1504 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 6 / Monday, January 10, 2011 / Notices 

provisions of Federal transit laws (49 

U.S.C. 5323(b), and 5324), the projectlevel air quality conformity regulation of 

the U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) (40 CFR part 93), the 

section 404(b)(1) guidelines of EPA (40 

CFR part 230), the regulation 

implementing section 106 of the 

National Historic Preservation Act (36 

CFR part 800), the regulation 

implementing section 7 of the 

Endangered Species Act (50 CFR part 

402), section 4(f) of the Department of 

Transportation Act (23 CFR part 774), 

and Executive Orders 12898 on 

environmental justice, 11988 on 

floodplain management, and 11990 on 

the protection of the wetlands. 

The FTA regulations implementing 

NEPA, as well as provisions of the Safe, 

Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 

Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for 

Users (SAFETEA–LU), requires that 

FTA and METRO (1) invite other 

Federal and non-Federal agencies and 

Native American Tribes that may have 

an interest in the proposed project to 

become ‘‘participating agencies;’’ (2) 

provide an opportunity for involvement 

by participating agencies and the public 

to help define the purpose and need, 

and the range of alternatives for 

consideration; and (3) establish a plan 

for coordinating public and agency 

participation in, and comment on, the 

environmental review. It is possible that 

FTA and METRO will not be able to 

identify all Federal and non-Federal 

agencies and Native American Tribes 

that may have such an interest. Any 

Federal or non-Federal agency or Native 

American Tribe interested in the 

proposed project that does not receive 

an invitation to become a participating 

agency should notify at the earliest 

opportunity the Project Manager 

identified above under ADDRESSES. 

Paperwork Reduction 

The Paperwork Reduction Act seeks, 

in part, to minimize the cost to the 

taxpayer of the creation, collection, 

maintenance, use, dissemination, and 

disposition of information. Consistent 

with this goal and with principles of 

economy and efficiency in government, 

it is FTA policy to limit insofar as 

possible distribution of complete 

printed sets of environmental 

documents. Accordingly, unless a 

specific request for a complete printed 

set of environmental documents is 

received (preferably in advance of 

printing), FTA and its grantees will 

distribute only the executive summary 

of the environmental document together 

with a Compact Disc of the complete 

environmental document. A complete 

printed set of the environmental 

document will be available for review at 

the libraries and governments offices in 

the project area; an electronic copy of 

the complete environmental document 

will also be available on the project Web 

site at http://www.ridemetro.org. 

Blas M. Uribe, 

FTA Deputy Regional Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2011–149 Filed 1–7–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 

Safety Administration 

[Docket No. PHMSA–2010–0381 

Pipeline Safety: Establishing Maximum 

Allowable Operating Pressure or 

Maximum Operating Pressure Using 

Record Evidence, and Integrity 

Management Risk Identification, 

Assessment, Prevention, and 

Mitigation 

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous 

Materials Safety Administration 

(PHMSA); DOT. 

ACTION: Notice; issuance of Advisory 

Bulletin. 

SUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing an 

Advisory Bulletin to remind operators 

of gas and hazardous liquid pipeline 

facilities of their responsibilities, under 

Federal integrity management (IM) 

regulations, to perform detailed threat 

and risk analyses that integrate accurate 

data and information from their entire 

pipeline system, especially when 

calculating Maximum Allowable 

Operating Pressure (MAOP) or 

Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP), 

and to utilize these risk analyses in the 

identification of appropriate assessment 

methods, and preventive and mitigative 

measures. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Alan Mayberry by phone at 202–366– 

5124 or by e-mail at 

alan.mayberry@dot.gov. All materials in 

this docket may be accessed 

electronically at http:// 

www.regulations.gov. General 

information about the PHMSA Office of 

Pipeline Safety (OPS) can be obtained 

by accessing OPS’s Internet home page 

at http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

PHMSA’s goal is to improve the 

overall integrity of pipeline systems and 

reduce risks. To adequately evaluate 

risk, it is necessary to identify and 

evaluate the physical and operational 

characteristics of each individual 

pipeline system. To that end, the 

Hazardous Liquid and Gas Transmission 

Pipeline Integrity Management (IM) 

Programs were created with the 

following objectives: 

• Ensuring the quality of pipeline 

integrity in areas with a higher potential 

for adverse consequences (high 

consequence areas or HCAs); 

• Promoting a more rigorous and 

systematic management of pipeline 

integrity and risk by operators; 

• Maintaining the government’s 

prominent role in the oversight of 

pipeline operator integrity plans and 

programs; and 

• Increasing the public’s confidence 

in the safe operation of the nation’s 

pipeline network. 

