United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 22-1929

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

SHAUN WALKER,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Timothy S. Hillman, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Gelpí, Montecalvo, and Rikelman,

Circuit Judges.

Sarah Varney, with whom Darren Griffis and Murphy & Rudolf, 

LLP were on brief, for appellant.

Alexia R. De Vincentis, Assistant United States Attorney, 

with whom Joshua S. Levy, Acting United States Attorney, was on 

brief, for appellee.

December 19, 2023
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RIKELMAN, Circuit Judge. Shaun Walker appeals his 

thirty-six-month sentence for participating in a thwarted Hobbs 

Act conspiracy to rob a home business. Walker raises four 

procedural objections to his sentence, including the application 

of economic-loss and dangerous-weapon enhancements, and the denial 

of incomplete-conspiracy and mitigating-role reductions. Although 

the district court's ultimate sentence was one month below the 

low-end of the sentencing range recommended under the United States

Sentencing Guidelines, Walker asks us to review the calculation of 

the range itself.

After careful consideration, we find no reversible error 

in the district court’s treatment of the economic-loss and

dangerous-weapon enhancements or the incomplete-conspiracy

reduction. But because the sentencing court did not compare

Walker’s culpability to that of his co-defendants under the factors 

applicable to the mitigating-role reduction, we cannot confirm 

whether it erred in denying that reduction. Accordingly, we vacate 

and remand for resentencing on Walker's eligibility for a 

mitigating-role reduction.
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I. BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Facts1

On March 18, 2019, Junior Melendez was organizing a 

robbery of a home in Rockland, Massachusetts, out of which Joseph 

Wilson ran a business selling glass marijuana-smoking 

paraphernalia. Melendez was planning the break-in with Grace 

Katana, who had scouted the target location, Keith Johnson, who 

would lead the break-in, and a fourth person, who would aid Johnson

inside the home. On March 19, Melendez told Johnson that Shaun 

Walker would enter the home with Johnson as a substitute for the 

original person in that role. Johnson objected at first, 

preferring someone physically larger, before relenting to Walker's 

participation, telling Melendez, "I’m going in first, it doesn’t 

even matter."

With the four participants set, the plan was put into 

motion. On March 21, Katana suggested to Melendez that the robbery 

could go forward that Sunday. Two days later, on Saturday, 

March 23, Melendez called Johnson and confirmed they would proceed 

1 Because Walker pleaded guilty, our summary "draw[s] the 

facts from the change-of-plea colloquies, the unchallenged 

portions of the Presentence Investigation Report[], and the 

sentencing hearing transcript." United States v. Vargas-Martinez, 

15 F.4th 91, 95 n.1 (1st Cir. 2021). It also draws on phone call 

transcripts in the Government’s Supplemental Appendix, which 

contain undisputed statements not included elsewhere in the record 

but which both parties agree were properly before the district 

court. 
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"tomorrow." On Sunday, March 24, Melendez informed Johnson they 

would commit the robbery "tonight around 2 or 3 in the morning," 

and Johnson said he would be ready. 

Around 1:42 a.m. on Monday, March 25, Katana told 

Melendez he was ready to proceed "whenever the guys were ready," 

and agreed to meet Melendez near Hamilton Street in Worcester, 

Massachusetts. But Melendez changed his mind twenty minutes later, 

calling Katana at 2:04 a.m. to delay the break-in until "tomorrow," 

saying the middle of the night was "not really the best time to do 

it" and agreeing to meet Katana that night instead.

Apparently unknown to the conspirators, state and 

federal law enforcement had been intercepting Melendez's phone 

calls and text messages pursuant to a wiretap since March 14, 2019. 

Aware of Melendez and Katana’s middle-of-the-night plan, police 

watched from a distance in the early hours of March 25 as Melendez 

arrived to meet Katana in Worcester. At approximately 3:15 a.m., 

after Melendez had left the area, police observed three men loading 

a wheeled dolly into the back of a Honda CR-V registered to 

Katana’s sister.2 

Before the four men left for Rockland later on Monday, 

March 25, Johnson called Melendez to ask, "you got the thing, or 

I bringing mine?" Melendez responded that "he might not, he 

2 The record does not further identify the men.
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probably not even be there," apparently referring to Wilson, but 

instructed Johnson to "bring [his] just in case," repeating, "just 

bring one, bring one." The men were discussing whether Johnson 

should carry a firearm, and, following Melendez's instructions, 

Johnson brought a .380 caliber pistol to Rockland. Law enforcement

agents were listening to that call and intercepted a separate call

the following month in which Melendez told a third party that

Walker was angry that nobody told him Johnson was instructed to 

bring a gun into the home. 

The men traveled more than 60 miles from Worcester to 

Rockland on Monday afternoon. Upon arriving in Rockland around 

2:48 p.m., Melendez and Katana scoped out the Wilson property,

whereas Walker and Johnson waited in a Home Depot parking lot less

than a mile away. At 2:51 p.m., location information from 

Melendez’s phone indicated he was close to the target home. At 

2:53 p.m., a doorbell camera recorded Katana carrying away two 

packages that had been delivered to the doorstep of the property

earlier that day. 

