* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P.

34(a)(2). 

# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 10, 2009 *

Decided December 11, 2009

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 09

‐ 2654

ANDREW SALES,

Plaintiff

‐ Appellant,

v.

JOHN URANKAR and GATEWAY

AUTOMOTIVE GROUP,

Defendants

‐ Appellees

. Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 08

‐ cv

‐ 884

‐ JPG

J. Phil Gilbert,

Judge

.



### O R D E R

Andrew Sales appeals the dismissal of his complaint under the Truth in Lending

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., alleging that a car dealership, Gateway Automotive Group,

and one of its salespeople, John Urankar, violated the act when they arranged the financing

for a truck he bought from them. The district court dismissed the complaint for failing to

state a claim under TILA. We affirm. NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 09

‐ 2654 Page 2

The complaint alleged the following relevant facts. Sales entered into a retail

installment contract to buy a truck from Gateway, and Gateway assigned the contract to

Credit Acceptance Corporation. But a few days later Gateway and Urankar told Sales that

Credit Acceptance Corporation would not agree to the assignment. Gateway and Urankar

informed Sales, however, that another company, Car Financial Services, had agreed to take

the assignment. Based on this information, Sales entered into a second retail installment

contract. Sales subsequently learned, however, that Credit Acceptance Corporation had

never rejected the first contract, but instead had returned the contract to Gateway and

Urankar at their behest. Sales thus claimed that Gateway and Urankar engaged in a “bait

and switch” tactic and violated TILA by “changing the terms” of the first retail installment

contract.

The nature of Sale’s bait

‐ and

‐ switch claim is clarified in his subsequent filings (to the

district court and this court). He suggests that Gateway and Urankar deceived him—in

violation of TILA—by conditioning financing of the second contract on his agreeing to a

“service contract” (referred to in the district court as an “extended warranty”) that cost an

additional $ 1,295.

The district court dismissed the complaint. The court found that Sales did not allege

that Urankar was a creditor for purposes of the act with regard to the retail installment

contract, and that Sales could not identify any information required by TILA that Gateway

failed to disclose.

On appeal Sales renews his argument that the defendants violated TILA by forcing

him to buy a service contract/extended warranty in order to obtain financing. In support he

cites two cases where car dealers allegedly required the purchase of insurance products

and/or a service contract as a condition of financing, Bragg v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, Inc.

, 374

F.3d 1060 (11th Cir. 2004), and Brugger v. KIA

, No. 01 C 1860, 2001 WL 845472 (N.D. Ill.

2001) (unpublished order).

But neither of these cases stands for the proposition that coupling a service

contract/extended warranty with a financing agreement violates TILA. Although both

Bragg and Brugger involved financing that was conditioned upon the inclusion of insurance

products or service contracts, the alleged TILA violations in those cases stemmed from the

insurance products and service contracts not being included as part of the “finance charge”

in the TILA disclosures. Bragg

, 374 F.3d at 1063; Brugger

, 2001 WL 845472, at *2

. Sales has

not identified any information required by TILA that defendants failed to disclose.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.