Filed 9/28/23 In re Isabella C. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re ISABELLA C., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL 

SERVICES AGENCY,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MAURICE P.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 G062619

 (Super. Ct. No. 22DP1292)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from orders judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, 

Lindsey E. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed.

Christopher R. Booth, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Leon J. Page, County Counsel, and Karen L. Christensen, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

No appearance for the Minor.
2

Maurice P. (the father) appeals the court’s dispositional orders returning 

Isabella C. (Isabella or the child) to the custody of Rosa C. (the mother), arguing the 

lower court abused its discretion by finding that Isabella would be safe while in the 

mother’s care during visits. He asks this court to reverse and remand with directions that 

the father be granted primary physical custody with only supervised visits for the mother. 

The Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) opposes, arguing the court did not 

abuse its discretion and that substantial evidence supported the court’s findings. We 

agree with SSA and therefore affirm the orders.

I

FACTS

In the interests of brevity, we focus our statement of facts on the issues 

pertinent to the issue on appeal.

Following an investigation by SSA and the Fullerton Police Department, 

then eight-year-old Isabella1 was detained on September 26, 2022. The petition2, filed 

September 28, alleged that Isabella came within the jurisdiction of the court Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), (d) alleging, respectively, failure to 

protect and sexual abuse.

During the investigation, the child disclosed sexual abuse by her mother’s 

boyfriend, Ricardo R. (Ricardo). She told investigators that Ricardo lived with them. 

The abuse alleged consisted of Ricardo “hugging and touching the child’s buttocks,

having the child lie on top of him while making moaning noises, and kissing the child 

with his tongue in her mouth.” Isabella described the abuse and drew a picture of herself 

1 A petition was also filed as to Isabella’s 16-year-old half sister, J.R. As she is not part 

of this appeal, we omit references to her from this opinion whenever possible.

2

Subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless 

otherwise indicated.
3

lying on top of Ricardo in the mother’s bed. She denied he touched her “private parts,” 

exposed his private parts to her, or exposed her to pornography.

Isabella had reported this conduct to her mother, who, the child said, “did 

not believe her.” When interviewed, the mother said the child was lying and denied 

Ricardo lived in the home or was ever alone with the child. The mother said that Isabella 

“makes up stories she gets from her iPad” and “watches bad things on her iPad,” 

including R-rated movies. The mother said she found out the child had been watching 

sexual content by reviewing her iPad history, and she had since monitored the child’s 

iPad use. She stated the picture Isabella had drawn was impossible as the child was never 

left alone with Ricardo, and she denied the child had ever disclosed any abuse.

Ricardo, however, confirmed he was home alone with the child on a day 

she stayed home from school, the same day she reported the conduct to her mother. 

Otherwise, he denied the allegations of abuse, also claiming that the child’s reports were 

due to watching age-inappropriate videos. He denied residing at the mother’s home, but 

acknowledged that he stayed “a few days at a time.”

With respect to general neglect, the child reported there were times when 

she did not have enough food for dinner, because her mother “‘has no money, she spends 

it all on Rico.’” She also stated she did not have enough clothing and that a lot of her 

clothes were too small for her. She believed her mother liked Ricardo “‘way better than 

me.’” Isabella also told investigators that there were both drugs and alcohol in the home.

The child also reported that Ricardo had a gun in the house, and she was 

scared and believed he would shoot up the house. Ricardo admitted threatening the 

child’s adult brother when the brother had allegedly threatened him, but denied 

possessing a gun. Ricardo was on probation and had a prior conviction for domestic 

violence. The child reported witnessing several incidents of domestic violence between 

Ricardo and the mother, including “‘a lot’ of arguing.”
4

The father, who lived in Oregon, reported that he was concerned about the 

child’s care in the mother’s custody and stated he had sought custody of Isabella and had 

been granted visitation. His relationship with the mother had been difficult and marked 

by conflict.

On September 29, the court sustained the petition with amendments. The 

sustained petition included allegations regarding sexual abuse of the child by Ricardo, the 

domestic violence between the mother and Ricardo, the mother’s failure to provide 

appropriate supervision and to ensure that basic needs were met, and the mother and 

father’s relationship and custody dispute.

