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NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAUCRACY FOR ARMS 

CONTROL, COUNTERPROLIFERATION, AND 

NONPROLIFERATION: THE ROLE OF THE 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE—PARTS I AND II 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, 

THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 15 AND JUNE 6, 2008 

Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL 

WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

JOEL C. SPANGENBERG, Professional Staff Member 

JENNIFER A. HEMINGWAY, Minority Staff Director 

THOMAS A. BISHOP, Minority Legislative Assistant 

JESSICA K. NAGASAKO, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statement: Page 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, MAY 15, 2008 

Hon. Thomas Graham, Jr., Former Acting Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency .................................................................................................... 4 

Hon. Norman A. Wulf, Former President’s Special Representative for Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation (1999–2002); Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 

for Nonproliferation (2001–2002); Former Deputy Assistant Director, Nonproliferation and Regional Arms Controls, Arms Control and Disarmament 

Agency (1985–1999) ............................................................................................. 6 

Andrew K. Semmel, Former Deputy Assistant Director, Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Negotiations, U.S. Department of State .................................. 7 

FRIDAY, JUNE 6, 2008 

Patricia A. McNerney, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State, accompanied by Linda S. Taglialatela, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 

Human Resources, U.S. Department of State ................................................... 31 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Graham, Hon. Thomas Jr.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 53 

McNerney, Patricia A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 31 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 92 

Semmel, Andrew K.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 83 

Wulf, Hon. Norman A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Report on Securing the Nonproliferation Capability of the Department 

of State ........................................................................................................... 67 

APPENDIX 

Charts submitted by Senator Akaka ...................................................................... 104 

Background for May 15, 2008 ................................................................................. 108 

Background for June 6, 2008 .................................................................................. 113 

Post-Hearing Questions and Responses for the Record submitted by: 

Hon. Graham .................................................................................................... 118 

Hon. Wulf .......................................................................................................... 121 

Mr. Semmel ....................................................................................................... 130 

Ms. McNerney and Ms. Taglialatela ............................................................... 134 

(1) 

NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAUCRACY FOR 

ARMS CONTROL, COUNTERPROLIFERATION, 

AND NONPROLIFERATION: THE ROLE OF 

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE—PART I 

THURSDAY, MAY 15, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT

MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in Room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senator Akaka. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN AKAKA 

Chairman AKAKA. I call this hearing of the Subcommittee on 

Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and 

the District of Columbia to order. 

I want to welcome our witnesses. Thank you so much for being 

here today. Some of you have worked on the Hill and your experiences will certainly contribute here today. 

As you know, this is the second in a series of hearings that the 

Subcommittee is holding to explore the effectiveness and efficiency 

of government management in various aspects of national security. 

The first hearing considered proposed reforms to the U.S. export 

control system. Today’s hearing focuses on the management of the 

arms control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation bureaucracy at the Department of State, commonly known as the ‘‘T Bureau.’’ 

Just as our last hearing disclosed serious problems in our export 

control licensing system, this hearing will examine disturbing management issues in the T Bureau. These issues include a hostile political environment, a poorly conducted reorganization in 2005, and 

a resultant loss of well-qualified Federal Civil Service employees. 

Senator Voinovich and I recently requested the Government Accountability Office examine in depth these disturbing developments. 

Arms control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation are critical functions to our national security. If this bureaucracy is not 

2 

1The charts submitted by Senator Akaka appears in the Appendix on page 105. 

doing its job, our security is jeopardized and the leadership of this 

bureau and the Department of State should be held accountable. 

Our arms control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation bureaucracy has evolved since the end of the Cold War. In 1961 during the Kennedy Administration, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) was established to address the growing 

international security threat posed by nuclear weapons and fears 

of a dangerous missile gap between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 

But after almost 40 years of performing admirably, ACDA was disestablished. Its role and responsibilities were placed under the Department of State since some viewed its stand-alone role as out of 

place in the post-Cold War world. This, in my view, is a tragic mistake. 

Despite the many international efforts to control the proliferation 

of weapons of mass destruction, these weapons, especially nuclear, 

continue to pose a threat to international security. 

India and Pakistan detonated nuclear devices in 1998 causing a 

regional nuclear crisis. North Korea, which opted out of the Nonproliferation Treaty in 2003, detonated a nuclear weapon in October 2006. Iran’s nuclear program threatens stability in the Middle 

East. Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan ran a secret black market of nuclear 

items which revealed a growing demand for nuclear weapons. 

Osama bin Laden has called the acquisition of a weapon of mass 

destruction a religious duty. 

For the United States to handle these national and international 

security issues, we need not just good policies and international 

agreements but a healthy organizational structure to implement 

policies. 

My goal in this hearing is to identify possible recommendations 

for improving the arms control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation bureaucracy. 

The Department of State is the lead agency for managing U.S. 

arms control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation efforts. The 

Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security leads 

the bureaus of International Security and Nonproliferation, Political Military Affairs, and Verification, Compliance, and Implementation. 

If you will see these three charts that we have here,1 you will 

see that this bureaucracy has changed from 1999 when it was an 

independent agency, known as ACDA, until today. ACDA was 

merged into the State Department bureaucracy where its long term 

and worldwide focus has unsuccessfully competed against prevailing regional and bilateral interests. 

From 2005 until today, these charts clearly demonstrate the 

elimination of bureaus singularly focused on arms control and nonproliferation. These charts begin to tell the story of how our country’s security has been imperiled by bureaucratic reorganization. If 

this Administration cannot begin to correct the damage, the next 

Administration must do that. 

A number of concerns include: The loss of independent agency 

status for the arms control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation bureaucracy, making it less responsive to national needs. 

3 

Another is a loss of experienced Federal employees, especially 

those with critical physical and social science backgrounds. 

Another is the overburdening of an assistant secretary handling 

arms control and nonproliferation. 

And another is the fear that other nations may perceive our concern for these critical national issues as weak and fleeting since the 

arms control bureau was merged into another bureau. 

Some of the reforms I want to explore are: (1) Reestablishing an 

independent arms control agency or granting greater autonomy 

through the existing bureaus within the current structure, (2) Updating the bureau structure to support a greater focus on nonproliferation and arms control efforts, and (3) Ensuring that there 

are enough qualified arms control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation professionals to carry out national policies and our 

international obligations. 

We cannot wait until terrorists or more unfriendly states obtain 

a nuclear weapon. 

Today’s hearing will help us identify ways to reform the key government agency responsible for preventing this from happening. 

I want to at this time welcome our witnesses to the Subcommittee. 

Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., Former Acting Director and 

Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 

Andrew K. Semmel, Former Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Negotiations, Department 

of State. 

And Ambassador Norman Wulf, Former Deputy Assistant Director for Nonproliferation and Regional Arms Control, Arms Control 

and Disarmament Agency. 

As you know, it is a custom of this Subcommittee to swear in all 

witnesses and I would ask you to please stand to take the oath. 

Will you raise your right hand? 

Do you swear that the testimony that you are about to give this 

Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I do. 

Mr. WULF. I do. 

Mr. SEMMEL. I do. 

Chairman AKAKA. Thank you very much. 

Let the record note that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

Before we start, I want to let you know that your full written 

statements will be part of the record. I would also like to ask you 

to keep your remarks brief and I certainly look forward to your testimony. 

So, Ambassador Graham, will you please proceed with your 

statement. 

4 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Graham appears in the Appendix on page 53. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. THOMAS GRAHAM, JR.,1 FORMER 

ACTING DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY 

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to 

come here and participate in this hearing on the national security 

bureaucracy for arms control and nonproliferation. 

I personally, along with many others, appreciate your interest in 

this subject which is important to the future security of our country. I also thank you for your perceptive opening remarks. 

On April 1, 1999, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), a mainstay of the U.S. national security policy since 

1961, went out of business. 

As part of a reorganization of foreign affairs agencies in 1998 

and 1999, the main functions of ACDA were absorbed by the State 

Department. 

Was this a wise decision? Are America and the world safer with 

the arms control portfolio integrated into the range of foreign policy 

concerns that occupies the State Department rather than constituting the sole responsibility of a specialized agency? 

President Kennedy and his Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, 

strongly supported the legislation that established ACDA. 

The fundamental rationale for not placing the arms control-nonproliferation bureaucratic structure within the State Department 

structure was and is that the pursuit of arms control and disarmament goals will often conflict with the primary mission of the 

Department of State which is to foster good relations with other 

countries. 

For example, to press Pakistan on nuclear nonproliferation 

issues or criticize Russia for perceived arms control treaty violations can be contrary to pursuing with those countries good relations and will often be opposed by the regional State Department 

bureau responsible for relations with the country in question. 

Most often in the competition of ideas within the State Department, interests of improved short-term bilateral relations will prevail over arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation interests. 

The early years of the agency in the 1960s were prosperous and 

successful as Secretary Rusk believed in and supported the role of 

ACDA. 

Over strong opposition by the State Department, ACDA successfully pressed for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which 

is now considered a centerpiece of international security. 

Other highlights, all of which depended on the existence of an 

independent arms control agency, were negotiation of the SALT 

agreements, negotiation of the START agreements, negotiation of 

the chemical weapons convention, the extension of the nuclear 

weapon test moratorium in 1993, the indefinite extension of the 

NPT, and the negotiation of the comprehensive test ban treaty. 

However, in the 1990s, the Department of State pressed for the 

termination of ACDA and the merger of its functions into the Department of State. While this effort failed in the early 1990s, it succeeded later in the decade with the support of the new Republicanled Congress in place after 1994. 

5 

However, this step was taken pursuant to a compromise solution 

agreed to by ACDA and the State Department, supported by the 

White House and the Congress. This compromise solution, reached 

in 1999, contains certain conditions which it was intended, if not 

observed in the future, would remove the legitimacy of this new bureaucratic and legislative arrangement. 

These were principally the preservation of the independent arms 

control advocacy role within the government at the highest levels 

and that the ACDA arms control-nonproliferation functions transferred would be strengthened and have the lead role in the Executive Branch. 

However, the Bush Administration chose not to appoint officials 

who were committed to the success of arms control-nonproliferation 

policies and not to observe the conditions of the 1999 decision. 

Rather the arms control process was destroyed by the abrogation 

of the ABM Treaty by the United States, the abandonment of the 

START process, initiated by President Reagan, and many other 

comparable actions which resulted, among other things, in the 

grave weakening of the NPT. 

On top of all of this, Secretary Rice essentially abolished the 

Arms Control Bureau and reconstructed the Nonproliferation Bureau in the State Department so as to make it much more difficult 

to develop and follow nonproliferation policies. 

Mr. Chairman, it is of the highest priority that the United States 

return to its traditional role of pursuing a world order built on 

rules and international treaties designed to enlarge international 

security and lead the world to a safer and more stable future. Only 

with a workable bureaucratic structure in place to support sound 

arms control-nonproliferation policies and agreements can this be 

accomplished. 

The structure built on the 1999 compromise has demonstrated 

that it cannot work. The soundest solution would be for Congress 

to reestablish by statute an independent arms control agency. In 

that way, the independent voice for arms control and nonproliferation can best be preserved, and even if there should be sometime 

in the future another attempt to marginalize the arms control-nonproliferation process, with an independent agency in place, it can 

always be brought back by a subsequent Administration. 

However, having said this, if the independent agency concept 

proves not to be politically possible, at a minimum I would urge 

that the Congress should require by law observation of all the conditions agreed as part of the 1999 compromise solution. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman AKAKA. Thank you very much, Ambassador Graham. 

And now we will hear from Ambassador Wulf. 

6 

1The report entitled ‘‘Securing the Nonproliferation Capability of the Department of State,’’ 

submitted by Mr. Wulf appears in the Appendix on page 67. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. NORMAN A. WULF,1 FORMER PRESIDENT’S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION (1999–2002); FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NONPROLIFERATION (2001–2002); 

FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR NONPROLIFERATION AND REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL, ARMS 

CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY (1985–1999) 

Mr. WULF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you for this opportunity to appear before this Subcommittee. 

I, like my colleagues, found myself nodding in agreement with 

much of your opening statement. 

I am here today to present a report that was prepared by a volunteer task force. The genesis for the report was a concern among 

many of us that the State Department no longer had the capability 

of meeting the nonproliferation challenges that are facing us today. 

We were catalyzed into action by the statement of Defense Secretary Gates last fall. He gave a speech decrying the abolition of, 

‘‘Cold War Agencies,’’ specifically citing the USIA. He also expressed concern that the present State Department structures were 

inadequate to meet development assistance needs. 

Well, for us, another Cold War agency that was abolished along 

with USIA was the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. And 

we believe and our report stresses that there are serious problems 

in the State Department structures supporting arms control and 

nonproliferation. 

What I would like to do is briefly summarize the report’s findings. I will hopefully have the opportunity to express my personal 

views at a subsequent point. 

Our group believes that the organizational capacity of the State 

Department must be strengthened to meet nonproliferation and 

arms control challenges. 

Critical personnel have left. The Arms Control Bureau has been 

abolished. The bureau whose mandate includes nonproliferation is 

burdened with tasks outside of its traditional purview, and the 

State Department is simply not organized to ensure that these critical issues are accorded the priority that they deserve. 

Regarding bureau structure, the report suggests streamlining the 

work of the Nonproliferation Bureau. This means removing issues 

such as missile defense, the U.N. First Committee or the Conference on Disarmament from that bureau and allowing it to focus 

solely on nonproliferation issues. 

The report recommends that these issues that have been removed and others related to arms control be addressed in one bureau, either a separate bureau devoted to arms control as in the 

1999 approach or consolidated into the existing Verification and 

Compliance Bureau. 

Regarding verification and compliance, the report urges that 

steps be taken to reduce bureaucratic turf battles that exist among 

the bureaus in the T family and free up resources by reducing 

verification activities to those required to meet statutory requirements. 

7 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Semmel appears in the Appendix on page 83. 

To address the growing staffing problems, the report recommends taking steps to halt further departures, improve morale, 

and to encourage those who have gone to other agencies to return. 

Reliable career paths must be developed for both Civil Service 

and Foreign Service. It is not acceptable, in our judgment, to rely 

on other departments for all technical expertise, but that is increasingly becoming the case as steps to recruit and retrain scientists and others with technical expertise are scaled back. 

As a part of the State Department, it is appropriate that certain 

office director positions in these functional bureaus be made available to Foreign Service officers, but it must be recognized that 

doing so reduces the management positions available to Civil Service employees. This not only makes a service in the State Department in these areas less attractive, but it also is made less attractive by the continuing decline in the number of SES positions available to the nonproliferation area. 

Finally, the group believed that the Foreign Service must take 

steps to develop career paths that reward and do not punish Foreign Service officers working in the nonproliferation area. 

The area in which there are differing views among those preparing this report was how to ensure that nonproliferation-arms 

control equities were heard at the highest levels. 

Some argued for reliance on personal relationships among the 

various State Department officials. Some urged use of the existing 

statutory authority allowing the Under Secretary a separate voice 

from the State Department and some urged the creation of an independent agency. 

As I indicated, we could not reach any agreement and all those 

options are included in the report. 

Since my time has expired, I will stop at this point, but I hope 

that I could have the opportunity at some point to express my view 

as to which of these options I would support. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Wulf. 