By 3:02 p.m., Melendez and Katana had arrived at the 

Home Depot. Although Melendez previously had instructed Walker to 

purchase from Home Depot "whatever we need" while Melendez and 

Katana went to the house, Walker asked Melendez to buy the supplies

instead, saying "we can't be going in and showin' our face," and 

suggesting Melendez "grab a crowbar," before adding "what you 
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think? Whatever, whatever you think's going to work." Home Depot 

security footage and a purchase receipt show that at 3:07 p.m., 

Melendez and Katana bought a two-foot iron crowbar, an eight-inch 

screwdriver, and razor blades, which they loaded into the Honda 

occupied by Walker and Johnson. 

Melendez also told Walker "[t]here's one whip [car]" in 

the driveway of Wilson's house and that Katana did not "think 

anybody [was] there" but that they were "not sure." Apparently, 

Katana was trying to gather more information from an unspecified 

fifth person. Melendez's last statement to Walker was that 

"we[']re gonna look . . . and make the decision after that." 

Convinced an armed robbery was imminent, Massachusetts 

State Police stopped both vehicles in the Home Depot parking lot. 

Walker was driving the Honda with Johnson in the front passenger 

seat. From that vehicle, officers seized a loaded .380 caliber 

pistol from the glove compartment; the crowbar Melendez and Katana 

had purchased; and the wheeled dolly loaded the night before. In 

Melendez’s vehicle, officers found a ski mask and the two boxes 

Katana had taken from the front steps of the home, which contained 

$2,500 worth of glass smoking pipes. Wilson later told law 

enforcement that the glassware in his home on the day of the 

intended robbery was worth approximately $40,000. 
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B. Legal Proceedings

On May 18, 2022, Walker pleaded guilty to violating the 

Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The presentence investigation 

report (PSR) recommended a sentencing range of thirty-seven to 

forty-six months based on a total offense level of 21, which was 

derived from the following calculation. The Guideline applicable 

to Hobbs Act conspiracies is that for "Attempt, Solicitation, or 

Conspiracy (Not Covered by a Specific Offense Guideline)." U.S. 

Sent'g Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G.") § 2Xl.l; see id. § 1B1.2

("If the offense involved a conspiracy . . . refer to 

§ 2Xl.l . . . ."). Section 2X1.1 borrows the base offense level 

for the substantive offense -- here, the robbery Guideline, id.

§ 2B3.1 -- "plus any adjustments from such guideline for any 

intended offense conduct that can be established with reasonable 

certainty," id. § 2Xl.l(a). The robbery Guideline provides a base 

offense level of 20. Id. § 2B3.1(a).

The PSR also recommended two enhancements and two 

reductions. It initially recommended a five-level increase for 

possession of a firearm, but both Walker and the government 

objected because the government was unable to prove Walker could 

have reasonably foreseen that Johnson would carry the gun. In 

response, the probation officer recommended instead a three-level 

enhancement based on possession of "dangerous weapon[s]": the 

crowbar, screwdriver, and razor blades. Id. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E). 
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The PSR also recommended a one-level economic-loss increase 

because the intended loss was more than $20,000 but did not exceed 

$95,000. See id. § 2B3.1(b)(7)(B). Finally, the PSR recommended 

a two-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility and a further 

one-level decrease for Walker’s timely notice of his intent to 

plead guilty, reaching a total offense level of 21. Because Walker

had a criminal history score of zero, he qualified for criminal 

history category I.

Walker asserted four objections to the PSR's guideline 

calculation in his sentencing memorandum. First, he requested a 

four-point reduction for his role as a minimal participant in the 

conspiracy. See id. § 3B1.2(a). Walker argued that he was 

"substantially less culpable than the average participant" in the 

conspiracy, id. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(A), and "plainly among the least 

culpable" in the offense under the factors laid out in the

Guideline commentary, id. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.4; see also id. § 3B1.2 

cmt. n.3(C) (listing factors "the court should consider" when 

determining whether defendant is eligible for a reduction). He 

explained that he did not fully understand the scope or structure 

of the activity, nor did he participate in its planning; he 

intended to perform only a small role in the break-in itself; he 

lacked decision-making authority and expressed reticence about 

certain steps; and the record did not show that he stood to benefit 
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from his participation. At the sentencing hearing,3 the government 

responded that Walker could not be a minimal participant, arguing 

that it was "hard to imagine that an individual who ultimately 

agreed . . . to go into the house to actually commit the robbery 

[would] be a minimal participant in that conspiracy." The 

government also argued that Walker hesitated to enter the Home 

Depot because he feared a witness might later identify him on 

security footage, not because he was having second thoughts about 

the robbery.

Second, Walker requested a three-level reduction because 

he and his co-conspirators had not taken all the necessary acts to 

complete the robbery. See id. § 2X1.1(b)(2). Walker argued that 

Melendez had doubts about whether to carry out the robbery as late 

as when the group was at Home Depot because Katana could not 

determine whether the home was occupied. Walker further argued 

that the group had not reached the final staging area because 

Melendez had asked Walker whether the group could meet at a 

restaurant to decide what to do. The government responded that 

the incomplete-conspiracy reduction was "the exception to the 

rule" and unwarranted in this case, when the co-conspirators had 

planned the robbery for six days, armed themselves with a pistol, 

3 The government did not file a sentencing memorandum. 
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driven 60 miles to within half a mile of the target property, and 

purchased items to perform the break-in. 

