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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

CAROLYN SUE KELSEY and DAVID B. 

KELSEY,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

FOR PUBLICATION

December 14, 2017

9:15 a.m.

v No. 336852

Montcalm Circuit Court

NITA LINT, LC No. 2015-020665-NO

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: MARKEY, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this dog-bite case, plaintiffs1 Carolyn Kelsey and David Kelsey appeal as of right the 

order granting summary disposition to defendant Nita Lint and denying plaintiffs’ motion for 

sanctions under MCR 2.114(E). Because the trial court erred by concluding that Kelsey was a 

trespasser as a matter of law and dismissing plaintiffs’ dog-bite claims on this basis, we reverse 

the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to Lint and remand for further proceedings. In 

addition, because the trial court failed to determine whether Lint’s attorney conducted a 

reasonable inquiry into the facts that formed the basis for the documents he signed under MCR 

2.114(D), we vacate the trial court’s denial of plaintiffs’ request for sanctions and remand for 

specific findings on this issue. 

On August 31, 2013, Kelsey was bitten by Lint’s dog while on Lint’s property. Kelsey 

had attended a garage sale at Lint’s house on August 30, 2013. She returned to Lint’s property 

about 5:00 p.m. on August 31, 2013, after the sale had ended, to inquire about an item that had 

been for sale the previous day. When Kelsey exited her vehicle, Lint’s dog ran at Kelsey from 

the back of the house and bit Kelsey’s leg. Following this incident, plaintiffs filed the current 

lawsuit alleging: (1) a statutory dog-bite claim under MCL 287.351, (2) a common law dog-bite 

claim premised on the assertion that Lint knew of the dog’s violent propensities and acted 

negligently by failing to properly control the dog, and (3) a claim for loss of consortium. 

 1 Plaintiffs Carolyn Kelsey and David Kelsey will be referred to collectively as “plaintiffs” in 

this opinion. References to “Kelsey” are to plaintiff Carolyn Kelsey in particular. 
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Lint moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10), asserting that 

plaintiffs’ dog-bite claims must fail because, when Kelsey returned to the property after the yard 

sale ended, she was a trespasser on Lint’s property. Lint contended that, as a trespasser, Kelsey 

was not lawfully on the property for purposes of MCL 287.351. Likewise, for purposes of 

Kelsey’s common law dog-bite claim, Lint maintained that her only obligation to a trespasser 

was to refrain from willful and wanton misconduct and that her ownership of a dog with no

history of biting did not constitute willful or wanton misconduct. 

Plaintiffs opposed Lint’s motion for summary disposition, arguing that Kelsey was a 

licensee because, like the general public, Kelsey had an implied license to enter Lint’s property

and approach the house to knock on the front door. In opposing Lint’s motion for summary 

disposition, plaintiffs also sought sanctions under MCR 2.114(E). Plaintiffs presented a recorded 

statement in which Lint admitted that her dog had previously bitten a mailman. Based on this 

statement, plaintiffs asserted that they were entitled to sanctions under MCR 2.114(E) because 

Lint or Lint’s attorney signed documents that were not well-grounded in fact insofar as the 

documents indicated that Lint had no knowledge of her dog biting anyone before Kelsey.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary disposition to Lint. The trial court 

reasoned that Kelsey was an invitee when she attended Lint’s garage sale; but, the court 

concluded as a matter of law that Kelsey was a trespasser when she returned to Lint’s property 

after the sale. Based on Kelsey’s status as a trespasser, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ 

statutory and common law dog-bite claims. The trial court also denied plaintiffs’ request for 

sanctions under MCR 2.114(E). Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial 

court denied. Plaintiffs now appeal as of right.

I. KELSEY’S STATUS ON LINT’S PROPERTY

On appeal, plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred by dismissing their statutory and 

common law dog-bite claims based on the conclusion that Kelsey was trespassing. Specifically, 

plaintiffs contend that anyone, including Kelsey, has an implied license to enter property and

knock on the front door. According to plaintiffs, in the absence of a fence or “no trespassing” 

signs, Lint acquiesced in the general public’s customary use of property. While there was a “no 

soliciting” sign on Lint’s door, plaintiffs maintain that this does not render Kelsey a trespasser 

because she was not soliciting and, in any event, the dog attacked Kelsey before she had an 

opportunity to observe the sign. With regard to the garage sale, plaintiffs argue that the sale did 

not alter the general implied license that exists to enter property. Plaintiffs contend that, if 

anything, Lint’s practices showed that she had acquiesced in allowing people to return to her 

property after a garage sale to take a second look at items. In these circumstances, plaintiffs 

assert that the trial court erred by concluding as a matter of law that Kelsey was a trespasser.