And now, we will hear from Mr. Semmel. 

TESTIMONY OF ANDREW K. SEMMEL,1 FORMER ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE 

Mr. SEMMEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I share my colleague’s applause of your opening statement. I 

think you touched upon the critical issues that we need to address 

here. 

And thank you again, as my colleagues have, for the opportunity 

to discuss some of the important management and organizational 

issues of the so called T Bureaus of the Department of State. 

Mr. Chairman, I am going to go to my statement very quickly 

but during my tenure as the Deputy Assistant Secretary—I left the 

Department in December of last year—I served under five different 

assistant secretaries or about one assistant secretary on average 

ever 11 months. Three served in acting capacity and only two were 

confirmed by the Senate. 

8 

When I left in December, all four occupants in the front office of 

the ISN Bureau held acting positions or temporary positions and 

three were political appointees. 

The reason I mentioned this is there is a price to pay with leadership instability and frequent change. It makes formulating and 

implementing our arms control and nonproliferation policies more 

difficult at home and abroad. It weakens the Bureau’s voice in the 

department and in the interagency fora. It creates confusion among 

the permanent staff whose expertise and experience are vital for 

continuity and clarity, and it impairs our ability to negotiate with 

counterparts in other countries. 

Turning to the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Bureau merger, I was a member of the senior management panel appointed in 

September 2005 tasked with implementing the merger of the Arms 

Control and Nonproliferation Bureaus. 

I might point out that I recall that no one in the Nonproliferation 

Bureau at the time and I was told by the senior leadership in the 

Arms Control Bureau that no one there really supported or thought 

this was a good idea at the outset. 

The case was made for the merger on the grounds of minimizing 

duplication and redundancy and on the benefits of streamlining 

and cost savings. 

There are a number of, what I call, anomalies in that merger 

which I want to point out, Mr. Chairman. 

What I mean by anomalies is the sort of developments that occurred outside the normal that have a bearing on the efficacy of the 

new ISN Bureau. 

The first is that the combined workforce of the new ISN Bureau 

resulted in substantially fewer full-time equivalents. This is permanent personnel, about a 16 percent reduction than the combined 

workforce of the two bureaus prior to the merger. Several offices 

were severely truncated in size and remain understaffed today. 

One office was cut nearly in half. 

Paradoxically, the newly named Verification, Compliance and Implementation Bureau which had received a critical review by the 

Office of the Inspector General and a recommendation for reduction 

in size and responsibilities was, in fact, expanded in size and function. 

The second point that I see as an anomaly of that merger: The 

report of the Inspector General concluded that the Nonproliferation 

Bureau was overworked and was well led and that the Arms Control Bureau was underemployed and had low morale. Despite this, 

the leadership of the ISN Bureau was almost exclusively drawn 

from the Arms Control Bureau. 

Three of the four ISN front office leaders and the special assistant were chosen from the Arms Control Bureau by the then Under 

Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. In 

the process of doing that, the arms control function was deflated 

and the role of the Arms Control Bureau was elevated, at least the 

leadership. 

There are other things that happened and I will not go into 

them, but one of them was, as was mentioned already, that staff 

flight that took place, i.e., members either went into early retirement, sought other jobs, and so forth. 

9 

Finally, I would mention that the senior management panel, on 

which I served, interestingly enough was composed of four political 

appointees, political appointees including myself, who had dim 

knowledge about the Foreign Service and Civil Service personnel 

systems. 

We were required to function pretty much in secrecy and we 

were bereft of the day-to-day help of the human resources elements 

within the State Department. 

The bottom line on the merger, as I see it, is that the merger of 

the Arms Control and the Nonproliferation Bureau has done little 

to strengthen the voice in the State Department on nonproliferation and arms control. 

I see my time is running out, Mr. Chairman, but I want to mention four things that could be done. 

One of them is a cultural change in the State Department and 

that is to change the internal biases and the working assumptions 

within the State Department, so that serving in functional bureaus, 

like the ISN, yield greater rewards and greater status than they 

now enjoy. 

Another one is to have the Foreign Service Institute institute 

courses on multilateral diplomacy and on arms control and nonproliferation which they are starting to do just now. 

The second broad suggestion I mentioned in my statement pertains to separate entity which has already been discussed. Whether 

it is based on the model of the Arms Control and Disarmament 

Agency or some other mechanism, some separation would give it 

greater independence and voice within the State Department, 

greater clarity and visibility when dealing with foreign countries. 

The third suggestion is organizational reform and there are a series of suggestions I make in my paper, a half dozen or so, that 

could be made that would work to improve the structure and the 

process as well as maintain, attract and maintain the skills in the 

State Department for arms control and nonproliferation. 

The fourth area I mention almost gratuitously is what I call policy. Any organizational change, whether it is on the margins or if 

it is fundamental change such as creating a new independent organization, can only be as good as the soundness of the policy of the 

new Administration and the leadership that is set up to manage 

that policy. 

I conclude, Mr. Chairman, by simply saying that there are a 

number of options that we have on this panel laid out today and 

more I suppose that we will discuss in the questions and answers. 

And sorting through all of these maze of options is a difficult 

chore. It would be a wise thing, it seems to me, to create a bipartisan blue ribbon task force to think through some of these recommendations and others, on what our nonproliferation and arms 

control policy agenda should be and how this agenda should be 

structured and managed to optimize chances of success in furthering our national interest. 

This should be done as soon as possible so that its findings and 

recommendations are available for consideration by the next Administration. Thank you. 

Chairman AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Semmel. 

10 

I thank you very much for your testimonies and the recommendations that you are making to this Subcommittee. 

I would like to ask my first question to Ambassador Wulf and 

also Mr. Semmel. 

Ambassador Graham states that enforcing the terms of the 1998 

ACDA compromise solution is better than reestablishing an independent agency for arms control and nonproliferation. If you could 

choose between an independent agency or a semi-autonomous agency status for arms control and nonproliferation within the State 

Department, which would you choose and why? 

Ambassador Wulf and also Mr. Semmel. 

Mr. WULF. It is a question that I have wrestled with myself, and 

the answer that I came out with is clearly, I am strongly in favor 

of an independent agency. 

The primary reason for favoring an independent agency is that 

an independent agency gives independent representation in the 

inter-agency process at every step in the process whereas, if you 

are a semi-autonomous agency, the benefit of that is the State Department need not and probably would not form its own nonproliferation and arms control bureaus. 

But the compromises and decisions that have to be made with respect to the State Department’s position would be made solely by 

the State Department. Whereas if you have a separate agency, you 

have a State Department position going into an inter-agency meeting and presumably the independent agency position which may or 

may not be different. 

So for those reasons, I think an independent agency is far preferable. There are a variety of other reasons I could add as well, but 

that is the fundamental one. Thank you. 

Chairman AKAKA. Mr. Semmel. 

Mr. SEMMEL. Yes. It is a good question. I think we have all wrestled with this and I know that the document that Mr. Wulf has 

identified that was put together has a series of pros and cons which 

I think summarize, in many respects, the benefits or the lack of 

benefits of an independent or semi-independent or semi-autonomous organization dealing with these issues. 

I have to tell you, and this is not a cop out, but I am somewhat 

agnostic about that because I think there are strong arguments on 

both sides. I think certainly what we want to give the function of 

pursuing sound arms control, nonproliferation policy much greater 

visibility and a stronger voice within the national security bureaucracy. 

Any organization, whether it is a separate organization like the 

ACDA, will only work if the senior leadership want it to work. In 

other words, you can design on paper a seemingly infallible organizational structure, but if the leadership does not want it to work 

for whatever reason, you may get a seat at the table on the critical 

issues but you may not be heard, if you are at that table. 

So it really depends upon what comes down from the top. I personally think that there is some strong merit in a separate organization either within the State Department or outside the State Department like one modeled after ACDA. 

The other point I would mention, Mr. Chairman, is that if we are 

thinking about the new Administration, and this is perhaps obviVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:09 Mar 12, 2009 Jkt 043088 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\43088.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
11 

ous, but if we are thinking about a new Administration, going back 

to a separate entity like ACDA or whatever it may be, whatever 

its merits and it has considerable merits, will require a considerable amount of effort on its part at a time in which they are reorganizing the entire government or reorganizing much of the entire 

government, and something has to give in that process. 

The presumption is the new Administration will want to embark 

on a whole series of, perhaps, new initiatives in the area of arms 

control and nonproliferation. Can it do everything at once? Can it 

reorganize and still pursue these new initiatives? It may be too 

much carrying capacity, too much of a load for a new Administrative. So I would caution against that in terms of taking on too 

much at once. 

Chairman AKAKA. Ambassador Graham, would you want to respond to their answers? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I very much agree with my two colleagues that, if possible, a separate agency would be the best solution. 

As I said in my opening remarks, it has long been recognized 

that there is an inherent conflict between arms control and nonproliferation policies and the central mission of the Department of 

State—enhancing for lateral and multilateral relations with other 

countries—and to put them together almost inevitably is going to 

lead to the downgrading of arms control and nonproliferation policies which, I believe in the age in which we live, are essential to 

our national security. 

Secretary Dean Rusk said, ‘‘Disarmament is a unique problem in 

the field of foreign affairs. It entails not only a complex of political 

issues but involves a wealth of technical scientific and military 

problems which, in many respects, are outside the Department’s 

formal concerns and in many instances reach beyond the operational functions the Department is designed to handle.’’ 

And critical in all of this, if nonproliferation-arms control is important as I and my colleagues believe that it is, it is essential to 

preserve that independent advocacy voice which means that the 

person, the official who is in charge of arms control and nonproliferation has the right to go to the President if he or she believes it is necessary and also has the right to have a seat on the 

National Security Council when arms control and nonproliferation 

issues are discussed and to have a separate vote, in other words, 

to be able to vote in favor, if he or she so chooses, for a nonproliferation proposal even if the Secretary of State disagrees. 

Well, I would submit that it defies human nature to give such 

a vote to someone who works for the Secretary of State. My guess 

is his performance evaluation might be adversely affected if he 

were to vote contrary to what the Secretary of State wanted, and 

that is why, in my view, an independent agency is far and a way 

the best solution if we want to have the best policies. 

Chairman AKAKA. Ambassador Wulf, you wanted to say something? 

Mr. WULF. Yes. Thank you. I wanted to elaborate, if I could, a 

little bit on why I think an independent agency is the best way to 

go. 

12 

First, it is worth noting, as Ambassador Graham did, the Department of State’s focus must be upon the totality of U.S. interests 

with a given country. Contrast that with an independent agency 

whose single focus is nonproliferation or arms control. 

The result is that the State Department is often forced to focus 

on the crisis of the day and that often times will lead to some compromise on nonproliferation principles. 

I would suggest as a general proposition that incremental decisionmaking on any issue will almost always lead to a weakening 

of the general principle. The classic example of this is the decision 

to engage in civil nuclear cooperation with India. 

We abandoned the principle that all nonproliferation is bad, but 

India did not abandon its principle that it wanted to maintain and 

build its nuclear weapons capability. 

I would also submit that the time horizons that the Department 

of State often times thinks in are dictated in part by the 3-year rotational assignment that Foreign Service officers have. 

I am not suggesting Foreign Service officers are incapable of 

thinking in long terms perspectives, but I am suggesting there is 

a fundamental difference between a career civil servant who has 

worked in this one area for 20 years and a Foreign Service officer 

that came in last year and began working on a given issue. 

I also think that an independent agency is best able to design a 

personnel system that emphasizes career civil servants and recruits people with technical expertise or scientific knowledge. It can 

create an environment where there is a synergy between, what I 

will call, techies and policy wonks. 

Time horizons are not influenced by Foreign Service rotation but 

Foreign Service officers can still make valuable contributions by 

working in that independent agency as, indeed, was the case with 

ACDA. 

While the crisis of the day, whether it is North Korea or Iraq, 

will command the headlines and the senior level attention, someone needs to maintain and improve the overall nonproliferation regime. 

The expertise within the U.S. Government in, for example, IAEA 

safeguards, continues to dwindle. Yet those safeguards are the first 

line of defense against nuclear proliferation. Neglect of the NPT 

has been noted by friends, both domestic and foreign. So that the 

experience to date, I would suggest, is that the State Department 

is not capable of supporting arms control and nonproliferation policy in the manner in which it needs. 

I would also pick up a point I think you had in your opening 

statement, Mr. Chairman, and that is that the creation of an independent agency will send a clear message to the rest of the world, 

friends and allies who may fear that we have lost our way, they 

will be reassured by the creation of a new agency and they will believe once again that the United States continues to see nonproliferation and arms control as essential components of international security. 

And I think for those tempted to proliferate, I think the message 

would be sent that the United States is ready to maintain a leadership role against proliferation. 

13 

Finally, I would emphasize that with an independent agency— 

Mr. Semmel outlined some of the deficiencies in Senate-confirmed 

individuals that now occupy the Department of State. With an 

independent agency, you will have a multiplicity of Senate-confirmed individuals. 

When a U.S. official engages in discussions with a foreign country, that country matches the rank of the individual coming there. 

What is now being done by office directors should be done and used 

to be done by people confirmed with the advice and consent of the 

U.S. Senate. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman AKAKA. Thank you. Ambassador Graham, of course, 

has mentioned the independent agency and so have you. 

So, Ambassador Wulf, could you elaborate for me why a semi-autonomous agency within the State Department, roughly modeled on 

the National Nuclear Security Administration, can be an improvement over the existing model? 

Mr. WULF. I think it could be an improvement over the existing 

model, but I do not think it would be as good as an independent 

agency; and the fundamental reason is, as a semi-autonomous 

agency, they would be subject to the direction of the Secretary of 

State; and the likelihood, as Ambassador Graham has indicated, of 

someone who works directly for the Secretary of State taking a totally contrary view to the Secretary is very small. 

We had some recent experience with that model. The ACDA 

merger legislation provided the Under Secretary, the ‘‘T’’, with the 

possibility of an independent voice at the NSC meetings. It worked 

‘‘sort of’’ well, I would say, during the end of the Clinton Administration but not terribly well, and it certainly has not worked, I do 

not think at all, during the last 7 or 8 years. 

There are those who claim that the model in the Department of 

Energy has not worked very well either. But I think the biggest 

drawback to a semi-autonomous agency is the lack of a separate 

voice at inter-agency meetings. 

If you are a part of the State Department, you will represent the 

Department of State’s views. You will not have an independent 

voice to represent a view contrary to the State Department’s views. 

Chairman AKAKA. Thank you. Would any one, Ambassador 

Graham or Mr. Semmel, want to comment on the semi-autonomous 

model? 

Mr. SEMMEL. Well, just one general comment, Mr. Chairman, 

and this is perhaps in the area of the obvious. 

As you know, President Bush, Secretary Rice, Secretary Gates, 

and most commentators on national security and foreign policy 

have pointed out that the challenge with the threat of proliferation 

of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and the materials and 

technology associated with that getting into the wrong hands constitutes the most significant threat that we face. It is what I like 

to call column ‘‘8’’ on the front page, the upper fold of the newspaper type of issues that we have to deal with in the world. 

And right now the structure that we have is embedded in the 

State Department seems to be a disconnect between the saliency, 

if you want to call it, of the issue area that we are facing, an issue 

area that is going to grow and expand by the way. It is not going 

to retract unless we do something about it and are successful. 

