10-2840-cr(L)

United States v. Rodriguez

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER 

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1,

2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON

ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan

3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of

New York, on the 21st 4 day of November, two thousand twelve.

5

6 PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, Jr.,

7 RICHARD C. WESLEY,

8 PETER W. HALL,

9 Circuit Judges.

10

11 

12

13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

14

15 Appellee,

16

17 -v.- Nos. 10-2840-cr (L),

18 10-3104-cr (con)

19

20 LUIS RODRIGUEZ,

21

22 Defendant-Appellant.

23 

24

25 FOR APPELLANT: Michael A. Young, New York, NY.

26

27 FOR APPELLEE: David C. James, Robert L. Capers and

28 Licha M. Nyiendo, Assistant United States

29 Attorneys, for Loretta E. Lynch, United

30 States Attorney for the Eastern District

31 of New York, Brooklyn, NY. 

32

33
2

1 Appeal from the United States District Court for the

2 Eastern District of New York (Trager, J.).

3

4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED

5 AND DECREED that the judgment of the United States District

6 Court for the Eastern District of New York be AFFIRMED. 

7 Defendant-appellant Luis Rodriguez appeals from an

8 August 2, 2010 judgment of conviction entered by the United

9 States District Court for the Eastern District of New York

10 (Trager, J.), following a jury trial and the district

11 court’s denial of Rodriguez’s motion for a new trial. 

12 Rodriguez was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and

13 possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of

14 cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A),

15 and 846; two counts of murder in furtherance of a drug

16 conspiracy, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A); two

17 counts of murder through use of a firearm, in violation of

18 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1), and using and carrying a firearm

19 during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, in

20 violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). 

21 On appeal, Rodriguez maintains that (1) the government

22 violated its disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland,

23 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) there was insufficient evidence to

24 support his convictions; (3) the district court erred in
3

1 allowing him to represent himself; (4) the district court

2 erred in denying Rodriguez’s motion to have a witness

3 psychiatrically evaluated; and (5) a cooperating witness

4 perjured himself. The panel has reviewed the briefs and the

5 record in this appeal and agrees unanimously that oral

6 argument is unnecessary because “the facts and legal

7 arguments [have been] adequately presented in the briefs and

8 record, and the decisional process would not be

9 significantly aided by oral argument.” Fed. R. App. P.

10 34(a)(2)(C). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

11 facts and procedural history of the case.

12 A district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial

13 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Wong,

14 78 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 1996). The district court in this

15 case concluded that no new trial was merited under Brady. 

16 Under Brady, “‘the suppression by the prosecution of

17 evidence . . . violates due process’” if the evidence is

18 favorable to the accused, the evidence was willfully or

19 inadvertently suppressed by the prosecution, and the

20 suppression results in prejudice. United States v. Douglas,

21 525 F.3d 225, 244-45 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S.

22 at 87). The suppression of immaterial evidence, even if it
4

1 is favorable to the accused, does not violate Brady. Kyles

2 v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). To demonstrate

3 materiality, the accused must show that “the favorable

4 evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in

5 such a different light as to undermine confidence in the

6 verdict.” Id. at 435. Although suppressed information need

7 not itself constitute admissible evidence, it must at least

8 “potentially lead[] to admissible evidence favorable to the

9 defense.” United States v. Rodriguez, 496 F.3d 221, 226 n.4

10 (2d Cir. 2007). 

11 Rodriguez’s Brady challenge is based on a number of

12 statements by government informants suggesting that one of

13 the people whose murder was the subject of this case was

14 killed by someone other than Rodriguez’s co-conspirators and

15 for a different reason. The district court analyzed these

16 statements in detail in reference to a similar motion

17 brought by Miguel Santos, one of Rodriguez’s co-defendants,

18 see United States v. Santos, No. CR-01-537, 2010 WL 2985913,

19 at *5-9 (E.D.N.Y. July 27, 2010), aff’d United States v.

20 Santos, No. 10-3218-cr, 2012 WL 2298887, at *2-3 (2d Cir.

21 June 19, 2012), and cited this reasoning when denying

22 Rodriguez’s motion. In our view, the district court
5

1 correctly concluded in Santos that “none of the informants’

2 statements would be admissible at trial or could possibly

3 lead to admissible evidence [because t]hey are all hearsay

4 or speculation.” Id. at *6. In addition, substantial

5 corroborating evidence, including telephone records and

6 ballistic evidence, linked Santos and Rodriguez to the

7 shooting. Id. at *7. Contrary to Rodriguez’s arguments,

8 the court’s ruling depended on its qualitative analysis of

9 the evidence rather than the timing of Santos’s trial, and

10 thus the reasoning from Santos was properly applied in

11 Rodriguez’s case as well. There was no abuse of discretion

12 in the court’s ruling that the government’s failure to

13 disclose the informants’ statements did not merit a new

14 trial.

15 Rodriguez’s challenge to the sufficiency of the

16 evidence is reviewed de novo. United States v. Abu-Jihad,

17 630 F.3d 102, 134 (2d Cir. 2010). He maintains that

18 evidence regarding a particular amount of stolen money,

19 which allegedly represented the proceeds from a particular

20 quantity of cocaine, was insufficient to establish that

21 cocaine was the drug involved. The focus of the indictment,

22 however, was not on the particular transaction yielding the
6

1 money at issue but on the general activities of the

2 organization, and the money obtained was not the only

3 evidence indicating that the conspirators were involved with

4 cocaine. There was also testimony regarding the purchase

5 and transport of cocaine, and the testimony must be taken as

6 true in a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence. United

7 States v. Desena, 287 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2002).

8 The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants the right to

9 represent themselves at trial so long as “that decision is

10 made intelligently and knowingly, with full awareness of the

11 right to counsel and the consequences of its waiver.” 

12 United States v. Tracy, 12 F.3d 1186, 1191 (2d Cir. 1993)

13 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975)). 

14 In determining whether a waiver was adequate, “[w]e need not

15 analyze the district court’s every word, so long as the

16 record as a whole demonstrates that the defendant knowingly

17 and intelligently waived [his] right to counsel.” Torres v.

18 United States, 140 F.3d 392, 401 (2d Cir. 1998). In this

19 case, the record reflects that the district court engaged in

20 repeated discussions with Rodriguez regarding his choice

21 over the course of four separate status conferences, warned

22 him about the potential practical difficulties of conducting
*Rodriguez’s perjury claim fails. Rodriguez has

offered no evidence that Medina did not believe his plea was

valid or that he faced a maximum sentence of life

imprisonment–especially as Medina’s plea agreement states

that his maximum possible sentence was life imprisonment. 

Accordingly, even if Medina’s plea is invalid under Smith v.

United States, 360 U.S. 1 (1959), there is no basis for

finding that Medina committed perjury. 

7

1 a trial, and strongly counseled against waiving his right to

2 counsel because it was possible that the government would

3 seek the death penalty. Rodriguez repeatedly assured the

4 court that he wanted to control his representation and the

5 arguments that were advanced on his behalf. In addition,

6 not only had Rodriguez been through another federal criminal

7 trial before this one, but he had chosen to represent

8 himself during his previous sentencing as well. The

9 district court did not err in concluding that Rodriguez

10 “understood [his] rights, knew [his] options, was aware of

11 the risks and voluntarily waived [his] right to counsel.” 

12 See Torres, 140 F.3d at 401.

13 We have considered all of Rodriguez’s remaining

arguments and find them to be without merit.* 14 For the

15 reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is

16 AFFIRMED. 

17 FOR THE COURT:

18 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

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20