RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 17a0086p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

WILLIAM THOMAS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

CITY OF COLUMBUS, OHIO; KIMBERLEY JACOBS;

WILLIAM T. KAUFMAN, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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No. 16-3375 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus. 

No. 2:14-cv-00906—Gregory L. Frost, District Judge. 

Argued: December 9, 2016 

Decided and Filed: April 19, 2017 

 Before: McKEAGUE, GRIFFIN, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges. 

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ARGUED: Nicholas A. DiCello, SPANGENBERG, SHIBLEY & LIBER, LLP, Cleveland, 

Ohio, for Appellant. Timothy J. Mangan, CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Columbus, Ohio, for 

Appellees. ON BRIEF: Nicholas A. DiCello, Jeremy A. Tor, SPANGENBERG, SHIBLEY 

& LIBER, LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Timothy J. Mangan, Janet R. Hill Arbogast, 

CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees. 

_________________ 

OPINION 

_________________ 

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. This case primarily concerns an officer’s decision to fire 

his weapon. Specifically, whether that decision was reasonable when an apparent suspect exited 

>
No. 16-3375 Thomas v. City of Columbus, et al. Page 2

an ongoing burglary 40 feet away from the officer and then ran towards the officer with a gun. 

For the following reasons, we hold that it was and that the district court properly granted 

summary judgment to the defendants on the remaining claims. Thus, we affirm. 

I 

In 2012, Destin Thomas lived in an apartment complex near Columbus, Ohio. His front 

door opened to a breezeway. On one end, the breezeway led to a parking lot that Destin’s 

building shared with the others in the complex. On the other end, it led to a grassy area that 

separated Destin’s building from other developments and a nearby road. 

At around 8:45 a.m. on a July morning, two men broke through Destin’s front door. 

Destin called 911 from inside his bedroom and spoke quietly to avoid drawing the burglars’ 

attention. After a few minutes, however, the men tried to force their way into Destin’s room. 

A struggle ensued. 

As Destin confronted the intruders, the 911 dispatcher sent out a burglary alert. The 

Columbus Police Department considers a burglary in progress a “priority one” call—a 

designation reserved for “ongoing life-threatening crimes, and situations likely to result in 

serious physical harm to any person.” R. 32-1, Kaufman Aff. Ex. A-3, PID 133. Normally, the 

Department requires that two officers respond to these calls. “However, if the circumstances 

indicate a present or an imminent threat to a citizen’s safety,” the Department’s procedures state 

that “the first available sworn personnel shall respond directly and immediately to the scene.” 

Id. at Ex. A-4, PID 135 

Five officers in the area responded to the alert. Officer William Kaufman was the first to 

arrive on the scene. On his way to the apartment complex, Officer Kaufman received updates 

from the dispatcher that let him know that the caller was inside a bedroom, that multiple suspects 

were in the apartment, and that the dispatcher heard yelling and crashing noises in the 

background. 

When Officer Kaufman pulled into the complex’s parking lot, he stopped his cruiser a 

few spaces down from the breezeway’s entrance. He ran from his car toward the breezeway, 
No. 16-3375 Thomas v. City of Columbus, et al. Page 3

approaching it from between a parked car and truck. Officer Kaufman says that as he ran, he 

could hear a commotion coming from the breezeway. The complex was in a high-crime area and 

Officer Kaufman says that he expected a gun might be involved. Officer Kaufman had his 

weapon unholstered. 

When Officer Kaufman approached the breezeway’s entrance, two men exited Destin’s 

apartment and ran toward him. The first had a gun in his hand. Officer Kaufman stopped at the 

parking lot’s edge, about 40 feet from Destin’s front door. He shouted and then fired two shots 

at the person with the gun, who had closed the distance to what Officer Kaufman later estimated 

to be ten feet. 

The second suspect fled. Officer Kaufman chased him for a few steps before stopping. 

He then radioed out “shots fired” and requested an ambulance. Officer Kaufman never 

administered aid to the suspect that he shot, later saying that he considered it unsafe to do so with 

an active crime scene. He also says that the suspect appeared to be dead. 

The person that Officer Kaufman shot was not a burglar. Rather, it was Destin, who had 

managed to disarm a burglar before fleeing his apartment. Unbeknownst to Officer Kaufman, 

and perhaps Destin, the gun that Destin had wrestled away was unloaded. Tragically, Destin 

died from the two gunshot wounds. 

When the next officer arrived on the scene a few minutes later, he entered the breezeway 

from behind the building. He found Officer Kaufman facing toward Destin’s apartment door 

with his gun drawn. Between the officers lay Destin’s body, clothed only in the gym shorts that 

he had slept in. The officer asked Officer Kaufman if he was okay. Officer Kaufman responded, 

“I think this was the homeowner.”

