safety. Some facilities have hired consultants to assist 

or lead the study. Facilities have not expressed to us that performing the IST review 

has been overly burdensome, and the extraordinary compliance record further supports this position. 

RESPONSES BY LISA P. JACKSON TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR BOXER

Question 1. Please provide a description of how New Jerseys Toxic Catastrophe 

Prevention Act could provide an opportunity for businesses to have a more stable 

business plan as a result of using inherently safer technologies. 

Response. Performing an IST review and implementing IST or other risk reduction measures provide several positive benefits resulting in a more stable business 

plan for a facility. First of all the reduction in risk of a release lowers the companies 

potential liabilities. This has the secondary benefit of increasing the surrounding 

community’s perception, confidence, and acceptance of the facility. Many IST alternatives, which have an initial capital cost, have lower operating costs in areas such 

as maintenance, operations, and emergency response requirements. If the risk of release can be eliminated or substantially reduced, the facility would become less attractive to a terrorist and thus less likely as a terrorist target. Reducing or eliminating the risk of a release caused by a terrorist or occurring accidentally would 

avoid business losses from a production shutdown following the incident. All of these 

serve to provide the facility a more stable business plan. 

Question 2. Please provide the type of economic impact analysis that your Agency 

conducts to determine whether a business should use inherently safer technology. 

Response. The standards require that an IST review must be conducted and must 

include an analysis of whether adoption if IST is practicable and the basis for any 

determination that implementation of IST is impractical. To interpret ‘‘practicable 

and the basis for any determination that implementation of IST is impractical,’’ the 

Department of Environmental Protection intends to use a definition of ‘‘feasibility’’, 

which would include such factors as whether the implementation of IST is ‘‘capable 

of being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable period of time, 

taking into account economic, environmental, legal, social, and technological factors.’’ 

Question 3. Will your Agency be tracking the economic benefits derived from 

business’s use of any inherently safer technologies required to be used under New 

Jersey’s Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act? Please provide any such analysis that 

you currently possess. 

Response. We do not currently possess any analysis tracking the economic benefits derived from business’s use of any inherently safer technologies. However, our 

Department will be tracking the evaluation and implementation of IST alternatives 

to provide a valuable reference universe for the chemical industry. Documented IST 

success stories, if applicable, will serve as a valuable tool as facilities investigate 

available options. 

STATEMENT OF CHARLIE COTT, VICE PRESIDENT, PLANT FOODS AND TRANSPORTATION

MFA INC

INTRODUCTION

I would like to thank Chairman Inhofe and Senator Jeffords for holding this important hearing today. My name is Charlie Cott, Vice President, Plant Foods and 

Transportation, with MFA Incorporated, a regional farmer cooperative operating 

and headquartered in the state of Missouri. I am here today to testify on behalf of 

the Agricultural Retailers Association (ARA), which represents a significant majority of the Nation’s retail dealers who provide essential agricultural pesticides, fertilizer, seed and other agronomic services to America’s farmers. As the only national 

organization exclusively representing the interests of the agricultural retail and distribution industry, ARA is vitally interested in any Federal laws or regulations related to inherently safer technology (IST) requirements that may affect the oper-
72 

1 Doane’s Ag Professional Magazine, Summer 2003, p.40-41 2 Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under Clean Air 

Act Section 112(r)(7); Final Rule; 40 CFR Part 68 

ation of facilities and chemicals utilized in the Nation’s agricultural sector. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on this important issue. 

MFA Incorporated is built upon a solid commitment to its farmer/owners to provide quality products and services, embracing honesty in business and offering professional advice that farmers can depend on. MFA Incorporated is a farm supply cooperative established in 1914, and has retail facilities in Missouri, Iowa, Kansas, 

Oklahoma, and Arkansas. We have approximately 150 full service retail facilities, 

both company owned and affiliates, and 100 bulk fertilizer plants. Our Board of Directors is made up of our farmer/owners, and they keep us in tune with the needs 

of our more than 45,000 members. The heart of our operations is our Agri Services 

Centers providing farmers and ranchers with the products and services they need 

to do business in today’s complex farming environment. I grew up in north central 

Missouri in Saline County. I graduated from the University of Missouri, Columbia 

in 1976, and have worked for MFA Incorporated in various capacities since 1977. 