On September 30, the court granted a temporary restraining order 

protecting the mother and the child from Ricardo.3 The court ordered the child released 

to the father and ordered him to enroll her in services.

In the October 20 jurisdiction/disposition report, the social worker 

recommended that the petition be sustained and dependency be terminated with exit 

orders. In sum, Isabella’s narrative remained consistent, but she did not wish to speak 

further about the sexual abuse. The child missed her mother and adult siblings, and 

stated she felt safe with the mother and not with Ricardo. She wanted to stay with her 

mother and visit her father.

The mother, for her part, again stated she did not believe the sexual abuse 

petition and stated Isabella had not disclosed it to her, but admitted Isabella had said she 

did not feel comfortable when Ricardo hugged or kissed her. She felt “confused” by the 

abuse allegations. She denied putting her boyfriend before her children and stated if she 

had known about the abuse, she would have taken action. The mother stated she was at 

home in her room on the day the alleged abuse occurred and had no idea why Ricardo 

stated he was alone, but claimed she had been drinking. She denied physical domestic 

3 Ultimately, Ricardo could not be served with the restraining order.
5

violence, claiming she and Ricardo argued but the arguments did not escalate. The 

mother also denied the presence of firearms in the home. As to the general neglect 

allegations, the mother denied them, stating she made sure the child eats and there was 

always food in the home. She stated the child had clothes that fit.

The father stated he learned about the abuse allegations for the first time 

when he was contacted by SSA. He stated Ricardo had threatened to shoot him on one 

occasion. He denied the relationship with the mother was rife with conflict, stating she 

was a “‘great mother’” and “‘provider.’” He believed, however, that the mother involved 

herself with people with whom the child was not safe. The father expressed concern

about the child having unsupervised visits with the mother due to her inability to protect 

her from abuse. He stated “the mother needed to be held accountable for what occurred.” 

He further stated that as long as the child was safe, he did not have a problem with the 

child visiting the mother.

At the jurisdiction hearing on October 20, the parents submitted on the 

amended petition, and the court set a disposition and review hearing, with Isabella 

remaining in the father’s care in the meantime. Supervised virtual visits were authorized 

between Isabella and the mother.

In the following period, the mother enrolled in an abuse therapy program at 

UCI and had completed six sessions by February 2, 2023. The mother’s therapist stated 

she was “doing well and will address the reasons that led” to SSA’s involvement. The 

mother now believed Isabella and had told the therapist she had not suspected abuse 

because she had not seen any change in Isaballa’s behavior. It appeared the mother 

wanted to support the child in any way she could, and she seemed to be protective and 

receptive to feedback. Her therapy had addressed how she could advocate on her child’s 

behalf. While the mother found it difficult to coparent with the father, she wanted to 

have a good relationship with him and avoid conflict.
6

The mother’s telephonic visits were liberalized to unsupervised. The father 

stated this seemed crazy to him and that the case appeared to be moving backwards. 

Isabella was generally doing well in the father’s care.

A contested disposition hearing began in late April. SSA’s reports were 

submitted and the child testified. Isabella missed the mother and wanted more visits, and 

she expressed wanting to live with her mother, which was a change from her previously 

stated wishes.

The social worker assigned to Isabella’s 17-year-old half sister, J.R., 

reported that J.R. said that neither she nor the mother have had any contact with Ricardo. 

Only the mother and J.R. currently lived in their home. The mother’s therapist reported 

she was doing “‘really well’” in therapy and doing a good job advocating for the child. 

She appeared receptive to therapy and appeared to be integrating what they were working 

on.

In an addendum report, SSA changed its recommendation to terminating 

dependency with the child to remain in the father’s primary care and the parents to share 

custody. The social worker opined: “Throughout the life of the case, the father has

provided the child, Isabella with a safe home environment and has ensured all her basic 

needs have been met. In addition, the father and the child participated in case plan 

services by attending therapy to address the issues that led to the Agency’s involvement.

Further, the father has also enrolled the child in extracurricular and education activities.

[¶] As it pertains to the mother, it is believed she has eliminated the safety concerns in 

her home and has actively participated in her case plan services. It is reported the mother 

has addressed, in therapy, the reason that led to the involvement of the Social Services 

Agency and the mother has made great progress.”