Third, Walker argued that a three-level dangerous-weapon 

enhancement for possession of the crowbar, screwdriver, and razor

blades was improper because he possessed the items only with the 

intent to facilitate the robbery, not to cause injury. The 

government argued that the enhancement was available as long as it 

could show with reasonable certainty that Walker intended to 

"possess[] an item that was capable of inflicting death or serious 

bodily injury," and both parties agreed the crowbar, screwdriver, 

and razor blades could inflict such harm. 

Finally, Walker argued that the one-point economic-loss 

enhancement was inappropriate. He contended that the court could 

consider only the actual loss caused by the conspirators, not the 

intended loss, because the government could not show with 

reasonable certainty that the conspirators would have stolen all 

of the glassware had the break-in occurred. The actual loss of 

$2,500 would not have warranted an enhancement. See id.

§ 2B3.1(b)(7)(A). The government responded that the conspiracy 

Guideline indicates that "in an attempted theft, the value of the 

items that the defendant attempted to steal would be considered," 

id. § 2X1.1 cmt. n.2, so the intended $40,000 loss was sufficient 

to justify the adjustment. 
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The district court allowed the parties to present their 

positions without questioning and, at the end of the presentations, 

decided to adopt the PSR's offense level calculations. It did not 

explain its reasoning on the record. The government asked for a 

sentence of forty-six months of imprisonment, at the top of the 

sentencing range recommended under the Guidelines, whereas Walker 

requested no incarceration, two years of probation, and three years

of supervised release.4 After hearing Walker's allocution, which 

the district court remarked "was one of the best [it had] ever 

heard," the court sentenced him to thirty-six months'

incarceration and three years' supervised release. Walker timely 

appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

On appeal, Walker raises only procedural challenges to 

his sentence. Accordingly, our review of the district court's 

decision scrutinizes its legal conclusions de novo and its factual 

findings for clear error. See United States v. Andino-Rodríguez, 

79 F.4th 7, 31 (1st Cir. 2023). We address each of Walker's 

challenges below, leaving the most complicated on this record for 

last.

4 Walker's sentencing memorandum noted that he spent more than 

three years in court-ordered home confinement after his initial 

arrest in 2019, during which he left home only for work and to 

attend to his children. 
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B. Economic-Loss Enhancement

Walker asks us to reverse the district court's 

application of a one-point economic-loss enhancement on two 

grounds. He argues that the district court committed legal error 

by applying the enhancement based on the $40,000 value of the

intended loss, rather than the $2,500 value of the glassware Katana 

removed from the property. See U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(7)(A)-(B) 

(applying no enhancement for losses of $20,000 or less and a onepoint enhancement for losses greater than $20,000 but not exceeding

$95,000). Further, Walker contends that the government failed to 

prove with "reasonable certainty" that the conspirators 

"specifically intended" to cause a loss of more than $20,000. We 

reject both arguments.

First, the plain language of the Guidelines and our

precedent both foreclose Walker's claim that the district court 

applied the wrong legal standard. The language of the applicable 

Guidelines allows district courts to consider intended losses. 

The conspiracy Guideline instructs sentencing courts to apply "any 

adjustments from [the substantive offense] guideline for any 

intended offense conduct that can be established with reasonable 

certainty." Id. § 2X1.1(a) (emphasis added). The conspiracy 

Guideline commentary defines "intended offense conduct" as conduct 
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that was "specifically intended" or that "actually occurred."5 Id.

§ 2X1.1 cmt. n.2. Under the robbery Guideline commentary, "loss" 

is "the value of the property taken, damaged, or destroyed." Id.

§ 2B3.1 cmt. n.3. Applying the commentary of the conspiracy

Guideline to that of the robbery Guideline therefore requires 

district courts to consider the value of the property that the 

conspirators specifically intended to steal when sentencing for a 

robbery conspiracy. Cf. § 2X1.1 cmt. n.2 ("In an attempted theft, 

the value of the items that the defendant attempted to steal would 

be considered."). And our case law confirms that "'intended' loss 

is the test" for determining whether an economic-loss adjustment 

applies to a thwarted robbery conspiracy. United States v. 

Chapdelaine, 989 F.2d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 1993).6

Walker argues that a case decided by the Third Circuit

after his sentencing nevertheless commands a different result 

here. See generally United States v. Banks, 55 F.4th 246 (3d Cir. 

5 The commentary in the Guidelines, including the application 

notes, is binding unless it conflicts with the Guidelines 

themselves or a statute. Andino-Rodríguez, 79 F.4th at 35 (citing 

United States v. Carrasco-Mateo, 389 F.3d 239, 244 (1st Cir. 

2004)).

6 Walker argues that Chapdelaine is inapplicable because it 

considered "intended loss" based on a since-amended provision in 

the robbery Guideline. But as we explained in Chapdelaine, the 

previous framework, in the end, directed us to "intended loss" 

based on the language in the conspiracy Guideline. See 989 F.2d 

at 35 n.8. The same is true today, even though the modern 

Guidelines take us on a more direct route to get there. 
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2022). Banks held that the plain meaning of the economic-loss 

adjustment under the separate but similar theft Guideline "does 

not include intended loss." Id. at 257 (interpreting U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1(b)(1)). In so ruling, the Third Circuit withheld deference 

to the commentary accompanying the theft Guideline because that

commentary broadened the language of the Guideline beyond its text.

