SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NOS. A-0392-21 

 A-1828-21

 A-2728-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

JAMEL LEWIS, 

a/k/a ADUAL LEWIS, 

TAREAK BOND, JAMAL BROWN, 

ADWAL LEWIS, JAMAL LEWIS, 

JAMIL LEWIS, KIREESE OCONNOR, 

KIRESE OCONNER, JAMIL KHAN, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________ 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

SHARIF TORRES, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

__________________________________ 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-0392-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

ROBERT HARRIS, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

___________________________________ 

Submitted (A-0392-21 and A-1828-21) and Argued (A2728-21) March 18, 2024 – Decided March 28, 2024

Before Judges Mawla, Chase, and Vinci. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Union County, Indictment No. 10-03-0288.

Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant Jamel Lewis (Steven M. Gilson, Designated

Counsel, on the brief). 

Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant Sharif Torres (Andrew Robert Burroughs, 

Designated Counsel, on the briefs). 

Adam W. Toraya argued the cause for appellant Robert 

Harris (Bailey & Toraya, LLP, attorneys; Adam W. 

Toraya, on the brief). 

William C. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney 

for respondent in A-0392-21 (Milton Samuel 

Leibowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the 

brief). 

Michele C. Buckley, Assistant Prosecutor argued the

cause for respondent in A-2728-21 (William C. Daniel, 
3 A-0392-21

Union County Prosecutor, attorney; Michele C. 

Buckley, of counsel and on the briefs in A-1828-21 and 

A-2728-21). 

Appellant Jamel Lewis filed a pro se supplemental 

brief. 

PER CURIAM 

 Defendants Jamel Lewis, Sharif Torres, and Robert Harris, separately 

appeal from: July 29, 2021; July 24 and September 23, 2021; and July 29, 2021 

and March 8, 2022 orders denying their respective petitions for post-conviction 

relief (PCR). We consolidate these appeals and affirm for the reasons expressed 

in this opinion. 

I.

 We previously recounted the facts when we affirmed defendants' 

convictions and sentences in State v. Lewis, Nos. A-2411-15, A-2550-15, and 

A-2551-15 (App. Div. Jan. 7, 2019) (slip op. at 2-9). To summarize, on October 

28, 2008, defendants staged a kidnapping of Tanya Worthy from co-defendant 

Rashawn Bond's home and used her car to go to her boyfriend Rahim Jackson's 

home in Green Brook to rob him. While Jackson was home watching television, 

he heard the garage door open, and when he opened the door to the garage, he 

saw Worthy's car. A masked person emerged from the car holding a gun and 

told Jackson not to move. Jackson closed and locked the door, the gunman 
4 A-0392-21

returned to Worthy's car, and the vehicle left. Jackson ran to the home of a 

neighbor, who then called police. Approximately two hours later, first 

responders found Worthy's vehicle aflame. Once the fire was extinguished, they 

discovered Worthy's charred body. She died, having been shot three times prior 

to being burned. 

 The State's theory of the case was that Worthy had been killed in a robbery 

gone awry, and that Lewis and Bond thought they could use Worthy to gain 

entry to Jackson's home to rob him because he was allegedly a wealthy drug 

dealer. To accomplish the robbery, Lewis and Bond enlisted Harris, Torres, and 

an unindicted co-conspirator, Titus Lowery, as help. We described the role each 

defendant played as follows: 

According to the State, while Worthy was 

visiting Bond, with whom she was also romantically 

involved, defendants and Lowery stormed in, robbed 

her, and kidnapped her, and then Lewis and Lowery 

drove away in her car, with Worthy in the back seat, 

from Bond's Newark residence to Jackson's Green 

Brook residence. Bond, Harris, and Torres followed

along in another car but didn't reach Jackson's residence 

in time to carry out the intended home invasion with 

Lewis and Lowery. Their plan botched, Lewis and 

Lowery fled Green Brook with Worthy still in the car, 

and Bond, Harris, and Torres changed course to meet

up with them in Elizabeth to destroy the evidence, 

including Worthy and her vehicle. 
5 A-0392-21

The defense disputed any connection between or 

among defendants or between or among defendants and

Worthy. But witnesses testified at trial, often with 

reference to photographs, that Bond and Lewis were 

cousins and close friends, that both were acquainted 

with Harris, and that Harris was acquainted with 

Torres. One witness in particular, Sean Williams, 

testified that he encountered Lewis, a family friend, at 

a party in Irvington three days prior to the crimes; at 

that time, Lewis asked Williams to steal a four-door 

vehicle that he needed to commit . . . [the] home 

invasion and robbery . . . of "one of [Bond's] 

b[*****]s." Lewis promised Williams that Bond would 

compensate him, but Williams ultimately declined to

steal the car Lewis sought.

