1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

Case No. 0:22-cv-61029-RAR 

LATOYA RATLIEFF, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, 

FLORIDA, a Municipal Corporation; 

ELIEZER RAMOS, individually; PAUL 

CRISTAFARO, individually; STEVE 

GREENLAW, individually; AVERY 

FIGUERAS, individually; DOUGLAS 

MACDOUGHALL, individually; 

ROBERT DIETRICH, individually; 

JOHN DOE 1, individually; RICK 

MAGLIONE, individually and 

officially, JOHN DOE 2, individually; 

and JOHN DOE 3, individually, 

Defendants. 

_____________________________ / 

 

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT 

This federal civil rights and state law tort action arises from the Fort 

Lauderdale Police Department’s (“FLPD”) violent dispersal of peaceful 

demonstrators at the May 31, 2020, George Floyd demonstration. To effectuate 

that dispersal, FLPD deployed, without warning or a dispersal order, tear gas 

and kinetic impact projectiles (“KIPs”). Plaintiff Latoya Ratlieff was tear gassed 

and shot in the head by a KIP. Ms. Ratlieff sues the City as well as the individual 

FLPD officers who, acting in concert, participated in the dispersal of the 

demonstration, including those who deployed tear gas, deployed KIPs, and those 

in the chain of command who ordered the use of force or failed to stop it. 

JURISDICTION 

1. The claims asserted arise pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, 

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the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution, and the Constitution and laws of the State of Florida. 

This Court has jurisdiction to hear all claims. 

2. This Court has original jurisdiction over claims brought pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over claims brought 

pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the State of Florida. Damages exceed 

$50,000.

3. Venue is proper in Broward County, Florida because it is where the 

events complained of occurred, where defendant City of Fort Lauderdale is 

headquartered, and where the named and unidentified individual defendants

work or undertook the actions that are the subject of this complaint.

4. Plaintiff Latoya Ratlieff (“Ms. Ratlieff” or “Ratlieff” or “Latoya”) 

performed all conditions precedent, in accordance with §768.28(6), Florida 

Statutes, before bringing this action. All conditions precedent have otherwise 

occurred, been performed, been met, been waived, would be futile, or are 

otherwise inapplicable.

PARTIES

5. Latoya Ratlieff was, at the time of the actions described in the 

complaint, a resident of Palm Beach County, Florida, and a citizen of the United 

States of America and the State of Florida. 

6. Ms. Ratlieff is the great niece of Fannie Lou Hamer, an American 

suffrage and women’s rights activist and civil rights icon, a community organizer, 

and a leader of the civil rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s. From her 

infancy, Ms. Ratlieff was encouraged to speak out peacefully against injustice 

and to never be silent in the face of oppression, just as her great-aunt, Ms. 

Hamer, did. Through civil rights pioneer Fannie Lou Hamer, Ms. Ratlieff learned 

at an early age the power of organized community gatherings, peaceful in nature, 

designed to speak to the powerful, governmental institutions, and the favored 

about the need to improve society and implement social justice reforms.

7. At all relevant times, defendant City of Fort Lauderdale (“City”) is 

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and was a duly organized municipal government corporation and public entity 

existing under the laws of the State of Florida. At all relevant times, City was the 

employer of defendants Eliezer Ramos, Douglas MacDoughall, Robert Dietrich, 

Paul Cristafaro, Steve Greenlaw, Avery Figueras, John Doe 1, and John Does 2-

3. The Fort Lauderdale Police Department is a Department within the City.

8. At all relevant times, defendant Eliezer Ramos (“Ramos”) was a duly 

authorized employee of the City and the FLPD. At the times relevant to the 

conduct described in this complaint, Ramos was a licensed police officer within 

the State of Florida. Ramos is a citizen of the State of Florida residing in Broward 

County and is over the age of 18.

9. At all relevant times, defendant John Doe 1 was a duly authorized 

employee of the City and the FLPD. At the times relevant to the conduct described 

in this complaint, Ramos was a licensed police officer within the State of Florida. 

John Doe 1 is a citizen of the State of Florida residing in Broward County and is 

over the age of 18.

10. At all relevant times, defendant Sergeant Paul Cristafaro 

(“Cristafaro”) was a duly authorized employee of the City and the FLPD and a 

licensed police officer within the State of Florida. Cristafaro is a citizen of the 

State of Florida and is over the age of 18. On information and belief, he resides 

in Broward County, Florida.

11. At all relevant times, defendant Assistant Chief Douglas 

MacDoughall (“MacDoughall”) was a duly authorized employee of the City and 

the FLPD and a licensed police officer within the State of Florida. MacDoughall

is a citizen of the State of Florida and is over the age of 18. On information and 

belief, he resides in Broward County, Florida. 

12. At all relevant times, defendant Captain Robert Dietrich (“Dietrich”) 

was a duly authorized employee of the City and the Fort Lauderdale Police 

Department and a licensed police officer within the State of Florida. Dietrich is a 

citizen of the State of Florida and is over the age of 18. On information and belief, 

he resides in Broward County, Florida.

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13. At all relevant times, defendant Captain Steve Greenlaw (“Greenlaw”) 

was a duly authorized employee of the City of Fort Lauderdale and the FLPD and 

a licensed police officer within the State of Florida. Greenlaw is a citizen of the 

State of Florida and is over the age of 18. On information and belief, he resides 

in Broward County, Florida.

14. At all relevant times, defendant Lieutenant Avery Figueras 

(“Figueras”) was a duly authorized employee of the City and the FLPD and a 

licensed police officer within the State of Florida. On day in question, Figueras 

was S.W.A.T. Commander. Figueras is a citizen of the State of Florida and is over 

the age of 18. On information and belief, he resides in Broward County, Florida.

15. At all relevant times, defendants John Does 2-3 were duly 

authorized employees of the City and the FLPD and licensed police officers within 

the State of Florida. John Does 2-3 are citizens of the State of Florida residing in 

Broward County and are over the age of 18. 

16. At all relevant times, defendant Rick Maglioni (“Maglioni”) was a duly 

authorized employee of the City and the FLPD. At the times relevant to the 

conduct described in this complaint, Maglione was a licensed police officer within 

the State of Florida. Maglione is a citizen of the State of Florida residing in 

Broward County and is over the age of 18.

RELEVANT FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS

17. The murder of George Floyd, captured on video and seen by millions 

around the world, encouraged countless law-abiding citizens and residents from 

every corner and region of the United States (and even more worldwide) to 

commence peaceful public demonstrations to demand meaningful, impacting 

change, social justice, and a collective determination that Black lives matter. 

During the time of the global pandemic of COVID-19, groups of peaceful, law 

abiding, constitutionally enabled citizens gathered throughout the United States, 

including in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, to demonstrate against the brutality and 

systemic injustices perpetrated by law enforcement officers against Black people 

and people of color.

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18. This action arises because of the FLPD’s decision to disperse 

peaceful demonstrators with chemical weapons and less-than-lethal munitions 

without warning or lawful justification.

I. Weapons and Rounds Used.

19. Ms. Ratlieff and other peaceful demonstrators were tear gassed and 

shot at by FLPD officers, including the individual defendants, while the 

demonstrators peacefully and legally assembled and demonstrated against police 

brutality occurring in the United States. 

A. Riot Control Agent.

20. Euphemistically labeled as “riot control agents,” “tear gas” consists 

of chemical compounds that temporarily make people unable to function by 

causing substantial irritation to the eyes, mouth, throat, lungs, and skin.1

21. On May 31, 2020, FLPD officers deployed riot control agents on 

peaceful, law-abiding demonstrators gathered in the City of Fort Lauderdale. 

22. When the City deployed these agents, it and the FLPD, including the 

individual defendants named in the complaint, knew or reasonably should have 

known the agents would temporarily incapacitate and immobilize the target of 

the tear gas and any person in the vicinity, whether targeted or not. The City and 

FLPD further knew the deployment of tear gas would restrict the free movement 

of gathered participants.

23. FLPD officials knew that launching chemical munition cannisters 

from 40mm devices could and would injure persons when the cannisters hit a 

person in the head, face, or other body parts.

24. Vendors of chemical munitions and riot control agents market them 

as aerosols containing ingredients formulated to provide a reliable means to 

incapacitate targets and others in the vicinity. 

1Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Facts About Riot Control 

Agents Interim document (Last Accessed Aug. 2, 2021), 

https://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/riotcontrol/factsheet.asp.

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25. An “OC chemical munition,” including pepper spray, is one type of 

riot control agent. The active ingredient in pepper spray is oleoresin capsicum 

(OC), an oily resin plant extract. The spray is designed to cause a severe burning 

sensation in the eyes, nose, and mouth. Contact with OC particles incapacitates 

subjects by causing an almost immediate burning of the skin, and a burning, 

tearing, and swelling of the eyes. Exposure to the OC can cause severe 

blepharospasm (twitching or spasmodic contraction) of the eyes and even 

involuntary closing of the eyes.2

26. When an OC agent is inhaled, the respiratory tract is inflamed, 

resulting in a swelling of the mucous membranes lining the breathing passages, 

temporarily restricting breathing to short, shallow breaths. 

27. The OC agent further causes a constriction of the airway. When 

inhaled, the inhalation causes coughing and shortness of breath. This, in turn, 

causes a gagging reflex and gasping for breath. 

28. A “CS chemical munition” is another type of chemical munition riot 

control agent. Exposure to a CS chemical agent causes a burning sensation and 

tearing of the eyes to the extent that the subject cannot keep their eyes open, 

and a burning irritation of the mucous membranes of the nose, mouth, and 

throat, resulting in profuse coughing, nasal mucus discharge, disorientation, 

and breathing difficulty, partially incapacitating the subject.

29. Tear gas also causes respiratory arrest, vomiting, and allergic 

reactions. It can permanently damage the eyes, cause asthma symptoms, and 

2David K. DuBay, Director of Research, Defense Technology Corporation 

of America, Casper Wyoming. Rusty E. Rush, Associate Director of Toxicology, 

Springborn Laboratories, Spencerville, Ohio, Aerodynamic Particle Size Analysis 

Of First Defense® Pepper Spray (2003), https://www.defensetechnology.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/aerodynamic-particle-sizeanalysis-062520.pdf.

Case 0:22-cv-61029-RAR Document 126 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/13/2023 Page 6 of 76
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result in traumatic brain injury (“TBI”).3 It can have serious adverse effects on 

pregnant women and fetuses.4

30. Riot control agents are banned in warfare.5

31. While the effects of CS are considered temporary at low 

concentrations, higher concentrations have been known to cause permanent 

injury (primarily to the respiratory system) and death in experimental animal 

studies as well as anecdotal human exposures. The National Academy of 

Sciences does not identify a minimum safe concentration of the compound 2-

chlorobenzalmalononitrile (CS, the primary component of tear gas), as even the 

lowest concentrations can result in “notable discomfort, irritation, or certain 

asymptomatic, non-sensory but transient effects”. 

32. Significant psychological symptoms and long-term disability from 

the use of crowd control weapons have been reported in scientific literature..

33. Members of the FLPD failed to adequately plan their deployment of 

tear gas on May 31, 2020. The deployment of non-lethal chemical agents from 

the police line, west, toward the crowd, was flawed and inadequate.

34. A proper non-lethal chemical agent plan should include the desired 

3Will Stone & Carrie Feibel, From ‘Flash Bangs’ To ‘Rubber’ Bullets: The 

Very Real Risks of ‘Riot Control Agents’, NPR, June 6, 2020, 

https://www.npr.org/sections/health- shots/2020/06/06/871423767/fromflash-bangs-to-rubber-bullets-the-very-real-risks-of-riot-control- agents.

4Chemical Irritants, Physicians for Human Rights, https://phr.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/PHR_INCLO_Fact_Sheets_Chemical_Irritants.pdf.

5 Art. 1, § 5, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 

Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 

opened for signature Jan. 13, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21, 32 I.LM. 800, 

available at http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/ (last visited 

Jan. 28, 2022) ("Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a 

method of warfare."); Gas Smells Awful: U.N. Forces, Riot-Control Agents, and the 

Chemical Weapons Convention, 31 Mich. J. Int'l L. 475, 477 (2010) (“RCAs are 

banned chemical agents under the CWC, except when used in law-enforcement 

situations.”); Will Stone & Carrie Feibel, From ‘Flash Bangs’ To ‘Rubber’ Bullets: 

The Very Real Risks of ‘Riot Control Agents’, NPR, June 6, 2020, 

https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/06/06/871423767/fromflash-bangs-to-rubber-bullets-the-very-real-risks-of-riot-control-agents.

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direction to move the crowd, along with wind conditions and direction. Video 

evidence shows clouds of non-lethal chemical agents blowing away from the 

crowd and directly back to the line of police.

B. Impact Weapons Designed to Harm.

35. FLPD deployed kinetic impact projectiles (KIPs). KIPs have a larger 

surface area than other ammunition, and take unpredictable flight paths when 

deployed, thus reducing accuracy.6 The unreliability of KIPs is so well 

understood that FLPD policy prescribes the minimal standard of accuracy for 

KIPs as only twelve inches. 

36. KIPs are widely known to cause contusions, abrasions, and 

hematomas.7 Blunt impact from KIPs may cause internal injuries.8

37. Fatalities occur when KIPs strike a person’s head, neck, or

precordium (the region of the chest immediately in front of the heart).9

38. Reliable independent studies, well known among researchers and 

law enforcement agencies, have documented the likelihood of serious bodily 

injury and death from the use of KIPs. This is especially so when KIPs are used 

in crowd control situations.

39. In Death, injury and disability from kinetic impact projectiles in crowd 

control settings, a systematic review of readily available literature uncovered that 

three percent of those injured by KIPs in crowd control settings died from 

6Rohini Haar et al., Death, injury and disability from kinetic impact 

projectiles in crowd control settings: a systematic review, 2017 BMJ Open 2, 

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5736036/pdf/bmjopen2017-018154.pdf.; Kinetic Impact Projectiles, Physicians for Human Rights, 

https://phr.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/PHR_INCLO_Fact_Sheet_Kinetic_Impact_Projectiles.

pdf.

7W. Bozeman & J. Winslow, Medical Aspects of Less Lethal Weapons, The 

Internet Journal of Rescue and Disaster Medicine, 

https://print.ispub.com/api/0/ispub-article/7142.

8Id.

9Id.

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inflicted injuries.10 Of those who survived KIP injuries, seventy-one percent had 

injuries considered severe.11 Fifteen percent of the other survivors of KIP injuries 

were permanently injured.12

40. Another study’s findings revealed that chest and abdominal KIP 

impact sites are associated with increased rates of hospital admissions and 

serious injuries, and that head, ocular, and torso impacts sites are associated 

with death, significant injury, and permanent disability. Cardiac arrest and 

death have been described following impacts to the chest or abdomen.13

Abdominal strikes can cause liver laceration. 

41. The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National 

Institute of Justice, in a 2014 publicly released report, advised that users of 

impact munitions (including KIPs) must be aware that individuals struck in the 

chest and abdomen areas are “more susceptible to serious injury or death, 

especially at close ranges.”14

42. Among the weapons issued to and used by defendant Ramos were 

Defense Technology 40mm Direct Impact CS rounds. The 40mm Direct Impact 

munition is a high-speed projectile consisting of a plastic body and a blue 

crushable foam nose. The blue foam nose indicates that the round contains a 

CS powder payload. The CS powder contains the chemical orthochlorobenzal10Id. 11Rohini Haar et al., Death, injury and disability from kinetic impact 

projectiles in crowd control settings: a systematic review, 2017 BMJ Open 2, 

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5736036/pdf/bmjopen2017-018154.pdf. The study defined severe injuries as those requiring 

professional medical management. Severe injuries ranged from lacerations that 

required suturing to penetrating injuries that required surgery or intensive care 

unit-level care.

