The Defense Science Board Permanent 

Task Force 

on 

Nuclear Weapons Surety 

Report on the Unauthorized 

Movement of Nuclear Weapons 

February 2008 

(Revised April 2008) 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

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This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). 

 

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Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in this report do not necessarily 

represent the official position of the Department of Defense. 

 

The DSB Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety completed its information gathering in 

December 2007. In April 2008 a data error was discovered and the report revised accordingly. 

Specifically, report Section III: Nuclear Enterprise Focus was updated to reflect that the Strategic Air 

Command tanker force was reassigned to the Air Mobility Command (vice Military Airlift Command). 

 

 

This report is UNCLASSIFIED and releasable to the public. 

ii 
iii 
iv 
 DSB PERMANENT TASK FORCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS SURETY

18 Dec 2007 

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD 

SUBJECT: Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety 

Attached is the Task Force report on an independent assessment of the systemic causes of 

the August 30 unauthorized movement of nuclear warheads from Minot AFB, North 

Dakota to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. Based on the information and insights gained from 

investigating and assessing these systemic causes, the report includes 16 

recommendations to strengthen nuclear weapons surety. The report reflects the 

unanimous findings and recommendations of the participants reflected in Appendix B. 

Larry D. Welch, General, USAF (Ret) 

Task Force Chairman 

v 
vi 
Table of Contents

Section I: Background

 Bottom Line ...............................................................................................................1 

 Tasking.......................................................................................................................1 

 Nuclear Weapons Movement Background ................................................................2 

 The Incident ...............................................................................................................3 

Section II: Procedures and Processes

 Discussion..................................................................................................................5 

 Procedures and Processes -- Findings and Recommendations ..................................5 

Section III: Nuclear Enterprise Focus

 Declining Focus .........................................................................................................7 

 Enterprise Dispersal...................................................................................................7 

 Continuing Complex Demands..................................................................................8 

 Level of Focus............................................................................................................9 

 Nuclear Enterprise Focus – Findings and Recommendations ...................................12 

Section IV: Nuclear Enterprise Environment

 Discussion..................................................................................................................15

 Joint Advisory Committee Report on the Nuclear Readiness of the Department 

 of Defense - 1995 – Excerpts...............................................................................15 

 Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence – 1998 – Excerpts ........16 

 Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities – 2006 – Excerpts.......17 

 Nuclear Enterprise Environment – Current Task Force Findings and 

 Recommendations..............................................................................................19 

Appendices

Appendix A: Terms of References (TOR).............................................................................21 

Appendix B: Task Force Membership...................................................................................23 

Appendix C: Task Force Meetings ........................................................................................25 

Appendix D: Acronyms and Initializations ...........................................................................27 

vii 
viii 
Section I: Background 

Bottom Line

This unauthorized weapons movement incident can be a just-in-time rescue if lasting corrective 

actions are implemented now. The process and systemic problems that allowed such an incident 

have developed over more than a decade and have the potential for much more serious 

consequences. This time, the harm was limited to impact on confidence and careers and the 

incident is beneficially focusing needed attention on multiple aspects of the nuclear enterprise. It 

has dramatized the need for uncompromising processes and procedures, clear focus on the 

unique demands of the enterprise at multiple levels of the national security structure, and an 

environment that attracts, nurtures, and guides the right numbers of the best and brightest as 

stewards of this uniquely powerful national security force. It also highlights the need for clearly 

understood and competently executed responsibilities and accountabilities at all levels in the 

enterprise. There are currently significant deficiencies in meeting each of those needs. At the 

same time, the Task Force found concerted efforts underway in the operating forces to return to 

appropriate standards of competence and focus following the 30 August 2007 incident to include 

a supplement to the Air Force Instruction addressing specific deficiencies that permitted the 

unauthorized movement. 

The Department of Defense (DoD) has received authoritative and credible reports of declining 

focus and an eroding nuclear enterprise environment for at least a decade with little in the way of 

effective and lasting response. Some findings and recommendations from those reports, 

particularly relevant to conditions surrounding the unauthorized movement incident, are 

described in Section IV of this report. This incident has provided a fresh opportunity to address 

these deficiencies. There is little mystery regarding what needs to be done or how to do it. The 

nuclear enterprise performed at all levels with the needed competence for decades. This report is 

intended to briefly summarize what needs to be done to restore that performance across the 

nuclear enterprise. 

Tasking

The Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety was tasked by the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD [AT&L]) and the 

Commander, U.S. Strategic Command to conduct an independent investigation of the 

unauthorized transfer of nuclear warheads between Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, and 

Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana on 30 August 2007. The task is to identify root and 

systemic causes and provide recommendations to help strengthen DoD nuclear surety programs 

and practices. 

This report addresses the issues most directly related to the strategic nuclear forces. Further work 

will be done and reported separately early in 2008 by the Task Force to address any relevant 

tactical nuclear force issues that are different from the strategic forces issues. Beginning in 

Section II, this report addresses three related sets of surety issues: 

• Procedures and Processes 

• Nuclear Enterprise Focus 

• Nuclear Enterprise Environment 

1 
Nuclear Weapons Movement Background

The task of moving cruise missiles between Minot AFB and Barksdale AFB was part of a cruise 

missile reposturing program. In support of that program, warheads are removed from the 

advanced cruise missiles at Minot AFB and the nuclear-inert missiles are then transported to 

Barksdale AFB. Some of the missiles are moved via ferry on B-52 aircraft. This ferry mode is 

referred to as tactical ferry. The standard configuration for cruise missiles is six cruise missiles 

mounted on a pylon. Two six-missile pylons are carried on the B-52, one under each wing. 

Two such pylons of nuclear-inert missiles were to be transported from Minot AFB to Barksdale 

AFB on a Barksdale B-52H on 30 August 2007. 

The procedures for movement of a nuclear weapon or nuclear capable cruise missile from access 

to the storage facility to completed loading on the ferry aircraft is illustrated in Figure 1 below. 