OVERVIEW OF AG RETAIL/DISTRIBUTION INDUSTRY

In 2002, there were an estimated 10,586 farm retail outlets in the United States.1

The overall number of retail outlets is even lower today and has been declining due 

to a number of factors taking place within the industry: consolidation, increased domestic and global competition, higher operating costs, and low profit margins. ARA 

members range in size from family-held businesses or farmer cooperatives to large 

companies with multiple outlets located in many states. A typical retail outlet may 

have 3 to 5 year-round employees with additional temporary employees added during the busy planting and harvesting seasons. Many of these facilities are located 

in small, rural communities. 

The goods and services that we provide include: seed, crop protection chemicals, 

fertilizer, crop scouting, soil testing, custom application of pesticides and fertilizers 

and development of comprehensive nutrient management plans, and state of the art 

IPM programs. Certified crop advisors (CCA’s) are retained on retailer’s staff to provide professional guidance and crop input recommendations to farmers and consumers. Retail and distribution facilities are scattered throughout all 50 states and 

provide important jobs in rural and suburban communities. The food and agriculture production and processing industry contributes substantially to the American economy ? accounting for 13 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product and 18 

percent of domestic employment. 

EXISTING SAFETY REGULATIONS AND INHERENTLY SAFER TECHNOLOGY

Even before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, agricultural retailers 

have been one of the most heavily regulated industry segments in the country. 

Many of the products used by the industry are hazardous materials, which are highly regulated and expensive materials. There are countless Federal and State laws 

and regulations related to the safe handling, transportation and storage of agricultural crop 

inputs. For example, many agricultural retail facilities that handle and store a 

threshold amount of listed substances such as ammonia are required to comply with 

the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Risk Management Program 

(RMP)2. Under the rule, covered facilities must develop an RMP that describes their 

chemical accident prevention programs and submit full updates and resubmissions 

to EPA at least once every 5 years. The RMP Rule divides regulated facilities into 

three program focuses according to the level of potential danger they may present 

to surrounding communities. 

Most agricultural retailers fall under the RMP’s Program 2 Requirements, which 

generally are processes of low complexity and do not typically involve chemical reactions. Program 2 RMP requirements for retailers include written operating and 

maintenance procedures; training; mechanical integrity, compliance audits, incidence investigations and employee participation. They also conduct hazard assessments, which include analyses of worst-case and alternative release scenarios; establish emergency response programs that include plans to inform the public and 

emergency response organizations about the chemicals onsite and their health effects and strategies to coordinate those plans with the community; and report steps 

taken to prevent incidents that can release dangerous chemicals. Program 2 RMP 

reporting requirements are less stringent than Program 3 RMP requirements, which 

are usually for higher risk chemical facilities and involve complex chemical proc-
73 

3 7 U.S.C. s/s 136 et seq. (1996) 

essing operations. The prevention program requirements for Program 3 are very 

similar to those of the OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) requirements. 

The Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act3 (FIFRA) continues to be 

the basis of EPA regulations covering agricultural pesticides. Sections of the code 

cover handling, labeling, crop tolerance requirements, precautionary statements, environmental protection issues, worker protection standards, storage requirements, 

transportation regulations and considerations, product use, and lots more issues designed to protect the public and all workers. 

The Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 

Safety Administration (PHMSA) formulates, issues and revises Hazardous Materials 

Regulations (HMR) under the Federal Hazardous Materials Transportation Laws. 

The HMR issued by the DOT cover hazardous materials definitions and classifications, hazard communications, shipper and carrier operations, training and security 

requirements, and packaging and container specifications. Agricultural retailers and 

distributors are required to comply with many of these DOT regulations. 