12Id. at 7.

13Jennifer A. Beatty, Jason P. Stopyra, John H. Slish, William P. Bozeman, 

Injury patterns of less lethal kinetic impact projectiles used by law enforcement 

officers, 69 J. Forensic Leg. Med. 4 (2020). 14U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, National Institute 

of Justice, Impact Munitions Use: Types, Targets, Effects (Oct. 4, 2014), 

https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/206089.pdf.

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malononitrile, the same chemical found in tear gas.

43. Upon impact, the crushable foam nose dissipates energy while 

simultaneously releasing the CS powder payload. The payload is ejected laterally, 

dispersing a two-foot diameter cloud of CS powder. The CS payload causes a 

burning sensation to the skin, tearing, tightness in the chest, feelings of 

suffocation, and possible mental disorientation. 

44. The Direct Impact CS round is intended to be used as an accurate 

way to deliver an irritant payload in close proximity to a group of subjects. 

According to official product materials, due to the efficient payload dispersion 

pattern, multiple subjects will be affected by targeting only a few individuals with 

a direct impact round.

45. Consistent with the research showing the increased likelihood of 

serious bodily injury by targeting the abdomen and chest areas, the product 

specifications for the direct impact munition defendant Ramos fired expressly 

advised against abdominal, upper body, and head strikes. The specifications 

explain that the large muscle groups of the buttocks, thigh, and knees of the 

subject, when shot from 16 feet to 131 feet, are likely to provide sufficient pain 

stimulus, while greatly reducing serious or life-threatening injuries.

46. Likewise, Defense Technology’s Specialty Impact Munitions Basic 

Instructor Certification Program advises against abdominal, upper body, and 

head strikes as a first resort. According to the manual, all rounds have the 

potential for causing serious injury and/or death. Defense Technology, 

accordingly, defines the “green zone” for targeting a person as the thighs, 

buttocks, and legs. 

47. As explained by Defense Technology, the “yellow zone” includes the 

knees, abdomen, and arms. 

48. The “red zone” includes the entire back, chest, groin area, and head. 

The red zone is the unauthorized target area that is to be avoided.

49. The training manual instructs that a yellow strike zone is an 

escalated zone only for an individual unaffected by a green zone strike. 

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50. Contrary to Defense Technology training materials and product 

specifications, FLPD’s less-than-lethal policy does not advise against targeting 

the lower abdomen and back. 

51. Misuse of impact weapons can result in serious and permanent 

bodily harm and death.15

52. On May 31, 2020, City final decisionmakers directed the use of KIPs 

to disperse groups of peaceful demonstrators. 

53. In a statement on behalf of FLPD, approved by the Chief of Police, 

the City and FLPD confirmed that KIPs were fired with the intent to disperse the 

crowd assembled at S.E. 2nd Street and S.E. 1st Avenue.

54. FLPD officers were directed to target anyone who picked up tear gas 

cannisters. FLPD officers, including defendant Ramos, did not aim for the green 

zone. FLPD officers, including defendant Ramos, targeted the yellow zone (i.e., 

the abdomen area) and red zone (i.e., the lower back, chest, groin area, and head) 

as a first resort. Several innocent peaceful demonstrators were hit in the red 

zone, including Ms. Ratlieff. 

55. FLPD’s 40mm less-than-lethal training materials confirm FLPD 

officers were not instructed against aiming for the abdomen and lower back “nogo” zones. In training, FLPD employees were instructed to deploy rounds to the 

chest area if other rounds are ineffective. An FLPD captain, during the 

investigation into Ms. Ratlieff’s shooting, confirmed that officers were “looking 

for. . . center mass, you know, areas” and that “hitting somebody in the chest 

[with a KIP] is - is just as viable.”

15See United Nations Public Order Management, Less Than Lethal 

Weapons (UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards for Formed Police Units, 1st Edn. 

2015), available at: 

http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/387390/Less%20Than%20

Lethal%20Weapons.pdf#page=7. KIPs include rubber bullets; rubber buckshot; 

soft polymer rounds; wax bullets; plastic bullets; beanbag rounds; sponge 

grenades; ring airfoil projectiles (both kinetic and tear gas projectiles); and 

rubber bullets with electroshock effect (e.g., Taser XREP rounds).

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56. The defendants knew KIPs can cause serious personal injury upon 

striking a person. FLPD did not train its officers on the use of KIPs in crowd 

control situations. Nor does the FLPD less-than-lethal munitions policy provide 

guidance for using KIPs during mass demonstrations. The bi-annual KIP 

certification course does not include or test on the use of these weapons during 

crowd control situations. 

57. While not identical, the impact from a Defense Technology 40mm 

impact munition can be described as delivering an impact similar to being hit by 

a fast-thrown or hit baseball. Defense Technology 40mm Impact munitions 

typically have a minimal safe range of five feet, and a maximum effective range 

of 131 feet. 

II. Absence of a Dispersal Order.

58. During a demonstration, lawful protesters are often unaware of the 

status of their demonstration and would have no reason to leave the area unless 

advised by law enforcement that their protest had become an unlawful event and 

dispersal orders given. 

59. Deploying tear gas into a crowd and firing impact munitions prior to 

any announcement to the crowd that the event had become unlawful and they 

were being ordered to leave the area, exposes innocent persons to the effects of 

the tear gas and/or impact munitions.

60. The common-sense procedural safeguards that protect lawful 

protestors who are peacefully assembled are half a millennia old. The earliest 

unlawful assembly laws, enacted during the reigns of King Edward VI (1549) and 

Queen Mary (1553), required notice to those assembled that their assembly was 

deemed unlawful by the authorities, an order to disperse, and an opportunity to 

disperse. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. 4 *82 

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(1769).16

61. The English Riot Act of 1715, which imposed the death penalty for 

failing to disperse after the assembly as declared unlawful, riotous or 

tumultuous, similarly required an order to disperse and one hour to comply 

before one could be seized, apprehended, and taken before the Justices. Martin 

Hinton, And The Riot Act Was Read!, 24 Adelaide L. R. 79, 80 (2003).17 The Riot 

Act of 1715, like the Riot Act of Queen Mary, indemnified any official who killed, 

maimed, or hurt a person who refused to disperse when ordered to do so. Id. at 

86.

62. The Florida legislature in 1868 codified those same procedural 

safeguards. Florida statutory law contains a mandatory requirement that law 

enforcement notify the assembly that their assembly has become unlawful, 

riotous, or tumultuous. 

63. If, during the dispersal, persons who refused to leave are killed or 

wounded by an officer, that officer is “guiltless and fully justified in law.” 

64. In contrast, if a dispersing officer is killed or wounded, the person 

refused to leave are be held answerable for the officer’s death or injury.

65. FLPD policies and procedures dictate the notice required by Florida 

law before making mass arrests for participating in an unlawful assembly. The 

dispersal order must inform those assembled that their assembly has been 

declared unlawful, to disperse, and that should they fail to disperse, they will be 

arrested or subjected to other police action, including less-than-lethal munitions 

and chemical agents.

66. Specifically, FLPD’s dispersal order Policy No. 501.10 provides:

When the Incident Commander determines that the participants are 

unlawfully, riotously, or tumultuously assembled in violation of F.S. 

16 (available at chromeextension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://lonang.com/wpcontent/download/Blackstone-CommentariesBk4.pdf).

17 (available at 

http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AdelLawRw/2003/6.pdf).

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870.04, the following proclamation must be issued before an arrest for 

unlawful assembly is made: DISPERSAL ORDER I am (rank and name), of 

the Fort Lauderdale Police Department. I hereby declare this to be an 

unlawful assembly and, in the name of the State of Florida, command all 

persons so assembled at (specific address of location) to immediately and 

peacefully disperse, which means to separate and leave the area. If you do 

not do so, you will be arrested or subjected to other police action. Other 

police action may include the use of less-lethal munitions, or chemical 

agents. Chapter 870.04 of the Florida State Statutes prohibits remaining 

present at an unlawful assembly. If you remain in the area, which was just 

described, regardless of your purpose for remaining, you will be in violation 

of Section 870.04. The following routes of dispersal are available: (give 

directions for evacuation routes). You have (X number of minutes) to 

leave in a peaceful, orderly manner, or face arrest or other police action. 

67. The policy further provides that the warnings will be made from 

stationary vantage points that are observable by the crowd, or to a large number 

of participants. Additional warnings, according to the policy, must be announced 

via public address systems in police vehicles. The warning must be given at an 

amplitude to be heard by the entire assemblage. 

68. In preparation for the Fort Lauderdale demonstrations in solidarity 

with worldwide opposition to the unprovoked police murder of the unarmed and 

not resisting George Floyd, FLPD prepared a pre-recorded dispersal order to be 

played from a Long-Range Acoustic Device (LRAD). 

69. LRAD “can project messages up to 600 meters away, produce a 

maximum continuous output of 136 dB at one meter away, and has the capacity 

to overcome 88 dBs of background noise at 250 meters.”

70. FLPD Detective Burdick assisted in the preparation of the dispersal 

announcement. The LRAD was placed on top of FLPD Lt. Jenkins’ marked FLPD 

Suburban vehicle. 

71. Lt. Jenkins, with the LRAD and pre-recorded dispersal order, was 

present at the parking garage during the incident giving rise to this complaint. 

72. Lt. Jenkins did not personally deploy chemical munitions or fire 

less-than- lethal weapons. He was aware of other FLPD officers doing so but did 

nothing to stop them. 

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73. Lt. Jenkins remained ready and able to play the pre-recorded 

dispersal message through the LRAD.

74. During the time leading to the tear gassing and shooting of gathered 

participants, including Ms. Ratlieff, at no point was their assembly declared 

unlawful. Nor was any dispersal order given. 

75. No advance warning or announcement was made before FLPD 

deployed chemical and less-than-lethal munitions. 

76. In contrast, police in the area received ample warning of the FLPD’s 

decision and intent to deploy chemical munitions via their closed-access police 

communications channel.

77. Contrary to the clear requirements of Florida law, FLPD trained its 

officers that no dispersal orders was necessary where there was violence, 

including rocks and/or bottles were being thrown. 

78. By policy, custom, and practice, FLPD does not give the dispersal 

orders required by law. This custom eliminates the dispersal order requirements 

of Florida law altogether, as it is difficult to imagine a nonviolent riotous, 

tumultuous, or unlawful assembly that could be subject to dispersal by tear gas 

and KIPs.

79. Thus, although FLPD had the means of providing a dispersal order, 

FLPD chose not to issue a dispersal order.

III. Timeline of Law Enforcement Response to Fort Lauderdale 

George Floyd Demonstration.

80. On Sunday, May 31, 2020, Black Lives Matter Alliance of Broward 

County organized a peaceful community gathering against police brutality in the 

wake of the murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis, Minnesota police on May 

25, 2020. 

81. In preparation for the event, the BLM Alliance trained 80 volunteers 

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in de-escalation techniques.18

82. The Fort Lauderdale peaceful gathering involved thousands of 

socially conscious citizens from every walk of life and every recognizable 

demographic group. Some participants were born in the United States. Others 

were immigrants to this country. Men, women, and children gathered in 

solidarity. Black, white, people of color, Latinos, Asians, Caucasians, and many 

other ethnicities and cultures were represented in Fort Lauderdale that day. 

They all joined in a visible demonstration to propel meaningful change in police 

behavior against the citizens and people of the United States, the State of Florida, 

and Broward County. 

83. The gathering was peaceful and without incident. None of the 

participants were accused of looting, burning, rioting, or otherwise inciting 

violence. 

84. Yet, despite the peaceful gathering and the organizers’ 

announcements that the lawful display would be peaceful, FLPD readied its 

officers and employees for violence, and presented themselves as ready to 

unleash violence against the peaceful congregants. 

85. As the gathering, including speeches and displays, wound down and 

the peaceful demonstrators returned to their cars, some passers-by observed 

uniformed FLPD police officers situated at a public parking garage at S.E. 2nd 

Street and S.E. 1st Avenue. They began a peaceful chant and display of their 

signs around 6:45 p.m. 

86. One of the FLPD officers (Hayes) requested the arrival of more police 

units and officers, claiming she was completely surrounded. 

87. Photojournalists and others present in the area, as well video footage 

of that time period, confirm that the police officers were never attacked and were 

never in danger of being attacked. Those persons walking from the organized 

18Miami Herald, Protest live updates: Ft. Lauderdale issues 9 pm curfew 

after clashes with ‘agitators,’ https://www.miamiherald.com/siteservices/profiles/article243135896.html (last accessed October 21, 2022). 

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demonstration were peaceful and kept a sufficient distance from the police

vehicle. They were engaged in the peaceful exercise of their First Amendment 

rights.19

88. Nonetheless, several FLPD units responded in emergency mode with 

the intent to disperse the crowd at the intersection. The responding units did not 

encounter any unlawful conduct from the peaceful demonstrators. Still, force 

was used against peaceful demonstrators. 

89. Specifically, video footage shows a responding member of the FLPD 

(Stephen Pohorence) physically attacking a peaceful demonstrator while 

attempting to disperse peaceful demonstrators from the intersection. The officer, 

with a known history of using excessive force against citizens, attacked a woman 

kneeling with her hands in the air while offering no violence to anyone at or 

around 6:52 p.m. Pohorence pushed the demonstrator who was on her knees. 

90. The City does not claim there were any acts of violence toward law 

19 Miami Herald, How a peaceful march turned ugly: Cops say protesters 

attacked. Photos tell another story,

https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/broward/article24367

1132.html#storylink=cpy (last accessed October 21, 2022).

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enforcement stationed at the corner of Southeast 2nd Street and Southeast 1st 

Avenue before Pohorence used force against a kneeling demonstrator.

91. A SWAT Quick Reaction Force also responded. That team included 

Detective James, and Defendants Ramos, Burdick, and Cristafaro.

92. A few individuals in the crowd defended the unarmed woman by 

responding to this unprovoked use of force—done at a rally decrying those very 

police practices—in throwing the water bottles in their hands at Pohorence.

93. The majority of those gathered, however, remained peaceful. The 

majority peaceful congregants continued demonstrating and lawfully exercising 

their First Amendment rights by taking to their knees, displaying signs, 

chanting, and policing the small minority of agitators. 

94. Notwithstanding, at or around 6:52:52 p.m., in broad daylight, FLPD 

decided to disperse the crowd in front of the garage by means of tear gas and 

kinetic impact projectiles (KIPs). Body camera footage shows an officer 

requesting the key to get tear gas from the police vehicles. 

95. FLPD gave no announcement to those gathered of its intention to 

use these means of force, despite having the opportunity to do so.

96. The decision to use tear gas and KIPs was not a split-second 

decision. Nor was the implementation of the decision to disperse the crowd using 

tear gas and KIPs.

97. At or around 6:53:09 p.m., the FLPD officers were first advised of 

the anticipated tear gas. FLPD made no effort to similarly inform the gathered 

demonstrators.

98. However, when FLPD made the decision to deploy tear gas, the 

assembly had not been declared unlawful. Nor was there a curfew violation. 

99. FLPD ignored Florida law’s dispersal order requirements, even 

though FLPD had ready access to a pre-recorded dispersal order and other 

speakers for broadcasting to the persons gathered in the vicinity.

100. The group near the parking garage included peaceful 

demonstrators, media observers, and other persons who were simply trying to 

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drive out of the parking garage.

