### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE Ja nuary 24, 200 6 S es sio n
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . STEVE ALL EN CLI CK

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Blou nt County No. C-14572 D . Ke lly Th om as, Jr., Judge

No. E2004-02655-CC A-R3- CD - F iled March 21, 2006

The de fenda nt, Steve Allen C lick, was convicted of three counts of agg ravated rape and one count of eva ding a

rre st. The trial court imposed consecutive se ntence s of forty y ear s for e ach a g g ravated rape and a c oncurr ent sentenc e of e leven m o n t h s and twenty -nine day s for e vading arr est. The eff ective se ntence is, theref

ore, 120 y ear s. I n this appeal, the de fendant asserts (1) that the trial court
err ed by failing to merg e two of the ag g ravated ra pe convic tions; (2) that the evidenc e is insufficient to support the convictions for a g g ravated ra pe; (3) that the prosec utor' s clo s i n g ar gu m ent was improper; and ( 4) that the trial c ourt err ed by imposing consec utive sentenc es. The judg ments of the trial court a

re a ffirme d.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nts of the Trial Court Affi rm ed

G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I P TO N and J AM ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J J ., joined.
Kristi M. Davis, Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee (on appea l) and Mack Garner, D istrict Publi c De fende r (at trial), for the appe llant, Steve Allen Click.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Gen eral & Re po rt e r; John H. B le ds oe , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Michae l L . Fly nn, District Attorney Gene ral; and Robert Headrick, Ass i s t an t District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

. OP IN ION
At approximately

8:30 p.m. on March 25, 2003, the vic tim, Barba ra Plaut, wa s attacke d and
ra pe d w hil e wa lki ng he r d og on the g re e nw a y ne ar he r re sid e nc e in M aryvil le . A t tria l, the vic tim testified that as she w al k ed al o n g a tra il, she noticed a ma n, whom she later identified as the defe ndant, walking toward he r. She re membere d that she had seen the man on the g ree nway on an earlier occ asion and that his appea ranc e had frig htened her. She r eca lled that the def endant, who w as dresse d in dark clothing, suddenly "lung ed" at her

and spray ed her

fac e with mace . Acc ording to the vic tim , the de fe nd a nt " g ra bb e d a t [he r], " c a us ing he r to fa ll, a nd the n " y a nk e d" her to her fe e t,-2-

spra y e d h e r w ith ma c e a g a in , a n d d ir e c te d h e r in to a n e ar b y w o o d e d ar e a

. Sh e r e me mb e red tha t when they

g ot into the wooded ar ea, the defe ndant s aid, "I just hate bitches like y ou," a s he struck her w ith what she believe d to be a pipe. T he victim described the blow as so hard that she saw " blue sp arkle s, " fe ll t o th e g ro un d, a ndthe n s a w the sil ho ue tte of the de fe nd a nt h old ing wh a t app e are d to be a pipe in his raised hand. A ccor ding to the vic tim, the defenda nt stated his intention to rape her and orde red he r t o remove her c lothes. She remembe red that she took off he r shirt and pa nts and the defe ndant cut her

bra w ith a knife.

The victim testified that as she lay on her ba ck, the de fendant place d a cloth over he r fa ce, partially blocking her view, befor e penetr ating her vag ina with his penis. She described the initial penetr ation as " some thrusting . . . thre e, four , fi v e, s i x t imes. And then he pulled out." The de fe nd a nt the n o rd e re d th e vic tim on to h e r h a nd s a ndkn e e s a ndus e d g ra phic ter mi nolog y

in expressing his intent to penetr ate he r ana lly

. She rec alled that whe n the def endant wa s not successf

ul in this e ff ort, h e c ho se to pene tr a te he r v a g ina a se c on d ti me . Sh e state d th a t th e de fe nd a nt a g a in "thr usted" sever al times without ejaculating . Acc ording to the victim, the defe ndant then dire cted her to rise to her kne es and forc ed his pe nis into her mouth. She testified that the defe ndant place d h i s h an d o n t h e ba ck o f he r he ad , "t h ru s t ed " s ev er al t i m es , an d t h en wi t h d re w w i t h o u tej ac u l at i n g. As he pulled up his pants, he or dere d the victim not to move.

