0FFlcE 0i= THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

*: AUSTIN 

GROVERSELLERS 

AT~~~~~~ GENERAL 

Honorable .?oraer Gsrrison, Jr., Director 

Texas Department of Public Safety 

Camp Mabry 

Austin, Tsxas 

Attention: Driver’s License 

Dear Sir: 

Division c\ 

Ylo have received 

which reads in part as foil 

any motor ve 

transportation ~of pupils to and frown school; or any 

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motor vehicle in use as a public or COr:imOn carrier 

of persons; providing that any person under tvrentyone (21) years of’ age who drives mid school buses 

must be recommended by tho County Superintendent b 

and 10~1 School Prinolpnl, and all statutes now 

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flon;Roier &rrison, Jr., Page 2 

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prohibiting the operation of such motor vehicles by 

persone under the age of tvienty-one (21) years are 

suspended until the conclusion of hostilities. Prooided, hovrover, that this Aot will not apply to drivers 

of vehicles operated under pcrnit or cartificate issued by the Railroad Co;arcission OP Texas.’ 

“We would apprecilte very nuch receiving an 

opinion .from you as to whether or not Senate Bill 

No, 119 is still in affect, and if so, when it will 

expire . . 

“We would also like to have an opinion as to 

vjhethor a license issued under the provisions of 

Senate Bill No. 119 ~lou1.d be valid until the date 

of expiration sho*fn on the license (one year from 

date of issuanoc) or would this license terminate ’ 

upon the expiration of the emergency provision of .--: 

Senate Bill No, 119.” .: 

Many wartins statutao, both state and federal 

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contain provisions for their termination effective upon “tie conclusion of the present war”, or “until the conclusion of hostilities.w These tv;o terms, v;hen use& separatoly, may indicata 

different times; but when the Legislature places them both in 

the same statute referring to the same subject, the two provisions were meant t,o indicate the same time, In ordar to 

determine this time, we, shall look to the intent and purpose 

of the Legislature in passing this Act and the faots existing 

at the time of’ its passage. In Section 2 of Senate Eill 119, 

46th LeCislature (1943)) supra, the Legislature clearly explains 

the reason the Act was passed, in the following words: 

?SGCtion 2. The fact that’ it is becoming increasingly mora diffioult for, operators of motor 

vehicles In use as oo.mon or public carriers of 

persons to obtain operators twenty-one (21) years 

or’. ago or over, the fa~ct that many school bu.ses 

cannot now be opcrateQ in compliance wtth oW' .’ 

statutes, . and the crowded oondition which nou exists 

in such school buses and public carriers,creatcs an 

emergency and an imperative publio.neoessity that 

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Ron. Homer Garrison, Jr. , Rage 3 

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the. Constitutional Rule requiring bills to be, read 

on three several days id each house be suspended, 

and the same is hereby suspended, and this Act shall 

,take effect and be in force from and after its passage; 

and it is so enactad.‘8 

Thus it is seen that due to the necessities of the 

military .and essential industry, there existed at the ‘time 

this Act was passed a shortage of operators over the age oi’ 

twenty-one (21) years. To alleviate this condition, the Legislature lOv;ered the ago limit to seventeen (17) years, and it 

is only reasonable to presuns that the Legislature did not 

intcnd to terminate the effect of this Act upon tha cessation 

of aotual fighting in the various theaters of vi:ar because the 

existing con&ition of a shortage of bus operators would not 

terminate simultaneously therewith, and the processes of..military demobilization, the remedy for said shortaGe, oannot-’ 

completely transpire until many mon,ths after the actual conclusion of hostilities. 

It is well settled that a war is not u~ncludcd in 

the legal sense until some formal action by a compstent authority terminstine the war an8 ro-establishing peace is ha&. 

Hamilton v. Kentucky DistilJ.ories and Warehouse Company (1919) 

251 II. s. 11+6* Kahn v. Anderson (1920) 255 fT. S. 1; In Ro 

Hiller, (19223 201 Federal 761,,'766, 262 U. S. 760~ Vincenti 

v. u. s. (1921) 272 Federal 111,; Yeisnnn v. -D. S. 11921) 271 

Federal 944; The. T:rotector (lS71) 12 ‘Yall. (U. S.) 700; Xx 

parts Givins (1920) 262 Redoral 702, 703; Knceland-Digelow 

Company v. Llichigan Central Railroad Company (1919) 207 IZichigan 546, 553; State v. Dixon (1923) 66 Montana 76, 99; 

Further, it is the province of the political department, and not of the judicial department, of the Federal Government, to 8etormina nhen !A:ar is at an end. 20 L. cd. &63; l’erkins v. RoCers, 35 Ind. 12/+, 9 Am. Rep. 639; 67 Corpus Juris 

429. To date, neither Con;;ress nor tb.e Fresident has formally 

declared the war* s conclusion. 

As specifically stated in Knccland-BiColOw Company 

v. Railroad Co:apany , 207 Zichi~an 553, War, in the legal sense, 
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I Honorable Romcr Garrison, Jr., Paga 4 

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oontinues until, end terminates at the tine of, some forinal 

confirclation of peace by an authority conpetent to~.proclaim 

it. It is the province of the political departzen%, and not 

of the judicial department, of government, to determine when 

war is at an end, and a legislative act designating a psrticular day as thd, upon which a war closed should be aocepted by 

$he courts,’ In the United States, the power to reestablish 

peace, like that to declare via?!, rests exolusively with Congress, ana the Fresident has no such authority except as has 

. been given him by Congress. VI 

It is our opinion, therefore, that the present war 

has not yet legally concluded and cannot be considered as concluded in the lee21 sense even though actual hostilities are 

at an end. Senstc nil1 119 will not expire until the Congress 

of the United States, or the Preddent by nuthority of Congress, 

formally proclnizs the terrainstion~ or conclusion of the present 

war. Answering your second question with respect to the date 

of termination of the license, it is our further opinion that 

said licenses terminate upon the expiration of the emergency 

provisions of Senate Bill 119 at the tine indicated above. 

Wo trust this satisfactorily answers your questions, 

Yours very truly 

ATTC!WN GEI,W?AL CO’ TaXAS 

BY BY L ci a-L 

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Eugene Alvis 

Assistant 

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