14 

So that the current organizational arrangement that we have, it 

seems to me, is inadequate to measure up to the dangers that we 

face in this area; any incremental change, it seems to me, whether 

it is organizational or dealing with personnel, resources, and the 

like of this function, whether it is a semi-autonomous entity within 

the State Department or an independent agency, I think would be 

an important step, the right step in the direction that we have to 

face. I think both Ambassador Wulf and Ambassador Graham have 

already pointed out some of the positives of a separate organization. 

I only made that one caveat about the difficulty of making a 

transition again. This would be the third. If the new Administration coming in were to want to have either a semi-independent or 

independent, this would be the third major reorganization in 10 

years. All of them were deemed to be necessary. All of them have 

been problematic. 

None of them really solved the problem, I think, in a satisfactory 

manner, and whether we want to go through that again, I think, 

is a question we really have to think through. 

Chairman AKAKA. Thank you. 

Ambassador Graham, I have a question for you, but you may 

begin with your comment that you want to make. 

Mr. GRAHAM. I would just like to add, Mr. Chairman, that the 

problem with a semi-autonomous agency, if we want really sound 

nonproliferation and arms control policies, is that it is not independent. 

From time to time in order to clearly present the arms controlnonproliferation alternative at the highest levels of our government 

so that the President, the Cabinet can understand all that is involved, the person responsible for arms control-nonproliferation policy may have to take a position contrary to the Secretary of State, 

and that is difficult to do when you work for the Secretary. 

As one example that comes to mind, during the 1980s or early 

1990s, according to law, the Arms Control Agency, the Department 

of Defense and the Department of State were required to submit 

recommendations to the President as to whether or not Pakistan 

should be recertified each year that they did not have a nuclear 

weapon and, therefore, it was OK to sell military equipment, and 

in particular, fighter-bombers to Pakistan. 

And for several years the Department of Defense would recommend certification and the Department of State would recommend certification. The Afghan war was going on but ACDA always recommended not to certify. And in fact, Pakistan did have 

a nuclear weapon, at least they had parts of a weapon that could 

quickly be assembled into a workable weapon. 

Eventually when the Afghan war ended, President Bush chose 

the ACDA option but the President had it in front of him every 

year, which he would not have been the case had there not been 

an independent agency. I do not think an autonomous agency within the State Department could do that. 

Chairman AKAKA. Thank you. 

Ambassador Graham, you have identified a number of instances 

where the current Administration has abandoned its commitment 

15 

to arms control and nonproliferation. Let me give you some examples. 

The rejection of the anti-ballistic missile treaty. The abandonment of the Second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the decision not to continue pursuing the ratification of the Comprehensive 

Test Ban Treaty. 

In this post-September 11, 2001 world, does the current organization best support this new strategic priorities as the Secretary 

states, ‘‘to prevent the acquisition of WMD by terrorists and hostile 

states and contribute to the international effort to secure and remove and eliminate WMD, their delivery systems and related materials through diplomacy and counterproliferation efforts.’’ 

Does the current organization, in the post-September 11, 2001 

world, best support the new strategic priorities? 

Mr. GRAHAM. You will be getting my personal opinion, of course. 

I would say no because I believe that part of the effort to reduce 

the threat to the United States of weapons of mass destruction, 

particularly nuclear weapons of course, but all weapons of mass destruction, is intimately related to the advancement of and success 

of sound arms control and nonproliferation policies. 

The chemical weapons convention, for example, prohibits chemical weapons worldwide, at least to all of those countries that have 

signed up to it. 

That helps with limiting the possibilities of the proliferation of 

chemical weapons and the ultimate use of them by terrorists. The 

fewer such weapons that exist, the more the world community 

moves towards zero, the less is the likelihood that terrorists are 

going to be able to have them and use them. 

With respect to the ABM treaty and the START II treaty, it remains in our interest, while at the same time dealing with the terrorist threat based on WMD, to stabilize at lower levels the nuclear 

weapon balance with Russia and those two treaties greatly contributed to that. 

The reason that the START process ended which had been begun 

by President Reagan and there are no more negotiated reductions, 

negotiated reductions in long-range nuclear weapon systems, is 

that when we withdrew from the ABM treaty, the Russians had always made it clear that they would not continue with the START, 

the second START treaty, unless the ABM treaty was in force. We 

withdrew so they backed away from START II and that was the 

end of it and that was most unfortunate. 

With respect to the test ban, the test ban will help in inhibiting 

proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world in two ways. 

First, more than any single thing the United States could do, it will 

strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and make it more 

effective because from the earliest days it has been clear that the 

quid, the principal quid that the rest of the world wanted for giving 

up nuclear weapons forever from the nuclear weapons states, for 

their quo of giving up nuclear weapons forever was the test ban. 

If we are going to give up nuclear weapons forever, at least the nuclear weapon states could stop testing was and is the viewing the 

NPT nonnuclear weapon states. 

The NPT is based on a compromise. It was not a free gift from 

the rest of the world. It was a compromise, a strategic compromise; 

16 

and the principal, the most important part of the price that the nuclear weapons states paid for stopping proliferation with the NPT 

was the test ban. So it is very important to the long-term health 

of the NPT. 

And second, with the test ban in force, it is going to be not impossible but much more difficult for additional states to acquire nuclear weapons. 

Yes, you can assemble a Hiroshima-type bomb without testing, 

yes, you can do that. But there are many other things in creating 

a nuclear arsenal that the test ban monitoring system would detect. 

When the Kursk submarine exploded in the Arctic waters, a 

small conventional explosion underwater, some of the test ban 

monitors picked that up 3000 kilometers away. So it would improve 

the proliferation situation. 

So in dealing with the world that we have today, which is one 

of declining order, a threat of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons spreading to unstable countries and terrorist 

organizations, a less than perfect relationship with Russia and 

China, these measures are an important part of our national effort 

to enhance our security and the security of the rest of the world 

and they should not be abandoned. They should be pursued. 

Chairman AKAKA. I am glad to hear the last sentence you made 

because I wondered if you thought it was a national security concern and you just mentioned that. 

Ambassador Graham, you just said ‘‘dealing with the world that 

we have today.’’ When ACDA was the lead agency for arms control 

and nonproliferation, its director could appeal directly to the President for support. 

You mentioned in your testimony that Under Secretary of State 

for Arms Control and International Security who is also a senior 

adviser to the President and Secretary of State can still appeal to 

the President. 

What is the difference today? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, the difference is twofold. One, he works for 

the Secretary of State, and two, in this Administration, at least my 

understanding is, the various Under Secretaries have never availed 

themselves of that right. 

It only works if, in the inter-agency struggles over what is the 

soundest approach to particular arms control and nonproliferation 

policies, the ACDA Director or the arms control-nonproliferation director, Under Secretary, whatever he may be called, is free to approach the President directly. 

Now, if he works for the Secretary of State, he is obviously bypassing the Secretary of State, but he is not if he is head of an 

independent agency. 

And the independent arms control and disarmament agency directors in the past actually did avail themselves of that right. 

I remember once I was doing some research for the confirmation 

of a ACDA director in the 1980s and I do not have any figures for 

the 1980s and 1990s; but I do remember this that we found, just 

by looking at White House logs, that Ambassador Gerard Smith, 

who was the director of the Arms Control Agency from 1969 to 

1973, had 46 private meetings with President Nixon during his 4- 

17 

year stay there. His successors, I think, had far less, but they did 

have some. 

During the year that I was acting director, on the nuclear test 

ban issue, I personally experienced and utilized the right at an 

NSC meeting to cast my own vote and I did so twice on the decision to extend the test ban moratorium in 1993. 

So it was a real, particularly the second vote on the test moratorium, it was a real right and it was utilized. It is much more difficult for an Under Secretary, two levels down from the Secretary 

of State, to do that. 

We tried to fashion the 1999 compromise so that the legal right 

to do that existed, but the only way it would have ever had a 

chance of working, although this is difficult, would have been for 

the Under Secretary to frequently use it, to establish that precedent that it would be used with some frequency, that is, both the 

access to the President and the separate vote at the NSC. 

Chairman AKAKA. Do you think the Under Secretary is silenced 

before his views can be presented before the National Security 

Council or President? 

Mr. GRAHAM. If he is silent, can his views be—— 

Chairman AKAKA. Yes. 

Mr. GRAHAM. I would think not. My guess is if the National Security Council members, the principals, when they are discussing 

whatever nonproliferation issue of the day it may be, if nobody 

mentions the Under Secretary, nobody is going to think of him. 

That would be my guess as to what would likely happen, that the 

only way that his views or her views would register on National 

Security Council principals is if he or she were there expressing 

them. 

Chairman AKAKA. Mr. Semmel. 

Mr. SEMMEL. May I just make one caveat to what Ambassador 

Graham just mentioned and that is going back to a point I alluded 

to before that. If the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security has the full confidence of the Secretary of State 

and if the Secretary of State makes it known, through whatever 

means, but certainly makes it known that the Under Secretary has 

his or her full confidence and speaks on her behalf on these issues, 

that automatically elevates the Under Secretary’s role in the interagency fora, the National Security Council, and so forth. 

I don’t want to be trite about this, but I used to teach political 

science and my favorite definition of politics, which is what we are 

really talking about, is that it is a process involving mobilization 

of bias. It is mobilization of a point of view that you favor and 

somebody else does not favor. 

So that the Under Secretary, if he or she is able to have allies 

within the Administration at senior levels, there is a lot of articles, 

for example, that when Mr. Bolton was Under Secretary of State 

he had very close relationships with the White House over at the 

Vice President’s office. 

And in the inter-agency fora at the senior levels of National Security Council, you could begin to, as Under Secretary, mobilize 

those assets in terms of the process. 

So while I agree basically with what Ambassador Graham is saying, I think that having a separate vote has much more clout in 

18 

the process. There are ways in which that can be mollified somewhat. Thank you. 

Chairman AKAKA. Thank you very much for that. 

Mr. Semmel, you mentioned that the State Department Office of 

Inspector General pre-determined the outcome of its T Bureau investigation findings in 2004 and 2008. These findings had an impact on the 2005 reorganization. 

Can you elaborate on this? 

Mr. SEMMEL. What I said in my statement was that it was the 

feeling, it was the judgment of those of us who were involved with 

the Office of the Inspector General that somehow or another the 

outcome of its investigation was going to be determined even before 

the investigation took place. 

Whether we were right or wrong on that, as subsequent developments unfolded, I think we were right that somehow or another we 

knew what the end result was going to be before the process began. 

I think because it was made known to us at the outset that there 

was considerable redundancy of functions between the Arms Control Bureau and the Nonproliferation Bureau and that others at 

senior levels were talking about the need for us to readjust to the 

post-September 11, 2001 security world that we faced and that this 

was one way in which we could make that kind of adjustment. 

There was a perception also and others can comment on this on 

this panel and outside that the current Administration had given 

far less weight to the function of arms control. 

Subsequently it was determined in the Inspector General’s report, as I mentioned in my opening statement, that the Arms Control Bureau was deemed to be under-worked. They had a lot of people not doing a whole lot of work simply because they were not assigned a lot of work. 

It was, again, the senior level policy preferences sort of seeped 

down and manifested itself in a way in which these two bureaus 

functioned. Whereas the Nonproliferation Bureau which was a policy area in which the Administration did give considerable credence 

to in terms of preventing weapons of mass destruction getting in 

the wrong hands, was an area that was deemed to be very important and a high priority within this Administration. 

So putting all of that together, there was the deep suspicion at 

the outset that if it is not broke, do not fix it. The system was 

working pretty well in terms dealing with nonproliferation and that 

merging the two bureaus together was not the optimum strategy 

for us to engage in at this point in time, particularly the way in 

which it unfolded. 

There was the perception that somehow or another the Under 

Secretary at that point liked the leadership in the Arms Control 

Bureau but did not like the function. He liked the function in the 

Nonproliferation Bureau but did not like the leadership. And when 

the two merged, certainly that was the outcome. 

In other words, if our perceptions were correct at the outset, indeed, that is the way in which the merger unfolded where you had 

the leadership of the Arms Control Bureau which had very little 

to do, taking over basically the leadership of the new combined 

International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau. 

19 

Others can comment on this as they see fit. So most of what we 

thought was a part of the motivation behind the request for the Office of the Inspector General to look into the possible merger of 

these two bureaus did, in fact, unfold in their report and the subsequent merger that took place. 

Chairman AKAKA. Ambassador Wulf. 

Mr. WULF. Could I just add my understanding, and I have to say 

that I have never read the entire contents of the IG’s report. I have 

been only shown portions of it. 

My understanding is the IG concluded that the Nonproliferation 

Bureau was doing extremely good work but, as Andy indicated, it 

was overworked. 

The Arms Control Bureau was under worked and the IG recommended the merger of arms control and nonproliferation. I 

would suggest that those who sought the abolition of the Arms 

Control Agency in the 1990s did not do it because they were proponents of the Department of State. They did it because they disliked arms control and I would suggest that the merger in 2005 

was largely driven by the same motivation, a dislike, a distrust of 

arms control. 

I am taken, personally, by the fact that we have three Secretaries—Secretary Kissinger, Secretary Shultz, Secretary Perry and 

former Senator Nunn saying we are really at a very serious point 

with respect to nuclear weapons and we really need to start doing 

things much differently than we have been doing it. 

I do not believe that the Department of State structure can meet 

the challenge that those four have posed to the political establishment as to what needs to be done to enhance our national security. 

Thank you. 

Chairman AKAKA. Thank you. 

Mr. Semmel, you mentioned that the 2005 Bureau reorganization 

has done little to strengthen the voice of the T Bureau on nonproliferation and arms control issues. 

What is your net assessment of the effectiveness of this reorganization? 

Mr. SEMMEL. Mr. Chairman, one of the things that did result 

from the merger that took place is that the new bureau, the International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau, the ISN Bureau, 

did create two new offices. It created two new offices, one to deal 

with weapons of mass destruction terrorism, called WMDT office, 

and another to work on questions of counterproliferation and interdiction issues in which the Proliferation Security Initiative, something calculated PSI, was the focal point. 

I think those were creative additions. Whether they should be 

lodged in the ISN Bureau or not is another question, but certainly 

they were a creative policy for this bureau. I think that is a step 

forward in the reorganization. I think that made a lot of sense. 

There was also an office or suboffice created to deal with strategic planning which really had been moribund, I think, in this 

area for sometime. 

I do not want to convey the impression that this merger is all 

sort of backsliding or negative. There were some creative things. 

Maybe the fourth thing I can say on the positive side is, and this 

may be real conjecture, that subsequently when the current AssistVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:09 Mar 12, 2009 Jkt 043088 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\43088.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
20 

ant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation, who, 

by the way, is now acting as the Under Secretary, probably has 

given some strength to this bureau because he has the confidence 

of the Secretary of State. They have worked together at the National Security Council, and elsewhere. 

So, from a personal relationship, the interpersonal dynamics 

which are very important in policy making as they are up here in 

the Senate, as I used to recall, probably gave some additional 

strength to the International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau, given that confirmation of the current Assistant Secretary. 

But I see nothing apart from that that gives us greater entre into 

the senior decisions at the National Security Council. I do not see 

our issues being given greater weight in the inter-agency fora. 