See id. at 256-58 & n.45 (citing United States v. Nasir, 17 F.4th 

459, 472 (3rd Cir. 2021) (en banc) (Bibas, J., concurring)).

Walker argues that because the adjustments under the theft and 

robbery Guidelines share the word "loss," the logic of Banks should 

apply to section 2B3.1(b)(7) and compel us to reverse. But Banks

did not involve a conspiracy charge, so the sentence in that case 

rested only on the language of the theft Guideline. See id. at

251, 256-58. Here, by contrast, the conspiracy Guideline governing 

Hobbs Act robberies expressly instructs courts to consider 

"intended offense conduct." U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(a). And unlike the 

intended loss language in the theft Guideline commentary, the 

textual hook for intended conduct in the conspiracy Guideline is 

contained in the Guideline itself, quelling any concern that the 

commentary could have impermissibly expanded the meaning of the 

relevant Guideline here.

Second, there was no error in the district court's 

application of the reasonable certainty standard. Our precedent 

allows sentencing courts to draw inferences from "the actual plan 
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of the conspirators to determine which specific characteristics of 

the offense they intended." United States v. Medeiros, 897 F.2d 

13, 19 (1st Cir. 1990); see Chapdelaine, 989 F.2d at 35

("[R]easonable certainty goes to what with reasonable certainty 

can be determined to be the conspirator's intent." (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Medeiros, 897 F.2d at 18)).

Walker argues that because the robbery did not take 

place, it is "speculative" to assume that the conspirators would 

have successfully stolen more than $20,000 worth of property,

thereby warranting the enhancement. Again, our precedent says

otherwise. In Chapdelaine, the defendant received a four-point

increase for a loss between $800,000 and $1,500,000 for his

unsuccessful conspiracy to rob an armored truck containing 

$1,000,000. See 989 F.2d at 35. The defendant argued on appeal, 

as Walker does here, that "the loss . . . was speculative," rather 

than reasonably certain, "because no robbery actually occurred."

Id. But we disagreed, discerning no clear error in the finding

that the co-conspirators intended to steal all the money in the 

truck. See id. So too here. Walker argues that the conspirators 

might not have "kn[own] how much inventory would [have been]

inside" or "been able to locate all the inventory" or "had the 

time and physical ability" to remove it all. But these 

possibilities support, at best, a plausible alternative finding; 

they do not demonstrate clear error. See United States v. Flete-
- 16 -

Garcia, 925 F.3d 17, 26 (1st Cir. 2019) ("If two plausible but 

competing inferences may be drawn from particular facts, a 

sentencing court's choice between those two competing inferences 

cannot be clearly erroneous." (first citing United States v. Nuñez, 

852 F.3d 141, 146 (1st Cir. 2017); and then citing United States

v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499, 508 (1st Cir. 1990))).

C. Dangerous-Weapon Enhancement

Walker next argues that the district court erred by 

applying a three-point enhancement under the robbery Guideline for 

possession of dangerous weapons because the government failed to 

prove that Walker intended to use the crowbar, screwdriver, and 

razor blades as weapons. Walker is incorrect as a matter of law 

that the Guidelines require such proof.

As explained previously, the conspiracy Guideline

directs courts to adopt the base offense level of the substantive 

offense "plus any adjustments from such guideline for any intended 

offense conduct that can be established with reasonable 

certainty." U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(a). Among the specific offense 

characteristics of the robbery Guideline is a three-level 

enhancement if "a dangerous weapon was brandished or possessed." 

Id. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E). A dangerous weapon includes "an instrument 

capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury." Id. cmt. 

n.2 (incorporating by reference U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(E)(ii)).
- 17 -

Our precedent does not resolve whether the government 

must show that a defendant intended to possess a dangerous weapon 

with intent to use it as such. The government argues that it needs

to show only that Walker intended to possess the weapons, whereas

Walker argues that the enhancement applies only if he intended to

use the items to "inflict[] death or serious bodily injury."

"Typically, we give the language used in guideline 

provisions its plain and ordinary meaning." United States v. 

Patch, 9 F.4th 43, 46 (1st Cir. 2021); accord United States v. 

Pope, 554 F.3d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 2009) (interpreting weapons 

enhancement according to its "plain meaning"). Section 2X1.1(a) 

instructs district courts to adjust the Guideline calculation from 

the underlying substantive offense based on "intended offense 

conduct." U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(a). "[I]ntended" modifies "conduct,"

which, in the relevant sense, means "the act, manner, or process 

of carrying on." See Conduct, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 

Dictionary (10th ed. 1993). Accordingly, "intended offense 

conduct" in the conspiracy Guideline refers to -- and the specificintent requirement applies to -- the actions a defendant intended 

to take in the course of the substantive offense. The text of the 

robbery Guideline clearly states that the relevant offense conduct 

is the "possess[ion]" of a dangerous weapon. U.S.S.G. 

