FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT MAY 10, 2007 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 05- 1394 0 N o. 06- 1109 6

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Dock etNos . 04 -0 04 57 -CR- T-30 -MS S-0 08 , 04 -0 04 57 -CR- T-20 MAP UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll ee, ve rs us HUGO SALAZ AR, a.k .a. Mex ic o, JUAN BAUTISTA LUGO, ISM AEL ROLON AYALA, a.k .a. Fla co , Defen da nt s- App el la nt s. ve rs us ALEXIS ROLON AY ALA, Defen da nt -Ap pe ll an t.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeals fr om

the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (M ay 1 0, 200 7)2

Be fo re CA RN E S, W IL SO N and H IL L , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M: This appeal involves four defendants. T hree of the def endants, Juan Ba uti sta L ugo, I sm ae l R olo n A y al a, and H ugo Sa la za r, w er e tr ie d and f

ound gui lty of c onsp ir ac y

to poss es s w iththe int en t t o di str ibu te one kil ogr am or m or e of heroin, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841 (a)( 1), ( b)(1)(A )(I ) and § 846. T he other ap pe ll an t, Al ex is Ay al a, en te reda gu il ty ple a b efo re t he tri al . T he c harg es a ga ins t the de fe ndants ste m f ro m the ir inv olv em en t i n ahe ro in distribu tion schem e that began in the m iddle of 200 1 and lasted un til Septem ber 2004 . The m anager and supervisor of the heroin distrib ution ring was I sm ael A y al a. T he oth er

thr ee de fe ndants pe rf

orm ed vari ous dut ie s to f

urthe r the co nspi ra cy , inc lud ing se lli ng, pa ck ag ing , and transpo rt ing he ro in. A lth oughthe heroin was sold at m any

differ ent locations, the principal place of distributi on was a w arehouse on 15th Stree t in Bradenton, Florida. T his is th eir consolidated ap pe al . W e wil l d is cu ss each de fen da nt ’s app eal in tu rn . I. HUG O SALAZ AR Sa la zar is a

tatto o art ist

by tr ad e. T ri al te sti m ony

ind ic at ed that he m et

the o th e r c o - c o n s p i r a t o r s w h i l e p u r c h a s i n g h e r o i nf o r p e r s o n a l u s e . S o me t i me the re af te r, he the n be gan gi vin g tatto os t o m em be rs of the c onsp ir ac y

in ex ch an ge3

fo r he ro in. E ve ntu al ly , he be gan se lli ng h er oina t the 15th S tr ee t w ar eh ouse , and at som e poi nt l at er

on, he be gan a ssi sti ng i n th e pa ck ag ing of the he ro in and i n th e tra ns po rta ti on of t he dru gs an d d ru g p ro ceed s fr om on e lo cat io n t o a no th er. O n a ppe al S al az ar

m ak es tw o c ont en tio ns: ( 1) that the re w as ins uf fi ci en t ev ide nc e to s uppo rt

his c onvi ct ionand ( 2) that the gov er nm en t’ s us e of

aspi ra lboun d no te book

that l ist ed

S al az ar ’ s stre et

nam e, “ Me xic o, ” co nst itute s r ev er sib le erro r. Sa la zar’ s f

ir st c ont en tio n st em s f

ro m the de fe nse he pr es en te d a t tri al : h e wa s a drug user, not a drug salesm an. Although he acknowledges hanging o ut at the 15th S tr ee t w ar eh ouse , he arg ue s th at the e vid en ce im

pli catin g hi m

in the conspiracy

either lac ked credibility

or w as not properly

adm itted. More spe ci fi ca lly , he arg ue s th at the te sti m ony

of his c o- co nspi rator s is ins uf fi ci en t be ca use : ( 1) the c o- co nspi rator s gave c onf lic tin g te sti m ony

a s to the ti m ing and scope of his participation in the conspi racy ; (2) ea ch co-conspirator hoped to curry favor w ith the go vernm ent by im plicating Salazar; and (3) the only phy sical ev ide nc e co nne ct ing him to the c onsp ir ac y

is ins uf fi ci en t t o su

ppor t hi s co nv ic ti on . W e re vie wde nov o th e suf fi ci en cy of the e vid en ce sup portin g gu ilt be y ond a re asonable dou bt. United States v. G arcia , 405 F. 3d 12 60, 1269 (11t h Cir.4

