IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 15-1433

Filed September 28, 2016

FIRST AMERICAN BANK,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MIDWEST CREAMERY, INC., d/b/a COLD STONE CREAMERY, f/k/a CS 

CREAMERY, INC.; SCOTT OTIS; JANET OTIS; and JRF, INC.,

Defendants-Appellants.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Douglas F. Staskal, 

Judge.

Midwest Creamery appeals a district court order granting judgment on 

three promissory notes and a supplemental order awarding attorney fees. 

AFFIRMED.

Andrew B. Howie of Hudson, Mallaney, Shindler & Anderson, P.C., West 

Des Moines, for appellants.

Christopher K. Loftus, Lynn W. Hartman, and Dawn M. Gibson of 

Simmons Perrine Moyer Bergman, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

Heard by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
2

TABOR, Judge.

Midwest Creamery,

1

an Iowa corporation operating Cold Stone Creamery 

ice cream franchises, appeals a district court order granting judgment in favor of 

First American Bank on three promissory notes and a supplemental order 

awarding attorney fees. Midwest Creamery contends the district court erred in 

(1) finding default under the promissory notes, (2) awarding damages on the 

entire third promissory note, and (3) granting excessive attorney fees. 

We find substantial evidence to support the district court’s finding of 

default under the promissory notes as well as its determination First American

was entitled to collect the entire amount due on the third note. Although the 

attorney-fee award was substantial, in considering the complexity of the litigation, 

we find no abuse of discretion in the award. Moreover, we find First American’s 

counsel is entitled to recover appellate attorney fees.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

On October 9, 2003, CS Creamery, Inc. borrowed $500,000 from First 

American and executed two promissory notes (Note 1 and Note 2), each in the 

amount of $250,000. The promissory notes were unconditionally guaranteed by 

JRF, Inc., the holding company of CS Creamery, and Scott and Janet Otis, the 

sole shareholders of JRF. At this time, CS Creamery also authenticated a 

security agreement granting First American an interest in its assets. The parties 

modified the notes more than once in the next several years. Although the 

modification agreements referenced the original notes, they listed Midwest 

 

1 Guarantors Scott Otis, Janet Otis, and JRF, Inc. are also parties to this action. For 

ease of reference, we will use “Midwest Creamery” throughout this opinion to refer to the 

defendants-appellants collectively.
3

Creamery, Inc., a corporation under the same ownership as CS Creamery, as the 

debtor rather than CS Creamery. 

A little under two years later, Midwest Creamery borrowed $475,000 from 

First American and executed a promissory note (Note 3) in that amount. Again, 

the Otises and JRF unconditionally guaranteed the note. Note 3 indicated its 

guaranteed portion had been sold to a registered agent for value. Midwest 

Creamery authenticated a security agreement granting First American an interest 

in some of its assets but excluding “equipment and machinery.” 

Over the next several years, Midwest Creamery was frequently tardy in its 

payments on the notes, periodically drifting between thirty and sixty days past 

due. Midwest Creamery also failed to provide annual financial statements and 

tax returns in accordance with the terms of the notes. Beginning in 2012, the

delinquency worsened, and Midwest Creamery fell perpetually behind in its 

payments. Rather than declare Midwest Creamery in default, First American

continued to accept the late payments to allow Midwest Creamery to “work 

through” its financial problems. In correspondence between the parties, First 

American emphasized the importance of keeping the account under sixty days 

past due. 

Midwest Creamery’s financial difficulties worsened. By April 2014, the IRS 

had filed several tax liens against Midwest Creamery, and the landlord of its

Johnston ice cream store location had locked Midwest Creamery out of the 

property and initiated a lawsuit, alleging delinquency in rental payments. 

Although Midwest Creamery and First American worked together to resolve the 
4

tax-lien issue, Midwest Creamery failed to inform First American of the lockout. 

Only in the course of a routine site visit did First American discover the lockout. 

