1 NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0616n.06 No. 08-4318 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
DE NN IS HA RRIS, P laintif f-App ellant,
v. BUTLE R COUNTY, OHIO, BY AND THROUGH ITS S HERIFF ’S DE P AR TM EN T; RI CH AR D K . J ON ES, S H E RI FF, and JOHN DOE 1, 2, an d 3, De fend ant s- App e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP PEA L F RO M THE U NI TED STATES DIST RI CT CO UR T F OR THE SOU THER

N D ISTRIC T OF OHI O

Be for e : S ILER , G IBBO NS, and G RI F F IN , C ir c uitJudg e s. JULIA SMITH GIBBONS , Circuit Judge. Plaintiff- ap p el l an t Dennis Har ris appea ls the district court’s g rant of summar y judgme nt on Harr is’s claim of wr ong ful termination in violation of the F irst and Four

teenth Amendme nts and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. B eca use the district cour

t did not
err in gr antingsummary

judgme nt, we af

firm. I
. Ha rr is wa s hir e d a s a de puty sh e ri ff by B utl e r County in 1 99 9. As ide fr om a

br ie f f our- mon th depar ture duringwhich Ha

rris held a job outside of the sheriff ’s depar tment, H arr is w orked in theAlthough the parties disput e the content of the conversation, we cre dit Harris’s ve rsion of 1 the fac ts be cause we are revie wing the district c ourt’s g rant of summar y judgme nt. Se e Ma tsu sh ita Elec. I ndus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Cor p. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

2 corr ections division of the sheriff ’s depa rtment until his s epar ation in J anuar y 2006. Def endant Richa

rd Jones was elec ted B utler County Sheriff in November

2004 and beg an his new position in J anuar y 2005. Har

ris rec eived his re g ular c o m m i s sion from J ones af ter be ing
re -s wo rn in b ut d id n ot r e c e ive a

“ sp e c ia l c omm iss ion ” that w ou ld a llo w h im t o c arr y a g un and to work a dditional shifts for outside companies. Ha rris cla ims that he attempted to arra ng e a me eting wi th J on e s to dis c us s th e sp e c ia l c omm iss ion but w a s una

ble to s c he du le it. Ha

rr is s ub se qu e ntl y happene d upon J ones in a ha llway and aske d why

he h ad not receive d his special commission. Ha rr is c la ims that Jone s re sp on de d that it w a s “ be c a us e y ou wa s [ sic ] out campa igning for Patton.” 1 Har ris Dep. at 87. Patton was one of Jones’s opponents for the office of sheriff. Har ris states that he de nie d c ampa ig nin g fo r Pa tto n and that Jone s r e sp on de d th a t “ Ihe ard y ou wa s [ sic ] at a f

undraiser

. . . a nd y ou wa s [ sic ] really

shoveling it on me and talking bad [about me].” Har ris Dep. at 87-88. Har ris asser ts that J ones continued to c omplain that Harr is had never campa igne d for him and stated that H arr is “ sh ou ld p ic k [hi s] f ri e nd s w ise r. ” Ha

rr is D e p. a t 10 5- 10 6. Ha

rr is r e sp on de d th a t he did not campaig n for a

ny one but admitted that he had attended a hog roast fundra iser for former Sheriff Don Gabba

rd that w as h el d at Har

ris’s chur ch. Sever al day s later, Jones told Harris that he ha d decide d to give him the special c ommissi on afte r his wife ha d encour ag ed him to do so. The district cour

t clarifie d the import of th i s co n v er sation in its order dated Septe mber 3, 2008: Pla int if

f Ha rr is an d f or me r S he ri ff

Ga bb ard ’s fa mil y be lon g to t

he same c hurc h. Al so involved is another B utler County Deputy Sheriff, Rog er B rooks. B rooks is the son-3

in-law of f

ormer Sher iff Ga

bbard a nd is also Plainti ff Ha rris’ g ood friend. Appar ently

there is a long standing hostile relationship betwee n former Sheriff Gabba rd and Sher iff Jones and their families, w hich Plaintiff Har ris believes c on tr ibute d to She ri ff