101. At around 6:54 p.m., FLPD officers were advised a second time to 

clear the area because of the anticipated tear gas.

102. The announcement made exclusively to the FLPD officers via the 

confidential police radios but not broadcast to those gathered citizens gave law 

enforcement officers without tear gas masks the opportunity to move to a safe 

distance, and to further encourage those officers equipped with gas masks 

sufficient time to put their gas masks on. Because of the announcement, officers 

without gas masks were able to retreat to a safe distance.

103. The public, media, and peaceful demonstrators received no such 

warning that tear gas was about to be deployed.

104. After officers without gas masks were allowed to go to places of safety 

and those with masks were given the opportunity to put on gas masks, FLPD 

began indiscriminately directing tear gas against peaceful demonstrators 

minutes later. 

105. Defendant Cristafaro deployed the first round of tear gas.

106. The police use of the tear gas was done by firing metal cannisters 

capable of inflicting serious bodily injury directly into the community of gathered 

citizens. Throwable munitions were also deployed.

107. SWAT operators indiscriminately deployed tear gas, throwing the 

cannisters into the demonstrators intending to disrupt the protest.

108. At 6:56 p.m., SWAT member Steve Smith requested Field Force 

team. 

109. By this point, the FLPD officer who had initially requested police 

reinforcements and the officer who provoked the crowd by attacking a 

demonstrator (Pohorence) had already left the scene. 

110. FLPD completely blocked egress and ingress from the public parking 

garage and prohibited the free movement of the gathered community members. 

The FLPD presence and concerted actions in attacking the peaceful 

demonstrators agitated those present in the area. No legitimate law enforcement 

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interest existed to cause the police line to be initiated or maintained. 

111. Among the demonstrators struck by the deployment of tear gas were 

those who had parked in the public parking garage and were merely trying to 

leave the day’s peaceful event. They were trapped in the garage and assaulted by 

the FLPD unannounced deployment of tear gas. As recorded by body camera 

footage, many of these unarmed, law-abiding, and peaceful participants begged 

and pleaded to be allowed to leave, even as they were tear gassed. 

112. As these peaceful demonstrators were gassed, one demonstrator 

who was finally allowed to leave by the FLPD requested that internal affairs be 

called to the scene immediately. An FLPD bicycle officer, who had been given 

enough time to move to a safe location by the pre-gas warnings, casually replied, 

almost gleefully, that not only was internal affairs present at the scene, but 

internal affairs had ordered the use of tear gas.

113. Body camera footage shows tear gas filling the garage even as 

peaceful demonstrators were trapped by FLPD officers at around 6:56 p.m. The 

police made no provision for peaceful participants to exit the garage in their cars 

until around 6:56:45 p.m., after being assaulted by the tear gas. 

114. Also counted among demonstrators subjected to tear gas was a 

group of peaceful demonstrators standing in front of the FLPD, but sufficiently 

far away to not be within reach. 

115. The City agrees there is no video footage supporting any contention 

by any of its officers that rocks, bottles, bricks or fireworks or other explosives 

were thrown at law enforcement staged at the corner of Southeast 2nd Street and 

Southeast 1st Avenue on May 31, 2020, between 7:00 p.m. and 7:07:30 p.m. 

116. The City does not contend that rocks, bottles, bricks or fireworks or 

other explosives were thrown at law enforcement staged at the corner of 

Southeast 2nd Street and Southeast 1st Avenue on May 31, 2020, between the 

time periods of 7:00 p.m. Eastern Time and 7:07:30 p.m. Eastern Time.

117. The body worn camera footage and video footage from spectators 

confirm no rocks, bottles, or bricks were thrown at law enforcement from 7:00 

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p.m. to the time Ratlieff was shot at around 7:07:30 pm.

118. Law enforcement at the corner of S.E. 2nd Street and S.E. 1st 

Avenue, Fort Lauderdale were not confronted with burning buildings, burning 

cars, and looting like other police departments throughout the nation.

119. At 7:01 p.m., FLPD Bravo Field Force and Field Force Commander 

Captain Robert Dietrich arrived at S.E. 2nd Street and S.E. 1st Avenue. Field 

Force arrived with the intent to disperse the demonstration. Attached to the field 

force was a four-man SWAT team that included Defendant Ramos. Bravo Field 

Force was a block and a half away.

120. There were approximately 50 officers at the corner, who were later 

joined by more officers and the Broward Sheriff’s Office.

121. Ramos assisted the field force team’s protection contingent.

122. FLPD Bravo Field Force did not arrive to rocks, bottles, explosives, 

or fireworks being thrown at them. Rather, on the ground were rocks, bottles, 

and canisters: “You could tell that a clash had happened between our police 

officers and some of the violent crowd that was at that intersection.”.

123. Plaintiff Ratlieff, while passing the parking garage at approximately 

7:01:29 p.m., joined with peaceful participants who were taking a knee and 

peacefully exercising their First Amendment rights in the presence of the FLPD 

officers. Plaintiff held a sign proclaiming “Stop Killing Us.” 

124. Ms. Ratlieff and those gathered with her were a sufficient distance 

away from the FLPD to not interfere with or disrupt any law enforcement 

activities.

125. But FLPD continued to deploy tear gas without provocation and 

without warning. Again, the City concedes that rocks and bottles were no longer 

being thrown at FLPD after 7:00 p.m.

126. When the peaceful demonstrators verbally complained of the 

indiscriminate and assaultive FLPD police conduct, FLPD continued to deploy 

tear gas without legal justification. Participants, hands raised in the air, chanted 

the now-common mantra: “Hands up, don’t shoot.”

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127. Plaintiff Ratlieff and the peaceful participants gathered with her 

were intentionally tear gassed by FLPD to stop their demonstration. They 

received no advance warning before being tear gassed, and no warning was made 

during the FLPD tear gas deployment. Their assembly was not declared unlawful. 

No order to disperse issued. At all times, Ms. Ratlieff and other peaceful 

demonstrators were lawfully assembled in a place they were allowed to be. 

128. FLPD located at SE 2nd Street and SE 1st Avenue provided regular 

updates of their progress in dispersing the crowd. By 7:04 p.m., on-scene officers 

reported that only twenty (20) to thirty (30) participants remained in front of the 

FLPD officers. Notwithstanding, FLPD officers continued to deploy tear gas and 

fire kinetic impact weapons without warning or legal justification for the sole 

purpose of stopping the demonstrators from assembling. 

129. According to Field Force Commander Captain Dietrich, the SWAT 

team would deploy a gas canister that would cause the crowd to “kind of 

disperse.” It would be quiet for a minute or two and then the crowd would come 

right back into the intersection on top of the Field Force Team. According to 

Captain Dietrich, the following picture describes the group of people “on top” of 

the field force team that they sought to disperse:

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130. At 7:05 p.m., Chief Maglione requested the multiagency field force.

131. Some demonstrators responded to the unlawful deployment of tear 

gas by picking it up in an effort to thwart law enforcement’s efforts to effectuate 

the dispersal. Some covered it with cones, threw it to the side, or back at the 

field force line. The throwing back of tear gas cannisters thwarted FLPD’s efforts 

to disperse the crowd. 

132. By the time Ms. Ratlieff was shot, FLPD knew the deployment of tear 

gas would trigger some to throw it back.

133. At or around 7:06:06 p.m., the FLPD officers in the vicinity of Ms. 

Ratlieff reported that there were only ten (10) demonstrators in front of them and 

that most had dispersed after being attacked by the deployment of tear gas and 

KIPs. Notwithstanding, the FLPD SWAT team continued using chemical 

munitions directed at the participants, fully aware that the tear gas and KIPs 

were intended to and likely to cause serious personal harm and injury. Ms. 

Ratlieff was among the ten (10) remaining peaceful participants targeted by the 

FLPD. She struggled to flee from the armed police presence at approximately 

7:07:01 p.m.

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134. Ms. Ratlieff walked to a safe space near journalists and observers, 

even as she choked on and tried to recuperate from the tear gas. For no lawful 

reason, defendant FLPD officer Defendant John Doe 1 deployed yet another 

round of chemical munitions directly at and in the vicinity of Ms. Ratlieff and the 

group, incapacitating Ms. Ratlieff to the point she could not move or function. 

135. As another peaceful demonstrator was helping her to safety, Ms. 

Ratlieff was shot in the face by defendant Ramos.

136. Ramos gave no warning before deploying the direct impact round. 

FLPD Policy No. 113, Section H.4.b. requires the deploying officer give a warning 

before deploying a KIP. 

137. When he shot Ms. Ratlieff, Ramos was not defending life or property. 

He did not fire in response to any reasonable fear of imminent bodily harm to 

himself or others. 

138. Ms. Ratlieff was struck in the face by Ramos’ direct impact round, 

causing her severe, painful, and permanent physical and emotional injuries:

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139. The shooting of Ms. Ratlieff did not stop the FLPD’s dispersal or 

deployment of tear gas and KIPs without warning. FLPD continued to disperse 

the crowd and were joined by BSO field force team that also assisted in clearing 

out the crowd.

140. At 7:57 pm, FLPD issued a dispersal order at the intersection. 

Everyone complied and left the intersection.

141. The After Action Report records no violence, looting, or burning in 

that area after issuance of a dispersal order.

IV. The Aftermath.

142. Ms. Ratlieff was targeted by the City, FLPD, and the individual 

defendants and treated as an aggressor solely for her exercise of her protected 

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First Amendment rights. 

143. City and FLPD officials mocked Ms. Ratlieff in public. 

144. Several officers who claimed to witness the shooting falsely told 

Internal Affairs that Ms. Ratlieff was injured by a thrown rock, not a less lethal 

projectile. The Director of Internal Affairs responded that there would be 

discussions on how to proceed.

145. FLPD claims it investigated the officer who shot Ms. Ratlieff, but the 

“investigation” was mere window dressing designed to provide public cover for 

the illegal, unconstitutional, and unconscionable shooting. 

146. When Ms. Ratlieff appeared for her interview with FLPD internal 

affairs officers, she was informed by the FLPD official specifically selected and 

assigned to conduct the investigation that defendant Ramos was a “good guy” 

who “did not intend” to strike her. 

147. Given the clear bias on the part of the investigating internal affairs 

officer, the FLPD, and the City, Ms. Ratlieff objected and terminated the 

interview.

148. When Ms. Ratlieff appeared for a second interview, she was again 

victimized by the City, the FLPD, and its authorized agents. The substitute 

investigator, specifically tasked by the City and FLPD to conduct the interview 

after Ms. Ratlieff’s recognized complaint about the biased first interview, asked 

her in an accusatory manner if she threw projectiles at law enforcement, despite 

no evidence supporting the accusation and abundant contemporaneous video 

and personal observations that she did nothing of the sort. 

149. The City and FLPD had no factual basis for asking any such 

question or making the objectively false inquisition, knowing full well from both 

police body camera footage and cell phone video that Ms. Ratlieff was a peaceful 

participant. The offending comment was made solely for the purpose of 

intimidating Ms. Ratlieff for participating in an internal affairs investigation of 

the City’s officers.

150. During the internal affairs interview, the FLPD interviewer

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demanded to know how Ms. Ratlieff knew and was associated with individuals 

accused of throwing back the unlawfully deployed chemical munitions to law 

enforcement. Again, the City and FLPD had no factual basis for this line of 

questioning and knew from the police body camera and cell phone footage that 

Ms. Ratlieff had no such associations.

151. The City did not investigate the initial decision to use tear gas and 

KIPs against demonstrators without warning. Nor was Defendant John Doe 1’s 

deployment of tear gas formally investigated.

152. IA made no effort to identify, much less formally investigate the 

officer who deployed tear gas just before Ms. Ratlieff was shot.

V. After Action Report confirms lack of training.

153. FLPD assigned Major Dana Swisher the task of drafting an After 

Action Report. To do so, he reviewed over 8,000 minutes of body-worn camera 

footage, all related police reports, documented evidence, dispatch recordings, 

aerial footage, and social media postings and videos from attendees (After Action 

Report at 3).

154. The After-Action Report concedes the last department-wide field 

force training was in 2017. The report notes that the “gap” contributed to some 

of the issues they experienced. As FLPD explained, when individuals are under 

stress they revert to their training; many did not have training to revert to as a 

reference point for their actions.

155. The After Action Report acknowledged that FLPD in prior 

demonstrations, including the FTAA protests in Miami, utilized smaller 

projectiles that have lesser potential for creating injury. Those tools, which would 

provide sufficient, less lethal capabilities while minimizing the risk of serious 

injury to others, were not available on May 31, 2020.

156. As a direct and proximate result of the defendants’ individual and 

collective unlawful conduct, Ms. Ratlieff suffered severe and lasting physical 

injury, mental and emotional distress, and humiliation, some of which is 

permanent, and is entitled to monetary damages for each of said losses and 

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damages. 

157. As a further direct and proximate result of the individual and 

collective acts and conduct of the defendants, and each of them, as alleged in 

the complaint, Ms. Ratlieff incurred and will incur for an indefinite time in the 

future, medical, hospital, and related expenses, all in an amount presently 

unascertained, but according to proof at the time of trial. 

158. As a further direct and proximate result of the individual and 

collective acts and conduct of defendants, and each of them, as alleged in the 

complaint, Ms. Ratlieff has suffered loss of income and loss of earning capacity, 

all in an amount presently unascertained, but according to proof at the time of 

trial. 

VI. Municipal Liability Allegations.

A. Final Policymaker Theory

159. The FLPD Chief of Police is the final policymaker for policies 

governing policing by the FLPD. The Chief of Police reviews and approves FLPD 

policies before their implementation and dissemination.

160. There is no FLPD formal written policy governing the circumstances 

under which a crowd may be dispersed by tear gas and KIPs. 

161. Police Chief issued a directive that field force could not be mobilized 

without an order from him or one of the three Assistant Chiefs. Dietrich received 

a call to mobilize and so responded. 

162. FLPD did not create an Incident Operation Action Plan for the 

demonstration. There was one for a smaller protest.

163. FLPD planned for a demonstration on May 31, 2020, but learned a 

much larger demonstration would take place near downtown Fort Lauderdale on 

May 31, 2020. 

164. City officials monitored the police response from the Real-Time 

Crime Center (RTCC). 

165. The group included the City Manager, all three Assistant Chiefs of 

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Police, which included Incident Commander Assistant Chief Douglas 

MacDougall, several Majors, and SWAT Commander Captain Steven Greenlaw, 

among many others. The Chief of Police was available by phone and participated 

in major decisions via telephone.

166. Incident Command heard the radio request for assistance for an 

officer who claimed she was surrounded and needed help. Incident command 

sent an extraction team.

167. Cristafaro requested from Incident Command permission to deploy 

less-lethal munitions. SWAT Commander Greenlaw communicated the request 

to the leadership present at Incident Command. The Chief of Police attended by 

phone. While some in Incident Command opposed and advised against the 

deployment of less-lethal munitions against the crowd, the Chief of Police 

authorized the deployment of tear gas and KIPs. The Chief has agreed that the 

intent of the deployment of KIPs was to disperse the crowd at SE 2nd Street and 

SE 1st Ave.

168. Incident Command knew the crowd was being dispersed with tear 

gas and KIPs without a dispersal order.

169. Assistant Chief Douglas MacDoughall claims he disapproved the 

deployment of tear gas and less-lethal munitions on May 31, 2020, near the 

corner of SE 2nd Street and SE 1st Ave, from 6:30pm to 7:30pm. The City has 

claimed in its interrogatories, however, that the Assistant Chief approved the 

deployment of tear gas and less lethal munitions. The Assistant Chief did not

stop the deployment of tear gas and KIP upon learning no dispersal order was 

given.