On April 16, 2014, First American declared default and accelerated the 

remaining amounts due on all three notes, demanding full payment within seven 

days. Midwest Creamery failed to make any payments after receiving the 

demand letters, and First American filed suit on April 25 to foreclose its security 

agreements and obtain a monetary judgment. First American’s petition alleged 

Midwest Creamery was in default for failure to pay in accordance with the terms 

and conditions of the notes. The petition further alleged eight additional grounds 

of default, including failure to disclose material facts to the lender. After a bench 

trial in which First American pursued only a judgment for the remaining balance 

due on the notes, the district court ruled in favor of First American, listing several 

grounds of default. Shortly thereafter, the district court awarded $81,446.72 in 

attorney fees to First American. Midwest Creamery appeals both orders.

II. Scope and Standards of Review

We find this case was tried at law, and we review for errors of law. See 

Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; see also Van Sloun v. Agans Bros., Inc., 778 N.W.2d 174,

178–79 (Iowa 2010). The district court’s fact-findings carry the weight of a 

special verdict, and if substantial evidence supports those findings, they are 

binding on us. Van Sloun, 778 N.W.2d at 179. But we are not bound by the 

district court’s conclusions of law. Id.

We review a grant of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. 

NevadaCare, Inc. v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 783 N.W.2d 459, 469 (Iowa 2010). 
5

We will reverse only if the district court based “its ruling on grounds that are 

clearly unreasonable or untenable.” Id.

III. Analysis

A. Did First American prove Midwest Creamery was in default?

The district court determined Midwest Creamery had defaulted by failing to 

make timely payments on the promissory notes,2and on additional grounds:

(1) by failing to provide annual financial statements and tax returns; (2) by failing 

to pay taxes when due; and (3) by falling behind on rent payments to the extent 

of being locked out of a business location, a circumstance implicating multiple 

grounds of default. Midwest Creamery contends First American waived its right 

to accelerate on the grounds of failing to make payments when due and failing to 

pay taxes. We find it unnecessary to reach the issue whether First American 

waived its right to accelerate on the grounds of late payments and failure to pay 

taxes because we find substantial evidence in the record supporting Midwest 

Creamery’s default on the other grounds identified by the court.

Midwest Creamery argues the record does not support the district court’s 

findings of additional grounds of default. Midwest Creamery first challenges the 

sufficiency of the demand letters sent by First American, highlighting the fact that 

the letters did not specifically mention any grounds of default other than the 

failure to make timely payments. Midwest Creamery claims because First 

American “invented these bases for default after it decided to accelerate the 

note,” the district court should not have found Midwest Creamery in default. 

 

2 The notes have identical provisions concerning default.
6

On April 16, 2014, First American sent Midwest Creamery demand letters

regarding each of the three promissory notes stating “[t]he above loan is in 

default which default includes but is not limited to payment default and default 

under lease and franchise agreements” and accelerating Midwest Creamery’s 

obligations under the notes to become due within seven days of the notice. After

failing to receive any payments from Midwest Creamery, First American filed suit 

on April 25, listing nine grounds of default. 

The terms of the notes allowed First American, without providing notice or 

demand, to accelerate the balance upon default or to file suit. In Dunn v. 

General Equities of Iowa, Ltd., our supreme court noted acceleration provisions 

are not self-executing but rather require the holder “take some positive action to 

exercise his option to declare payments due under an acceleration clause.” 319 

N.W.2d 515, 516 (Iowa 1982) (quoting Weinrich v. Hawley, 19 N.W.2d 665, 667 

(Iowa 1945)). First American took that affirmative action to exercise its option in 

the April 16 demand letters. 

Midwest Creamery complains the demand letters were “silent as to why 

the bank chose to accelerate the notes. There was no mention of unpaid taxes, 

impaired collateral, a dispute with the landlord, or the failure to provide financial 

information.” But Midwest Creamery does not cite, nor do we find, any authority 

requiring First American to provide a notice to cure in these circumstances, 

specifically listing all grounds of default despite the express contrary terms of the 

notes. See Iowa Code § 554.9601(4) (2013) (stating debtor has the rights 

provided in the agreement of the parties upon default). Iowa law does provide a

debtor the right to notice of default in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Iowa 
7

Code § 537.5110 (providing consumer the right to notice of alleged default and 

right to cure in consumer credit transactions); id. § 654.2D (giving borrower a 

right to notice of alleged default and right to cure for mortgage of a homestead). 

But this is not a consumer credit or homestead transaction. In this commercial 

credit situation, we find First American’s letters invoking the acceleration clause 

were sufficient.