This illustration depicts the Task Force’s understanding of the procedures in effect at the time 

based on a review of existing directives and checklists and discussions with leadership in the 

bomber wings. It does not necessarily depict the processes that were in routine use by individual 

teams. 

Munitions

Maintenance 

Load Preparation

Storage Facility

Build-Up Sheet: records 

pylon number and 

missiles and warheads 

by serial number 

Breakout Crew: verifies 

the status of all weapons 

in the facility to include 

“verifying” which payload 

is installed 

Aircraft Preflight

Aircraft Loading

Convoy to the

Aircraft Convoy Crew: 

verifies which 

payload is 

installed

Aircrew : verifies 

the payloads

Crew Chief: verifies 

the payloads

The first step in the procedure for moving the weapons from the storage facility is for the 

breakout crew to open the storage facility and to verify the status of all the weapons in the 

storage facility before any other activities occur in the facility. Verifying the status requires 

verifying which payload is installed and checking the safety status of each missile. Current 

guidance permits storing nuclear training, test, or inert devices in the same storage facility with 

nuclear weapons. Since there is no externally apparent difference between cruise missiles with 

these various payloads, to preclude confusion with such intermingling, pylons of missiles with 

2 

Figure 1: Process and Procedure Bomber Weapons

Movement Flow
nuclear training, test, or inert devices are required to be physically identified by readily visible 

means. 

After the initial verification task is completed, the convoy crew (tow team) verifies which 

payload is installed and connects the tow vehicle to the munitions trailer carrying the pylon of six 

missiles. On arrival at the aircraft, the crew chief accepts the load after verifying the payloads. 

The load crew then completes the loading process and checks the status of each missile after 

completing the load. Before accepting the load, the aircrew is to check each weapon on each 

pylon to verify the payload in each of the missiles and the safety status of each missile. 

The Incident

A comprehensive description of the incident is provided in the classified Air Combat Command 

report: The Unauthorized Transport of Nuclear Weapons. The following is a brief unclassified 

synopsis. 

The movement plan identified two pylons of nuclear-inert missiles to be transported by tactical 

ferry on 30 August 2007. Subsequently, personnel of the Minot Munitions Maintenance 

Squadron changed the plan to prepare and transport a pylon of missiles closer to expiration dates 

for limited life components in lieu of one of the planned pylons of missiles. That change was 

reflected on the movement plan but not in the documents produced from the internal work 

coordination process at Minot. The documents produced from this process are used in daily 

operation and they continued to list the originally scheduled two pylons of weapons. As a 

consequence, one of the originally scheduled pylons of cruise missiles had not been prepared for 

tactical ferry. When the breakout crew accessed the storage facility, they did not properly verify 

the status of the weapons in the facility as required by established procedure and they failed to 

note that the missiles on one of the pylons on their internal work document still contained 

nuclear warheads. 

Although procedure requires three subsequent verifications (by three different groups) of the 

payload installed in the cruise missiles, those procedures were not followed. The weapons were 

then flown to Barksdale and downloaded from the aircraft. The convoy crew at Barksdale, 

following the proper procedure, determined that the missiles on one of the pylons contained 

nuclear warheads. 

3 
4 
Section II: Procedures and Processes 

Discussion

The Task Force found that, over time, procedures at the B-52 bases were compromised by 

processes that simplified work without adequate review and consideration of the risks. For 

example, the initial verification of the status of the weapons in the storage facility should take 

about 45 minutes. This verification is to be completed before any other action takes place. But, 

over time, to speed the process, breakout and convoy crews had established a process of 

concurrent activity. In this case, the breakout and convoy crew were connecting the trailer to the 

tow vehicle while the initial status verification was underway. 

As stated above, there is a requirement to identify pylons of nuclear-inert missiles with readily 

visible markings. Past practice involved placement of placards on multiple sides of the pylon and 

orange cones around the pylon. However, the Task Force could find no written directive that 

specifically described the required identifying means. Over time, the practice at Minot was 

reduced to an 8 x 10 piece of paper placed somewhere on the pylon. 

In the past, there was a requirement for a formal change of custody physically verified by serial 

numbers, recorded, and signed on a formal document when weapons moved from breakout crew 

to convoy crew to crew chief to aircrew. That practice was discontinued for bomber weapons 

although it is still the practice for Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) warheads. The 

reason given for the difference is that ICBM warheads routinely move off the air base to missile 

sites while bomber weapons are moved only on base for exercises. In any case, the still existing 

verification procedures were not followed either when the breakout crew conducted the initial 

verification and then turned the weapons over to the convoy crew or when the convoy crew 

passed the weapons to the crew chief or when the crew chief passed the weapons to the aircrew. 

While this breach of procedure might be attributed to the belief that, in this incident, nuclear 

weapons were not involved, subsequent discussions with other breakout crews, convoy crews, 

load crews, and aircrews indicated significant confusion over procedural requirements for 

movement of nuclear-capable cruise missiles. For instance, the breakout crew and aircrew 

checklists require that the crew “verify which payload is installed.” Some did not interpret 

“verify” as requiring a physical check. In any case, whatever the nature of “verification,” there is 

nothing in directives or checklists that would suggest that the requirement is different for the 

various payloads thought to be in the cruise missile – live warhead, inert device, test device, or 

training device. That is, there is one checklist for handling nuclear-capable cruise missiles that 

should apply regardless of the payload installed. 

There was not a clear understanding regarding who has explicit responsibility and accountability 

for any movement of special weapons outside the nuclear weapons storage area. The Task Force 

found significant confusion about delegation of responsibility and authority for movement of 

nuclear weapons. 

Procedures and Processes -- Findings and Recommendations

Findings: 

• Over time, nuclear weapons movement procedures for bomber weapons have been 

compromised for expedient work processes. This evolution has occurred without adequate 

review and approval above the wing level. 

5 
• There is confusion over applicability of nuclear weapons handling procedures for nuclear 

weapons systems that do not contain nuclear warheads. 

• The practice of storing nuclear munitions/missiles in the same facility with nucleartraining, nuclear-test, and nuclear-inert devices can lead to confusion and unnecessary 

access to nuclear weapons. 