170. Captain Steven Greenlaw, Operations Bureau - Special Events & 

Emergency Management S.W.A.T. Commander, approved the deployment of tear 

gas and less-lethal munitions on May 31, 2020, near the corner of SE 2nd Street 

and SE 1st Ave, from 6:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. 

171. Captain Robert Dietrich, Field Force Commander approved the 

deployment of tear gas and less-lethal munitions on May 31, 2020, near the 

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corner of SE 2nd Street and SE 1st Ave, from 6:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. 

172. Police Chief Rick Maglione authorized and ratified the deployment of 

tear gas and less-lethal munitions on May 31, 2020, near the corner of SE 2nd 

Street and SE 1st Ave, from 6:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. The Chief could have but did 

not stop the deployment. He initiated the deployment of a multi-agency field 

force.

173. The decisions of the Police Chief, Assistant Chief MacDoughall, 

Captains Greenlaw and Dietrich were not subject to review.

174. FLPD officers who deployed chemical munitions, the FLPD officers 

assigned to deploy less-than-lethal munitions, and FLPD command staff worked 

collectively toward a unified goal of dispersing the assembly that included Ms. 

Ratlieff.

175. Final policymakers within the City authorized, directed, and ratified

the deployment of tear gas and KIPs at demonstrators and the basis for the 

deployment at SE Second Street and SE First Avenue. 

176. Maglione knew tear gas and KIPs were being deployed without a 

dispersal order. He still approved and ratified the deployment and continued 

deployment of KIPs and tear gas.

177. Captain Dietrich, Field Force Commander, took FLPD Bravo Field 

Force Team to SE 2nd Street & SE 1st Ave with the intent to disperse the crowd.

178. The Field Force donned gas masks and brought ballistic shields, 

batons, tear gas, and KIPs.

179. Each officer present at FLPD played a different role, but worked 

toward a unified goal of clearing out SE 2nd Street & SE 1st Ave.

180. Officers on the Field Force front line used their ballistic shields to 

protect and conceal FLPD officers behind the line who deployed KIPs and tear 

gas. 

181. Defendant John Doe 1 and John Does 2-3 stood behind the 

protection of the Field Force line, where they deployed the tear gas that dispersed 

peaceful demonstrators. FLPD officers subjectively knew tear gas deploys 

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indiscriminately and that demonstrators lawfully present and engaged in First 

Amendment activities would be forced to inhale tear gas.

182. Defendant Ramos protected the field force line with less-lethal cover. 

He also deployed several rounds of KIPs at anyone who attempted to thwart the 

dispersal by removing the tear gas cannisters his team members deployed. 

183. Defendant Lieutenant Figueras, the most senior SWAT officer on 

scene, explained that less lethal munitions deployed by Ramos and others was 

used to help FLPD disperse the crowd.

184. Defendant Ramos deployed several rounds of KIPs to ensure that 

crowds of peaceful demonstrators could no longer peacefully practice their First 

Amendment-protected rights. Ramos fired direct impact munitions in aid of 

dispersing the crowd of demonstrators.

185. Shortly before or after Ratlieff’s shooting, one officer with KIPs 

approached another officer who had also fired KIPs. The first officer asked if the 

second officer’s video was on. The second officer mistakenly said it was on 

standby. Their conversation was recorded. The first officer asked, “Did you see 

me f**k up those motherf rs? The second officer responded “Yeah, “I got the 

one f** *er,” and the two began laughing.

B. Failure to Train

186. The City and FLPD’s failure to properly train its employees on the 

proper use of KIPs in crowd control situations, including the type of KIPs that 

should be used as well as where and when to aim KIPs, was a moving force 

behind the constitutional law violations alleged in this lawsuit.

187. Conspicuously absent is a policy for the FLPD that would provide 

guidance to department members when to make announcements of unlawful 

assemblies and dispersal orders absent the intent to make mass arrests as 

outlined in policy 501.10. FLPD could and should have made continual 

announcements and dispersal orders prior to Ms. Ratlieff being shot in the face 

with an impact munition. 

188. The department-wide Field Force trained officers how to put on gas 

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masks when deploying tear gas. The course does not address how to deploy tear 

gas or kinetic impact projectiles during a crowd control situation. This is not a

training objective of the course.

189. FLPD provides SWAT and field training officers a course on 40 mm 

Multi Launcher Operator. The course does not address the use of tear gas and 

less lethal munitions specifically in crowd control situations. Nor does the 

annual qualification test on the officer’s ability to accurately use a 40mm with a 

gas mask on, much less with a gas mask on while gas is being deployed 

190. Defendant Ramos did not recall and his training file does not record 

him receiving training on using less lethal in the context of crowd control or 

demonstrations, firing a less-lethal munitions with a gas masks, or warning 

suspects before deploying a KIPs.

191. Ramos’ lack of training in firing the 40mm launcher while wearing 

a helmet and gas mask increased the likelihood of hitting an unintended person. 

While Detective Ramos estimated the distance from his position in the line of 

police officers to the unknown male at 30 to 50 feet, a Google Map view indicates 

the distance may have been to be up to 60 feet. Regardless, Detective Ramos had 

not been trained to fire 40mm impact munitions at distances over 45 feet. (KH 

at 19).

CAUSES OF ACTIONS

COUNT I: Federal Civil Rights Violations – Unlawful First Amendment 

Restriction on Speech.

(All Defendants, but the City)

192. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 191. 

193. On May 31, 2020, all Defendants stopped peaceful demonstrators 

from exercising their First Amendment rights. Plaintiff was among the peaceful 

demonstrators.

194. Plaintiff and other demonstrators were in a public forum, set aside

by FLPD for demonstrators to assemble and exercise their First Amendment 

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rights.

195. Defendants violated plaintiff’s rights of freedom of speech and 

assembly under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by 

disrupting her lawful First Amendment activities, including her peaceful 

demonstration against excessive force by law enforcement.

196. Defendants violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights when they

stopped the assembly of peaceful congregants gathered in a public forum. 

197. Defendants violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by deploying 

tear gas and KIPs at crowds containing peaceful demonstrators without warning.

198. The deployment of tear gas and KIPs forced peaceful demonstrators 

like Ms. Ratlieff to discontinue exercising their First Amendment rights.

199. The restrictions on speech imposed by FLPD were not narrowly 

tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest using the least restrictive 

means available.

200. The Defendants, individually and in concert with one another, 

deployed tear gas and KIPs that stopped peaceful demonstrations. 

201. Ms. Ratlieff was in a place she had a right to be. Curfew had not yet 

begun. FLPD had not issued a dispersal order, much less declared the assembly 

unlawful. 

202. Defendants’ actions violated plaintiff’s clearly established rights to 

freedom of expression and assembly under the First Amendment to the United 

States Constitution by prohibiting plaintiff from and making her discontinue 

exercising her constitutional rights to free speech and expression in a public 

forum. 

203. The restrictions were not reasonable time, place and manner 

restrictions.

204. Final policymakers within the City authorized and directed the 

deployment of tear gas and KIPs at demonstrators at SE Second Street and SE 

First Avenue. 

205. Chief Maglione authorized the deployment of KIPs and tear gas and 

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initiated the deployment of a multi-agency field force.

206. Captain Dietrich, the Field Force Commander, took FLPD Bravo 

Field Force Team to SE 2nd Street & SE 1st Ave with the intent to disperse the 

crowd.

207. The Field Force donned gas masks and brought ballistic shields, 

batons, tear gas, and KIPs.

208. Each officer present at FLPD played a different role, but worked 

toward a unified goal of clearing out SE 2nd Street & SE 1st Ave.

209. Officers on the Field Force front line used their ballistic shields to 

protect and conceal FLPD officers behind the line who deployed KIPs and tear 

gas. 

210. Defendant John Doe 1 and John Does 2-3 stood behind the 

protection of the Field Force line, where they deployed the tear gas that dispersed

peaceful demonstrators. FLPD officers subjectively knew tear gas deploys 

indiscriminately and that demonstrators lawfully present and engaged in First 

Amendment activities would be forced to inhale tear gas.

211. Defendant Ramos protected the field force line with less-lethal cover.

He also deployed several rounds of KIPs at anyone who attempted to thwart the 

dispersal by removing the tear gas cannisters his team members deployed.

212. Defendant Lieutenant Figueras, the most senior SWAT officer on 

scene, explained that less lethal munitions deployed by Ramos and others was 

used to help FLPD disperse the crowd.

213. Defendant Ramos deployed several rounds of KIPs to ensure that 

crowds of peaceful demonstrators could no longer peacefully practice their First 

Amendment-protected rights. Ramos fired direct impact munitions in aid of 

dispersing the crowd of demonstrators.

214. 215. Cristafaro, MacDougall, Greenlaw, Maglione, Figueras, 

Dietrich, and other supervisory officers violated plaintiff’s First Amendment 

rights because their commands caused the subordinate police officers to 

disperse peaceful demonstrators, including plaintiff, who were exercising their 

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freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment. 

215. Cristafaro, MacDougall, Greenlaw, Maglione, Figueras, Dietrich, and 

other supervisory officers violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by failing to 

stop the use of tear gas and KIPs against peaceful demonstrators who they knew 

or should have known were exercising their First Amendment rights. Their 

failure to stop their subordinate officers from acting unlawfully caused the First 

Amendment violations.

216. Captain Greenlaw and Lieutenant Figueras violated plaintiff’s First 

Amendment rights because their commands caused the subordinate police 

officers to disperse peaceful demonstrators, including plaintiff, who were 

exercising their freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment. 

Defendants inhibited and chilled plaintiff’s First Amendment activity by 

incapacitating and injuring her with tear gas and KIPs when plaintiff was 

engaged in a peaceful demonstration at a public forum, speaking out against 

police violence and the continued law enforcement oppression of communities of 

color in the United States. Plaintiff’s protected First Amendment activity was a 

substantial or motivating factor in defendants’ use of force intended to chill 

plaintiff’s speech. 

217. FLPD and its employees were not enforcing a lawful dispersal order. 

The participants’ assembly had not been declared unlawful. Nor was there a 

lawful order to disperse. At all times, plaintiff was in a place she was allowed to 

be. Yet, FLPD indiscriminately deployed chemical agents at the peaceful 

gathering and directed the use of KIPs to effectuate and support the deployment 

of chemical agents.

218. The defendants knew or should have known that dispersing 

peaceful demonstrators, directing subordinates to dispersing peaceful 

demonstrators, and failing to stop subordinates from dispersing peaceful 

demonstrators, thereby preventing plaintiff from exercising her constitutional 

rights to free speech and expression in a public forum, were clearly established 

violations of the First Amendment at the time of the incident. Keating v. City of 

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Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 766 (11th Cir. 2010).

219. As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ unlawful conduct, 

plaintiff was tear gassed, shot by a KIP, and suffered severe and permanent 

physical injury, emotional distress, and humiliation, and is entitled to monetary 

damages. 

For these reasons, Ms. Ratlieff demands judgment against all defendants

(but the City) for damages, punitive damages, prejudgment interest on liquidated 

damages as allowed by law, costs of this action, reasonable attorney’s fees, 

injunctive relief, and any other relief this Court deems just and proper. 

COUNT II: Federal Civil Rights Violations – Unlawful First Amendment 

Restriction on Speech.

(The City)

220. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 191. 

221. On May 31, 2020, all Defendants stopped peaceful demonstrators 

from exercising their First Amendment rights. Plaintiff was among the peaceful 

demonstrators.

222. Plaintiff and other demonstrators were in a public forum, set aside 

by FLPD for demonstrators to assemble and exercise their First Amendment 

rights.

223. Defendants violated plaintiff’s rights of freedom of speech and 

assembly under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by 

disrupting her lawful First Amendment activities, including her peaceful 

demonstration against excessive force by law enforcement.

224. Defendants violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights when they 

stopped the assembly of peaceful congregants gathered in a public forum. 

225. Defendants violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by deploying 

tear gas and KIPs at crowds containing peaceful demonstrators without warning.

226. The deployment of tear gas and KIPs forced peaceful demonstrators 

like Ms. Ratlieff to discontinue exercising their First Amendment rights.

227. The restrictions on speech imposed by FLPD were not narrowly 

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tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest using the least restrictive 

means available.

228. The Defendants, individually and in concert with one another, 

deployed tear gas and KIPs that stopped peaceful demonstrations. 

229. Ms. Ratlieff was in a place she had a right to be. Curfew had not yet 

begun. FLPD had not issued a dispersal order, much less declared the assembly 

unlawful. 

230. Defendants’ actions violated plaintiff’s clearly established rights to 

freedom of expression and assembly under the First Amendment to the United 

States Constitution by prohibiting plaintiff from and making her discontinue 

exercising her constitutional rights to free speech and expression in a public 

forum. 

231. The restrictions were not reasonable time, place and manner 

restrictions.

232. Final policymakers within the City authorized and directed the 

deployment of tear gas and KIPs at demonstrators at SE Second Street and SE 

First Avenue. 

233. Chief Maglione authorized the deployment of KIPs and tear gas and 

initiated the deployment of a multi-agency field force.

234. Captain Dietrich, the Field Force Commander, took FLPD Bravo 

Field Force Team to SE 2nd Street & SE 1st Ave with the intent to disperse the 

crowd.

235. The Field Force donned gas masks and brought ballistic shields, 

batons, tear gas, and KIPs.

236. Each officer present at FLPD played a different role, but worked 

toward a unified goal of clearing out SE 2nd Street & SE 1st Ave.

237. Officers on the Field Force front line used their ballistic shields to 

protect and conceal FLPD officers behind the line who deployed KIPs and tear 

gas. 

238. Defendant John Doe 1 and John Does 2-3 stood behind the 

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protection of the Field Force line, where they deployed the tear gas that dispersed 

peaceful demonstrators. FLPD officers subjectively knew tear gas deploys 

indiscriminately and that demonstrators lawfully present and engaged in First 

Amendment activities would be forced to inhale tear gas.

239. Defendant Ramos protected the field force line with less-lethal cover. 

He also deployed several rounds of KIPs at anyone who attempted to thwart the 

dispersal by removing the tear gas cannisters his team members deployed. 

240. Defendant Lieutenant Figueras, the most senior SWAT officer on 

scene, explained that less lethal munitions deployed by Ramos and others was 

used to help FLPD disperse the crowd.

241. Defendant Ramos deployed several rounds of KIPs to ensure that 

crowds of peaceful demonstrators could no longer peacefully practice their First 

Amendment-protected rights. Ramos fired direct impact munitions in aid of 

dispersing the crowd of demonstrators.

242. 215. Cristafaro, MacDougall, Greenlaw, Maglione, Figueras, 

Dietrich, and other supervisory officers violated plaintiff’s First Amendment 

rights because their commands caused the subordinate police officers to 

disperse peaceful demonstrators, including plaintiff, who were exercising their 

freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment. 

243. Cristafaro, MacDougall, Greenlaw, Maglione, Figueras, Dietrich, and 

other supervisory officers violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by failing to 

stop the use of tear gas and KIPs against peaceful demonstrators who he knew 

or should have known were exercising their First Amendment rights. Their 

failure to stop their subordinate officers from acting unlawfully caused the First 

Amendment violations.

244. Captain Greenlaw and Lieutenant Figueras violated plaintiff’s First 

Amendment rights because their commands caused the subordinate police 

officers to disperse peaceful demonstrators, including plaintiff, who were 

exercising their freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment. 