2005 ). “ [W e] c onsi de r w he the r, und er the tot al ity

of the c ir cum stanc es , the re is suf fi ci en t e vid en ce to supp ort a j ur y ve rd ic t whe n th e fa ct s are vie w ed in the li ght m ost f av or ab le to the gov er

nm en t. ” U nit ed

S tate s v. Mi er es -B or ge s, 919 F . 2d 652, 658 ( 11th C ir . 199 0) . W e al so r ev ie wthe j ur y ’ s c re dib ili ty

c hoi ce s inthe gove rn m en t’ s f

av or . I d. a t 65 6. A lth oughS al az ar m ay put f orth an in te rp re tatio n of the e vid en ce that w oul d no t su ppor t a j ur y ve rd ic t a ga ins t hi m , the gov er nm en t ne edno t d is pr ov e ev ery reas on ab le hypo th es is ex cep t g ui lt . Id. In st ead , we determ ine whether the j ury m ade a r easonable construction of the evidence. Id. If that constructio n paints a picture of guiltbey ond a reasonable doub t, this Court wil l n otrev ers e th e jury’ s v erd ic t. Id . Co nc er nin g th e te sti m ony

of c o- co nspi rator s, “ anunb ro ke n stre am of precedent in this circuit has establish ed that the uncorroborated testim ony of a co -c onsp ir at or

or a cc om pli ce is suf

fi ci en t t o pr ove gui lt be y ond a re as ona ble doub t.” Cra ig v. Singletary , 127 F. 3d 10 30, 1044 (11t h Cir. 1997 ). In this case, at least four w itnesses testified that Salazar had sold , pac kaged, and transported he ro in i n f

urthe ranc e of

the ove ra ll co nspi ra cy . A lth oughS al az ar c or re ct ly poi nts out som e dis cr ep an ci es in the te sti m ony a ga ins t hi m , tho se dis cr ep an ci es r el at e onlyto the tim ing and sco pe of his participation. No one testified that Sa lazar wa s not a part of the conspiracy . It is unrem arkable that differ ent co-conspirators5

would have differe nt recollections of the precise m om ent when Sa lazar j oined the m . T he j ur

y obv iou sly

tho ught that he w as part

of the c onsp ir ac y , and the te st im on y was s uf fic ie ntforth em

to m ak e th atin fere nc e. T he phy sic al e vid en ce that S al az ar c ha lle nge s is aspi ra l- boun d no te book that a ppare ntl y w as ne ve r adm itt ed

int o e vid en ce by

the dis tr ic t c ourt. T he notebo ok was discovered in Ism ael A y ala’ s BMW by De tective Paul D avis. When D et ec tiv e D av is f

ound the not eb ook, it

ha d be ensta she d inase cr et c om partm en t whe re t he car’s d riv er s id e ai rb ag sh ou ldha ve be en . On l y o n e p ag e i nth e n o t eb o o kre l at edt o Sa l az ar . Th atp ag e l i s t edSa l az ar ’s str ee t nam e, “ Me xic o. ” T he e ntr y did not li st any da te s, dol lar am ount s, or dr ug quanti tie s. I nst ea d, ne xt t o S al az ar ’ s stre et nam e w as asy

m bol —e ith er

an “ X ” or the num ber “ 1” with a slash through it. The author of the notebo ok entry had dr awn an arr owc onne ct ing S al az ar ’ s stre et nam e to the sy

m bol . T he gov er

nm en t m ade a gener al ref

erence to the notebo ok while question ing a witness, and later, dur ing c los ing arg um en ts, pub lis he d th e pa ge w ithS al az ar ’ s stre et nam e on i t t o th e ju ry. O n a ppe al , S al az ar

m ak es tw o arg um en ts a

bout the not eb ook. H is f

ir st argum ent, part of his insu fficiency of the evidence contention, is that the m ere appearance of his street nam e in the noteboo k next to an am bigu ous sym