• The various levels of inspection activities have failed to detect these changes in process 

which compromised established procedure. The Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspection 

process requires only limited mission performance, sometimes generating as few as one 

aircraft. 

Recommendations: 

• The Secretary of the Air Force should direct that Air Force directives be revised to 

provide clear direction to: 

o Re-establish that the Wing Commander is the approval authority for any movement 

of nuclear weapons or nuclear-capable cruise missiles on the installation outside the 

nuclear weapons storage area. 

o Re-establish formal change of custody requirements for any movement of nuclearcapable cruise missiles outside the weapons storage area to include serial number 

verification and custody change documentation using a formal document signed at 

each change of custody. 

o Direct that nuclear weapons not be stored in the same facility with non-nuclear 

munitions/missiles to include nuclear-capable cruise missiles with payloads other 

than nuclear warheads. 

o Require that Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspections include comprehensive 

evaluations of all tasks required to generate the full rapid response nuclear bomber 

force commitment for the inspected unit and supporting activities outside the unit to 

include tanker support. 

Implementing these recommendations and the more comprehensive recommendations in the Air 

Combat Command report is an essential step toward correcting deficiencies in processes and 

procedures but cannot, by themselves, ensure that an incident of this or greater magnitude will 

not occur again. Additional attention is needed to ensure that the surety of nuclear weapons 

receives appropriate attention at multiple levels and to provide confidence in the needed 

understanding and competence at multiple levels of the nuclear enterprise. Attention, 

understanding and competence, at multiple levels, will require restoring authority, responsibility, 

accountability, focus at appropriate levels, and valuing the activities at all levels. 

6 
Section III: Nuclear Enterprise Focus 

Declining Focus

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a marked decline in the level and intensity of focus 

on the nuclear enterprise and the nuclear mission. The decline in focus took place gradually as 

changes were made to policies, procedures and processes. However, when comparing the current 

level of focus to that of 1990, the aggregate change is dramatic. The Task Force and several of 

the senior DoD people interviewed believe that the decline in focus has been more pronounced 

than realized and too extreme to be acceptable. The decline is characterized by embedding 

nuclear mission forces in non-nuclear organizations, markedly reduced levels of leadership 

whose daily focus is the nuclear enterprise, and a general devaluation of the nuclear mission and 

those who perform the mission. There are at least eight underlying changes that played a role in 

this decline. The issue is not whether these were necessary or desirable. There are good reasons 

for most of the changes listed and some of them are clearly positive. The issue is the cumulative 

effect on attention to the nuclear enterprise. The changes are: 

• End of the Cold War and demise of the Soviet Union, 

• Reduction in the size of the nuclear forces, 

• Dispersal of responsibility for nuclear matters throughout the enterprise: OSD, Joint Staff, 

Strategic Command, Air Force, 

• Disestablishment of the Air Force Strategic Air Command, 

• Assignment of multiple non-nuclear missions to U.S. Strategic Command and strategic 

forces at all levels, 

• Recurring drives to reduce headquarters and headquarters manning, and the competition for 

people, 

• Lack of any significant nuclear force modernization programs in the acquisition system, 

and 

• Demands of multiple military contingencies. 

Enterprise Dispersal

With the disestablishment of Air Force Strategic Air Command (SAC) in June 1992, the four 

operational elements of the Air Force strategic forces – ICBMs, bombers, strategic 

reconnaissance systems, and the tanker force -- were dispersed to three separate major 

operational air commands. 

The ICBM mission was transferred first to Air Combat Command and then to Air Force Space 

Command. The logic of the move to Air Force Space Command was based on a perceived 

similarity in personnel skills required for space operations and ICBM operations. The Task Force 

found that the ICBM forces remained tightly focused on their mission, with 20th Air Force and 

the ICBM wings committed solely to the strategic nuclear mission focused on sustaining a high 

state of readiness. However, the missile wing designations were changed from Strategic Missile 

Wing to Space Wing which has been interpreted by some in the ICBM force as de-emphasizing 

the nuclear mission. 

The bomber force and the strategic reconnaissance force were assigned to Air Combat Command 

(ACC) which had been predominantly a tactical fighter and tactical reconnaissance command. 

7 
The SAC tanker force was reassigned to the newly established Air Mobility Command and given 

expanded responsibilities. 

The end result is that the strategic nuclear mission was dispersed among three major operational 

commands none of which had strategic nuclear forces or operations as a central focus or body of 

expertise. 

In past years, the Air Force found it wise to move the tactical airlift force from Tactical Air 

Command, the predecessor of ACC, to the then Military Airlift Command and to move the 

special operations forces to a newly formed Air Force Special Operations Command. In each 

case, the underlying reason was the difficulty in providing the needed focus on the demands of 

these unique missions in a predominantly fighter command. Given this historical experience, 

there was concern over retaining focus on strategic bomber and strategic reconnaissance forces 

within ACC. To help ensure a continuing focus, these forces were assigned to 8th Air Force (AF) 

which has, since early in World War II, been regarded as a strategic bomber command. 

However, 8th AF subsequently has been assigned multiple additional non-nuclear missions, its 

headquarters has been significantly reduced in manning, many authorized nuclear-related 

positions have not been filled (13 of 31 positions unfilled in the Air Force component to U.S. 

Strategic Command), and the training, operations, and maintenance functions have been moved 

from 8th AF to headquarters Air Combat Command in a skip-echelon concept to consolidate and 

reduce overall headquarters manning. Hence, 8th Air Force had no day-to-day responsibility for 

B-52 operations, training or maintenance. 

Continuing Complex Demands

Beginning with the implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreement 

and accelerated by the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense has focused on reducing 

nuclear forces and nuclear weapons with the goal of moving from over 9,000 deployed strategic 

nuclear warheads in the late 1980s to no more than 2,200 in 2012. However, the complexity of 

the nuclear enterprise has not been reduced proportionately to those numbers. Figure 2 below 

shows the numbers of different types of nuclear systems as one indicator of that persistent 

complexity. 