As for defendants' connection with Worthy, 

Bond's cousin Terron Billups confirmed that Worthy 

and Bond had been romantically involved. And 

Jasmine Campbell, another girlfriend of Bond's, found 

Worthy's business card in a black leather handbag Bond 

gave Campbell just hours after Worthy's body was set 

on fire. The bag, which was eventually turned over to 

police, led the investigation to Bond and then 

defendants. 

[Id. at 3-6 (second alteration in original).] 

 The State's case included cell-site location information (CSLI), which 

tracked phone numbers attributed to defendants, Bond, Lowery, and Worthy. 

The State also had call records for those phone numbers. It adduced testimony 

from telephone company records custodians about the call records and 

subscriber information for accounts belonging to Worthy, Lewis, Bond, and 
6 A-0392-21

Karima Rose; Rose testified Harris was using her phone at the time. Worthy's

and Lewis's lines were on the Sprint network. A telephone company 

representative also identified Torres as a subscriber to an AT&T account "and a 

representative of the Philadelphia County Adult Probation Department testified, 

based on the department's records, about the phone number that Lowery 

provided to a probation officer who was collecting his basic contact 

information." Id. at 7. 

 Engineers from AT&T and Sprint were qualified as experts in CSLI 

information. The Union County Prosecutor's Office prepared maps "that plotted 

the cell sites with which the phone for each account made connections during 

the night in question. The individual who created the maps testified that he 

prepared them based on CSLI records obtained from the service providers for 

the respective phones." Ibid. We recounted what the CSLI evidence revealed: 

According to call records, Bond contacted Lewis, 

who then placed three calls to Harris during the 

afternoon. During a thirty-minute span beginning at 

around 5:30 p.m., while Worthy was at [a] Newark 

restaurant, Torres called Bond, who called Worthy, 

then Lewis, and then Worthy again. Around 7:00 p.m., 

both Worthy's and Bond's phones connected with a cell 

tower near Bond's Newark residence, supporting an 

inference that Worthy visited Bond after leaving the 

restaurant. Thirty minutes later, Worthy's phone, along 

with those used by Bond, defendants, and Lowery, all 
7 A-0392-21

connected with that same tower within a few minutes

of one another. 

Around 8:00 p.m., when the prosecution claimed 

the kidnapping occurred, the phones attributed to 

Lewis, Lowery, and Worthy began connecting with a 

westerly sequence of cell sites between Newark and 

Green Brook. Partway there, Worthy's phone abruptly 

ceased to track with the others and last connected with 

a site near the intersection of Interstate 78 and Route 

24; her phone was later recovered by police on the side 

of the road in that vicinity. 

Call records showed that while Lewis and 

Lowery were traveling with Worthy to Green Brook, 

Bond called Campbell—the girlfriend to whom he 

ultimately gave Worthy's handbag—several times, 

initially without success. Campbell testified that when 

Bond finally reached her at 8:19 p.m., he asked her to 

pick him up at a Newark intersection so she could lend 

him her car. She complied, and he left with her vehicle 

after dropping her off at her residence. CSLI records 

demonstrated that, soon thereafter, the phones 

attributed to Bond, Harris, and Torres all began 

connecting with a series of cell towers from Newark

toward Green Brook. 

At about 8:40 p.m., while the other three were on 

their way, Lewis's and Lowery's phones connected to a 

cell site across Route 22 from Jackson's Green Brook 

residence. That timing coincided with Jackson's 

recollection of when he encountered the masked 

individual, and briefly preceded his neighbor's phone 

call to police. Records confirmed that the neighbor's 

call was placed at 8:48 p.m. At the same time, phones 

belonging to Harris, Torres, and Bond were connecting 

to cell sites near Watchung, ten minutes' driving 

distance from Jackson's home. The same data revealed 
8 A-0392-21

an abrupt change in direction after the neighbor's call 

to police, showing that the phones used by the three 

began connecting with an easterly sequence of cell sites 

back toward Newark. Around the same time, Lewis's 

and Lowery's phones connected with a series of sites 

headed in the same direction between Green Brook and 

Newark. Call records also showed that Lewis and 

Harris were in constant contact during this period.