The victim testified that af ter the de fendant had walke d "a g ood distance" away , she put on he r c lothe s, wa ite d s e ve ra l mor e min ute s, a nd the n ra n to a hous e a nd a sk e d the fe ma le oc c up a nt t o call the police . The victim stated that she the n ran to a nother house, w here a couple waited with her
on the ir fr on t por c h unti l the po lic e arrive d. Th e vic tim de sc ri be d h e r a ssaila nt a s a wh ite ma le in his late twenties or e arly

thirties, wearing da

rk clothi ng and a cap with a pattern on it. She rec alled that when a n ambulance arrived, she wa s treate d briefly befor e the police drove he r to the location of the ra pe. The re, shesaw the defe ndant standing in a near by parking lot. The victim testified that she identified the de fenda nt as her assailant and was then taken to Blount Memoria l Hospital, where
a fo re ns ic e xaminat io n was perf orme d. She state d th a t ph oto g ra ph s w e re take n o f h e r andthat a

" ra pe kit " wa s c oll e c te d. Th e vic tim su ff e re d a sc a lp l a c e ratio n, a

c on c us sio n, a ndnu me ro us c uts and bruises, inc luding some to he r vag ina.

Du ri ng c ro ss- e xami natio n, the vic tim e xpla ine d tha t she did no t f ig ht the de fe nd a nt b e c aus e she fe are d for he r life. She described the def endant a s "e x tremely

enra g ed" during the offe nses. The victim concede d that she did not g et a g ood look at the wea pon, having seen it only

in silhouette, but de sc ri be d it

a s " a c y lin de r, " app ro xima te ly sh ou lde r w idth inle ng th andno t a s w ide a s h e r w ri st.

Gina Kor czy nski testified that at approximately 9:00 p.m. on the evening of the offe nses, a blood-cove red w oman ca me to her house , "bang ing on the door, be g g ing to c ome in. . . . Her clothes ha ng ing fr om h e r, be lt h a ng ing . St a tin g sh e had been rape d a ndbe a te n o n th e g re e nb e lt. " Ms. Korc zy nski, who explained that she and her husband did not invite the victim insi de bec ause the y did not want to wake their childre n, stated that they waited on the f

ront porch w ith her until police
arrived.-3-

John F ole y of the Ma

ryvil le Pol ic e De pa

rt me nt, wh o w a s o n p a tr ol w he n h e re c e ive d a c a ll to be on the look out in th e greenbelt are a for a white male wea

ring black c lothing and a

ball cap, testified that he obse rved a man who matched the description of the suspec t walking toward afourdo or , g re e n Satu rn pa

rk e d ne ar the wo od s. Th e of fi c e r state d tha t whe n he blo c ke d the su sp e c t' s p a th to the Saturn and dire cted him to stop, the suspect, who wa s later identifie d as the d ef en d an t , ran sever al hundre d y ards be fore he wa s appre hended. The officer discovere d the victim's g lasses in the de fe nd a nt' s p oc ke t.

At t ri al , S t ephanie Montgome ry , an optician at University Ey e Surg eons, identified the g la sse s f ou ndin the de fe nd a nt' s p oc ke t. S he c on fi rm e d th a t th e y ha d b e e n d isp e ns e d to the vic tim in Dece mber 2004.
Mary ville Poli ce D epartment Detec tive Carlos Hess, Jr., who was in cha rge o f the investigation, testified that office rs ar rived on the scene within five mi nutes of t he 911 ca ll and had the def endant in custody within twelve minutes. Herec alled that the victim' s shirt and her br a, which had bee n cut and ha d blood on it, were f ound in the are a wh er e t h e rape occur red. H e stated that office rs fou n d a

c a n o f ma c e n e ar

b y b u t th e p ip e d e s c r ib e d b y th e v ic ti m w a s n e v e r

lo c a te d. Detec tive Hess testified that he swabbe d some small, reddish-br own s tains on the def endant' s hands and sent the swa

bs to the Tennesse e B ureau of I nvestig ation (TB I ).

Mari ssa Young er, a

reg istered nur se at B lount Memorial Hospital, testified that she
c on du c te d a

fo re ns ic e xami natio n o f the vic tim a ft e r the ra

pe

. She state d th a t sh e too k p ho tog ra ph s, c oll e c te d clo thi ng , pe rf

orme d a p e lvi c e xami natio n, a ndtr e a te d th e vic tim fo r p os sib le e xpos ur e to
s ex u al l y tra n s m i t t ed d i s ea s es

. M s

. Yo u n ger t es t i fi ed t h at t h e br u i s es an d l ac er at i o n s t o t h e v i ct i m 's h e a d , b a c k , a n d le g s w e r e c o n s is te n t w ith b lu n t f o r c e tr a u ma