8 
3 bomber aircraft types

2 cruise missile types

3 ICBM types

7 strategic warheads

3 dual-capable fighters

2 tactical weapons

Navy Systems

2 submarine types

2 SLBMs

1 cruise missile

2 strategic warheads

1 tactical weapon

2007

Air Force Systems

2 bomber aircraft types

2 cruise missile types

1 ICBM type

5 strategic warheads

2 dual-capable fighters

1 tactical weapon

Navy Systems

2 submarine types

1 SLBM

1 cruise missile

2 strategic warheads

1 tactical weapon

While the size of the overall nuclear force and numbers of deployed weapons have been greatly 

reduced and the numbers of different types of nuclear systems have been reduced somewhat, this 

does not translate to a reduction in complexity. Instead, the nuclear mission is, in some respects, 

more complicated today. The New Triad requires integration of nuclear, advanced conventional, 

non-kinetic, defense, and infrastructure issues into a single strategic deterrence concept. The 

Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) also levies complex demands on the nuclear enterprise. The 

reduction in the size of the nuclear forces requires that the remaining force be no less competent. 

The Level of Focus

In contrast to the need, the level of accountable individuals whose principal focus and daily 

business is the nuclear enterprise has been reduced from senior flag officer or senior civilian at 

the end of the Cold War to Colonels/Captains or mid-level civil servants today. 

There has been little change in focus at the operating levels in the Navy and in the ICBM force 

up through the numbered air force (20th Air Force). Otherwise the decline is characteristic across 

the DoD. In each case, in each headquarters, the change in focus could be justifiable. Still, when 

this occurs across virtually all of the relevant headquarters, the aggregate result is a precipitous 

decrease in attention to the nuclear enterprise. 

Figure 3, showing the Air Staff A-3 (Operations) organization, is an example of the current 

placement of dedicated nuclear focus in current DoD organizations. The level of nuclear 

enterprise focus in other organizations is similar and is shown in Table 1. 

9 

Figure 2: Change in Nuclear Force Composition

Air Force Systems

1990
Director of Operations

A3

3 Star

Director of 

Space & Nuclear

Operations 

1 Star

Director 

of 

Air Operations

Director 

of 

Cyber Operations

Director 

of 

Weather

Nuclear Operations

Division 

Colonel

Space Operations

Division 

Forces Development

And Training

Division 

A Colonel is the 

most senior person 

whose principal and 

daily focus is the 

nuclear enterprise

There has been little change in the Navy operational and technical organization and focus 

managing the nuclear enterprise. While the attack submarines no longer routinely carry nuclear 

weapons, the submarine forces retain their nuclear legacy and nuclear focus. The principal focus 

on systems and procedures continues to be in the Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) organization 

commanded by a Rear Admiral – virtually unchanged from the Cold War organization. 

However, the decline in the level of focus within the Navy Staff is similar to that seen in the Air 

Staff. 

Table 1 summarizes the change in level of focus across a broader set of organizations to illustrate 

the major downgrading of the level of attention accorded the nuclear enterprise. 

Table 1: Change in Level of Primary Focus 

Organization 1990 2007 

Secretary of Defense Assistant to the Secretary of 

Defense (ATSD) for Atomic

Energy – direct report for safety & 

security (Senate-confirmed 

appointee) 

Deputy ATSD Nuclear Matters 

(SES) w/ multi-mission ATSD 

reporting to USD/AT&L 

OSD/Policy Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

Nuclear Forces and Arms Control 

(SES) 

 Director, Strike Policy Integration 

(GS-15) 

Navy Staff Director, Strategy and Policy N51 

(O-7) 

Head, Global Strike & Nuclear 

Policy (GS-15) 

Joint Staff Deputy Director, Operations (O-8) Chief, Strategic Operations Division 

(O-6) 

10 

Figure 3: Air Staff A3 Operations Organization
Air Staff Deputy Director, Forces (O-8) Chief, Nuclear Operations 

Division (O-6) 

Combatant Command Commander, U.S. Strategic Air 

Command* (4 Star) 

Chief, Division (O-6) 

Major Air Command Commander, Air Force Strategic 

Air Command* (4 Star) 

Chief, Strategic Operations 

Division,(O-6) 

Numbered Air Force 

Bomber Commands Commander, 8th Air Force (3 

Star) 

Commander, 15th Air Force (3 

Star) 

Commander, 8th Air Force (multihatted, multi-mission) (3 Star) 

* Commander and Staff dual-hatted as Air Force MajCom and Combatant Command

The reduction of the level of focus on the nuclear mission in U.S. Strategic Command is a 

natural result of the growth in global missions assigned to that command with a consequent 

dilution of the nuclear mission. The additional missions were those that were consistently 

neglected between contingency operations. 

• Space; 

• Global strike and integration; 

• Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; 

• Network warfare; 

• Information operations; 

• Integrated missile defense; and 

• Combating weapons of mass destruction. 

These are global missions requiring global attention and USSTRATCOM remains the logical 

combatant command for these global missions. However, this proliferation of mission demands 

was a factor in the reduced level of attention to the nuclear enterprise as it fell to below the level 

required to provide the needed oversight and support to the nuclear mission. Even so, there are 

no B-52 assets assigned to or under the operational control of USSTRATCOM. Hence the 

command that some assumed had daily operational interest in strategic nuclear bomber 

operations has no daily authority or accountability for these forces. 

There are always priority choices within the larger mission set and the strategic nuclear deterrent 

mission must be first priority even if it requires fewer resources than some of the added missions. 

The issue, here, is not to debate what the weapons are for or their applicability to the 21st century 

deterrence task. The issue is that we have the weapons and their military and political nature 

demands intense attention to their proper care. 

The reduction in focus is also reflected in the B-52 nuclear mission. During interviews with B-52 

aircrews and weapons handling crews, the typical estimate of the share of their time spent on the 

nuclear mission varied from 5% to 20%. Heavy focus of a segment of the strategic nuclear 

bomber force on conventional operations for an extended period is not new. What is new is 

focusing the entire B-52 force predominantly on the conventional mission as the accepted 

permanent or semi-permanent state of affairs. 