As an industry, we have done a good job of educating and training employees to 

judiciously handle hazardous materials and to make sure they remain in the hands 

of authorized personnel. Employees of agricultural retailers and distributors complete numerous training and certification programs that help ensure hazardous materials are being stored and handled with proper care. An employer at an agricultural retail facility is responsible that their employees comply with several regulatory requirements such as: (1) Commercial Applicator Certification; (2) DOT 

Hazmat training for hauling hazardous materials such as anhydrous ammonia, ammonia nitrate and other certain agricultural chemicals; (3) Worker Protection Standard training; (4) OSHA Standards such as Worker Right to Know, Lockout/Tagout, 

Confined Space Entry, Personal Protective Equipment, etc.; (5) Random drug and 

alcohol testing; (6) Commercial Drivers Licenses and Hazardous Material Certification; and Restricted Use Pesticide recordkeeping. 

Because existing regulations are working, ARA does not believe the Federal Government should mandate the use of ISTs or alternative approaches for chemical 

processing, which is extremely complex, and which differs from company to company. Our industry would support common-sense chemical security regulations that 

recognize the needs of America’s agricultural industry. ARA is working closely with 

the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on this very matter. However, we do 

strongly oppose efforts by anti-chemical activist groups that are attempting to tie 

new IST mandates to chemical facility security legislation. If an IST mandate was 

put in place for the Nation’s agricultural industry it could jeopardize the availability 

of lower-cost sources of plant nutrient products or certain agricultural pesticides 

used by farmers and ranchers. It will also hurt our ability to compete with growing 

threats from countries such as Brazil and China. It is estimated that 96 percent of 

the world’s consumers reside outside the United States. According to the USDA Economic Research Service (ERS), the U.S. agricultural trade surplus for 2006 is estimated to be only $1 billion compared to a $21 billion surplus in 1997. This change 

is being caused by increased international competition and higher operating costs 

for our farmers and ranchers due to more regulations and higher input costs, primarily due to higher fuel and fertilizer costs. 

ARA believes it is important for Congress to oppose legislative proposals such as 

S. 2486 sponsored by Senators Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) and Barrack Obama (DIL) that according to Senator Lautenberg would ‘‘require every chemical facility in 

the nation to adopt inherently safer technology.’’ IST is not a security issue and relates to process safety decisions that should be left to the safety experts that help 

manage these facilities. We strongly agree with concerns expressed by DHS Secretary Chertoff that his agency not move from a security based focus into broader 

environmental objectives that are unrelated to security. We also agree with Senate 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Susan Collins 

that the Lautenberg-Obama approach ‘‘would impose costly, intrusive, and burdensome mandates that take the wrong approach to homeland security’’ and that ‘‘process engineering decisions are best left to the private sector.’’ We appreciate Chairman Collins efforts to work with our industry on chemical site security issues where 

we have serious concerns such as the IST issue. We were pleased last week when 

an IST mandate amendment offered last week during committee consideration of 

the ‘‘Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Act of 2005’’ (S. 2145) was soundly defeated. 

Uninformed anti-chemical groups have been pushing for an IST mandate long before September 11, 2001. Congress should be very careful about how it handles this 
74 

4 GAO-03-439 Homeland Security: Voluntary Initiatives Are Under Way at Chemical Facilities, but the Extent of Security Preparedness is Unknown, March 2003, p. 29 

issue. A March 2003 General Accounting Office (GAO) report4 found that ISTs could 

result in shifting, rather than reducing, the risk of terrorist attacks. In that report, 

GAO stated, ‘‘reducing the amount of chemicals stored may shift the risk onto the 

transportation sector as reliance on rail or truck shipments increases.’’ Availability 

of lower-cost sources of plant nutrient products or certain pesticides used by farmers 

could be at risk under an IST or other alternative approaches mandate. As this committee should be aware, the EPA already monitors IST technologies when reviewing 

agricultural pesticides for new section 3 registrations and during the re-registration 

process. It also considers agricultural pesticides for fast track registration that it 

deems the product safer for use. A new IST approach or mandate would set up a 

duplicative effort that is not needed and potentially opens the door for anti-chemical 

groups to file lawsuits against the industry. Agricultural retailers and their farmer 

customers cannot afford the loss of essential crop input products, new expensive 

Federal mandates or defending against frivolous lawsuits. 