Defendants inhibited and chilled plaintiff’s First Amendment activity by 

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incapacitating and injuring her with tear gas and KIPs when plaintiff was 

engaged in a peaceful demonstration at a public forum, speaking out against 

police violence and the continued law enforcement oppression of communities of 

color in the United States. Plaintiff’s protected First Amendment activity was a 

substantial or motivating factor in defendants’ use of force intended to chill 

plaintiff’s speech. 

245. FLPD and its employees were not enforcing a lawful dispersal order. 

The participants’ assembly had not been declared unlawful. Nor was there a 

lawful order to disperse. At all times, plaintiff was in a place she was allowed to 

be. Yet, FLPD indiscriminately deployed chemical agents at the peaceful 

gathering and directed the use of KIPs to effectuate and support the deployment 

of chemical agents.

246. The defendants knew or should have known that dispersing 

peaceful demonstrators, directing subordinates to dispersing peaceful 

demonstrators, and failing to stop subordinates from dispersing peaceful 

demonstrators, thereby preventing plaintiff from exercising her constitutional 

rights to free speech and expression in a public forum, were clearly established 

violations of the First Amendment at the time of the incident. Keating v. City of 

Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 766 (11th Cir. 2010).

247. As a direct and proximate result of the City’s unlawful conduct, 

plaintiff was tear gassed, shot by a KIP, and suffered severe and permanent 

physical injury, emotional distress, and humiliation, and is entitled to monetary 

damages. 

For these reasons, Ms. Ratlieff demands judgment against the City for 

damages, punitive damages, prejudgment interest on liquidated damages as 

allowed by law, costs of this action, reasonable attorney’s fees, injunctive relief, 

and any other relief this Court deems just and proper.

COUNT III: Federal Civil Rights Violations - First Amendment Retaliation.

(All Defendants, but the City)

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248. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 191. 

249. On May 31, 2020, all Defendants named in this lawsuit stopped 

peaceful demonstrators from exercising their First Amendment rights. Plaintiff 

was among the peaceful demonstrators.

250. Defendants violated plaintiff’s rights of freedom of speech and 

assembly under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by 

disrupting her lawful First Amendment activities, including her peaceful 

demonstration of excessive force by law enforcement.

251. Defendants violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by deploying 

tear gas and KIPs at crowds containing peaceful demonstrators without warning.

252. The FLPD forced peaceful demonstrators, including Ms. Ratlieff, to 

discontinue exercising their First Amendment rights.

253. FLPD deployed KIPs and tear gas with the intent to disperse the 

assembled demonstrators. 

254. FLPD knew not all demonstrators present were engaged in acts of 

violence. FLPD further knew they would be affected by the use of force to disperse

the crowd.

255. Plaintiff was one of those peacefully demonstrating when she was 

tear gassed and forced to discontinue her peaceful assembly and demonstration.

256. While trying to recover from tear gas and then escape the tear gas, 

she was struck with a KIP, and forced to discontinue her peaceful assembly and 

demonstration.

257. The Defendants, individually and in concert with one another, 

deployed tear gas and KIPs that stopped peaceful demonstrators. They did so 

without any warning, forcing demonstrators to discontinue their peaceful 

assembly. 

258. Defendants’ actions violated plaintiff’s clearly established rights to 

freedom of expression and assembly under the First Amendment to the United 

States Constitution by prohibiting plaintiff from and making her discontinue 

exercising her constitutional rights to free speech and expression in a public 

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forum. 

259. Final policymakers within the City of Fort Lauderdale authorized 

and directed the deployment of tear gas and KIPs at demonstrators at SE Second 

Street and SE First Avenue. 

260. Final policymakers within the City authorized and directed the 

deployment of tear gas and KIPs at demonstrators at SE Second Street and SE 

First Avenue. 

261. Chief Maglione authorized the deployment of KIPs and tear gas and 

initiated the deployment of a multi-agency field force.

262. Captain Dietrich, the Field Force Commander, took FLPD Bravo 

Field Force Team to SE 2nd Street & SE 1st Ave with the intent to disperse the 

crowd (RD 87:3-8).

263. The Field Force donned gas masks and brought ballistic shields, 

batons, tear gas, and KIPs.

264. Each officer present at FLPD played a different role, but worked 

toward a unified goal of clearing out SE 2nd Street & SE 1st Ave.

265. Officers on the Field Force front line used their ballistic shields to 

protect and conceal FLPD officers behind the line who deployed KIPs and tear 

gas. 

266. Defendant John Doe 1 and John Does 2-3 stood behind the 

protection of the Field Force line, where they deployed the tear gas that dispersed 

peaceful demonstrators. FLPD officers subjectively knew tear gas deploys 

indiscriminately and that demonstrators lawfully present and engaged in First 

Amendment activities would be forced to inhale tear gas.

267. Defendant Ramos protected the field force line with less-lethal cover. 

He also deployed several rounds of KIPs at anyone who attempted to thwart the 

dispersal by removing the tear gas cannisters his team members deployed . 

268. Defendant Lieutenant Figueras, the most senior SWAT officer on 

scene, explained that less lethal munitions deployed by Ramos and others were 

used to help FLPD disperse the crowd.

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269. 215. Cristafaro, MacDougall, Greenlaw, Maglione, Figueras, 

Dietrich, and other supervisory officers violated plaintiff’s First Amendment 

rights because their commands caused the subordinate police officers to 

disperse peaceful demonstrators, including plaintiff, who were exercising their 

freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment. 

270. 215. Cristafaro, MacDougall, Greenlaw, Maglione, Figueras, 

Dietrich, and other supervisory officers violated plaintiff’s First Amendment 

rights by failing to stop the use of tear gas and KIPs against peaceful 

demonstrators who he knew or should have known were exercising their First 

Amendment rights. Their failure to stop their subordinate officers from acting 

unlawfully caused the First Amendment violations.

271. Captain Greenlaw and Lieutenant Figueras violated plaintiff’s First 

Amendment rights because their commands caused the subordinate police 

officers to disperse peaceful demonstrators, including plaintiff, who were 

exercising their freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment. 

Defendants inhibited and chilled plaintiff’s First Amendment activity by 

incapacitating and injuring her with tear gas and KIPs when plaintiff was 

engaged in a peaceful demonstration at a public forum, speaking out against 

police violence and the continued law enforcement oppression of communities of 

color in the United States. Plaintiff’s protected First Amendment activity was a 

substantial or motivating factor in defendants’ use of force intended to chill 

plaintiff’s speech. 

272. FLPD and its employees were not enforcing a lawful dispersal order. 

The participants’ assembly had not been declared unlawful. Nor was there a 

lawful order to disperse. At all times, plaintiff was in a place she was allowed to 

be. Yet, FLPD indiscriminately deployed chemical agents at the peaceful 

gathering and directed the use of KIPs to effectuate and support the deployment 

of chemical agents.

273. As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ unlawful conduct, 

plaintiff was tear gassed, shot by a KIP, and suffered severe and permanent 

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physical injury, emotional distress, and humiliation, and is entitled to monetary 

damages. 

For these reasons, Ms. Ratlieff demands judgment against all defendants 

(but the City) for damages, punitive damages, prejudgment interest on liquidated 

damages as allowed by law, costs of this action, reasonable attorney’s fees, 

injunctive relief, and any other relief this Court deems just and proper. 

COUNT IV: Federal Civil Rights Violations - First Amendment Retaliation.

(The City)

274. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 191. 

275. On May 31, 2020, all Defendants named in this lawsuit stopped 

peaceful demonstrators from exercising their First Amendment rights. Plaintiff 

was among the peaceful demonstrators.

276. Defendants violated plaintiff’s rights of freedom of speech and 

assembly under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by 

disrupting her lawful First Amendment activities, including her peaceful 

demonstration of excessive force by law enforcement.

277. Defendants violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by deploying 

tear gas and KIPs at crowds containing peaceful demonstrators without warning.

278. The FLPD forced peaceful demonstrators, including Ms. Ratlieff, to 

discontinue exercising their First Amendment rights.

279. FLPD deployed KIPs and tear gas with the intent to disperse the 

assembled demonstrators. 

280. FLPD knew not all demonstrators present were engaged in acts of 

violence. FLPD further knew they would be affected by the use of force to disperse 

the crowd.

281. Plaintiff was one of those peacefully demonstrating when she was 

tear gassed and forced to discontinue her peaceful assembly and demonstration.

282. While trying to recover from tear gas and then escape the tear gas, 

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she was struck with a KIP, and forced to discontinue her peaceful assembly and 

demonstration.

283. The Defendants, individually and in concert with one another, 

deployed tear gas and KIPs that stopped peaceful demonstrators. They did so 

without any warning, forcing demonstrators to discontinue their peaceful 

assembly. 

284. Defendants’ actions violated plaintiff’s clearly established rights to 

freedom of expression and assembly under the First Amendment to the United 

States Constitution by prohibiting plaintiff from and making her discontinue 

exercising her constitutional rights to free speech and expression in a public 

forum. 

285. Final policymakers within the City of Fort Lauderdale authorized 

and directed the deployment of tear gas and KIPs at demonstrators at SE Second 

Street and SE First Avenue. 

286. Final policymakers within the City authorized and directed the 

deployment of tear gas and KIPs at demonstrators at SE Second Street and SE 

First Avenue. 

287. Chief Maglione authorized the deployment of KIPs and tear gas and 

initiated the deployment of a multi-agency field force.

288. Captain Dietrich, the Field Force Commander, took FLPD Bravo 

Field Force Team to SE 2nd Street & SE 1st Ave with the intent to disperse the 

crowd (RD 87:3-8).

289. The Field Force donned gas masks and brought ballistic shields, 

batons, tear gas, and KIPs.

290. Each officer present at FLPD played a different role, but worked 

toward a unified goal of clearing out SE 2nd Street & SE 1st Ave.

291. Officers on the Field Force front line used their ballistic shields to 

protect and conceal FLPD officers behind the line who deployed KIPs and tear 

gas. 

292. Defendant John Doe 1 and John Does 2-3 stood behind the 

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protection of the Field Force line, where they deployed the tear gas that dispersed 

peaceful demonstrators. FLPD officers subjectively knew tear gas deploys 

indiscriminately and that demonstrators lawfully present and engaged in First 

Amendment activities would be forced to inhale tear gas.

293. Defendant Ramos protected the field force line with less-lethal cover. 

He also deployed several rounds of KIPs at anyone who attempted to thwart the 

dispersal by removing the tear gas cannisters his team members deployed . 

294. Defendant Lieutenant Figueras, the most senior SWAT officer on 

scene, explained that less lethal munitions deployed by Ramos and others were 

used to help FLPD disperse the crowd.

295. 215. Cristafaro, MacDougall, Greenlaw, Maglione, Figueras, 

Dietrich, and other supervisory officers violated plaintiff’s First Amendment 

rights because their commands caused the subordinate police officers to 

disperse peaceful demonstrators, including plaintiff, who were exercising their 

freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment. 

296. 215. Cristafaro, MacDougall, Greenlaw, Maglione, Figueras, 

Dietrich, and other supervisory officers violated plaintiff’s First Amendment 

rights by failing to stop the use of tear gas and KIPs against peaceful 

demonstrators who he knew or should have known were exercising their First 

Amendment rights. Their failure to stop their subordinate officers from acting 

unlawfully caused the First Amendment violations.

297. Captain Greenlaw and Lieutenant Figueras violated plaintiff’s First 

Amendment rights because their commands caused the subordinate police 

officers to disperse peaceful demonstrators, including plaintiff, who were 

exercising their freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment. 

Defendants inhibited and chilled plaintiff’s First Amendment activity by 

incapacitating and injuring her with tear gas and KIPs when plaintiff was 

engaged in a peaceful demonstration at a public forum, speaking out against 

police violence and the continued law enforcement oppression of communities of 

color in the United States. Plaintiff’s protected First Amendment activity was a 

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substantial or motivating factor in defendants’ use of force intended to chill 

plaintiff’s speech. 

298. FLPD and its employees were not enforcing a lawful dispersal order. 

The participants’ assembly had not been declared unlawful. Nor was there a 

lawful order to disperse. At all times, plaintiff was in a place she was allowed to 

be. Yet, FLPD indiscriminately deployed chemical agents at the peaceful 

gathering and directed the use of KIPs to effectuate and support the deployment 

of chemical agents.

299. As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ unlawful conduct, 

plaintiff was tear gassed, shot by a KIP, and suffered severe and permanent 

physical injury, emotional distress, and humiliation, and is entitled to monetary 

damages. 

For these reasons, Ms. Ratlieff demands judgment against all defendants 

for damages, punitive damages, prejudgment interest on liquidated damages as 

allowed by law, costs of this action, reasonable attorney’s fees, injunctive relief, 

and any other relief this Court deems just and proper.

COUNT V: Federal Civil Rights Violations – Fourteenth Amendment.

(All Defendants, but the City)

300. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 191. 

301. Defendants committed acts that violated plaintiff’s right to 

substantive due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution. 

302. Freedom of speech and the right to peacefully assemble in a public 

forum are fundamental components of the liberty safeguarded by the Due 

Process Clause to the U.S. Constitution.

303. The City, FLPD, and the individual defendants provoked a peaceful 

gathering by using unwarranted and unlawful violence against a peaceful 

demonstrator kneeling and chanting. 

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304. The City, FLPD, and the individual defendants did not deescalate. 

Instead, final policymakers within the City authorized and directed the 

deployment of tear gas and KIPs to disperse the peaceful gathering. The 

demonstration was never declared unlawful, as provided by Florida law and 

FLPD policies. No dispersal order issued. Nor were those gathered warned before 

the police deployment of force. 

305. The decision by the City, FLPD, and the individual defendants to 

deploy tear gas and KIPs to disperse peaceful demonstrators was not a splitsecond decision. 

306. The City, FLPD, and the individual defendants had sufficient time to 

allow those peacefully assembled to leave. The City, FLPD, and the individual 

defendants had sufficient time to declare (if the facts warranted) an unlawful 

assembly, to issue a lawful dispersal order, or alternatively, to warn peaceful 

demonstrators of the police intent to deploy force. 

307. FLPD warned law enforcement officers present in the same area of 

its intended deployment of tear gas, giving only the police sufficient time to get 

to safety. The City, FLPD, and the individual defendants refused and failed to 

give the peaceful gathering the same warning, despite having the opportunity to 

do so. The City, FLPD, and the individual defendants failed and refused to 

broadcast the readily available prerecorded message on the LRAD device.

308. After the initial use of tear gas and KIPs, City final policymakers had 

sufficient time to consider the continued use of tear gas and KIPs.

309. The City, FLPD, and the individual defendants knew or reasonably 

should have known the demonstrators were mostly peaceful demonstrators and 

members of the media. The City, FLPD, and the individual defendants were 

deliberately indifferent to the substantial likelihood of injury to peaceful 

demonstrators and media observers lawfully present who were neither warned 

nor lawfully dispersed.

310. Defendant Ramos deployed munitions in a manner that created a 

substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm. Ramos intentionally 

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fired direct impact rounds into peaceful demonstrators knowing they had been 

tear gassed and were frantically trying to escape the cloud of tear gas. 

311. In addition, Ramos did not aim for the thighs, buttocks, and legs, 

the recommended target areas. He aimed for the abdomen. By firing, as a first 

resort, at areas other than those recommended by the product specifications, 

Ramos increased the substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury naturally 

associated with the use of KIPs in crowd control situations, and knew or 

reasonably should have known of the increased risk.