11 
Further evidence of the mindset is found in the formal training courses. The formal training 

course at Barksdale that provides transition training for all new B-52 crews includes no flight 

training for the nuclear mission. The same is true of the B-52 Weapons Instructor Course. 

Instead, these courses include a single simulator mission dedicated to the nuclear mission. The 

instructor aircrews are not nuclear qualified. Hence, the focus is almost completely on 

conventional weapons operations. After graduation from transition training, the new aircrew, for 

example, can deploy to Guam for 120 days in a conventional-only role before becoming 

qualified in the nuclear role. This reinforces the perception that nuclear qualification is not a 

critical element of B-52 mission qualification and the first priority is to be involved in 

conventional weapons B-52 operations. 

A number of decisions about wing-level operations can only be seen as an effort to minimize the 

cost of the nuclear mission with inadequate consideration for the nuclear commitment. The most 

obvious example is moving deployed cruise missiles from the base where most of the nuclearcapable B-52 bombers are located. Hence, focus on the nuclear mission will be further 

complicated by the need for temporary deployments between bases for hands-on nuclear 

weapons training and exercises, and by the need to deploy aircraft between bases for the B-52 

rapid response commitment. 

The net result is that the de facto primary mission of the bomber force has become 

overwhelmingly conventional operations focused. Again, there are credible reasons for this. 

Most important among them is that the strategic bomber force has conventional capabilities that 

are increasingly important to a wide variety of non-nuclear contingency operations. This is not a 

new phenomenon. Strategic nuclear bombers have been widely used in non-nuclear 

contingencies for decades. The issue today is not the use of strategic nuclear forces in nonnuclear contingencies. The issue is the balance and the attitude. 

While broad statements about attitudes are always risky, there was a set of attitudes detected by 

the Task Force that was succinctly described by an experienced B-52 aircraft commander, 

saying: “The nuclear mission is all about procedures; the conventional mission is about 

operational results.” It seemed readily apparent that, over time, handling bomber weapons and 

nuclear activities have come to be considered an exercise activity rather than a serious 

operational activity. That is, the exercise is to break out some weapons, load them on a B-52, 

download the weapons and return them to storage. In contrast, during the Cold War, while 

people in the strategic nuclear bomber business understood that their primary mission was 

strategic deterrence and if they were successful they would never have to deliver a weapon, 

every part of the activity was based on the need to be sure that they could deliver a nuclear 

weapon if deterrence failed. In other words, the attitude was highly operational. This difference 

is not surprising given that the majority of personnel handling bomber nuclear weapons, from 

breakout crew to aircrew, have never experienced nuclear alert. This change in attitude has had a 

major impact on the overall environment and culture in the bomber force. 

To restore a balance in mission focus and influence attitudes, the Task Force considered the 

wisdom of assigning all Air Force nuclear forces to a single numbered air force. While there are 

some attractive features of such a solution, it would require a major restructuring among multiple 

commands and would almost certainly have other unintended consequences. Instead of providing 

focus, it could be counterproductive in that it could delay, rather than facilitate, correcting the 

current deficiencies. Instead, the Task Force recommendations focus on restoring full attention to 

the rapid response nuclear deterrent bomber commitment. To do that, the operational elements of 

12 
the nuclear enterprise from squadron to combatant command must have a need to focus on the 

operational mission. The only reasonably certain way the Task Force could find to do that is to 

make each level responsible and accountable for the strategic bomber force as their daily work. 

That will require giving operational control of some part of the B-52 force to the Air Force 

component to USSTRATCOM (Task Force 204) which will also demand daily operational 

attention in USSTRATCOM headquarters. 

Nuclear Enterprise Focus -- Findings and Recommendations 

Findings: 

• While the size of the nuclear force and the deployed nuclear weapons stockpile has been 

greatly decreased, the complexity of the mission remains demanding. Despite these complex 

demands, the level of focus on the nuclear enterprise has been drastically reduced. 

• The nuclear enterprise within OSD has been dispersed and downgraded with the 

responsibilities of the principal office within USD (AT&L) expanded to include chemical 

and biological weapons, and the nuclear enterprise within USD (Policy) subordinated to 

ASD/SOLIC which has a wide-ranging portfolio. 

• With no strategic nuclear bomber forces under the operational control of the combatant 

command or its Air Force component and the skip echelon approach that removed 8th Air 

Force responsibility for B-52 operations, training, and maintenance, there was no 

headquarters above the wing that focused on the strategic nuclear mission. 

• The level of focus within major headquarters from Joint Staff to Air Force major command 

was drastically reduced with little apparent consideration or understanding of the impact of 

such reduction across virtually all such headquarters. 

o The daily focus on the nuclear mission within the Joint Staff has been reduced to an O-6 

Strategic Operations Division chief. 

o The nuclear mission within the USSTRATCOM has been dispersed across 24 offices 

within the headquarters. The most senior officer whose daily focus is on the nuclear 

enterprise is an O-5 in an O-6 billet. 

o The positions maintaining daily focus on the nuclear mission within Air Force and the 

Navy Staffs has been reduced to that of O-6 (Colonel/Captain). 

o The nuclear mission within the Air Force has been dispersed from a single-focused 

strategic command to three operational commands that have had little or no focus on the 

nuclear mission. With that dispersal, the level of daily focus on the strategic nuclear 

bomber mission was reduced from senior flag-level to O-6 level. 

• The conventional roles of the B-52 force so dominate the nuclear role that there is minimum 

daily attention to the nuclear role outside the restricted area where nuclear weapons are 

stored and maintained. Moving nuclear weapons from where the majority of B-52 strategic 

bombers are based is likely to further complicate focus on the nuclear mission and further 

devalue the nuclear mission. 

• The B-52 initial training and advanced weapons school both largely ignore the nuclear 

mission. There are no flying sorties devoted to the nuclear mission in either course. 

13 
• Over time, handling bomber nuclear weapons has come to be regarded as an exercise activity 

rather than a serious operational activity. 