“This Court reviews a trial court's decision on a motion 

for summary disposition de novo.” Barnes v Farmers Ins Exch, 308 Mich App 1, 5; 862 NW2d 

681 (2014). Lint moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). 

However, the parties and the trial court relied on evidence outside of the pleadings, meaning that 

Lint’s motion is properly reviewed under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Sisk-Rathburn v Farm Bureau 

Gen Ins Co of Michigan, 279 Mich App 425, 427; 760 NW2d 878 (2008). “When reviewing a 

motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), which tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint, this Court 
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considers all the evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party and grants summary disposition only where the evidence fails to establish a genuine issue 

regarding any material fact.” Id. “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, 

giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon 

which reasonable minds might differ.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 

468 (2003). 

Plaintiffs brought both a statutory dog-bite claim and a common law, negligence-based 

dog-bite claim. We begin with plaintiffs’ statutory claim. The dog-bite statute is MCL 

287.351(1), which states:

If a dog bites a person, without provocation while the person is on public 

property, or lawfully on private property, including the property of the owner of 

the dog, the owner of the dog shall be liable for any damages suffered by the 

person bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner's 

knowledge of such viciousness.

The statute imposes “almost absolute liability” on the dog owner, except when the dog bites after 

being provoked. Koivisto v Davis, 277 Mich App 492, 496; 745 NW2d 824 (2008). However, to 

succeed on a claim under MCL 287.351(1), the plaintiff must be on public property or “lawfully 

on private property.” See Cox v Hayes, 34 Mich App 527, 531; 192 NW2d 68 (1971).

A person is lawfully on the private property of the owner of the dog within the 

meaning of this act if the person is on the owner's property in the performance of 

any duty imposed upon him or her by the laws of this state or by the laws or 

postal regulations of the United States, or if the person is on the owner's property 

as an invitee or licensee of the person lawfully in possession of the property 

unless said person has gained lawful entry upon the premises for the purpose of an 

unlawful or criminal act. [MCL 287.351(2) (emphasis added).]

Licensees and invitees—in addition to trespassers—are common-law categories for persons who 

enter upon the land of another. Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 596; 

614 NW2d 88 (2000). Under MCL 287.351(2), invitees and licensees are “lawfully” on the 

property, but a trespasser cannot maintain a statutory dog-bite claim. See Alvin v Simpson, 195 

Mich App 418, 421; 491 NW2d 604 (1992). 

In this case, the parties focus their arguments on whether Kelsey was a licensee or a 

trespasser when she returned to Lint’s property. “A ‘trespasser’ is a person who enters upon 

another's land, without the landowner's consent.” Stitt, 462 Mich 596. In comparison, “[a]

‘licensee’ is a person who is privileged to enter the land of another by virtue of the possessor's 

consent.” Id. Consent to enter may be either express or implied. Pippin v Atallah, 245 Mich 

App 136, 142; 626 NW2d 911 (2001). “Permission may be implied where the owner acquiesces 

in the known, customary use of property by the public.” Alvin, 195 Mich App at 420. 

Plaintiffs maintain that Kelsey had an implied license to enter Lint’s property. In 

considering whether Kelsey had implied consent to enter Lint’s property, we begin with the 

proposition that in the United States, and in Michigan in particular, based on the established 
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habits in this country, there is an implied license that permits ordinary persons to enter property, 

approach a home, and knock. See Florida v Jardines, 569 US 1, 8; 133 S Ct 1409; 185 L Ed 2d 

495 (2013); Kentucky v King, 563 US 452, 469; 131 S Ct 1849; 179 L Ed 2d 865 (2011); People 

v Frederick, 500 Mich 228, 234-235; 895 NW2d 541 (2017). More fully, the United States 

Supreme Court has explained this implied license as follows: 