Midwest Creamery next argues First American did not prove Midwest 

Creamery defaulted in failing to provide financial documents in accordance with 

the notes and directs us to conflicting testimony on the issue. Mark Lyons, chief 

credit officer at First American, testified financial documents from Midwest 

Creamery were missing from First American’s file, while Steven Phipps

acknowledged only that First American generally received Midwest Creamery’s

financial documents late and stated he would “have to look at the files to see if 

[First American] ever received” them. Scott Otis testified he had eventually 

produced all financial documents for Midwest Creamery. Otis indicated due to 

the time constraints of his CPA, he was unable to provide the financial 

information by the deadlines in the notes, but First American knew of the problem 

and told him the delay was acceptable.3 

In concluding Midwest Creamery had defaulted on this ground, the district 

court stated: “Midwest Creamery was regularly tardy in supplying the business 

records and tax returns it is required to provide to First American under the terms 

of the Notes. Some of the documents were never supplied.” We agree Midwest 

 

3 Despite First American’s alleged representations to Otis, Midwest Creamery does not 

argue First American waived its right to accelerate on this ground.
8

Creamery was in default for failing to provide financial statements in accordance 

with the terms of the notes. Although the record contained conflicting testimony 

whether Midwest Creamery had completely failed to provide certain financial 

documents, no dispute existed that Midwest Creamery failed to provide the 

financial documents within the time periods required by the notes. Therefore, we 

affirm on this ground.

Midwest Creamery also argues the lockout by its landlord in Johnston did 

not place it in default. The district court found Midwest Creamery in default on 

several grounds due to the lockout and resulting legal proceedings: (1) failing to 

preserve or account for collateral, (2) failing to disclose material facts to First 

American, (3) becoming subject of a civil or criminal action First American

believed could materially affect its ability to pay, (4) defaulting on loans and 

agreements with other creditors to the extent First American believed it could 

materially affect its ability to pay, and (5) having an adverse change to financial 

condition and business operation First American believed could materially affect 

its ability to pay. 

Citing the fact that CS Creamery rather than Midwest Creamery executed 

the first two promissory notes and subsequent grant of security interests in its 

equipment, Midwest Creamery argues First American did not have a security 

interest in the equipment at the location of the lockout and, therefore, Midwest 

Creamery had no duty to inform First American of the lockout because it was not 

a “material fact”—First American had no danger of losing collateral. Midwest 

Creamery also maintains “[b]eing subject to a civil proceeding is insufficient to be 

found in default because then, any lawsuit, from a ‘slip and fall’ case brought by a 
9

patron could be used to declare Midwest Creamery in default.” Lastly, Midwest 

Creamery contends that even if we find it was in default, First American waived 

its right to declare default by failing to act on its knowledge of the lockout for 

several months. 

We find it unnecessary to address whether First American had a security 

interest in the equipment at the location of the lockout because substantial 

evidence supports the other grounds of default found by the district court. At the 

time First American discovered the lockout, Midwest Creamery’s financial 

difficulties were readily apparent. Midwest Creamery had been chronically 

behind in its payments for two years and was subject to tax liens. Because of 

these pre-existing financial concerns, First American was justified in believing the 

lockout—which prevented Midwest Creamery from doing business at one of its 

locations, arose from delinquency in rent payments, and resulted in litigation—

materially affected Midwest Creamery’s ability to pay on the notes.

Finally, Midwest Creamery’s waiver claim concerning the lockout is 

without merit. A party may waive its rights under a contract, including the right to 

accelerate. Dunn, 319 N.W.2d at 516. A pattern of actions or omissions such as 

failing to accelerate a debt may constitute a course of performance4“sufficient to 

establish waiver” of the option to accelerate. See id. at 517. We fail to see how 

 

4 The Dunn court uses the phrase “course of dealing” rather than “course of 

performance.” 319 N.W.2d at 517. But in many references, “course of performance” is 

the term used to describe “a sequence of conduct between the parties to a particular 

transaction,” which would encompass prior acceptance of delinquent installments in a 

single transaction. See 13 Williston on Contracts § 39:30 (4th ed. 2015) (noting that by 

“regularly accepting late payments” a lender may establish waiver by “course of 

performance”). Compare Iowa Code § 554.1303(1), with id. § 554.1303(2).
10

First American waived its right to accelerate on grounds related to the lockout.5 

Any delay between First American’s discovery of the lockout and its declaration 

of default was minimal and not enough to constitute waiver.