Jone s’ anim os ity

tow ard him
. Ha rri s v . B utle r Co un ty , N o. 1:0 7CV 06 9, 20 08 U. S. D ist . L EX I S 86 38 5, a t *4 (S .D . O hio Se pt. 3, 2008). J ones asse rts that Har

ris was not terminate d for poli tical re asons but for his admitted violation of the Butler County Sheriff’ s Offic e associations policy , which prohibits employ ees f rom
e sta bli sh ing pe rs on a l re latio ns hip s wi th fo rm e r i nmate s f or a t le a st t we lve months a ft e r a

n inmate ha s b e e n r e le a se d f

ro m de te nti on . Wh ile a dmi tti ngthat he c on ta c te d a fo rm e r i nmate , H arr is c la ims that he wa

nted to encour ag e re p ea t offende rs to improve their lives a nd stay out of prison in the future. H e obtained c ontact information from jail r ecor ds for a former inmate, Tabitha H olland, and contac ted her

sever al times. First, he ca lled Ms. Holland’s home conta ct number a nd was told by her moth e r th a t H o ll an d w a s n o t th e r e . A n o th e r ti me , H ar r is c a ll e d H o ll an d an d s p o k e w it h her direc tly . He identifie d himself as “D ave H arr is,” rathe r t han “Dennis Har ris,” and asked to see her
. Ho lla nd re fu se d to me e t w ithHa

rr is b e c a us e sh e di d no t kn ow who h e wa s. Ha rr is s ub se qu e ntl y called H olland ag ain and arr ang ed to dr ive by her home, stopping the car to spe ak with he r for a bout five minutes. Har

ris met with H olland one other time, at which point she ente red H arr is’s car and they had a c onversation. Harris c laims that H olland g ave him a brief kiss be fore exit ing the car , but Holland complained that Harr is gr oped her while she wa s in his car. Holland subsequently

repor ted t hese contacts to the s heriff ’s office, and Har

ris was broug ht in to discuss the alleg ations with Captain Katie McMahon. Har ris admitted to contactingHolland and the br ief kiss but denied any other phy sical conta ct with Holland. Captain McMa hon informedWe note that Har ris’s complaint was based upon Sheriff J ones’s direc t actions rathe r than 2 a theor y of respondeat superior . Section 1983 do es n o t p er mit muni cipal liability based upon a theory of respondeat superior
. Se e Mi lle r v. C alh ou n Co un ty , 408 F.3d 803, 813 ( 6th Cir. 2005). “Municipal liability

may attach f or policies promul gated by the offic ial vested with final policy making authority

for the municipa lity .” Id. (c i t i n g Pe mb au r v. Cinc inn ati , 475 U.S. 469, 482- 83 (1986)) . I n this case, Sher iff Jones’s personnel mana g ement dec isions constit uted the policy of Butler County , Ohio. 4 Ha rr is that his c on ta c ts wi th Ho lla nd vio late d th e de pa

rtme nt’ s a sso c iatio ns po lic y , a nd he wa s to ld that he c ou ld e ith e r r e sig n to avo id p ub lic ity or that he wo uld

be te rm inate d. Ha

rr is w a s g ive n unti l the ne xt mor

nin g to m ake his de c isi on . A ft e r s pe a kin g wi th h is w if e and his un ion

ste wa rd , H arr is
re s i gn edt h at af

t ern o o nra t h er

t h an wa i t i n g u n t i l t h e f

o l l o wi n g m o rn i n g. Har ris filed suit, al l egi n g violations of his First and F ourtee nth Amendment spee ch and association rig hts as well as proce dural and substantive due proce ss violations. He made additional 2 state law c laims inc luding violations of his r ights to f ree speec h and asse mbly , reta liatory discharg e, defa mation, and torti ous interfe renc e with an employ ment relationship. The de fenda nts moved for summary judgme nt o n al l o f Ha

rris’s c laims, which the district court g rante d in an orde r date d September 3, 2008. The distri ct court found that Harr is presente d no evidenc e to support his claim of a substantive due proc ess violation and that he c ould not establish a proce dural due proce ss violation beca use his resig nation was voluntary and informe d. Ha rri

s , 2008 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 86385, at *17- 21. The district cour