If MFA was forced to recommend less effective pest management products or less 

efficient plant nutrient products to our farmer customers, the net results would be 

lower yields, less quality, less farm revenue, and markets shifting to foreign countries. Would you buy a wormy apple, a scared tomato, or rotten grapes? Of course 

not, and neither will other American consumers; but that is what you can expect 

if an IST mandate becomes law. 

In addition, our nation is making a strong effort to become more energy independent and less dependent on foreign sources of energy. ARA is a supporter of Federal policies that promote the use of renewable fuels and serves as a member of the 

25x25 Ag Energy Working group, whose goal is for farms, ranches, forests, and 

other working lands to provide 25 percent of the United States’ energy needs from 

renewable sources by 2025. For example, corn is a major component in the manufacture of ethanol, a clean-burning, renewable, domestically produced fuel. According 

to the Renewable Fuels Association (RFA), ethanol production is the third largest 

use of U.S. corn, utilizing a record 1.43 billion bushels of corn in 2005. The state 

of Missouri ranks ninth in total corn production in the U.S. Corn is Missouri’s second largest crop in production, producing nearly 300 million bushels of corn annually. If an IST mandate became law, it could force the use of less efficient fertilizer 

for corn crops, which in turn would directly impact crop yields. According to 

ethanolfacts.com, one bushel of corn yields about 2.8 gallons of ethanol. A reduction 

of one bushel per acre in corn production would reduce Missouri net farm income 

by $5 million. It would also mean that there would be less corn available to produce 

ethanol and hinder the Nation’s efforts to become more energy independent. 

ARA believes that Congress should not go to such extremes as actually picking 

winners and losers in the crop protection and plant nutrient industry. This is an 

issue best left up to the market place and consumers. 

CONCLUSION

ARA and our members strongly support the war on terrorism and are committed 

to do our part to address security related concerns. As an industry we have already 

made great strides, but we believe it is important to have commonsense, workable 

regulations in effect that do not place unreasonable and unnecessary IST mandates 

on the industry. America’s agricultural industry is currently faced with high fuel, 

fertilizer and transportation costs. It is also important to note that about 80 percent 

of U.S. counties were declared disaster or contiguous disaster counties last year due 

to devastating hurricanes, fires, floods, excessive moisture and severe drought. With 

the current state of the domestic and international agricultural markets and uncertainties facing America’s agricultural industry, now is not the time for Congress to 

try to place further burdens on farmers and ranchers by limiting their product 

choices, increasing their input costs, and impacting their crop yields. This type of 

Federal policy could help further drive many within agriculture out of business and 

increase our dependence on foreign sources of food and fiber, similar to what we 

now face with foreign oil. 

Thank you for considering ARA’s views. We appreciate Chairman Inhofe’s interest 

and support on this important issue. We welcome the opportunity to provide further 

input to the committee on the issue of IST and address any security gaps that may 

exist within the industry. ARA stands ready to work with Congress on the development of a chemical site security legislation that adequately reflects the needs of 

America’s agricultural industry and our rural economy. As we face these challenges, 

we can only accomplish what needs to be done if we work together. 
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RESPONSES BY CHARLIE COTT TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR INHOFE

Question 1. Your company is a large distributor of ammonium nitrate based fertilizers. Based on events in Oklahoma City, I, more than anyone, understand how 

dangerous ‘‘A-N’’ can be. I am also concerned with your comments about effects on 

the food supply if other alternatives were forced upon agriculture. How are best 

management practices and current safety rules for distributors, farmers, and ranchers working? 

Response. Retailers handle hazmat materials regularly in the production of American’s food supply with out any incidents. We all realized after OK City and 9-11 

that we need to be even more responsible and knowledgeable of issues surrounding 

terrorism. Before that time our focus was on accidents not intentional misuse. MFA 

has incorporated a number of new security measures that will help prevent ammonium nitrate or hazardous materials we handle from falling into the wrong hands, 

including registration and name/address of users (where required), no sales of 

bagged AN, no sales of AN to non-agricultural users, and no sales of bagged bulk 

fertilizer products sold. AN is still a very useful and economical farming tool, but 

can it be replaced? Anything can be replaced, but at a cost, most of those production 

programs that could switch from AN to other materials have already done so and 

the remaining users need AN just to remain productive and produce an economical 

crop. On certain crops, AN is still the recommended plant nutrient product of choice 

by the University of Missouri, the State’s land grant college. Current alternatives 

to AN are not desirable to many of our farmer customers because they do not exhibit the same chemical characteristics and would not fit well in their crop production practices, or economic value. 