CSLI revealed that defendants and their cohorts 

converged at approximately 10:15 p.m., when their 

phones connected with a cell site in Newark about a

mile from where Worthy was found burned inside her 

car. . . . Afterward, Shakeerah Scott, the mother of 

Lewis's child, testified that she picked up Lewis and 

two others at another Newark location; she gave them a 

ride to Lewis's car. Bond, meanwhile, returned 

Campbell's car to her at her house at 12:32 a.m., a time 

confirmed by the record of a phone call he placed to her 

announcing his arrival. When Campbell went outside

to meet Bond, he handed her the car keys as well as the 

handbag in which she eventually found Worthy's 

business card. 

[Id. at 7-10.] 

 Not long after defendants' trial, the United States Supreme Court decided 

Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __, __ (2018) (slip op. at 17-18), which 

held individuals have an expectation of privacy in the records of their physical 

movements as captured by CSLI, and that the government's acquisition of CSLI 

constitutes a search. Following the appellate briefing, defendants filed 

supplemental briefs seeking a remand to adjudicate the validity of the 
9 A-0392-21

constitutionality of the State's acquisition of their CSLI and the propriety of the 

admission of this information at trial. We concluded their arguments were 

untimely and declined to consider them. Moreover, although Carpenter was 

decided after defendants' trial and pending their appeals, we noted "our Supreme 

Court had already recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy and 

established a warrant requirement for similar information in State v. Earls, 214 

N.J. 564, 584 (2013)." Lewis, slip op. at 16-17. We also noted defendants never 

moved to suppress the CSLI nor objected to its admission. Id. at 17. Therefore, 

the record lacked the facts on which to determine whether Carpenter was 

violated, and the issue was not properly preserved for appeal. Ibid. 

Defendants also argued the trial court abused its discretion when it 

admitted redacted gang photos featuring Harris and Torres. Id. at 35. At trial, 

defendants objected to the photos and sought to redact items indicative of gang 

membership, including bandannas, hand gestures, and other individuals in the 

photos whom the jury might associate with defendants. Id. at 36-37. The photos 

were redacted to remove the bandannas. Id. at 37. On appeal, defendants argued 

the redacted photos were nonetheless prejudicial and identified them as 

members of the Bloods gang. Ibid. 
10 A-0392-21

We concluded the court had not erred because the gang membership 

"argument was never asserted at trial and the photographs were never introduced 

to show gang affiliation." Id. at 38. Furthermore, "they were redacted 

specifically to remove the red bandannas and a sign mentioning 'B-Block,' the 

only obvious indicia of that affiliation, as well as the hand gestures mimicking 

holding a gun and [a] picture on [a] t-shirt, the only portions obviously

suggestive of violence." Ibid. The photos were not completely sterile because 

they still "depicted individuals giving an obscene gesture, but that gesture is 

ubiquitous and not unique to gang members." Ibid. Indeed, no expert 

commented on the significance of the unredacted hand gestures "at trial, so there 

was no reason to believe a juror would draw an inference that the individuals 

depicted were gang members." Ibid. 

Defendants also argued there was insufficient evidence to support their 

convictions at trial because the State's evidence was circumstantial and most of 

it was data, which "inexactly established their locations at certain times." Id. at 

41. We found otherwise, for the following reasons: 

The significance of CSLI to this case was not that 

it ambiguously placed defendants at approximate 

locations at any one particular time, but that it 

demonstrated the unusual coincidence of their locations 

and directions of travel throughout the extended period 

during which this sequence of crimes occurred and 
11 A-0392-21

during which call records revealed they remained in

contact with one another. Harris and Lewis remained 

in frequent contact throughout, and Lewis and Torres 

were both in contact with Bond just before the 

kidnapping. CSLI then showed that all three converged 

in the vicinity of Bond's home at the same time Worthy 

was there, and that the two sets of cohorts separately 

made their way west toward Green Brook and then 

suddenly east back toward Newark after Jackson 

encountered the masked individual in Worthy's car. 

Though Harris and Torres failed to reach Green Brook 

by that time, a cell cite across the highway from 

Jackson's home placed Lewis there right in time for the 

encounter. 