§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(E); see Pope, 554 F.3d at 246 (holding enhancement 

applies under theft Guideline "if the dangerous weapon 'was 
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possessed'" (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2B2.1(b)(4))). Because the action 

is contained in the word "possess[ion]," the plain meaning of the 

Guidelines supports the government’s view that Walker needed only 

to "specifically intend[]" to "possess[]" the items in connection 

with the robbery. See U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(a) cmt. n.2; id.

§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(E).

Our understanding of the dangerous-weapon enhancement is 

consistent with the case law of our sister circuits, and we can 

identify no out-of-circuit precedent adopting Walker's 

interpretation. See United States v. Lavender, 224 F.3d 939, 941 

(9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting defendant's argument that "dangerous 

weapons should be considered dangerous weapons for sentencing 

purposes only when they are carried with the intent to use them as 

weapons"); Pope, 554 F.3d at 246 (same regarding the burglary 

Guideline). For example, based on the plain meaning of the 

dangerous-weapon enhancement under the burglary Guideline, the

Second Circuit held in Pope that the enhancement itself required

the government only to show "possession of a dangerous weapon, 

regardless of whether the dangerous weapon was employed as such 

during the commission of a crime." 554 F.3d at 246 (citing 

Lavender, 224 F.3d at 941). The defendant in Pope, who had carried 

a sledgehammer into a bank burglary, maintained that an enhancement 

for possessing a dangerous weapon was inappropriate because the

sledgehammer was "not inherently a weapon," and the defendant had 
- 19 -

used it only to break into the bank, not to cause injury. Id. at 

245. But the Second Circuit understood the focus of the 

enhancement to require courts to evaluate whether an item "was 

possessed," not the manner in which it was used. Id. at 246.

To be sure, Pope did not interpret the enhancement

through the lens of the conspiracy Guideline, which expressly 

limits sentencing courts to considering conduct that was 

"specifically intended or actually occurred." U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1

cmt. n.2. But Pope's explanation that the dangerous-weapon 

enhancement applies when the defendant intended to possess a 

dangerous weapon -- regardless of how the item would be used to 

facilitate the offense -- confirms our view that the conspiracy 

Guideline's intent requirement applies to possession of a 

dangerous weapon and nothing more. See 554 F.3d at 245-46; accord

Lavender, 224 F.3d at 941.

Because Walker concedes that he specifically intended to 

possess the crowbar, screwdriver, and razor blades during the 

robbery, and that such items fit within the Guideline definition 

of "dangerous weapon," the district court did not err by applying

the enhancement here. 

D. Incomplete-Conspiracy Reduction

Walker next argues that the district court erred by 

denying his request for a three-level incomplete-conspiracy 

reduction. The sentencing court’s factual finding that the 
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participants were "about to complete" the conspiracy is subject to 

clear error review.7 See Chapdelaine, 989 F.2d at 35. We find no 

clear error here.

A conspiracy defendant is entitled to a three-level 

reduction from the base offense level of the underlying substantive 

offense "unless" the court finds with "reasonable certainty" that 

"the conspirators were about to complete" the object of the 

conspiracy "but for apprehension or interruption by some similar 

event beyond their control." U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(a), (b)(2). Walker 

argues that at the time of the conspirators' initial arrests in 

the Home Depot parking lot, Melendez and Katana believed that 

someone might be home and planned to undertake additional 

reconnaissance before proceeding, so they were not "about to 

complete" the robbery. He urges us to reverse, contending that 

these facts show the conspiracy here did not proceed as far as the 

robbery in Chapdelaine.8

7 A sentencing court may also deny an incomplete-conspiracy 

reduction if it finds that "the defendant or a co-conspirator 

completed all the acts the conspirators believed necessary on their 

part for the successful completion of the substantive offense." 

U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b)(2). In that context, "[t]he question of 

whether the offense was substantially completed is a judgment 

call," which we review for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Serunjogi, 767 F.3d 132, 143 (1st Cir. 2014).

8 The government, for its part, attempts to distinguish 

Chapdelaine as a case in which the defendants had completed all 

the acts necessary to accomplish the robbery, but our holding in 

that case clearly stated otherwise. See 989 F.2d at 35 ("Under 

these circumstances, there was no clear error in the district 
- 21 -

In that case, we found no clear error in the district 

court’s finding that Chapdelaine was "'about to complete' a 

robbery" when the participants had stolen getaway vehicles in 

advance, scouted the arrival and departure times of the target 

truck for several days, arrived at the mall on the day of the 

intended robbery "prepared and equipped to carry out a robbery,"

and "were thwarted only by the unexpected early departure of the 

[target] truck." Chapdelaine, 989 F.2d at 30-31, 35. Walker 

contends that the presence of the car in the driveway of the Wilson 

residence gave the conspirators here pause, forcing them to 

reconsider whether to proceed. Unlike in Chapdelaine, Walker 

argues, the conspirators here did not arrive at the final staging 

area ready to complete the offense. Rather, there was still an 

opportunity to withdraw from or otherwise abandon the conspiracy. 