As I mentioned in my statement, the size of the bureau has been 

truncated as a result of the merger, about 16 percent fewer persons 

than one might have expected. 

Across the board, the nonproliferation and arms control function 

has been a voice that simply is, I would not say silenced, but certainly has been subdued in the process. I say that only in the context that the issues that we are dealing with are going in this direction and the organization that we are dealing with are going up 

in another direction, and there is a wide gap between what we 

need to do organizationally and other means in dealing with these 

issues. 

So I do not see any major leaps forward in terms of this organization even though it was designed to strengthen the voice certainly within the Department and within the inter-agency fora. I 

do not see that happening. I do not see that happening in terms 

of our international negotiations as well. 

As Ambassador Wulf pointed out, there are fewer senior officials 

with senior ranks who are engaged in those international negotiations and much of that responsibility falls to more junior persons 

such as the Deputy Assistant Secretary, and myself, office directors, and others. 

So I think the net result, despite some positives that one should 

not discount, the net result is I think at best a static organization 

in terms of its strengthening the role in this particular policy area. 

Chairman AKAKA. Mr. Semmel, you mentioned that the senior 

management panel, the group that led the 2005 reorganization, did 

not directly benefit from the Department’s human resources expertise. 

In what ways would this panel have benefited from human resources expertise? 

Mr. SEMMEL. Thanks. I could wax on this issue for sometime, 

Mr. Chairman. But let me just say that, first of all, the senior management panel was asked to make recommendations on the decisions that were subsequently made on the reorganization. Our recommendations were not all accepted by the Under Secretary when 

we made recommendations to him. 

We got involved in some very micro-planning. We had little name 

cards for every member of the ISN Bureau and began to place 

them in bureaus and offices within the bureaus, and so forth. It 

was micro-management of the highest order. 

21 

Specifically on your question, without getting into the internal 

workings of the senior management panels, which I do not think 

I should do, there was a decision that was made early on to not 

have present during our deliberations, which were in secret I might 

point out, members of the human resources offices, both within the 

T family or within the larger Department of State for reasons that 

I objected to, but for reasons that we do not have to get into at this 

point in time. 

So there we were in a sense, as I characterize it, feeling our way 

in the dark on issues. Eventually we did get obviously human resources people engaged who knew the personnel system, Civil Service, Foreign Service personnel systems but not during our deliberations. It was outside of the deliberations, which I believe was a 

mistake. 

In other words, as I described in my statement that initially the 

four members of the senior management panel were all political appointees, including myself, who had limited experience in personnel 

management within these two personnel services in the Department. You could measure the number of years of experience in the 

State Department on my two hands. 

We really did need some additional expertise to help guide us 

through some of these decisions, but it was decided at that point 

in time that they would not be included in the room when we were 

deliberating and I think that was a mistake in terms of the efficacy 

of our group, in terms of wisdom of the kinds of options that we 

were deciding upon. It was one of the anomalies I pointed out in 

my opening statement. 

Chairman AKAKA. Ambassador Wulf. 

Mr. WULF. Could I just add that I have stayed in contact with 

many of the colleagues that I used to work with in ACDA and in 

the State Department, for 3 years, before retiring. And I never saw 

a more dispirited bunch of people in my whole life than those who 

went through the 2005 reorganization. 

In 1999, when ACDA was merged into the State Department, we 

went out of our way to be as transparent as possible, to share fully 

the information and to make sure everybody was treated fairly. 

This approach that Mr. Semmel has described, and I commend 

him for his efforts to try to make it a more fair process, was characterized to me by one of the lawyers in the legal adviser’s office 

as within the letter of the law but certainly not what anybody 

would call good management practice, and I think the bitterness 

that was generated by how it was done continues to this day. You 

have a very demoralized staff as a result of how the 2005 merger 

was handled. 

Chairman AKAKA. I have one more question for Mr. Semmel, and 

following that question, I am going to ask the panel if they have 

any final comments to make to the hearing. 

Mr. Semmel, you argue that changing the cultural biases in the 

State Department is worth doing since regional bureaus tend to be 

favored over functional bureaus within the Department. 

How would you recommend the Department change these cultural biases? 

Mr. SEMMEL. It is a very difficult thing to do because, Mr. Chairman, I do know there have been efforts in the past to address this 

22 

question and address this issue. They have not amounted to any 

substantial change. I think this is because this is a part of the personality of the State Department, part of the personality of the Foreign Service that is very difficult to change. Personalities are very 

difficult to change in general. 

I do not know if in the wake of the merger that we were just 

talking about, that created the ISN Bureau, that one of the things 

I personally suggested to the Under Secretary which came to fruition sometime later, was that we set up within the T group our 

own task forces within this family, within the T family, our own 

task forces on the Foreign Service and a separate task force on the 

Civil Service to see whether or not internally we could make some 

positive changes so that we could recruit Foreign Service officers 

who are essential for our function, retain them, and find a good 

satisfactory post-service employment after they leave the ISN Bureau, and the functional bureaus. 

But the problem is a much larger one. The problem is a State 

Department-wide problem and it is one in the Foreign Service. And 

I think that again to try to fundamentally change something, it 

needs to come from the top down. It needs to come from the Secretary. It needs to come from the management bureau within the 

Department, and so forth. 

So I think every time there is a new Administration, there is an 

opportunity for beginning to take a re-look at, take another look at 

the way in which we are organized. The new Administration may 

very well want to do that. 

I think civil servants tend to be looked upon as technicians. They 

tend not to serve in our foreign country posts. I think that serving 

in international institutions is looked upon with disfavor as I mentioned. I think much of the State Department also looks upon multilateral diplomacy and international organizations as feckless organizations that do not accomplish very much. These are all things 

I think that are out of step with the way in which the world is 

evolving. 

So it is very difficult to make those changes from the bottom up. 

They really have to come from the top down. Somebody has to say, 

this is the way we are going to do business and these are the ways 

we are going to change the way in which we function. 

It is not easy. It will take a long time to transform any personality or any inbred cultural attributes, but I think it would certainly enhance this function of arms control and nonproliferation as 

well as some of the other so-called functional bureaus and the conduct of foreign policy by giving some greater voice to multilateral 

diplomacy. 

But I do not want to suggest that it is going to be easy. It is 

something that I do advocate and I think should be done. It should 

be a sustained effort because it requires a sustained effort from the 

top down. 

Chairman AKAKA. I want to ask the panel to close with any summary remarks they may have on this hearing. 

You have all recommended ways to the improve arms control, 

counterproliferation, and nonproliferation bureaucracy. In addition 

to what I just asked you to do, I am going to ask you to, if you 

23 

would, mention your top three recommendations to address the 

staffing, management and organizational challenges that we face. 

Ambassador Graham. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let me again commend you for holding this hearing. 

Just from my own personal perspective, I think these issues are 

very important and little attention has been paid to them for years 

and, as a result, developments have taken place which affect our 

national security in a negative way which, if these issues had been 

addressed earlier, perhaps the result might have been somewhat 

different. 

We live in, in my opinion, Mr. Chairman, a very dangerous world 

today. It is, at least in part, featured by a decline in world order 

everywhere, certainly in many places. I have heard experts say 

that there are 50 to 70 countries that are sliding into the failed or 

failing states category, and as such, a breeding ground for international terrorists and then we have the strengthening of international terrorism worldwide and the terrorists desire to acquire 

weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. As you 

said in your opening remarks, Osama bin Laden said that acquiring nuclear weapons is a religious duty. 

And the technology is so much more available or at least much 

of it is. I can remember in the early 1990s there were very strict 

controls on computer technology. There had existed computers of 

great power which are very useful in nuclear weapons programs, 

and these computers were in the possession of only a few governments. No one else. Well, it was not long ago that the technology 

developed in a way that you or I could walk into a shop in Hong 

Kong and walk out with a computer capability comparable to those 

computers that used to be possessed by only a few nations. 

So the potential for nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 

destruction to spread is considerable. It is going to require a serious effort to persuade some countries not to acquire nuclear weapons. 

In 1958, the British Prime Minister said, during a television 

interview, that our independent contribution—he meant by that, 

the British nuclear weapons program—puts us right where we 

ought to be, a great power; and 3 years later, President de Gaulle 

said something similar in a speech. ‘‘Any great state that does not 

possess nuclear weapons when others do makes itself hostage to 

fortune.’’ 

The Indian prime minister said something to that effect, India is 

a big country now, we have the bomb, in 1998. 

Nuclear weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, carry with them 

political prestige that is attractive over and above any military utility they might have, which in most cases is negligible. 

We have a situation where the nuclear nonproliferation treaty is 

much weaker than it used to be. The NPT nuclear weapon states 

have not delivered on their disarmament obligations. Indeed, we 

have gone in reverse direction since 1995 and since Norm’s work 

in 2000. 

These are very worrisome conditions to anyone who cares about 

our country’s national security. And it is clear, the United States 

cannot go it alone under these conditions. We need allies. We need 

24 

multilateral treaty arrangements that we can rely upon. We need 

international security treaty regimes which we can rely on both because they are soundly conceived, but also because they are effectively verifiable. 

It will be very difficult for us to improve the situation and develop the international cooperation that we need to have, to expand 

the multilateral treaty arrangements that we need, to strengthen 

the international security treaty regimes that are essential to controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of 

mass destruction which can arrest the potential for grave danger 

to our country unless we have in our government a bureaucratic 

structure that is capable of developing sound policies to meet these 

threats. 

That is not to say that the arms control or nonproliferation alternative always should prevail, but it is extremely important for the 

President and the National Security Council to have that alternative in front of them as one possibility to consider. 

So I would urge serious consideration by the Congress of the creation through legislation of some sort, of an independent agency 

that can help strengthen our security in a very difficult and dangerous age. 

Chairman AKAKA. Thank you. Ambassador Wulf. 

Mr. WULF. As my colleagues have mentioned, I also extend my 

thanks for this hearing on this extremely important topic obviously, Mr. Chairman. 

A couple of comments on comments by others. Personalities 

clearly matter, but one should not put a system solely at risk because personalities change. 

I think the way to look at the issue of what structure is required 

is not, ‘‘well, we get the right people in place and they will work 

with each other and things will work out just fine.’’ 

I think the better way to look at the issue is, assuming that you 

have the right people in place, that they are good and competent 

people, how can we design a structure to make them even more effective and hopefully perhaps a little less susceptible to changing 

political whims? 

An example that builds on one Ambassador Graham cited, is the 

CTBT itself. Early on in the Clinton Administration when a lot of 

people were not yet in place in the various departments and agencies throughout the government, the question of what position 

should the United States take on a comprehensive test ban was 

hotly debated. 

The State Department early on decided on a compromise position 

which I will characterize as a limited number of tests per year at 

a lower threshold than the existing threshold that was in place at 

that time. 

ACDA took zero tests and zero yield as its preferred approach 

and it kept that option alive. It could not force the rest of the interagency to accept that, but it kept it alive until the Department of 

Energy had enough people in place and Secretary O’Leary got 

enough advice from enough different quarters that she came to the 

conclusion that was the best option, and it ultimately was the position adopted by the U.S. Government. 

25 

Had there not been an independent agency like ACDA, that option would no longer have been on the table by the time the Secretary of Energy and the Department of Energy was organized 

enough to promote that option. 

I think there is something to be said for a small agile agency 

made up of, shall we say, similarly motivated people as opposed to 

a small part of a very large agency. 

I think, for example, that when I was a Deputy Assistant Director in ACDA I spent perhaps 10 percent of my time keeping my 

senior management informed of what the bureau was doing. I contrast that to when I was a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Department of State and I probably spent 40 percent of my time trying to keep my senior management informed of what my part of 

the bureau was doing instead of actually doing things. 

It is simply, shall I say, the difference between 250 people and 

what is the Department now? Around 19,000. So there is something to be said for the culture that comes with a small dedicated 

agency with people similarly motivated. 

There has also been a question about whether the substantive 

issues that will face the new Administration at the start are so big 

that we should not take time away from them to work on structure? You have to turn that question around. Can you do the substance if you do not have the structure? 

I would argue that you can work on both. I would urge that whoever is the President-elect spends his time during the transition 

addressing the question of what kind of priorities he wishes to 

achieve during his presidency in the areas of arms control and nonproliferation? What structure do I need to achieve those priorities? 

And if he reaches a conclusion which I recommend, that is an independent agency, he begins drafting during the transition and begins working with the Congress to lay the groundwork for prompt 

action on that. 

I believe the time period between the introduction of legislation 

to create ACDA back in 1961 and its enactment was something a 

little over 3 months. It can be done, Mr. Chairman, and I think you 

can address structure and address substantive issues. 

So my top three recommendations, I only have two. Draft legislation now creating an independent agency and the mandate of that 

agency should be nonproliferation, counterproliferation, safeguarding of nuclear materials and arms control, and I am not putting 

arms control last because I think it is least important. 

And I would say the second recommendation is an interim step 

until such an independent agency is established would be to recreate the Arms Control Bureau in the Department of State and remove from the nonproliferation bureau issues like missile defense 

and the Conference on Disarmament. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman AKAKA. Thank you very much, Ambassador Wulf. Mr. 

Semmel. 

Mr. SEMMEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, I too congratulate 

you on this hearing. I think it is absolutely important and it certainly is timely. 

Let me say, first of all, to echo some of the comments that my 

colleagues have made, that we are, I think, at a critical juncture 

26 

on this issue in terms of our national security, in terms of world 

affairs, and I think the new Administration, whoever it is, whoever 

comes into the White House and the State Department will be tested the very first day. I think the issues are boulders rolling down 

hill towards the next Administration. They are going to have to 

contend with them now or as soon as possible. 

As I have mentioned in my longer statement, the tide is not moving—the trend lines are not moving in the right direction right 

now. I think it is going to be very difficult for the new Administrative as the problems begin to pile up. 

I mean to suggest that there is state of urgency about this issue 

and about doing it right as we move into the next Administration. 

Having said that, I think it would be correct for me to say there 

have been some very constructive things done over the last few 

years. We ought not to forget those things. 

Innovations have taken place across-the-board in dealing with 

the issue of nonproliferation and counterproliferation include the 

Proliferation Security Initiative and there has been some stock pile 

reductions. We have had a moratorium on testing since the early 

1990s. We have not produced any fissile materials in a long time, 

etc., and there are a number of negatives that have been pointed 

out already. 

I think the NPT is hanging on not by a thread but certainly the 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is being very stressed right now 

and will become even more so if we do not get the right answer to 

Iran and North Korea. If what comes out of those two processes in 

dealing with their nuclear programs are unsuccessful, I am not 

sure where we are going to stand with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 

The conference on disarmament in Geneva has been virtually at 

an impasse for at least 10 years, and not produced much that we 

can shout about, and enforcement of IAEA reports have been somewhat lacking at the moment. So there are some positives and negatives and we can actually expand upon those if we wanted to. 

The three priorities, if you will, that come to mind for me is, first 

of all, per your question, we need to elevate the status and the role 

of this function within the State Department, within the U.S. Government. It has to be elevated because of the nature of the challenge, the nature of the threat that exists now and that is going 

to grow in the future. It is not going to dissipate in the immediate 

future. 