6 See In re Prop. 

Seized from Sykes, 497 N.W.2d 829, 833 (Iowa 1993) (“Mere passivity may not 

support a waiver.”). Therefore, we affirm on this ground.

B. Was First American required to provide written evidence it had 

repurchased the guaranteed portion of Note 3 to obtain judgment on 

the entire balance of the note?

In the event we find First American proved Midwest Creamery defaulted 

under the notes, Midwest Creamery asks us to limit the bank’s recovery on Note 

3. The face of Note 3 indicated the guaranteed portion of the note had been sold 

for value. At trial, First American representative Mark Lyons testified the loan 

First American issued to Midwest Creamery was guaranteed in part by the Small 

Business Administration (SBA), which allowed First American to sell the 

guaranteed portion—seventy-five percent of the loan—to an approved third party. 

Lyons continued that in accordance with SBA procedure, once Note 3 first went 

into default in 2011, First American repurchased the guaranteed portion from that 

third party. Although First American was prepared to produce all of the original 

promissory notes at trial, it was unable to provide any written documentation of 

its agreement to repurchase Note 3. 

 

5 The notes contained anti-waiver provisions, which stated: “Lender may delay or forgo 

enforcing any of its rights without giving up any of them.” Because we find Midwest 

Creamery failed to prove waiver, we decline to consider the effect the anti-waiver 

provisions would have on Midwest Creamery’s waiver claim.

6 At trial, Lyons was unsure of when First American became aware of the lockout, stating 

he would need to review his notes and it was likely in “January or February of 2014.” 

But Phipps, the First American employee who actually performed the site visit, testified 

he discovered the lockout in March, approximately one month before First American 

declared default. 
11

Midwest Creamery argues First American was not entitled to judgment on 

the entirety of Note 3 because First American failed to provide written evidence it 

had repurchased the SBA-guaranteed portion of the note. Midwest Creamery 

contends the verbal testimony regarding the repurchase of the previously sold 

portion from First American representative Mark Lyons was not competent 

evidence, hearsay, and violated the parol evidence rule. Thus, according to 

Midwest Creamery, First American’s recovery on Note 3 must be limited to

twenty-five percent—the portion of the note it did not sell—of the unpaid balance. 

First American contends it remained the holder of Note 3 under Iowa’s

Uniform Commercial Code and retained the right to enforce the note in its 

entirety because it sold only a portion of the note to a third party. See Iowa Code 

§ 554.3203(4). First American further contends it did, in fact, repurchase the 

previously sold portion as Lyons testified, and First American owned the entire 

note at the time of trial. Finally, First American points out that it surrendered the 

original note to the court before the judgment was docketed, proving it was the 

owner of the note. 

We find substantial evidence supports the district court’s conclusion First 

American owned all of Note 3 and was entitled to enforce it. The holder of a 

promissory note, which includes an entity in possession of a note payable to it, 

has the right to enforce the note. Id. §§ 554.1201(2)(u), .3301. Here, although 

First American transferred a portion of Note 3, it retained possession of Note 3 as 

well as all rights and responsibilities associated with it—First American remained 

the payee under the loan and kept all servicing responsibilities. See id. 

§ 554.3203(4) (“If a transferor purports to transfer less than the entire instrument, 
12

negotiation of the instrument does not occur. The transferee obtains no rights 

under this Article and has only the rights of a partial assignee.”). And even if the 

partial transfer had granted a third party rights in the note, the testimony of Lyons 

at trial and First American’s subsequent surrender of the original note to the court 

before entry of judgment indicated First American had repurchased the 

transferred portion by the time of trial. Midwest Creamery does not cite, nor do 

we find, any case law requiring First American to provide written proof of its 

repurchase, and because the evidence presented at trial demonstrated First 

American remained the holder of the note throughout the course of the loan, we 

decline to require written proof over and above the original promissory note. See 

Grimes Sav. Bank v. McHarg, 213 N.W. 798, 799 (Iowa 1927) (noting production 

of original note by payee sufficient to establish a prima facie case of ownership).