But Chapdelaine makes clear that "[i]t is nearness of 

the crime to achievement . . . that defeats the reduction 

available for conspiracies . . . that have not progressed very 

far." Id. at 36. And Walker fails to explain why the district 

court clearly erred in determining that the robbery conspiracy 

here had "progressed far enough." Id.

court's conclusion that Chapdelaine was 'about to complete' a 

robbery 'but for apprehension or interruption by some similar event 

beyond the defendant's control.'" (emphasis added) (quoting 

U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b)(1))).
- 22 -

We reverse for clear error only if the district court's 

factual findings are not plausible on the record as a whole and if 

we "form[] a strong, unyielding belief that a mistake has been 

made." United States v. Montañez-Quiñones, 911 F.3d 59, 66 (1st 

Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Cintrón-Echautegui, 604 F.3d 

1, 6 (1st Cir. 2010)). Here, Walker and his co-conspirators

planned the robbery for nearly a week, drove more than 60 miles in 

separate cars from Worcester to Rockland, and, although Melendez 

and Katana saw a vehicle in the driveway at the target home, stole 

items from the front porch and then purchased items at Home Depot 

to facilitate the break-in. A district court could plausibly treat

these facts as demonstrating that the presence of a vehicle at the 

home had merely slowed, rather than stopped, the momentum of the 

conspiracy. Nor does the record contain any evidence that Walker 

took steps to withdraw from the conspiracy at that time. Although 

Walker disagrees with the district court's interpretation of the 

facts, "the sentencing court's choice among supportable 

alternatives cannot be clearly erroneous." Andino-Rodríguez, 79 

F.4th at 34 (quoting United States v. De la Cruz-Gutiérrez, 881 

F.3d 221, 227 (1st Cir. 2018)).

E. Mitigating-Role Reduction

Walker's final challenge to his sentence is that the 

district court erroneously denied him a mitigating-role adjustment 

for what he claims is his lesser role in the offense as compared 
- 23 -

to his co-conspirators. We conclude that we cannot evaluate on 

this record whether denying the reduction constituted error and 

therefore remand to the district court.

"Role-in-the-offense determinations are notoriously 

fact-specific." United States v. Pérez, 819 F.3d 541, 545 (1st 

Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). It is not surprising then that 

"absent a mistake of law, battles over a defendant's" role are

"almost always . . . won or lost in the district court." Id. at

546 (quoting United States v. Graciani, 61 F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir. 

1995)). Indeed, "[w]e've often warned that, [b]ecause determining 

one's role in an offense is a fact-specific inquiry, we rarely 

reverse a district court's decision regarding whether to apply a 

minor role adjustment." Andino-Rodríguez, 79 F.4th at 31 (second 

alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting De la Cruz-Gutiérrez, 881 F.3d at 225-26). The defendant 

"bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

that he is entitled to the downward adjustment." United States v.

Arias-Mercedes, 901 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Pérez, 819 

F.3d at 545). Absent a showing of legal error subject to de novo 

review, "[a] defendant will 'only prevail on appeal by 

demonstrating that the district court's determination as to his 

role in the offense was clearly erroneous.'" De la Cruz-Gutiérrez, 

881 F.3d at 226 (quoting United States v. González-Soberal, 109 

F.3d 64, 74 (1st Cir. 1997)).
- 24 -

"[A]ll parties engaged in a criminal enterprise can be 

'located on a continuum.'" Andino-Rodríguez, 79 F.4th at 34 

(quoting Arias-Mercedes, 901 F.3d at 8). "Those who are primarily 

responsible stand on one end," while "the least culpable 

participants . . . stand at the opposite end." Id. To be eligible

for any mitigating-role reduction, a defendant must, as a threshold 

matter, be "substantially less culpable than the average 

participant in the criminal activity." United States v. MendozaMaisonet, 962 F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 

cmt. n.3(A)). If that requirement is met, then a district court 

must evaluate the defendant's classification among the "pool of 

defendants eligible for an adjustment." Id. A minimal participant 

is "plainly among the least culpable of those involved," U.S.S.G. 

§ 3B1.2 cmt. n.4 (emphasis added), whereas a minor participant is 

"less culpable than most other participants in the criminal 

activity, but [his] role could not be described as minimal," id.

cmt. n.5 (emphasis added). A defendant may receive a four-point 

reduction if he is a minimal participant; a two-point reduction if 

he is a minor participant; and a three-point reduction if his 

culpability falls somewhere between minimal and minor. See

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.

Accordingly, to be a candidate for a minimal-participant 

reduction (worth four points) Walker must show that he is both

"substantially less culpable than the average participant in the 
- 25 -

criminal activity" and "plainly among the least culpable of those 

involved"; and to be a candidate for a minor-participant reduction 

(worth two points) he must be both "substantially less culpable 

than the average participant in the criminal activity" and "less 

culpable than most other participants in the criminal activity." 

Mendoza-Maisonet, 962 F.3d at 23 (citations omitted); accord

Andino-Rodríguez, 79 F.4th at 34. Other circuits apply this 

conjunctive standard too. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 

252 F.3d 230, 234-35 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Kearby, 943 

F.3d 969, 977 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v. Dominguez-Caicedo, 