. Sh e s tate d th a t th e in ju r y to the victim's ba ck wa s six inches long and one inc h wide and w as consis t en t wi t h the victim's ha ving been struc k by

a metal pole.
Marg are t Ba sh, a for ensic scie ntist wit h the DNA unit of the TBI crime la b, testified that she perf ormed a DNA a naly sis of the swabs take n from the blood stains on the def endant' s hands. She confirme d that both of t he swabs contained D NA of the defe ndant and the vic tim. Ms. Bash stated that the swab from the left hand indicated that the victim wa s the major contributor and the one f rom t h e ri gh t h an d i n d i ca t ed t h e de fe n d an t wa s t h e ma j o r co n tri b u t o r. S wa b s t ak en f r o m t h e v i ct i m 's
mou th andva g ina

we re ne g a tiv e fo r the pr e se nc e of the de fe nd a nt' s sp e rm

.
I The defenda nt first asserts that the t rial court erre d by failing to merg e the two c onvictions for a g g ravated vag inal rape into a single conviction. Citi ng State v. Phill ips, 924 S.W .2d 662 (Tenn. 1 9 9 6 ) , h e c o n t e n d s t h a t b e c a u s e t h e t w o i n s t a n c e s o f v a g i n a l p e n e tr a t i o n w e r e s e p ar a t e d b y o n l y a fe w s e c on ds , th e y

we re pa rt of the sa me of

fe ns e a nd , a s su c h, sh ou ld ha ve be e n me rg e d. Th e state
s u b m i t s t h at b ec au s e t h e t wo i n s t a n c es o f v agi n al p en et ra t i o n we re s ep ar at ed b y t h e d ef en d an t 's faile d atte mpt

a t a na l pe ne tr a tio n, se pa

rate c on vic tio ns do no t of fe nddo ub le je op ard y

princ ipl e s.-4-

Th e do ub le je op ard y c laus e of the Un ite d Stat e s Co ns tituti on pr ov ide s th a t no pe rs on sh a ll "be subject for

the same of

fense to be twice put in jeopa rdy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V

. Simi larly , article 1, section 10 of t he Tennessee Constit ution provides that "no per son shall, for the same off ense, be twice put in jeopar dy of life or limb." Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 10. Our supreme c ourt ha s n ote d th a t " thr e e fu nd a me nta l princ ipl e s u nd e rl ie do ub le jeo pardy : ( 1) pr ote c tio n a g a ins t a second prosec ution after an acquittal; (2) pr otection ag ainst a sec ond prosec ution after c onviction; and (3) protec tion ag ainst multi ple punishments for the same offe nse." State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 378 (Tenn. 1996) (citations om itted). Our hig h court observed that " whether two offe nses ar e the ' same' for double jeopardy purposes depends upon a 'close and ca ref ul analy sis of the offe nses involved, the statutory

definitions of the crimes, the leg islative intent and the particular fa cts and circ u m s t an ce s

. '" I d. (quoting State v. Bla ck, 524 S.W.2d 913, 919 (Tenn. 1975)). F inally , our su pr e me c ou rt

no te d th a t w hil e app e llate re vie w m us t be g uid e d b y the tes t a nn ou nc e d in Bloc kburg er v. U nited States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), that test i s n o t conclusive of leg islative intent and the revie wing court must a lso e x amine (1) whe ther ther e we re multiple victims involved; (2 ) w hethe r s e ve ra l di sc re te a c ts w e re inv olv e d; and(3 ) w he the r the e vil a t w hic h e a c h o ff e ns e is direc ted is the same or

differ ent. Denton, 938 S.W.2d at 378-79.
Multipl icity conce rns the division of conduct into discr ete of fense s, cre ating sever al offe nses out of a sing le offe nse. Severa l g ener al principles determine whether offe nses are "sta cked" so as to b e mul tip lic ito us :
1. A s ing le off

ens e ma y no t be div ide d in to s e pa rate pa rt s; g e ne ra lly , a

sin g le
wr on g fu l a c t may

no t f urnis h th e ba sis fo r m or e than o ne c ri min a l pr os e c uti on ; 2. I f each offense char g ed requires proof of a f act not re quired in proving the other, the offe nses ar e not multipli citous; and 3. Whe re tim e a nd loc a tio n sep arate a nddis tin g uis h th e c omm iss ionof the of fe ns e s, the of fe ns e s c a nn ot b e sa id t o h a ve ari se n o ut o f a sin g le wr on g fu l a c t.

Phill ips, 924 S.W .2d at 665 (footnotes omitted).