“A license may be implied from the habits of the country,” notwithstanding the 

“strict rule of the English common law as to entry upon a close.” McKee v 

Gratz, 260 US 127, 136; 43 SCt 16; 67 L Ed 167 (1922) (Holmes, J.). We have 

accordingly recognized that “the knocker on the front door is treated as an 

invitation or license to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to the home by 

solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds.” Breard v Alexandria, 341 US 622, 

626; 71 S Ct 920; 95 L Ed 1233 (1951). This implicit license typically permits 

the visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to 

be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave. Complying with 

the terms of that traditional invitation does not require fine-grained legal 

knowledge; it is generally managed without incident by the Nation's Girl Scouts 

and trick-or-treaters. Thus, a police officer not armed with a warrant may 

approach a home and knock, precisely because that is “no more than any private 

citizen might do.” [Jardines, 569 US at 8.]

Based on Jardines, the Michigan Supreme Court has similarly recognized “an implied license to 

approach a house and knock.” Frederick, 500 Mich at 238. The scope of this implied license is 

“defined by what anyone may do” based on “custom” and the “background social norms that 

invite a visitor to the front door.” Id. at 238-239 (citation omitted; emphasis in original).2 Quite 

simply, as a general proposition, the established customs in Michigan grant anyone, including 

Kelsey, an implied license to approach a house and knock on the front door.3 

 2 Lint attempts to distinguish Jardines and Frederick by emphasizing that they are police “knock 

and talk” cases. However, while decided in the context of the Fourth Amendment, these cases 

“employed a property-rights framework” to determine what actions the police could lawfully 

take. See Frederick, 500 Mich at 235. In other words, the ability to approach a house and knock 

on a door is not unique to the police; rather, it is the well-established principle that anyone may 

approach a house and knock on the door that leads to the conclusion that the police also have an 

implied license to engage in such activity. Id. at 238-239. 

3 In contrast to this basic proposition, Lint relies on three cases: Ramonas, Alvin, and Tieman. 

Contrary to Lint’s arguments, these cases do not compel the conclusion that Kelsey was a 

trespasser. First, Ramonas is easily distinguished because it involves a situation in which the 

plaintiff rode a train at an amusement park when the train was not being operated for public use. 

Ramonas v Grand Rapids Ry Co, 194 Mich 69, 73; 160 NW 382 (1916). While it is customary 

for the general public to approach a residential front door (and thus there is an implied license to 

do so), there is no implied license for the public to ride a train at an amusement park when the 

train is not open for business. Similarly, Alvin involved a scenario in which the plaintiff acted 
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Turning to the more specific facts of this case, reasonable minds could conclude that Lint 

acquiesced in the known, customary use of residential property by the public that involves 

approaching houses and knocking on the front door to make contact with the occupants. For 

instance, Lint’s property did not have a fence that prevented entry. The record also indicates 

that, when approaching Lint’s house from the street, there were no signs prohibiting entry or 

stating “no trespassing.” Instead, an individual approaching Lint’s home found an open, ungated 

driveway devoid of signs prohibiting entry. Cf. People v Taormina, 130 Mich App 73, 80; 343 

NW2d 236 (1983); Smith v VonCannon, 283 NC 656, 662; 197 SE2d 524 (1973). From these 

circumstances, it could be inferred that Kelsey had an implied license, consistent with the 

accepted habits in Michigan, to enter the property and to approach Lint’s front door. 

In contrast to this conclusion, in terms of evidence suggesting that Kelsey should not 

have been on the property, it appears that there was a small “no soliciting” sign posted on a door 

leading to a portion of Lint’s garage where she previously operated a beauty parlor. Posting a 

notice may serve to prevent the creation of an implied license. See Restatement (Second) of 

Torts § 330, comment e (1965). However, whether signs posted on property revoke the public’s 

implied license to approach the house and knock depends on the context in which a member of 

the public encountered the signs and the message that those signs would have conveyed to an 

objective member of the public under the circumstances. United States v Carloss, 818 F3d 988, 

994 (CA 10). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 330, comment e (1965) (“[T]he decisive 

factor is the interpretation which a reasonable man would put upon the possessor's act.”). 

Viewing the evidence in this case in a light most favorable to Kelsey, it could be concluded that 

the location of the “no soliciting” sign was such that someone would have to drive down Lint’s 

driveway to her house and approach the door before realizing that soliciting was not allowed. 