At the hearing, the social worker testified consistent with the reports. She 

stated that Ricardo did not live in the mother’s home and was not around. The mother 
7

now believed Isabella’s allegations and had addressed the issue of being protective of her 

daughter in therapy, as reflected by Ricardo no longer being in her life.

After the close of evidence, the father and Isabella’s counsel argued for 

only supervised visitation for the mother. SSA argued it could not meet its burden under 

section 361, subdivision (c), to show by clear and convincing evidence that removing the 

child was required for her safety. SSA recommended primary custody to the father and 

extended visits for the mother. The mother requested joint custody.

The court found there was no longer any risk to the child in the mother’s 

home. “The same concerns articulated in the petition are no longer outstanding today.” 

The mother’s progress in therapy, among other factors, indicated that SSA had not met its 

burden under section 361, subdivision (c), to show that removal was necessary, and the 

court was therefore required to keep custody with the parents. The court declared 

Isabella a dependent and terminated dependency with custody orders (also known as exit

orders), which included shared legal and physical custody to both parents. The child’s 

primary residence was to be with the father. The court’s order included visitation and 

contact orders, which provided for visits with the mother during certain school breaks and 

holidays.

The father now appeals.

II

DISCUSSION

The father’s only argument on appeal is that the court abused its discretion 

when, “in the face of overwhelming evidence,” it determined that Isabella would be safe 

in the mother’s custody during supervised visits. (Boldfacing & capitalization omitted.) 

He asks this court to reverse and remand to the lower court with directions that the father 

be granted primary physical custody with only supervised visits for the mother.
8

Relevant Law and Standard of Review

“If the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a minor who has been 

adjudged a dependent child of the . . . court . . . on its own motion, may issue . . . an order 

determining the custody of, or visitation with, the child.” (§ 362.4, subd. (a).) “Any 

order issued pursuant to this section shall continue until modified or terminated by a 

subsequent order of the superior court. The order of the juvenile court shall be filed in 

the [relevant family law] proceeding . . . at the time the juvenile court terminates its 

jurisdiction over the minor, and shall become a part thereof.” (§ 362.4, subd. (b).)

Pursuant to section 302, subdivision (d), any such order is deemed a final judgment and 

remains in effect after the termination of jurisdiction. The order may only be modified if 

a significant change of circumstances exists. (Ibid.)

“[I]n making [termination and custody] orders, the juvenile court must look 

at the best interests of the child.” (In re John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 973,

superseded by statute on another point as stated in In re Marriage of David & Martha M. 

(2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 96, 102-103.) A court must evaluate these interests “in the 

context of the peculiar facts of the case before the court.” (John W., at p. 965.) “The 

issue of the parents’ ability to protect and care for the child is the central issue. The 

presumption of parental fitness that underlies custody law in the family court just does 

not apply to dependency cases.” (In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704, 712.) The 

court must consider the totality of the circumstances and issue orders that are in the 

child’s best interests. (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 201.)

“‘[T]he juvenile court has broad discretion to make custody [and visitation] 

orders when it terminates jurisdiction in a dependency case [citation].’ [Citation.] We 

review the juvenile court’s exit orders for an abuse of that discretion. [Citations.] We 

will not disturb the juvenile court’s decision ‘“‘unless the trial court has exceeded the 

limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd 

determination.’”’” (In re J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 112-113.) There is no abuse of 
9

discretion where substantial evidence supports the court’s order. (See In re Daniel C. H.

(1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 814, 839.)

In determining whether substantial evidence exists, “[w]e do not reweigh 

the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. 

[Citation.] The judgment will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence, even 

though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have 

reached a different result had it believed other evidence.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 

Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) “Substantial evidence must be of ponderable legal significance. 

It is not synonymous with ‘any’ evidence. [Citation.] The evidence must be reasonable 

in nature, credible, and of solid value. [Citation.] The appellant has the burden of 

showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or 

order.” (Ibid.)

Analysis

The father supports his argument that the trial court erred by going back to 

the date of detention and reviewing the facts of the case from that point: “Isabella cannot 

be deemed safe, because not only did mother repeatedly accuse her of lying about her 

sexual abuse, mother repeatedly insisted that Isabella never even told her about the abuse. 