I n St a te v. B arn e y , 9 86 S.W. 2d 54 5 (T e nn

. 19 99 ), ou r su pr e me c ou rt c lari fi e d th e ru lin g in Phill ips while considering the issue of whe n separ ate a cts of illeg al sexual conduct can support separ ate c onvictions. Cit ing People v. Mader a, 282 Cal. Rptr. 674 (Ct. App. 1991), our hig h court ruled that the "critica l consideration" wa s the intent of the def endant. B arne y , 986 S.W .2d at 548-49. Th e re le va nt f

a c tor s to be c on sid e re d w e re ide nti fi e d a s f oll ow s: 1. temporal proximit y

-- the g reater the interval betwee n the acts, the more likely the acts a re se parate; 2. sp a tia l pr oximi ty

-- mov e me nt o r r e -p os iti on ing te nd s to su g g e st s e pa rate a c ts; 3. occu rren c e of

a n in te rv e nin g e ve nt - - an in te rr up tio n te nd s to su g g e st s e pa rate
a c ts; 4. sequenc e of the ac ts -- serial penetr ation of diffe rent orif ices a s distinguished fr om repe ated pe netrations of the same orif ice tends to sug g est separ ate of fense s; and-5-

5. the de fe nd a nt' s in te nt a s e vid e nc e d b y c on du c t a ndstate me nts

.
I d.

I n th is c a se , the fi rs t fa c tor , te mpo ra l pr oximi ty , w e ig hs a g a ins t se pa rate c on vic tio ns be c aus e only moments separated the two vag inal penetr ations. I t was established at t rial that the e ntire attac k too k le ss than ha lf

a n h ou r. Th e se c on d f

a c tor , s patia l pr oximi ty , w e ig hs in f a vo r o f s e pa

rate convictions. The de fenda nt first penetrated the victim' s vag in a as she lay on the g round and the n order ed her

onto her ha nds and knee s in a futile ef fort to rap e her

anally . He then pe netrated her vag ina a second t ime. The thi rd factor, the occur renc e of an intervening event, a lso weig hs in favor of sepa rate convictions. As indicated, the vag inal rape o f t h e v i ct i m was interr upted by the defe nd a n t' s f

a il e d a tt e mp t a t a n a l p e n e tr a ti o n

. T h e f o u r th f a c to r , th e s e q u e n c e o f th e a c ts , weig hs sli g htl y a g a ins t se pa

rate c on vic tio ns be c a us e the c ha lle ng e d r a p e s i n v o l v eth ep e n e tr a tio n o f the sa me orifice

. Finally , the fifth fac tor, the defendant' s intent, weig hs in favor of sepa rate convictions. The defe ndant not only attempted anal penetr ation but also stated his intent to do so before or dering the victim onto her hands and knees. The second va g inal penetr ation occur red only afte r the de fendant had unsucc essfully

attempted to pene trate the v i ct i m an al l y . Under these c ircumstance s, it is our view that the se parate convictions for ag g ravated vag inal rape are not multi plicitous. The defe ndant is not entitl ed to re lief on this issue.

II The de fenda nt also asserts that the e videnc e i s insufficient to support the a g g ravated ra pe convictions. He c ontends that bec ause no w eapon w as found, the state fa iled to prove that he used a dea dly wea pon to commit the offense s. The state submits that the victim's testimony and the injuries she suffe red w ere sufficie nt to establish that the defe ndant used a deadly wea pon. On appe al, of course , the s tate is entitled to the s trong est leg itimate view of the e vidence and all rea sonable infe renc es which mig ht be dra wn there from. State v. Cabbag e, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). The cre dibilit y of the witnesses, the weig ht to be g iven their testimony , an d the
rec onciliation of conflicts in the proof are matters entrusted to the jury as the trier of fac t. By rg e v. Sta te , 5 75 S.W. 2d

29 2, 29 5 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 78 ). W hen th e suf fi c ie nc y of the e vid e nc e is
c ha lle ng e d, the re le va nt q ue sti on is w he the r, a ft e r r e vie wi ng the e vid e nc e in the lig ht m os t f a vo ra ble to the state, any

rational trier

of fa ct could have found t he essential elements of the c rime bey ond a
rea sonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e ); State v. Wil liam s , 657 S.W .2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983)

. Qu e sti on s c on c e rn ing the c re dib ili ty of the wi tne sse s, the we ig ht an d va lue of the e vid e nc e , a s w e ll as all fa ctual issues raised by the evidenc e ar e re solved by the trier of fa ct

. L iakas v. State, 286 S.W .2d 856, 859 (1956). Be cause a verdic t of g uilt against a defe ndant re moves the pre sumption of innoce nce and raises a pre sumption of guilt, the convicte d criminal def endant be ars the bur den of showing that the evidenc e wa s leg ally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdic t. State v. Evans, 838 S.W .2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992)

. Ag g ravated rape i s define d as "unlawful sex ual penetration of a victim by the def endant . . . [where] [f] orce or coe rcion is use d to a ccomplish the ac t and the def endant is armed with a we apon-6-

or any article used or f

ashioned in a ma nner to l ea d t h e v i ct i m rea sonably to believe it to be a
wea pon." T enn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-502(a )(1) (2003).