Harris is correct that the evidence showed he was 

not in the car with Worthy when she was driven to 

Green Brook. But he ignores that CSLI revealed he was 

proceeding in the same direction from the same starting 

point near Bond's home, that he abruptly changed 

directions at the time Jackson's neighbor called the 

police, and that he ended up in Elizabeth where 

Worthy's body was later found. The same can be said 

for Torres, whose phone followed the same 

approximate path. And so did that of Bond, whose gift 

of Worthy's handbag to Campbell ultimately steered the 

criminal investigation in defendants' direction. 

Harris asserts in his pro se brief that the State 

failed to establish even that he was the user of the phone 

attributed to him because evidence showed several calls 

from that phone were likely placed by Bond. But 

Billups testified that he communicated with both Harris 

and Bond on that phone, and Rose, the subscriber on

that phone's account, unequivocally testified that Harris 

was the phone's user when the crimes occurred. Lastly, 

insofar as Harris points out that Campbell never 

identified him as one of the individuals with Bond when 
12 A-0392-21

she lent Bond her car, and that Scott never identified 

him as one of those she picked up with Lewis later that 

night, neither fact, even taken at face value, undermines 

the evidence we have already summarized to a degree

that would call into question the integrity of the jury's 

verdict. 

[Id. at 41-43.] 

II. 

Each defendant filed a PCR petition. As relates to the issues raised on 

these appeals, all three challenged the admission of the CSLI evidence and 

claimed trial counsel were ineffective for not moving to suppress the evidence. 

Lewis and Harris argued counsel were ineffective for failing to retain a CSLI 

expert to rebut the State's proofs. Lewis and Torres asserted trial counsel were 

ineffective for not adducing alibi testimony. Torres and Harris claimed trial 

counsel coerced them not to testify and failed to fully advise them of their rights 

to testify in their own defense. Torres alleged counsel failed to review discovery 

with him and failed to move to suppress the gang member evidence. And Harris 

claimed ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not having argued there 

was insufficient evidence to convict on appeal, and not moving to correct a 

factual error in the appellate opinion. 

Judge John M. Deitch considered all three petitions and issued three 

written opinions, one for each defendant, on July 29, 2021. Lewis's petition was
13 A-0392-21

denied without an evidentiary hearing. Torres's petition was mostly denied 

without an evidentiary hearing, except for, as relevant here, his claims trial 

counsel was ineffective for not pursuing an alibi witness, reviewing discovery, 

and failing to counsel him regarding the right to testify. Following the 

evidentiary hearing, the judge issued a September 23, 2021 written opinion 

denying Torres's petition. Harris's petition was also denied without an 

evidentiary hearing related to his claims against trial counsel, however, the 

judge conducted an evidentiary hearing to assess his claims against appellate 

counsel. The judge then issued his March 8, 2022 written opinion denying 

Harris's petition regarding the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We 

next address the judge's findings regarding each defendant related to the issues 

they now raise before us. 

A.

The judge found Lewis's claim trial counsel was ineffective for not 

moving to suppress the CSLI information lacked merit because the information 

was obtained pursuant to the search warrants, which the law treats as 

presumptively valid. Lewis provided no evidence revealing the search warrants 

for the cell phones and the cell tower data "were based on any false statements 

in the police's certifications." Moreover, the judge who granted the warrants 
14 A-0392-21

found probable cause because the lead investigator certified Campbell provided 

him with her cell phone records and identified four numbers Bond used to 

contact her. The State's CSLI expert testified one of those numbers was 

subscribed to by Torres. Bond used that number the night of the killing to 

contact Campbell. Therefore, "trial counsel could not have filed a successful 

motion to suppress under Carpenter or Earls" because "[t]here was ample 

probable cause to support the issuance of the CDW [communications data 

warrant] seeking, inter alia, CSLI, for these telephone numbers." 

Lewis argued Laquan Bond would have been a partial alibi witness and 

adducing his testimony at trial would have rebutted Williams's testimony that 

Lewis asked Williams to steal a car for the robbery. Further, the defense 

provided a certification from Maurice Williams that his brother Sean is a liar 

and that Maurice1 did not see Laquan2 or Lewis at the party in which Lewis 

asked Williams to steal the car. 

