alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
---

EXHIBIT 32.1
CERTIFICATION
OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350:AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I, Matthew J. Espe, Chief Executive Officer of IKON Office Solutions, Inc. (the
Company), do hereby certify with respect to the Quarterly Report of the
Company on Form 10-Q for the period ended December 31, 2004 (the Report) that:

|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and                               
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|   
|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date:   February 8, 2005

|/s/ MATTHEW J. ESPEMatthew J. Espe                      Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

---
§ 825.211 Maintenance of benefits under multi-employer health plans. ( a ) A multi-employer health plan is a plan to which more than one employer is required to contribute, and which is maintained pursuant to one or more collective bargaining agreements between employee organization(s) and the employers.
( b ) An employer under a multi-employer plan must continue to make contributions on behalf of an employee using FMLA leave as though the employee had been continuously employed, unless the plan contains an explicit FMLA provision for maintaining coverage such as through pooled contributions by all employers party to the plan.
( c ) During the duration of an employee's FMLA leave, coverage by the group health plan, and benefits provided pursuant to the plan, must be maintained at the level of coverage and benefits which were applicable to the employee at the time FMLA leave commenced.
( d ) An employee using FMLA leave cannot be required to use banked hours or pay a greater premium than the employee would have been required to pay if the employee had been continuously employed.
( e ) As provided in § 825.209(f) of this part, group health plan coverage must be maintained for an employee on FMLA leave until: ( 1 ) The employee's FMLA leave entitlement is exhausted;
( 2 ) The employer can show that the employee would have been laid off and the employment relationship terminated; or,
( 3 ) The employee provides unequivocal notice of intent not to return to work.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 681 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

110th CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. RES. 681

   To allow the part time, volunteer practice of medicine in private 
                          medical facilities.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

           September 24 (legislative day, September 17), 2008

 Mr. McConnell (for himself, Mr. Cornyn, and Mr. Inhofe) submitted the 
following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and 
                             Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
   To allow the part time, volunteer practice of medicine in private 
                          medical facilities.