Whether that involves the strengthening, or rather the creating 

of a semi-independent entity within the State Department, or an 

independent entity, or strengthening the role of the Under Secretary, any one of those, it seems to me, would move in the right 

direction but, as I say, I am somewhat agnostic about this. 

I would say this, that if the new Administration has a set of ambitious nonpoliferation goals, whatever those goals may be, maybe 

a departure from where we are, or augmentation of where we are 

at right now, then it will not be able to accomplish those ambitious 

goals in the absence of some kind of restructuring and strengthening of this role within the State Department, or within the national security bureaucracy. 

27 

So the first thing is to strengthen and elevate the status and role 

of this function. 

Second, I like to combine what is desirable and what is doable, 

and one of the things that I think can be doable over the long run 

is to increase the funding, programmatic funding, on this function. 

Programmatic, by that I mean, obtaining—and Congress can play 

a role in this obviously—funding in the areas of cooperative threat 

reduction, in the area of redirection of former weapons scientists, 

funding for the International Atomic Energy Agency, and export 

controls, and so on. That is a doable priority. 

And so is, I think, augmenting the personnel, not only the numbers of people working in this function, but also the skills that they 

have, which are oftentimes technical skills. We need to recruit 

more physical scientists, natural scientists, and engineers into this 

area. And one of the ways we might do this is, as I suggest in my 

paper, is to revive something akin to what used to exist, namely, 

the Foreign Service Reserve Officer system where the Foreign 

Service Reserve Officer system was developed to find skills that 

could otherwise not be found within the State Department through 

its normal recruitment system. 

The third area is, as I mentioned, and you and I have talked 

about, Mr. Chairman, to change the rewards structure in Foreign 

Service. That is to say, to make part of a Foreign Service career 

path the inclusion of service in a functional bureau, that all foreign 

officers at one point or another in their career should be required 

to serve in some functional bureaus. It does not have to necessarily 

be the ISN Bureau, to get that kind of experience that they would 

otherwise be lacking. 

If you change that reward structure, you are going to get more 

interest and more ability to recruit and retain Foreign Service officers in this function. Thank you. 

Chairman AKAKA. Well, I thank you so much. You have been 

very helpful to us. I thank all of you. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman AKAKA. Yes, Ambassador Graham. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for intervening here at 

the end, but I realize I forgot to give you my recommendations. 

My recommendations, well, first let me say I do support the recommendations that Ambassador Wulf and Mr. Semmel have suggested. They all seem very sound to me. 

The ones I would focus on myself is, first, draft legislation for an 

independent agency. 

Second, I hope the Senate early next year will take a close look 

at those individuals who are going to be selected to have responsibilities in the arms control and nonproliferation area and question them to get a sense as to whether they are interested and support these policies at least in general terms. 

Third, it seems to me that substantively next year the 

overridingly most important arms control-nonproliferation issue 

will be ratification of the comprehensive test ban treaty as has 

been urged by Messrs. Shultz, Nunn, Kissinger, and Perry. And 

along with that, it is important for the Congress to keep up the 

funding, as Mr. Semmel has suggested, for the comprehensive test 

28 

ban treaty office in Vienna that operates the worldwide verification 

system and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thank you. 

Chairman AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. 

I want to say that your recommendations highlighted many fundamental improvements that can be implemented now and also 

when the next Administration comes, and we are working on that. 

This Subcommittee will continue to focus on reforms to critical 

aspects of our national security. Over the next few months we will 

continue to examine the arms control and nonproliferation bureaucracy. We will also look into ways to improve our foreign assistance 

and public diplomacy bureaucracies and processes. 

These are our plans and I was glad, ambassador, in your remarks that you mentioned that our country should have allies as 

well as international treaties in our relationships. 

All of this will be helpful to us, and so again, thank you so much 

for your comments and your testimonies. 

The hearing record will be open for one week for additional statements or questions other Members may have. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:52 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(29) 

NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAUCRACY FOR 

ARMS CONTROL, COUNTERPROLIFERATION, 

AND NONPROLIFERATION: THE ROLE OF 

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE—PART II 

FRIDAY, JUNE 6, 2008 

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT

MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE,

AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m., in Room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senator Akaka. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. I call this hearing of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the 

District of Columbia to order. I want to welcome our witnesses 

today, and I want to thank you so much for being here. 

This is the third in a series of hearings that I am holding to explore the effectiveness and efficiency of government management in 

various aspects of national security. The first hearing considered 

proposed reforms to the U.S. export control system. During the second hearing, former Administration officials discussed the management of the arms control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation 

bureaucracy at the Department of State, commonly known as the 

‘‘T Bureau.’’ Today’s hearing will allow us to hear from current 

State Department senior leaders about these same issues within 

the T Bureau and give them the opportunity to respond to the testimony of our previous witnesses. As I mentioned to the witnesses 

at our last hearing, Senator Voinovich and I recently requested the 

Government Accountability Office to examine the effect of organizational changes on the State Department, specifically on its capabilities and resources. 

The major powers of the world signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1968. Since then, four other countries have developed nuclear weapons through their efforts outside of the NPT. 

And now we confront the desire of terrorists to obtain similar 

weapons. The nuclear genie has emerged from the bottle. We must 

re-cork it before international security is further threatened. 

30 

1The charts submitted by Senator Akaka appears in the Appendix on page 105. 

Leading Presidential candidates have spoken forcefully about 

containing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Senator McCain 

recently declared that his highest priority, if elected, is to reduce 

the danger that nuclear weapons will ever be used while strengthening all aspects of the nonproliferation regime. Senator Obama is 

also dedicated to bolstering the NPT and securing loose nuclear 

materials. Both candidates have committed themselves to fighting 

proliferation. However, both candidates know that policy statements are not enough. Statements need to be matched by action. 

The right policies are critical, but equally important are effective 

and efficient institutions to support policy implementation. My goal 

in this hearing, along with examining possibly damaging personnel 

practices that occurred during the T Bureau’s reorganization during 2005, is to identify possible recommendations for improving the 

arms control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation bureaucracy. 

As you can see in the three charts that I have on my right,1 the 

Department of State leads U.S. arms control, counterproliferation, 

and nonproliferation efforts. The Under Secretary for Arms Control 

and International Security leads the bureaus of International Security and Nonproliferation, Political-Military Affairs, and 

Verification, Compliance, and Implementation. 

This bureaucracy has changed in two significant ways from 1999 

until today. First, ACDA, which was an independent agency that 

led the national arms control and nonproliferation effort, was 

merged into the State Department bureaucracy where its multilateral and long-term focus has largely taken a back seat to the prevailing regional and bilateral interests of the Department. 

These charts demonstrate clearly the second significant change 

to this bureaucracy. In 2005, the bureaus singularly focused on 

arms control and nonproliferation were eliminated and merged into 

the International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau. I am concerned that this merger further weakened the State Department’s 

ability to implement effective arms control and nonproliferation 

policy. I believe that steps must be taken quickly to repair damage 

that has been done. 

The number of controversial issues from the 2005 reorganization 

include: The absence of human resources and Civil Service personnel from the Senior Management Panel, which had the responsibility of crafting the reorganization and reporting its recommendations to the Under Secretary; the significant reduction in 

the number of full-time equivalent personnel despite the creation 

of two new offices within the International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau; the loss of an independent arms control bureau, which may have convinced other nations that America was 

not committed to reducing weapons of mass destruction; an inadequate process for selecting strong leaders with distinguished backgrounds for the bureaus; and concern that morale problems have 

discouraged well-qualified and experienced career employees in the 

T Bureau from remaining in the Department. 

In addition to gaining a better understanding of the impact of 

the reorganization on the T Bureau, I also want to explore possible 

31 

1The prepared statement of Ms. McNerney appears in the Appendix on page 92. 

reforms, including: Reestablishing an independent arms control 

and nonproliferation agency that is modeled on ACDA; creating a 

semi-autonomous arms control and nonproliferation agency within 

the State Department; reestablishing an arms control bureau 

alongside nonproliferation and verification and compliance bureaus 

within the T Bureau; elevating the role of the head of the arms 

control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation bureaucracy to 

have an unobstructed and clearly defined role in national security 

decisions; and, following in the footsteps of former Secretary of 

State Colin Powell, finding ways to address the diplomatic and 

human capital readiness challenges confronting the T Bureau so 

that there are enough qualified arms control, counterproliferation, 

and nonproliferation professionals to carry out national policies and 

our international obligations. 

We need to work together to prevent terrorists and rogue nations 

from obtaining a nuclear weapon. This hearing, taken with the last 

hearing on this subject, is particularly important since it will help 

clarify the challenges ahead and provide possible solutions. 

Again, I want to welcome our witnesses to this Subcommittee 

today: Patricia McNerney, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of State, and Linda Taglialatela, who is Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for the Bureau of Human Resources, Department of 

State. 

It is the custom of the Subcommittee to swear in all witnesses, 

and I would ask both of you to stand and raise your right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give 

this Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth, so help you, God? 

Ms. MCNERNEY. I do. 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. I do. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. Let it be noted for the 

record that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

Before we start, I want you to know that your full written statement will be part of the record. Also, I would like to ask you to 

keep your remarks as brief as you can. 

And with that, Ms. McNerney, please proceed with your statement. 

TESTIMONY OF PATRICIA A. MCNERNEY,1 PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY LINDA S. TAGLIALATELA, DEPUTY 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF HUMAN RESOURCES, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Chairman, I also just 

wanted to note, I am serving as the Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for the International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau, not the Human Resources Bureau. In that capacity, I am currently the acting head of that bureau, for the record. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for that. 

32 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to 

discuss the State Department’s role in protecting U.S. national security and ensuring that we are responding appropriately and 

robustly to today’s nonproliferation and international security challenges. 

When Secretary Rice began her tenure, she called upon the Department of State to transform the way we think about diplomacy 

and to consider how we might best use our diplomatic tools to meet 

today’s threats and prevent tomorrow’s problems. Thanks to that 

vision of Secretary Rice, we reshaped the structure of the so-called 

T Bureaus, moving away from a system designed to address the 

challenges presented by the Cold War toward a structure more 

capable of countering today’s nonproliferation and international security challenges. By creating a robust Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, strengthening the Bureau of PoliticalMilitary Affairs, and expanding the Bureau of Verification and 

Compliance’s mandate to include treaty implementation, Secretary 

Rice not only effectively enabled the Department to better respond 

to the challenges of the post-September 11, 2001 world, but 

strengthened our commitment and our ability to support the nonproliferation and arms control regimes already in place. 

With the merger of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Bureaus to form the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, the redundancies lingering from the 1999 merger of 

the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency into the Department 

were removed. 

As a bureau that covers both traditional and non-traditional security threats, I believe we have thoroughly and effectively enabled 

each of our 13 offices to examine and monitor the multifaceted elements of nonproliferation and arms control. Our offices not only 

focus on conventional, nuclear, missile, chemical, and biological 

threat reduction; WMD terrorism; but also on the nexus between 

WMD and terrorism, and on complex regional affairs and their effect on nonproliferation and international security. By placing a 

greater focus on counterproliferation and global cooperative threat 

reduction in addition to multilateral and bilateral engagement, we 

have enhanced our national ability to engage on the full range of 

nonproliferation issues. 

I am proud of the work that the ISN Bureau and its highly 

skilled Civil Service and Foreign Service officers have done in leading the U.S. Government’s nonproliferation and security efforts. We 

continue to attract and retain exceptionally qualified and motivated 

individuals, with many young and talented officers who are our 

best investment in future capability to address these security 

threats. 

With more than 180 civil servants, as well as Foreign Service officers, we feel confident that the quality of work produced by our 

bureau reflects positively on the caliber of its employees and the 

quality of our work environment. All of the T Bureau employees 

have been strongly encouraged to take training courses at the Foreign Service Institute and other outlets to continue to enhance 

their skills and expertise, and to work with their leadership to develop a long-term career plan to include training opportunities. 

33 

Additionally, we have implemented a new T Family Award for 

Excellence in International Security Affairs in order to recognize 

the outstanding Foreign and Civil Service employees in the Arms 

Control and International Security field, and to further motivate 

our employees to strive for excellence. 

As Senator Lugar noted when he participated in the announcement of the reorganization by Secretary Rice in 2005, the changes 

made by the Secretary to enhance our counterproliferation, 

counterterrorism, and threat reduction efforts ‘‘are important reforms that will both streamline governmental action and provide 

greater safety for all Americans.’’ We have worked hard to achieve 

success internationally as well as domestically, through implementing the Secretary’s and the President’s vision in creating a 

workforce prepared to meet these challenges of the 21st Century. 

I look forward to any questions you have for me, as well as my 

colleague from the Human Resources Bureau, and we appreciate 

your time. I have a longer statement that I would ask be submitted 

for the record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator AKAKA. It will be included in the record. 

Well, thank you very much. I would like to direct my first question to Ms. Taglialatela. 

Ms. Taglialatela, in previous testimony, we heard that there has 

been a significant loss of civil servants from the State Department 

in recent years. A Nonproliferation Bureau career officer who retired a few weeks after the reorganization in the year 2005 mentioned in an article in Arms Control Today that the reorganization 

of the bureaus in 2005 led many experienced career officers to 

leave the new International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau. 

How much attrition has the ISN Bureau experienced since the 

implementation of the reorganization of 2005? 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. Thank you for that question, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to say that during the reorganization, while the final 

decisions on specific person placements were made by the individuals who were the managers of the bureau, the Bureau of Human 

Resources and a representative from the Office of the Legal Adviser 

at the State Department, and I can assure you that there were no 

violations of Merit System principles and there were no violations 

of any law or regulation. 

At the same time, when we worked and developed the crosswalk 

between the two bureaus, we put the two bureaus together, and we 

ensured that everyone had a position to go to, that no one was displaced, that no one lost grade and no one lost salary. Some people, 

because of the positions that they were moved into, may have felt 

that there were opportunities elsewhere or it was time for them to 

leave. 

This is the sort of phenomenon that happens any time there is 

management and organizational change. You will find people who 

are uncomfortable with the way things are, and they choose to 

leave. There was a number of—not a large number, but there was 

a number of employees who chose to either find other work and/ 

or retire. I do not believe that in the more recent years since then, 

the initial merger, that we have had any large increases or continued large amounts of attrition in the bureau. It has pretty much 

stabilized. 

34 

As you may be aware, the State Department has one of the lowest attritions in the Federal Government. We run below the average on our Civil Service. Our attrition overall is about 8 percent 

a year, whereas the Federal Government is about 12 percent on 

Civil Service. And basically, the bureaus have fit into that average 

and maintained similar comparable attrition numbers to the State 

Department on the whole. 

Senator AKAKA. How does this compare to the typical attrition 

from the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Bureaus from 1999 to 

2005? 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. I do not have specific numbers on what the 

attrition was from 1999. Basically, again, when the merger took 

place and we also merged individuals from the U.S. Information 

Agency, everyone from both of those agencies were, again, guaranteed a crosswalk position at grade without loss of salary into the 

new, redesigned organization. Again, if people chose to leave, it was 

because they did not want to become part of the State Department 

proper or they had other opportunities elsewhere. 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Mr. Chairman, I might just add on that point 

that if you look at a snapshot of vacant positions in August 2005, 

just prior to the reorganization, between the Nonproliferation Bureau and the Arms Control Bureau, that rate was about 12 percent. 