The IM regulations supplement 

PHMSA’s prescriptive safety regulations 

with requirements that are intelligent, 

performance based and processoriented. One of the fundamental tenets 

of the IM program is that pipeline 

operators must be aware of the physical 

attributes of their pipeline as well as the 

physical environment that it 

transverses. These programs reflect the 

recognition that each pipeline is unique 

and has its own specific risk profile that 

is dependent upon the pipelines 

attributes, its geographical location, 

design, operating environment, the 

commodity being transported, and many 

other factors. This information is a vital 

component in an operator’s ability to 

identify and evaluate the risks to its 

pipeline and identify the appropriate 

assessment tools, set the schedule for 

assessments of the integrity of the 

pipeline segments and identify the need 

for additional preventive and mitigative 

measures such as lowering operating 

pressures. If this information is 

unknown, or unknowable, a more 

conservative approach to operations is 

dictated. 

An IM program must go beyond 

simply assessing pipeline segments and 

repairing defects. Improving operator IM 

programs, the analytical processes 

involved in identifying and responding 

to risk, and the application of 

assessment and development of 

preventive and mitigative measures is 

also a critical objective. In addition, the 

ability to integrate and analyze threat 

and integrity related data from many 

sources is essential for enhanced safety 

and proactive integrity management. 

However, some operators are not 

sufficiently aware of their pipeline 

attributes nor are they adequately or 

consistently assessing threats and risks 

as a part of their IM programs. 

Over the past several years, PHMSA 

inspections and investigations have 

revealed deficiencies in individual 


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operators’ risk analysis approaches, the 

integration of data into these risk 

assessments, the abilities to adequately 

support the selection of assessment 

methods, identification and 

implementation of preventive and 

mitigative measures, and maintenance 

of up-to-date risk information and 

findings about their pipeline segments. 

In particular, operators’ programs fail to 

adequately address stress corrosion 

cracking, seam failure, or internal 

corrosion in their threat identification 

and risk assessments. The actual use of 

threat and risk information to determine 

assessment methods, to evaluate other 

preventive and mitigative measures, and 

to use those measures during periodic 

evaluation have been found to be 

deficient. Inspections and investigations 

have revealed examples where 

assessment methods, specific tools, and 

schedules were not based on a rigorous 

assessment of the type of threats posed 

by the pipeline segment, including 

consideration of the age, design, pipe 

material including seam type, coating, 

welding technique, cathodic protection, 

soil type, surrounding environment, 

operational history, or other relevant 

factors. Finally, inspections and 

investigations indicate that efforts to 

collect and integrate risk information 

can be inappropriately narrow, lack 

verification and fail to take into account 

relevant risk information and lessons 

learned from other parts of their system. 

In recent pipeline accident 

investigations, NTSB and PHMSA have 

discovered indications that operator 

oversight of IM programs has been 

lacking and thereby failed to detect 

flaws and deficiencies in their 

programs. The level of self-evaluation 

and oversight currently being exercised 

by some pipeline operators is not 

uniformly applied. The NTSB is also 

concerned that pipeline operators 

throughout the United States may have 

discrepancies in their records that could 

potentially compromise the safe 

operation of their pipelines. NTSB has 

recommended that operators diligently 

and objectively scrutinize the 

effectiveness of their programs, identify 

areas for improvement, and implement 

corrective measures. 

On January 3, 2011, NTSB 

recommended that PHMSA inform the 

pipeline industry of the circumstances 

leading up to and the consequences of 

the September 9, 2010, pipeline rupture 

in San Bruno, California, to ensure that 

both PHMSA and NTSB findings and 

recommendations with respect to the 

verification of records used to establish 

or adjust MAOP or MOP are 

expeditiously incorporated into the IM 

programs for pipeline operators. The 

pipeline rupture in San Bruno, CA 

involved a 30-inch-diameter natural gas 

transmission pipeline owned and 

operated by Pacific Gas and Electric 

Company (PG&E). The rupture occurred 

in a residential area killing eight people, 

injuring many more, and causing 

substantial property damage. The 

rupture created a crater about 72 feet 

long by 26 feet wide. A ruptured pipe 

segment about 28 feet long was found 

about 100 feet away from the crater. The 

resulting fire destroyed 37 homes and 

damaged 18. NTSB’s preliminary 

findings indicate that the pipeline 

operator did not have an accurate basis 

for the MAOP calculation. 