t also g rante d summary

judgme nt on Harr is’s state constitutional claims, f inding that there is no private right of action to reme dy violations of the Ohio Constit ution. Id. at *21-22. Ne xt, th e dis tr ic t c ourt

fo un d that Harr is co uld no t est a bli sh a vio latio n of O hio pu bli c po lic y

be c a us e he wa s not an at-will employ ee a nd could not maintain either a defa mation or tortious interfer enceSome case s cite a test with four prong s, adding in a second eleme nt that the defe ndant knew 3 about t he plaintiff’ s protecte d conduct. See Thaddeus- X , 1 75 F .3 d at 38 7 n .3 . “ Th is e le me nt i s 5 with e mploy

ment claim beca

use he prese nted no evidenc e that the defe ndants wer e conta cted by any potential employ ers or made any false claims relating to Ha rris. Id. at *22-27. Finally , the district court ad d re s s ed Harris’s claim that he w as terminate d in retaliation for failing to support Sheriff J o n e s , i nv i o l a t i o no f

h i s f e d e r a l c o n s t i tu t i o n a l r i g h t s o f f r e e s p e e c han d

p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n . It found that Ha

rris wa s unable to establish a prima facie c a se of re ta liatio n f

or po lit ic a l sp e e c h b e c a

us e Jone s’ s a c tio ns we re ba se d u po n his dis lik e of

Ha rr is’ s f ri e nd sh ips rathe r t

ha n h is p oli tic a l le anin g s. Id. at *29. In addition, even if H arr is could establish a prima f acie reta liation case, he could not
surv ive the burd e n- sh if

tin g ana ly sis be c a

us e of his a dmi tte d v iol a tio ns of the a sso c iatio ns po lic y

via his contacts with Holland. Id. at *31. Har ris timely appea led. II. We re vie w a

dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra

nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt de novo
. Mazur v. Y oung , 507 F.3d 1013, 1016 (6th Cir. 2007). Summary judgme nt is war rante d if “ther e is no g enuine issue as to any materia l fac t and . . . the movant is entitled to a judg ment as a matter of law.” Fe d. R. Civ. P . 56(c)
. “The district court must draw a ll r easona ble infere nces in f

avor of the nonmoving party .” Skowronek v. Am. S.S. Co. , 505 F.3d 482, 484 ( 6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). A p la int if f m us t est a bli sh thr e e e le me nts fo r a cl a im o f e mpl oy me nt- ba se d r e ta liatio n: f

ir st, that th e e mpl oy e e “ e ng a g e d in pr ote c te d c on du c t” ; se c on d, that “an adve rs e a c tio n w a s ta ke n a g a ins t the [employ ee] that would deter a per son of ordinar

y firmness fr om contin u i n g t o engag e in the
con du ct” ; and

thi rd , th a t “ the a dv e rs e a c tio n w a s mo tiv a te d at le a st i n p art by the [em plo y e e ’s ] protec ted conduc t.” Thaddeus-X v. Blatter , 175 F.3d 378, 394 ( 6th Cir. 1999) ( en banc ) (Moore , J .). 3c a

ptu re d b y the thi rd pr on g a bo ve : the de fe nd ant mus t hav e kn ow n a bo ut t he pr ote c te d a c tiv ity

in order for it to have motivated the adver se ac tion.” Id. 6 I f the plaintiff suc cee ds in establishing these three elements, then the defe ndant m ust show that he
wo uld have ma de the same de c isi on in the a bs e nc e of the pr ote c te d co nd uc t to be e nti tle d to pr e va il on summary

judgme nt. See id. at 399. The rig ht of political association i s we ll established as fa lling within the cor e of a ctivities protec ted by

the Fir st Amendment. Se e So war ds v . Lo ud

on Cou nty , 2 0 3 F.3d 426, 432 ( 6th Cir. 2000). “Support of a political c andidate f alls within the scope of the rig ht of political association.” Id. (c i t i n g Elrod v. Burns , 427 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1976))
. Although H arr is stated in his deposition that he did not c ampaig n for any of the candidates for sheriff , he had previously