1

 We use Maurice Williams's first name because he shares a surname with Sean 

Williams. We intend no disrespect. From here on, when we refer to "Williams," 

we intend Sean Williams. 

2

 We use Laquan Bond's first name because he shares a surname with Rashawn 

Bond. We intend no disrespect. From here on, when we refer to "Bond," we 

intend Rashawn Bond. 
15 A-0392-21

The judge rejected Lewis's argument regarding Laquan because Lewis did 

not tell trial counsel about Laquan prior to trial and did not certify to the alibi 

as part of the PCR petition. Moreover, Laquan was not an alibi witness but a 

witness the defense could use to attack Williams's credibility. Therefore, the 

judge found "any benefit would be tangential, at best. Furthermore, if 

Laquan . . . was shown to be incredible, that . . . could have a devastating effect 

upon . . . Lewis." The judge noted Lewis's petition was "not critical of trial 

counsel not contacting Maurice," nonetheless, Lewis had "not made any 

showing that would require a hearing on trial counsel's actions regarding 

Laquan . . . or Maurice." 

Lewis's petition included a report from a cell-site expert. However, the 

judge found it did "not create a question warranting a hearing" because the 

defense expert did "not dispute the location of the cell-towers[,] . . . [or] dispute 

that one can get a general sense of where a cellphone is based upon which tower 

it is connecting to," nor did he "point to any error in the data used to plot the 

tower maps or the calls themselves." The defense expert report corroborated the 

State's expert, who testified at trial that call detail records do not indicate the 

caller's precise location and, even though the precise location is unknown, the 

cell tower and sector used by the phone is known. The judge found the balance 
16 A-0392-21

of the defense expert report merely criticized the State expert's maps for not 

"showing the sectors geographically for each phone call" and trial counsel's 

cross-examination of the State's expert. Lewis failed to make a prima facie 

showing that warranted a hearing on the CSLI testimony because the State's 

expert explained why the tower sectors were not on the map and the defense 

expert failed to explain how trial counsel's cross-examination was deficient. 

B.

 The judge found Torres's claim that his counsel was ineffective for not 

suppressing the gang member evidence was procedurally barred because Torres 

conceded his attorney objected to the evidence, but it was admitted over his 

objection. Even if the issue were not procedurally barred, the judge pointed out 

that we addressed and rejected defendants' arguments related to the admissibility 

of this evidence in the prior appeal. He added "the hand signs [were] ubiquitous 

and not specific to gangs . . . so there was no reason for jurors to believe they 

were associated with gangs." The judge rejected Torres's argument his counsel 

was ineffective for not moving to suppress the CSLI evidence for the same 

reasons expressed in Lewis's petition. However, he ordered an evidentiary 

hearing regarding the claims defense counsel failed to review discovery, 
17 A-0392-21

investigate an alibi witness, and explain defendant's state and federal 

constitutional rights to testify in his own defense. 

 Both defense attorneys and Torres testified at the evidentiary hearing. 

Judge Deitch made detailed credibility findings, which we need not repeat here, 

and concluded both attorneys were credible, and Torres was not. The judge 

detailed the level of communication both attorneys had with Torres and 

concluded the credible evidence showed they provided the discovery to Torres 

and discussed it with him. Counsel had a good rapport with Torres; "[t]hey had 

a free exchange of ideas"; and Torres knew the State's case "came down to 'the 

phone and whether [he] possessed the phone.'" 

 Torres claimed his employer was his alibi because she would have 

testified he was at work hanging Halloween decorations at the time of the 

kidnapping. Pursuant to the testimony, the judge concluded defense counsel did 

investigate the alibi by speaking to Torres's employer, but "she had no 

information to support an alibi for the day in question." Moreover, Torres's 

employment application was unsigned, and he had given investigators a 

statement that he did not begin working for this employer until after the killing. 

Therefore, counsel exercised appropriate judgment by deciding not to call the 

employer because it "would have been substantially detrimental to the defense." 
18 A-0392-21

Torres's second alibi witness was a man named "Fat Mike" who Torres 

claimed was Bond's cousin. Torres asserted he lent his phone to Fat Mike and 

Fat Mike's testimony would disprove the State's CSLI evidence showing Torres 

was with the other defendants the night of the murder. The judge found defense 

counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate this alibi witness because 

Torres never told counsel about the witness and the alleged alibi was "a posthoc contrivance by [Torres]." Indeed, Torres provided "no particulars 

concerning [the alleged alibi witness] to support his existence." The testimony 

at the evidentiary hearing convinced the judge "trial counsel appropriately and 

effectively reviewed the discovery with [Torres who] was well aware of . . . the 

charges . . . and . . . the State's proofs . . . against him. He appreciated that the 

case would hinge on connecting the cellular telephone to him." Therefore, the 

judge found it was "beyond belief" Torres would have withheld information 

from his attorney about who he lent his phone to. 