If you look at what we have now in 2008, that rate is about 8 percent. So we are actually doing better as a bureau under the new 

construct than we were with the two bureaus. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Taglialatela, in previous testimony, we 

heard that the number of full-time equivalent employees, FTEs, 

was reduced by the merger of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Bureaus. Were any FTE positions eliminated? If so, why were 

they eliminated? 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. Thank you for the opportunity to explain, Mr. 

Chairman. There were no positions eliminated or taken away from 

the T area when the merger took place, the merger of the Arms 

Control Bureau and the Nonproliferation Bureau. What happened 

was in the decisions that went forward in a reprogramming letter, 

there were decisions to rearrange the functions within the whole T 

area. Some positions went to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Some positions shifted to the Verification, Compliance, and 

Implementation Bureau. So there was not a loss of total FTE. 

What happened was it was a shift. And the total number of FTE 

left in the new bureau was probably less than what was in the Bureau of Arms Control and the Bureau of Nonproliferation only because some of those functions were shifted to other areas. 

Senator AKAKA. Did you have an overall strategic plan, including 

the human capital aspects, for the reorganization? And if you did, 

what was that plan? 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. From the standpoint of the Bureau of Human 

Resources and the management area in the State Department, we 

were involved in reviewing the organizational structure that was 

proposed and sent forward in the congressional notification. We 

were involved in making sure that all of the offices had work statements determining what functions would be performed by the 

newly formed offices because there was a realignment of functions 

in the new organization. And we looked at the number of positions 

35 

to ensure that there was a crosswalk of if there were X number of 

positions in the two bureaus, that many positions plus the ones 

that went to either the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and the 

Verification, Compliance, and Implementation Bureau both got— 

that all of the people in positions were accounted for. 

From a standpoint of strategic planning, we looked at the resources and made sure that the skill sets were transferable between the two bureaus. But as far as actually assigning people and/ 

or looking for any staffing gaps, we did not do that at the time. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. McNerney, in the previous hearing on this 

matter, I was disturbed by a witness who stated that the office responsible for nonproliferation had to rely on temporary help—interns, short-term scholars, and retirees. For me, this was shocking. 

How much temporary help is currently assisting the ISN Bureau? 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Well, Mr. Chairman, we maintain, obviously, a 

high level of full-time employees that do our day-to-day work, but 

we actually think we benefit by a number of consultants that are— 

for example, recently retired Ambassador Don Mahley, who brings 

a wealth of years of experience in arms control, we have retained 

that ability. We have tapped him to continue to negotiate some specific arms control kinds of agreements. Again, we rely on what we 

call AAAS fellows. These are scientific experts that come into the 

Department for a year or two. Our bureaus actually are one of the 

key areas to attract these kinds of fellows that we think augment 

our capabilities and our scientific reach-back. Often they come from 

the labs and places like that, and we have got about 20 percent of 

all the Department’s AAAS fellows. 

Additionally, sometimes young students come in on an internship, and this is a good way to get to see some of these students 

as they are coming out of school. Oftentimes, they will apply later 

for full-time positions, and having worked in the bureau, we know 

whether they are talented, what their expertise is. And so, again, 

this is a program that I actually think is very helpful and useful 

to us. But certainly the real day-to-day work, the long hours, the 

hard work that gets done by our staff, it is done by our full-time 

workforce. And that is what we rely on for the bulk of our work. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. McNerney, a previous witness testified that 

one of the goals for the 2005 merger of the Nonproliferation and 

Arms Control Bureaus was to achieve greater efficiencies and to reduce costs through streamlining and consolidation. Have you or the 

Department examined the effects of the 2005 merger to determine 

if it generated any cost savings? 

Ms. MCNERNEY. I am not sure about cost savings, but if I would 

look at it more from the policy standpoint of how we are accomplishing our core objectives, one thing, we review regularly where 

our key priorities are. For example, at the time of the reorganization, there were only just over two full-time equivalent staff in our 

Regional Affairs Bureau working on Iran. Obviously, Iran is a key 

challenge of the day, and so we have moved a number of our FTEs 

from other offices to that office to greatly augment our team that 

deals with the Middle East and Iran. 

Similarly, our counterproliferation initiatives that does a lot of 

the work to interdict shipments of concern, look at financial measVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:09 Mar 12, 2009 Jkt 043088 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\43088.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
36 

ures that we do to support our Iran policy and our North Korea 

policy, we thought that we needed to have additional individuals 

working on those key core issues. And so, again, we shifted some 

from other offices into that office in order to focus on those areas. 

And just recently, we followed up with some of our WMD terrorism 

personnel that were still straddling two bureaus to move them into 

our WMD T Bureau to really focus the leadership and attention in 

one group. So that is the kind of thing we are doing on a regular 

basis to make sure that our people are meeting the key challenges 

of the day. 

The actual costs, what has really been the case across the Department and across government, is we are all having to readjust 

our costs and our figures, the appropriations that we get. We have 

been working under CRs a couple years in a row, and so travel 

monies are tighter. Our program monies are tighter. And so I personally have really focused in on reducing any kinds of contract 

employees that really do cost a lot more than your standard government employee and trying to eliminate those kinds of costs so 

we can focus them on the core mission, which is to address threats 

like Iran, like North Korea, like terrorist access to nuclear weapons 

and nuclear materials. 

Obviously, we have got a responsibility to meet those core challenges, and so under tight budgets and constraints that we all face 

across the Department, I think it is incumbent on the leadership 

of our bureau to look at those costs in that context and try to move 

and shift resources. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. McNerney, you mentioned in your testimony 

that the new T Bureau structure is more capable of countering 

nonproliferation and international security challenges. Can you explain this in more detail? 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Yes, sir. Before this reorganization, we did not 

have an office that was devoted to counterproliferation initiatives. 

This has been a really key area for us in the last several years as 

we address North Korea and Iran. We now have an office that 

looks at interdictions on a regular basis, that looks at our financial 

measures against banks that might be supporting proliferation activities, companies, front companies that might be part of larger 

networks to try to avoid some of our other programs designed to 

impede proliferation activities. It is an office that focuses on the 

new resolution, Security Council Resolution 1540, which was adopted in 2004, looking at a broad-based increase in every State’s export control authorities, laws, implementation. So that is one area 

where we certainly have retooled and refocused ourselves, and that 

office did not exist before this merger. 

A second office that did not exist before this merger dealt with 

WMD terrorism. There is, obviously, in government a large WMD 

community, a large terrorism community, but often there is that 

seam in between where you are not really bringing the two communities together and focusing on that nexus between WMD and terrorism. And so we created an office as a result of—the Secretary 

created this office as a result of the merger to better focus and drill 

down on this particular threat. And through that, we have evolved 

what is called the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 

and really reached out across the world to develop capabilities in 

37 

other governments. Currently, there are more than 70 governments 

now participating in that initiative, and that is a partnership globally that did not exist 2 years ago. And so that is the kind of thing 

that the bureau really has focused on. 

Additionally, we have sort of retooled some of our offices to focus 

on the problems of nuclear energy today, for example. There is a 

growth of nuclear energy, but obviously with that responsibility 

comes to reduce the proliferation risks of civil nuclear energy. And 

so even as we are looking to work with countries to have that capability, which is one of the promises of the Nonproliferation Treaty, 

we are trying to do it in a way that ensures that things like enrichment and reprocessing, which have a much greater capability to be 

misused or diverted for proliferation activities, we’re trying to 

eliminate those kinds of aspects of the nuclear program through 

things like an assured fuel supply with the IAEA and other initiatives of that sort. 

So, I think if you really look at sort of what we are doing as a 

bureau, how we are integrated better with the Department, one of 

the key things is our team really has been part of Nick Burns’ 

team and now Bill Burns running Iran policy. We have integrated 

very closely with that process because we are in the State Department. We are not fighting each other. Obviously, people have disputes over policy all the time, but they get worked out. But we are 

supporting that process in a direct way. Obviously, when the Secretary has an issue related to proliferation, she has us to call upon, 

and we are obviously working her broader agenda and the President’s broader agenda. When she has meetings with the President 

on our issues, she brings the Under Secretary, John Rood, to those 

meetings and obviously relies on him, and he obviously relies on us 

for all of that work and expertise. 

So, it takes time because the ACDA merger brought us into the 

Department, but kind of just plopped it in the middle. Then I think 

this second reorganization really integrated us further into the 

work and the challenges we are facing today. And, it takes time, 

but we are really working, I think, as a team throughout the Department. 

For example, if you look again at the North Korea issue, Assistant Secretary Chris Hill relies on us to support all of the settlement actions. We have a nonproliferation disarmament fund, and 

we are funding all the actions to eliminate components from the reactor at Yongbyon, and that has been something that our bureau 

has really led the charge on. 

So I think there are always going to be personnel departures. 

Unfortunately, when we were being stood up through this reorganization, the government was also standing up the new DNI with 

a lot of new jobs that had better resources attached to some of 

those jobs, and they were able to steal a few of our people. But 

some of them went over and they realized they did not like it as 

much, they wanted to be back at the Department and working on 

these vital issues, we think, for national security. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. McNerney, when the Arms Control Bureau 

was abolished in 2005, some of the functions and staff were transferred to the International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau. 

38 

In previous testimony, it was argued that this action made it much 

more difficult to achieve priority U.S. nonproliferation objectives. 

The Office of Inspector General’s reports from December 2004 

noted that the State Department’s Nonproliferation Bureau was already burdened with a wide range of issues. When you add to this 

list responsibility for topics such as missile defense, the chemical 

and biological weapons conventions, and the Fissile Material CutOff Treaty, one result, a previous witness argued, is an Assistant 

Secretary who is spread too thin to provide the senior policy leadership necessary in this critical area of national security. 

What would your response be to this assertion? 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Well, I guess what I would argue is that, in fact, 

by merging these two, we have—and some of the responsibility of 

the Arms Control Bureau went to another bureau, so these were 

divided. 

Another aspect of that merger was there was a new Deputy Assistant Secretary position created, so it actually gave greater dayto-day front office management over a number of these issues by 

having an additional Deputy Assistant Secretary focused on the 

issues. 

The other part is, again, we did not just give all that responsibility in sort of one chain. For example, the Fissile Material CutOff Treaty became a core responsibility of the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary who is responsible for nuclear affairs. And so they are 

really integrating that into our larger agenda on a number of these 

nuclear affairs, the NPT Treaty, etc. 

You look at the Chemical Weapons Convention, again, integrating that into our broader chemical, biological office that has the 

range of issues. 

Then on the missile defense—the Missile and Space Policy Office, 

that office was originally put in the Verification, Compliance, and 

Implementation Bureau, and it was soon realized that it just didn’t 

fit well there, that it fit more broadly into our larger nonproliferation agenda, and so that office, with the full complement of personnel, was later then moved to the International Security and 

Nonproliferation Bureau in order to accomplish that mission as 

well. 

So we think we have got a pretty good—people are working hard, 

obviously, and lots of long days, but I think we have got a pretty 

good mix and balance in our issue area. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Taglialatela, in our previous hearing testimony, it was stated that the Senior Management Panel, the panel 

tasked with crafting the recommendations for the reorganization, 

operated in near secrecy without the direct benefit of the Department’s human resources expertise. Why was the Under Secretary 

for Management not put in charge of implementing this reorganization? 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. Mr. Chairman, I apologize, but I do not know 

why senior management made the decision. Generally at the Department, when a reorganization or merger has been approved 

through congressional notification, the actual implementation is 

left up to the individual bureaus. In the case of the merger, the 

then-Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 

formed a Senior Management Panel made up of Deputy Assistant 

39 

Secretaries from each of the three bureaus—being Arms Control, 

Nonproliferation, and Verification, Compliance, and Implementation—to sit down and work through the actual reassignment of individuals. Also included was the executive assistant to the Under 

Secretary. 

At that time initially, they started to meet to work through the 

concept, sort of the idea of where people would go. Some of the employees expressed concern both to the employees’ union, being the 

American Foreign Service Association and the American Federation 

of Government Employees, as well as some of the employees expressed their concerns within the T hierarchy, and they asked that 

a member from the Bureau of Human Resources and a member 

from their Executive Director Office sit in on the meetings. 

When they had their initial preliminary planning meetings and 

started talking about actually moving people, I personally sat in on 

a number of those meetings. We did begin halfway through the 

process to have meetings with the employees. I will tell you that 

had I been left in charge, I probably would have done it differently 

and engaged the employees much sooner. But when they had finalized their organizational structures and started to identify people, 

they did meet with employees. They did offer them an opportunity 

to express where they might like to go, which of the offices they 

would be most interested in. Some of them had obviously specific 

places that they were well suited for, which was basically where 

they were in the old two bureaus. They moved into similar positions under the new bureau, and they moved forward. 

I think in hindsight, the process could have been a little more 

transparent. It could have been a little more informative throughout the process. This is not the first merger or reorganization I 

have been through in the Department. I think that every one of 

them has had its share of problems because I think employees, 

when you start talking about their occupations and their careers, 

everyone gets very nervous, very excited about what is going to 

happen to them specifically, as well as what is going to happen to 

their office, their organization, and their colleagues. We probably 

should have done things a little bit differently. But in the end, employees were kept aware of what was happening and were allowed 

to express their interests in what they would like to do. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Taglialatela, I have a series of questions I 

would like you to answer about personnel management, and you 

can even answer yes or no, if you wish. And here are the questions. 

Is it normal procedure there for career staff to be removed from 

management positions and be replaced by someone with less rank 

and experience? 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. It is not normal to do that, sir. What happens 

in a merger when two organizations that are performing similar 

functions or you are going to merge two similar offices together, 

you always start out with two office directors, possibly two deputy 

office directors, several branch chiefs. And when you merge the offices together, you have to figure out first what is the best appropriate organizational structure. Then what you have to do—and 

that is where the Bureau of Human Resources participates, is in 

the design of those organizational structures. Then it is up to the 

managers who are well aware of the capabilities of the individuals, 

40 

their contributions, what abilities and skills they have as managers, as well as their expertise in the area, and figure out how 

best to place people within the organizational structure that has 

been approved. 

Senator AKAKA. Is it common to name detailees from other agencies in positions such as acting office directors? 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. It is not prohibited; it is something that is 

not encouraged. Obviously, we look to put individual employees 

from within the Department in those key jobs as a way of giving 

them opportunities to expand their career, to enhance their abilities to perform and to retain the talent and expertise within the 

Department. 

Senator AKAKA. Is it normal to have employees indicate job preferences without position or office descriptions being provided? 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. Yes and no. I think when you look at organizational—when you are taking two functions and putting them together, one of the first things that they did in the T reorganization 

is look at their office structures and determine how many people 

were needed—sort of guesstimate how many people would be needed in each of the offices to perform the functions. Based on that, 

there were generic descriptions of what each of these offices would 

do, the kinds of functions they would perform, the areas of responsibility they would have. And they asked people to identify where 

they might like to work based on that, with the understanding that 

no one was going to lose grade. Obviously, some people would be 

moved at grade, but if they departed, their jobs would be reclassified and reassessed to fit better into the organization. 