attended a

political fundra iser for

former Sheriff G abbar d, the sherif f bef ore Jones. Harr is als o claims that J ones believed that Harr is had cam p ai gn ed for a political rival, Patton. In addition, Harr is did not
c a mpa ig n f

or She ri ff Jone s and

c la ims that he wa s b e rate d b y Jone s for fa ili ngto c a mpa ig n f or him
. There fore , Har

ris has established the first element of protec ted conduct for his reta liation claim. See Sowards , 203 F.3d at 432. Th e se c on d e le me nt of the re ta liatio n c la im i s th a t th e e mpl oy e e su ff e re d a mate ri a lly

a dv e rs e
a c ti o n . “ T h e te r

m ‘ a dv e r s e a c ti o n ’ is dr aw n f r o m e mp lo y

me n t c a s e la

w ; e xamp le s in

th a t c o n te xt include discha

rg e, demotions, ref

usal to hire, nonre newa l of co n trac ts, and failure to promote.” Thaddeus-X

, 1 75 F .3 d at 39 6 ( c itatio ns omi tte d) . “ Th e Sixth C ir c uit ha s c on sis te ntl y

he ld t hat de

m i n i mis em ploy

ment actions ar e not mater ially adver se and, thus, not ac tionable.” Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ

. , 220 F.3d 456, 462 (6th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Harr is argues that he
su ff e re d tw o a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt a c tio ns : hi s f

a ilure to r e c e ive his sp e c ia l c omm iss ion in a tim e lyAlthough r etaliation claims ar ise in a varie ty of constitutional and statutory contexts, “the 4 essential fr amewor

k rema ins the same” de spite the variations that can ar ise in differ ent bodies of statutory law. See Thaddeus-

X , 175 F.3d at 386-87.

7 manner and his eff

ective te rmination. Har ris fac ed a two to thre e month delay in rec eiving his special commission, which could be sufficie nt to constitut e a materially adver se employ

ment action if it ca

used Ha rris to suffe r a “mater ial los s o f b en ef

its.” See J

ordan v. City of Cleveland , 464 F.3d 584, 596 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (finding that a “de nial of money” q ualified a s a mater ially adver se ac tion in a Title VI Ireta liation
c a se ). Ho we ve r, Ha

rr is a c kn ow le dg e d in his de po sit ion that th e sp e c ia l c omm iss ion do e s n ot e nti tle 4

a de pu ty to a dd iti on a l pa

y ; r a the r, it a llo ws de pu ti es to pe rf or m sp e c ia l “ bla c kto pp ingde ta ils ” direc ting tra ffic f

or outside companie s. I n Bowman , a te n- da y los s of a p os iti on

wh ic h w a s me re ly
a tit le and did no t in c lud e a dd iti on a l dutie s o r e xtra pa y wa s n ot h eld to be a

mate ri a lly

a dv e rs e employ ment action in a Title VI Icase . 220 F.3d at 462. I n Smith v. County of Hamilton , a loss of op po rtun it y

for com pen sat ory ti me was not hel d to cons ti tu te an advers e emp lo y men t acti on . 34 F. App’x 450, 456 (6th Ci r. 2002). Given the tempora ry nature of the de lay

in rec eiving the spec ial
c omm iss ion

and a la c k o f d ir e c t ef

fe c t on Ha rr is’ s le ve l of

pa y , w e fi nd that th e te mpo ra

ry de lay in
rec eiving his special commission did not constit ute a mate rial adve rse em p l o y m en t action. See Freem an v. Pott er , 2 00 F . App ’x 43 9, 44 2 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 6) (f

ind ingthat a

mate ri a l a dv e rs e
e mpl oy me nt a c tio n g e ne ra lly

“ inf lic ts dir e c t economic ha

rm”) ( emphasis adde d). Ha rr is n e xt ar g ue s th a t he me e ts t he se c on d pro ng of his re ta liatio n c la im thr ou g h h is eff ective te rmination. Although H arr is submitted a letter of re signation, he did so under the thre at of immediate ter

mination if he chose not to r esig n. Gene rally , employ ee resig nations are presumed8