Recommendations: 

• The Secretary of Defense should: 

o Establish an Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Nuclear Enterprise, reporting 

directly to the Secretary, to assist the Secretary in ensuring continued attention to 

nuclear policy, acquisition, technology, surety, and command and control. This is not 

intended to replace the acquisition functions of USD (AT&L) or the functions of the 

other undersecretaries. 

o Direct that the Air Force dedicate the full rapid response commitment to the nuclear 

mission on a continuous basis, rotating the commitment among the B-52 squadrons. 

During the rotation to the nuclear commitment, the unit would be OPCON to Task 

Force 204 (the Air Force nuclear bomber component to USSTRATCOM) and would 

focus on training for the nuclear deterrent mission. 

• The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command should establish a flag-level office within J-3 

or J-5 whose daily focus is the nuclear enterprise and the conventional missions of 

strategic nuclear assets. All headquarters nuclear policy, operations, training, surety, and 

C2 responsibilities should be assigned to this office. 

• The Secretary of the Air Force should direct the consolidation of existing Air Force 

technical organizations into a single technical organization (using Navy SSP as a model) 

reporting directly to the Air Force Chief of Staff, led by a Major General that has full 

responsibility and accountability within the Air Force for, and only for, nuclear systems 

and procedures. 

• The Air Force Chief of Staff should: 

o Ensure that Task Force 204 has the needed authorizations and is fully manned to meet 

the full rapid response nuclear commitment. 

o Ensure that nuclear career fields, enlisted and officer remain viable and adequately 

manned to provide a continuing “no defects” culture within the nuclear enterprise. 

o Establish an office within A-3/A5 in the Air Staff headed by a flag officer whose daily 

business is the nuclear enterprise. 

• The Chief of Naval Operations should establish an office within N3/N5 headed by a flag 

officer whose daily business is the nuclear enterprise. 

• The Commander, Air Combat Command should: 

o Ensure that 8th AF has the full resources, authority, and accountability for daily B-52 

operations – nuclear and conventional. 

o Direct that the B-52 initial training course at Barksdale and the B-52 Weapons School 

course include flight training in the nuclear mission. 

14 
Section IV: Nuclear Enterprise Environment 

Discussion

The Task Force repeatedly heard the perception in the force that the nuclear forces and the 

nuclear deterrent mission are increasingly devalued. Consequently, the Task Force reviewed 

earlier reports from the Defense Science Board, the Joint Advisory Committee on Nuclear 

Weapons Surety (the forerunner to the DSB Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety), 

and various other organizations and commissions over the past 15 years that have addressed the 

level of support and oversight accorded the nuclear enterprise. This was a small part of a much 

larger set of reports from a wide range of authoritative sources, to include the Air Force, which 

reported similar concerns. These reports provide information and insights on the impact of 

devaluing the nuclear mission and therefore the nuclear enterprise. The reports reflect a concern 

that, over this period, there has been a steady long-term trend minimizing the perceived 

importance of the nuclear deterrent to national security. Some examples of the language in these 

reports follow: 

Joint Advisory Committee Report on the Nuclear Readiness of the Department of Defense, 1995

• Strategic bombers – Overall the operational units continue to exhibit pride and high 

competence in the nuclear bomber mission. However, the organization and focus on 

bomber force readiness for the strategic nuclear mission have changed radically in the 

past six years – removed from daily alert (Sept 1991); SAC disestablished and bombers 

transferred to ACC (June 1992); Nuclear ORIs halted in early 1990’s (reinstated in 

March 1996). The current ORI structure does not explicitly include nuclear, thus 

conveying an important message to the wing about the priority of the mission. 

• While there remains a rich pool of nuclear bomber experience in the units and higher 

headquarters, this residual pool will be short lived unless consciously and carefully 

renewed at all levels. The JAC does not presume to judge what the readiness 

requirements should be for heavy bombers. The JAC did observe that it is not clear that 

there is a match between readiness and practice. Diluting Major Command attention to 

the bomber nuclear mission will inevitably be reflected in the attitudes of unit 

commanders and aircrews as turnover continues to replace commanders and aircrews 

whose experience is rooted in the nuclear mission. 

• Nuclear Expertise – There is reason for concern about the long-term quantity and quality 

of nuclear weapon expertise within the DoD as the size of the DoD nuclear community 

shrinks and the interest level declines. 

• Senior Management – more expertise needed in OSD and JCS and involvement in 

planning, programming and oversight for nuclear weapons support. OSD ATSD’s 

attention to nuclear matters is stretched by competing responsibilities with other weapons 

of mass destruction. 

• The Navy and Air Force provide smart buyer, technical expertise for nuclear weapons 

systems. But, DoD does not have the structure in place and the expertise at all the levels 

required to be a smart customer of the DOE supplier of nuclear warheads and support. 

The JAC recommends that the mission of the Defense Nuclear Agency be sharply 

15 
refocused to help provide critical staff nuclear expertise to the Secretary of Defense and 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence, 1998

• It is imperative that the general decline in the value accorded nuclear expertise be 

reversed now. Without a sharp reversal in the decline, there will be little incentive for the 

best and brightest to enter this key field. 

• The level of attention and expertise varies widely across DoD. At the OSD level and in 

the Navy and Air Force, the acquisition oversight function continues with a high degree 

of expertise. In contrast the policy functions are fragmented with responsibilities divided 

between various offices in USD (Policy) and USD (A&T) and with reduced senior-level 

attention in the Services. There is need for technical expertise at multiple levels. Over the 

past several years, there has been an effort to fashion the needed support in the Defense 

Special Weapons Agency (DSWA). However, DSWA was not given the charter and 

control of resources needed to fill this role. There is continuing uncertainty about the 

future of nuclear expertise available to senior DoD leaders as this function is being 

assigned to the newly organized and more diverse Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

(DTRA). DTRA appears to have the charter in this area but will need strong support to 

meet the need. 

• USSTRATCOM has stepped into the vacuum to perform some functions neglected 

during the general drawdown of nuclear forces and reduced interest in nuclear matters. 