I think some people were a bit concerned because, yes, if you do 

that, then you are never sure what the grade of the job is you are 

going into. But everyone was guaranteed up front that no one 

would lose grade. So that there shouldn’t have been concern about 

where they fit into the organization and what their role would be. 

Senator AKAKA. Is downgrading SES level office director positions to the GS–15 level a normal practice at the State Department? 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. I would not say that it was normal. It is a 

practice that goes on because when you redefine the work being 

performed, sometimes the grade of the job goes down; sometimes 

the grade of the job goes up. 

Senator AKAKA. Is it normal for the State Department, specifically the T Bureau, to not notify employees of promotion opportunities for which they may be well qualified? 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. When there are promotion opportunities anywhere in the State Department, they are to be advertised in the 

appropriate forum through Merit Promotion Vacancy Announcements and individuals are allowed to apply and considered fairly 

and equitably for those positions. 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Mr. Chairman, I might add as well, something 

we have done to try to encourage even better transparency is not 

only expect officers to look at the normal Federal sites for notification of positions, but also to e-mail to each and every officer any 

opening and vacancy so that they are aware of that and have the 

opportunity to compete for such a position. 

41 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Taglialatela, I understand that the State Department’s Office of Inspector General reports released in December 2004 concluded that the Nonproliferation Bureau was overworked, the Arms Control Bureau was underworked, and that another bureau—the Verification and Compliance Bureau—should be 

downsized and its responsibilities severely reduced. However, the 

newly merged International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau 

was reduced in staff size, according to a previous witness, far below 

the total size of the combined number before the merger, while the 

newly named Verification, Compliance, and Implementation Bureau grew in size and responsibilities. 

Can you explain to me this apparent departure from the findings 

and conclusions of the OIG? 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. We monitor the compliance responses to the 

OIG. We are not responsible for ensuring that they are implemented. Any time the Inspector General’s office does an inspection 

of an organization and they have a list of recommendations, it is 

incumbent upon the appropriate bureaus to provide response. 

In the case of the reorganization, I can only assume that ISN 

provided responses—ISN, VCI, and the Under Secretary for Arms 

Control and International Security—to the Inspector General which 

defined how they were going to allocate their resources and why— 

if, in fact, the recommendations were to reduce the Verification, 

Compliance, and Implementation Bureau, why, in fact, it grew. 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Yes, just on that point, obviously this was a decision by then-Under Secretary Bob Joseph and Secretary Rice. But 

my understanding is they looked at the recommendations from the 

OIG and felt that a way to address the core concerns laid out by 

the OIG was to take some of the responsibility of the Arms Control 

Bureau and add them to the Verification and Compliance Bureau. 

And so it is that shifting of responsibility which meant some shifting of personnel. But there certainly was no overall reduction in 

people, and if you look at the two—if you look at the International 

Security and Nonproliferation Bureau, it is obviously much larger 

than the original NP Bureau or the original AC Bureau. But the 

additional people that would have been in one of those bureaus, basically the Arms Control, were shifted to the Verification and Compliance Bureau. And so they had more responsibility and, therefore, 

more personnel were put towards that new responsibility. 

There was just a very small shift of four personnel to the Political-Military Affairs Bureau, so that was quite minor. 

So, overall, the International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau certainly grew as a single bureau, but then overall, the numbers pre-reorg and post-reorg within the T Bureaus stayed static. 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. May I add a comment, please? 

Senator AKAKA. Yes. 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. I think one of the things—and I am not sure 

what specifically your witness was alluding to, but one of the 

things that I would like to make clear is that from 2004 to the 

present time, the State Department has not received any additional 

resources. A lot of our resources have gone to staffing our embassy 

in Iraq, our embassy in Kabul, expanding our presence in Pakistan. 

And because of that, we have taxed the bureaus for reductions to 

42 

gather up new positions that can be reprogrammed to these priorities. 

So since 2004—or 2005, the bureaus domestically have all lost resources because of reprogramming to these priorities. So over time, 

I believe ISN has lost resources that were not necessarily attributed to the fact that we did not believe they needed them, but because the Secretary declared we had a priority that we needed to 

staff to 100 percent, and we moved resources to that priority. 

Ms. MCNERNEY. But just to follow up on that, we all across the 

Department, all bureaus were required to give the Under Secretary 

for Management sort of a snapshot of where we could impose cuts. 

And it was our view that given that we had just gone through this 

exercise, we really were pretty close to the bone in terms of our 

staffing. And he agreed with that, Pat Kennedy, the Under Secretary for Management. So we were as a bureau certainly less impacted than others around the Department, including many of the 

regional bureaus. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Taglialatela, I heard in previous testimony 

that three of the four International Security and Nonproliferation 

Bureau leaders, as well as the Special Assistant, were chosen from 

the Arms Control Bureau by Bob Joseph, who was then the Under 

Secretary for Arms Control and International Security. This appears to go against the Office of Inspector General’s December 2004 

findings. 

Why would the Under Secretary choose to eliminate leaders from 

the Arms Control Bureau, which has, in the words of the OIG, 

faced—and I am quoting—‘‘palpable morale problems’’? 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. My understanding is that at the time, if I remember correctly, Mr. Semmel, who came from the Nonproliferation Bureau, Mr. Mahley, and Mr. Record, both who came from the 

Arms Control Bureau, were made the Deputy Assistant Secretaries. They had all previously been Deputy Assistant Secretaries, 

and they continued to serve as Deputy Assistant Secretaries. Only 

at the time of their departures were adjustments made to the staffing of the Deputy Assistant Secretary positions. 

Senator AKAKA. I understand that the Under Secretary for Management, Henrietta Fore, met in December 2005 with at least 11 

individuals who had expressed concerns about the implementation 

of the T Bureau reorganization. Their concerns included the complete absence of career civil servants advising the panel charged 

with reorganization and a lack of transparency in the selection 

process for acting office directors. 

Was any action taken to address their concerns? 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Based on that meeting, 

along with issues raised by the two employee unions, the Under 

Secretary, Henrietta Fore, had a conversation with then Under 

Secretary Joseph, and the two of them decided that it would be appropriate for a person from the Bureau of Human Resources to sit 

on the Senior Panel. I was asked to join the Senior Panel. I participated in many of their meetings. We talked about the assignment 

of employees. I focused primarily on the grades and previous jobs 

of the employees and where they were being crosswalked to. When 

it came down, again, to two individuals who had similar backgrounds and were serving in similar positions and one of them was 

43 

being reprogrammed because we did not need two, such as deputy 

directors or branch chiefs or division chiefs, they were the ones who 

made the final decisions because they knew the individuals and 

their specific strengths, weaknesses, their specific expertise, and 

they made the final decisions. I ensured that everybody was being 

looked at in a fair, honest way. When there were promotion opportunities, they were advertised. People were given the opportunity 

to compete. 

So I believe that, in essence, the process was fair, and the Under 

Secretary for Management was very concerned and made sure that 

there was fair representation for the employees. She also attended 

a townhall meeting with them, at which Under Secretary Joseph 

was present, and from that time forward, we had periodic townhall 

meetings with all of the employees to answer their questions. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Warren Strobel, formerly of the KnightRidder news service, wrote an article in which he mentioned that 

a half-dozen State Department employees who were very concerned 

about the loss of knowledgeable experts in the newly merged bureaus would only speak on condition of maintaining their anonymity because they feared retaliation. 

From your perspective, do you think these employees had any 

reason to fear retaliation? 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. From my perspective, no, sir. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Strobel from that news service identified 

Thomas Lehrman, who headed the new Office of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Terrorism, as advertising for government positions, citing political loyalty to President Bush and Secretary of State Rice 

as a qualification. I am very troubled by this report because it 

clearly violates the Merit System principles. Is this story true? If 

so, what specific actions were taken to correct Mr. Lehrman’s actions? 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to say that is a 

true story. The individual did send out such an e-mail to a number 

of colleagues and associates asking if they were interested in positions. When we found out about it, we asked him and made sure 

that he responded and sent out a follow-up e-mail basically taking 

down the offer for employment. We explained to him very clearly 

that there is an appropriate process by which we advertise jobs at 

the State Department. And we told them if they wanted to go 

ahead and advertise jobs, that we would work with them to do so. 

Senator AKAKA. Was any Department or bureau-wide training 

conducted to prevent this from happening again in the future? 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. No, sir. We talked specifically to the Executive Office, who is responsible for posting or advertising their vacancies. The people who were responsible for filling positions in the 

bureau were not aware of what this gentleman did until we saw 

the e-mail that went out. It was an informal job advertisement as 

opposed to an official advertisement from the Department. But you 

would have to ask someone in the bureau if senior management 

talked to all of their managers about this issue. 

Ms. MCNERNEY. I can discuss what we do now. That obviously 

was an appalling action on the part of that particular officer, and 

he came to realize that he had obviously acted outside of his responsibility. 

44 

When we look at employment now, I make sure that any time 

there is a vacancy that the office director begins to talk to their 

Deputy Assistant Secretary, about what are the needs, what are 

the gaps, what kinds of employees do we want; and then we work 

closely with our Executive Office within the bureau to create the 

position description; and then we move to do that through the normal advertisement channels. So there has been reoccurrence of 

such an activity, and I think all of our office directors are working 

very closely with their Deputy Assistant Secretaries as well as the 

front office management to be sure that we are doing this by the 

book. And I certainly would not tolerate such behavior. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, Ms. McNerney and Ms. Taglialatela, recently I held a hearing on the Federal hiring and recruitment process. One of our witnesses was a chief human capital officer from 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. While NRC has some unique 

hiring flexibilities, they have a robust and effective recruitment 

process that could be applied to any Federal agency. For instance, 

NRC has partnered with the University of Puerto Rico to hire and 

further train engineering students. Additionally, all the managers 

at NRC also serve as recruiters at conferences and meetings, and 

I was glad to hear you mention in your statement that you have 

interns that come in. These are ways of dealing with the problems 

we have with personnel hiring. 

What similar recruitment efforts could be done at the State Department to improve the staffing needs in the scientific fields? 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. Mr. Chairman, we have a very robust recruiting program. The State Department is very concerned about the 

baby-boomer retirement tsunami that is beginning now. We assume we are going to lose a lot of our talent. For the last 5 years, 

we have been the No. 2 agency in the Federal Government for recruiting Presidential Management Fellows, some of whom are educated in the scientific and technical areas, some of whom have 

other job experiences in the area of arms control and nonproliferation. 

We also have an active program—called Pickering and Rangel 

Fellows—which are predominantly geared towards the Foreign 

Service, but they do come on board and work in various areas, both 

in Washington and in our embassies overseas, again and who have 

scientific and interests in arms control and nuclear nonproliferation. 

We have partnered very closely on the AAAS program, and as 

Ms. McNerney said, we use them quite frequently. They have 20 

percent of our AAAS fellows in their program. And we do use intern programs to the fullest extent. We usually, particularly during 

the summer, as we are beginning the summer right now, we will 

have over a thousand interns in Washington and in our embassies 

overseas, again, trying to encourage people to be interested in and 

look to some of the career occupations that we have at the Department so that we can start interesting them in a career at the Department. So we have a very robust program that we are working 

on. 

We have also created some additional programs. We have Jefferson Science Fellows who we bring in for a year from the academic. 

We usually have five to ten a year. They come in, they work in varVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:09 Mar 12, 2009 Jkt 043088 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\43088.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
45 

ious bureaus, providing and lending support to those bureaus on 

various scientific, technical areas. When their year is completed, 

they go back to their universities, and they remain a consultant to 

the Department for the next 4 to 5 years. So we are looking strongly at creating that interest in the community. 

We also have in our embassies overseas what we call environmental, scientific, and technical technology officers. These are people who have very specific interests in the area, and they work very 

closely with the people in the T Bureaus as well as in OES on 

these kinds of issues. They develop their expertise through the Foreign Service Institute and their experiences overseas, and we do attempt to rotate them back to Washington into bureaus like ISN, 

VCI, and PM. 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Mr. Chairman, just following on that, I think if 

we really were—there are a lot of people who kind of keep looking 

back to 2005, and obviously any reorganization has turmoil to it. 

I think if we are really looking at what we have now, I think we 

have got the right structure, but people are really at the heart of 

how we can do our jobs. We have some terrific top-level managers 

that are reaching retirement age. In 5, 6 years, they are gone. How 

are we building a workforce that can go beyond? And one of the 

ways that we are doing it at the bottom levels is obviously the 

Presidential Management Fellowships. These are the entry-level 

talented officers, many of them Master’s programs, some Ph.D.s 

One of my colleagues behind me is PMF, and she is about to go 

off to Lawrence Livermore Lab for 2 months and really develop 

some of that kind of expertise. 

We have some of our PMFs out to embassies in Abu Dhabi, for 

example, where you really have the question of transshipment of 

proliferation-related items to Iran, and so really understanding 

what is going on, how they can interact. 

We have sent some of our officers—one of our officers right now 

is doing a rotation at the National Security Council, developing 

really kind of that leadership expertise at the mid-level, but she 

was a PMF who spent time in Beijing. So there is this requirement 

to really give opportunities and an expansive kind of look. 

Then there is the mid-career—there are just less of them because 

there was that period where there was less hiring. But one thing 

we have done is I have worked with Pat Kennedy to approve creation of a position at our UN mission to the IAEA and try to build 

up a rotation there where we can develop the safeguards capabilities because that is such an essential piece of what we do in terms 

of applying safeguards to programs like Iran, like North Korea, and 

so building up those kinds of rotations where they see the IAEA 

and how it works on the ground. But we have got to be recruiting 

good people. 

We recently opened a position in our bureau for a PMF, and 20 

percent of all PMFs applied for that one single position. So we are 

getting the best and the brightest, and I could not believe the resumes. I mean, just every one of them quite talented. So it is very 

competitive, obviously, and that is a good thing. And we are recruiting some of the best, but we need to do more. And we obviously do it within the limitations of our budgets and our personnel 

ceilings. 

46 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Ms. Taglialatela, one of the significant barriers to Federal service 

for many scientists or other professionals is the student loan debt 

and comparatively low salary in the Federal Government compared 

to the private sector. Agencies have been authorized to pay back 

student loans for an employee up to $10,000 per year and $60,000 

aggregate. In fiscal year 2006, the State Department provided loan 

repayments to 869 employees totaling more than $4 million. 

How much do you see debt from student loans as a factor in the 

State Department’s recruitment of scientists and professionals? 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question. 

Student loan repayment is a significant issue with the younger 

generation. What we have found is that with the rising costs of 

education throughout the country, it is very difficult for young people to enter into the Federal Government at the salaries which we 

are able to offer without student loan repayment. 

What we are proud of at the State Department is that we are 

one of the top agencies and we are a best practice across the Federal Government for student loan repayment. We have one of the 

most robust programs in the Federal Government. Based on the 

amount of money we are able to put into the program, we are able 

to offer individuals $4,600 or the maximum amount of their loan, 

because some are nearing the end of their loan, to people to pay 

towards their student loan repayment. It is an incredible incentive 

for young people. 

Senator AKAKA. Can you tell me or provide for the record the 

number of staff in the ISN Bureau who have attended the Leadership and Management School, how many have participated or are 

participating in the SES candidate development program, the 

Council for Excellence in Government Fellow program, the Civil 

Service Mentoring program, the Situational Mentoring program, 

and the Civil Service Mid-Level Rotational program? 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. Unfortunately, sir, I do not have that information handy, but I would be more than happy to provide it for 

the record, sir. 