I n this case, the vic tim testi fied that the defendant struck her with what she believed to be a pipe. While conceding that she di d not ge t a g ood look at the object, she described it as " a cylinder" that was less than two f

eet long with a circ umfere nce the siz e o f t h e co u rtroom microphone . She insisted that the object was not a stick. A nurse c onfirmed tha t t h e injuries to the victim wer e c on sis te nt w ith blu nt f

or c e tr aum a fro m a

" me ta l po le ." Pho tog ra

ph s in dic a tin g that th e vic tim
su ff e re d a se ve re sc a lp l a c e ratio n a nda lon g br uis e to he r ba c k a

re fa c ts f ro m w hic h th e jury

c ou ld
rea sonably

have inf err ed the u s e o f a weapon. Unde r these c ircumstance s, it is our view that the
c ir c ums ta nti a l e vid e nc e wa s su ffi cie nt to e sta bli sh that th e de fe nd a nt u se d a de a dly we apo n to
c omm it the ra

pe s.

III The de fenda nt next contends that the pr osecutor ma de an imprope r re mark during his closing arg ument. The state submi t s t h at t he def endant waived any

challeng e to the closing arg ument by failing to lodge a conte mporane ous objection.

I n i t i al l y , t h e s t at e c o rr ec t l y p o i n t s o u tt h at t h e d ef

en d an td i d n o to b

j ec td u ri n g t h e p ro s ec u t o r's closing arg ument. Appellate r elief is g ener ally not available w hen a pa rty has " failed to take whatever a ction was re asonably available to preve nt or nullify the harmful eff

ect of any err or." Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) (" Nothing in this rule sha ll be construed a s requiring re lief be g rante d to a pa rt y re sp on sib le fo r an e rr or

or wh o f a ile d to take wh a te ve r a c tio n w a s r e a so na bly a va ila ble to preve nt or nullify

the harmful ef

fe ct o f an err or." ); see State v. Killebrew, 760 S.W.2d 228, 235 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988) (wa iver a pplies when the de fendant fails to make a c o n temporane ous objection); se e als o State v. J enkins, 733 S.W .2d 528, 532 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) ; State v. Rho d e n , 7 3 9 S

. W

. 2 d 6 , 1 1

- 1 2 , 1 8 ( T e n n

. C r i m

. A p p

. 1 9 8 7 )

. W h e t h e r p r o p e r l y a s s i g n e d o r n ot, howeve r, this court may

consider pla in error

upon the re cord und er Rule 52(b) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Procedure . State v. Og le, 666 S.W.2d 58 (Tenn. 1984).

B e fo re a n e rr or ma y be so re c og nize d, it m us t be " plain" a ndmus t a ff e c t a " su bs ta nti a l r ig ht" of the a ccused

. T h e word " plain" is synony mous with "cle ar" or equiva lently "obvious." United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Plain er ror is not mere ly err or that is conspicuous, but espec ially eg reg ious e rror that strikes at the fairne ss, integ rity , or public reputation o f j u d i ci al proce eding s. See State v. Wooden, 658 S.W .2d 553, 559 (Tenn. Cr i m. App. 1983). I n State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d 626, 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), this c ourt define d "substantial right" as a rig ht of " fundame ntal proportions in the indictment proce ss, a rig ht to the proof of e very element of the offe nse and

. . . constitutional in nature ." I n that case , this court established five fac tors to be applied in determining whe ther a n err or is plain:
(a ) the re c or d mu st c le arl y e sta bli sh wh a t oc c ur

re d inthe tr ia l c ou rt ; (b ) a c le ar andun e qu ivo c a l rule of la w m us t ha ve be e n b re a c he d; (c ) a su bs ta nti a l r ig ht o f the a c c us e d mu st h a ve be e n a dv e rs e ly a ff e c te d;-7-

(d) the a ccuse d [m ust not have wa ived] the issue for tac tical re asons; and (e) consideration of the err or must be " nece ssary to do substantial just ice."

I d. at 641-42 (footnotes omitted). Our supre me court char acte rized the Adkisson test as a " clea r and meaning ful standard" and emphasiz ed that eac h of t he five fac tors must be pre sent befor e an e rror qualifies as pla in error . State v. Smit h, 24 S.W .3d 274, 282-83 (Te nn. 2000).