Further, “no soliciting” is not synonymous with “no trespassing” or “do not enter” and thus 

reasonable minds could conclude that a small “no soliciting” sign on a door to the garage would 

not prevent Kelsey from driving up Lint’s driveway and exiting her vehicle. Cf. Pippin, 245 

Mich App at 142 (a sign “forbidding people to park their vehicles in a particular place does not 

necessarily convey the message that they may not walk or ride through that same place”).4 

 

outside accepted customs. In Alvin, the plaintiff—a child trying to retrieve a ball—climbed over 

a fence into an enclosed back yard and the child admitted that he was trespassing when he did so. 

Alvin, 195 Mich App at 419. Again, while it is customary to approach front doors and knock, it 

is not customary to climb over fences and enter someone’s backyard. Finally, Tieman v 

Grinsteiner, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 27, 2011 (Docket No. 

300265), is nonbinding, MCR 7.215(C)(1), and unpersuasive because this Court did not consider 

authority supporting the proposition that the public has an implied license to enter property, 

approach the front door, and knock. See Jardines, 569 US at 8; Frederick, 500 Mich at 234-235, 

238-239. 

4 See also State v Crowley, __ So3d __, __ (2017); (“‘No Soliciting’ signs can be found in 

places where visitors are plainly welcome and expected, including supermarkets, malls, 

neighborhoods, hospitals, and stadiums.”); Furman v Call, 234 Va 437, 440-441; 362 SE2d 709 

(1987) (“The only signs read: ‘Private Property, No Soliciting.’ Clearly, the purpose of the signs 

is to prohibit soliciting, not the entry of motor vehicles operated by members of the public.”). 
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According to Kelsey’s description of events, she was attacked by Lint’s dog within seconds of 

exiting her vehicle and she did not have a chance to approach Lint’s door on which the sign was 

posted. In these circumstances, even if Kelsey’s proposed inquiry could be considered 

“soliciting,” given Kelsey’s assertion that she was bitten as soon as she exited her vehicle, before 

she approached Lint’s door or had a chance to speak with Lint, reasonable minds could conclude 

that she was still within the scope of the public’s implied license when she exited her vehicle and 

was attacked by Lint’s dog. 

The only other fact presented by the parties as bearing on Kelsey’s status is the garage 

sale held by Lint on the weekend of Kelsey’s visit. Lint argues, and the trial court concluded, 

that, because the sale had ended, Kelsey was a trespasser when she returned. However, this 

reasoning ignores the public’s implied license to enter the property and approach the door. That 

is, as noted by the trial court, when inviting the general public to her property for a sale, it could 

be concluded that Lint welcomed those individuals as invitees and, when the sale ended, it could 

be concluded that Kelsey lost her invitee status.5 But, the end of a garage sale—and the loss of 

invitee status—do not eliminate the implied license that normally exists. In other words, while 

heightened invitee status may have existed during the sale, the end of the sale returned things to 

their normal state, which typically includes an implied license for anyone to enter the property 

and knock on the door.6 See Jardines, 569 US at 8; Frederick, 500 Mich at 234-235, 238-239. 

Overall, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Kelsey, while Kelsey did not 

have Lint’s express permission to return to the property, it could be inferred that Kelsey had an 

implied license to enter the property and to approach Lint’s house. Generally, when considering 

an entrant’s status on the land, “if there is evidence from which one could infer a particular 

person's status on land, then the question is one for the jury.” Pippin, 245 Mich App at 141. 

Consequently, because reasonable minds could conclude that Kelsey was a licensee, the trial 

 5 “An ‘invitee’ is a person who enters upon the land of another upon an invitation which carries 

with it an implied representation, assurance, or understanding that reasonable care has been used 

to prepare the premises, and make [it] safe for [the invitee's] reception.” Stitt, 462 Mich at 596-

597 (citation and quotation marks omitted; alteration in Stitt). While Kelsey may have been an 

invitee on Friday when attending Lint’s garage sale, Kelsey does not contend on appeal that she 

was an invitee on Saturday when she returned after the sale.

