Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

National Defense University

Washington, D.C. 
Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

National Defense University

Since its inception in 1994, the Center for the Study of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction (previously the Center for Counterproliferation 

Research) has been at the forefront of research on the consequences of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for American 

security. Originally focusing on threats to the Armed Forces, the 

WMD Center now also applies its expertise and body of research to 

the challenges of homeland defense and security. In February 2004, 

President George W. Bush commended the Center for providing 

“vital insight into the dangers of a new era.”

The broad mandate of the Center includes research, education, 

and outreach. Its research focuses on understanding the security 

implications of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the challenge of fashioning effective responses to them. Education and 

outreach programs seek to enhance awareness in the next generation of military and civilian leaders of the WMD threat as it relates 

to defense and homeland security policy, programs, technology, 

and operations. As a part of its outreach efforts, the WMD Center 

hosts annual symposia on key issues, bringing together experts and 

participants from the government and private sectors.
The Future Nuclear Landscape

The Future Nuclear Landscape

by Paul I. Bernstein, 

John P. Caves, Jr., and 

John F. Reichart

Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Occasional Paper 5

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

April 2007
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Contents

Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

A Complex and Dynamic Nuclear Landscape . 1

Potential “Game Changers” . . . . . . . . . . 3

Challenges in Shaping the Nuclear Landscape. 16

Progress in Addressing Nuclear Threats . . . 21

Nuclear Modernization in Russia, China, 

and the United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Adapting Declaratory Policy to 

Evolving Threats and Capabilities. . . . . . . . 33

Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

vii

Acknowledgments

This occasional paper of the National Defense University’s Center 

for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Center) 

examines aspects of the contemporary and emerging international security environment that the authors believe will define the future 

nuclear landscape and identifies some associated priorities for policymakers. The foundation for the paper is the presentations and discussions conducted during the WMD Center’s sixth annual symposium, 

The Future Nuclear Landscape: New Realities, New Responses, held at the 

National Defense University on May 17–18, 2006. In several areas, the 

authors have expanded upon those discussions and examined broader 

issues and considerations shaping the nuclear landscape.

While all symposium sessions were off the record and all comments 

delivered on a nonattribution basis, the authors wish to thank the many 

speakers and panelists for their contributions to that event and, hence, to 

this paper. In particular, the WMD Center thanks Ambassador Jack D. 

Crouch, II, Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor, and Dr. John J. Hamre, President and Chief Executive Officer, Center 

for Strategic and International Studies, and former Deputy Secretary of 

Defense, for delivering the symposium’s keynote addresses.

The WMD Center also expresses its appreciation to Ambassador 

Linton F. Brooks, Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security, and 

Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, for his perspectives on implementing global partnerships for nuclear security. 

Additionally, the symposium owes its success to the following key participants: Dr. Julie Bentz, Ms. M. Elaine Bunn, Ms. Bernadette Camille, 

Dr. Leonard W. Connell, Dr. Lewis A. Dunn, Mr. Michael Eisenstadt, 

Mr. Fritz W. Ermarth, Mr. Michael Evenson, Mr. James A. Kelly, Ms. 

Ellen Laipson, Dr. Peter R. Lavoy, Dr. Ronald F. Lehman II, Mr. Thomas 

Lehrman, Colonel Charles D. Lutes, USAF, Mr. Franklin C. Miller, Dr. 

Roger C. Molander, Dr. Michael Nacht, Major General Richard Y. Newton III, USAF, Mr. Vayl Oxford, Mr. Daniel B. Poneman, Dr. Brad Roberts, Dr. Mark Schneider, Dr. James A. Tegnelia, Mr. James P. Thomas, 

and Captain Kurt W. Tidd, USN.

The Future Nuclear Landscape



A Complex and Dynamic Nuclear Landscape 

I

n important ways, the world is at a nuclear crossroads. The complex 

and dynamic nuclear landscape presents us with challenges along 

at least four axes: regional nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism, 

great power nuclear relations, and the security implications of increased 

interest in nuclear energy. These problems are interrelated in ways that 

the national security community does not fully understand. Strategy and 

policy frameworks do not address them in sufficiently integrated fashion. 

New conceptual thinking is required to develop a more unified understanding of and approach to managing the risks and opportunities posed 

by these 21st-century nuclear challenges.

Today, more than at any other time in the nuclear era, nuclear capacity 

and potential (knowledge, technology, and materials) are accessible to a growing number of actors with more ambitious goals. The result is a high degree 

of nuclear latency that challenges traditional thinking about nuclear threats. 

Whereas 30 or 40 years ago, only a handful of countries were assumed to 

know how to acquire nuclear weapons, as many as 35 or 40 nations currently 

are believed to be in the know, and many more could become so based on 

their participation in civilian nuclear energy programs.1

In a world characterized by high nuclear latency, a number of risks 

stand out. One is simply that there may be multiple ways for states to be 

considered nuclear-capable. While robust nuclear weapons programs 

remain the most serious proliferation danger, a range of possibilities 

below this threshold or level of capability must be of concern as well. So 

must be models of weapons development enabled by technologies and 

processes that might be easier to conceal and harder to detect (for example, laser enrichment). A nuclear-latent world also challenges our thinking about warning, suggesting the possibility of a significant mismatch 

between lead times and reaction times. Finally, careful attention must 

be paid to the catalytic or transformative events that could push a latent 

nuclear actor toward a more active or accelerated posture. Japan often 

is cited as a possibility in this regard, but also of concern are so-called 

rollback states that could, with varying degrees of ease, reconstitute their 

nuclear weapons programs in response to changed conditions.

These considerations have significant implications for political and 

technical intelligence, not least of which is the need for a sharper focus on 

intentions. More broadly, there needs to be a way to measure latency that 

is meaningful to decisionmakers and planners. Metrics may be qualitative 

and/or quantitative and should strive to enable policies that can influence 
	 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 5

both intentions (for example, through incentives) and capabilities (for 

example, through barriers).

The latency challenge will grow as more states gain access to either 

basic or more advanced levels of nuclear technology. Consider the countries that recently have expressed interest in or intent to initiate or expand 

nuclear energy activities, including in some cases developing an indigenous capability to enrich uranium: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 

Egypt, Morocco, South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela.2 Driving these decisions is a dynamic mix of motivations shaped by security, 

energy, and science. Anxiety about North Korea and Iran likely is fueling 

proliferation pressures in East Asia and the Middle East as threat perceptions evolve and concerns grow about the fraying of the international 

nonproliferation regime. Others may look at these cases and conclude 

that possessing or seeking nuclear weapons results in enhanced leverage and influence. Energy security is an increasingly salient factor in the 

appeal of nuclear technology, given the economics of oil and what may 

become increasing pressures to find alternatives to fossil fuels in light of 

global warming. Additionally, many countries associate nuclear not just 

with security or energy, but with modernity as well. That is, access to 

nuclear science and technology is seen by those who consider themselves 

behind as a powerful means to join the community of advanced nations.

The problem is not limited to states. Small groups or individuals operating outside traditional political boundaries may be capable of 

assisting states or terror groups in developing or acquiring nuclear capability. In this sense, the A.Q. Khan clandestine nuclear procurement network—to cite only the most prominent nuclear black market activity—is 

a concrete manifestation of globalization in the security arena. In the 

future, we may look back at the Khan phenomenon not as an anomaly but 

as the harbinger of a period in which literally anything could be bought 

or sold. Certainly, this is a problem that the framers of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), 40 years ago, could not have anticipated.

It is no surprise, then, that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is 

under great stress. The regime overall has been effective in containing the 

spread of nuclear weapons, not least by giving governments confidence 

that restraint is in their self-interest. But the progress of determined, hostile proliferators poses a major threat to the integrity of the regime and 

the norms that it embodies. Failure to resolve these challenges and delegitimize various models of creeping proliferation could lead to a broadbased loss of faith in the regime and its effectiveness as a security alternative to possessing nuclear weapons. Increasing global energy demand is 
The Future Nuclear Landscape 

a complicating factor not only because nuclear energy is becoming more 

appealing but also because of the geopolitics of oil. In a time of higher oil 

prices, it will be difficult to impose the type of hard sanctions that may 

be necessary to induce states such as Iran—a major oil exporter that also 

has the capability to interfere with other exporters’ oil shipments—to 

limit their nuclear ambitions. China’s rapidly growing need for imported 

energy is of particular concern here, as Beijing seeks to establish strategic 

relationships with major oil exporters such as Iran.

Indeed, it is not possible to separate regional nuclear proliferation 

challenges fully from the dynamics of great power strategic relations. 

While the United States has been highly proactive in developing innovative approaches to the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) problem, 

it needs the help of Russia and China to work the hardest cases, such as 

North Korea and Iran. Washington, Moscow, and Beijing clearly have 

some common interest in managing these problems, but there are also 

pressures working against cooperation, including differing assessments 

of the importance and urgency of the North Korean and Iranian nuclear 

challenges and uncertainty in each capital about where the others are 

headed in terms of nuclear and other strategic force capabilities. Strategic 

dialogue to address these uncertainties and forge a more common perspective on the nuclear future may make it easier to bridge some of the 

differences evident in addressing the WMD challenge. Exploring linkages 

across these dimensions of security may yield new opportunities for great 

power cooperation.

Potential “Game Changers” 

An Openly Nuclear North Korea 

North Korea’s nuclear test of October 9, 2006, ended any doubt as to 

whether Pyongyang has developed nuclear weapons. The test was a logical progression of the North’s nuclear policy, the overall thrust of which in 

recent years has been to convince the world—and the United States in 

particular—of its nuclear capability. While the technical aspects of the test 

suggest North Korea has only a rudimentary weapons capability, there is no 

longer any uncertainty about the North’s ability to achieve a nuclear yield. 

North Korea must now be considered a de facto nuclear weapons state.3

In response to the test, the United States was successful in crafting a sanctions resolution that was approved unanimously by the United 

Nations (UN) Security Council. The sanctions are less than comprehensive, 
	 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 5

however, and there are indications that China interprets its obligations under 

the sanctions resolution differently than does the United States. Moreover, 

South Korea has expressed reluctance to jeopardize a number of high-profile 

bilateral economic development projects with the North. These fault lines in 

the sanctions regime notwithstanding, diplomacy appears to have been given 

a fresh impetus in the immediate post-test period. Three-way talks brokered 

by Beijing involving U.S., North Korean, and Chinese officials resulted in an 

agreement to resume the six-party disarmament talks. According to press 

accounts, U.S. willingness to shift its stance on direct talks with North Korea 

and to discuss financial penalties imposed in 2005 on Asian banks accused 

of aiding North Korean counterfeiting operations were important factors in 

bringing Pyongyang back to the negotiating table.4

Whether the six-party talks have any realistic prospect of success is now openly debated. After taking actions—missile and nuclear 

tests—publicly deemed unacceptable to the United States and escaping 

the harshest penalties, North Korea may believe it can bargain from a 

position of strength. The United States hopes the opposite is true: that 

the UN sanctions will motivate Pyongyang and enhance Washington’s 

leverage. Even as diplomacy continues, however, the practical focus has 

already begun to shift toward containing a nuclear-armed North Korea, 

particularly preventing and deterring nuclear use and nuclear transfers to 

third parties, and reassuring anxious regional allies. As the region begins 

adjusting to life with an openly nuclear North Korea, what are the possible repercussions?

One possibility is that having gained membership in what remains 

a fairly exclusive international club, Kim Jong-Il will feel more secure 

and perhaps become easier to deal with. More likely is that the increased 

confidence derived from possessing a demonstrated nuclear capability 

will embolden Kim to continue aggressive and risk-taking behavior. A 

number of significant dangers stand out: increased pressure on South 

Korea and Japan for purposes of extracting concessions and aid; accelerated efforts to build nuclear weapons capable of being delivered on longrange missiles; and, as nuclear fuel and weapons production increase, 

possible sales to terror groups or states seeking nuclear capability, both 

for financial gain and as a means to heighten the risks facing the United 

States. This last danger may lead the United States to consider additional 

and more explicit actions designed to limit North Korea’s ability to transfer nuclear materials (for example, a blockade of goods leaving the North, 

or a tailored declaratory policy), as suggested by the sanctions resolution 

tabled by Washington shortly after the nuclear test.
The Future Nuclear Landscape 

Additionally, the United States and South Korea must consider the 

possibility that North Korea, if it develops more than a token arsenal, will 

integrate nuclear weapons into its war planning. It may be that Pyongyang 

views these weapons principally as instruments of extortion, coercion, 

and regime survival, but some analysts and planners believe that early 

North Korean use of nuclear weapons in a major war is plausible. Such 

early use conceivably could advance a number of possible objectives: raise 

the stakes of U.S. and Japanese involvement, deter attacks directly on the 

regime, avoid a “use it or lose it” situation, and galvanize loyalty among 

its own people. If it is possible that war on the peninsula could go nuclear 

early, there is no separating deterrence of North Korean nuclear use from 

deterrence or prevention of conflict altogether. This will require a deterrence strategy that combines threats of severe punishment with credible 

denial capabilities.

But whether a sustained effort to enhance deterrence will even be 

possible is unclear. Much will depend on whether the U.S.–South Korean 

alliance emerges stronger or weaker in the post-test period. While Seoul 

shows no sign of abandoning its efforts at forging closer ties to the North, 

some South Korean officials have pressed the United States to reaffirm, 

and even strengthen, existing security guarantees. China’s diplomatic 

stature and its ambition to be seen as a responsible global power could 

suffer depending on the outcome of the six-party talks. While Beijing has 

facilitated the resumption of talks following North Korea’s nuclear test, it 

has also been unable—or unwilling—to dissuade Pyongyang from taking 

the provocative actions that have created a crisis atmosphere in Northeast 

Asia. As talks resume with perhaps one last chance to achieve success, the 

stakes for China in encouraging restraint in North Korea’s behavior and 

compromise at the negotiating table would appear to be high. Not least, 

failure in the six-party talks, followed by further steps on Pyongyang’s 

part to strengthen its nuclear status, could create significant strains in 

U.S.-China relations.

The stakes may be even greater for the United States. Its stature 

and credibility would suffer in the wake of a major nonproliferation failure, especially one likely to result in intensified proliferation pressures 

throughout the region. The reverberations would be felt beyond the 

region as well. Iran, in particular, will be watching how the United States, 

other regional powers, and the international community respond to an 

openly nuclear North Korea. So will other states—both those contemplating the nuclear option and those who see their security as tied to the 

strength of the international nonproliferation regime. U.S. policymakers 
	 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 5

must formulate a comprehensive strategy today in order to put in place 

political and military firewalls to contain the proliferation pressures that 

could be unleashed by an openly nuclear North Korea and to prevent or 

deter Pyongyang from using nuclear weapons and transferring nuclear 

capabilities to other states or terrorists.

A Nuclear Iran 

Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear capability is already a complex challenge for 

the United States and its allies, even though many Western analysts believe 

Iran is 5 to 10—and perhaps as many as 15—years away from being able to 

produce a weapon.5 Iran remains on a sharp learning curve in its uranium 

enrichment efforts and may be experiencing technical difficulties that will 

slow the pace of producing bombmaking materials.6 This means that significant time may remain both to pursue diplomatic solutions under which 

Iran would forego nuclear weapons and to impose delays on Iran’s program 

in the hope that the current domestic consensus supporting it will weaken 

or collapse. Whether extra time can make a difference remains to be seen, 

but some government officials and experts outside government believe that 

Iran is intent on achieving some type of nuclear weapons capability and that 

negotiations or even coercive measures are unlikely to prevent that outcome. 

In this view, Tehran will accept isolation rather than concede on the nuclear 

issue, but it probably believes it can become a nuclear power at an acceptable 

price and leverage its nuclear status for enhanced power and influence.

A number of recent developments underscore a pessimistic outlook: 

the ascendance of Iranian rulers, including President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with possible messianic convictions; the strengthened position in 

Iran of the pro-nuclear Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); the 

significant spike in global oil prices; and efforts by the Iranian government 

to make the regime more resistant to economic sanctions.7 These developments are reinforced by fundamental Iranian mistrust of American intentions, a weakened U.S. position in the region, perceived divisions among the 

major powers, and, in all likelihood, a sense in Tehran that the “correlation 

of forces” is in its favor. Taken together, in the words of one analyst, “the 

thrust of these developments is that Iran appears to have committed itself 

fully—in terms of absolutist regime rhetoric, the investment of ‘face’ and 

material resources, and anticipation of penalties—to the completion of an 

indigenous nuclear fuel cycle as the basis for a nuclear weapons capability.”8

Others argue that this kind of proliferation fatalism is dangerous in 

light of where Iran stands in the weapons development process, the very 

significant risks posed by a nuclear Iran, and uncertainty about whether 
The Future Nuclear Landscape 

deterrence strategies can work.9 But how might a nuclear Iran behave, 

and what are the implications? In the event that Iran goes nuclear, will 

everything in the region change at once, or will the effects unfold slowly 

and incrementally?

Answers to these questions are inherently speculative, and there is no 

consensus among experts. Some believe a nuclear Iran—whether overtly 

nuclear or capable of assembling weapons rapidly—will present an even 

greater challenge to Western interests and regional stability, more openly 

asserting its hegemonic ambitions, intimidating its neighbors, exporting 

its brand of Islamic revolution, and leveraging its position in the global oil 

economy. Nuclear capability will lead Iran to take more risks, much as Pakistan was emboldened by its 1998 nuclear tests to confront India in Khargil, 

and much as Saddam Hussein’s adventurism appears to have been fueled 

by progress in chemical and biological weapons in the late 1980s. Others 

wonder whether Iranian nuclear weapons would remain under centralized 

control, or who would control the details of nuclear operations. The possible role of the IRGC is especially problematic here, given its contacts with 

known terror groups. Iran could also decide to become a supplier of nuclear 

technology to other problem states.

An alternative view posits that a nuclear Iran will feel more secure 

and pursue a more moderate course in the region, adopt a deterrence 

strategy, and rather than brandish its nuclear weapons, treat them as 

weapons of last resort and regime survival. But even if nuclear weapons 

do not moderate Tehran’s behavior, some analysts believe that Iran can 

be deterred and contained, even from transferring nuclear capabilities 

to terrorists.10 Is there a basis for deterrence optimism in the case of Iran 

other than a general belief that states are rational actors and perforce constrained by fear of retaliation? Deterrence remains a guessing game to a 

significant degree, but some analysts suggest that the United States faces 

an enormous challenge making deterrence threats credible to Iran’s leaders—and convincing them that we will not act on these threats if Tehran 

conciliates. Fundamentally, the Iranian leadership views the United States 

as inherently hostile, and there is little basis to assume how they would 

respond to U.S. threats or pledges of restraint. The emergence of national 

leaders with possible messianic convictions who may seek confrontation 

is a potentially significant complicating factor. Still, elements of the leadership, while perhaps overestimating U.S. hostility, seem to understand 

the substance of U.S. declarations and appear capable of conciliating if 

compelled. Thus, deterrence appears viable in principle, but it will require 

gaining a far greater degree of situational awareness than we currently 
	 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 5

possess, and a very careful calibration of the variables that would shape 

deterrence dynamics in an actual crisis.

How would others in the region react to a nuclear Iran? Will Arab 

states that have learned to live with a nuclear-armed Israel (particularly 

Egypt and Syria) find themselves unable to live with a nuclear-armed 

Iran? Not necessarily. Neither of these states reacted in kind to Iraq’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. These states might choose instead to improve 

selected conventional or chemical capabilities. States such as Turkey, 

Saudi Arabia, and a future Iraq may feel compelled to react in some way, 

though it may be possible to influence their responses through their 

security ties to the United States and others. The groundswell of anxiety 

emerging in the region as a result of Iran’s growing power and influence 

conceivably could lead to stronger collective security arrangements in the 

Gulf. Alternatively, it could lead to greatly heightened proliferation pressures in response to which countries such as Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi 

Arabia decide to pursue an independent nuclear capability. The first two 

have recently announced plans to expand nuclear energy activities; the 

latter two have ties to nuclear powers that could provide assistance (Israel 

and Pakistan, respectively).11 None of them may wait until Iran crosses 

the finish line. How Egypt and Saudi Arabia react may also be shaped 

in part by Israel’s actions. In an effort to buttress deterrence of Iran and 

reassure its own public, Israel might choose to declare its nuclear status 

openly, while exploring further options to enhance the survivability of 

its forces and protection of its cities. Such a development could reinforce 

Cairo’s and Riyadh’s interest in the nuclear option.

Finally, the United States, confronted with a nuclear-armed Iran, 

will need to consider a broad range of actions to manage a new and complex set of risks and challenges. Even as political and coercive strategies to 

prevent Iran from going nuclear continue to unfold, it is not too early to 

consider contingency planning focused on:

■ reassuring regional friends and allies and trying to contain proliferation pressures through enhanced security cooperation

■ assessing the prospects for coercive disarmament through political or 

military means

■ enhancing U.S. military capabilities in the region, including those for 

power projection, missile defense, and nuclear, biological, and chemical protection for forces and populations

■ developing a tailored deterrence strategy

■ preventing Iran from transferring nuclear capabilities to terrorists.
The Future Nuclear Landscape 

Fallout from the U.S.-India Deal 

In July 2005, the United States and India announced the creation 

of a global partnership that would include civil nuclear cooperation, 

ending a nearly 30-year embargo on U.S. nuclear trade with India. In 

March 2006, the two governments reached agreement on the details of 

the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, under which India 

will separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities, and place some 

of the civilian sites under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

safeguards. Additionally, India has committed to adhere to the IAEA’s 

Additional Protocol, continue its unilateral nuclear test moratorium, 

not transfer enrichment or reprocessing technologies to states that do 

not have them, adopt national export control laws in harmony with the 

Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime, and 

work with the United States to conclude a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.12

The George W. Bush administration has committed to seek changes to 

U.S. nonproliferation laws and international nuclear commerce rules in 

order to accommodate the agreement, supply nuclear fuel to India, and 

enable Indian participation in international research activities exploring 

advanced nuclear energy concepts.13

For the United States, the impetus for reversing almost three decades 

of nonproliferation policy is fundamentally political: to transform the 

relationship with India by ushering in a new era of cooperation that will 

strengthen India’s position and thereby promote a more stable order in 

Asia. U.S. and Indian interests are converging, and a democratic, economically dynamic, and politically moderate India is seen as a natural 

ally of the United States in a strategically important region. Not least, an 

India with enhanced international legitimacy, growing power, and energy 

security can serve as a de facto counterweight to an increasingly powerful China, although administration officials insist this is not the principal 

purpose of reconfiguring relations with New Delhi.

Washington sees bilateral nuclear cooperation as enabling this 

transformation. This requires remedying India’s anomalous position in 

the nuclear nonproliferation regime, bringing it closer to the mainstream 

of global nonproliferation efforts. India will no longer be treated as a nonproliferation outlier or be subject to sanctions for being a nuclear power 

outside the NPT. In return, India will bring at least some of its nuclear 

activities and national laws into compliance with longstanding rules governing safeguards and nuclear commerce. Principally, India will place an 

additional eight power reactors under safeguards by 2014, and will do 
10 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 5

the same for future reactors it declares to be civilian. Additional facilities 

associated with fuel fabrication will also be made available for safeguards. 

Excluded from the separation plan are eight operational or planned power 

reactors, breeder reactors under construction, heavy water plants, uranium enrichment facilities, spent fuel reprocessing facilities, and selected 

research reactors.14

The agreement has generated strong criticism among some Members of Congress and in the nonproliferation community. The critique of 

the agreement falls along the following main lines:

■ It excludes too many Indian facilities from safeguards and fails to 

place meaningful limits on India’s ability to produce fissile materials for weapons. Indeed, U.S. fuel supplies to India could facilitate expansion of its nuclear arsenal.15

■ It undermines the NPT regime by rewarding a nonmember with nuclear technology and undermining the standard of full-scope safeguards as the criterion for receiving nuclear assistance (affirmed at 

the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences).

■ It creates a double standard and sets a bad precedent at a time when 

the international community is struggling to deal with North Korean 

and Iranian nuclear activities. In fact, it is not clear how much support the United States can expect from India on the Iran case, given 

the growing strategic relationship between New Delhi and Tehran.

■ It will not bring India into the nonproliferation mainstream because India remains outside the NPT, has not signed the Comprehensive Test 

Ban Treaty, and continues to produce fissile material for weapons.

■ It will not lead India to become a counterweight to China. India 

may compete with China for regional influence, but there are also important elements of political, economic, and military cooperation in the relationship. Moreover, India has a strong tradition of 

foreign policy independence.

Administration officials characterize the agreement, despite its limitations, as advancing nonproliferation objectives by enlisting India more 

fully and explicitly in global efforts to limit nuclear proliferation, without 

adding to India’s military capabilities. While India remains outside the 

NPT, it is viewed by Washington as having a good record on nonproliferation and technology transfer and as a responsible steward of its civilian and nuclear enterprises. The agreement with India may represent a 

nonproliferation double standard, but the circumstances are sufficiently 

unique that it should not set a harmful precedent. The payoff is promising 

enough to make the benefits outweigh the risks, which can be managed. 

In any case, the punitive policies of the past are clearly obsolete.
The Future Nuclear Landscape 11

Beyond stating the obvious—that the U.S.-India nuclear deal is 

a watershed development whose consequences are likely to be significant—it is difficult to predict how the agreement will shape proliferation 

dynamics or the politics of nonproliferation. The double-standard issue 

should not be casually dismissed. In the assessment of one analyst:

In the past 10 years, virtually all states agreed to strengthen the 

nonproliferation regime, sacrificing some sovereignty by allowing 

additional, intrusive inspections under the Additional Protocol. 

In the wake of the revelations in 2004 about Pakistani scientist 

A.Q. Khan’s nuclear black market sales, non-nuclear weapon 

states under the NPT are also being asked to consider further 

restrictions on their sovereignty by voluntarily restricting their 

access to sensitive nuclear technologies like uranium enrichment 

and reprocessing. If some states view the U.S.-Indian nuclear 

cooperation agreement as a breach of faith in the basic bargain 

of the NPT, they might be less inclined to accept additional 

sacrifices, to the detriment of the nonproliferation regime.16

Moreover, nuclear powers whose help we need to deal with Iran, in 

particular China and Russia, are quick to point out what they view as double 

standards in U.S. nonproliferation policy. This is one type of consequence 

to be concerned about. Another is the possibility that the agreement could 

contribute to pressures to expand nuclear arsenals in the region. The agreement may or may not lead India to enlarge its stockpile, but it is likely to fuel 

Pakistani anxiety about its own capability to produce sufficient fissile materials and weapons and about the implications of greater U.S.-India cooperation 

for the conventional balance on the subcontinent as well. Chinese opposition 

to the agreement has become more vocal, and from Beijing’s vantage, the 

potential for growth in Indian fissile material stocks and weapons production, 

especially in the context of developments in longer-range missiles, heightens 

the threat facing China. While a major nuclear buildup in the region may not 

be inevitable, the risk of an arms race cannot be dismissed. Much will depend 

on India’s behavior in the period ahead. The United States should be paying attention now to the ways in which regional nuclear dynamics could be 

reshaped by civil nuclear cooperation with India—dynamics that include the 

United States, India, Pakistan, China, and possibly Japan.

Nuclear “Next Use” 

The next use of a nuclear weapon will shock the international system with potentially far-reaching consequences, especially if it is deemed 

successful in achieving the user’s objectives. In considering the prospects 
12 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 5

for nuclear next use, three critical questions present themselves: Is nuclear 

use becoming more likely? How will the next use of nuclear weapons 

shape attitudes about the utility of nuclear weapons and incentives to possess them? What are the implications for U.S. policies, forces, and planning? While exploration of these questions is inherently speculative, it 

can nonetheless yield insights useful to policy development.

More Likely? Use of nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future is 

conceivable in a number of potential regional conflicts where such use 

may appear to one or more actors as the best of a set of bad alternatives. 

Highly motivated terrorist groups are another concern. Prudent policy 

planning should assume that a next use of nuclear weapons is becoming 

more likely. But what could such use look like? Although the specific circumstances are impossible to know, the key variables surrounding nuclear 

use can be defined. These include the user (state or nonstate); timing in 

the context of a crisis or war; type of weapon; point of attack; objectives; 

effects; and net operational/strategic result. Using these variables, scenarios can be generated to develop and test hypotheses about nuclear use.

Looking at a significant number of illustrative scenarios, state use of 

nuclear weapons can be envisioned in all phases of conflict. It is difficult 

to define a moment of maximum danger; nuclear use may occur at any 

point along a continuum from “out of the blue” through the escalating 

phases of a crisis-conflict and even in a postconflict phase. Terrorist use 

of a nuclear weapon is likely to be unexpected—although it might not 

truly be a surprise, given documented terrorist interest in nuclear capability—and from today’s vantage is most plausibly associated with al Qaeda 

and its affiliated jihadist organizations.

Characteristics of a nuclear next use also could vary widely. Under 

some conditions, a nuclear test could qualify as a next use, undertaken for 

political rather than technical reasons. Detonation of a nuclear weapon to 

achieve electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects could be seen as an attractive 

option for some nuclear-armed states. Nuclear use could support objectives 

ranging from coercion to military operations, war termination, regime preservation, and revenge. Western analysts often view regional nuclear capabilities as weapons of last resort, or closely tied to regime survival. This may well 

be the case in many circumstances. In other circumstances, though, states 

may see the use of nuclear weapons as the only viable means to change the 

status quo or remedy a deteriorating regional security situation. In contrast to 

some Western thinking about nuclear weapons at least since the 1960s, next 

nuclear uses could be intended to dominate the battlefield and make possible 

a military victory in an ongoing regional conflict. Particularly in the case of 
The Future Nuclear Landscape 13

India and Pakistan, either country also could view nuclear use as a means of 

preempting anticipated nuclear use by the other side. Finally, the purpose of 

nuclear next use could be to catalyze action by an outside party—that is, to 

create pressures for other countries to become involved in a conflict.

For states contemplating use of nuclear weapons, there are two 

critical thresholds to be managed: a lower threshold of expected success 

in achieving its objectives, and a higher threshold of triggering decisive 

counterescalation by the country attacked or its allies. The next user 

will want to be above the first threshold and below the second. What is 

especially dangerous is that neither threshold is likely to be well defined 

or well understood—and both are subject to change as a crisis or war 

unfolds. This is but one example of how misperception could contribute 

to a nuclear next use.

What Impact? The impact of next nuclear use on the perceived utility of nuclear weapons and incentives to acquire them will hinge most 

critically on how successful the use is seen by various leaderships. Success 

or failure is likely to be measured in immediate results, near-term consequences, and longer-term spillovers. How other countries, including the 

United States, respond after next use could have an important influence 

on how perceptions form and take hold.

Any next use will erode the longstanding taboo against nuclear use, 

though to what extent will depend on many factors, including the degree 

to which the use is seen as justified by the international community. 

A failed use, a test, or a use with grave and graphic destruction might 

result in less erosion of the nuclear taboo. By contrast, a successful use 

that advanced political and military goals and did not result in decisive 

counterescalation could result in greater erosion. The impact of terrorist nuclear use seems even more uncertain, but if seen not as an isolated 

event but as part of a larger campaign or a harbinger of more to come, 

it could well serve to erode the nuclear taboo that has heretofore constrained state actors.

Any nuclear use is likely to influence state incentives to acquire nuclear 

weapons or strengthen their nuclear security in some other way. Here, too, 

the perceived success or failure of nuclear use would be the most important 

variable. Failed use that led to the virtual destruction of the next user would 

graphically demonstrate the dangers of nuclear weapons and probably help 

bolster nonproliferation efforts. By contrast, a next use that undermined the 

perceived credibility of American nuclear security guarantees could compel 

many countries to rethink their posture of nuclear abstinence.
14 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 5

Implications. While nuclear terrorism understandably remains a 

dominant focus of policymakers, it is also important to take seriously the 

possibility of next use by a state. Policy, military, and intelligence planning 

should focus on gaining an improved understanding of the conditions 

under which different nuclear states might employ their weapons, as well 

as the full set of U.S. interests that would be engaged by such an event. 

Preventing and deterring nuclear next use are clearly the preferred outcomes, but should these fail, U.S interests will include deterring follow-on 

use, reassuring allies and friends, shaping perceptions of nuclear weapons 

utility, defusing ill-considered demands for nuclear disarmament, and 

crafting responses that will leverage the shock to shape the post-use security environment (for example, restoring the nuclear taboo and strengthening nonproliferation efforts).

Where U.S. interests are directly targeted or threatened by a nuclear 

attack, it will be especially important not only to ensure adequate crisis 

and consequence management, but also to take steps to enhance defenses, 

restore deterrence, and convey to the adversary the great risks associated 

with nuclear use against the United States or its allies. Regardless of U.S. 

stakes in a region prior to nuclear use, they are likely to be transformed 

by the very act. Above all, the United States should put in place policies, 

plans, and capabilities to ensure that any next use against the United 

States or an American ally will fail—and to make it known that U.S. policy is committed to that outcome.

New Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle 

The nuclear proliferation crises of the last decade have compelled policymakers to consider how to close the most serious loophole in the NPT 

bargain: the ability of nuclear aspirants to build the means to manufacture 

weapons under the cover of civilian nuclear programs. This is now widely 

appreciated as the center of gravity of the proliferation problem. As nuclear 

technologies continue to spread, especially to meet energy demands, the 

building blocks for a weapons capability will unavoidably spread as well, 

and spent fuel stocks could grow significantly. But even without a major 

expansion in global nuclear energy, this problem now demands urgent 

attention, and serious proposals have been put forth in recent years.

Two basic approaches have been articulated. One emphasizes 

enhanced export controls to limit the spread of nuclear technologies. 

Speaking at the National Defense University in February 2004, President Bush called on the Nuclear Suppliers Group to deny the transfer of 

enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not already 
The Future Nuclear Landscape 15

possess them, even if these states are nonnuclear members of the NPT. 

He further asked these states to renounce enrichment and reprocessing in 

exchange for reliable access to nuclear fuel at a reasonable price.17

An alternative approach proposed by Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA 

director general, goes further by challenging the very idea that states 

should even possess the most sensitive nuclear technologies. Acknowledging that “the margin of security under the current non-proliferation 

regime is becoming too slim for comfort,” ElBaradei proposed to restrict 

enrichment and reprocessing exclusively to facilities under multinational 

control; adopt nuclear energy systems that by design avoid the use of 

materials that may be applied directly to making nuclear weapons or are 

otherwise proliferation-resistant; and develop multinational approaches 

to manage and dispose of spent fuel and radioactive waste.18

Both these approaches promise to toughen the nonproliferation 

regime, but neither is easy to implement or problem-free. Both are likely 

to be viewed by nonweapons states as discriminatory and inconsistent 

with their basic right under Article IV of the NPT to acquire nuclear 

technology for peaceful purposes. A strategy of denial based on informal, nonbinding arrangements may provide only a limited or temporary 

barrier to the further spread of key technologies, especially if demand 

for nuclear energy continues to grow. Furthermore, it may encourage 

the emergence of additional clandestine nuclear supply networks.19

Multinational approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle are hardly a new idea 

and date back to the beginning of the nuclear age and the Baruch Plan 

of 1946. Despite many subsequent efforts, little progress has been made, 

as nations have been reluctant to give up national control over these 

technologies and processes for reasons of sovereignty, concerns about 

the assurance of supply, and economics. For these same reasons, nearterm prospects for a multinational solution seem limited.20 Nonetheless, 

both the Bush and ElBaradei initiatives recognize that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is at an important historical juncture that requires 

new ideas.

There is also a common belief that technology is part of the solution. 

ElBaradei speaks explicitly in his proposal about proliferation-resistant fuel 

cycle technologies. In the United States, the Department of Energy (DOE) 

in February 2006 announced the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership 

(GNEP), an initiative to develop new technologies for reprocessing and 

recycling spent fuel from nuclear power reactors that minimize waste and 

reduce proliferation concerns. If they can be developed, these technologies, it is argued, will be more proliferation-resistant than current methods 
16 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 5

because they will not separate out pure plutonium as part of the recycling 

process; rather, plutonium would be combined with other materials that 

render it significantly less dangerous as a proliferation concern.21 This material would be destroyed in accelerators or fast reactors. Uranium and other 

elements that are chemically removed from spent fuel would be recycled, 

thereby extracting more energy and reducing the volume and heat load of 

waste requiring permanent geologic disposal. Based on international and 

private sector response, DOE believes there are suitable advanced technologies available that may be ready for demonstration and possibly commercial scale operation. Under GNEP, the United States also envisions working 

with other advanced nuclear nations to develop a fuel services program to 

provide fresh fuel and recovery of used fuel to nations that forego the development of enrichment and reprocessing technologies.

Questions about GNEP concern both its policy and technical 

aspects. Some experts believe that ending the de facto U.S. moratorium on 

reprocessing will damage the nonproliferation regime and contribute to 

proliferation dangers. In this view, actively promoting reprocessing makes 

it attractive to others and makes it more difficult to argue that the technology should be restricted. Moreover, reprocessing facilities anywhere 

are potential sources for terrorists seeking nuclear materials. Others 

question whether the technologies being advanced are truly more proliferation-resistant as they would still produce a material that could be used 

to make a nuclear weapon and may be only marginally more resistant to 

theft than separated plutonium. Still others believe that no advanced fuel 

cycle technology can be as cost-effective in minimizing proliferation risks 

as storing unreprocessed spent fuel in a geologic depository. Finally, some 

observers question the wisdom of moving rapidly toward commercialscale reprocessing facilities under GNEP, preferring to see a broad, balanced research and development (R&D) effort to identify new fuel cycle 

technologies for the longer term.22

Challenges in Shaping the Nuclear Landscape 

Impact of the War in Iraq on U.S. Nonproliferation Efforts 

Many governments feel alienated from Washington because the 

public rationale for the Iraq war is widely viewed as either illegitimate or 

based on a massive intelligence failure. The damage to U.S. credibility has 

been serious, making it more difficult to marshal others to confront new 

proliferation threats vigorously (or support U.S. objectives more broadly). 
The Future Nuclear Landscape 17

Forging a common approach to Iran within a coalition that divided bitterly 

over Iraq has compelled the United States to make significant adjustments 

to its strategy. The war also has deepened political divisions at home, making the search for bipartisan approaches more difficult. These domestic 

political constraints and the strain on U.S. forces resulting from the war are 

recognized by Iran and North Korea, whose leaderships likely now see the 

United States as less willing or able to pursue coercive strategies that implicitly or explicitly threaten military action in response to their proliferation 

activities. As a result, these countries are emboldened to resist international 

pressure to dismantle their nuclear programs or capabilities.

Limited Help from Russia and China 

Moscow and Beijing care about containing the spread of nuclear weapons, just not as deeply or intensely as does Washington. While Russia and 

China do not wish to see unchecked proliferation, neither are they prepared 

to make major political or economic sacrifices to support a nonproliferation agenda that is viewed at least by some officials as preserving American 

advantage. Strategic economic considerations increasingly reinforce this: 

nuclear technology is one of the few technologies that Russia can market 

competitively, and China’s aggressive effort to secure energy sources colors its 

posture toward proliferation problems, such as that of Iran. Whereas in the 

past it may have been possible to treat the proliferation problem as a more or 

less stand-alone issue in great power relations, it is no longer possible to separate it from broader economic, energy, and regional security considerations. 

Any effort by the United States to forge a more common or cooperative great 

power approach to managing WMD challenges will require recognizing and 

addressing Russian and Chinese equities.

Chinese officials and commentators increasingly suggest that U.S. 

nonproliferation policy is self-serving and based on double standards. 

Whereas China is pressed on cases such as Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea, 

the United States expects others to support preserving the special status of 

Israel, rewarding India despite its refusal to join the NPT, and accepting the 

creeping nuclearization of Japan. Russia, for its part, has recently issued an 

official document on nonproliferation policy that accuses the United States 

of politicizing nonproliferation and opposes key elements of U.S. strategy 

(although without mentioning the United States).23 On the other hand, 

neither country likely would allow differences over proliferation to cause a 

fundamental breach in their relationships with Washington, and there are 

cooperative activities that are potentially significant. The ongoing strategic 

dialogue with China provides an opportunity to seek stronger common 
18 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 5

ground on countering WMD. Presidents Bush and Vladimir Putin recently 

launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, designed to 

expand and accelerate efforts and capacity among like-minded nations to 

control nuclear materials, stop illicit trafficking, respond to acts of nuclear 

terror, deny safe haven, and strengthen national legal frameworks.24

Gaps in Knowledge and Understanding of Suspect Programs 

and Activities 

Limitations in WMD intelligence are by now a well-studied problem. Even before the serious questions raised by the Iraq war, there were 

efforts to assess the capabilities of the Intelligence Community with 

respect to WMD and identify required reforms.25 The WMD intelligence 

track record is mixed. There have been major successes (not always publicly acknowledged), and there are recognized oases of excellence in the 

community with respect to WMD intelligence collection and analysis. 

There have also been some significant failures and chronic dysfunctions 

stemming from a broad range of organizational, operational, and analytical shortfalls.26 In the aftermath of Iraq and in the face of continuing 

uncertainties vis-à-vis the nuclear intentions and capabilities of North 

Korea, Iran, al Qaeda, and others, it is not surprising to hear the question 

asked: Are our intelligence capabilities good enough to understand this 

threat properly and anticipate the range of challenges that may emerge?

While there is vast room for improvement, it is essential to have realistic expectations. Determined, adaptive proliferators skilled at deception and 

denial will find ways to conceal at least some of their activities from even a 

greatly improved WMD intelligence enterprise. To some degree, therefore, 

uncertainty will always outweigh certainty, and policymakers must accept 

that there are inherent limits to WMD intelligence. But much can be done 

to reduce uncertainty and the ambiguity associated with clandestine WMD 

programs. Emphasis should be placed on minimizing the prospects for significant strategic surprise and providing decisionmakers with more robust 

and timely actionable intelligence. Reforms to enable this must encompass 

organization, methodology, and technology. Compensating for inevitable 

intelligence gaps also requires the military to emphasize a capabilities-based 

approach to planning and investing.

Organizationally, a fundamental problem has been the lack of 

aggressive Intelligence Community ownership of all aspects of the combating WMD intelligence mission. Creating the Office of the Director for 

National Intelligence (ODNI) and a supporting National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) is intended to remedy this problem. Among the 
The Future Nuclear Landscape 19

greatest challenges facing the ODNI and NCPC are improving horizontal 

integration across the WMD Intelligence Community and coordinating collection and analysis efforts around specific high-priority targets.27

With respect to methodology and technology, new sources and methods 

are required that are less well known to adversaries and more tailored to 

discovering concealed WMD activities. These methods overall must focus 

more on the earliest stages of the proliferation process, and they require 

a sharper focus on intentions, people, transactions, and critical nodes, 

enabled by improved human intelligence, information processing, and 

exploitation of persistent intrusive sensing technologies.

Cultural and Organizational Obstacles to Effective Responses 

Strategy and policy analysts often do not understand science and 

technology well. Nuclear functionalists tend to lack in-depth regional 

expertise, while regional or country specialists are not always well versed 

in strategic force issues (China is a good example). There also is a gap 

between nuclear analysts and those working on other military issues. 

These cultural problems both reflect and perpetuate divergent vocabularies and frames of reference, and contribute to stovepipes, turf battles, and 

weak integration of activities. In the combating WMD arena, stovepiped 

organizations and processes have been a persistent problem dating back 

many years. There are signs, however, that the community is moving 

toward greater unity of effort.

In the last 2 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has established an organizational and planning framework to define and execute 

the combating WMD mission. The National Military Strategy to Combat 

WMD provides an “ends-ways-means” approach to planning, executing, 

and resourcing to guide the activities of combatant commanders, Services, and support agencies. It defines core military strategic objectives, 

guiding principles for developing concepts of operations and plans, and 

eight critical missions for the Armed Forces.28 The designation of U.S. 

Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) as lead command for combating 

WMD has laid the foundation for a more integrated, synchronized effort 

across the combatant commands and DOD as a whole to implement this 

strategy. For the first time, there is a single focal point for the Armed 

Forces, an important step toward further institutionalizing combating 

WMD in DOD.

To execute on a day-to-day basis, the commander, USSTRATCOM, 

has established the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating WMD, a component-like organization closely linked to the Defense Threat Reduction 
20 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 5

Agency. The test of these new command and organizational arrangements 

will be the degree to which they can assist regional commands to define, 

plan and resource for, and execute rigorously all aspects of the combating WMD mission. One key focus today is the development of Concept 

Plan 8099, the global concept for the combating WMD mission that will 

provide the planning template for all regional commands. Another is the 

set of joint concepts and capabilities-based assessments that are being 

conducted to support the definition of warfighter requirements and 

enable the USSTRATCOM commander to be an effective advocate in the 

requirements process.

In the Department of State, the Office of the Under Secretary for 

Arms Control and International Security has reorganized to align its 

activities with national combating WMD priorities, to include nuclear 

detection activities, nuclear information-sharing, consequence management, and the development of country- and region-specific plans that can 

be synchronized with DOD plans. In the Intelligence Community, the 

aforementioned National Counterproliferation Center will integrate intelligence, coordinate planning, and conduct strategic operational planning 

at the national level.

Indicators of greater intra- and interagency jointness are encouraging, as are signs that the WMD terror threat has brought the counterproliferation and counterterrorism communities closer together. But a strong 

push is needed to ensure that interagency structures and processes are 

capable of effectively managing complex contingencies involving WMD 

from start to finish—from policy formulation to coordination and execution of operations. Policymakers a decade ago recognized that WMD 

could be a complicating factor in managing complex contingencies.29 This 

is no less true today, and indeed has been brought into even sharper relief 

by intervening events. So the question remains: How can the government 

institutionalize a collaborative process to plan, execute, and assess combating WMD activities and operations, utilizing all the tools of statecraft? 

Especially as the combating WMD playing field becomes more crowded, 

as the toolkit becomes more diverse and sophisticated, and as multiple national and international efforts become more interdependent, the 

requirement for timely and effective interagency coordination will only 

grow. This will require more than refining national strategy and preparing 

decisions for the President; it must include putting in place mechanisms 

to create and sustain long-term plans for combating WMD that develop 

integrated courses of action and enable their execution across multiple 

agencies, including DOD. This capability, if it can be achieved, will create 
The Future Nuclear Landscape 21

new opportunities for defeating the threat, in some cases reducing pressures for military action.

Practical steps toward strengthening interagency capabilities for 

combating WMD include developing an overarching interagency concept 

of operations; clarifying DOD’s relationship to other agencies for both 

war plan execution and response to domestic events, and the associated 

requirements for interagency support; creating the capacity for rapid 

interagency crisis action planning and mission execution; and increasing 

capacity in civilian agencies to better support operations.

Progress in Addressing Nuclear Threats 

A range of programs is now in place to enhance capabilities to deny 

terrorists access to WMD materials, technologies, and expertise. These 

include initiatives that target the spectrum of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, 

and efforts managed by the Department of the Treasury to disrupt terrorist financing. In the nuclear area specifically, additional effort has been 

focused on a number of important challenges, such as the security of 

nuclear facilities in Russia, detecting the movement of nuclear or radiological materials, attributing nuclear attacks in the United States, and 

meeting the information needs of first responders.

Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities 

Terrorists may acquire nuclear capability in a number of ways, 

including an outright purchase or gift from a nuclear weapons state, or 

through the theft of materials that could be used to construct a nuclear or 

radiological weapon. Theft, in fact, is our greatest concern with respect 

to the security of nuclear facilities in Russia. Efforts to date to improve 

nuclear security in Russia have been effective: today, 80 percent of the 

sites where materials are stored have been secured, and current programs 

are on a pace to complete this process by 2008. There has been some 

progress as well in instilling a security culture, a best practices approach, 

and an emphasis on emergency management capabilities.

But there are troubling trends as well. The growing influence of the 

security services has created obstacles to accessing some sensitive sites, 

though Russian authorities have said that they will upgrade security at 

these sites on their own. It is also clear that Russian standards for physical security are less robust. Moreover, a culture of corruption persists in 

Russia, underscoring the risks associated with the insider threat. Many 
22 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 5

small-scale incidents demonstrate this, and while it is a problem the Russian military seems to appreciate, it is less clear that officials of the Federal 

Agency on Atomic Energy have a similar appreciation. Of equal or greater 

concern are questions about whether the Russian leadership is willing to 

commit the resources needed to sustain security improvements over time. 

If they are not, much of the progress that has been made under bilateral 

threat reduction programs could be at risk.

Nuclear Detection 

The U.S. organizational focal point for this mission is the Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), which is a jointly staffed national 

office established to improve capabilities to detect and report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or 

radiological material for use against the United States. Managed by the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the DNDO has formulated 

a global nuclear detection architecture with multiple geographic layers 

and multiple opportunities for detection, including materials protection, 

control, and accountability, overseas border security, port of departure 

screening, overseas interdiction, Coast Guard inspections, and U.S. border protection. A systematic assessment has been performed of these layers and associated capabilities to encounter, detect, identify, and interdict 

the threat. Plans to close capability gaps have been put in place.

Currently, two programs provide the majority of detection assets 

to foreign ports of departure: the DOE Megaports initiative and the 

DHS Container Security Initiative (CSI), which operates at 50 ports 

worldwide. In 2005, CSI ports processed 73 percent of all containers 

destined for the United States prior to lading.30 Secondary screening 

measures are executed on containers that trigger existing detectors. 

Future emphasis will be placed on increasing the volume of U.S.-bound 

cargo scanned for nuclear and radiological material, using both passive 

detection and automated radiography, and transmitting all collected 

data to appropriate government authorities. An important R&D thrust 

is to develop next-generation passive sensors to enable 100 percent 

passive coverage of all official ports of entry, with relocatable assets for 

other locations. There is also substantial investment in handheld and 

portable systems to support the Border Patrol and Coast Guard, commercial vehicle inspection, expanded surveillance for high-risk cities, 

and Federal surge capacity.
The Future Nuclear Landscape 23

Nuclear Attribution 

Developing a robust forensics and attribution capability for covert 

nuclear attacks presents major technical, organizational, and policy 

challenges. The national-level effort in this area, known as the Domestic Nuclear Event Attribution (DNEA) program, has only recently been 

acknowledged publicly. Managed by the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency, the DNEA program (as the DNDO) is an interagency activity. 

The focus is on post-detonation technical nuclear forensics that can support a determination of attribution that would also be informed by intelligence and law enforcement findings. An initial operational capability has 

been achieved for improvised nuclear devices, and government authorities have expressed a high degree of confidence that this mission can be 

accomplished in a timely way.31 Attention has now turned to radiological 

dispersal devices, for which many more potential sources exist.

From a technical standpoint, the forensic requirement is to determine materials and design, and from there identify the source. For the 

former, capabilities such as robotic technologies and deployable field 

laboratories are being developed. For the latter, there must be a known 

source against which to compare debris, and our database of sources 

needs to be as comprehensive as possible. Whether the goal is to support 

legal prosecution or to respond politically and militarily to an attack (or 

both), it is essential to maintain a chain of evidence and to exercise the 

decision process with decisionmakers. Ultimately, attribution is a political 

process that will require senior leaders to determine how much and what 

kind of information to make available to allies, adversaries, the international community, and the public. An effective attribution capability contributes importantly to deterrence.

Nuclear Consequence Management 

With the increased concern today about the likelihood of nuclear 

use, especially by terrorists, greater attention is being paid to the Nation’s 

preparedness to respond to the effects of one or more low-yield nuclear 

detonations in a major urban area. In a series of workshops, the Center 

for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Center) undertook 

to identify the key questions about such effects that responders would 

need answered in the immediate aftermath of an event and to determine 

whether the answers would be available to them in a timely way.

In identifying the key questions that would need to be answered, the 

WMD Center found that one or more low-yield nuclear detonations in a 

major U.S. urban area would directly engage to varying degrees almost 
24 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 5

all U.S. Federal agencies as well as those of affected states, localities, and 

private sector entities. These entities would turn to U.S. nuclear experts, 

particularly at the Federal level, to provide fast, accurate, and actionable 

responses to a large and diverse set of questions about nuclear effects and 

response. The most important questions that U.S. nuclear experts would 

be looked upon to field in the immediate aftermath of the detonations 

would concern:

■ impacts on key infrastructure, especially communications, transportation, and power

■ government capacity for response, especially the availability of response 

personnel and medical resources

■ who is in charge of the response

■ timely guidance on how to respond, especially evacuation versus shelter-in-place, triage, and movement from the hot zone to a clean zone

■ rapid delineation of radiation hazard zones, especially their perimeter 

and variability, and whether responders can safely enter.

In examining the Nation’s preparedness to answer those questions in a timely way, the WMD Center concluded that important, 

actionable gaps exist in U.S. preparedness. Most gaps arise from a 

failure to communicate existing knowledge effectively about nuclear 

effects and the most appropriate responses thereto from national 

sources of expertise to responders at state and local levels. Responders 

need greater education about nuclear weapons effects and response, 

especially regarding radiation. National standards for nuclear response 

need to be established and/or harmonized across all levels of government. Nuclear response standards and guidance need to be made 

available to responders in readily accessible, field-useable form. Closing some gaps may require new knowledge, which may be obtainable 

through modeling/simulation, technological R&D, surveys/inventories, and other research.32

Improving U.S. preparedness to respond to low-yield nuclear detonations in a major urban area does not necessarily require a new, highprofile government initiative; it should be possible to accomplish via 

existing Federal interagency and Federal/state/local government information-sharing and cooperation mechanisms. However, it will require sustained, active leadership and oversight by a national entity with the requisite mission and authorities, such as the U.S. Homeland Security Council 

or Department of Homeland Security.
The Future Nuclear Landscape 25

Nuclear Modernization in Russia, China, and the 

United States 

Russia: Modernized Weapons Central to Security 

The discussion of nuclear weapons in Russia is vastly different 

from what occurs in the West. Political and military leaders in the 

United States and Europe generally seek to avoid open discussion of 

national or alliance nuclear weapons issues. In part, this is because these 

issues are a point of sharp contention among national security elites 

and certain segments of public opinion. It also reflects a widespread 

belief among military leaders that our nuclear weapons are decreasingly 

relevant to the dominant security challenges we now confront. By contrast, Russian leaders speak frequently about the central role of nuclear 

weapons in national strategy, acknowledge that Russia’s status as a world 

power is based largely on its nuclear arsenal, and tout new developments in Russian nuclear forces.33 This is intended to remind the world 

that Russia remains a nuclear superpower and to strengthen deterrence 

at a time when conventional forces remain inadequate and potential 

adversaries could question Russia’s resolve or capabilities. These imperatives are reflected most notably in the continued priority Russia affords 

nuclear forces in allocating defense resources.

Strategic nuclear systems are a budgetary priority for the Kremlin, 

even at the expense of needed improvements to conventional forces.34

Moscow seems intent on maintaining a full range of weapon types, and 

modernization efforts include the silo-based and road-mobile Topol-M 

(SS–27); new ballistic missile submarines armed with the Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); new long-range cruise missiles; maneuverable warheads to penetrate missile defenses; and possible 

new intercontinental ballistic missile and SLBM systems.35 However, fiscal constraints mean that Russia will not be able to field new systems in 

large numbers. In his May 10, 2006, state of the nation speech, President 

Putin stated:

We must take into account the plans and development vectors 

of other countries’ armed forces, and we must keep ourselves 

informed on promising developments, but we should not go 

after quantity and simply throw our money to the wind. Our 

responses must be based on intellectual superiority. They will 

be asymmetrical, not as costly, but they will unquestionably 

make our nuclear triad more reliable and effective.36
26 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 5

The reference to asymmetrical responses would appear to apply 

most directly to the Igla maneuverable warhead, which has been tested 

at least twice since November 2005, and to a reported hypersonic delivery vehicle, both of which are intended to penetrate U.S. ballistic missile 

defenses. It also reflects the need to do more with less in order to maintain 

a nuclear balance with the United States. By most accounts, Russian strategic forces will decrease in the period ahead for budgetary reasons and 

aging to a level below that established by the Moscow Treaty (1,700–2,200 

operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads). Some assessments, 

it should be noted, contend that by 2020, Russia will be able to deploy at 

least 2,000 nuclear warheads on modernized land- and sea-based systems, 

and will be able to sustain this level for 30 years or more.37

Moscow would like to use the arms control process to mitigate 

some of the challenges in maintaining a sufficient and affordable strategic 

nuclear force. President Putin has made clear his interest in a new treaty 

that would supersede the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START 

I), which expires in 2009, and possibly also the Moscow Treaty, which 

expires in 2012. His overall objective is to achieve greater flexibility in 

managing Russia’s forces while simplifying START I provisions for verification and transparency.38 The prospects and possible contours of a new 

agreement are one topic of discussion in a high-level U.S.-Russia strategic 

dialogue that has been initiated in recent months. It is worth noting as 

well that prominent Russian strategic analysts have been proposing far 

more ambitious ideas for transforming the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship into a fundamentally cooperative one. Most notably, Alexei Arbatov 

and Vladimir Dvorkin urge the two sides to move “beyond deterrence” 

based on deeper agreed reductions (1,000–1,200 warheads), more extensive data exchanges, joint de-alerting of strategic nuclear forces, operational constraints on deployed forces, integrated missile early warning, 

and cooperative missile defense.39

Press accounts and statements by government officials also suggest 

that Russia is engaged in R&D on fourth-generation nuclear weapons 

capabilities—for example, precision low-yield nuclear weapons (possibly 

with yields as low as a few tens of tons), clean nuclear weapons (including 

earth penetrators and neutron weapons), and weapons tailored to create 

special effects (such as electromagnetic pulse). Press reports also refer 

to more advanced or even exotic research into weapons based on pure 

fusion and nuclear isomers. The degree of investment and technical progress in these areas is uncertain, at least based on open sources, although 

some analysts suggest such capabilities would be highly consistent with 
The Future Nuclear Landscape 27

official Russian doctrine, which emphasizes the role of nuclear weapons 

in deterring and prevailing in a broad range of nuclear and nonnuclear 

contingencies. If, as Russian doctrine proclaims, a lower nuclear threshold is required to deter conflict even down to the local level, then acquiring more usable nuclear weapons that could deliver decisive effects with 

presumably manageable escalation risk would be a logical development.

Some analysts go further, seeing in Russia’s investigation of tailored 

nuclear weapons a response to Moscow’s inability to influence important 

developments in what it considers its traditional sphere of influence (for 

example, the Balkan wars, the Iraq war, North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] expansion). In this view, such weapons confer a capability 

to apply “nuclear pressure” as an instrument of policy to achieve Russian 

objectives in a way not possible with higher-yield weapons. Exactly how 

is not clear, but presumably this logic holds that armed with such weapons, Moscow could credibly threaten to intervene in regional conflicts 

involving outside powers and thus protect Russia’s interests and maximize 

Russia’s political influence.40

China: Modernized Forces for Deterrence, Not Supremacy 

While we are learning more about China’s nuclear capabilities, 

plans, and thinking, there is still insufficient transparency on these issues. 

In part, China seeks to cast a nuclear shadow over East Asia by developing usable forms of coercive power to advance its regional security interests. This is one reason it places great importance on improvements to its 

regional missile forces. Short-range missiles in particular appear central 

to Beijing’s strategy should war erupt over Taiwan. The force of shortrange missiles now deployed facing Taiwan has grown dramatically over 

the last decade to approximately 700. Some reports suggest these missiles 

are dual-capable. In a war over Taiwan involving the United States—

which, if not nuclear, would be conducted under a nuclear shadow—this 

missile force could be employed to demonstrate resolve and maintain 

strategic initiative as a counter to U.S. deterrence and coercion efforts. 

Indeed, many Chinese strategists see the burden of nuclear escalation in 

a Taiwan conflict as falling on the United States, and believe Washington 

can be restrained, given asymmetric interests and asymmetric willingness 

to absorb punishment. One question currently being debated in China’s 

strategic community is whether there are ways to use nuclear weapons 

that fall beneath the threshold of U.S. nuclear retaliation.41

China is also motivated to maintain a modern nuclear force in order 

to avoid nuclear coercion or blackmail by other major powers; this is an 
28 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 5

enduring legacy from the 1950s and, for Beijing, an essential condition 

for proper political relations among the major powers. This requires a 

viable nuclear deterrent based on longstanding principles of mutual vulnerability. Thus, at the strategic level, the current modernization process 

was triggered by the 1996 Taiwan Straits episode, from which China 

concluded that it needed to close key gaps in its strategic nuclear forces 

in order to maintain an assured retaliatory capability. Chinese strategists 

couch this in the language of active deterrence, effectiveness, sufficiency, 

counterdeterrence, and countercoercion, and these concepts have motivated a modernization effort that has resulted in a more diverse force with 

greater range, mobility, and survivability. The number of deployed longrange missiles has not grown much but likely will in the period ahead. 

Likewise, while estimates have not changed of the number of warheads in 

its arsenal, China stands at a threshold for potentially significant stockpile 

growth. At least publicly, U.S. estimates reflect a great deal of uncertainty 

regarding how large the coming buildup may be. It may be quite limited 

but could also encompass thousands of new weapons. Judgments that 

China reaches about U.S. intentions will be a key factor in the direction 

Beijing chooses.

Indeed, developments in U.S. strategic forces have strongly reinforced the urgency attached to China’s nuclear modernization. In particular, Beijing widely viewed itself as the target of the 2001 U.S. Nuclear 

Posture Review (NPR), adding a degree of complexity and uncertainty to 

China’s nuclear security environment. From Beijing’s vantage, the logic is 

clear: the United States dominates “rogue” states and no longer considers 

Russia an enemy. The “China threat,” however, is routinely promoted by 

elements of the U.S. strategic community. In this light, Beijing’s concern is 

that the New Triad, especially placed in the context of the 2002 National 

Security Strategy, signals U.S. intent to “escape the nuclear balance” and 

the concept of mutual vulnerability in favor of “absolute security” and 

preemption. In particular, China fears the United States may tailor the 

New Triad, as well as emerging space capabilities, to negate China’s strategic nuclear deterrent force, increasing the possibility of nuclear coercion 

in a crisis.42

China seems to be following a wait-and-see attitude on how much 

of a challenge the New Triad presents, and how to respond. From Beijing’s 

perspective, the nuclear modernization program presumably needs to 

keep pace with developments in the New Triad, in particular missile 

defense. But what if it cannot? Might China then turn to operational fixes 

such as launch on warning or even preemptive strategies? This is one of a 
The Future Nuclear Landscape 29

number of open questions as China contemplates its emerging strategic 

posture. Another major area of debate concerns the continuing validity 

of China’s no-first-use (NFU) doctrine, a debate that has been driven to 

some degree by concerns generated by the NPR. The question of whether 

NFU should be eliminated or made conditional reflects concerns about 

new nonnuclear strike capabilities that could hold at risk Chinese nuclear 

forces or important centers of gravity. It also reflects a view that U.S. 

rejection of NFU is consistent with the NPR and U.S. efforts to lower the 

nuclear threshold.43 However, it does not appear that any policy change 

is forthcoming. The NFU debate may suggest a growing willingness to 

allow open discussion of nuclear policy and doctrine questions—and thus 

could be seen as evidence of increased openness and transparency—but 

the traditional arguments for a no-first-use policy remain compelling 

for Beijing. These arguments are political, moral, and strategic and are 

believed to yield significant political benefits for China in the international community, especially as it seeks to signal its “peaceful rise” as a 

major global power.44

To date, China’s nuclear modernization has had no real impact on 

the strategic nuclear balance with the United States. Nothing currently 

envisioned by the Chinese leadership appears to portend a competition for 

supremacy. The key questions then become how to avoid stumbling into a 

more intense strategic competition than either side wants, and how to manage respective force modernization strategies in a way that does not poison 

the larger political relationship. Both official and unofficial dialogue are 

essential to achieve greater transparency regarding capabilities, doctrine, 

and plans; better understand Chinese debates and perceptions; and explore 

policy approaches and the prospects for exchanges, initiatives, and agreements that could contribute to stability and restraint in the U.S.-China strategic relationship. As part of this process, the United States needs to build 

intellectual capacity to address the range of political-military issues shaping 

the relationship. This means investing to build a community of specialists 

with the requisite functional and regional expertise to contribute in sustained fashion to both focused analysis and enhanced dialogue.45

The United States: Declining Interest and Expertise, Weak 

Consensus on Future 

While interest in nuclear weapons is rising in the rest of the world, 

the United States since the end of the Cold War has experienced an erosion 

of institutional interest and expertise in U.S. nuclear capabilities. A smaller, 

less diverse nuclear force has had an impact on Service nuclear career paths. 
30 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 5

Senior DOD civilian leaders seem less engaged and informed than their predecessors. In Congress, only a small group of legislators can be considered 

expert or well versed in nuclear weapons issues. For some, it appears, nuclear 

weapons are a Cold War tax that no longer needs to be paid. One result is that 

there is no meaningful political consensus today on the future direction for 

U.S. nuclear weapons. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review outlined a vision for 

a transformed strategic posture in which nuclear weapons would continue to 

play an important role, albeit one that could be reduced over time. But while 

the NPR has generated significant effort in the Departments of Defense and 

Energy to take practical steps to advance the New Triad concept, it did not 

generate the kind of public debate on the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. 

strategy required to develop a sustainable long-term consensus on policy, 

R&D, and investment needs. Indeed, 5 years after the NPR was issued, we are 

still hearing calls for starting such a debate.46

There is certainly no lack of strong feeling on these matters, but opinion 

is generally polarized between those seeking to adapt the nuclear posture to 

the emerging security environment and those who believe that innovation 

in nuclear capabilities beyond the requirements of reliability and safety is 

both unnecessary and damaging to U.S. nonproliferation objectives. One 

camp seeks a more flexible range of nuclear capabilities to cope with threat 

uncertainty and enhance deterrence credibility. This camp rejects existential 

deterrence and believes that the types of weapons in the U.S. arsenal make a 

big difference in the ability to deter. Relying on the Cold War arsenal built to 

deter the Soviet Union carries a significant risk of self-deterrence in regional 

conflicts where there may be an asymmetry of stakes. New capabilities are 

required, and underground testing may be needed to validate these capabilities. By contrast, the other camp believes the historical imperative of the 

post–Cold War era is to reduce steadily the number of nuclear weapons and 

our reliance on them, and to occupy the moral high ground in the battle 

against nuclear proliferation by foregoing force modernization and nuclear 

testing. It is morally wrong and strategically unwise to produce new weapons 

that are more usable and thereby lower the nuclear threshold. The current 

stockpile is adequate to the requirements of deterrence, which is not as prone 

to failure as is often argued.

In the policy arena, this clash of perspectives has been most pronounced in congressional consideration of funding for nuclear weapons 

R&D. Efforts by the Bush administration to obtain funding to study 

enhanced nuclear capabilities (Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, Advanced 

Concepts Initiative) ultimately fell victim to arguments made by both 

Democrats and Republicans that these initiatives were provocative, would 
The Future Nuclear Landscape 31

undermine U.S. nonproliferation strategy, and represented too high a budget priority for the administration in relation to threat reduction activities. 

For the moment at least, no political consensus exists to introduce new 

kinds of military capabilities into the nuclear force.

Achieving such a consensus will require narrowing what today 

appears to be an unbridgeable gap. It will probably require a changed 

set of circumstances—perhaps the next use of nuclear weapons or a 

regional nuclear war; perhaps generational change in the Congress; 

perhaps new leadership in the executive branch. Fundamentally, however, creating a sustainable political consensus on type and quantity will 

require a willingness to reexamine first principles and consider with 

fresh eyes the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security. Hard questions 

will need to be answered:

■ What roles do we want nuclear weapons to play?

■ If high-yield legacy weapons are not responsive to the threats we face, 

why retain them in high numbers; why not eliminate them?

■ What confidence do we have that a new generation of more discriminate nuclear weapons (with greater accuracy and lower yield) will actually be a more effective deterrent against the kinds of adversaries 

we now confront?

■ If new types of nuclear capabilities are essential to deter effectively, 

how do we reconcile this with our nonproliferation objectives and 

our exhortations to others to forswear the nuclear option?

■ Does not morality compel us to provide our leaders with military 

options that are more acceptable morally as well as more rational 

strategically?

■ Do we not need to keep pace with advances in nuclear weapons technology being pursued by Russia (and perhaps China), with whom our 

strategic relationships over the long term remain uncertain?

What, then, is the basis for action today? The little common ground 

that exists between the two opposing nuclear camps concerns the importance of maintaining a nuclear stockpile that can be certified as reliable 

and safe, and finding a way to reduce the stockpile over time by making 

the DOE production complex more responsive to new requirements that 

could emerge. There seems to be agreement that investing in costly life 

extensions for most aging weapons does not make much sense and ultimately could be unaffordable. A sounder course is to retire reserve warheads, replace others with simpler, more reliable versions, and establish 

a “warm” scientific and production infrastructure in the event that future 

military requirements demand a new type of capability. This, in essence, 
32 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 5

is what is now being pursued under the banner of responsive infrastructure (one leg of the New Triad) and stockpile transformation, the central 

element of which is the reliable replacement warhead (RRW). This initiative represents the political art of the possible with respect to U.S. nuclear 

weapons today.

The RRW program will provide replacement warheads for legacy 

U.S. nuclear weapons. By relaxing Cold War–era design constraints, 

replacement warheads can be designed that are easier to manufacture, 

use fewer hazardous materials, and incorporate enhanced safety, security, 

and use control features. These replacement warheads will reduce the 

likelihood that nuclear testing will be needed to resolve technical problems, and thus allow the capabilities of the current nuclear stockpile to be 

extended well into the future with a high degree of confidence. Successfully implemented, the RRW concept will also help revitalize the nuclear 

weapons design community and preserve the critical skills necessary for 

the next generation of scientists and engineers to certify the stockpile 

without nuclear testing and, if necessary, adapt existing weapons and 

develop new ones.

Ambassador Linton Brooks, while Administrator of the National 

Nuclear Security Administration, recently offered the following vision for 

a responsive infrastructure enabled by the RRW program to be achieved 

around 2030:

The deployed stockpile—almost certainly considerably smaller 

than today’s plans call for—has largely been transformed. Reliable 

Replacement Warheads . . . are more easily manufactured at fewer 

facilities with safer and more environmentally benign materials. 

These modified warheads have the same military characteristics, 

are carried on the same delivery systems, and hold at risk the 

same targets as the variants they replaced, but they have been 

re-designed for reliability, security, and ease of maintenance. 

Because of this, even though there is almost no one left in the 

complex who remembers a nuclear test, let alone has conducted 

one, confidence in the stockpile is high. . . . The deployed 

stockpile is backed up by a much smaller non-deployed stockpile 

than today. . . .The elimination of dangerous and environmentally 

difficult materials has made this possible and obviated the need 

for large numbers of spare warheads to hedge against reliability 

problems. . . . We still worry about a hedge against geopolitical 

changes and attempts by others to instigate an arms race. But that 

hedge is no longer in aging and obsolete spare warheads but in 

the Responsive Infrastructure . . . . Our Responsive Infrastructure 
The Future Nuclear Landscape 33

can also produce weapons with different or modified military 

capabilities if required. The weapons design community that was 

revitalized by the RRW program can adapt an existing weapon 

within 18 months and design, develop, and begin production of 

a new design within 3–4 years of a decision to enter engineering 

development . . . new, intrinsic features built into the growing 

number of Reliable Replacement Warheads have improved both 

safety and security.47

Realizing this ambitious vision is a major undertaking for the 

Departments of Energy and Defense. Over time, it seems clear that the 

program’s success will be measured by the degree to which it yields a 

capability to respond to new military requirements should they emerge, 

thereby enabling meaningful stockpile reductions. Less clear is when a 

political consensus supporting the development of new nuclear capabilities may emerge.

Adapting Declaratory Policy to Evolving Threats 

and Capabilities 

Despite significant, even dramatic, changes in U.S. strategy and 

security policies in response to new concerns about weapons of mass 

destruction and terrorism, there has been little debate about or innovation in declaratory policy in recent years. Some senior policymakers have 

suggested that declaratory policy is an underutilized tool in the fight 

against proliferation and WMD terrorism and requires more systematic 

thought—and not simply in terms of managing crises or the run-up to 

conflict, but as an integral element of ongoing efforts to dissuade and 

deter new kinds of adversaries and reassure allies. Declaratory policy can 

be considered at a number of levels. In part, the challenge is to determine 

how best, if at all, to leverage U.S. nuclear capabilities to deter extreme 

outcomes, such as WMD use. In part, it is to determine how the United 

States can marshal all instruments of national power to underwrite 

declaratory policies directed at a broader range of problems, from deterring nuclear transfers to communicating attribution capabilities.

Role of Nuclear Threats in Deterring WMD Use 

The longstanding U.S. policy of calculated ambiguity has eschewed 

explicit statements concerning how the United States would respond to 

WMD attacks in order to avoid both limiting the President’s freedom of 

action and placing too high a value on nuclear weapons as an instrument 
34 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 5

of policy. In some actual crises (such as the first Gulf War), the United 

States sought to lessen the degree of ambiguity perceived by adversaries by making sharper—if still implicit—threats of nuclear retaliation 

in response to egregious acts.48 In this way, U.S. declaratory policy has 

attempted to maintain a balance between the requirements of deterrence, 

on the one hand, and nonproliferation objectives, on the other.

The benefits and risks of this declaratory posture are well understood; less clear is whether new security concerns argue for adaptations or 

changes to declaratory policy. Alternative policies would either make the 

threat of nuclear response more explicit, or eliminate it entirely through 

some type of no-first-use pledge. Specific alternative policies and their 

general rationale include but are not limited to the following.

A More Explicit Threat of Nuclear Response. In an era of more salient 

WMD threats, it is necessary to communicate more directly the risks 

associated with WMD use against American interests. A policy of assured 

nuclear response will induce caution and restraint, as WMD-armed 

adversaries will be less inclined to believe they could conduct a WMD 

attack and escape the most severe U.S. retaliation.

Retain Nuclear Response Option, but Pledge No First Use. Because the 

consequences of chemical or, in particular, biological weapons use could 

be so devastating, it is unwise to forego the added increment of deterrence that even an implicit nuclear threat can provide. But the normative 

restraint against WMD could be strengthened were the United States 

to pledge not to initiate the use of such weapons. While stopping short 

of renouncing any use of nuclear weapons, such a pledge, in combination with a record of strict U.S. compliance with the Chemical Weapons 

Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, could nonetheless 

enhance the moral legitimacy of U.S. policy by making clear that the sole 

purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter and, if necessary, respond to 

the use of WMD. A variant on this concept is to establish an enforceable 

international consensus, led by the recognized nuclear weapons states, 

against the first use of WMD by a state or subnational group.49

A No-Nuclear-First-Use Policy. Such a policy would go further, in 

the belief that adopting roles for nuclear weapons beyond deterrence of 

nuclear attack enhances their legitimacy and fuels proliferation pressures 

while providing no greater degree of deterrence than already assured by 

the mere existence of U.S. nuclear capabilities. Moreover, U.S. conventional military power is sufficient to deter nonnuclear WMD threats. A 

no-nuclear-first-use policy would allow the United States to seize the 

moral high ground while still protecting its interests.
The Future Nuclear Landscape 35

A careful exploration of the merits of a shift toward any of these alternative declaratory policies will need to address a number of considerations:

■ Credibility. Will an explicit nuclear threat be credible, or have WMDarmed adversaries come to believe that the United States lacks the 

will to use nuclear weapons in response to nonnuclear attacks? Does 

the character of the U.S. nuclear arsenal make a difference? Similarly, 

will anyone believe an explicit U.S. pledge not to use nuclear weapons 

first in any circumstance?

■ Freedom of action. Would alternative declaratory policies unduly constrain Presidential freedom of action in a crisis or conflict, or 

could they be formulated in a way that preserves flexibility in pursuing political and military courses of action?

■ Nonproliferation. What impact would alternative declaratory policies have on nuclear proliferation dynamics? For instance, would 

an assured nuclear response policy enhance the perceived value and 

utility of nuclear weapons and thereby encourage greater proliferation, or are proliferation incentives largely unaffected by U.S. declaratory policy?

■ Reassurance. Are policy alternatives likely to enhance or weaken reassurance of allies regarding U.S. commitments to their security, to 

deterrence generally, and to nonproliferation objectives?

■ Nonlethal attacks. Should declaratory policy explicitly make provisions 

for the possibility of nuclear attacks against U.S. interests intended to 

avoid large-scale casualties—for example, an EMP attack?

■ WMD terror attacks. How should declaratory policy treat the threat 

posed by WMD terror groups and, by extension, possible state sponsors or facilitators of this threat? The President has said that we will 

not distinguish between terrorists and their state sponsors, but a more 

specific declaratory statement directed at state support for WMD terrorism potentially could influence the calculus of state actors who 

might contemplate aiding terrorists’ search for WMD or abetting an 

actual attack.50

Deterring and Dissuading the Transfer of Nuclear Capabilities 

New concerns about the spread of nuclear capabilities raise new 

challenges for declaratory policy. To what degree, and how, should U.S. 

declaratory policy address the possible transfer by a state of nuclear capabilities (materials, technology, expertise, components, design/weaponization data, warheads) to hostile third parties (states or terror groups)? 

One could argue that developments in this arena, including documented 

terrorist interest in nuclear weapons and the extensive covert nuclear procurement network operated by A.Q. Khan, point to gaps in declaratory 

policy that should be filled as part of a comprehensive combating-WMD 
36 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 5

strategy that also emphasizes prevention and interdiction. Declaratory 

policy can help reinforce the risks associated with nuclear transfers, in 

part by indicating some of the specific consequences that would follow 

exposure of such activities. This is an area where nonnuclear responses 

are likely to figure prominently and where focused concept development 

should be undertaken.

Communicating U.S. Attribution Capabilities 

As the technical means to attribute nuclear attacks improve, policymakers will need to decide how to communicate this capability to potential 

adversaries in order to maximize its deterrent value. In doing so, it will be 

essential to strike a balance between conveying a credible capability to identify the source of an attack and protecting intelligence and scientific techniques which, if known to adversaries, could provide the means to complicate the process of forensic investigation and possibly escape attribution.

New Triad Capabilities 

Finally, it is worth asking whether the anticipated maturation of 

nonnuclear capabilities as part of the New Triad raises issues or new 

requirements with respect to declaratory policy. In particular, as missile 

defenses and conventional strike systems (both kinetic and nonkinetic) 

become more advanced and assume a more prominent role as strategiclevel force assets, there may be value in crafting some specific messages 

regarding these capabilities (including their relationship to nuclear forces) 

for the consumption of both allies and adversaries.
The Future Nuclear Landscape 37

Notes

1

 Mohamed ElBaradei, “Towards a Safer World,” The Economist, October 16, 2003. 2

 Additionally, the Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council recently urged the Arab world to 

pursue nuclear technology more aggressively. See Nicole Stracke, “GCC Countries Reopen Arab Nuclear Technology Debate,” Gulf Research Center, September 14, 2006. 3

 North Korea completed the nuclear fuel cycle for plutonium some time in the late 1980s or early 1990s, and 

nongovernmental experts estimate that it has produced 43 to 61 kilograms of plutonium, of which 20 to 53 kilograms 

are in separated form and usable for weapons manufacture. This stock of separated plutonium is sufficient to produce 

from 4 to 13 nuclear weapons. Unconstrained, North Korea is projected to possess enough separated plutonium by 

mid-2008 to build 8 to 17 weapons. See David Albright and Paul Brannan, “The North Korean Plutonium Stock Mid 

2006,” Institute for Science and International Security, June 26, 2006. Plutonium stocks refer to material produced by 

North Korea’s 5-megawatt reactor. A 50-megawatt reactor is under construction, though recent satellite photographs 

indicate a lack of activity at the site. Completion of this reactor could take several years; when operational, it would 

have the potential to produce enough plutonium annually for roughly 10 nuclear weapons. North Korea is also believed 

to maintain a concealed uranium enrichment capability, based on information gained from investigations of the A.Q. 

Khan nuclear procurement network. It is unclear how extensive or mature this capability is. 4

 Helene Cooper, “U.S. Debates Value of North Korea Talks,” The New York Times, November 2, 2006. 5

 William J. Broad, Nazila Fathi, and Joel Brinkley, “Analysts Say a Nuclear Iran Is Years Away,” The New 

York Times, April 13, 2006. Testifying before the Senate Intelligence Committee in February 2006, Director of 

National Intelligence John D. Negroponte stated that if Iran continues on its current pace, it will likely have the 

capability to produce a nuclear weapon “within the next decade.” 6

 David Ignatius, “Iran’s Uranium Glitch,” The Washington Post, September 29, 2006, A21. 7

 See Gregory F. Giles et al., “Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: Building Situational Awareness,” final 

report prepared for Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, August 11, 2006. 8

 Ibid., IV–5.

9

 For example, see Scott D. Sagan, “How to Keep the Bomb from Iran,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 5 (September/

October 2006), 45–59. 10 For an articulation of some of these views, see David E. Sanger, “Suppose We Just Let Iran Have the 

Bomb,” The New York Times, March 19, 2006. 11 There are longstanding rumors of Saudi efforts to secure nuclear technology from Pakistan. Publicly, 

Saudi officials deny any nuclear ambitions and emphasize the Kingdom’s policy of establishing a regional WMDfree zone. Some Saudi analysts have suggested that faced with a nuclear-armed Iran, Riyadh would choose to seek 

protection under a U.S. nuclear umbrella. See Riad Kahwaji, “Saudi Arabia Braces for a Nuclear Iran,” Defense News, 

May 22, 2006, 1. Other press accounts allege Saudi Arabia–Pakistani nuclear collaboration. See Sammy Salama and 

Gina Cabrera-Farraj, “Report Alleges Saudi Arabia Working on ‘Secret Nuclear Program’ with Pakistani Assistance,” 

WMD Insights, issue 5 (May 2006), available at <www.wmdinsights.com/PDF/FP_MayIssue.pdf>. 12 On May 18, 2006, the United States tabled drafts of a negotiating mandate and text for a fissile material 

cutoff treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament. While India’s official position on FMCT is at odds with 

elements of the U.S. proposal (in particular with respect to verification provisions), New Delhi has stated its willingness to work with the U.S. draft. See Peter Crail, “U.S. Fissile Material Proposals Stir Cautious Optimism,” WMD 

Insights, issue 7 (July/August 2006), available at <www.wmdinsights.com/PDF/FP_July_AugIssue.pdf>.

13 The Atomic Energy Act and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act require that nonnuclear weapons states 

receiving nuclear cooperation from the United States have comprehensive safeguards in place. Under the terms of 

the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, India is considered a nonnuclear weapons state. The pact also requires the 

agreement of the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) that governs international nuclear commerce. The 

NSG, which operates by consensus, has indicated that it will not take up possible amendments to its guidelines until 

the U.S. Congress enacts related legislative changes. Advanced research activities include the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor experiment in fusion technology and the Generation IV International Forum on 

future reactor concepts. 14 For details on India’s separation plan, see Sharon Squassoni, “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues 

for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, March 28, 2006, available at <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33016.

pdf>; and “India’s Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views,” Congressional Research Service, March 10, 2006, 

available at <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33292.pdf>. 15 A counterpoint is offered by Ashley J. Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who argues 

that India does not suffer from a strategically significant shortage of natural uranium and is currently separating far 

less weapons-grade plutonium than it has the capability to produce. See Tellis, “Atoms for War? U.S.-Indian Civilian 

Nuclear Cooperation and India’s Nuclear Arsenal,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006, available at 

<www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18443&prog=zgp&proj=zsa>. Administration 

officials make the same argument. 16 Squassoni, 12. On the point referencing the Additional Protocol, it should be noted that more than half of 

NPT member states have not yet brought it into force.
38 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 5

17 “President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD,” White House press release, February 

11, 2004. The President also called on the Nuclear Suppliers Group to deny nuclear technology to states that have not 

ratified the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol, which grants the agency expanded inspection 

rights. To date, these proposals have not been adopted by the group. 18 ElBaradei. Dr. ElBaradei has also expressed support for stronger controls on nuclear trade.

19 See Tariq Rauf and Fiona Simpson, “The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Is It Time for a Multinational Approach?” 

Arms Control Today 34, no. 10 (December 2004), 17–21. 20 Jon B. Wolfstahl, “The Nuclear Third Rail: Can Fuel Cycle Capabilities Be Limited,” Arms Control Today

34, no. 10 (December 2004), 11–16. 21 Clay Sell and Robert Joseph, “Global Nuclear Energy Partnership,” State Department briefing, February 

16, 2006, available at <http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/61808.htm>. 22 See Matthew Bunn, statement before the Committee on Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy 

and Water Development, September 14, 2006; Richard K. Lester, “New Nukes,” Issues in Science and Technology

(Summer 2006), 39–46; Edwin S. Lyman, “The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership: Will It Advance Nonproliferation or Undermine It?” Union of Concerned Scientists, undated; and Union of Concerned Scientists, “U.S. Nuclear 

Fuel Reprocessing Initiative,” April 10, 2006. 23 See Nikolai Sokov and Leonard S. Spector, “Russian Government White Paper on WMD Nonproliferation 

Reveals Both Differences and Similarities with U.S. Approach,” WMD Insights, issue 8 (September 2006), available 

at <www.wmdinsights.com/PDF/FP_SeptIssue.pdf>. On the positive side, the white paper endorses the Proliferation Security Initiative and acknowledges the contribution of the United States (among others) in enhancing WMD 

security in Russia. 24 “The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,” Fact Sheet, Office of the Press Secretary, The White 

House, July 15, 2006; and “U.S.-Russia Joint Fact Sheet on the Global Initiative To Combat Nuclear Terrorism,” 

Office of the Spokesman, Department of State, July 15, 2006. 25 These include the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the 

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Deutch-Specter Commission) of 1999, as well as multiple internal Intelligence Community reviews. 26 These are discussed in the report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 

Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Silberman-Robb Commission), March 31, 2005. 27 Ibid., 317–319.

28 The six guiding principles are active, layered defense; situational awareness and integrated command and 

control; global force management; capabilities-based planning; effects-based operations; and assurance. The military 

missions are offensive operations, elimination operations, interdiction operations, active defense, passive defense, 

WMD consequence management, security cooperation and partner activities, and threat reduction cooperation. 29 See Presidential Decision Directive 56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” May 1997, which 

states: “We must also be prepared to manage the humanitarian, economic and political consequences of a technological crisis where chemical, biological, and/or radiological hazards may be present. The occurrence of any one of these 

dimensions could significantly increase the sensitivity and complexity of a U.S. response to a technological crisis.” 30 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Container Security Initiative 2006–2011 Strategic Plan, August 2006, 

34, available at <www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/csi_strategic_plan.

ctt/csi_strategic_plan.pdf>. 31 The final analytic or technical judgment on the findings of a forensic investigation would be made by the 

Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee. 32 There is a wealth of information on nuclear effects based on atmospheric testing that occurred until 1963, 

and a good deal of data on responding to nuclear attacks as well. But many first responders are unaware of this 

information. Additionally, available data are not adequately adapted to the needs of contemporary first responders. 

Some efforts are under way to address this, such as the Department of Homeland Security Protective Action Guides 

for Radiological Dispersal Devices and Improvised Nuclear Devices. 33 See Vladimir Putin’s state of the nation address in May 2006, in which he stated that it was “too 

early to speak of an end to the arms race,” claimed a “new spiral” of the arms race has begun, and called for 

strengthening Russia’s nuclear forces. Text available at <www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_

type70029type82912_105566.shtmll>. 34 See Nabi Abdullaev, “Critics Question Russia’s Priorities,” Defense News, September 11, 2006, 14. The 

$186 billion State Arms Procurement Program for 2007–2015 was adopted in June 2006 and provides for modernization of all elements of strategic nuclear forces. Precise figures are not available in open sources. As a point 

of reference, in 2000, the Chief of Armaments of the Russian Armed Forces stated that in the next several years, 

28 percent of arms procurement funding would support modernization of strategic nuclear forces. Cited in Mark 

Schneider, “The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (Washington, DC: United States Nuclear 

Strategy Forum, 2006), 10. 35 For more on the maneuverable warhead (known as Igla) and possible deployment timelines for some 

new strategic systems, see “Russia to Deploy Defense-Penetrating System,” WMD Insights, issue 1 (December 2005/

January 2006), available at <www.wmdinsights.com/PDF/WMDInsights_Issue1.pdf>; and Nikolai Sokov, “Vladimir Putin: ‘No Future’ in Arms Race; Russia Acts to Ensure Defense Through Asymmetric Nuclear Force,” WMD 

Insights, issue 6 (June 2006), available at <www.wmdinsights.com/PDF/FP_JuneIssue.pdf>.
The Future Nuclear Landscape 39

36 Putin, 9.

37 See “Institute Director Solomonov: Upgraded Nuclear Force Good Through 2045,” Moscow Izvestiya

(Moscow Edition), April 14, 2006, 1–2, cited in OpenSource.gov CEP20060414019008. Yuri Solomonov is general 

designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT), developer of the Topol-M and Bulava missile systems. It is possible that his remarks, coming soon after the publication of Kier A. Lieber and Daryll G. Press, “The 

Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006), were intended principally to respond to 

the assertion that Russia’s strategic nuclear capabilities are in an advanced state of decline. 38 See Nikolai Sokov, “Putin Seeks to ‘Replace’ START I Treaty,” WMD Insights, issue 8 (September 2006), 

available at <www.wmdinsights.com/PDF/FP_SeptIssue.pdf>. 39 Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: Transforming the U.S.-Russian Equation (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006). 40 See Schneider, 24–25, for a more detailed articulation of this argument by Russian analysts. Schneider’s 

paper provides a critical assessment of official Russian attitudes toward nuclear weapons and the evolution of official doctrine. For a rebuttal to Schneider’s analysis, see Vladimir Dworkin, “On Strategic Relations Between Russia 

and the U.S.,” Center for International Security, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian 

Academy of Sciences, September 2006. 41 Some close observers believe that Chinese experts have done little thinking about the dynamics of nuclear 

escalation and de-escalation in the context of a Taiwan war. See Bonnie Glaser, Evan Medeiros, and Brad Roberts, 

“China-U.S. Strategic Nuclear Relations: A Conference Summary,” July 2006. 42 For recent assessments of how Chinese media are treating the question of U.S. strategic capabilities, see 

Jing-Dong Yuan, “Chinese Media Discusses U.S. Nuclear Superiority,” in WMD Insights, issue 5 (May 2006), available at <www.wmdinsights.com/PDF/FP_MayIssue.pdf>; and Jing-Dong Yuan, “China Eyes U.S. Space Weapons,” 

WMD Insights, issue 3 (March 2006), available at <www.wmdinsights.com/PDF/FP_MarIssue.pdf>. 43 Glaser, Medeiros, and Roberts, 7–8. These analysts contend that Chinese strategists believe mistakenly 

that the United States has a “first use” policy, rather than a policy of “calculated ambiguity” that actually envisions 

nuclear use only in extremis. 44 For a discussion of the no-first-use debate in China, see Jing-Dong Yuan, “Beyond No-First-Use: Recent 

Chinese Discussions of Nuclear Strategy,” WMD Insights, issue 8 (September 2006), available at <www.wmdinsights.

com/PDF/FP_SeptIssue.pdf>. 45 Glaser, Medeiros, and Roberts, 12, 14.

46 Certainly a critical factor in this has been the dominant focus of policymakers in DOD and elsewhere on 

the war on terror and related initiatives following the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent anthrax 

attacks. 47 Ambassador Linton F. Brooks, “The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” 2006 Arms Control 

Association Panel Discussion, January 25, 2006. See also statement of Thomas P. D’Agostino, Deputy Administrator 

for Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration, before the House Armed Services Committee, 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, April 5, 2006. 48 Then-U.S. Secretary of State James Baker would later recount of his meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister 

Tariq Aziz in January 1991, shortly before the launch of Operation Desert Storm: “In hopes of persuading them [the 

Iraqi leadership] to consider more soberly the folly of war, I purposely left the impression that the use of chemical or 

biological agents by Iraq could invite tactical nuclear retaliation.” See James A. Baker, III, The Politics of Diplomacy

(New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 395. 49 See Lewis A. Dunn, “The Case for an Enforceable Consensus Against NBC First Use,” The Nonproliferation Review 9, no. 3 (Fall/Winter 2002), 82–88. 50 The recent revision to France’s official nuclear doctrine emphasizes that state sponsors of terrorism are 

at risk of nuclear retaliation. See speech by Jacques Chirac, during his visit to the Strategic Forces, January 19, 2006, 

available at <www.elysee.fr>.

41

About the Authors

Paul I. Bernstein is a Vice President with Science Applications 

International Corporation (SAIC) in McLean, Virginia. He specializes in 

analysis and project management in the areas of weapons proliferation, 

strategic forces policy, and regional security, and works with the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Joint Staff, 

and National Defense University on a range of technical and training 

activities. Mr. Bernstein is a member of the Combating WMD Panel of 

the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee, has supported development 

of key Department of Defense combating WMD strategy and concept 

documents, and is a regular guest lecturer on WMD issues at the Army 

and Marine Corps War Colleges. He developed the programs of instruction for the Proliferation, Terrorism, and Response Course at the Defense 

Nuclear Weapons School and the WMD elective taught at the Army 

War College. In the strategic forces area, Mr. Bernstein assists efforts 

to advance the implementation of the Nuclear Posture Review, and led 

analytic support to the 2004 Strategic Capabilities Assessment, the first 

of the NPR periodic assessments. He is principal author of several previous symposium reports for the NDU Center for the Study of Weapons 

of Mass Destruction, most recently Combating WMD: Challenges for the 

Next Ten Years (February 2005).

John P. Caves, Jr., is a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for the 

Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University. Prior to joining the Center in October 2003, he served as Deputy 

Director for Counterproliferation Policy in the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD). Among other assignments during his 17 years with OSD 

were Country Director, Office of European Policy, and Deputy Director 

for Plans, Defense Security Assistance Agency. Mr. Caves holds a Master 

of Public Affairs degree from Princeton University, an MS degree from 

the National War College, and a BA degree from Boston College. He twice 

received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service; 

he also received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian 

Service. Mr. Caves is the author of “Globalization and WMD Proliferation: 

The Policy Landscape,” Strategic Insights 5, no. 6 (Monterey, CA: Center for 

Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, July 2006).
42 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 5

John F. Reichart is the Director of the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University. Dr. Reichart 

also teaches courses in counterproliferation and national security policy 

at the National War College. Prior to assuming his duties at NDU in 1995, 

Dr. Reichart served for 6 years as a member of the Policy Planning Staff, 

Department of State. While at State, he was responsible for providing advice 

and analysis to four secretaries of state on European security policy and a 

wide range of global political/military issues. In 1987–1988, he was a senior 

fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 

DC. He served at the U.S. Mission to NATO, Brussels, with responsibility 

for theater nuclear issues, from 1982 to 1987. Earlier, he taught international 

relations and defense studies as associate professor of political science at the 

U.S. Air Force Academy. Dr. Reichart began his career as a technical analyst at the Foreign Technology Division, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. 

Dr. Reichart, a retired USAF colonel, is the co-author of American Defense 

Policy and a variety of articles on defense and proliferation issues, including 

“The Case for Nuclear Deterrence Today,” Orbis (Winter 1998), and “The 

Threat From Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons,” World Defense 

Systems 2000. He holds a PhD and MA in political science from The Ohio 

State University and a BA in government from Manhattan College.
Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

National Defense University

Since its inception in 1994, the Center for the Study of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction (previously the Center for Counterproliferation 

Research) has been at the forefront of research on the consequences of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for American 

security. Originally focusing on threats to the Armed Forces, the 

WMD Center now also applies its expertise and body of research to 

the challenges of homeland defense and security. In February 2004, 

President George W. Bush commended the Center for providing 

“vital insight into the dangers of a new era.”

The broad mandate of the Center includes research, education, 

and outreach. Its research focuses on understanding the security 

implications of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the challenge of fashioning effective responses to them. Education and 

outreach programs seek to enhance awareness in the next generation of military and civilian leaders of the WMD threat as it relates 

to defense and homeland security policy, programs, technology, 

and operations. As a part of its outreach efforts, the WMD Center 

hosts annual symposia on key issues, bringing together experts and 

participants from the government and private sectors.
Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

National Defense University

Washington, D.C.