Trial courts have substantial d i s cretionary authority in determining the proprie ty of final arg ument. Although c ounsel is ge nera lly g iven wide lat i t ude, courts must restrict any improper
ar gu m en t

. S p ar k s v

. S t at e, 5 6 3 S

. W

. 2 d 5 6 4 , 5 6 9 -7 0 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. 1 9 7 8 ). Ge n er al l y s p ea k i n g, closing arg ument "must be te mperate, must be predic ated on e vidence introduced during the trial of the ca se, and must be pe rtinent to the issues being tried." State v. S u t t o n , 562 S.W .2d 820, 823 (Tenn. 1978) . To merit a new trial, howeve r, the a rg ument must be so inflammatory or improper

as to affe ct the ver dict. Har

ring ton v. State, 385 S.W .2d 758, 759 (Tenn. 1965). I n J udg e v. State, 539 S.W .2d 340 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976) , this c ourt articulated the fac tors to be consider ed in making that determination:
(1) The conduct c omplained of view ed in the conte x t and in li gh t of the fa cts and
c ir c ums ta nc e s o f t

he c a se [;] (2 ) [t ]he c ur a tiv e me a su re s u nd e rt ake n b y the c ou rt a ndthe pr os e c uti on [;] (3 ) [t ]he int e nt o f the pr os e c uto r i n ma kin g the imp ro pe r s ta te me nts [;] (4) [t] he cumulative eff

ect of the i mproper conduct and any other e rror s in the rec ord[; and] (5) [t] he re lative streng th or wea kness of the c ase.
539 S.W .2d at 344.
Most restrictions during final ar g ument are place d upon the state. That is based in g reat
me a su re up on the ro le of

the pr os e c uto r i n th e c ri min a l ju sti c e sy ste m: [The prosecutor ] i s the repr esentative not of an ordina ry party to a controve rsy , but of a so ve re ig nty

wh os e ob lig a tio n to g ov e rnimp art ia lly is a s c omp e lli ng a s it s obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, ther efor e, in a c ri m i n al prosec ution is not that it s h al l wi n a ca s e, but that justi ce sha ll be done. As such, he is in a pe c uli ar andve ry de fi nit e se ns e the se rv a nt of the la w, the tw of old a im of

wh ic h is that g uil t sh a ll n ot e sc ape or inn oc e nc e su ff

er. He ma y

pr os e c ute wi th e arn e stn e ss and vig or -- indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike har d blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to r efr ain from improper methods
c a lc ulate d to pr od uc e a

wr on g fu l c on vic tio n as it is to use e ve ry le g iti ma te me a ns to bring about a just one.

I t is fair to say

that the ave rag e jury , in a gre ater or l ess degr ee, ha s confidenc e that these oblig ations, which so plainly rest upon the prosec uting attorney , will be faithfully observe d. Cons eq uently , improper sug g estions, insinuations and,-8-

espec ially , assertions of personal knowle dg e ar e apt to car ry much weight ag ainst the
acc used whe n they

should properly

car ry none.

Be rg er v. U nited States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see a lso Judge , 539 S.W .2d at 344-45. Thus, the state mus t r e fr a in f

ro m arg ume nt d e sig ne d to inf la me the jury

a ndsh ou ld re stric t its c omm e nta ry to matters in evidenc e or issues at trial. The prose cutor must not express a persona l be lief or opinion, but wheth er t h at q u alifies as misconduc t often depe nds upon the specif ic terminolog y

used. F or example, arg ument predic ated by the words "I think" or "I submit" does not ne cessa rily indicate a n expressi o n o f p er s o n al opinion. United States v. Stul g a, 584 F .2d 142, 147 (6th Cir. 1978). The prosec ution is not permitted to ref lect unfa vorably

upon defe nse counse l or the trial tac tics employ ed during the cour se of the trial. See Dupr ee v. State, 410 S.W.2d 890, 892 ( T enn. 1967); Moore v. State, 17 S.W

. 30, 35 (Tenn. 1929); Watkins v. State, 203 S.W . 344, 346 (Tenn. 1918) ; McCrac ken v. State, 489 S.W .2d 48, 50 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972). Althoug h there may be no commenta

ry on the conse quence s of an a cquittal, the prosecution may point out the gra vity of a pa rticular c rime and emph as i z e t h e importanc e of la w enf orce ment. See State v. Da kin, 614 S.W .2d 812, 815 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980); Bowling v. State, 458 S.W .2d 639, 641 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970)

. Thi s c o u r t h a s o b s e r v e d th a t th e r e ar e f iv e g e n e r a ll y

r e c o g n iz e d ar e a s o f

p r o s e c u torial mis c on du c t r e la te d to c los ing arg ume nt:

1. I t is unprofessional conduc t for the pr osecutor intentionally to misst ate the evidenc e or mislead the jury as to the infer ence s it may draw

. 2. I t is unprofe ssional c onduct for the prosec utor to e x press his p er s o nal belief or opinion as to the truth or fa lsityof any testimonyor evide nce or

the g uilt of the de fe nd a nt. 3. The prose cutor should not use arguments calc ulated to inflame the p a s s i o n s o r

p r e j u d i c e s o f t h e j u r y. 4. The prose cutor should re fra in from ar g ument which would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidenc e, by injecting issues broade r than the g uilt or innocenc e of the accused under the controlling law, or by making predic tions of the c on se qu e nc e s o f the jury ' s v e rd ic t. 5. I t is unprofessional conduc t for a p ro s ec u tor to intentionallyref er to or
arg ue fa c ts o uts ide the re c or d u nle ss the fa c ts a re m atter s o f c omm on pu bli c knowledg e. State v. Goltz, 111 S .W.3d 1, 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) (c itations omi tted).