to be voluntary
. See Rhoads v. Bd. of Educ. , 1 0 3 F. Ap p ’x 8 8 8 , 8 9 5 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Leheny v. City of Pittsburgh , 183 F.3d 220, 227 (3 d C i r. 1999)). We have found, howe ver, that an
e mpl oy e e ’s re sig natio n ma y c on sti tut e a

c on str uc tiv e dis c ha

rg e wh e n th e e mp lo y ee re a so na bly believed his ter

mination to be immi n ent. See F ord v. Ge n. Motors Corp. , 3 05 F .3 d 5 45 , 5 54 (6 th Cir. 2002). Althoug h it is debatable whe ther Ha rris has met his burde n of demonst ra t i ng
c on str uc tiv e dis c ha

rg e , w e ne e d n ot d e c ide wh e the r H arr is h a s satis fi e d th e se c on d p ro ngof his c la im of employ ment-base d reta liation because the third eleme nt is dispos itive. See, e .g., Mullins v. U.S. Bank, 296 F. App’ x 521, 526 (6th Cir. 2008) (a ssuming plaintiff showe d an adve rse e mploy ment action whe n she wa s unable to satisfy later e lements of the c laim); Ho lle yv . G ile s Co un ty , 1 65 F. A p p ’ x 4 4 7 , 4 5 1

- 5 2 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 6) (a ssuming without decidingthat plaintiff’s re signa tion constitut ed a construc tive termination and ther efor e an a dverse action). Har ris is unable to meet the third prong of demonstrating that the adver se employ ment action was motivated at least in part by his protec ted conduc t. This element re quires a c ausal c onnection betwee n the employ ee’ s protec ted conduct and the a dverse action take n ag ainst him. Se e Tha dd e us X , 175 F.3d at 394. Har

ris cannot show that his poli tical af filiation was a substantial or motivating fac tor for the resig nation beca use he ha s not demonstrated a link betwee n his resig nation and his lack of politi ca l s u p p o rt fo r Sheriff J ones. Se e Kre uz e r v . B ro wn , 128 F.3d 359, 363 ( 6th Cir. 1997) (re quiring that it be a motivating fac tor). I ndeed, Har ris admitted violating the associations policy and knew that a violation of the associations policy would result in te rmination. Har ris’s belief that he wa s terminated f

or political r easons is insuff icient to de monstrate the causa l connec tion required to establish a claim of r etaliation. See Coffey v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hosp. Auth. , No. 98-9

6230, 1999 U.S. App. L EXI S 25187, at *13 (6 t h C i r. Oct. 6, 1999) (unpublished) (findingthat “rumors, c onclusory

alleg ations and subj ective be liefs” a re insuff icient to defe at a motion for
s u m m ar y j u d gm en t ) ( ci t i n g Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp. , 964 F.2d 577, 585 ( 6th Cir. 1992)). Finally , even if

Har ris could establish a prima facie c a se of re ta liatio n, he wo uld

be un a ble to survive the burde n shifting por tion of the ana ly sis. “I f the plaintiff meets [hi s] burde n, the burde n then sh if ts to th e d e f

e n d an ts to p r o v e b y

a p r e p o n d e r an c e o f

th e e v id e n c e th a t t

h e e mp lo y

ment decision would have been the same a bsent the prote ct ed conduc t.” Sowards , 203 F.3d at 431 (citation omitted). B utler County has pre sented e vidence that Ha rr i s’s admitted violation of the
as s o ci at i o n s p o l i cy

l edt o h i s re s i gn at i o nan d t h at Ha rr i s t h er ef o re wo u l d h av e b ee nas k edt o re s i gn or be te rminated e ven if he had not eng ag ed in an y p ro t ec t ed conduc t. Harr is also stated that he knew he could be terminated for his c ontacts with H olland. Butler County ’s intere st in preventing exploi tative re lationships between its employ ees a nd former inmates constitutes a leg itimate rea son supporting H arr is’s termination. Har ris has not come for

war d with evidence permitting the trier of fac t to conclude that B u t l er C o u n t y would not have ter

minated him absent protec ted conduc t on Har ris’s par t. Se e Ga rv e

yv . M on tgo me ry , 128 F. App’ x 453, 463 (6th Cir. 2 0 0 5 ) (holding that evidenc e of misconduc t or a “ defic ient work pe rfor mance rec ord” pr eclude d the plainti ff f rom establishing a

g enuine issue of

materia l fac t such that a rea sonable juror could find for the plaintiff) ; Dr igge rs v . Ci ty of O we ns bo ro , 1 10 F . App ’x 49 9, 51 1 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 4) (f

ind ingthat a

le g iti mate internal investig ation of a police office r’s conduct could not suffice to demonstrate r etaliation at the prima facie stag e or a s evidenc e of pr etext). III
.10