Moreover, we are not persuaded by Midwest Creamery’s evidentiary 

objections. Midwest Creamery contends Lyons was not competent to testify to 

First American’s alleged repurchase of Note 3 because his testimony was “selfserving.” But testimony is not inadmissible on grounds of competency simply 

because it is self-serving. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.601 (“Unless otherwise provided 

by statute or rule, every person is competent to be a witness.”); see also Fed. R. 

Evid. 601 advisory committee’s note (“Interest in the outcome of litigation . . . 

require[s] no special treatment to render [it] admissible . . . .”).

7

 Midwest 

 

7 We find the case cited by Midwest Creamery in support of this argument, In re Vargas, 

396 B.R. 511 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008), to be readily distinguishable. The Vargas court 

found a low-level clerk was not competent on grounds of lack of personal knowledge to 

testify as a records custodian when there was no indication of how he had “custody of 

any books, records or files of [the company], or . . . any connection” to the company. 

396 B.R. at 515. But here, there was no question that either of the First American 

representatives who testified at trial had personal knowledge about the promissory 
13

Creamery also argues the testimony is hearsay but does not point to any specific 

objectionable language. We fail to see how a First American representative’s 

testimony that First American repurchased Note 3 involves an out-of-court 

statement implicating the hearsay rules. Finally, Midwest Creamery urges us to 

find Lyons’s testimony in violation of the parol evidence rule “as it seeks to 

modify the written language of Note 3.” Again, we find Midwest Creamery’s 

argument unavailing. The parol evidence rule does not apply to subsequent 

modifications of a written contract. See Whalen v. Connelly, 545 N.W.2d 284,

291 (Iowa 1996).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment on the entire balance of 

Note 3.

C. Did the district court abuse its discretion in the amount of attorney 

fees it awarded to First American?

Midwest Creamery’s last challenge is to the district court’s grant of 

attorney fees. In its decision granting judgment to First American, the district 

court found First American was “contractually entitled” to recover reasonable 

attorney fees and expenses. First American subsequently filed an application for 

attorney fees, seeking $85,146.72. After a hearing on the matter, the district 

court granted attorney fees and expenses in the amount of $81,446.72.

Midwest Creamery argues the district court abused its discretion in the 

amount of attorney fees it awarded to First American because (1) the award

included amounts for time spent before First American declared default and

(2) the complexity of the case did not warrant such an “exorbitant” amount of 

 

notes. Both were relatively high-level employees of First American who worked 

extensively on the matter.
14

fees. First American counters that the award correctly included fees and 

expenses beginning in 2011 because the notes expressly allowed attorney fees 

to enforce the notes and to protect collateral, regardless of whether those fees 

occurred before or after First American declared default. First American

contends the amount of the award was appropriate considering the extensive 

efforts of First American’s counsel and the intricacy of the case. 

1. May the attorney-fee award include amounts accrued before First 

American declared default?

Without citation to authority, Midwest Creamery argues First American

should not be able to recover any attorney fees and expenses incurred before 

First American declared default in 2014. A party may generally recover 

reasonable attorney fees “[w]hen judgment is recovered upon a written contract” 

that includes an express attorney-fee provision. Iowa Code § 625.22; see also 

NevadaCare, Inc., 783 N.W.2d at 469–70. In construing such a provision, we 

look to the plain meaning of the language. See Palo Sav. Bank v. Sparrgrove, 

No. 02-1234, 2004 WL 57466, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2004); see also Fed. 

Land Bank of Omaha v. Woods, 480 N.W.2d 61, 66 (Iowa 1992). According to

the terms of the notes, First American was entitled to:

Without notice and without Borrower’s consent . . .

. . . .