    Resolved,

SECTION 1. VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF MEDICAL SERVICES.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of the rules 
or regulations of the Senate, a Senator may use the medical facilities 
of a private entity in order to provide voluntary and necessary medical 
care to his patients, provided that the Senator--
            (1) is a licensed physician;
            (2) only practices medicine on a part-time basis outside of 
        regular Senate office hours;
            (3) believes in good faith that he must use the medical 
        facilities of a private entity in order to provide the 
        necessary and professionally required level of medical care to 
        his patients;
            (4) does not receive any compensation, income, or revenue 
        as a result of providing such voluntary medical care; and
            (5) does not allow the private medical facility to use his 
        name.
    (b) Effective Period.--This resolution shall take effect on the 
date of adoption of this resolution.
                                 <all>
```
#### Larry Lee CHRISTIANSEN, Appellant, v. Joseph C. O’CONNOR, Sheriff of San Diego County, State of California, Appellee.

No. 21351.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

March 16, 1967.

*365Lyle L. Richmond, Jr., San Diego, Cal., for appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jack K. Weber, Deputy Atty. Gen., Los Angeles, Cal., James D. Keller, Dist. Atty., San Diego, Cal., for appellee.

Before WASHINGTON* HAMLEY and JERTBERG, Circuit Judges.

*

 Judge George T. Washington of the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM.

, Larry Lee Christiansen, in California penal custody following his conviction and sentence for grand theft, applied to the district court for a writ of habeas corpus. His one ground for relief was that he had been denied a speedy trial, and that this contravened his constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment which, he asserts, is made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied the application and Christiansen appeals.

Christiansen filed his application on June 8, 1966, which was one day before his state trial and conviction. The district court denied his application on July 8, 1966, which was after Christiansen’s state conviction, but before sentence was pronounced on August 30, 1966. He has an appeal from his state conviction and sentence now pending in the California appellate court, in which appeal he has raised his speedy trial question.

While Christiansen has not exhausted his state remedies in the criminal proceeding, he did, prior to the state trial, seek relief by way of prohibition or mandamus in the California District Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. Apparently on the basis of these and other pre-trial state proceedings, the district court, in this habeas corpus proceeding, held that Christiansen had exhausted his state remedies, but. denied the application on the merits.

In our opinion Christiansen has not exhausted his state remedies in view of the fact that his state appeal from the criminal conviction is still pending. On this ground, and without prejudice to Christiansen’s right to raise a constitutional question at the proper time, if he so desires (cf. Hoag v. State of New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 472, 78 S.Ct. 829, 2 L.Ed.2d 913; Klopfer v. State of North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1, decided March 13, 1967), the order denying the application is

Affirmed.
Opinion filed Ap ril 23 , 2 009



### In The 

# Eleven th Court of Appeals

____________ 

### No. 1 1- 09 -0 00 53 -CV

____ ____ __ CA ROL J. M ORRIS, Ap pellant

V. STA TE OF TEX AS , A ppellee
On App eal from the 238th Distric t Court Midland County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CV 46715

M E M O R

A N D UM O P I N I O N A tempora

ry injunction was iss ued aga inst Carol J

. Morris t o abate a nuis ance located on r eal proper ty owned by

Morris and located at 210 S. L ee Street, Midland, Texas. On Fe bruar y 11, 2009, Morris, pro se, f

iled this appeal fr om the temporar y injunction. W e dismiss the appea l as moot. Fifte en day s after

Morris filed he r notice of appea l relating to the tempor ary injunction, the trial court he ld a “f

inal hear ing” in the underlyin g ca s e. Ba sed upon that hea ring , the trial cour

t rende red a

final judg ment and per

manent injunction on Marc h 2, 2009. Morris has a lso filed a pro se appe al from the f

inal j u d gm ent and permane nt injunction – our Cause No. 11-09- 00072-CV.W e note , how ev er , that Morris ’s appe al fr om

the f ina l judg m ent

rem ai ns pendi ng at this tim e in this court in Ca use N o. 11- 1 09-00072- CV. 2 Upon re ceiving

the latter notice of appea l a nd the trial cour

t’s final judg ment, the cler k of this court
wr o te Morris on Mar ch 23, 2009, and inf ormed he r that her

appea l of the tempora

ry injunction
a pp e ars to b e moo t be c a

us e of the iss ua nc e of the pe rm ane nt i nju

nc tio n. Mo rr is w a s r e qu e ste d to provide this court with a written response showing g rounds to c ontinue the appe al in Cause No. 11- 09-00053-CV. Morris has re sponded i n writing but has not shown g rounds for c ontinuing the a ppeal f rom the tempora

ry injunction. Morris a sserts that we have r enumber ed her appea l, that both injunctive order s violate the Texas Rules of Civil P roce dure, that this cou rt h as “unlawf ully withheld the appea l,” and that Morr is “chooses to c ontinue these a ppeals” in an ef

fort “to obtain he r enti t led
e qu ita ble and c omp e ns ator

y re lie f. ” Mo rr is c ite s Sm ith v . O ’N e ill , 813 S.W .2d 501 (Tex. 1991), and Murphy v . McD aniel , 2 0 S. W.3 d 87 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 0, no pe t.) . N e ith e r o f t he se c a se s, howeve r, support the c ontinued viability of this appea l. “I f, while on the appea l of t he gra nting or denying of the tempora ry injunction, the trial court rende rs final judgme nt, the case on appea l become s moot.” Isuani v. Mansk e-She ffield Radiology Group, P.A. , 802 S.W .2d 235, 236 (Tex. 1991). The c ourt in Isuanid et er m i n ed t h at the cour t of appea ls should have dismissed the appea l of the t empora ry injunction as m oot as soon as itlear ned of the trial court’s final judg ment. Id. at 237. Acc ording ly , having lear ned that the t rial cour

t has enter ed a f

inal judgme nt in the under l y i n gcase , we must dismiss t his appea l of the trial cour t’s g rantingof a te mporary

injunction. 1 The a ppeal is dismissed as moot.

PER C URI AM April 23, 2009 Panel consists of: Wright, C.J ., M c C a l l , J. , an d

S tr an g e , J.
**EXHIBIT 31.1****CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER**I, Arthur S. Przybyl, certify that:     1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Akorn, Inc.;     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;     4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating tothe registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others withinthose entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and     5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect theregistrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.     /s/ ARTHUR S. PRZYBYL     Arthur S. Przybyl  *Chief Executive Officer*     Date:August 10, 2006
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### National Transportation Safety Board

# FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT:

Rhonda Underwood (202) 314-6065.

Dated: June 2, 2000.

Rhonda Underwood,

Federal Register Liaison Officer.

[FR Doc. 00-14347  Filed 6-2-00; 3:17 pm]

BILLING CODE 7533-01-M
Exhibit 32.2

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

The undersigned, Robert L. Poley, Chief Financial Officer of Heartland Oil and Gas Corp., hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)            the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Heartland Oil and Gas Corp. for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2005 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)            the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Heartland Oil and Gas Corp.

 
| Dated: August 12, 2005 |   |                        |
|------------------------|--------|-----------------------------|
|                   |   |                        |
|                   |   |                        |
|                   |   | /s/ Robert L. Poley         |   |
|                   |   | Robert L. Poley             |
|                   |   | Chief Financial Officer,    |
|                   |   | Heartland Oil and Gas Corp. |
|                   |   |                        |
|                   |   |                        |
|                   |   |                        |   |
|                   |   |                        |
|                   |   |                        |
|                   |   |                        |
|                        |        |                             |  |  |

 

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Heartland Oil and Gas Corp. and will be retained by Heartland Oil and Gas Corp. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Editorial Note on Part 149
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 149 appear by USCG-2010-0351, 75 FR 36284, June 25, 2010.

§ 149.323 What are the requirements for first aid kits? ( a ) Each manned deepwater port must have an industrial first aid kit, approved by an appropriate organization, such as the American Red Cross, for the maximum number of persons on the deepwater port.
( b ) The first aid kit must be maintained in a space designated as a medical treatment room or, if there is no medical treatment room, under the custody of the person in charge.
( c ) The operator must ensure that each first aid kit is accompanied by a copy of either the Department of Health and Human Services Publication No. (PHS) 84-2024, “The Ship's Medicine Chest and Medical Aid at Sea,” available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402, or the “American Red Cross First Aid and Safety Handbook,” available from Little Brown and Company, 3 Center Plaza, Boston, MA 02018.
§ 181.19 Construction of labels. ( a ) Each label must be made of material that can withstand exposure to water, oil, salt spray, direct sunlight, heat, cold, and wear expected in normal use of the boat or item of associated equipment without deterioration of legibility.
( b ) Each label must be made of material that shows visible traces of the alteration or removal of information on the label.
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed July 27, 2022.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D21-2375

Lower Tribunal No. A91UNWE

________________

Heyling C. Dumas,

Appellant,

vs.

The State of Florida,

Appellee.

An appeal conducted pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Jeffrey M. Kolokoff, 

Judge.

Heyling C. Dumas, in proper person.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee.

Before SCALES, MILLER and GORDO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
§ 151.04 Penalties for violation. ( a ) A person who violates MARPOL 73/78, the Act, or the regulations of this subpart is liable for a civil penalty for each violation, as provided by 33 U.S.C. 1908(b)(1). Each day of a continuing violation constitutes a separate violation.
( b ) A person who makes a false, fictitious statement or fraudulent representation in any matter in which a statement or representation is required to be made to the Coast Guard under MARPOL 73/78, the Act, or the regulations of this subpart, is liable for a civil penalty for each statement or representation, as provided by 33 U.S.C. 1908(b)(2).
( c ) A person who knowingly violates MARPOL 73/78, the Act, or the regulations of this subpart commits a class D felony, as described in 18 U.S.C. 3551 *et seq.* In the discretion of the Court, an amount equal to not more than one-half of the fine may be paid to the person giving information leading to conviction.
( d ) A ship operated in violation of MARPOL 73/78, the Act, or the regulations of this subpart is liable *in rem* for any civil penalty covered by paragraph (a) or (b) of this section, or any fine covered by paragraph (c) of this section, and may be proceeded against in the United States District Court of any district in which the ship may be found.
[CGD 88-002, 54 FR 18403, Apr. 28, 1989, as amended by CGD 88-002A, 55 FR 18582, May 2, 1990; CGD 92-007, 57 FR 33261, July 27, 1992; CGD 96-052, 62 FR 16703, Apr. 8, 1997; USCG-1999-5832, 64 FR 34714, June 29, 1999]
4 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DANIEL M. WOODS

,

Defendant Below,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE,

Plaintiff Below,

Appellee. §

§

§ No. 64, 2020

§

§ Court Below

— Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware

§

§ Cr. ID No s

. 1701019682,

§ 1702009077, 1702009428 (N)

§

§

Submitted: April 17, 2020

Decided: June 17, 2020

Before SEITZ , Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN , Justices.

ORDE R

A fter careful consideration of the parties’ briefs 1 and the record on appeal

, we

conclude that the judgment below should be affirm ed on the basis of and for the reasons

assigned by the Superior Court in its January 29, 2020 Order denying the appellant’s

fi rst motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. 2

NOW, T HEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is GRANTED

and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen L. Valihura

Justice

1 The appellant’s motion to strike the appellee’s answering brief based on minor mistakes in the Table

of Citations is denied

. 2 State v. Woods

, 2020 WL 491187 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2020).
The majority of the state 

subawardee projects 

focused on expanding 

physical fitness and outdoor 

recreational opportunities 

for people with paralysis. 

A majority of subawardees noted 

serving rural populations and 

racial and ethnic minority groups.

Paralysis Resource Center State Pilot Grants: Subawardee Survey

Self-Evaluation and Application Process Metrics

Community Impact

In April and May 2020 , 

the 29 state PRC pilot 

subawardees were 

surveyed to capture 

self - evaluation, 

application process, 

and outcomes 

information. 

Increased educational 

opportunities and 

awareness was the 

most frequently cited 

community impact. 

 

*LGBTQ + stands for Lesbian, Gay, 

Bisexual, Transgender, 

Queer/Questioning. SOGI stands for 

Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

Project Types

Populations Served
#### COLLARD AND ROE, P.C. *v.*KIRK STRAIGHT ET AL.

(AC 19473)

O’Connell, C. J., and Foti and Spear, Js.

Submitted on briefs November 30

officially released December 28, 1999

Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.