40 F.4th 938, 960 (9th Cir. 2022).

We recognize that this framework can pose a challenge

for district courts reviewing small criminal enterprises like this

one, and comparing participants in a four-person conspiracy can be

particularly vexing. By our math, only the two least culpable 

defendants in a four-person conspiracy could qualify for a twopoint reduction by showing that each is "substantially less 

culpable than the average participant" and "less culpable than 

most other participants." But we emphasize that the individuals

who could qualify as "substantially less culpable than the average 

participant" in a four-person enterprise will vary based on the 

facts of a particular case. In some four-person conspiracies, the 

average participant could be the second-most culpable individual

if the most culpable individual's role was significantly greater 
- 26 -

than that of all the others. The third and fourth participant 

might then qualify for a reduction if each was "substantially less 

culpable" than the second participant. In other four-person 

conspiracies, the average participant might be the third-most 

culpable individual, so only the fourth participant could receive

a reduction. In all these situations, however, a sentencing court

must consider whether the defendant is also "less culpable than 

most other participants" in a four-person conspiracy in order to 

grant a minor-role reduction. And there may be instances when 

none of the participants qualifies. See, e.g., De la CruzGutiérrez, 881 F.3d at 226 (citation omitted) (denying reduction 

where participants were "equal partners in the criminal 

activity").

Here, we do not have enough information about the 

district court's rationale for denying the reduction. Based on 

the record we can only conclude, as the government conceded at 

oral argument, that Walker was less culpable than Melendez, the 

mastermind, and Johnson, who planned to enter the home with a gun. 

Walker also may be less culpable than Katana, who participated 

heavily in planning and was the only person to remove glassware

from the premises but did not intend to enter the home. But the 

district court, which is the expert on the facts, particularly 

after presiding over Katana's trial, at no time identified the 
- 27 -

average participant or compared the culpability of Walker and 

Katana on the record.

The lack of any explanation for the district court's

decision gives us special pause here because it is not apparent 

from the record that the court performed the inquiry required by 

the mitigating-role Guideline. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C) 

("[T]he court should consider the following non-exhaustive list of 

factors." (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Wynn, 37 

F.4th 63, 69 (2d Cir. 2022) ("The district judge . . . erred in 

denying [the defendant] a mitigating role adjustment without first 

addressing [four] relevant factors that appear to support such an 

adjustment."); United States v. Diaz, 884 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 

2018) ("[T]he assessment of a defendant's eligibility for a minorrole adjustment must include consideration of the factors 

identified by the Amendment . . . ."). Since 2015, the Guidelines 

have channeled decision-making about culpability through five nonexhaustive factors to determine whether a defendant is eligible 

for a mitigating-role reduction. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C); 

id. Supp. to App. C, Amend. 794. The factors are:

(i) the degree to which the defendant understood the 

scope and structure of the criminal activity;

(ii) the degree to which the defendant participated in 

planning or organizing the criminal activity;

(iii) the degree to which the defendant exercised 

decision-making authority or influenced the exercise of 

decision-making authority;
- 28 -

(iv) the nature and extent of the defendant’s 

participation in the commission of the criminal 

activity, including the acts the defendant performed and 

the responsibility and discretion the defendant had in 

performing those acts;

(v) the degree to which the defendant stood to benefit 

from the criminal activity.

Id. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C). An evaluation of these factors does not 

require extensive analysis, see United States v. Castillo, 995 

F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2021), but it does require both a judgment 

about the defendant's own conduct and a comparison to the other 

participants, see Andino-Rodríguez, 79 F.4th at 33; United States

v. Nkome, 987 F.3d 1262, 1273 (10th Cir. 2021) ("[T]he crux of 

§ 3B1.2 is a defendant's relative culpability." (quoting United 

States v. Yurek, 925 F.3d 423, 446 (10th Cir. 2019))).

In some cases when a sentencing court gave no explanation 

on the record for denying a reduction, we have discerned the 

court's rationale by inferring that the court agreed with the 

government's reasoning that the reduction was unwarranted. See, 

e.g., Mendoza-Maisonet, 962 F.3d at 24. Nonetheless, sentencing 

courts must give sufficient explanation to "allow for meaningful 

appellate review." Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007);

see Wynn, 37 F.4th at 68 (remanding for resentencing because "[t]he 

district judge's decision lack[ed] any analysis of [four of the] 

relevant mitigating role factors that the Guidelines provide");

cf. United States v. Reyes-Correa, 81 F.4th 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2023) 
- 29 -

(vacating sentence for procedural unreasonableness because 

district court provided "boilerplate" explanation for upward 

variance). Thus, although some sentences may survive clear error

review based on other information in the record, even without an 

explicit comparison, we stress that comparing participants based 

on the Guideline factors is critical. See United States v. MuñozFontanez, 61 F.4th 212, 214 (1st Cir. 2023) ("Inadequate 

explanation is a recognized sentencing error." (citing Gall, 552 

U.S. at 51)).

Against this backdrop, we conclude that we are unable to 

affirm here for three reasons. First, the district court did not 

explain its grounds for denying the mitigating-role reduction. 

After the parties' presentations, the court stated that it would 

accept the Guidelines calculations recommended in the PSR. Often 

when we have affirmed the denial of the reduction in previous 

cases, we have been able to rely on some explanation by the 

district court. See, e.g., Andino-Rodríguez, 79 F.4th at 33, 35 

(affirming the denial of a mitigating-role reduction where "the 

court went through the five mitigating role adjustment factors and 

matched Andino's conduct to each factor"); Castillo, 995 F.3d at

18 ("The district court's comparison to Arias-Mercedes and the 

statements that Castillo must have been aware of the quantity of 

cocaine on board were sufficient to 'allow for meaningful appellate 

review' of the denial of the downward adjustment." (quoting Gall, 
- 30 -

552 U.S. at 50)). The district court also did not engage with the

parties during their presentations in a way that would permit us 

to understand its reasoning from its comments and questions to 

counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Montes-Fosse, 824 F.3d 168,

172 (1st Cir. 2016) (district court's "exchange" with defense 

counsel allowed inference about court's justification for denying 

reduction).