bol do es6

nothin g to e sta

bli sh h is p ar

tic ipatio n inthe c onsp ir ac y . T hat arg um en t do es not he lp S al az ar , be ca

use w ith out

the not eb ook the re is ab undant e vid en ce pr ovi ng h is gu il t b ey on d areas on ab le do ub t. H is o the r ar gum en t i s th at the gov er

nm en t’ s us e of

the not eb ook dur ing the tr ia l r equir es us t o r ev er se his c onvi ct ion . B ec au se S al az ar did not obj ec t t o th e gove rn m en t’ s pu

bli catio n of

the not eb ook to the j ur

y , our r ev ie wis onl y

f or pla in error . United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189 , 1202 (11th Cir. 2005). “ Likew ise, w he n ade fe ndant d oe s no t ob j ec t at tri al to state m en ts m ad e by the pr ose cu tio n, w e re vie wund er

the sam e pla in e rr or

standard . ” U nit ed

S tate s v. W ill iam s, 445 F. 3d 13 02, 1307 (11t h Cir. 2006 ). “ Under the plain er ror standard, before an ap pe llate c ourt c anc or

re ct an e rr or not r ai se d a t tri al , the re m

ust be ( 1) e rr or , ( 2) that i s pl ai n, and ( 3) that a ff ec ts s ubst an tia l r igh ts. ” I d. a t 13 08. T o a ff ec t a de fe ndant’ s su

bst an tia l r igh ts, the e rr or

“ m ust have a ff ec te d th e out co m e of

the district court proceedings. The standard for showing that is th e fam iliar re as ona ble pr oba bil ity of adif fe re nt r es ult

f orm ulatio n, w hic h m eans a

pr oba bil ity sufficient to und erm ine confidence in the outcom e. ” United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 129 1, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005 ) (quotation m arks and citations om itted). Even assum ing th at the district court plainlyerr ed by allowing any

ref erence to the not ebook during testim ony and closing argum ents, that err or did not aff ect7

Sa la zar’ s su

bst an tia l r igh ts. T he te sti m ony a ga ins t hi m

spe ci fi ca lly

ide nti fi ed

him as adr ug p ac ka ge r, c our ie r, and s al es m an . T ha t t es tim ony w as f ar m or e pr obativ e of Salaz ar’ s guiltthan the notebo ok entry . Ther e is no reasonable probabilit y that the j ury would have reac hed a differ ent verdict if the notebookhad never been m en ti on ed . II. JU AN BA UTIS TA LUG O L ugo m ak es thr ee c ont en tio ns o n a ppe al . H is f

ir st tw o c ont en tio ns i nvol ve $900 0 in cash that was seized on May 11, 2004 from

an autom obile that he was dr ivi ng. O n th at

da te , D ep uty

Mi ch ae l K eny anof

the Mana te e Co unty , F lor ida Sh er if f’ s D ep ar tm en t pu lle d ov er

L ugo’ s auto m obi le a ft er

he dis co ve re d th at

the num be r on the c ar ’ s li ce nse plate w as r eg ist er ed to a dif fe re nt v eh ic le . L ugo inf orm ed O ff ic er K eny anthat he ha d r en te d th e car an d gave O ff ic er K eny ana co py of the r en ta l c ontra ct . K eny antoo k th e ag re em en t and r et ur ne d to his pa tr ol car t o v eri fy

Lug o’s ac co un t wi th th e ren ta l ca r co m pa ny. Approxim ately

two m inutes after the tra ffic stop began, anoth er police officer , D eputy

Pre ston Spear, arrived on the scene. While Off icer K eny an wa s co nta ct ing the r en ta l c ar

c om pany , D ep uty

S pe ar a ske d L ugo fo r pe rm iss ionto se ar chhis ve hic le . L ugo co nse nte d, and S pe ar se ar ch ed the c ar , f ind ing $90 00 i n the c ar ’ s c en te r co nsol e. T he c as h w as div ide d in to d en om inatio ns o f $900 . ( T he8

fa ct that the m one y

w as div ide d in to $ 900 de nom inatio ns i s si gni fi cant b ec au se Ism ael A y ala and his co-conspirators soldheroin in quan tities priced at $900.) Lugo told Deputy