312. Ramos did not deploy direct impact rounds to protect himself or 

others from death or serious bodily harm, much less to prevent imminent death 

or serious bodily harm. Ramos did not deploy direct impact rounds to protect 

property or life. Nor did Ramos deploy direct impact rounds for a lawful purpose. 

Ramos was not responding to a clear and present danger.

313. Defendant Ramos deployed direct impact rounds to effectuate the 

indiscriminate dispersal of those persons gathered in the area. Their presence 

was lawful, and their assembly was never declared unlawful. There was no 

dispersal order. There was no curfew violation. Those who gathered and 

assembled, including the media observers, were lawfully gathered in a place they 

had a right to be.

314. Ramos’ statement that he was targeting a man walking away after 

throwing back a chemical munition launched at the peaceful demonstrators was 

not true. Notwithstanding, the claim did not justify his use of force against Ms. 

Ratlieff or any other person. 

315. As Ramos admitted under oath, he knew at the time he fired the 

round that the intended target “was trying to use people as shields.” Ramos 

accordingly knew or should have known there was a substantial likelihood that 

plaintiff (whom Ramos claims the intended target was hiding behind) would 

either be struck by the direct impact round itself or the CS powder payload 

ejected upon impact as well as the substantial likelihood of death or serious 

bodily injury.

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316. Furthermore, the people comprising the group into which FLPD fired 

indiscriminately were engaged in no unlawful conduct when Defendant John Doe 

1 and John Does 2-3 fired chemical munitions to disperse the lawful assembly. 

There was no lawful ground or legitimate government interest served by using 

tear gas to disperse the lawfully assembled group without a warning or lawful 

dispersal order. There was no lawful ground or legitimate government interest 

served by using KIPs to effectuate or support the unlawful dispersal by tear gas.

Their unlawful conduct caused LaToya Ratlieff to move and ultimately be shot 

while escaping the tear gas.

317. The Defendants knew the gas might be moved.

318. By their conduct, the defendants individually and collectively were 

deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of harm their conduct could cause. 

Their conduct was so egregious that it shocks the conscience. 

319. Defendants’ conduct was not objectively reasonable.

320. Defendants’ conduct and manner in which they deployed chemical 

munitions and KIPs without warning or dispersal order violated Ms. Ratlieff’s 

due process rights.

321. Defendants’ conduct in unjustifiably using chemical munitions and 

KIPs to unlawfully disperse peaceful demonstrators and in striking plaintiff in 

the head, causing severe physical injury, while plaintiff and other peaceful 

demonstrators were engaged in protected First Amendment activity was 

shocking to the conscience, beyond the bounds of acts tolerable in a civilized 

society, and so egregious and outrageous that it may fairly be said to shock the 

contemporary conscience.

322. Alternatively, defendants’ individual and collective conduct in using 

chemical munitions and KIPs to unlawfully disperse a peaceful assembly 

engaged in protected First Amendment activity was maliciously and sadistically 

done to harm and injure those gathered, including the plaintiff. 

323. Alternatively, defendants’ individual and collective conduct in using 

chemical munitions and KIPs to unlawfully disperse a peaceful assembly 

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engaged in protected First Amendment activity was objectively unreasonable.

324. The City and FLPD’s failure to properly train its employees, 

including Defendant Ramos and John Does 2-3, on the proper use of KIPs in 

crowd control situations, including the type of KIPs that should be used as well 

as where and when to aim KIPs, was a moving force behind the constitutional 

law violations alleged. 

325. As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ unlawful conduct, 

plaintiff was tear gassed, shot by a KIP, and suffered severe and permanent 

physical injury, emotional distress, and humiliation, and is entitled to monetary 

damages. 

For these reasons, Ms. Ratlieff demands judgment against All Defendants 

(But the City) for damages, punitive damages, prejudgment interest on liquidated 

damages as allowed by law, costs of this action, reasonable attorney’s fees, 

injunctive relief, and any other relief this Court deems just and proper. 

COUNT VI: Federal Civil Rights Violations – Fourteenth Amendment.

(The City)

326. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 191. 

327. Defendants committed acts that violated plaintiff’s right to 

substantive due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution. 

328. Freedom of speech and the right to peacefully assemble in a public 

forum are fundamental components of the liberty safeguarded by the Due 

Process Clause to the U.S. Constitution.

329. The City, FLPD, and the individual defendants provoked a peaceful 

gathering by using unwarranted and unlawful violence against a peaceful 

demonstrator kneeling and chanting. 

330. The City, FLPD, and the individual defendants did not deescalate. 

Instead, final policymakers within the City authorized and directed the 

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deployment of tear gas and KIPs to disperse the peaceful gathering. The 

demonstration was never declared unlawful, as provided by Florida law and 

FLPD policies. No dispersal order issued. Nor were those gathered warned before 

the police deployment of force. 

331. The decision by the City, FLPD, and the individual defendants to 

deploy tear gas and KIPs to disperse peaceful demonstrators was not a splitsecond decision. 

332. The City, FLPD, and the individual defendants had sufficient time to 

allow those peacefully assembled to leave. The City, FLPD, and the individual 

defendants had sufficient time to declare (if the facts warranted) an unlawful 

assembly, to issue a lawful dispersal order, or alternatively, to warn peaceful 

demonstrators of the police intent to deploy force. 

333. FLPD warned law enforcement officers present in the same area of 

its intended deployment of tear gas, giving only the police sufficient time to get 

to safety. The City, FLPD, and the individual defendants refused and failed to 

give the peaceful gathering the same warning, despite having the opportunity to 

do so. The City, FLPD, and the individual defendants failed and refused to 

broadcast the readily available prerecorded message on the LRAD device.

334. After the initial use of tear gas and KIPs, City final policymakers had 

sufficient time to consider the continued use of tear gas and KIPs.

335. The City, FLPD, and the individual defendants knew or reasonably 

should have known the demonstrators were mostly peaceful demonstrators and 

members of the media. The City, FLPD, and the individual defendants were 

deliberately indifferent to the substantial likelihood of injury to peaceful 

demonstrators and media observers lawfully present who were neither warned 

nor lawfully dispersed.

336. Defendant Ramos deployed munitions in a manner that created a 

substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm. Ramos intentionally 

fired direct impact rounds into peaceful demonstrators knowing they had been 

tear gassed and were frantically trying to escape the cloud of tear gas. 

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337. In addition, Ramos did not aim for the thighs, buttocks, and legs, 

the recommended target areas. He aimed for the abdomen. By firing, as a first 

resort, at areas other than those recommended by the product specifications, 

Ramos increased the substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury naturally 

associated with the use of KIPs in crowd control situations, and knew or 

reasonably should have known of the increased risk.

338. Ramos did not deploy direct impact rounds to protect himself or 

others from death or serious bodily harm, much less to prevent imminent death 

or serious bodily harm. Ramos did not deploy direct impact rounds to protect 

property or life. Nor did Ramos deploy direct impact rounds for a lawful purpose. 

Ramos was not responding to a clear and present danger.

339. Defendant Ramos deployed direct impact rounds to effectuate the 

indiscriminate dispersal of those persons gathered in the area. Their presence 

was lawful, and their assembly was never declared unlawful. There was no 

dispersal order. There was no curfew violation. Those who gathered and 

assembled, including the media observers, were lawfully gathered in a place they 

had a right to be.

340. Ramos’ statement that he was targeting a man walking away after 

throwing back a chemical munition launched at the peaceful demonstrators was 

not true. Notwithstanding, the claim did not justify his use of force against Ms. 

Ratlieff or any other person. 

341. As Ramos admitted under oath, he knew at the time he fired the 

round that the intended target “was trying to use people as shields.” Ramos 

accordingly knew or should have known there was a substantial likelihood that 

plaintiff (whom Ramos claims the intended target was hiding behind) would 

either be struck by the direct impact round itself or the CS powder payload 

ejected upon impact as well as the substantial likelihood of death or serious 

bodily injury.

342. Furthermore, the people comprising the group into which FLPD fired 

indiscriminately were engaged in no unlawful conduct when Defendant John Doe 

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1 and John Does 2-3 fired chemical munitions to disperse the lawful assembly. 

There was no lawful ground or legitimate government interest served by using 

tear gas to disperse the lawfully assembled group without a warning or lawful 

dispersal order. There was no lawful ground or legitimate government interest 

served by using KIPs to effectuate or support the unlawful dispersal by tear gas. 

Their unlawful conduct caused LaToya Ratlieff to move and ultimately be shot 

while escaping the tear gas.

343. The Defendants knew the gas might be moved.

344. By their conduct, the defendants individually and collectively were 

deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of harm their conduct could cause. 

Their conduct was so egregious that it shocks the conscience. 

345. Defendants’ conduct was not objectively reasonable.

346. Defendants’ conduct and manner in which they deployed chemical 

munitions and KIPs without warning or dispersal order violated Ms. Ratlieff’s 

due process rights.

347. Defendants’ conduct in unjustifiably using chemical munitions and 

KIPs to unlawfully disperse peaceful demonstrators and in striking plaintiff in 

the head, causing severe physical injury, while plaintiff and other peaceful 

demonstrators were engaged in protected First Amendment activity was 

shocking to the conscience, beyond the bounds of acts tolerable in a civilized 

society, and so egregious and outrageous that it may fairly be said to shock the 

contemporary conscience.

348. Alternatively, defendants’ individual and collective conduct in using 

chemical munitions and KIPs to unlawfully disperse a peaceful assembly 

engaged in protected First Amendment activity was maliciously and sadistically 

done to harm and injure those gathered, including the plaintiff. 

349. Alternatively, defendants’ individual and collective conduct in using 

chemical munitions and KIPs to unlawfully disperse a peaceful assembly 

engaged in protected First Amendment activity was objectively unreasonable.

350. The City and FLPD’s failure to properly train its employees, 

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including Defendant Ramos and John Does 2-3, on the proper use of KIPs in 

crowd control situations, including the type of KIPs that should be used as well 

as where and when to aim KIPs, was a moving force behind the constitutional 

law violations alleged. 

351. As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ unlawful conduct, 

plaintiff was tear gassed, shot by a KIP, and suffered severe and permanent 

physical injury, emotional distress, and humiliation, and is entitled to monetary 

damages. 

For these reasons, Ms. Ratlieff demands judgment against the City for 

damages, punitive damages, prejudgment interest on liquidated damages as 

allowed by law, costs of this action, reasonable attorney’s fees, injunctive relief, 

and any other relief this Court deems just and proper.

COUNT VII: Federal Civil Rights Violations – Fourth Amendment.

(John Doe 1 and John Does 2-3)

352. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 191. 

353. The conduct of John Doe 1 and John Does 2-3 violated plaintiff’s 

rights to be free from unreasonable seizures and excessive force in violation of 

the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

354. Final policymakers within the City of Fort Lauderdale authorized 

and directed the use of tear gas and less lethal munitions against peaceful 

demonstrators without warning and without first issuing a lawful dispersal 

order. 

355. The tear gas restrained her freedom of movement. Ms. Ratlieff and 

other peaceful demonstrators were seized.

356. Ms. Ratlieff was seized when FLPD, by means of extreme force

(persistent tear gas), restrained her freedom of movement through means 

intentionally applied. FLPD and its officers excessively tear gassed the 

demonstrators. 

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357. The subjective intent of FLPD in deploying force is immaterial, 

because the appropriate inquiry is whether the challenged conduct objectively 

manifested an intent to restrain freedom movement. Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 

989, 998 (2021).

358. The officers, including John Doe 1, John Does 2-3, and Ramos, 

objectively restrained the plaintiff’s and others’ freedom of movement by 

deploying tear gas and blocking their freedom of movement.

359. Ms. Ratlieff, who was trying to demonstrate and exercise her First 

Amendment rights in a place she was allowed to be, was not free to disregard 

FLPD’s show of authority and go about her business of demonstrating in front of 

the Field Force team assembled at the parking garage.

360. Ratlieff and other peaceful demonstrators complied with the show of 

force that limited their freedom of movement by no longer showing her sign and 

demonstrating in the area in front of the FLPD Field Force team.

361. Notwithstanding, Officer John Doe 1 deployed more force in the form 

of tear gas that further restrained Ms. Ratlieff’s freedom of movement. Video 

footage show Ms. Ratlieff incapacitated as she choked on tear gas.

362. As a result of Defendant John Doe 1’s conduct, Ms. Ratlieff complied 

with the unlawful order and submitted to the unlawful show of authority that 

restricted her freedom of movement and while doing so was shot in the face by 

Defendant Ramos with a direct impact round. 

363. The seizure was unreasonable. Ms. Ratlieff was in a place she had a 

right to be. Curfew had not yet begun. FLPD had not issued a dispersal order, 

much less declared the assembly unlawful. FLPD did not have probable cause 

or reasonable suspicion to seize Ms. Ratlieff. 

364. Defendants City, John Doe 1, John Does 2-3, and Ramos could not 

have reasonably believed plaintiff had committed or was about to commit any 

crime or public offense, particularly since plaintiff was unarmed, non-violent, 

compliant, and engaged in lawful First Amendment activity when seized by 

police. She was not unlawfully assembled.

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365. With no lawful basis, reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or 

warrant, defendants used excessive force on plaintiff by unjustifiably deploying 

tear gas and KIPs at the area in which plaintiff was situated as well as by striking 

plaintiff in the head with a direct impact weapon not marketed for targeting a 

single individual in a peaceful assembly, causing severe physical injury when 

there was no reason to so restrain a peaceful participant such as plaintiff. Given 

the absence of a lawful basis to seize plaintiff, all force used was unreasonable.

366. Defendant Ramos fired KIPs to effectuate the seizure of the peaceful 

assembly. After tear gas was deployed, Ramos fired KIPs in support of that 

seizure, firing indiscriminately at anyone who attempted to prevent the 

attempted seizure by picking up the chemical munitions and moving the 

munitions from the location. 

367. FLPD officers who deployed chemical munitions worked collectively 

with the FLPD officers assigned to deploy less-than-lethal munitions to restrain 

the freedom of movement of those present, including plaintiff.

368. The City and FLPD’s failure to properly train its employees, 

including Ramos and John Does 2-3, on the proper use of KIPs in crowd control 

situations, including the type of KIPs that should be used as well as where and 

when to aim KIPs, was a moving force behind the constitutional law violations 

alleged.

369. Final policymakers within the City authorized and directed the 

deployment of tear gas and KIPs at demonstrators at SE Second Street and SE 

First Avenue. Chief Maglione authorized the deployment of KIPs and tear gas and 

initiated the deployment of a multi-agency field force.

370. Under California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625 (1991), the law was 

clearly established that a seizure occurs when an officer, by means of physical 

force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen. 

The law was likewise clearly established that a show of authority which restrains 

a person’s freedom of movement is a seizure where a reasonable person under 

the circumstances would believe that he or she should comply. Popple v. State, 

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626 So. 2d 185, 188 (Fla. 1993).

371. As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ unlawful conduct, 

plaintiff was tear gassed, shot by a KIP, and suffered severe physical injury, 

emotional distress, humiliation, and is entitled to monetary damages. 

For these reasons, Ms. Ratlieff demands judgment against the Defendants 

(minus the City) for damages, punitive damages, prejudgment interest on 

liquidated damages as allowed by law, costs of this action, reasonable attorney’s 

fees, injunctive relief, and any other relief this Court deems just and proper. 

COUNT VIII: Federal Civil Rights Violations – Fourth Amendment.

(The City)

372. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 191. 