There are several methods available 

for establishing MAOP or MOP. A 

hydrostatic pressure test that stresses 

the pipe to a designated percent of the 

desired MAOP or MOP, without failure, 

is generally the most effective method. 

Hydrostatic testing requirements and 

restrictions for natural gas pipelines are 

specified in Title 49 CFR Part 192, 

Subpart J. Similar requirements for 

hazardous liquid pipelines are found in 

49 CFR Part 195, Subpart E. Although 

hydrostatic testing is recognized to be 

the most direct and effective 

methodology for validating a MAOP or 

MOP, its implementation requires that 

operating lines be shut down, which 

may adversely affect customers 

dependent on the natural gas supplied 

by the pipeline, particularly if the pipe 

fails during the test, which could 

necessitate a protracted shutdown. 

Consequently, operators prefer to use 

available design, construction, 

inspection, testing, and other related 

records to calculate the valid MAOP or 

MOP. However, this method is 

susceptible to error if pipeline records 

are inaccurate. With respect to the 

portion of the pipeline that failed in the 

September 9, 2010, San Bruno incident, 

PG&E used available design, 

construction, inspection, testing, and 

other related records to calculate the 

MAOP. The NTSB’s examination of the 

ruptured pipe segment and review of 

PG&E records revealed that although the 

as-built drawings and alignment sheets 

mark the pipe as seamless API 5L Grade 

X42 pipe, the pipeline in the area of the 

rupture was constructed with 

longitudinal seam-welded pipe. The 

ruptured pipe segment was constructed 

of five sections of pipe, some of which 

were short pieces measuring about four 

feet long, containing different 

longitudinal seam welds of various 

types, including single- and doublesided welds. Consequently, the short 

pieces of pipe of unknown 

specifications in the ruptured pipe 

segment may not have been as strong as 

the seamless API 5L Grade X42 steel 

pipe listed in PG&E’s records. PG&E’s 

records also identify Consolidated 

Western Steel Corporation as the 

manufacturer of the accident segment of 

Line 132. However, after physical 

inspection of the ruptured section, 

investigators were unable to confirm the 

manufacturing source of some of the 

pieces of ruptured pipe. 

Integrity Management Regulatory 

Provisions 

For hazardous liquid pipelines, 

§ 195.452 establishes requirements for 

IM programs in HCAs. Section 

195.452(b)(1) requires that each operator 

of a hazardous liquid pipeline ‘‘develop 

a written IM program that addresses the 

risks on each segment of pipeline.’’ 

Section 195.452(e) defines the minimum 

list of risk factors that must be included 

in the risk assessments used to schedule 

segment assessments. Appendix C 

provides additional guidance on these 

risk factors. Section 195.452(f) defines 

the required elements of an IM program. 

These elements include an analysis that 

integrates all available information 

about the integrity of the entire pipeline 

and the consequences of a failure, 

including data gathered during previous 

integrity assessments and data gathered 

in conjunction with other maintenance 

inspections and investigations. These 

elements also include an identification 

of additional preventive and mitigative 

measures to protect the HCAs 

(§ 195.452(i)), including conducting a 

risk analysis in which an operator must 

evaluate the likelihood of a pipeline 

release and how it could affect the 

HCAs. Preventive and mitigative 

measures to be evaluated based on risk 

factors include, but are not limited to, 

leak detection system modifications and 

installation of additional Emergency 

Flow Restricting Devices. 

For natural gas pipelines, Subpart O 

of 49 CFR Part 192 establishes the 

requirements for IM programs in HCAs. 

Section 192.911(c) requires that IM 

programs include ‘‘[a]n identification of 

threats to each covered pipeline 

segment, which must include data 

integration and a risk assessment.’’ This 

section further requires ‘‘[a]n operator 

must use the threat identification and 

risk assessment to prioritize covered 

segments for assessment (§ 192.917) and 

to evaluate the merits of additional 

preventive and mitigative measures 

(§ 192.935) for each covered segment.’’ 