F or the fi rs t ti me on

a pp e a l, H arr is r a ise s a

c la im that he wa s ter

min a te d be c a

us e of his c los e fr ie nd sh ips wi th m e mbe rs of the Ga bb ard fa mil y , wh o we re dis lik e d by She ri ff Jone s. As a

thr e sh old
matte r, Ha

rr is h a s w a ive d th is c la im b y fa iling to r a ise it b e low . “ I ssu e s th a t are no t sq ua re ly prese nted to t h e t ri al co u rt are considere d waived a nd may not be ra ised on appe al.” O’Bry an v. Holy See , 556 F.3d 361, 375 ( 6th Cir.), petition for cert. filed , 77 U.S.L .W. 3645 (U.S. May 7, 2009) (N o . 0 8 -1 3 8 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Thu rm an v . Yellow F re igh t Sy s. , 90 F.3d 1160, 1172 ( 6th Cir. 1996)). Even if Har ris had not waived the claim, his rig ht of intimate association cla im is properly char acte rized as duplicative of his r etaliation claim rathe r than as a separ ate c laim. Se e He nle yv . Tu lla ho ma City Sc h. Sy s. , 84 F. App’ x 534, 543 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that in order to maintain a sepa rate fre edom of a sso c iatio n c la im, a pla int if f mus t show that the a dv e rs e a c tio n w ou ld h a ve be e n c on sti tut ion a lly impermissibl e ev en if the def endants did not have a re taliatory motive). In Henley , the plaintiffs
wer e pre vented f

rom playing on the ir school’s baske tball team and alleg ed that it was in re taliation for their pare nts’ complaints. The pane l found that excluding the pla intiffs from the ba sketball team
wa s n ot c on sti tut ion a lly im perm iss ibl e a bs e nt a re ta liator

y mot ive be c a

us e it d id n ot “ un du ly intrude[] on their familial relations or fr iendships.” Id. The defe ndants’ actions in that case did not interfe re w ith the plaintiffs’ intimate associations but were instea d collater al ef fec ts of the defe ndants’ alleg ed re taliation. Id; se e also Sowards , 203 F.3d at 433 n.2 (“[I ]t is c lear that
. . . the ri g ht o f i nti mate a sso c iatio n is pr ote c te d o nly wh e re the pla int if

f a lle g e s an un du e int e rf

e re nc e wi th
a protec ted intimat e r el at i onship.”). L ike wi se , H arr is’ s te rm inatio n w ou ld n ot b e c on sti tut ion a lly impermissible if made with a pur e motive. A ter mination of employ

ment cannot be char acte rized
as an a ction that is likely to con s t i t u t e an “undue intrusion” into the inti mate assoc iations of the11

terminated e mploy ee. S

e e A d k in s v . B d

. of Educ. , 9 8 2 F.2d 952, 956 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Roberts v. United States J ayce es , 4 68 U.S
. 60 9, 61 8 ( 19 84 )) . T he re fo re , w e fi nd that H arr is i s unable to esta

blish a separ ate f

ree dom of association claim and to avoid summary judgme nt on that basis. See H

enley , 8 4 F
. A p p ’ x a t 54 3- 44 ; W a r d v. Athens Ci ty Bd. of Educ. , No. 97-5967, 1999 U.S. App. L EXI S 22766, at *15-20 (6th Cir. Aug . 11, 1999) (f indin g t h at p l aint iffs could not establish a F irst Amendm en t fre edom of a ssociation claim wher e the c laim was not based on interfe renc e by

the school boar d in their family relations). I V. For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the district court’s g rant of summar y judgme nt to the de fe nd ants
.