373. The conduct of John Doe 1 and John Does 2-3 violated plaintiff’s 

rights to be free from unreasonable seizures and excessive force in violation of 

the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

374. Final policymakers within the City of Fort Lauderdale authorized 

and directed the use of tear gas and less lethal munitions against peaceful 

demonstrators without warning and without first issuing a lawful dispersal 

order. 

375. The tear gas restrained her freedom of movement. Ms. Ratlieff and 

other peaceful demonstrators were seized.

376. Ms. Ratlieff was seized when FLPD, by means of extreme force 

(persistent tear gas), restrained her freedom of movement through means 

intentionally applied. FLPD and its officers excessively tear gassed the 

demonstrators. 

377. The subjective intent of FLPD in deploying force is immaterial, 

because the appropriate inquiry is whether the challenged conduct objectively 

manifested an intent to restrain freedom movement. Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 

989, 998 (2021).

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378. The officers, including John Doe 1, John Does 2-3, and Ramos, 

objectively restrained the plaintiff’s and others’ freedom of movement by 

deploying tear gas and blocking their freedom of movement.

379. Ms. Ratlieff, who was trying to demonstrate and exercise her First 

Amendment rights in a place she was allowed to be, was not free to disregard 

FLPD’s show of authority and go about her business of demonstrating in front of 

the Field Force team assembled at the parking garage.

380. Ratlieff and other peaceful demonstrators complied with the show of 

force that limited their freedom of movement by no longer showing her sign and 

demonstrating in the area in front of the FLPD Field Force team.

381. Notwithstanding, Officer John Doe 1 deployed more force in the form 

of tear gas that further restrained Ms. Ratlieff’s freedom of movement. Video 

footage show Ms. Ratlieff incapacitated as she choked on tear gas.

382. As a result of Defendant John Doe 1’s conduct, Ms. Ratlieff complied 

with the unlawful order and submitted to the unlawful show of authority that 

restricted her freedom of movement and while doing so was shot in the face by 

Defendant Ramos with a direct impact round. 

383. The seizure was unreasonable. Ms. Ratlieff was in a place she had a 

right to be. Curfew had not yet begun. FLPD had not issued a dispersal order, 

much less declared the assembly unlawful. FLPD did not have probable cause 

or reasonable suspicion to seize Ms. Ratlieff. 

384. Defendants City, John Doe 1, John Does 2-3, and Ramos could not 

have reasonably believed plaintiff had committed or was about to commit any 

crime or public offense, particularly since plaintiff was unarmed, non-violent, 

compliant, and engaged in lawful First Amendment activity when seized by 

police. She was not unlawfully assembled.

385. With no lawful basis, reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or 

warrant, defendants used excessive force on plaintiff by unjustifiably deploying 

tear gas and KIPs at the area in which plaintiff was situated as well as by striking 

plaintiff in the head with a direct impact weapon not marketed for targeting a 

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single individual in a peaceful assembly, causing severe physical injury when 

there was no reason to so restrain a peaceful participant such as plaintiff. Given 

the absence of a lawful basis to seize plaintiff, all force used was unreasonable.

386. Defendant Ramos fired KIPs to effectuate the seizure of the peaceful 

assembly. After tear gas was deployed, Ramos fired KIPs in support of that 

seizure, firing indiscriminately at anyone who attempted to prevent the 

attempted seizure by picking up the chemical munitions and moving the 

munitions from the location. 

387. FLPD officers who deployed chemical munitions worked collectively 

with the FLPD officers assigned to deploy less-than-lethal munitions to restrain 

the freedom of movement of those present, including plaintiff.

388. The City and FLPD’s failure to properly train its employees, 

including Ramos and John Does 2-3, on the proper use of KIPs in crowd control 

situations, including the type of KIPs that should be used as well as where and 

when to aim KIPs, was a moving force behind the constitutional law violations 

alleged.

389. Final policymakers within the City authorized and directed the 

deployment of tear gas and KIPs at demonstrators at SE Second Street and SE 

First Avenue. Chief Maglione authorized the deployment of KIPs and tear gas and 

initiated the deployment of a multi-agency field force.

390. Under California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625 (1991), the law was 

clearly established that a seizure occurs when an officer, by means of physical 

force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen. 

The law was likewise clearly established that a show of authority which restrains 

a person’s freedom of movement is a seizure where a reasonable person under 

the circumstances would believe that he or she should comply. Popple v. State, 

626 So. 2d 185, 188 (Fla. 1993).

391. As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ unlawful conduct, 

plaintiff was tear gassed, shot by a KIP, and suffered severe physical injury, 

emotional distress, humiliation, and is entitled to monetary damages. 

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For these reasons, Ms. Ratlieff demands judgment against the City for 

damages, punitive damages, prejudgment interest on liquidated damages as 

allowed by law, costs of this action, reasonable attorney’s fees, injunctive relief, 

and any other relief this Court deems just and proper. 

COUNT IX: Battery.

(Ramos, Eugene, Cristafaro, Greenlaw, Figueras, Dietrich, MacDoughall, John 

Doe 1, and John Does 2-3)

392. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 181.

393. Ratlieff suffered a harmful and offensive contact when she was shot 

by Ramos.

394. Ratlieff did not consent to the Defendants’ contact.

395. Ratlieff suffered a harmful and offensive contact when she was tear 

gassed by John Doe 1 and John Does 2-3.

396. Eugene, Cristafaro, Greenlaw, and Figueras, Dietrich, MacDoughall 

directed the use of tear gas and KIPs.

397. Ramos, Eugene, Cristafaro, Greenlaw, Figueras, Dietrich, 

MacDoughall, John Doe 1, and John Does 2-3 were acting in the scope and 

furtherance of their employment.

398. Ramos, Eugene, Cristafaro, Greenlaw, Figueras, Dietrich, 

MacDoughall, John Doe 1, and John Does 2-3 acted intentionally, in bad faith, 

or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard 

of human rights, safety, or property.

399. As a direct and proximate result of Ramos, John Doe 1, and John 

Does 2-3’s conduct, plaintiff was tear gassed, shot by a KIP, and suffered 

damages, including mental anguish, bodily injury, pain and suffering, disability, 

disfigurement, emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of capacity 

of the enjoyment of life, expense of hospitalization, medical treatment. The losses 

are permanent and/or continuing and plaintiff will continue to suffer losses in 

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the future.

For these reasons, Ms. Ratlieff demands judgment against Ramos, John 

Doe 1, and John Does 2-3 for compensatory damages, costs, injunctive relief, 

and such other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate.

COUNT X: Battery.

(City of Fort Lauderdale)

400. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 191. 

401. Ratlieff suffered a harmful and offensive contact when she was shot 

by Ramos.

402. Ratlieff did not consent to the Defendant’s contact.

403. Ratlieff suffered a harmful and offensive contact when she was tear 

gassed by John Doe 1, John Does 2-3 and other FLPD employees.

404. Final decisionmakers within the City directed and authorized the 

use of chemical and less-than-lethal munitions against the assembly. Ms. 

Ratlieff was a participant in the assembly.

405. Eugene, Cristafaro, Greenlaw, Dietrich, MacDoughall, and Figueras 

directed the use of tear gas and KIPs.

406. Ramos, Eugene, Cristafaro, Greenlaw, Figueras, Dietrich, 

MacDoughall, John Doe 1, and John Does 2-3 were acting in the scope of their 

employment.

407. Ramos, Eugene, Cristafaro, Greenlaw, Figueras, Dietrich, 

MacDoughall, John Doe 1, and John Does 2-3 acted intentionally but not in bad 

faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful 

disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

408. Pursuant to Florida Statute §768.28(9), the City of Fort Lauderdale 

is liable.

409. As a direct and proximate result of Ramos, John Doe 1, and John 

Does 2-3’s conduct, plaintiff was tear gassed, shot by a KIP, and suffered 

damages, including mental anguish, bodily injury, pain and suffering, disability, 

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disfigurement, emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of capacity 

of the enjoyment of life, expense of hospitalization, medical treatment. The losses 

are permanent and/or continuing and Ratlieff will continue to suffer losses in 

the future.

For these reasons, Ms. Ratlieff demands judgment against the City for 

compensatory damages, costs, injunctive relief, and such other and further relief 

as the Court deems appropriate.

COUNT XI: Negligent Use of Direct Impact Munitions and Chemical 

Munitions.

(City of Fort Lauderdale)

410. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 191. 

411. This common law cause of action arises from Ramos negligently 

shooting plaintiff with a direct impact weapon in the face.

412. Ratlieff did not consent to the Defendant’s actions.

413. Final decisionmakers within the City directed and authorized the 

use of chemical and less-than-lethal munitions against the assembly. Ms. 

Ratlieff was a participant in the assembly.

414. The City, John Doe 1, and Ramos created a foreseeable zone of risk 

by deploying tear gas without warning or dispersal order and then deploying 

impact rounds into peaceful demonstrators who had been tear gassed and were 

frantically moving around trying to escape the cloud of tear gas. 

415. The City, John Doe 1, and Ramos owed a duty to all within the zone, 

including Ratlieff, to act with reasonable care to lessen the risk or see that 

sufficient precautions were taken to protect others from the harm that the risk 

imposed.

416. Ramos breached his duty of care owed by negligently handling his 

40mm launcher, negligently firing a direct impact round that hit plaintiff, and/or 

firing a KIP into a crowd without giving a warning. 

417. Ramos negligently deployed a direct impact at a demonstrator. 

Ramos knew his intended target “was trying to use people as shields.” 

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Notwithstanding, Ramos attempted to strike this demonstrator with a less-thanlethal round, while firing into a known group of people peacefully assembled. 

Ramos used the wrong less-than-lethal round and fired even though his view 

was obscured by tear gas and the bystanders behind whom the intended target 

was hiding. Even worse, Ramos aimed for the abdomen, a body part different 

from that recommended by the direct impact product specifications (i.e., the 

thighs, buttocks, and legs), that substantially increased the risk of serious death 

or bodily harm. There was no immediate need for Ramos to fire a less-than-lethal 

round. 

418. Defendant Ramos’s negligent operation of his KIP directly and 

proximately caused Ratlieff’s wrongful injury and resultant damages.

419. Ramos’ actions occurred within the scope and course of his 

employment with the City.

420. John Doe 1 breached his duty of care owed by negligently throwing 

chemical munitions into a crowd containing peaceful demonstrators without 

giving a warning.

421. John Doe 1’s negligent operation of chemical agents directly and 

proximately caused Ratlieff’s wrongful injury and resultant damages.

422. Pursuant to Florida Statute §768.28(9), the City of Fort Lauderdale 

is liable.

423. As a direct and proximate result of Ramos’s conduct, Ratlieff was 

tear gassed, shot by a KIP, and suffered damages, including mental anguish, 

bodily injury, pain and suffering, disability, disfigurement, emotional distress, 

humiliation, embarrassment, loss of capacity of the enjoyment of life, expense of 

hospitalization, medical treatment. The losses are permanent and/or continuing 

and Ratlieff will continue to suffer losses in the future.

For these reasons, Ms. Ratlieff demands judgment against the City for 

compensatory damages, costs, injunctive relief, and such other and further relief 

as the Court deems appropriate.

COUNT XII: Negligent Use of Direct Impact Munitions.

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(Ramos)

424. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 191. 

425. This common law cause of action arises from Ramos negligently 

shooting plaintiff with a direct impact weapon in the face.

426. Ramos created a foreseeable zone of risk by deploying impact rounds 

into persons peacefully assembled who had been tear gassed and were trying to 

escape the cloud of tear gas. 

427. Ratlieff did not consent to the Defendant’s actions.

428. Ramos owed a duty to all within the zone, including Ratlieff, to act 

with reasonable care to lessen the risk or see that sufficient precautions were 

taken to protect others from the harm that the risk imposed.

429. Ramos breached his duty of care owed by negligently handling his 

40mm launcher, negligently firing a direct impact round that hit plaintiff, and/or 

firing the KIP without providing a warning. 

430. Ramos negligently deployed a direct impact at a person in the 

assembly. Ramos knew his intended target “was trying to use people as shields.” 

Notwithstanding, Ramos attempted to strike this person with a less-than-lethal 

round, while clearly in a group of people peacefully assembled. Ramos used a 

less-lethal round not intended to target a single person in a group and fired even 

though his view was clearly obscured by tear gas and the bystanders behind 

whom the target was hiding. Even worse, Ramos aimed for the abdomen, a body 

part different from that recommended by the direct impact product specifications 

(i.e., the thighs, buttocks, and legs), that substantially increased the risk of 

serious death or bodily harm. And there was no immediate need for Ramos to

fire a less-than-lethal round. 

431. Ramos’s negligent operation of his KIP directly and proximately 

caused Ms. Ratlieff’s wrongful injury and resultant damages.

432. Ramos acted in bad faith, or with malicious purpose or in a manner 

exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

433. As a direct and proximate result of Ramos’s conduct, Ms. Ratlieff 

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was tear gassed, shot by a KIP, and suffered damages, including mental anguish, 

bodily injury, pain and suffering, disability, disfigurement, emotional distress, 

humiliation, embarrassment, loss of capacity of the enjoyment of life, expense of 

hospitalization, medical treatment. The losses are permanent and/or continuing 

and Ratlieff will continue to suffer losses in the future.

For these reasons, Ms. Ratlieff demands judgment against the City of Fort 

Lauderdale for compensatory damages, costs, injunctive relief, and such other 

and further relief as the Court deems appropriate.

COUNT XIII: Negligent Use of Chemical Munitions.

(John Doe 1)

434. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 191. 

435. This common law cause of action arises from John Doe 1’s

negligently use of chemical munitions.

436. John Doe 1 created a foreseeable zone of risk by deploying chemical 

munitions into crowds of persons peacefully assembled without warning or 

dispersal order. 

437. Ratlieff did not consent to the Defendant’s actions.

438. John Doe 1 owed a duty to all within the zone, including Ratlieff, to 

act with reasonable care to lessen the risk or see that sufficient precautions were 

taken to protect others from the harm that the risk imposed.

439. John Doe 1 breached his duty of care owed by negligently handling 

chemical munitions, negligently deploying the round in Ms. Ratliff’s vicinity while 

she was already choking on gas, and/or deploying the chemical munition 

without providing a warning. 

440. John Doe 1’s negligent operation of chemical rounds directly and 

proximately caused Ms. Ratlieff’s wrongful injury and resultant damages.

441. John Doe 1 knew or should have known the round would be picked 

up and that a KIP would in turn be fired.

442. John Doe 1 acted in bad faith, or with malicious purpose or in a 

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manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or 

property.

443. As a direct and proximate result of Ramos’s conduct, Ms. Ratlieff 

was tear gassed, shot by a KIP, and suffered damages, including mental anguish, 

bodily injury, pain and suffering, disability, disfigurement, emotional distress, 

humiliation, embarrassment, loss of capacity of the enjoyment of life, expense of 

hospitalization, medical treatment. The losses are permanent and/or continuing 

and Ratlieff will continue to suffer losses in the future.

For these reasons, Ms. Ratlieff demands judgment against the City of Fort 

Lauderdale for compensatory damages, costs, injunctive relief, and such other 

and further relief as the Court deems appropriate.

Count XIV: Federal Civil Rights Violations – Fourteenth Amendment 

Procedural Due Process

(All Defendants but the City)

444. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 191. 

445. The due process clause provides that no state shall deprive any 

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.

446. Freedom of speech and the right to peacefully assemble in a public 

forum are fundamental components of the liberty safeguarded by the Due 

Process Clause to the U.S. Constitution.

447. Before FLPD could deprive peaceful demonstrators like Ms. Ratlieff 

of their First Amendment rights, they were entitled to notice, an opportunity to 

be heard, and other procedural safeguards.