Du ri ng his re bu tta l arg ume nt, the pr os e c uto r m a de the fo llo wi ng c omm e nt:
[Defenda nt's attorney ] has asked y ou to put y our ang er and/ or re vulsion aside. I say don' t y ou dare . That is part a nd parc el of y our common sense ; that is part and par cel of what the J udg e will instruct y ou that y o u are to utili ze, that being y our common sense, in sitting a nd evaluating this ca se.-9-

I n this case, the de fenda nt conce ded at tria l that he was the assailant and simplyarg ued that he should be c onvicted of a lesser of fense than ag g ravated ra

pe. The proof of

his guilt as to the char g ed off

enses wa s prac tically

uncontrove rted. Under these circ umstances, it is our view that the prosec utor' s isolated rema rk did not aff

ect the ve rdict of the jury . See Te nn. R. App. P. 36(b); Tenn. R. Crim. P . 52(a) . I n conseque nce, the err or would not rise to the leve l of plain err or.

IV Fi n al l y , t h e d ef

en d an tas s er t s t h at t h e t ri al co u rt erre d b y o rd er i n g co n s e c u t i v e s en t en ci n g. The state submits that consec utive sentenc ing w as appr opriate be cause the def end an t h as an e x t e n s i v e r e c o r d o f

c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y.
When there is a challeng e to the l eng th, rang e, or manner of service of a sente nce, it is the duty of this court to conduc t a de novo revie w with a pre sumption t hat the dete rminations made by the tr ia l c ou rt

are c or re c t. T e nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 (d ) ( 20 03 ). Th is pres um pt ionis "c onditioned upon the aff

irmative showing i n the re cord that the trial court c onsidered the sentenc ing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circumstance s." State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 19 91 ); se e Sta te v. Jone s, 88 3 S.W. 2d 59 7, 60 0 ( Te nn . 1 99 4) . " I f the tr ia l c ou rt app lie s in app ro pria te fac tors or otherw ise fails to follow the 1989 Sentenc ing A ct, t he pre sumption of corre ctness fa lls." State v. Shelton, 854 S.W .2d 116, 123 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) . The Sentenc ing Commission Com m en t s p ro v i de that the bur den is on the def endant to show the impropriety of the sente nce. Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 , Se nte nc ing Com m' n Co mme nts

. Our re view re quires an analy sis of (1) the evidenc e, if a ny , rec eived at the trial and sente ncing hearin g ; ( 2 ) th e p r e s e n te n c e r e p o r t; ( 3 ) th e p r in c ip le s o f s e n te n c in g a n d th e ar g u me n ts of counse l relative to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and char acte ristics of t he off ense; (5) any

mitigating or enha ncing fac tors; (6) any statements made by

the def endant in his own beha lf; and (7) the defe ndant' s potential for re habilitation or t re at ment. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40- 35-102, -103, - 210 (2003); State v. Smith, 735 S .W.2d 859, 863 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).

Prior to the enac tm en t o f t h e Criminal Sentencing Reform Ac t of 1989, the limited classifications for the imposit ion of conse cutive sente nces w ere set out in Gray v. State, 538 S.W .2d 39 1, 39 3 ( Te nn

. 19 76 ). I n that c a se , ou r su pr e me c ou rt ru le d th a t a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e s mu st be pre sent befor e plac ement in any one of the classific ations. L ater , in State v. Tay lor, 739 S.W .2d 227 (Tenn. 1987), our high court established an additional cate g ory for those de fendants convicted of two or more statutory

offe nses involving sex ual abuse of m inors. There wer e, howe ver, a dditional words of c aution:
[C]ons e c uti ve se nte nc e s sh ou ld n ot r ou tin e ly be imp os e d

. . . a nd

. . . th e a g g re g a te maxi mum of consec utive terms must be rea sonably related to the seve rity

o f t he offe nses involved.