But again, they have done so on a piecemeal basis, without a corresponding clear charter. 

A more comprehensive charter would provide better assurance of comprehensive 

coverage of the needs. Nuclear expertise in the remaining operational units assigned 

nuclear readiness tasks continues at a high level. The situation in the Service staffs is less 

positive though the Air Force has initiated important steps to restore focus on this need 

and the Navy SSP continues to provide focused attention to nuclear systems. 

• The need for attention to the nuclear deterrent, is clearly stated in the May 1997 Report to 

Congress from the Secretary of Defense. 

o Sustainment (of the nuclear deterrent) is most likely to be successfully 

accomplished...if a set of interrelated conditions are achieved: 

- The capability is clearly and consistently given priority by the Department’s 

senior leaders 

- All of the physical components that make up the capability are regarded as 

limited-life 

- Career paths exist for both military and civilian personnel that attract and 

retain sufficient numbers of personnel with appropriate qualifications 

- The program involves a complete end-to-end capability (developmentdeployment-operations) 

- The magnitude of the activity is sufficient to support achievement of the 

preceding conditions 

16 
• Some indications of the current state of attention: Some policy declarations/documents 

have minimum emphasis on nuclear deterrence – Joint Vision 2010, 1997 and 1998 CJCS 

Posture Statements to Congress, USAF Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st

Century. This lack of emphasis on the nuclear deterrent has been noted in nuclear forces 

and support activities. 

• Service Focus – Air Force. Air Force Headquarters (and ACC Headquarters) attention to 

nuclear issues suffered a precipitous decline immediately following the end of the Cold 

War with the emphasis on downsizing and dismantling nuclear forces. The major Air 

Force nuclear modernization programs were terminated or sharply curtailed. Strategic Air 

Command was disestablished and its Air Force responsibilities divided among Air Force 

Space Command for ICBMs, Air Combat Command for bombers and Air Mobility 

Command for tankers. Responsibility for weapons went to an Air Logistics Center under 

the newly combined Air Material Command. Hence, Air Force nuclear forces 

responsibilities were subsumed in commands where the nuclear deterrent was not a major 

part of the day-to-day focus of the command, In the case of the bombers; this was 

exacerbated by the increasing focus on the non-nuclear mission of the bomber force. The 

resulting decline was graphically illustrated when the responsible command stopped 

nuclear operational readiness inspections for a period of three years. The Air Force Chief 

of Staff, responding to this problem, established a special directorate to focus attention on 

nuclear issues. Yet, this directorate is focused on the nuclear deterrent and on counterproliferation – one is to deal with illegitimate activities, the other is dedication to 

maintaining a legitimate, valuable contribution to national security. 

• The most difficult issue and the one with the most long-term implications is the 

widespread perception in both the Navy and Air Force that a nuclear forces career is not 

the highly promising opportunity of the past era. 

• The Air Force has been through a serious bathtub of focus on managing, tracking and 

nurturing nuclear qualification in support forces and staffs. Following some problems 

surfaced by inspections, the AF Institutional Support Review identified an urgent need 

for attention to personnel matters for nuclear experienced people. 

• The demands on the SSBN force and their focus have changed little since the end of the 

Cold War other than some reduction in patrol rates. 

Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities, 2006

• Since the end of the Cold War, DoD senior-level attention to nuclear weapons 

management has been minimal at best. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 

Atomic Energy’s focus was expanded to include chemical and biological that have little 

in common with nuclear matters except the generic term of weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD). 

• The Air Force has eliminated a major command focused on nuclear capabilities and has 

changed the headquarters organization dealing with nuclear matters several times in 

recent years and has no headquarters office or organization with nuclear in the title. 

Within the Navy the Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) organization has remained intact 

and effective. But that is largely a matter of a longstanding, tightly integrated and focused 

organization that has existed with little change in organization and status since 1957. 

17 
• Nuclear weapons have always been and continue to be more instruments of national 

policy than weapons of military operations. Hence, even during the Cold War, nuclear 

weapons required special organizations and approaches in DoD. These were generally 

dedicated, nuclear-unique, organizations and programs at the DoD staff level, in the 

military departments and in the combatant commands. Since the end of the Cold War, 

with the escalation of other national security challenges, nuclear matters have slipped 

even further toward the edge of DoD’s mainstream attention. With perhaps one exception 

– the Navy Strategic Systems Programs -- the nuclear-dedicated organizations were 

disestablished, vitiated, or tasked with additional missions that, in various degrees, 

submerge the nuclear weapons activities. Nuclear weapons need to be addressed within 

the context of the NPR and the overall strategic posture, to include non-nuclear 

capabilities. Still, nuclear weapons remain unique in their policy implications, their 

effects, and the demands of safety and security. Hence, a competent and committed 

structure for nuclear weapons within the DoD needs to be re-established 

• In DoD there are three key needs – creating an Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Strategic Weapons (ASD [SW]), strengthening the Nuclear Weapons Council, and 

strengthening the role of the U.S. Strategic Command. 

• The relationship between an “Assistant to the Secretary” of Defense and other DoD 

authorities has, over time, become cloudy and inconsistent. For this and other reasons, the 

Task Force believes that the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 

Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ATSD [NCB]) should be changed 

to a new office/position -- the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Weapons 

(ASD [SW]), reporting to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, with authorities that are clear 

and well understood. 

• Within the ASD (SW), a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Weapons 

(DASD [NW]) would be established and have responsibility for the nuclear aspects of 

strategic weapons. The DASD (NW) would have the nuclear weapons responsibilities of 

the current ATSD (NCB) and the nuclear weapons aspects of global strike-related 

programs. The ASD (SW) would work closely with the USD (AT&L) to better ensure 

oversight of the status and responsiveness of DoD’s contractor/industrial base for nuclear 

weapons. 

• The functions of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) in support of the U.S. 

strategic posture remain crucial. In this new construct, DTRA would report to the ASD 

(SW). DTRA would continue to provide strong support directly to combatant 

commanders. 

