#### Johnson v. Ronald’s Administrator and Heirs.

Wednesday, Nov. 17th, 1813.

i. Statute of Frauds — Memorandum in Writing — Sufficiency of.‡ — A letter promising to make a deed, for a tract of land, "according to contract, is a sufficient memorandum or note in writing, under the act "to prevent frauds and perjuries;” notwithstanding the terms of such contract are not mentioned;, if the party claiming the conveyance can prove by the testimony of one witness, what price was agreed to be given for the land.

Jacob Johnson filed his bill in the Superior Court of Chancery for the Richmond District, against the administrator and heirs of William Ronald deceased, for the purpose of obtaining conveyances .for two tracts of land, in conformity with a contract between the complainant and the said Ronald in his lifetime ; which lands the complainant alledged, he had purchased at five dollars per acre, and fully paid for by ^sundry work done as a carpenter, and other services, rendered to the decedent, who had put him in possession of the lands but failed to execute deeds. The administrator demurred to the bill, as containing no equity on which a decree against him could be founded. The other defendants denied the contract, although they admitted a letter from William Ronald to-the complainant, (exhibited with the bill,) to be authentic ; contending that the language of that letter did not import any obligatory bargain. They also alledged (but did not prove) the possession of the plaintiff to betortious ; and, farther, said, “they were advised that, if any agreement ever was made-by their late father to sell any lands, part of the Beaverdam tract, to the complainant, such agreement could have no validity, not only because the said tract was under a prior *39mortgage(1) to Thomas Jefferson, Esq. but also because such agreement, if ever made, was a mere verbal agreement, and therefore null and void under the act of assembly entitled an act to prevent frauds and perjuries.”

The letter relied upon by the complainant, as evidence of the bargain, was in the following words.

10th July, 1792.

Sir,

Mr. David Rowlan has my note for a sum of money, fifty pounds or thereabouts, which was paid by you into my hands. I then expected, and have ever since understood, that, if you and myself concluded a bargain for a part of my Beaverdam land, that the money then paid should be considered as in part for the land ; and, having since concluded to let you have a portion of it, I wish to take in the note of hand, and give you a receipt for so much in part payment. When you get to work for me on Beaverdam at my plantation, I will aid them, and have the land laid off, and shall be ready to make you a deed according to contract. I expect to lay off twenty-five acres for you joining old Mr. Rowlan, according *to our first agreement, and one hundred and fifty acres or thereabouts, according to our second agreement. I will produce you the platt of the land, and my meaning is to lay it off in such a form as to make it as compact as I can, and to suit the remaining part of my tract; in the mean time, please to apply to Mr. Rowland for my note, and every thing shall be properly settled.

I am, Sir, your humble servant,

Wm. Ronald.

It appeared in evidence, that the complainant obtained an assignment to himself of the note to David Nowlan, July 3d, 1805 ; (which was after this suit was instituted ;) and it was proved by one witness, that the sum which Ronald verbally agreed to take for the lands was five dollars per acre. It also appeared that the plaintiff was in peaceable possession of those lands in Ronald’s lifetime.

The Chancellor referred the accounts between the parties to a commissioner, who reported the sum due the complainant, for work done for the decedent, as amounting to 3671. Is. lOd. on the 31st of December, 1792; and his report, to which there was no exception, was confirmed. The decree was, that the administrator, out of the assets in his hands, do pay the balance so appearing due to the plaintiff, with interest upon 3441. 19s. 8d. part thereof from the 31st of December 1792, until payment; and that the bill, as to all other matters, be dismissed.

Erom this decree the plaintiff appealed.

The case was submitted by the appellant’s counsel without argument; and no counsel appeared for the appellees.

‡

See monographic *note*on "Frauds, Statute of’” appended to Beale v. Digges, 6 Gratt. 582.

(1)

 Note. A copy of a decree foreclosing a mortgage of a tract of land in favour of Mr. Jeffeison, was inserted in the transcript of the record. But whether the mortgage comprehended the lands in controversy in this snit, or what was done upon chat decree, did not appear. — Note in Original Edition.

Wednesday, November 17th, 1813, the president pronounced the opinion of the Court, that the note of William Ronald to the appellant, the authenticity of which is admitted by the answer of the appellees, is sufficient evidence of the contract for two tracts of land, one of twenty-five acres, and the other of one hundred and fifty acres, as is set forth in the bill; that, rating the said land at five dollars per acre, the *price alledged in the bill, and proved by one witness to have been assented to by the said William Ronald, it appears, by the report of the commissioner, and the evidence therein referred to, that the full consideration for the said two tracks of land has been paid by tbe appellant to the said William Ronald in his lifetime, leaving a balance due to the appellant. The Court is therefore of opinion, that the appellant is well entitled to the lands in question; to be laid off by a commissioner, or commissioners, to be appointed by the Court of Chancery, according to the terms of the note of the said William Ronald, in a compact form, and so as to suit the remainder of the said Beaver-dam tract; — that there is no error in so much of the said decree as confirms the commissioner’s report, and that the residue thereof is erroneous.”

It was therefore decreed, that so much of the said decree as is mentioned above to be correct be affirmed ; that the residue thereof be reversed, and that the cause be remanded for farther proceedings.