448. The common sense procedural safeguards that protect persons

peacefully assembling are half a millennia old. The earliest unlawful assembly 

laws, enacted during the reigns of King Edward VI (1549) and Queen Mary

(1553), required notice to those assembled that their assembly was deemed 

unlawful by the authorities, an order to disperse, and an opportunity to disperse.

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William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. 4 *82 (1769).20

449. The English Riot Act of 1715, which imposed the death penalty for 

failing to disperse after the assembly as declared unlawful, riotous or 

tumultuous, similarly required an order to disperse and one hour to comply 

before one could be seized, apprehended, and taken before the Justices. Martin 

Hinton, And The Riot Act Was Read!, 24 Adelaide L. R. 79, 80 (2003).21 The Riot 

Act of 1715, like the Riot Act of Queen Mary, indemnified any official who killed, 

maimed, or hurt a person who refused to disperse when ordered to do so. Id. at 

86.

450. The Florida legislature in 1868 codified those same procedural 

safeguards. Florida statutory law contains a mandatory requirement that law 

enforcement notify the assembly that their assembly has become unlawful, 

riotous, or tumultuous. 

451. If, during the dispersal, persons who refused to leave are killed or 

wounded by an officer, that officer is “guiltless and fully justified in law.” 

452. In contrast, if a dispersing officer is killed or wounded, the person 

refused to leave are be held answerable for the officer’s death or injury.

453. Applied here, regardless of whether FLPD could lawfully disperse the 

crowd, before dispersing a peaceful demonstrators, and using force to effectuate 

that dispersal, 152 years of Florida law and 471 years of English law established

the common sense procedural safeguards. That is, law enforcement was required 

to provide notice that the assembly was unlawful, issue an order to disperse, and 

give demonstrators an opportunity to comply.

454. FLPD’s policy requires dispersal orders before making mass arrests, 

but FLPD has no policy governing the dispersal of an assembly determined to be 

20 (available at chromeextension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://lonang.com/wpcontent/download/Blackstone-CommentariesBk4.pdf).

21 (available at 

http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AdelLawRw/2003/6.pdf).

Case 0:22-cv-61029-RAR Document 126 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/13/2023 Page 67 of 76
68

unlawful, riotous, or tumultuous.

455. Contrary to the clear requirements of Florida law, FLPD trained its 

officers that no dispersal orders was necessary where there was violence, 

including rocks and/or bottles were being thrown. 

456. By policy, custom, and practice, FLPD does not give the dispersal 

orders required by law. This custom eliminates the dispersal order requirements 

of Florida law altogether, as it is difficult to imagine a nonviolent riotous, 

tumultuous, or unlawful assembly that could be subject to dispersal by tear gas 

and KIPs.

457. Thus, although FLPD had the means of providing a dispersal order, 

FLPD chose not to issue a dispersal order.

458. Ratlieff’s Due Process rights were violated when the defendants, 

individually and in concert with each other, dispersed a demonstration using 

chemical agents and kinetic impact projectiles without providing notice, an 

opportunity to be heard, and opportunity to disperse in a way that a person of 

ordinary intelligence could understand and comply with.

459. The Defendants, individually and in concert with one another, 

deployed tear gas and KIPs that stopped peaceful demonstrations without giving 

a warning. Ramos gave no prior warning. Nor did he rely on warnings given by 

someone else. No one warned the demonstrators of the use of force.

460. John Doe 1 and John Does 2-3 dispersed a crowd of demonstrators 

with tear gas. They gave no prior warning before dispersing demonstrators with 

tear gas. Nor were they relying on warnings given by someone else. No one 

warned the demonstrators of the use of force.

461. Ratlieff did not consent to the Defendants’ actions.

462. It was the City’s policy, as well as its failure to train and supervise 

its officers on the requirement of Florida law, and issue corrective instructions 

after violations were brought to light, that caused the due process violations.

463. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when she was 

shot with a kinetic impact projectile by Defendant Ramos and John Does 2-3

Case 0:22-cv-61029-RAR Document 126 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/13/2023 Page 68 of 76
69

without prior warning or prior dispersal order.

464. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when she was 

tear-gassed by John Doe 1 without prior warning or prior dispersal order.

465. The Chief of Police authorized the deployment of tear gas and KIPs.

466. Cristafaro ordered the use of KIPs and tear gas, after requesting 

permission from SWAT command. 

467. 215. Cristafaro, MacDougall, Greenlaw, Maglione, Figueras, 

Dietrich, and other supervisory officers violated plaintiff’s rights because their 

commands caused the subordinate police officers to disperse peaceful 

demonstrators, including plaintiff, who were lawfully assembled. 

468. 215. Cristafaro, MacDougall, Greenlaw, Maglione, Figueras, 

Dietrich, and other supervisory officers violated plaintiff’s rights by failing to stop 

the use of tear gas and KIPs against peaceful demonstrators. Their failure to stop 

their subordinate officers from acting unlawfully caused the Fourteenth 

Amendment violations.

469. SWAT command consisted of defendants Captain Steve Greenlaw 

and Lieutenant Avery Figueras.

470. Captain Greenlaw and Lieutenant Figueras violated plaintiff’s rights 

because their commands caused the subordinate police officers to disperse 

peaceful demonstrators, including plaintiff, who were exercising their freedom of 

expression.

471. There is no remedy at state law for the defendants’ violation of 

Florida’s unlawful assembly statutory procedure. Chapter 870 contains nor does 

Florida common law authorize a cause of action under Florida law for ignoring 

the requirements of notice and opportunity to disperse before the deployment of 

force.

472. There is no adequate remedy at state law for challenging the 

defendants’ dispersal of demonstrators, using force, without declaring their 

assembly unlawful and providing an opportunity to leave.

473. There is no adequate remedy at state law for vindicating the denial 

Case 0:22-cv-61029-RAR Document 126 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/13/2023 Page 69 of 76
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of Ms. Ratlieff’s right to assemble without due process.

474. FLPD did not give Ms. Ratlieff and other demonstrators a hearing 

before or after depriving them of their First Amendment rights to assemble in a 

public forum.

475. As a direct and proximate result of the City’s conduct, Ratlieff was 

tear gassed, shot by a KIP, and suffered damages, including mental anguish, 

bodily injury, pain and suffering, disability, disfigurement, emotional distress, 

humiliation, embarrassment, loss of capacity of the enjoyment of life, expense of 

hospitalization, medical treatment. The losses are permanent and/or continuing 

and Ratlieff will continue to suffer losses in the future.

For these reasons, Ms. Ratlieff demands judgment against the City for 

compensatory damages, costs, injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, and such other 

and further relief as the Court deems appropriate.

Count XV: Federal Civil Rights Violations – Fourteenth Amendment 

Procedural Due Process

(The City)

476. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 191. 

477. The due process clause provides that no state shall deprive any 

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.

478. Freedom of speech and the right to peacefully assemble in a public 

forum are fundamental components of the liberty safeguarded by the Due 

Process Clause to the U.S. Constitution. 

479. Before FLPD could deprive peaceful demonstrators like Ms. Ratlieff 

of their First Amendment rights, they were entitled to notice, an opportunity to 

be heard, and other procedural safeguards.

480. The common sense procedural safeguards that protect persons 

peacefully assembling are half a millennia old. The earliest unlawful assembly 

laws, enacted during the reigns of King Edward VI (1549) and Queen Mary 

(1553), required notice to those assembled that their assembly was deemed 

Case 0:22-cv-61029-RAR Document 126 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/13/2023 Page 70 of 76
71

unlawful by the authorities, an order to disperse, and an opportunity to disperse. 

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. 4 *82 (1769).22

481. The English Riot Act of 1715, which imposed the death penalty for 

failing to disperse after the assembly as declared unlawful, riotous or 

tumultuous, similarly required an order to disperse and one hour to comply 

before one could be seized, apprehended, and taken before the Justices. Martin 

Hinton, And The Riot Act Was Read!, 24 Adelaide L. R. 79, 80 (2003).23 The Riot 

Act of 1715, like the Riot Act of Queen Mary, indemnified any official who killed, 

maimed, or hurt a person who refused to disperse when ordered to do so. Id. at 

86.

482. The Florida legislature in 1868 codified those same procedural 

safeguards. Florida statutory law contains a mandatory requirement that law 

enforcement notify the assembly that their assembly has become unlawful, 

riotous, or tumultuous. 

483. If, during the dispersal, persons who refused to leave are killed or 

wounded by an officer, that officer is “guiltless and fully justified in law.” 

484. In contrast, if a dispersing officer is killed or wounded, the person 

refused to leave are be held answerable for the officer’s death or injury.

485. Applied here, regardless of whether FLPD could lawfully disperse the 

crowd, before dispersing a peaceful demonstrators, and using force to effectuate 

that dispersal, 152 years of Florida law and 471 years of English law established 

the common sense procedural safeguards. That is, law enforcement was required 

to provide notice that the assembly was unlawful, issue an order to disperse, and 

give demonstrators an opportunity to comply. 

486. FLPD’s policy requires dispersal orders before making mass arrests, 

22 (available at chromeextension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://lonang.com/wpcontent/download/Blackstone-CommentariesBk4.pdf).

23 (available at 

http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AdelLawRw/2003/6.pdf).

Case 0:22-cv-61029-RAR Document 126 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/13/2023 Page 71 of 76
72

but FLPD has no policy governing the dispersal of an assembly determined to be 

unlawful, riotous, or tumultuous.

487. Contrary to the clear requirements of Florida law, FLPD trained its 

officers that no dispersal orders was necessary where there was violence, 

including rocks and/or bottles were being thrown. 

488. By policy, custom, and practice, FLPD does not give the dispersal 

orders required by law. This custom eliminates the dispersal order requirements 

of Florida law altogether, as it is difficult to imagine a nonviolent riotous, 

tumultuous, or unlawful assembly that could be subject to dispersal by tear gas 

and KIPs.

489. Thus, although FLPD had the means of providing a dispersal order, 

FLPD chose not to issue a dispersal order.

490. Ratlieff’s Due Process rights were violated when the defendants, 

individually and in concert with each other, dispersed a demonstration using 

chemical agents and kinetic impact projectiles without providing notice, an 

opportunity to be heard, and opportunity to disperse in a way that a person of 

ordinary intelligence could understand and comply with.

491. The Defendants, individually and in concert with one another, 

deployed tear gas and KIPs that stopped peaceful demonstrations without giving 

a warning. Ramos gave no prior warning. Nor did he rely on warnings given by 

someone else. No one warned the demonstrators of the use of force.

492. John Doe 1 and John Does 2-3 dispersed a crowd of demonstrators 

with tear gas. They gave no prior warning before dispersing demonstrators with 

tear gas. Nor were they relying on warnings given by someone else. No one 

warned the demonstrators of the use of force.

493. Ratlieff did not consent to the Defendants’ actions.

494. It was the City’s policy, as well as its failure to train and supervise 

its officers on the requirement of Florida law, and issue corrective instructions 

after violations were brought to light, that caused the due process violations.

495. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when she was 

Case 0:22-cv-61029-RAR Document 126 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/13/2023 Page 72 of 76
73

shot with a kinetic impact projectile by Defendant Ramos and John Does 2-3 

without prior warning or prior dispersal order.

496. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when she was 

tear-gassed by John Doe 1 without prior warning or prior dispersal order.

497. The Chief of Police authorized the deployment of tear gas and KIPs.

498. Cristafaro ordered the use of KIPs and tear gas, after requesting 

permission from SWAT command. 

499. 215. Cristafaro, MacDougall, Greenlaw, Maglione, Figueras, 

Dietrich, and other supervisory officers violated plaintiff’s rights because their 

commands caused the subordinate police officers to disperse peaceful 

demonstrators, including plaintiff, who were lawfully assembled. 

500. 215. Cristafaro, MacDougall, Greenlaw, Maglione, Figueras, 

Dietrich, and other supervisory officers violated plaintiff’s rights by failing to stop 

the use of tear gas and KIPs against peaceful demonstrators. Their failure to stop 

their subordinate officers from acting unlawfully caused the Fourteenth 

Amendment violations.

501. SWAT command consisted of defendants Captain Steve Greenlaw 

and Lieutenant Avery Figueras.

502. Captain Greenlaw and Lieutenant Figueras violated plaintiff’s First 

Amendment rights because their commands caused the subordinate police 

officers to disperse peaceful demonstrators, including plaintiff, who were 

exercising their freedom of expression.

503. There is no remedy at state law for the defendants’ violation of 

Florida’s unlawful assembly statutory procedure. Chapter 870 contains nor does 

Florida common law authorize a cause of action under Florida law for ignoring 

the requirements of notice and opportunity to disperse before the deployment of 

force.

504. There is no adequate remedy at state law for challenging the 

defendants’ dispersal of demonstrators, using force, without declaring their 

assembly unlawful and providing an opportunity to leave. 

Case 0:22-cv-61029-RAR Document 126 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/13/2023 Page 73 of 76
74

505. There is no adequate remedy at state law for vindicating the denial 

of Ms. Ratlieff’s right to assemble without due process.

506. FLPD did not give Ms. Ratlieff and other demonstrators a hearing 

before or after depriving them of their First Amendment rights to assemble in a 

public forum.

507. As a direct and proximate result of the City’s conduct, Ratlieff was 

tear gassed, shot by a KIP, and suffered damages, including mental anguish, 

bodily injury, pain and suffering, disability, disfigurement, emotional distress, 

humiliation, embarrassment, loss of capacity of the enjoyment of life, expense of 

hospitalization, medical treatment. The losses are permanent and/or continuing 

and Ratlieff will continue to suffer losses in the future.

For these reasons, Ms. Ratlieff demands judgment against the City for 

compensatory damages, costs, injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, and such other 

and further relief as the Court deems appropriate.

Case 0:22-cv-61029-RAR Document 126 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/13/2023 Page 74 of 76
75 

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 

Plaintiff requests a jury trial as to all counts so authorized. 

RATZAN WEISSMAN & BOLDT 

2850 Tigertail Avenue, Suite 400 

Coconut Grove, FL 33133 

Tele: 305.374.6366 

Fax: 305.374.6755 

Stuart@rwblawyers.com 

StuartW@rwblawyers.com 

Kimberly@rwblawyers.com 

 By: s/Stuart N. Ratzan 

 STUART N. RATZAN 

 Florida Bar No. 911445 

 STUART J. WEISSMAN 

 Florida Bar No. 57909 

 KIMBERLY L. BOLDT 

 Florida Bar No. 957399

KUEHNE DAVIS LAW, P.A. 

100 SE 2 Street, Suite 3105 

Miami, FL 33131 

Tel: 305.789.5989 

Fax: 305.789.5987 

ben.kuehne@kuehnelaw.com 

mdavis@kuehnelaw.com 

johand@kuehnelaw.com 

efiling@kuehnelaw.com 

By: S/ Michael T. Davis 

BENEDICT P. KUEHNE 

Florida Bar No. 233293 

MICHAEL T. DAVIS 

Florida Bar No. 63374 

JOHAN D. DOS SANTOS 

Florida Bar No. 1025373 

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Case 0:22-cv-61029-RAR Document 126 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/13/2023 Page 75 of 76
76 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify on September 13, 2023, I electronically filed this document with 

the Clerk using CM/ECF, and certify this document is served on all counsel via 

transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF. 

 By: S/ Michael T. Davis 

 MICHAEL T. DAVIS 

Case 0:22-cv-61029-RAR Document 126 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/13/2023 Page 76 of 76