Second, we cannot rely solely on the government's 

arguments at sentencing as a basis for affirming. See MendozaMaisonet, 962 F.3d at 24. The government argued that it was "hard 

to imagine that an individual who ultimately agreed . . . to go 

into the house to actually commit the robbery [could] be a minimal 

participant in that conspiracy to commit a robbery." It also 

briefly rejected Walker's suggestion that his reluctance to enter 

the Home Depot supported the reduction, claiming that Walker simply 

feared being seen on camera. Unlike in other cases where we have 

inferred a district court's rationale from the arguments advanced 

at sentencing, here, the government's argument made no explicit 

comparison of the relative culpability of any of the defendants. 

Cf. id. ("At sentencing, the Government argued against the minimal 

participant reduction, stating that Mendoza had an 'equal 

participation' in the offense, access to the stolen vehicles -- in 

one of which an item that belonged to Mendoza was found -- and 

that he 'had the most dangerous weapon of the two.'"). Instead,
- 31 -

the government addressed "at most one of the Guidelines factors 

relevant to the mitigating role determination": the extent of 

Walker's participation in the planned criminal activity. Wynn, 37 

F.4th at 68 (vacating sentence because district court considered 

only a single factor).

Further, although we recognize that Walker focused his 

arguments at sentencing on the four-level reduction, the 

government never addressed below the possibility that Walker might 

qualify as a "minor" participant, even if not a "minimal" one. 

Our case law suggests, and the government concedes, that district 

courts "faced with a request for a four-level reduction for a 

minimal role could reasonably consider, in the course of that 

analysis, whether a lesser two-level reduction for a minor role 

had been made out." United States v. Olivero, 552 F.3d 34, 40 

(1st Cir. 2009); see also De la Cruz-Gutiérrez, 881 F.3d at 225. 

So we hesitate to treat the government's arguments as a sufficient 

basis for the sentencing court's denial of the lesser reductions 

available under section 3B1.2.

In fact, the possibility that the district court relied 

on the government's argument heightens the need for clarification 

here, given that the government's position below may have suggested 

that Walker was ineligible for any reduction based on his integral 

role in the conspiracy as "one of the individuals to go into the 

house to actually commit the robbery." Integral role, however, is 
- 32 -

not the correct legal standard. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C)

(whether a defendant played "an essential or indispensable role in 

the criminal activity is not determinative"); see, e.g., United 

States v. Sanchez-Villarreal, 857 F.3d 714, 722 (5th Cir. 2017) 

(vacating and remanding where district court denied reduction 

based solely on defendant's "critical" role in the offense); Diaz, 

884 F.3d at 917 ("To the extent the district court's reasoning 

reflects reliance on [the defendant's] courier conduct as 

dispositive of [his] eligibility for a minor-role reduction, it 

was error. Amendment 794 clarified that the performance of an 

essential role . . . is not dispositive.").

To the extent that the sentencing court relied instead 

on the PSR's rationale for denying a mitigating-role reduction, we 

are still not in a position to affirm. As Walker explained at 

oral argument before us, the PSR declined to recommend any 

reduction on the ground that "Walker was aware of the plan, agreed 

to it, and was fully prepared to effectuate the crime but for law 

enforcement intervention." But the district court's adoption of

that reasoning would still fail to satisfy the multifactor factual 

analysis required by the Guideline.

Third, we cannot confidently conclude that any error in 

the sentencing court's application of the mitigating-role 

reduction was harmless. We "may only deem [a sentencing] error 

harmless 'if, after reviewing the entire record, [we are] sure 
- 33 -

that the error did not affect the sentence imposed.'" United 

States v. Graham, 976 F.3d 59, 62 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting United 

States v. Alphas, 785 F.3d 775, 780 (1st Cir. 2015)). Thus, 

"resentencing is required if the error either affected or arguably 

affected the sentence." Id. (quoting Alphas, 785 F.3d at 780).

In conducting harmless error review of a sentence, we 

look not only to whether the error affected the Guidelines 

calculation, but also "seek to distinguish between a judge's 

reliance on facts in selecting an appropriate sentence and a 

judge's reliance on the significance that the Guidelines appear to 

assign to those facts." Id. (citing United States v. Goergen, 683 

F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2012)). The district court exercised lenity

here by granting a thirty-six-month sentence -- one month lower

than the bottom of the recommended range of thirty-seven to fortysix months. Although Walker's thirty-six-month sentence would be 

within the Guidelines range of thirty to thirty-seven months if he 

received a two-point reduction on remand, we agree with Walker 

that this lower Guidelines range could result in a sentence of 

less than thirty-six months. Thus, we think any error at least 

"arguably affected the sentence," requiring remand. Graham, 976 

F.3d at 62 (quoting Alphas, 785 F.3d at 780).

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we VACATE and REMAND for resentencing 

consistent with this opinion.