INFORMATION PROVIDED FOR THE RECORD 

As of March 2008, 67 out of 130 eligible employees at the GS–13, GS–14, and GS– 

15 levels from the International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) Bureau have 

completed leadership training at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI). 

One ISN employee was selected for the Department of Homeland Security’s Career Development Program (an SES training program) beginning in 2007 and running into 2008. He remains an ISN employee, and the Department funded his training costs, totaling around $40,000. 

The ISN Bureau has four mentees and four mentors in the 2008 Civil Service 

mentoring program, as well as five mentors who have volunteered as situational 

mentors. The ISN Bureau also has one participant in the current Civil Service MidLevel Rotational program. 

No employees from the ISN Bureau have participated in the Council for Excellence in Government program since the bureau’s creation in 2006, due in part to 

the high cost of the program. 

Ms. MCNERNEY. I might just add on that, I know we have certainly encouraged participation in many programs, but we as a bureau and as the Department have—unlike some of our agencies, we 

have very limited funding for things like the SES training program, which I think costs some $15,000, $20,000 for an officer to 

47 

do. When we encourage training, we encourage them to go to the 

Foreign Service Institute where everything is free for us as a bureau, and so that is really the mechanism by which we encourage 

most of our training. 

There have been a couple instances where there might be some 

sort of fellowship training. One officer with Harvard negotiated so 

that he only had to pay a small amount, and they picked up a lot 

of it. And it is that kind of thing where if we can even get a little 

seed money and get our officers out, we certainly encourage that. 

But these things cost money. The State Department has budget 

constraints, and so there are limits on the kinds of things one can 

encourage. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. McNerney, I have heard recommendations 

from previous witnesses about the need for a career path that develops scientific skills within the ISN Bureau. Do you agree with 

this assessment? If so, where is the ISN Bureau falling short in its 

current training and career paths for civil servant scientists? And 

what do you envision the career path to include that is different? 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Well, I would just sort of reiterate that a lot of 

the scientific training comes before an officer arrives, so we try to 

recruit those with a scientific background. Some of the ways that 

we try to encourage sort of on-the-job training is through these 

kinds of rotations to our labs. This position we have created at the 

IAEA to try to increase the understanding of safeguards and how 

they are applied through training opportunities at the Foreign 

Service Institute, through the recruitment of these AAAS fellows 

where you bring in those with some science background that can 

basically be on the staff, and it is a resource for other officers who 

may not have quite that same background. And sometimes someone with the real hard-core science background does not necessarily 

know how to integrate it into the policy discussions. And so that 

can be a resource where you have people who understand the policy ramifications more that can tap into some of that scientific expertise. 

We also work closely with the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, others that—they obviously bring—as well as our 

intelligence community many times to augment a delegation to 

support U.S. interests. We will look to some of those experts 

around the government. We do not limit ourselves simply to what 

is on the State Department manifest. And so there are really a 

range of ways, but, again, I would get to the point of recruitment 

and some of these younger officers, getting them in. Our current 

front office structure at the senior levels, we have one officer with 

a Ph.D., one with a M.D,, another with a Master’s, and myself with 

a law degree. So we have kind of covered the range of alphabet 

soup of degrees out there, and I think having that blend and that 

mix is really part of the effort as well. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. McNerney, what positions at the ambassadorial level are reserved for Civil Service substantive experts? 

Ms. MCNERNEY. That is one of the areas, I think, where there 

is—obviously within the Foreign Service they guard closely their 

ability to maintain the ambassadorial rank positions. And so we 

are somewhat limited, really, in having those. We do have the Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament who reports to our buVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:09 Mar 12, 2009 Jkt 043088 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\43088.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
48 

reau. We also have the Ambassador to the Organization for the 

Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Again, that is a direct 

report to our bureau. And we have on staff now—both have retired 

this year, actually. They have kind of tapped out, but Ambassador 

Don Mahley and Ambassador Mike Guhin, what we have done is 

retained them and their expertise through contract to continue 

doing work for us even as they have retired. And that is an important aspect of maintaining some of the expertise we have spent so 

many years developing as well. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. McNerney, I notice that few of your senior 

leaders—that is, office director and above—are female career civil 

servants or Foreign Service officers. What is your plan to develop 

women and minorities for senior leadership roles in the ISN Bureau? 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Well, actually, things have changed a bit. People 

are kind of joking that I am turning it into an all-female staff. But 

in our front office, myself and Mary Alice Hayward are two of the 

senior officers. We have additionally two male officers, one of them 

who is Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, also of minority descent—Asian American. And when you look down to our office directors, we now have Ambassador Rita Ragsdale, who is one of the 

Ambassadors, one of the office directors, as well as an additional 

Foreign Service officer who heads our Export Control Office, as 

well as another female officer who runs our missile technology regime. 

Then if you look down another layer, the women really—a number of them are deputies, and a number of officers as well that we 

are really kind of bringing up the ranks. 

So, some of this is generational as kind of the development process happens. But I certainly think if you look really across the bureau at both the leadership, the emerging leadership of women, 

and the sort of mid-level as well as the entry level, you see a lot 

of very capable women, strong women, and I think also we try to— 

obviously want to attract across the board not only from the female 

standpoint but all minorities, and try to really attract and have a 

talented but diverse workforce. And I think we are succeeding 

there. 

Senator AKAKA. Now that you have used the word ‘‘minorities,’’ 

let me ask you, what are your plans to develop, bringing in what 

we call a diverse group of personnel, into your Department and to 

diversify the personnel there? 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Obviously, we do all our hiring through the legal 

processes that are put before us. But, I think, all things considered, 

we are doing a pretty good job of attracting a pretty diverse workforce. The Department traditionally was sort of the white man’s 

group, and I think Secretary Rice likes to look back at the last 12 

years, and it certainly has been a different face at the top, which 

also sends a very strong message for recruitment as well. And I 

think certainly one of the things I have tried to look at not only 

looking at those with the top credentials, but seeing if there are 

some talented young officers that maybe did not have the opportunities for schooling or for education, but they look like they are 

bright and they want to work hard, look at ways we can really help 

them integrate into our workforce and to ensure through legal 

49 

methods that we have the kind of workforce that one would expect 

at the State Department. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Taglialatela, would you care to make comments on this question that I just asked? 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. It has been the policy of the Department and 

our goal to have a diverse workforce. Particularly when you look 

at what our role is, we want to be the face of America, in our embassies overseas, and here in Washington as well. And this is 

where we have relied very heavily on the Presidential Management 

Fellows. We have a very engaged career entry program for recent 

college graduates, and we also rely very heavily on our internship 

program to attract a diverse population. 

The State Department has 17 diplomats in residence who are all 

career Foreign Service officers, many of whom have served as Ambassadors, located at universities throughout the United States. 

While they are assigned to a particular university, they actually 

cover regions, and they deal with particularly diverse populations 

where they seek out and try to make young people aware of what 

the State Department is, what we do, what are the opportunities 

there for you, and encourage them to consider the State Department as an internship. 

We find that many young people who have no idea what the 

State Department is or truly what we do, once they come to an internship for a summer as a sophomore or a junior, many get 

hooked on what we do and start to think about it as a career for 

the future. So we really rely very heavily on our diplomats in residence and other individuals who travel around the United States 

to encourage young people to consider it as an occupation. 

Senator AKAKA. I will have two more questions for both of you. 

In previous testimony, it was suggested that the Foreign Service 

creates few incentives for Foreign Service officers to obtain the 

knowledge for leadership positions in nonproliferation and arms 

control. How would you develop a career path for FSOs in these 

areas? 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Well, one of the challenges we really do have as 

a bureau is attracting Foreign Service officers. And I think that the 

reason for that is in terms of if you are looking at a career track 

as a Foreign Service officer, spending a couple years at a bureau, 

a functional bureau, really does not build the kind of relationships 

out to the embassies, because the regional bureaus control the hiring out at those embassies. And so it has been a perennial challenge for us to really attract good officers. And those that work the 

issues out in a post, we work with very closely. There is usually 

a political-military officer who does the range of nonproliferation 

and security issues out at an embassy, and that individual builds 

those relationships with us back here, but when they come back to 

Washington, tend to want to go to the regional bureaus. And the 

best and the brightest—the ones you want to attract, obviously— 

are obviously going to be looking at their career and their future 

and trying to build that. 

So it really has been a challenge for us to be able to get the top 

Foreign Service officers. In fact, many of our postings for vacancies 

just go unfilled. And so what we do instead is try to convert those 

for short-term hiring and at least get an ability to bring in some 

50 

talented people to do the work that is required, because we do need 

to be meeting our requirements regardless of whether we can attract the Foreign Service. 

I have talked to the Director General about this, and I just have 

really encouraged him to think about how he can seriously take a 

look at attracting good Foreign Service officers through incentives. 

And if there isn’t a mechanism or if it is decided that they would 

like to keep the status quo, then we need to seriously consider 

switching those to Civil Service positions, because certainly the 

workload is not going away just because a Foreign Service officer 

does not bid on a post. But, I think certainly, if we are talking 

about building the expertise of the Foreign Service in these areas— 

and these are great challenges of the day, obviously—a tour in one 

of our bureaus certainly would be an ideal way to develop that kind 

of capability. 

Senator AKAKA. Would you care to make a comment on that, Ms. 

Taglialatela? 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. Yes. The Director General is fully aware of 

the problems we have recruiting people to the non-traditional Foreign Service bureaus, the functional bureaus in particular. And I 

think we are always encouraging officers to do a tour in a bureau 

that is not traditional to his or her occupational series or career 

track. 

What we have done for the Foreign Service officers is create a 

career development plan that says before you can move from the 

Foreign Service into the Senior Foreign Service, you have to have 

done a number of things. And based on the individual cones, we encourage officers to serve out of their particular career track. We encourage them to serve in bureaus other than regional bureaus. But 

along with that, we encourage them to learn more than one language, serve in several different bureaus in several different regions when they are overseas. We are attempting to stimulate 

them to become true generalists, have broader backgrounds, and 

hopefully this way we will encourage them to look at these opportunities. 

Right now, because of the demands on Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, India, and the fact that we have not gotten additional 

Foreign Service officers, unfortunately we have a shortage of Foreign Service officers, particularly at the mid-levels, to fill positions. 

We have asked in our 2009 budget for additional resources. We are 

working with Congress as they look at our 2009 budget to see if, 

in fact, we can get additional resources. But as long as there are 

more jobs than there are people, obviously they are going to pick 

the jobs that they find to be more career enhancing in their perspective. 

Senator AKAKA. Do you have any recommendations for improving 

the organizational structure and staffing for the T Bureau? If so, 

what are your top three? 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Well, I guess I have read the transcripts from 

the last hearing. The one thing I would recommend highly that we 

do not try to do is re-create a separate agency. I would bet some 

money that if you went around and polled the employees and asked 

them, ‘‘Do you want to work at the State Department or a separate 

agency?’’ you would hear overwhelmingly that these officers are 

51 

proud to be working at the State Department. They feel they are 

integrated into the policy structure, and that is where they certainly would like to stay. 

I think an area for encouragement, sort of my second point, 

would be if you are going to continue to encourage officers to stay 

with it, move up the chain, you have got to have incentives for 

movement up to the SES level. There has been a reduction across 

the government, I believe—Linda can get into that—in the number 

of SES slots. And so there is limited sort of ceilings for people as 

they are moving up the chain. And so looking at whether you cannot create a few more of these kinds of incentives to young officers 

that see a career path that is not going to stop at a GS–14 or GS– 

15 is obviously essential to continuing that kind of movement. 

And then I think the third recommendation might be to look at 

whether there isn’t a way to hire a little bit uniquely for some of 

this expertise that we need to attract. The hiring processes are 

cumbersome, and you have requirements about how you go about 

attracting good people. We, as I say, do it by the book, but it is 

pretty difficult to find someone with some of the background and 

capability using sort of the typical processes unless you are going 

to start sort of young, as I discussed, and kind of train them and 

groom them. And then, of course, any officer for any sorts of reasons can decide they want to move to another agency, move to another bureau within the Department, quit government and move 

somewhere else, take a break from working for a period of time. 

All those things through all of it, nothing is sort of fail-safe as you 

develop these kinds of incentives. But I think to the degree that we 

sort of see long-term ability to move up the chain and to have some 

of the rank and position, that is a great incentive for Civil Service 

officers. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Taglialatela. 

Ms. TAGLIALATELA. Thank you, sir. One of the things we did 2 

years ago was we created our Civil Service Mid-Level Rotation program. This program allows a number of Civil Service employees to 

apply, and once selected, swap jobs so that there is no vacant job, 

but they all move to a different bureau. Most of them have analytical reporting, writing, advocacy kinds of training backgrounds so 

that at the GS–12/GS–13, they are actually learning to use their 

skills in a different substantive area. 

Sometimes it is more difficult to do it in highly technical areas 

such as the T Bureau family, but one of the things we could consider to give them greater experience is to allow them—or set up 

something within just the T family where they rotate amongst the 

bureaus there and develop different perspectives of the same sort 

of subject matter. 

As far as the SES program goes, the State Department has implemented a SES candidate program. We are in the process of selecting the candidates. We have 98 candidates applying for five to 

six candidate positions. We will be interviewing candidates in the 

next month. There are highly qualified candidates from throughout 

the Department, but including the T family. 

Another thing we probably need to look at in greater detail is opportunities for either training or developmental assignments for individuals. I think one of the things that is very frustrating across 

52 

the State Department is the fact that we do run two personnel systems. Civil Service employees tend to get in a position and stay in 

them for a very long time, very traditional to all the other Federal 

agencies. Unfortunately, we have Foreign Service officers who rotate every 2 to 3 years in Washington and overseas, and I think 

people get the lust to move on, do different things, have greater experiences because they see their colleagues who are sitting right 

next to them doing just that. 

So it has presented a problem to the Department which we are 

looking at, such as through the Civil Service Mid-Level program 

and other kinds of training programs and developmental assignments to help the Civil Service get greater flexibility in being able 

to move around the Department. 

Senator AKAKA. I would like to thank both of you for your testimony and your responses. However, I am concerned that the arms 

control, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation bureaucracy has 

been crippled by the 2005 bureau reorganization as well as by the 

ACDA merger with the State Department in 1999. I am not convinced this bureaucracy in its current state has the human capital 

and organizational structures in place to respond to future challenges. This Subcommittee will continue to focus on reforms to critical aspects of our national security. Over the next few months, we 

will examine the foreign assistance and public diplomacy bureaucracies and processes. 

I will also be looking at transition planning. There will be a new 

President next January and new leadership at the State Department. We must take every step to ensure continuity in key positions at the Department, especially in light of the high rate of retirements within the Foreign and Civil Service ranks. 

Before we adjourn, I want to acknowledge a large group of students from California who I understand are in this audience. Is 

that correct? Yes. Well, welcome. I am glad you are here, and I 

want to express the hope that you have paid attention to the opportunities for public service in the State Department. And I hope you 

would look with interest in taking up some of those opportunities. 

And I want to welcome you from California to this hearing. 

The hearing record will be open for one week for additional statements or questions other Members may have. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:38 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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