Section 192.917(b) requires an operator 

to integrate existing data and 

information on the entire pipeline that 

could be relevant to a covered segment. 

In performing this data gathering and 


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1506 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 6 / Monday, January 10, 2011 / Notices 

integration, an operator must follow the 

requirements in ASME/ANSI B31.8S, 

section 4. At a minimum, an operator 

must gather and evaluate the set of data 

specified in Appendix A to ASME/ANSI 

B31.8S, and consider both on the 

covered segment and similar noncovered segments, past incident history, 

corrosion control records, continuing 

surveillance records, patrolling records, 

maintenance history, internal inspection 

records, operating stress levels, past 

pressure test information, soil 

characteristics, and all other conditions 

specific to each pipeline. Section 

192.917(c) states that an operator must 

conduct a risk assessment that follows 

ASME/ANSI B31.8S, section 5, and 

considers the identified threats for each 

covered segment. An operator must use 

the risk assessment to prioritize the 

covered segments for the baseline and 

periodic reassessments, and to 

determine what additional preventive 

and mitigative measures are needed for 

the covered segment. Sections 192.919 

and 192.921(a) further require that the 

operator explain why the particular 

assessment method for each segment 

was selected to address the identified 

threats to each covered segment. 

Specifically, § 192.921(a) requires the 

operator to select the method or 

methods best suited to address the 

identified threats to the covered 

segment (pipeline), which include 

internal inspection tool[s], pressure test, 

direct assessment, or other technology 

that an operator demonstrates can 

provide an equivalent understanding of 

the condition of the pipeline. More than 

one assessment method may be required 

to address all the threats to the covered 

pipeline segment. Section 192.935 

requires that an operator take additional 

measures beyond those already required 

by Part 192 to prevent a pipeline failure 

and to mitigate the consequences of a 

pipeline failure in a HCA. An operator 

must base the additional measures on 

the threats the operator has identified to 

each pipeline segment. This section 

requires that an operator conduct, in 

accordance with one of the risk 

assessment approaches in ASME/ANSI 

B31.8S, section 5, a risk analysis of its 

pipeline to identify additional measures 

to protect the HCA and enhance public 

safety. 

Advisory Bulletin (ADB–11–01) 

To: Owners and Operators of 

Hazardous Liquid and Gas Pipeline 

Systems. 

Subject: Establishing Maximum 

Allowable Operating Pressure or 

Maximum Operating Pressure Using 

Record Evidence, and Integrity 

Management Risk Identification, 

Assessment, Prevention, and Mitigation. 

Advisory: To further enhance the 

Department’s safety efforts and 

implement the NTSB’s January 3, 2011, 

recommendation to PHMSA [P–10–1], 

PHMSA is issuing this Advisory 

Bulletin concerning establishing MAOP 

and MOP using record evidence and 

integrity management; threat and risk 

identification; risk assessment; risk 

information collection, accuracy and 

integration, and identification and 

implementation of preventive and 

mitigative measures. 

I. Establishing MAOP or MOP Using 

Record Evidence 

As PHMSA and NTSB recommended, 

operators relying on the review of 

design, construction, inspection, testing 

and other related data to calculate 

MAOP or MOP must assure that the 

records used are reliable. An operator 

must diligently search, review and 

scrutinize documents and records, 

including but not limited to, all as-built 

drawings, alignment sheets, and 

specifications, and all design, 

construction, inspection, testing, 

maintenance, manufacturer, and other 

related records. These records shall be 

traceable, verifiable, and complete. If 

such a document and records search, 

review, and verification cannot be 

satisfactorily completed, the operator 

cannot rely on this method for 

calculating MAOP or MOP. Copies of 

the recommendations issued by NTSB 

to PHMSA, PG&E, and the California 

Public Utilities Commission, are 

available in the public docket and at 

PHMSA’s Web site: http:// 

www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/regs/ntsb. 