Question 2. Are you concerned that DHS rules and regulations, including IST, 

could conflict with the Department of Transportation’s regulations governing safety 

and security of the transit system? 

Response. The agrichemical industry is the most regulated business segment in 

the entire United States and we are constantly trying to work in an environment 

when agency regulations conflict. Currently DHS has very limited regulatory authority but we believe that soon Congress will address this area and I hope that 

the new DHS will coordinate with other agencies on existing hazmat security rules. 

ARA supports the DOT maintaining their jurisdiction and oversight for the transportation of hazmat materials. The DOT already has security rules in effect related 

to the secure transportation of hazmat and they seem to be working well. I do however have concerns there will not be regulatory harmony and that conflicts over interpretation of IST’s will be very confusing and bad for business. It is ARA’s understanding that DOT and DHS have or are working on an interagency agreement that 

establishes the ground rules on how they will interact on these types of security regulations related to hazmat transportation. 

RESPONSE BY CHARLIE COTT TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION FROM SENATOR JEFFORDS

Question. Your written testimony discusses a range of federal laws governing agricultural operations. Are any of these laws designed to address the unique risks 

posed by terrorism? 

Response. It is my understanding that the DOT’s hazmat transportation security 

laws and the fingerprint and background check requirements for applicants seeking 

a commercial drivers license (CDL) with a hazmat endorsement were implemented 

following 9/11 due to concerns of terrorists. I believe the same is true as it relates 

to the Coast Guard’s MTSA rules. While I am not aware of any other direct federal 

laws that address terrorism or terrorist activities, I can assure you that MFA operates in an environment where we are carefully regulated as to the safety and security of our facilities by several federal agencies such as the EPA, DOT, OSHA and 

DHS as well as state and local agencies. Industry has initiated several programs 

to assist retailers and local authorities to do a better job of preventing criminal activities thus also stopping terrorist activities. 

RESPONSES BY CHARLIE COTT TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR VOINOVICH

Question 1. Across the entire chemical manufacturing industry in the United 

States, how many of the chemicals listed on EPA’s Risk Management Plan list have 

scientifically proven alternatives that increase safety, reduce risk, and operate at 

least as effectively, in terms of both cost and end product, as the chemical compound 

that is being replaced? 
76 

Response. I have not done a study nor am I aware of any study on the EPA’s 

RMP’s than determines which chemicals are good IST substitutes. 

Question 2. Who or what body should determine what IST is? Should it be defined 

by Government, industry, or academia? If Government does define it, which agency 

should be responsible for that? 

Response. In the agricultural pesticide segment the EPA has responsibility for 

chemical approvals and that process is extensive taking many years to complete, detailed in it’s science, and very expensive for registrants. I do not see any reason to 

have another agency or organization duplicate or try to out guess what the EPA has 

done in regards to the approval of chemicals. MFA or any other agricultural retailer 

or farmers would have a hard time to determine what an IST is because we do not 

have the funds to conduct such a costly analysis. 

Question 3. To your knowledge has IST ever been defined as a security measure 

in federal law? 

Response. I am not aware of any regulation that defines IST as a security measure. I can not see how IST’s can even be considered security measures, there appear 

to be more of a philosophy. 

The EPA has concluded that: 

• ‘‘Inherently safer processes’’ is a developing concept and is not ready for general 

application; 

• IST frequently displaces risk rather than reducing it; 

• Even if a few examples of workable alternative approaches do exist, there is not 

a rational basis for imposing an additional industry-wide regulatory burden; and 

• The concept is normally considered when designing new processes, a time when 

changes can be implemented cost effectively. 

Question 4. Do you agree with the above assessments? In that context, do you believe that IST a concept that is ready for broad implementation as a regulatory requirement? 

Response. I agree with the above statements and do not believe that IST programs are ready for adoption for broad implementation as a regulatory requirement. 
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