6 Additionally, on the more specific facts of this case, the trial court’s conclusion that the end of 

the garage sale rendered Lint a trespasser ignores evidence that Lint had acquiesced to a practice 

by which Kelsey, and others, returned to Lint’s property after a garage sale for a second look at 

items that had been available during the garage sale. Kelsey testified that, on a previous 

occasion, she had returned to Lint’s property for a second look at an item after a sale. And, Lint 

confirmed that it was not uncommon for people to return to her property in the day or two 

following a garage sale. She stated that she preferred for people to call first; but, she conceded 

that they did not always do so. Faced with this practice, Lint made no effort—such as posting 

signs—to prevent people from returning. Thus, notwithstanding her “no soliciting” sign and the 

end of the garage sale, it reasonably could be concluded that Lint had acquiesced in a practice of 

allowing people to return to her property following a garage sale to take a second look at items.
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court erred by determining that she was a trespasser as a matter of law and by concluding that 

Kelsey was not lawfully on the property within the meaning of MCL 287.351. Therefore, we 

reverse the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to Lint on plaintiffs’ statutory dog-bite 

claim under MCL 287.351.7

With regard to plaintiffs’ common law dog-bite claim, plaintiffs’ common law theory is 

premised on negligence.

[A] negligence cause of action arises when there is ineffective control of an 

animal in a situation where it would reasonably be expected that injury could 

occur, and injury does proximately result from the negligence. The amount of 

control required is that which would be exercised by a reasonable person based 

upon the total situation at the time, including the past behavior of the animal and 

the injuries that could have been reasonably foreseen. [Trager v Thor, 445 Mich 

95, 106; 516 NW2d 69 (1994) (citation omitted).]

“To make a prima facie showing of negligence, a plaintiff need only establish that the defendant 

failed to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances to control or restrain the animal.” Hiner 

v Mojica, 271 Mich App 604, 613; 722 NW2d 914 (2006).

In this case, the trial court determined that Kelsey was a trespasser, such that Lint’s duty 

to Kelsey with regard to the dog only required her to refrain from willful and wanton 

misconduct. See Stitt, 462 Mich at 596 (“The landowner owes no duty to the trespasser except to 

refrain from injuring him by ‘wilful and wanton’ misconduct.”). Based on this conclusion, the 

trial court also reasoned that Kelsey could not show a breach of this duty because keeping a dog 

on one’s property did not constitute a willful and wanton act. However, as discussed, the trial 

court erred by concluding as a matter of law that Kelsey was trespassing when she was bitten by 

Lint’s dog. Thus, the trial court erred by applying the willful and wanton standard of care and by 

dismissing plaintiffs’ common law claim on this basis. Therefore, we also reverse the trial 

court’s grant of summary disposition to Lint on plaintiffs’ common law dog-bite claim.

II. SANCTIONS UNDER MCR 2.114(E)

In the trial court, plaintiffs requested sanctions under MCR 2.114(E) based on the 

assertion that Lint or her attorney signed documents—including pleadings, Lint’s summary 

disposition motion, and requests for admissions—that were not well-grounded in fact. Plaintiffs 

also sought an evidentiary hearing on this issue to determine whether Lint’s conduct and that of 

her attorney was reasonable in light of Lint’s recorded statement in which she admitted that her 

dog previously bit a mailman. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by denying 

their request for sanctions and by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on this issue.

 7 Having concluded that Kelsey’s status is an issue for the jury, Pippin, 245 Mich App at 141, we 

reject plaintiffs’ assertion that they were entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2). 
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This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s decision whether to impose sanctions 

under MCR 2.114. Guerrero v Smith, 280 Mich App 647, 677; 761 NW2d 723 (2008). “A 

decision is clearly erroneous when, although there may be evidence to support it, we are left with 

a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id.

Under MCR 2.114(D), the effect of signing a document is as follows: 

The signature of an attorney or party, whether or not the party is represented by an 

attorney, constitutes a certification by the signer that

(1) he or she has read the document;

(2) to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief formed after 

reasonable inquiry, the document is well grounded in fact and is warranted by 

existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal 

of existing law; and

(3) the document is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or 

to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.