Spear that the m oney

constitu ted proceeds from a car sale that he ha d c om

pl et edearl ie r in th e d ay , bu t Lu go ha d n o d oc um en ta ti on of t he sal e. When Deputy

Spear inform ed Lugo that he had to seize the m oney , L ugo assent ed w ith out pr ote st. A ft er

D ep uty S pe ar f ini she d th e se ar ch , O ff

ic er K eny aniss ue d a warning ticket to Lugo for drivin g a vehicle w ith a license plate that wa s re gis te re d to anothe r ve hic le . T he e nti re sto p la ste d tw en ty -f ive m inu te s. L ugo’ s f ir st tw o c ont en tio ns o n a

ppe al are : ( 1) that the se ar chof his ve hic le vio late d th e Fo urth A m en dm en t be ca use O ff ic er K eny on unr ea sona

bly and deliberately

delay ed issuin g the war

ning ticket so that Deputy Spear could search his c ar ; and ( 2) that the dis tr ic t c ourt c om m itt ed pla in e rr or

by a dm itt ing te sti m ony at trial about the $900 0 without first requiring the go vernm ent to adm it either ph ot og rap hs of t he m on ey or t he cu rren cy

it se lf. W e re vie wthe tr ia l c ourt’ s f ind ing s of

f ac t f or c le ar e rr or , but

w e re vie wde novo the appl ic at ionof

tho se f ac ts t o th e law . U nit ed

S tate s v. S im

m ons, 172 F . 3d 775, 778 (11t h Cir. 1999 ). T he Fourth Am endm ent perm its the pol ice to stop an autom obile if there is probable cause to believe that a tra ffic violation has oc curr ed . I d. ( ci tin g Whr env. U nit ed S tate s, 517 U . S. 806 , 810 , 116 S . Ct . 176 9,9

1772 ( 1996 )) . H er e, L ugo doe s no t di sput e that the re w as pr oba ble c au se f

or the ini tia l st op o f his ve hic le . H is o nly c ont en tio n is that he w oul d have be enable to stop Deputy

Spear ’ s search bef

ore the $9000 wa s discov ered if Of ficer Ke ny an ha d n otun reas on ab ly del ay edis su in g t he warn in g t ic ke t t o h im . Before trial L ugo filed a m otion to exclude the $90 00. T he district court fo und that D ep uty

K eny anha d no t unre as ona bly de lay ed iss uin g th e w ar

nin g tic ke t, r em ovi ng any

iss ue about

the va lid ity

of the c onse nt. L ugo poi nts to nothin g onappe al to pe rs ua de us tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f ac tf ind ing s w er e cl earl y erroneous, and the dis trict court’ s legal conclusio n that the duration wa s reas on ab le is co rrec t. A s f or his se co nd c ont en tio n—tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt c om m itt ed pla in e rr or by a dm itt ing te sti m ony

about the $90 00 w ith out

f ir st r equir ing the gov er

nm en t t o adm it ei the r phot ogr ap hs o f the $90 00 o r the c as h it se lf —L ugo ha s a

ppare ntl y ove rl ooke d th e fa ct

that the dis tr ic t c ourt di d a dm it phot ogr ap hs o f the $90 00 i nto ev id en ce. Hen ce, t he re was no erro r. L ugo’ s th ir d and f

ina l c ont en tio n is that hi s se nte nc e is unr ea sona ble . T he onl y arg um en t L ugo cl earl y

m ak es in supp ort of

thi s c ont en tio n is that hi s sentence is the sam e sentence that he w ouldhave rec eived pre-Booker under a m an da tor y se nte nc ing gui de lin es r eg im e. T ha t i s aspe ci ous ar gum en t, be ca use10

noth ing in Booker requires that a c ourt im pose a sentence outsid e of the advisory gu id el in es ran ge . Lug o’s co nv ic ti on an d s en te nc e are du e to be affi rm ed . III. ISM AEL AY ALA Ism ael A y ala contends that the dis trict court er red by instructing potential j ur y m em be rs dur ing voi r dir e that the y w oul d ne ed