II. Performing Risk Identification, 

Assessment, Data Accuracy, Prevention, 

and Mitigation 

Pipeline operators are reminded of 

their responsibilities to identify pipeline 

integrity threats, perform rigorous risk 

analyses, integrate information, and 

identify, evaluate, and implement 

preventive and mitigative measures as 

required by the Federal pipeline safety 

regulations. Operators should 

thoroughly review their current IM 

programs and make any changes 

necessary to become fully compliant 

with the Federal pipeline safety 

regulations. Future, PHMSA inspections 

will place emphasis on the areas noted 

in this Advisory Bulletin. 

Operators are also advised that 

PHMSA and its State partners intend to 

sponsor a public workshop on threat 

and risk identification, risk assessment, 

risk information collection and 

integration, and identification of 

preventive and mitigative measures. The 

purpose of the workshop will be to 

expand the industry’s knowledge base 

about effective IM programs. At this 

workshop, PHMSA will discuss the 

progress it has seen and the challenges 

remaining. Operators with demonstrably 

effective programs will be invited to 

share information. Public participation 

will be encouraged. 

A. Risk and Threat Identification 

PHMSA emphasizes the need for 

operators to be fully cognizant of the 

physical and operational characteristics 

of their systems, understand the threats 

to their systems, and the risks posed by 

their systems. Each operator is 

ultimately responsible for identifying all 

risk factors and cannot rely solely on the 

factors in § 195.452(e) and Appendix C 

of Part 195 or § 192.917. Any operator 

of a hazardous liquid or gas 

transmission pipeline that is not fully 

cognizant of the location, pipe material 

and seam type, coating, cathodic 

protection history, repair history, 

previous pressure testing, or operational 

pressure history, and other assessment 

information, incident data, soil type and 

environment, operational history, or 

other key risk factors of a pipeline 

operating at or above 30% SMYS should 

(1) institute an aggressive program as 

soon as possible to obtain this 

information, (2) assess the risks, and 

(3) take the proper mitigative measures 

based upon the operator’s IM program 

risk findings. In addition, if these 

operators do not have verified 

information on key risk factors, an 

immediate and interim mitigation 

measure that should be strongly 

considered is a pressure reduction to 80 

percent of the operating pressure for the 

previous month, hydro testing the 

pipeline or creating a remediation 

program to identify threat risks. 

Operators of transmission pipelines 

operating below 30% SMYS should also 

conduct an integrity threat and risk 

review of these pipelines to ensure 

safety in HCAs. PHMSA will require an 

operator that has not adequately 

identified all threats to take mitigative 

measures. 

B. Risk Assessment 

Operators are advised to re-examine 

the basis for their IM assessment, as 

well as their MAOP or MOP 

calculations and documentation to meet 

Federal regulations in 49 CFR Parts 192 

and 195. Operators must consider all 

significant risk factors in their risk 

assessments; conduct risk assessments 

capable of supporting identification of 

preventive and mitigative measures; 

integrate into their threat and risk 


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assessments all relevant risk 

information from prior integrity 

assessments, inspections, investigations, 

and incidents with design, construction, 

operational and maintenance data; to 

critically analyze the integrated data 

and incorporate the analysis into their 

risk assessments and integrity-related 

decision making; update and maintain 

their risk information; and to ensure 

that the risk information is made 

available throughout the organization in 

a form that can effectively support 

decisions on integrity assessment 

methods, tools, process and procedure 

changes, and schedule during the 

required periodic evaluations of 

pipeline integrity. PHMSA and its State 

partners intend to verify that operators 

have taken these actions during the 

course of future pipeline safety 

inspections and investigations. 

C. Data Accuracy 

Operators must review and scrutinize 

pipeline infrastructure documents and 

records, including but not limited to, all 

as-built drawings, alignment sheets, 

specifications, and all design, 

construction, inspection, testing, 

material manufacturer, operational 

maintenance data, and other related 

records, to ensure company records 

accurately reflect the pipeline’s physical 

and operational characteristics. These 

records should be traceable, verifiable, 

and complete to meet §§ 192.619 and 

195.302. Incomplete or partial records 

are not an adequate basis for 

establishing MAOP or MOP using this 

method. If such a document and records 

search, review, and verification cannot 

be satisfactorily completed, the operator 

may need to conduct other activities 

such as in-situ examination, pressure 

testing, and nondestructive testing or 

otherwise verify the characteristics of 

the pipeline when identifying and 

assessing threats or risks. 

D. Risk Mitigation and Prevention 

PHMSA advises operators to 

implement a robust IM process that 

includes methods best suited to address 

the threats and risks identified 

(§ 192.921(a) and § 195.452(f)). 

Operators must use post assessment and 

continuing evaluation processes to 

evaluate program effectiveness in 

identifying threats, addressing threat 

preventative and mitigative measures, 

and providing internal IM program 

feedback of assessment findings so the 

assessment process can be updated 

based upon threat findings. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on January 4, 

2011. 

Jeffrey D. Wiese, 

Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety. 

[FR Doc. 2011–208 Filed 1–7–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–60–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Surface Transportation Board 

Release of Waybill Data 

The Surface Transportation Board has 

received a request from Michael Behe 

representing FRN, LLC (WB604–9– 

1/03/11) for permission to use certain 

data from the Board’s 2009 Carload 

Waybill Sample. A copy of this request 

may be obtained from the Office of 

Economics. 

The waybill sample contains 

confidential railroad and shipper data; 

therefore, if any parties object to these 

requests, they should file their 

objections with the Director of the 

Board’s Office of Economics within 

14 calendar days of the date of this 

notice. The rules for release of waybill 

data are codified at 49 CFR 1244.9. 

Contact: Scott Decker, (202) 245– 

0330. 

Andrea Pope-Matheson, 

Clearance Clerk. 

[FR Doc. 2011–155 Filed 1–7–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4915–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 

Departmental Offices; Privacy Act of 

1974, as Amended 

AGENCY: Departmental Offices, Treasury. 

ACTION: Notice of Proposed Privacy Act 

System of Records. 

SUMMARY: In accordance with the 

Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, the 

Departmental Offices, U.S. Department 

of the Treasury (‘‘Treasury’’) gives notice 

of the establishment of a Privacy Act 

System of Records. 

DATES: Comments must be received no 

later than February 9, 2011. The new 

system of records will be effective 

February 9, 2011 unless the comments 

received result in a contrary 

determination. 

ADDRESSES: Comments should be sent to 

Claire Stapleton, Consumer Financial 

Protection Bureau Implementation 

Team, 1801 L Street, NW., Washington, 

DC 20036. Comments will be made 

available for inspection upon written 

request. Treasury will make such 

comments available for public 

inspection and copying in Treasury’s 

Library, Room 1428, Main Treasury 

Building, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, 

NW., Washington, DC 20220, on official 

business days between the hours of 

10 a.m. and 5 p.m. Eastern Time. You 

can make an appointment to inspect 

comments by telephoning (202) 622– 

0990. All comments, including 

attachments and other supporting 

materials, will become part of the public 

record and subject to public disclosure. 

You should submit only information 

that you wish to make available 

publicly. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Claire Stapleton, Consumer Financial 

Protection Bureau Implementation 

Team, 1801 L. Street, NW., Washington, 

DC 20036, (202) 435–7220. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 

Protection Act (‘‘Act’’), Public Law 111– 

203, Title X, established the Consumer 

Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). 

Once fully operational, CFPB will 

administer, enforce and implement 

Federal consumer financial protection 

laws, and, among other powers, will 

have authority to protect consumers 

from unfair, deceptive, and abusive 

practices when obtaining consumer 

financial products or services. The Act 

grants Treasury certain ‘‘interim 

authority’’ to help stand up the agency. 

The CFPB implementation team, 

currently within Treasury, will maintain 

the records covered by this notice. 

The new systems of records described 

in this notice, Treasury/DO.315—CFPB 

Implementation Team Consumer 

Inquiry and Complaint Database, will be 

used to collect, respond to, and refer 

consumer inquiries and complaints 

concerning consumer financial products 

and services. A description of the new 

system of records follows this Notice. 

The report of a new system of records 

has been submitted to the Committee on 

Oversight and Government Reform of 

the House of Representatives, the 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and 

the Office of Management and Budget, 

pursuant to Appendix I to OMB Circular 

A–130, ‘‘Federal Agency 

Responsibilities for Maintaining 

Records About Individuals,’’ dated 

November 30, 2000, and the Privacy 

Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a(r). 

The system of records entitled, 

‘‘Treasury/DO.315—CFPB 

Implementation Team Consumer 

Inquiry and Complaint Database’’ is 

published in its entirely below. 


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