The judge rejected Torres's claim he was not counseled about his right to 

testify. In addition to the fact the trial court had voir dired Torres about the right 

to testify, the evidentiary hearing established Torres and defense counsel "were 

in free and open communication [with another]. They were at the trial together 

daily." The judge credited defense counsel's testimony that he informed Torres 
19 A-0392-21

of the "right to remain silent, that the State could use his prior convictions 

against him, and that he would be subject to cross-examination if he chose to 

testify. He also discussed what [Torres] would 'add' to the case if he chose to 

testify." However, given counsel's cross-examination of the lead investigator 

on the issue of Torres lending his phone out to Fat Mike, the judge found "there 

was little that [Torres] could add." Indeed, the judge had found Torres "to be 

incredible, and it [was] highly likely a jury would have as well." There was no 

evidence in the record showing Torres wanted to testify. The judge concluded 

defense counsel had "appropriately counseled [Torres] on the issue, and [Torres] 

made a fully informed decision to remain silent of his own free will." 

C.

 Judge Deitch found Harris's claim he was pressured by trial counsel not 

to testify was "directly contradicted by [the] record at trial." The trial court had 

voir dired Harris on the matter and he unequivocally said that he did not wish to 

testify and no one had forced him into the decision. Harris also told the trial 

court he understood the decision whether to testify was his to make. Further, it 

was not duress for trial counsel to tell Harris the jury would not believe him if 

he testified because it was counsel's obligation to inform him whether it was 

wise to take the stand. The evidence supported the fact Harris should not have 
20 A-0392-21

testified because he did not deny being in New Jersey on the day of the crime, 

he made no reference to an alibi, and he did not explain how someone other than 

him would have had his phone during the incident. 

 The judge rejected the claims trial counsel was ineffective for not having 

suppressed the CSLI evidence or retained a CSLI defense expert for the same 

reasons as the other defendants. However, the judge ordered an evidentiary 

hearing to address Harris's claim appellate counsel failed to communicate with 

him and did not respond to a request to correct an error in the appellate decision 

affirming his convictions and sentence. 

Harris and appellate counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing, after 

which the judge issued a written decision denying the remaining PCR claims on 

March 8, 2022. The judge found appellate counsel credible and Harris not 

credible. Harris's testimony at the evidentiary hearing contradicted his claims 

appellate counsel did not communicate with him because: he admitted he spoke 

with appellate counsel; raised issues he wanted argued with counsel, including 

issues related to the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial; and appellate 

counsel told him he could raise those issues in a pro se brief, which Harris did 

file. 
21 A-0392-21

The error Harris claimed appellate counsel failed to address was our 

finding that Billups testified Harris called him on the Rose cell phone. Appellate 

counsel testified he did not recall the error, but having reviewed it at the 

evidentiary hearing, he concluded it would not change the outcome of the 

appeal. Moreover, the judge found Harris "admitted that he knew [four women 

with whom he had relationships] and that he spoke to them all on the Rose phone 

the day before and the day after the killing. However, he did not speak to them 

on the day of the killing through that phone." Therefore, there was no error in 

the appellate decision to correct. 

Even if Harris were correct about the error, the judge found it would not 

have changed the outcome because "there was very strong circumstantial 

evidence linking [Harris] to the Rose phone, and the Rose phone to the codefendants at trial." Indeed, Rose testified at trial that she considered Harris 

family and she had given him the phone, and he would pay the bill. "Sometimes, 

when she would call the number, others would answer[,] and she would leave a 

message for [Harris]." He would call her from Rose the number. And the Rose 

number received a call from Harris's girlfriend while the phone was in Newark 

early in the morning of the killing. 
22 A-0392-21

Campbell identified four telephone numbers Bond used to contact her in 

October 2008. Two of those numbers exchanged calls with the Rose number on 

the day of the killing. At trial, a T-Mobile representative testified to the exact 

times the Rose phone exchanged calls with Bond's number as well as the exact 

time and duration of the calls between Rose and Lewis's phone. The 

representative explained the Rose "phone hit off cell towers in Irvington, 

Newark, Hillside, Springfield, and Nutley during the pertinent hours of October 

28, 2008." The lead investigator testified the Rose phone was in contact with 

Lewis's phone "between approximately 7:28 p.m., and 9:39 p.m." and "hit off 

multiple cell towers between Newark and . . . Worthy's home" the night of the 

killing. 