to pay c los e atte nti on d

ur ing the tr ia l be ca

use the tr ia l transc ri pt w oul d “ not be a va ila ble . . . f or use dur ing deliberations . . . .” T he case law of this circuit grants broad di scretion to dist rict court to decide what ac cess, if any , the j ury will have to trial tr anscripts. Se e U nit ed S tate s v. D el ga do, 56 F . 3d 1 357, 137 0 ( 11th C ir . 199 5) ; Unit ed S tate s v. L oy d, 743 F . 2d 1 555, 156 7 ( 11th C ir . 198 4) . T he j ur y in thi s c as e ne ve r as ke d to have any portio n of

the tr an sc ri pt r ea d ba ck

to the m , and Ay al a pr es en ts n o ar gum en ts o n a

ppe al that pe rs ua de us tha t hi s su bst an tia l r igh ts w er e vio late d by the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s in str

uc tio n. I f anythi ng, the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s in str uc tio n pr oba

bly pr om pt edth e jury to p ay

clo se r at te nt io n t o t he tes ti m on y at t ria l. Ay ala’ s second content ion is th at the governm ent m ade an im proper co m m en t t o th e j ur

y dur ing it s r eb utt al c los ing arg um en t. T he a tto rn ey f or the gove rn m en t m ad e the c om m en t a ft er

the de fe nse c ouns el ha d a dm oni she d th e j ur or s to c onsi de r the f

ac t tha t the gov er

nm en t ha d pr es en te d no vid eo ta pe11

ev ide nc e of

dr ug a ct ivi tie s at the w ar eh ouse on 1 5thS tr ee t. T he r es pond ing co m m en t w as a s f

oll ow s: Mr . Br ow n w an te d to , y ou know , a ga in b ri ng u p th is c am er a busi ne ss an d s ug ge stto y ou itwas o ut rag eo us for th e Gov ern m en t t o s ay

we co ul dn ’t go on an y

bo dy’ s p riv at e p ro pe rty andpu t up avi de o c am era. Wel l , t h er e’s th i s l i t t l e t h i n g ca l l edth e F o u rt h Am en d m en t . I d o n ’t thinkany one of us would be very

happy if the G overnm ent snuck on to ou r pr op ert y

wit ho utou r pe rm is si on . Is m ae l A y al a nowarg ue s th at the gov er

nm en t’ s in voc at ionof

the F ourth Am en dm en t (1 ) in vi te d t he juro rs to m ak e d eci si on s i n t he co nt ex t o f th ei r own ri ght s and p ri vil eg es and n ot those of the de fe ndants ; ( 2) inv ite d th e j ur or s to decide the case on grounds ot her than the evidence and the law ; and (3) attem pted to s hif t the j ur or s’ e m

pha sis aw ay

f ro m the e vid en ce and t ow ar d e m oti on b y

“ relating defense ar gum ents to the jurors’ own property interests.” T o r ev er se aj ur

y ’ s ve rd ic t be ca

use of apr ose cu tor ’ s im

pr ope r re m ar

ks dur ing c los ing arg um en ts, the c ha lle nge d r em ar ks m ust ( 1) be im pr ope r an d ( 2) pr ej udi ce asub stanti al r igh t of the de fe ndant. U nit ed

S tate s v. Ba sc ar o, 742 F . 2d 1335 , 135 3 ( 11th C ir . 198 4) . I n th is c as e, the pr ose cu tor ’ s r em ar ks w er e not i m p ro p er , b ec au s e s h e w as en t i t l edt o re s p o n dt o i s s u es ra i s edb y th e d ef en s e’s closing argum ent, see United State s v. A lej andro, 118 F.3d 1518, 1524 (11 th Cir. 19 97 ), an d h er re sp on se was aleg it im at e o ne .12

Is m ae l A y al a’ s th ir d c ont en tio n is that the dis tr ic t c ourt c om m itt ed pla in er ro r by giv ing the f

oll ow ing j ur

y ins tr uc tio n: Whil e y ou are dis cu ssi ng the c as e do n ot h es itate to re ex am ine y our ow n op ini on and c hange y our m ind if y ou b ec om e co nvi nc ed

that y ou w er e w ro ng. B ut d o no t gi ve up y our hon es t be lie fs sol el y

be ca use the oth er s th ink

dif fe re ntl y or m er el y to ge t the c as e ove r w ith . Y our onlyinterest is to seek the truth from the evidence in the case. Is m ae l A y al a nowc ont en ds tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s “ se ek the tr uth ” ins tr uc tio n c lou de d th e j ur

y ’ s a bil ity to fo llo wthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s in str uc tio n on re as ona ble doubt. H e ar gue s th at “ [c ] le ar ly , the standard

of r ea sona ble doubt i s qu it e d iff eren t fr om

th e v ery am or

ph ou s s ta nd ardof s eek in g t he tru th .” Be ca use A y al a did

not obj ec t t o th e ins tr

uc tio n a t tri al , our

r ev ie wis onl y fo r pla in e rr or . W ill iam s, 445 F . 3d at 13 07. A nd the re w as non e he re . W iththe ex ce pti on o f the f

ina l se nte nc e of

it , w e al re ady

have a ff irm ed the c onst itutio na lity of thi s patte rnj ur

y ins tr uc tio n. S ee U nit ed

S tate s v. Br oke m ond, 959 F . 2d 2 06, 2 0 9 (1 1 th Ci r. 1 9 9 2 ). We ar e n o tp er s u ad edth atth e s up p l emen t al i n s tru ct i o n ’s adm oniti on to “ seek the truth” underm ined the jury ’ s understand ing of the dis trict co ur t’s i ns tru ct io n o n re as on ab le do ub t. Eve n i f th ere wer e err or , itis no t p la in . A y al a’ s f ourth and f

ina l c ont en tio n is that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed by enhanc ing his se nte nc e ba se d onhis use of f ir earm s inf

urthe ranc e of

the conspiracy

and his leadership role in the cons piracy . Ac cording to Ism ael A y ala,13

those enhancem ents wer e im proper because the fa cts upon which they we re based we re not found bey ond a reasonable doub t by a j ury . Ther efore, Ism ael ar gues that the district court engaged in th e ty pe of unconsti tutio nal, post-verdict j udicial fa ct fi ndi ng p ro hib ite d un de r Appr en di v . N ewJe rs ey , 530 U . S. 466 , 120 S . Ct . 2348 ( 2000 ), Bl ak el y

v. W as hin gto n, 542 U . S. 296 , 124 S . Ct . 253 1 ( 2004 ), and U nit ed S tate s v. Bo oke r, 543 U . S. 220 , 125 S . Ct . 738 ( 2005 ). T his c ont en tio n is fo re cl ose d by

bin din g pr ec ed en t. S ee U nit ed S tate s v. Ch au , 426 F . 3d 1 318, 1322 –23 (1 1thCi r. 200 5) . I sm ae l A y al a’ s c onvi ct ionand s en te nc e ar e due to be affi rm ed . IV. AL EXIS AY ALA U nli ke the oth er

de fe ndants in thi s a

ppe al , A le xis A y al a ple ad ed gui lty to co nspi ra cy

to dis tr ibu te and p oss es sio n w ithint en t t o di str ibu te one kil ogr am or m or e o f a m ix tu re o r su bs ta nc e co nt ai ni ng he ro in , in vi ol at io n o f 21 U.S.C. § 841( a) (1 ), ( b) (1 )( A )( i) and § 846 , and tw o c ount s of dis tr ibu tio n of

am ixt ur e or subs tance containing heroin , in violation o f 21 U. S. C. § 841 (a)( 1), ( b)(1)(C ). Alexis A y ala’ s first contention is that the dist rict er red by sentencing based on i ts f ind ing that hi s of

fe nse inv olv ed

f ive or m or e kil ogr am s of

he ro in. T he district court arrived at that am ountby considering th e PS I and the evidence pr es en te d a t the tr ia l of

his c o- co nspi rator s. H e nowarg ue s th at be ca use he14

pleaded guilt y

to conspi ring to po ssess with intent to distribu te “ one or m ore” kilog ram s of heroin, the district court shouldhave found that hi s offense involved be tw ee n on e an d th re e kil ogr am s of he ro in, giv ing him

agui de lin es se nte nc ing ran ge of 1 21 –1 51 m on th s i m pr is on m en t. The re i s n o m eri t i n t hi s ar gu m en t. N oth ing in Bo oke r pr ohi bit s adis tr ic t c ourt f ro m m ak ing a ddi tio na l f

ac tf ind ing s ba se d onapr ep onde ranc e- of -the -e vid en ce standard

w he n th at

c ourt i s a ppl y ing th e se nt en ci ng gu id el in es in an ad vi so ry m an ne r. See Ch au , 42 6 F .3dat 1 32 2– 23 . A le xis A y al a’ s se co nd c ont en tio n is that the dis tr ic t c ourt c le ar ly e rr ed by re fu sin g to giv e him

atw o- le ve l, m ino r- ro le se nte nc e re duc tio n purs uant t o se nte nc ing gui de lin es § 3B 1. 2( b) . Appl ic at ionN ote 5 t o § 3 B1 . 2 de fi ne s “ m ino r part ic ipant” a s ade fe ndant who i s le ss c ulp ab le than m ost oth er part ic ipants , but whose role cannotbe acc urately described as m inim al. Application Note 3(C) expla ins that the de ci sio n to appl y the m ino r part ic ipant r ed uc tio n is “ he av ily dependant up on the facts of the particular case. A s with any other fac tual issu e, the c ourt, in w ei ghi ng the tot al ity of the c ir cum stanc es , is not r equir ed to fi nd, ba se d so le ly

on the de fe ndant’ s bare a sse rt ion , that su char ole a dj ustm en t i s w ar rante d. ” “ T he pr opon en t of the downw ar d a dj ustm en t . . . a lw ay s be ar s th e bur de n of pr ovi ng a

m iti ga tin g r ole in the of

fe nse by apr ep onde ranc e of

the ev ide nc e . . . . ” U nit ed

S tate s v. Ro dr igu ez D e V ar on, 175 F . 3d 9 30, 939 ( 11th15

Ci r. 199 9) . W e re vie wthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n no t t o gi ve am ino r- part ic ipant re duc tio n on ly

f or c le ar e rr or . U nit ed

S tate s v. Ry an , 289 F . 3d 1 339, 134 8 ( 11th Ci r. 20 02 ). In determ ining whether

a defe ndant qu alifies for a m inor-role reduction, the di st ric t co ur t co nduc ts a two -p ro ng edan al y si s o f th e d efen da nt ’s con du ct . Id. Pr ong one r equir es the dis tr ic t c ourt t o a sse ss whe the r a de fe ndant’ s part ic ular ro le w as m ino r in r el at ionto the r el ev an t c ondu ct a ttr ibu te d to him

in ca lc ulatin g hi s ba se of fe nse le ve l. I d. I f the de fe ndant c ane sta bli sh tha t he play ed

onl y am ino r ro le in the c ondu ct

f or w hic h he ha s a lr ea dy

be enhe ld a cc ount ab le —no t a m ino r ro le in an y

lar ge r cri m in al co ns pi racy—a d own wardad jus tm en t m ay

be ap pl ie d. Id . a t 13 48–4 9. I f re ac he d, pr ong tw o of the ana ly sis r equir es the dis tr ic t c ourt t o consider the defendant’ s relative culpability as com pared to that of other part ic ipants . I d. a t 13 49. A le xis A y al a ar gue s th at

his r ole in the ove ra ll co nspi ra cy c onsi ste d of str ee t- le ve l transa ct ion s and o cc as ion al vis its to the w ar eh ouse w he re the dr ugs w er e sto re d. H e co ntr as ts h is p ar tic ipatio n w iththat of

his c o- co nspi rator s who ne got iate d w ithdr

ug s uppl ie rs , pa ck ag ed

the dr ugs fo r sa le , sup er

vis ed oth er c oconspirators, or financed the operation. He argues that he m eets the criter ia set fo rth to qu al ify for a m in or -ro le reduc ti on .16

T his arg um en t i s w ith out m er it. S im

ply be ca use he w as not

the m as te rm ind of the c onsp ir ac y

doe s no t m ean th at

his r ole w as m ino r. Appl y ing the f ir st p ro ng of the tw o- pr onge d ana ly sis , the dis tr ic t c ourt f ound that A le xis A y al a’ s r el ev an t co nduc t w as part ic ipatio n inac onsp ir ac y to poss es s w iththe int en t t o di str ibu te be tw ee n 18 . 4 and 2 8. 4 ki log ram s of he ro in. A lth oughhe w as not the le ad er

of the co nspi ra cy

( his c ousi n I sm ae l, w ho w as the le ad er , w as giv enaf our -l ev el inc re as e fo r his r ole ), A le xis A y al a co nc ed es that he hun g ou t at the w ar eh ouse w he re the drug s wer e d is tri bu te d a ndso ldso m e o f th e dru gs in fur th eran ce o f th e co ns pi racy. An uncontested factfinding in the PSI states that he participated in the conspi racy fo r thr ee y ears . H e intro duc ed his c ousi n I sm ae l t o adr ug s uppl ie r an d pe rs ona lly brough t in at least one custom er. T hose facts establish that Alexis Ay ala has fai le d t o s ho w cle ar erro r un de r th e fi rs t p ro ng of o urtwo -p ro ng edan al y si s. Alexis A y ala’ s third content ion is th at the district court im posed an unreasonable sentence on him . Our “ [r] eview f or rea sonablen ess is defere ntial,” W ill iam s, 456 F . 3d at 13 63, and i s gu ide d by the f ac tor s se t f

orth i n § 3 553( a) . I d. “ [T ] here is a r ange of rea sonable sentences from which the district court m ay ch oose . ” I d. “ W e w ill not sub sti tut e our

j udgm en t i n w ei ghi ng the r el ev an t fact or s b ecau se ‘ [o ]ur rev ie w is no t d e n ov o.’” Id.17

A le xis A y al a ar gue s th at

his 262 –m onth se nte nc e, a lth ougha t the bottom of the recom m ended sentencing guidelin es range, is unreasonable because it igno res his m ini m al r ole in the of fe nse , his pe rs ona l hi sto ry of dr ug a ddi ct ionand psy ch olo gic al pr obl em s, and p hy sic al abuse he suf fe re d inthe pa st. H e al so p oin ts ou t t he ha rd sh ip hi s i nc arce rat io n wi ll workon hi s fa m il y . Instead of the 262–m onth sentence he re ceived, he argues that a shorter se nte nc e, in co nj unc tio n w ithsub stanc e ab use c ouns el ing and m en ta l he al th tr eatm en t, w oul d a de quate ly de te r him

f ro m c om m itt ing f uture c ri m es and w oul d ad dr es s t he na tu re o f hi s ro le in th e co ns pi racy. A cc or din g to A le xis A y al a, the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f

ai lur e to g ive asho rt er

se nte nc e is unr ea sona

ble be ca use it is long er than necessar

y to m eet the purposes of sentencing as set forth in 1 8 U. S. C. § 3 55 3( a). Under our def

erential standard of re view, Ale xis Ay ala has not establish ed that his sent ence w as unreasonable. T he district court consid ered the § 3553(a) fa ct or s, r ej ec te d th e ar gum en t tha t hi s r ole in the c onsp ir ac y w as m ino r, and ad opt ed the P SI ’ s f

ind ing that A le xis A y al a ha d part ic ipate d inthe c onsp ir ac y f or thr ee y ears . H is s en te nc e w as w ith in the a dvi sor y gui de lin es r an ge , and the se nt en ci ng gu id el in es are o ne of t he fact or s t ha t t he di st ric t co ur t m us t co ns id er.18

A nd f ina lly , the se nte nc e w as w el l be lowthe pe rm iss ibl e statut or y m ax im um of li fe i m pr is on m en t. Acco rd in gl y , Alex is Ay al a’s se nt en ce i s due to be affi rm ed . V. AFFIRMED.