Under this rule, “an attorney is under an affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry into 

both the factual and legal basis of a document before it is signed.” Guerrero, 280 Mich App at

677. “The reasonableness of the inquiry is determined by an objective standard and depends on 

the particular facts and circumstances of the case.” LaRose Mkt, Inc v Sylvan Ctr, Inc, 209 Mich 

App 201, 210; 530 NW2d 505 (1995). “The filing of a signed document that is not well 

grounded in fact and law subjects the filer to sanctions pursuant to MCR 2.114(E).” Guerrero, 

280 Mich App at 678. Specifically, MCR 2.114(E) provides:

If a document is signed in violation of this rule, the court, on the motion of a party 

or on its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented 

party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the 

other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of 

the filing of the document, including reasonable attorney fees. The court may not 

assess punitive damages.

“[I]f a violation of MCR 2.114(D) has occurred, the sanctions provided for by MCR 2.114(E) are 

mandatory.” Guerrero, 280 Mich App at 678.

In this case, in documents signed by Lint’s attorney, including her motion for summary 

disposition, requests for admissions, and other documents, Lint repeatedly denied knowing that 

her dog had bitten anyone beside Kelsey or that the dog was aggressive. However, in February 

of 2014, Lint gave a recorded statement while speaking with a representative from her insurance 

agency. In this statement, she admits that her dog previously bit a mailman, that he was 
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“protective” of her, and that he had “shown aggression” toward people.8 This recording was 

referenced during Lint’s deposition in June of 2016, at which time Lint acknowledged that she 

had given a recorded statement and Lint’s attorney said that he “would look into whether or not 

there was actually a recorded statement taken or not.” Yet, according to statements by Lint’s 

counsel in the trial court, he did not obtain the recording until 2 or 3 weeks before the summary 

disposition hearing, which was held in November of 2016. Apparently without obtaining this 

recording or listening to its contents, Lint’s counsel moved for summary disposition and signed 

other documents, asserting that there was no indication that Lint’s dog was dangerous and that 

Lint had not kept a dog that was known to bite people. There is no indication that defense 

counsel attempted to correct these representations after obtaining Lint’s recorded statement.

While Lint gave obviously inconsistent statements, the question for purposes of MCR 

2.114(E) is whether, as the person signing the motion for summary disposition and other 

documents under MCR 2.114(D), Lint’s attorney made a reasonable inquiry into both the factual 

and legal basis of the documents before they were signed.

9

 Guerrero, 280 Mich App at 677. 

Whether counsel conducted a reasonable inquiry should be determined by the trial court and 

reviewed by this Court for clear error. Id. However, in this case, the trial court failed to consider 

this question and made no findings regarding whether Lint’s attorney made a reasonable inquiry. 

Instead, the trial court remarked that, in general, Lint’s attorney was a “gentlemen” and that his 

“integrity” was not in question. But, an attorney’s general character is not at issue under MCR 

2.114(D) and (E). Rather, the question is whether, based on the facts and circumstances of this 

particular case, LaRose Mkt, Inc, 209 Mich App at 210, Lint’s attorney made a reasonable 

inquiry into the facts supporting the motion for summary disposition and other documents before 

signing those documents. On the facts of this case, given that the issue was raised below and the 

trial court failed to decide whether defense counsel conducted a reasonable inquiry within the 

meaning of MCR 2.114(D), we vacate the trial court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions 

and remand to the trial court to make specific findings regarding this issue. See In re Forfeiture 

of Cash and Gambling Paraphernalia, 203 Mich App 69, 72-73; 512 NW2d 49 (1993). If 

defense counsel violated MCR 2.114(D), sanctions under MCR 2.114(E) are mandatory. 

Guerrero, 280 Mich App at 678.

 8 Veterinarian records for Lint’s dog also indicate that the dog was “very aggressive with people 

coming to the home.”

9 On appeal, Lint does not deny that her dog bit a mailman. Instead, she contends that sanctions 

are not appropriate because she has a “bad memory.” No finding has been made that Lint has a 

“bad memory.” In any event, considering her attorney’s conduct before signing documents 

under MCR 2.114(D), the fact that Lint has a “bad memory” could be seen to suggest that 

counsel’s inquiry was inadequate. In other words, in light of Lint’s “bad memory,” a reasonable 

inquiry might include obtaining and listening to a statement made by Lint relatively close in time 

to the dog-bite incident. 
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Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain 

jurisdiction. Having prevailed in full, plaintiffs may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.

/s/ Jane E. Markey

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause