Filed 2/11/21 P. v. West CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v.

MARCUS WEST,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B303435

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA479062)

APPEAL from a post-judgment order of the Superior Court 

of Los Angeles County, Leslie A. Swain, Judge. Affirmed.

Kelly A. Woodruff, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy 

Attorney General, and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorney General, 

for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

A jury convicted defendant Marcus West (defendant) of 

criminally threatening his wife, M.W., via a Facebook message 

and of violating a criminal protective order that prohibited such

communication. The only documentary evidence at trial of the 

threatening message was a screenshot printout of the offending 

message. We are asked to decide whether the printout was 

sufficiently authenticated to permit its introduction into 

evidence, whether defendant’s convictions are supported by 

substantial evidence, and whether the trial court erred by not 

instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted

criminal threats.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Message

Defendant and M.W.’s ten-year marriage was often 

turbulent. In February 2019, defendant was convicted of a 

domestic violence offense, placed on probation, and served with a 

protective order barring him from having any personal or 

electronic contact with M.W. Defendant and M.W. continued to 

have contact, however, despite the protective order.

One morning in June 2019, M.W. was angry at defendant 

(the record does not disclose why) and she disconnected service to

his mobile phone by removing it from her telephone service 

provider account. When she woke up from a nap later that day, 

she saw a Facebook message on her phone, sent at 6:30 a.m., that 

read: “Bitch, keep playing games[.] Ho[ ], you’re my wife and

always will be. Bitch, I will kill you if you don’t leave Bryan 
3

alone.[1][Y]ou better [remove] that restraining order also. You 

belong to me. I will make your life miserable. [L]et me catch you 

with someone else[,] I’m going to hurt both of you. I’m not going 

to allow [yo]u to play me like this, bitch. You have no choice but 

to stay with me. Fuck the cops and the judges[.] I’ll beat this 

case again and really make sure [you’re] dear.

2

If I can’t have 

you[,] nobody can, bitch[.] Remember that.”

Less than two hours after seeing the message, M.W. sought 

help at a Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) station. The 

desk officer who met with M.W. described her as “visibly upset” 

and “crying and shaking.” M.W. showed the Facebook message to 

the desk officer on her phone. She then took a screenshot of the 

message, which displayed as having been sent from Marcus West 

(i.e., defendant’s name), and emailed the screenshot to the officer, 

who printed out the emailed image and attached it to his written 

report. M.W. told the desk officer that the message was from 

defendant. 

After this initial visit, M.W. returned to the police station 

on at least two subsequent occasions to see what progress had 

been made in their investigation. Ten days after M.W. received 

the message, two LAPD officers interviewed M.W. at her home. 

According to both officers, M.W. appeared “very scared,” “very 

worried, and “frightened.”

1 M.W. was in a “phone relationship” with an incarcerated 

man named Bryan, and M.W. believed Bryan was in 

communication with defendant via Facebook.

2 At trial, M.W. testified she read “dear” as a typo and 

understood the message to say “make sure you’re dead.”
4

During the interview, M.W. opened a Facebook app on her 

phone and showed the threatening message to the lead 

investigating officer. He visually confirmed the screenshot 

printout that M.W. emailed the police matched the message as 

displayed by the Facebook app on M.W.’s phone. The lead 

investigator also saw a picture to the left of the message, and he 

recognized the person in the picture as defendant. (The police 

also noted M.W. and the Facebook account for Marcus West had 

62 Facebook “friends” in common.)

The next day, the lead investigator telephoned M.W., who 

still sounded “near hysterical” with fear. During the call, M.W.

confirmed the photograph associated with the Facebook message

was a photograph of defendant. The lead investigator then 

placed a preservation hold on defendant’s Facebook account and 

obtained a search warrant for records relating to that account. 

The warrant did not meet the company’s criteria for the release of 

information, however, and Facebook did not produce any of the 

records the warrant requested.

The police later located defendant and arrested him. Once 

he was in custody, M.W. changed her story about the message 

and the threat posed to her by defendant. When she first met 

with the district attorney, she told him her own mother sent the 

threatening message. According to M.W., her mother was a 

competent computer hacker who used her skills to send the 

message from defendant’s Facebook account in order to frame 

defendant because she did not approve of his relationship with 

M.W. A few weeks before trial, and at defendant’s urging, M.W.

met with the district attorney a second time and gave him a 

letter asking to rescind the protective order because she and 

defendant had made progress in their relationship.
5

B. Trial

At trial, before opening statements, defendant moved to 

exclude the screenshot printout from evidence. Defendant argued 

the prosecution could not authenticate it because the photograph 

next to the message was blurry on the printout, because the 

printout did not show the date of the message, and because the 

police had otherwise failed to establish the printout’s 

authenticity. The prosecutor argued the printout was admissible 

because the message itself included specific, personal information 

known to both M.W. and defendant (e.g., the existence of the 

protective order and the reference to Bryan), which was sufficient 

for a prima facie showing of authenticity. In the prosecution’s 

view, questions about whether defendant was at all times in sole 

control of his Facebook account went to the weight of the 

evidence, not its admissibility. 

The trial court overruled the defense objection. The court 

found the prosecution could meet its prima facie burden through 

testimony of M.W. and the police. The court further reasoned the

defense counterarguments went to the weight, not the 

admissibility “foundation-wise,” of the screenshot printout.

With the presentation of evidence underway, M.W. testified 

she would sometimes enter into relationships with other men 

during periods of separation from defendant during their 

marriage, which would make him unhappy and sometimes 

violent. Four months before she received the threatening 

message, M.W. obtained a criminal protective order after 

defendant pushed her down, punched her in the stomach, and hit 

her in the face multiple times. But defendant and M.W. 

remained in contact almost every day despite the order, and 

sometimes they spent the night together.
6

With regard to the threatening message, M.W. testified the 

printout of the screenshot displayed the message she received. 

She acknowledged the message was sent from defendant’s 

Facebook account and, at the time, she believed—but was not 

completely certain—it had been authored by defendant. M.W. 

also admitted she made up her theory about her mother hacking 

defendant’s Facebook account in order to shift blame for the 

message away from defendant.

As to how the message made her feel, M.W. said that when 

she first read the message it frightened her “a little bit.” Under 

further questioning, she admitted she went to the police station 

and returned to check on the status of their investigation because 

she was “actually” scared and “in fear of her life.”3 At another 

point in her testimony, however, M.W. denied being upset or 

crying when she first reported the message to the police. She 

also denied telling the lead investigator, during the interview ten 

days after receiving the threatening message, that she was still 

in fear; she maintained she told him only that she was “worried” 

and “concerned.” M.W. also admitted that during the ten-day

interval between receiving the message and being interviewed at 

her home, she allowed defendant to stay overnight in her home 

“once or twice” because defendant was having problems with his 

housing.

The defense’s only witness, a social media expert, testified 

that when she viewed defendant’s publicly accessible profile page 

on Facebook she found no photos—only his name. On cross3 M.W. testified her state of fear was heightened by reports 

from her building’s security personnel that defendant was riding 

his bicycle repeatedly past the building. 
7

examination, defendant’s expert conceded that hacking into a 

Facebook account would be difficult even for someone who had

been given the user’s password, especially if the hacker was using 

a device different from the one the account owner regularly used

to access his or her account.

The jury convicted defendant of making a criminal threat 

against M.W. (Pen. Code,

4

§ 422, subd. (a)) and contempt of court 

for violating the protective order (§ 166, subd. (c)(1)). The trial 

court sentenced defendant to a total of three years in prison: 

three years for the criminal threat conviction and 364 days, to be 

served concurrently, for the contempt of court conviction.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant’s principal argument for reversal, i.e., the 

screenshot of the Facebook message was inadmissible because 

there was “no evidence” to show it was sent by defendant, is 

meritless. The trial court was charged with determining only 

whether the prosecution made a prima facie showing of 

authenticity, which it did. M.W. showed the message on her 

phone to two different police officers, and one of those officers 

witnessed M.W. take the screenshot of the message. The printout 

of the screenshot included defendant’s name, his photograph, and 

a message with details that would be known to few people (if any)

beyond defendant. And the message was sent at a time when 

defendant would have a motive to make such a threat, both 

because of his wife’s relationship with the other man “Bryan” and 

because she had disconnected his phone service. This

4 Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the 

Penal Code.
8

circumstantial evidence and related testimony was sufficient for 

the prosecution to meet its threshold burden of admissibility, and 

indeed, solid evidence that supports the jury’s finding that 

defendant sent the message.

We additionally conclude there is substantial evidence 

defendant’s Facebook message caused M.W. to suffer sustained 

fear, one of the elements of a criminal threats offense. We 

further hold the absence of an instruction on the lesser included 

offense of attempted criminal threats does not warrant reversal. 

Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

defendant, there is no substantial evidence M.W. did not suffer 

sustained fear, and regardless, there certainly is no reasonable 

probability the jury would have convicted on the lesser, not the 

greater, offense if it had been so instructed.

A. The Screenshot Printout Was Sufficiently 

Authenticated

Authentication is statutorily defined as “the introduction of 

evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that it is the writing that 

the proponent of the evidence claims it is.” (Evid. Code, § 1400.)

As our Supreme Court has observed, authentication is essentially 

a “subset of relevance.” (People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 

258, 266-267 (Goldsmith).) Accordingly, the “first step is to 

determine the purpose for which the evidence is being offered. 

The purpose of the evidence will determine what must be shown 

for authentication, which may vary from case to case. [Citation.] 

The foundation requires that there be sufficient evidence for a 

trier of fact to find that the writing is what it purports to be, i.e., 

that it is genuine for the purpose offered. [Citation.] Essentially, 

what is necessary is a prima facie case.” (Id. at 267.) 
9

Only a prima facie showing is required because “[t]he 

ultimate determination of the authenticity of the evidence is for 

the trier of fact, who must consider any rebuttal evidence and 

balance it against the authenticating evidence in order to arrive 

at a final determination on whether the [writing], in fact, is 

authentic.” (In re K.B. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 989, 997 (K.B.); 

Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 5, West’s Ann. Evid. Code 

(2015 ed.) foll. § 1400, p. 193 [“the fact that the judge permits the 

writing to be admitted in evidence does not necessarily establish 

the authenticity of the writing; all that the judge has determined 

is that there has been a sufficient showing of the authenticity of 

the writing to permit the trier of fact to find that it is 

authentic”].) As our Supreme Court has explained: “‘As long as 

the evidence would support a finding of authenticity, the writing 

is admissible. The fact conflicting inferences can be drawn 

regarding authenticity goes to the document’s weight as evidence, 

not its admissibility.’ [Citation.]” (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th 

at 267; accord, People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 87 (Landry).) 

A proponent of an evidentiary exhibit may authenticate 

evidence through testimony of the person who created the exhibit 

or “by other witness testimony, circumstantial evidence, content 

and location.” (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 268.) For 

example, “[a] writing may be authenticated by evidence that the 

writing refers to or states matters that are unlikely to be known 

to anyone other than the person who is claimed by the proponent 

of the evidence to be the author of the writing.” (Evid. Code, 

§ 1421.)

People v. Cruz (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 715 (Cruz), another

case involving criminal threats made via social media, is 

illustrative. In Cruz, the court considered whether the 
10

prosecution made a sufficient prima facie showing that Facebook 

messages to the victim “from ‘Emilio Lopez’ and ‘Henry Hall’ 

were what the prosecution claimed they were—Facebook 

messages sent to [the victim] by defendant,” albeit using fictitious 

names. (Id. at 730.) The Court of Appeal concluded that even 

though the prosecution had not subpoenaed confirming records 

from Facebook (id. at 728), and even though the messages had no 

dates or times and could have been sent by persons other than 

defendant (ibid.), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting the messages in evidence in light of the content of the 

messages and the testimony of the victim and two others who 

received text messages from the defendant that contained similar 

threating language. (Id. at 720, 728, 730.) The Cruz court

explained: “[T]he Facebook messages to [the victim] from ‘Henry 

Hall’ and ‘Emilio Lopez’ included content that defendant 

communicated to [the victim] and others by means other than the 

Facebook messages themselves . . . . In addition, the messages 

included things defendant knew about or had access to, 

independently of the messages themselves . . . . This 

circumstantial evidence . . . made a prima facie showing that the 

Facebook messages to [the victim] were sent by defendant.” (Id. 

at 731; see also People v. Valdez (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1429, 

1435-1436 [printouts from defendant’s MySpace page were 

authenticated because “the page was password protected for 

posting and deleting content,” “the MySpace page icon identifying 

the owner of the page displayed a photograph of Valdez’s face,” 

and the page identified the owner’s interests, which “matched 

what the police otherwise knew of Valdez’s interests from their 

field contacts with him”]; United States v. Browne (3d Cir. 2016) 

834 F.3d 403, 413-414 [Facebook chat logs properly authenticated 
11

because, among other things, personal information that the 

defendant confirmed on the witness stand was consistent with 

the personal details that “Billy Button” interspersed throughout 

his Facebook conversations with the victims]; State v. Green (S.C. 

2019) 830 S.E.2d 711, 715-716 [personal information (names, 

addresses, and relationships) found in the content of Facebook 

messages was sufficient to authenticate them].)

The trial court here did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting the screenshot printout in evidence. (Goldsmith, 

supra, 59 Cal.4th at 266 [abuse of discretion standard applies to 

claims of evidentiary error].) The printout was an accurate copy 

of the screenshot (as witness testimony established) and the 

screenshot itself—essentially a photograph of the message—was 

taken by M.W. and witnessed by the desk officer.

5

 It is well 

recognized that a photograph may by authenticated by the person 

who took it or witnessed it being taken. (People v. Beckley (2010) 

185 Cal.App.4th 509, 514-516 [“‘the testimony of a person who 

was present at the time a film was made that it accurately 

depicts what it purports to show is a legal foundation for its 

admission into evidence’”].) The printout showed that the 

message came from a Facebook user with the same name as 

defendant and who was one of M.W.’s Facebook friends. The 

5

Insofar as defendant argues the printout of the screenshot 

should not have been admitted under the Secondary Evidence 

Rule (Evid. Code, § 1520), that was not the basis of the objection 

at trial and the argument is forfeited. (See, e.g., Landry, supra, 2 

Cal.5th at 86 [holding defendant forfeited Secondary Evidence 

Rule challenge by not raising it in the trial court].) It is also 

wrong on the merits—there was no dispute the printout was an 

accurate copy of the message and there was no testimony the 

prosecution ever had the “original” message in its possession.
12

printout also displayed a photograph of the sender, which M.W.

affirmed was a photograph of defendant, and the lead 

investigator testified he also recognized defendant as the person 

depicted in the photograph when he viewed the message on 

M.W.’s phone. M.W. testified to reasons why defendant would 

have been angry with her at the time she received the 

threatening message, which further tends to corroborate the 

conclusion that defendant sent the message. Social media 

experts for both the prosecution and the defense testified 

Facebook accounts are password protected and M.W. disavowed 

the only person proffered as someone who might have hacked 

defendant’s account (her mother). Most critically, the content of 

the message contained facts known to defendant and likely few if 

any others: the message identified M.W. as defendant’s wife, 

referenced the protective order, and named the individual with 

whom M.W. was carrying on a telephone relationship at the time.

Taken together, this circumstantial evidence provided the 

requisite “prima facie case” of authenticity. Arguments about the 

thoroughness of the police investigation into the message and the 

possibility that the message was authored by someone other than 

defendant who accessed his Facebook account went to the weight 

of the evidence, not its admissibility. 

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Defendant’s 

Convictions

“In order to prove a violation of section 422, the prosecution 

must establish all of the following: (1) that the defendant 

‘willfully threaten[ed] to commit a crime which will result in 

death or great bodily injury to another person,’ (2) that the 

defendant made the threat ‘with the specific intent that the 
13

statement . . . is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent 

of actually carrying it out,’ (3) that the threat—which may be 

‘made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic 

communication device’—was ‘on its face and under the 

circumstances in which it [was] made, . . . so unequivocal, 

unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person 

threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of 

execution of the threat,’ (4) that the threat actually caused the 

person threatened ‘to be in sustained fear for his or her own 

safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety,’ and (5) that the 

threatened person’s fear was ‘reasonabl[e]’ under the 

circumstances. [Citation.]” (People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 

221, 227–228 (Toledo); accord, People v. Orloff (2016) 2 

Cal.App.5th 947, 953.) Defendant challenges the sufficiency of 

the evidence regarding the first and fourth of these elements, i.e., 

whether defendant sent the threatening message and whether 

M.W. suffered sustained fear as a result.

We consider defendant’s challenge using the substantial 

evidence standard of review. We review the record “‘in the light 

most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it 

discloses . . . evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid 

value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (People v. 

Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 713.)

1. Identity

For all the reasons we have already given, there was

reasonable, credible, and solid evidence at trial that defendant 

was the author of the threatening Facebook message. The 

printout of the screenshot indicated the message was from a 
14

Facebook user with the same name as defendant and who was a 

Facebook friend of M.W.; the printout displayed a photograph of 

the defendant; the message, which was sent only to M.W.,

contained personal information about M.W. known to the 

defendant; upon receiving the message, M.W. immediately 

recognized the sender as defendant; M.W. told the desk officer 

unequivocally that the message had been sent by defendant; in 

the past, defendant had reacted violently when confronted with 

evidence that M.W. had entered into a relationship with another 

man; and M.W. admitted she had no facts to support her postarrest theory that her mother hacked defendant’s Facebook 

account and sent the message. 

2. Sustained Fear

Sustained fear for purposes of section 422 means a period 

of time that extends beyond what is “momentary, fleeting, or 

transitory.” (People v. Allen (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156 

(Allen).) A victim’s fear need not last for an extended period, 

such as days or weeks. Several courts, for example, have found 

“[f]ifteen minutes of fear . . . is more than sufficient to constitute 

‘sustained’ fear for purposes of . . . section 422.” (Id. at 1153, 

1156 [15 minutes between threat and defendant’s arrest 

sufficient for finding of sustained fear]; accord, People v. Fierro

(2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1346, 1348-1349 (Fierro) [affirming 

a finding of sustained fear where the defendant threatened to kill 

the victim during an incident at a gas station, and the victim was 

still in fear 15 minutes after he had left the station and was 

driving on the freeway]; People v. Wilson (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 

193, 197 (Wilson) [affirming a criminal threat conviction where 

the defendant “acted ‘crazy’ and unreasonably” in the victim’s 
15

yard for 15 to 20 minutes and threatened to kill the victim and 

his family].) In considering whether the statutory element of 

sustained fear was met, a trier of fact may rely on evidence 

indicating the victim had knowledge of the defendant’s prior 

threatening conduct and had previously reported this conduct to 

the police. (Allen, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at 1156.)

There is strong evidence M.W. was in sustained fear after 

reading defendant’s threatening message. M.W., who had prior 

knowledge of defendant’s violence and had previously sought 

police protection from that violence, read the message and shortly 

thereafter sought help from law enforcement. The desk officer 

testified M.W. was visibly upset and crying when he took her 

complaint. (Although M.W. denied being upset or crying during 

her interview with the desk officer when testifying at trial, she 

never testified she was not scared at that time.) There was also 

testimony from the lead investigator and his partner that M.W.’s 

demeanor remained fearful even days later. Moreover, even 

while testifying and attempting to minimize the fear she felt, 

M.W. still conceded she told the lead investigator some ten days 

after first reading the Facebook message that she was “worried” 

and “concerned.” That is just fear by another name. The 

evidence on the sustained fear element of a criminal threats 

offense was amply sufficient.6

6 Because there was substantial evidence to support the 

criminal threat conviction, we also hold that there was 

substantial evidence to support the contempt of court conviction.
16

C. The Absence of a Lesser Included Offense Instruction 

Does Not Warrant Reversal

“[E]very lesser included offense, or theory thereof, which is 

supported by the evidence must be presented to the jury.” 

(People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 155 (Breverman).) 

This is true even absent a request for such an instruction. 

(People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 112.) However, “the 

existence of ‘any evidence, no matter how weak’ will not justify 

instructions on a lesser included offense.” (Breverman, supra, 19 

Cal.4th at 162.) Rather, “such instructions are required 

whenever evidence that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser 

offense is ‘substantial enough to merit consideration’ by the 

jury. . . . ‘Substantial evidence’ in this context is evidence from 

which a jury composed of reasonable [persons] could . . . conclude 

[ ] that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed.” 

(Ibid.)

Defendant argues the trial court should have sua sponte 

instructed the jury on attempted criminal threats as a lesser 

included offense. (Toledo, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 231 [holding the 

language of the sections 422 and 664 support the existence of the 

crime of attempted criminal threats].) Such an instruction is 

required when there is substantial evidence “a 

defendant, . . . acting with the requisite intent, makes a sufficient 

threat that is received and understood by the threatened person, 

but, for whatever reason, the threat does not actually cause the 

threatened person to be in sustained fear for his or her safety 

even though, under the circumstances, that person reasonably 

could have been placed in such fear . . . .” (Toledo, supra, 26 

Cal.4th at 231.) We review the trial court’s failure to instruct on 

a lesser included offense de novo (People v. Nelson (2016) 1 
17

Cal.5th 513, 539), considering the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the defendant. (People v. Brothers (2015) 236 

Cal.App.4th 24, 30; People v. Aguilar (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1023, 

1028.)

There was no substantial evidence of a lack of sustained 

fear here. At most, M.W. denied expressing fear to the 

investigating officers 10 days after receiving the message—she 

said she was only worried and concerned. As we have already 

said, expressing her emotion in terms of worry rather than in 

terms of fear strikes us as a matter of meaningless semantics. 

Regardless, M.W. never denied experiencing fear (described using 

that specific word) in the earlier days after reading defendant’s 

threats and there was abundant evidence (her words and actions 

during that time) that she was indeed fearful.7 That undisputed 

initial fear, which really need only last for minutes not days as 

here (Allen, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at 1156), defeats any 

suggestion that a lesser included offense instruction was 

required. Moreover, even if such an instruction were required, it 

was harmless not to give it on these facts. (People v. Beltran

(2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955; Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 165, 

177 [when assessing prejudice we “focus[ ] not on what a 

reasonable jury could do, but what such a jury is likely to have 

done” and we “consider, among other things, whether the 

evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, 

and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so 

7 That M.W. later took action arguably inconsistent with her 

earlier fear (allowing defendant to shelter in her apartment) does 

not negate her initial fear.
18

comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the 

error of which the defendant complains affected the result”].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MOOR, J.

KIM, J.