B. Incur expenses to collect amounts due under this Note, 

enforce the terms of this Note or any other Loan Document, and 

preserve or dispose of the Collateral. Among other things, the 

expenses may include . . . reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. If 

Lender incurs such expenses, it may demand immediate 

repayment from Borrower or add the expenses to the principal 

balance. 
15

The district court found the legal “services provided before formal default was 

declared were reasonably necessary to preserve [First American’s] security 

interest, a matter that is within the scope of the contractual agreement to pay 

attorney fees.” We agree. The time and expense statements submitted by First 

American’s counsel include research regarding priority of First American’s 

security interest, drafting and revising a forbearance agreement, and negotiating 

lien waivers. The terms of the attorney-fee provision, which included expenses 

to enforce the terms of the notes and preserve collateral, were expansive enough 

to encompass this activity, so the district court was within its discretion in 

including the fees and expenses accrued before First American’s formal 

declaration of default. See Woods, 480 N.W.2d at 69–70 (finding lender entitled 

to attorney fees “for legal services in establishing its own claim and in defending 

against the counterclaims and affirmative defenses” when provision stated 

“reasonable attorney fees may be collected as a part of this indebtedness in any 

legal proceeding brought to enforce the collection”); Sparrgrove, 2004 WL 57466, 

at *3 (finding attorney fee provision stating “if you hire an attorney to collect this 

note, I also agree to pay any fee you incur with such attorney plus court costs” 

allowed for fees incurred to establish right to recovery and defend against 

counterclaims but did not encompass fees incurred to defend its secured position 

against claims of third parties).

2. Was the attorney-fee award unreasonable?

Under section 625.22, any attorney fee awarded must be reasonable. 

Midwest Creamery argues the fee award was unreasonably high considering 

“there was limited discovery, and it was a one-day trial that lasted approximately 
16

61⁄2 hours.” Midwest Creamery challenges the amount of time First American’s 

counsel spent and the number of attorneys who worked on the matter but not the 

hourly rate of the attorneys. “A reasonable attorney fee is initially calculated by 

multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the winning claims 

times a reasonable hourly rate.” Boyle v. Alum-Line, Inc., 773 N.W.2d 829, 832 

(Iowa 2009) (quoting Dutcher v. Randall Foods, 546 N.W.2d 889, 896 (Iowa 

1996)). Whether the hourly rate and time spent are reasonable depends upon 

the specific facts of each case. Id. In determining the amount of the award, the 

court must consider:

(1) the time spent; (2) the nature and extent of the services; (3) the 

amount of money involved; (4) the difficulty of handling and 

importance of issues; (5) the responsibility assumed; (6) the results 

obtained; (7) the standing of the attorneys in the profession; and (8) 

the customary changes for similar service. 

Dutrac Cmty. Credit Union v. Hefel, No. 15-0143, 2015 WL 7574230, at *9 (Iowa 

Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015). Further, the district court may reduce an award for 

unreasonable time spent or duplicative hours. Boyle, 773 N.W.2d at 833. We 

consider the district court an expert in determining what constitutes a reasonable 

attorney fee. See id. at 832.

The district court specifically addressed Midwest Creamery’s claim that 

the amount sought by First American was excessive: 

[T]hough the amount of the fee sought is in the high range for a 

case that is generically labeled a “collection” case, not all collection 

cases are the same. In the range of loan transactions, this one was 

a complicated, commercial loan transaction involving multiple 

notes, multiple security agreements, multiple guarantors, multiple 

business locations, and several years of close monitoring by the 

plaintiff and negotiation between the plaintiff, the defendant and the 

guarantors as the plaintiff became concerned about repayment.
17

The court also rejected Midwest Creamery’s claim it was unnecessary to have as 

many attorneys working on the case as it did, noting First American “reduced its 

original fee claim by an amount equal to the fees attributable to the second 

attorney who participated in the trial.”8 The district court found no other 

duplication of services.

We agree with the district court’s well-reasoned analysis. Although the 

trial itself was brief, the filings throughout the case and the statement of attorney 

fees demonstrate the complexity and difficulty of the matter as a whole. This 

case involved multiple guarantors and multiple lienholders. The fee statements 

disclose lengthy negotiations between the parties as well as summary judgment

and post-trial briefing. Although discovery was limited, requests by Midwest 

Creamery required First American’s counsel to review thousands of pages of 

documents. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of attorney fees in the 

amount of $81,446.72.

Finally, we find First American is entitled to appellate attorney fees 

“because the attorney fee language in the note does not prohibit such fees.” 

Woods, 480 N.W.2d at 70; see also Soults Farms, Inc. v. Schafer, 797 N.W.2d 

92, 111 (Iowa 2011). We award First American $3000 in appellate attorney fees.

AFFIRMED.

 

8 This reduced the original claim of $85,146.72 to $81,446.72—the amount ultimately 

awarded by the district court.