Right from the start, Isabella told law enforcement and the Agency that she told mother 

that mother’s boyfriend sexually abused her, but mother did not believe her.” By 

approaching the facts in this manner, the father turns the substantial evidence question on 

its head. He is not reviewing the evidence upon which the court actually based its 

decision – the mother’s status at the time of the disposition hearing – and questioning its 

sufficiency. Rather, he is reviewing every fact that might weigh against the mother from 

the start of the case and asking this court to reweigh those facts.

We decline to do so. There is no question that the mother failed at the 

beginning of the case in numerous ways. But instead of going back to the beginning of 
10

the case, we examine the evidence upon which the court actually based its ruling and 

determine whether that evidence is sufficient to support the order under the substantial 

evidence standard of review. The court found that “while [Isa]bella has been sexually 

abused, there’s no evidence that she remains at risk in mother’s home.” This finding was 

supported by substantial evidence. No evidence was presented at the disposition hearing 

that the mother and Ricardo had any contact since the emergency protective order had 

been in place; indeed, the only evidence was that there had not been any contact. 

Isabella’s teenage half sister reported in April 2023 that he had not been in the home, nor 

was she aware of any contact between Ricardo and the mother.4

The father argues that Isabella cannot be deemed safe in the mother’s care 

because “throughout the entire case” the mother lied about whether she and Ricardo were 

living together. But the court could reasonably find this an exaggeration of the facts 

based on Ricardo’s statements that there were other places where he lived and slept. He 

claimed he stayed with the mother “a few days at a time.” Ultimately, whether he lived 

with the mother before the outset of the case was far less pertinent than the lack of 

evidence that he was living with her at the time of the hearing. The court was free to give 

this conflict in the facts the weight it deemed appropriate, and the father’s statement that 

Isabella “cannot be deemed safe” in the mother’s care is not supported by any cited legal 

principle.

To remedy the issues that had led to dependency, the mother had been in 

therapy. As of April 2023, her therapist reported that she was doing “‘really well,’” was 

receptive, and was integrating what she learned in therapy. There was no evidence that 

the mother had not taken therapy seriously or not sought to learn from it. She had stated 

4

The father also claims the mother “never got a permanent restraining order.” The 

uncontradicted information in the record shows that the mother had never been able to 

serve Ricardo with the temporary order. Placing blame for this on the mother is 

unpersuasive.
11

to the therapist that she believed the abuse had taken place in February 2023. All of these 

facts show steady progress, as reflected in the therapist’s reports. The last report before 

the hearing stated the mother “can acknowledge types of abuse, safety and warning signs 

of abuse. She continues to process how to communicate with daughter on safety, set safe 

healthy boundaries and effectively co-parent. She is making steady progress in 

discussing allegations. Discussed advocating for daughter and visits.” While the father 

is free to denigrate the mother’s progress as “measly” and insufficient, the evidence 

supported the court’s finding that the mother had made significant progress. SSA also 

believed there was no substantial risk to the child in returning her to the mother’s care at 

the time of the hearing.

We cannot take seriously the father’s contention that the fact that J.R., the 

half sister, may or may not have believed Isabella’s sex abuse allegations by the time of 

the hearing as demonstrating that Isabella would be unsafe in the mother’s care. First, we 

do not know what J.R. believed by the time of the disposition hearing, as the father only 

quotes J.R.’s statements from the early days of the case. Second, to hold a teenager’s 

subjective beliefs against the mother would have been an abuse of the court’s discretion. 

If there is anything in the world a parent cannot control, it is what a teenager believes. 

There was no indication in the record that J.R. had ever discussed the sex abuse 

allegations with Isabella, and no reason to believe she would do so in the future.

The court had numerous pieces of evidence to support its finding. It had 

the lack of any evidence of contact between the mother and Ricardo, it had SSA’s 

opinion based on the entire record in the case, and it had the opinion of the mother’s 

therapist. Taken together, this was substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that 

the child would be safe in the mother’s care during visits. The father has failed to meet 

his burden to show an abuse of the court’s discretion, relying instead on cherry-picked 

facts designed to show the mother in the worst light possible.
12

III

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed.

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOETHALS, J.

MOTOIKE, J.