Bottom Line from Reviewed Reports

While each of these reports appeared to be well received by the relevant senior leadership at the 

time of each report, very few of the recommendations were implemented with lasting effect and 

there has been no reversal of the decline in visible senior level attention to the nuclear enterprise. 

18 
Nuclear Enterprise Environment – Current Task Force Findings and Recommendations

Findings:

• Public debate about the nuclear deterrent, the long-term future of nuclear weapons, 

approaches to sustaining the deterrent, and related subjects is inevitable and necessary as the 

world environment changes. There are legitimate questions about all these issues. Still, this 

debate cannot be allowed to obscure the most obvious and relevant facts about the nuclear 

enterprise. We still have a large stockpile of nuclear weapons and will almost certainly have 

a significant stockpile for a very long time. Those are the only facts needed to understand the 

need for sustained, intense attention to the nuclear enterprise and to robust nuclear weapons 

surety. 

• While this assessment was motivated by a specific incident of unusual magnitude, there are a 

large number of reports commissioned by the DoD on existing or developing concerns with 

the nuclear enterprise that have produced few lasting course corrections. 

Recommendations:

• The national security leadership should declare, unequivocally and frequently, that a 

reliable, safe, secure, and credible nuclear deterrent is essential to national security, and is 

a continuing high national priority. 

• The Secretary of Defense should establish a mechanism to ensure that the lessons from 

this incident produce institutional and environmental change for lasting attention at the 

right levels to the nuclear enterprise.

19 
20 
Appendix A: Terms of Reference 

21 
22 
Appendix B: Task Force Membership 

Task Force Members

General Larry D. Welch, USAF (Ret.), Institute for Defense Analyses

Dr. Harold M. Agnew, Independent Consultant

Vice Admiral Lyle G. Bien, USN (Ret), Independent Consultant

Dr. John C. Crawford, Independent Consultant

Dr. John S. Foster, Jr, Northrop Grumman Corporation

Dr. Sydell P. Gold, Independent Consultant

General James P. McCarthy, USAF (Ret.), USAF Academy

Admiral Richard W. Mies, USN (Ret.), Science Applications International Corporation

Major General Thomas H. Neary, USAF (Ret.), Science Applications International Corporation

Dr. Robert L. Selden, Independent Consultant

Rear Admiral Robert H. Wertheim, USN (Ret.), Independent Consultant

Task Force Advisors

Major General Kenneth L. Hagemann, USAF (Ret.), Independent Consultant

Mr. Jan R. Smith, Institute for Defense Analyses

Executive Secretary

Mr. David B. McDarby, Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

DSB Secretariat Representative

Mr. Brian Hughes, OUSD (AT&L)/DSB

Task Force Support

Ms. Brenda Poole, SAIC

23 
24 
Appendix C: Meetings 

• Principal Deputy, Office of the Deputy ATSD for Nuclear Matters, OSD AT&L 

• Director, Strike Policy & Integration, SO/LIC OSD Policy 

• Chief, Emergency Response Branch and Nuclear Surety Advisor, Joint Staff 

• Director, Space & Nuclear Operations (AF/A3O-S) Air Staff 

• Chief, Nuclear Surety Branch (AF/A3O-SNS) Air Staff 

• Chief, Munitions and Missile Maintenance Division (AF/A4MW) Air Staff 

• Security Forces Directorate, Nuclear/Physical Security Branch (AF/A7SO), Air Staff

• Deputy, Nuclear Weapons Surety & Policy, Navy Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) 

Manager, Transit Protection System, Navy SSP 

• Chief, Nuclear Operations Branch, U.S. Nuclear Command & Control System Support Staff 

(NSS) 

• Commander, 20th Air Force 

• 20th Air Force organizations – A3, A4, A7 

• Commander, 90th Space Wing 

• 90th Space Wing organizations – Operations, Maintenance, Safety, Security Forces 

• Commander, Navy Strategic Weapons Facility (SWFPAC) 

• Commander, Marine Security Forces at SWFPAC 

• U.S. Coast Guard at SWFPAC (mission affiliation with submarine transit) 

• Commander, 8th Air Force 

• Task Force 204 representatives 

• Commander, 2nd Bomb Wing 

• 2nd Bomb Wing organizations – Operations, Maintenance, Medical, Security Forces 

• Interviews with 2nd Bomb Wing personnel – aircrews, load crews, wing weapons 

maintenance crews, prep crews, planners, munitions accountability 

• Commander, Air Combat Command (ACC) 

• Director of Air and Space Operations, Headquarters ACC 

• Commander, USSTRATCOM 

• USSTRATCOM organizations – Joint Functional Component Command – Global Strike and 

Integration, J5 Plans and Policy Directorate, J87 Global Strike Division, J31 Space Branch, 

J38 Nuclear Operations C2 Branch, STRATCOM IG 

• Commander, 5th Bomb Wing 

• Commander, 91st Space Wing 

• 5th Bomb Wing Organizations – Weapons Load, Security, Munitions, Maintenance, 

Handling 

• Interviews with 5th Bomb Wing personnel: Load Teams, Munitions Maintenance Crews, 

Flight Crews 

25 
26 
Appendix D: Acronyms and Initializations

ACC Air Combat Command 

AFB Air Force Base 

ASD (SW) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Weapons 

ASD/SOLIC Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations & Low Intensity 

Conflict 

ATSD Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 

ATSD (NCB) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological 

Defense Programs 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

DASD (NW) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Weapons 

DoD Department of Defense 

DOE Department of Energy 

DSB Defense Science Board 

DSWA Defense Special Weapons Agency 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 

JAC Joint Advisory Committee on Nuclear Weapons Surety 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 

NPR Nuclear Posture Review 

OPCON Operation Control 

ORI Operational Readiness Inspection 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

OSD ATSD 

Office of the Secretary of Defense Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 

Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs 

SAC Strategic Air Command 

SES Senior Executive Service 

SSBN Ship, Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear (Ballistic Missile Submarine) 

SSP Navy Strategic Systems Programs 

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 

TOR Terms of Reference 

U.S. United States 

USAF United States Air Force 

USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 

27