Therefore, the judge concluded "there was ample evidence for a jury to 

find that [Harris] committed the crimes he was found guilty of." Moreover, 

appellate counsel did argue the weight of the evidence on appeal because 

[i]n Point 1A of the appellate brief, counsel argue[d] 

that: "[t]he evidence against . . . Harris was insufficient 

as a matter of law, or at least should have been set aside 

as a manifest denial of justice." Counsel then goes on 

to detail the evidentiary shortcomings in his statement 

of facts[ and] . . . then argued [the point] cogently over 

five pages in the brief. 
23 A-0392-21

Furthermore, [Harris] submitted a pro se brief, 

where he raised the same issues addressed by appellate 

counsel. 

[(Second alteration in original).] 

The judge noted appellate counsel specifically attacked the fact the State's 

evidence did not meet the burden of proof to show Harris had any involvement 

in the crime, including that there was no evidence "Harris knew Worthy or ever 

called [her] cell phone." Appellate counsel also argued even though the State 

attributed the Rose phone to Harris, "there is no direct evidence that Harris was 

in fact operating this phone[] and the cell phones attributed to . . . codefendants." 

III. 

In A-0392-21, Lewis raises the following points on appeal: 

THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING BECAUSE . . . 

DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE 

CASE OF TRIAL COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVENESS 

BY NOT SEEKING EXCULPATORY WITNESSES. 

A. Trial Counsel Failed to Pursue an Expert 

Witness to Rebut the State's Expert Witness 

Regarding the Operation of Cellphone Towers. 

B. Trial Counsel Failed to Pursue Laquan . . . and 

Maurice . . . to Rebut the Testimony of . . . 

Williams. 
24 A-0392-21

Lewis's pro se supplemental brief raises the following points: 

POINT I 

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR 

FAILURE TO FILE A SUPPRESSING MOTION FOR 

THE ILLEGAL [CDW]. 

POINT II 

TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR FAILING TO 

HIRE A DIGITAL FORENSIC EXPERT WITNESS 

DURING TRIAL. 

POINT III 

THE STANDARD FOR AN EVIDENTIARY 

HEARING HAS BEEN MET. 

In A-1828-21, Torres argues the following points on appeal: 

POINT I 

AS DEFENDANT HAD SHOWN THAT HE 

RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE . . . ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL, THE PCR COURT ERRED BY 

DENYING DEFENDANT'S PCR PETITION. 

(1) Trial counsel failed to consult with his client

and adequately prepare for trial. 

(2) Trial counsel's failure to fully investigate an

alibi defense denied defendant his constitutional 

right to effective legal representation and a 

complete defense. 
25 A-0392-21

(3) As trial counsel failed to adequately advise 

defendant about the advantages of testifying at 

trial, defendant did not make an informed 

decision when he waived his constitutional right 

to testify. 

(4) Trial counsel failed to move to suppress 

prejudicial gang related evidence. 

(5) As the search warrant failed [to] establish 

sufficient probable cause that defendant had 

committed a crime, trial counsel's failure to file a 

motion to suppress was prejudicial. 

And in A-2728-21, Harris raises the following points for our 

consideration: 

POINT ONE 

DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN HIS 

APPELLATE ATTORNEY FAILED TO 

ADEQUATELY RAISE A POINT ON DIRECT 

APPEAL IN VIOLATION OF U.S. CONST. 

AMENDS. VI, XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947) ART. I, 

PAR. 10. 

POINT TWO 

THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 

REMAINING POINTS IN THE PETITION FOR 

[PCR] WITHOUT AFFORDING HIM AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO FULLY ADDRESS 

HIS ASSERTION THAT HE RECEIVED 

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 

A.
26 A-0392-21

PCR "is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of habeas corpus." State 

v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 49 (1997) (citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 

(1992)). It provides a "built-in 'safeguard that ensures that a defendant was not 

unjustly convicted.'" State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013) (quoting State v. 

McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 482 (1997)). It affords a defendant a final opportunity 

to raise any legal error or constitutional issues, including a violation of the right 

to effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the 

United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey 

Constitution. Afanador, 151 N.J. at 49-50; McQuaid, 147 N.J. at 482. 

"Ordinarily, PCR enables a defendant to challenge the . . . final judgment of 

conviction by presenting contentions that could not have been raised on direct 

appeal." Afanador, 151 N.J. at 49 (citing McQuaid, 147 N.J. at 482-83). 

The Constitution requires "reasonably effective assistance," so an 

attorney's performance may not be attacked unless he or she did not act "within 

the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases" and instead 

"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 

(1980)). In addressing an ineffective assistance claim, we follow the twopronged standard formulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland, 
27 A-0392-21

which was adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 

42, 58 (1987). "That is, the defendant must establish, first, that 'counsel's 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness' and, second, 

that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" State v. Alvarez, 

473 N.J. Super. 448, 455 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 

694). "With respect to both prongs of the Strickland test, a defendant asserting 

ineffective assistance of counsel on PCR bears the burden of proving [their] 

right to relief by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 

339, 350 (2012). A failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland/Fritz test 

requires the denial of a petition for PCR. State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 280 

(2012). 

"To establish a prima facie case [for PCR], defendant must demonstrate a 

reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light 

most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits." R. 3:22-

10(b); State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013). "[A defendant] must do more 

than make bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel." 

Porter, 216 N.J. at 355 (quoting State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 

(App. Div. 1999)). 
28 A-0392-21

"Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential." 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Reviewing courts must make "a strong presumption 

that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance." Ibid. Indeed, "the court should recognize that counsel is strongly 

presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant 

decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id. at 690. The 

burden rests with the defendant to rebut this strong presumption that counsel's 

performance was adequate. Ibid. Further, because prejudice is not presumed, 

Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52, the defendant must demonstrate "how specific errors of 

counsel undermined the reliability" of the proceeding. United States v. Cronic, 

466 U.S. 648, 659 n.26 (1984). 

As relates to claims against "appellate counsel[, they do] not have a 

constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by the 

defendant." State v. Morrison, 215 N.J. Super. 540, 549 (App. Div. 1987) (citing 

Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 755 (1983)). Counsel will not be found 

ineffective for failure to raise a meritless issue or errors an appellate court would 

deem harmless. State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 361-62 (2009). 

"Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the 

reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular 
29 A-0392-21

case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 

The court must "determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the 

identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally 

competent assistance." Ibid. 

"The mere raising of a claim of [ineffective assistance of counsel] does 

not entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing." State v. Peoples, 446 N.J. 

Super. 245, 254 (App. Div. 2016). A court should hold an evidentiary hearing 

on a petition only if the defendant establishes a prima facie case in support of 

PCR, "there are material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by 

reference to the existing record," and "an evidentiary hearing is necessary to 

resolve the claims for relief." R. 3:22-10(b). 

We will uphold a PCR court's factual "findings that are supported by 

sufficient credible evidence." State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 551 (2021) 

(quoting Nash, 212 N.J. at 540). Review of a PCR court's interpretation of the 

law is de novo. Nash, 212 N.J. at 540-41. We review a PCR judge's decision 

to deny a defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. See State v. L.G.-M., 462 N.J. Super. 357, 365 (App. Div. 

2020). And where the PCR judge does not hold an evidentiary hearing, our

review of both the factual inferences drawn from the record by the PCR judge 
30 A-0392-21

and the judge's legal conclusions is de novo. State v. Aburoumi, 464 N.J. Super. 

326, 338 (App. Div. 2020). 

Having considered each defendant's contentions pursuant to these legal 

principles, we affirm for the reasons expressed in Judge Deitch's thoughtful and 

well-written opinions. Our de novo review of the findings he made without an 

evidentiary hearing, and our review of the findings following the evidentiary 

hearings he conducted, convince us he neither misapplied the facts nor 

misinterpreted the law. His findings are amply supported by the evidence in the 

record and are unassailable. For these reasons, we conclude the arguments 

raised in each appeal lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a 

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). 

Affirmed in A-0392-21, A-1828-21, and A-2728-21.