739 S.W .2d at 230. The Sente ncing Commi ssi o n Comments adopted the cautionary lang uag e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-115, Sentenc ing Co m m ' n Comments. The 1989 Act is, in essence , theT he f i rs t fo ur cr i t eri a are fo und in G ray

. A fi f t h c at ego ry in G ray , ba sed o n a s p eci f i c num b er of

pri o r f el o ny 1

con v i ct i on s , ma y e n h an ce t h e s en t en ce r an g e bu t i s n o l on g er a l i s t ed cr i t er i on

. Se e T en n

. Code An n

. § 40- 35

- 1 1 5, S en t en cing C o m m ' n C o m m en t s.
-10- codifica t i o n of the holding s in Gray and Ta y lor; consec utive sentenc es may be imposed in the dis c re tio n o f the tr ia l c ourt on ly upon a de te rm inatio n th a t on e or mor e of the fo llo wi ng c ri te ri a 1

e xist:
(1 ) T he de fe nd a nt is a pro fe ssi on a l cr imi na l who ha s kno wi ng ly de vo te d h ims e lf to criminal ac ts as a major sour ce of livelihood; (2) The defe ndant is an off ender whose re cord of

criminal ac tivityis ex tensive; ( 3 ) T h e d e f

e n d a n ti s a

d a n g e r o u s m e n t a l l y ab n o r m a l p e r s o n s o d e c l ar e d b y a c o m p e t e n t p s y c h i a tr i s t w h o c o n c l u d e s a s a r e s u l t o f a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n p r i o r to sentenc ing that the defe ndant' s criminal conduct has bee n char acte rized by a pattern of re pe tit ive or

c omp uls ive be ha vio r w ith he e dle ss i nd if fe re nc e to c on se qu e nc e s; (4) The defe ndant is a dang erous o ff en d er whose be havior indicates littl e or no re g ard fo r hu ma n li fe , a ndno he sit a tio n a bo ut c omm itt ing a

c ri me in w hic h th e ri sk to human life is high; (5) The defe ndant is convicted of two (2) or more statutory

offe nses involving se x ual abuse of a minor with consider ation of the agg ravating c ircumstance s arising from the re lationship between the defe ndant and victim or v i ct i m s , the time span of defe ndant' s undetec ted sexual activity , the nature and scope of t he sex ual acts and the
e xten t of the re sid ua l, p hy sic a l a ndme nta l dama g e to the vic tim or vic tim s; (6) The defe ndant is sentence d for a n offe nse committed while on probation; or (7 ) T he de fe nd a nt i s se nte nc e d f or c ri min a l c on te mpt

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-115(b) (2003).
The leng th of the sentenc e, whe n consec utive in nature , must be " justlydeserved in re lation to the seriousness of the offe nse," Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-102(1), and " no g reater than that deser ved" under the circ umstances, Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 103(2); State v. L ane, 3 S.W.3d 456 (Tenn. 1999)

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

or de re d c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s o n th e fo llo wi ng g ro un ds :
The issue of w hether

these sente nces should be se rved at the s am e t i m e or c on se c uti ve ly

to e a c h oth e r, the la w p ro vid e s th a t th e [c]o urt may or de r s e nte nc e s to
run consec utively if the [c] ourt finds by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that t he [d] efe ndant is an off

ender whose re cord of criminal activity is e x tensive. And for a person who w as born in 1979, and is 25 y ear s old, to have the fe lony and misdemeanor c onvictio n s t h at I have r ecited e arlier , that is an extensive criminal
rec ord.

. . . .-11- . . . [T] here very

well may be situations that one w ould consider more sever e than this, serial ra

pists who attack many

victims on differe nt day s and times, that very well is, I would say . But the law mere ly sets a standard that has to be met to justify
a maximu m s e n te n c e a n d a s tan d ar d th a t h a s to b e me t t o ju s ti f y c o n s e c u ti ve se nte nc ing . An d th at doe s n ot m e a n th a t on ly on e ty pe of of fe ns e c a n me e t bo th tho se sta nd ard s a nde ve rythi ng els e has to b e so me thi ng le ss. An d it ' s c le ar t o me from these fac ts that this case mee ts both of those standards, sa dly enoug h.

The re cord e stablishes that the defe ndant had fiftee n prior convictions as an adult and five prior juvenile a djudications. Ten of the adult convictions, including four convictions for a g g ravated bu rg lary a ndfo ur

c on vic tio ns fo r the ft

ov e r $ 10 00 , w e re fo r f e lon y of fe ns e s. Un de r the se circ umstances, the rec ord supports the trial court' s determination that the de fendant is an offe nder whose re cord of

criminal ac tivityis ex tensive. I n our view, the trial court did not er r by imposing
c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s.
Acc ording ly , the judg ments of the trial c ourt areaff irmed.

___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRES I DING JUDGE