After more officers arrived and secured the scene, a sergeant transported Officer 

Kaufman to a nearby police station. There, he met with his union-retained attorney. Officer 

Kaufman then returned to the scene for initial questioning but declined to comment. 

Nine days later, he submitted a statement through his attorney claiming that Destin had 

pointed the gun at him. Destin’s father, William Thomas, finds this implausible because Destin 
No. 16-3375 Thomas v. City of Columbus, et al. Page 4

had called the police. Further, Mr. Thomas notes that Destin’s bedroom faced the parking lot, 

meaning that he might have left his room specifically to run to Officer Kaufman. Officer 

Kaufman stuck by his story during his deposition, even agreeing when the opposing lawyer 

suggested that the only thing that would make his firing a weapon reasonable would be Destin 

lifting the gun towards him. 

Besides Officer Kaufman, only one other living person witnessed the shooting—the 

burglar that followed Destin out of the apartment. Police captured him, but he refuses to testify. 

Currently, he is pursuing relief for his felony murder conviction based on Destin’s death. 

II 

In 2014, William Thomas sued Officer Kaufman, the City of Columbus, and the City’s 

Police Chief, Kimberly Jacobs. He brought two claims against Officer Kaufman under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The first alleged that Officer Kaufman used excessive force in violation of 

Destin’s right to be free from unreasonable seizures—a Fourth Amendment right applied against 

the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The second asserted that Officer Kaufman violated 

Destin’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by showing deliberate indifference to his 

serious medical needs after the shooting. Mr. Thomas also brought state tort claims against 

Officer Kaufman based on the shooting. Finally, Mr. Thomas asserted that the City and Chief 

Jacobs failed to properly train Officer Kaufman, thus making them liable for the shooting under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 

The defendants moved for summary judgment, with Officer Kaufman asserting qualified 

immunity as a defense. The district court granted the motion on the federal claims and dismissed 

the state claims without prejudice. As to the excessive-force claim, the court concluded that no 

genuine dispute existed over Officer Kaufman’s testimony that Destin pointed a gun at him, and 

thus it found no Fourth Amendment violation. See R. 44, Opinion and Order, PID 1311. 

The court then found for Officer Kaufman on the deliberate indifference claim, holding that he 

did not disregard the risk to Destin but acted practically under uncertain circumstances. Id. at 

22–23, PID 1325–26. Lastly, the district court dismissed the failure-to-train claim because it 

found no constitutional violation. Id. 
No. 16-3375 Thomas v. City of Columbus, et al. Page 5

III 

Mr. Thomas appeals summary judgment on each claim. We review the district court’s 

decision de novo. Getz v. Swoap, 833 F.3d 646, 652 (6th Cir. 2016). A court properly grants 

summary judgment when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 

587 (1986). We “may affirm a decision of the district court for any reason supported by the 

record, including on grounds different from those on which the district court relied.” Stein v. 

Regions Morgan Keegan Select High Income Fund, Inc., 821 F.3d 780, 786 (6th Cir. 2016). 

IV 

A 

The parties initially briefed this case by focusing on the same issue that the district court 

honed in on: whether a genuine dispute existed that Destin pointed the gun at Officer Kaufman. 

The district court held that no dispute existed because Mr. Thomas lacked sufficient evidence to 

undermine Officer Kaufman’s sworn testimony. On appeal, Mr. Thomas mostly attacked the 

errors he perceived in that holding. We ordered supplemental briefing on the question of 

whether Officer Kaufman would be entitled to qualified immunity even if a jury could disbelieve 

Officer Kaufman and find that Destin never aimed the gun at him. We now hold that Officer 

Kaufman was entitled to immunity regardless of whether Destin raised the gun. 

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable seizures. 

This includes the right to be free from excessive force. Graham v. O’Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 

(1989). The Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard governs whether an 

officer’s force was excessive. See id. Deadly force is objectively reasonable when an officer 

“has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious 

physical injury to the officer or others.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985). 

We analyze an officer’s decision to use force “from the perspective of a reasonable 

officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 

We do so mindful that police officers face “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” situations that 
No. 16-3375 Thomas v. City of Columbus, et al. Page 6

require “split-second judgments.” Id. at 397. The Fourth Amendment only requires officers to 

act reasonably on the information they have; it does not require them to perceive a situation 

accurately. Cf. id. at 396 (“The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on 

probable cause, even though the wrong person is arrested[.]”) (citation omitted). 

In this circuit, we consider the officer’s reasonableness under the circumstances he faced 

at the time he decided to use force. See Livermore v. Lubelan, 476 F.3d 397, 406 (6th Cir. 2007) 

(describing the so-called “segmented analysis” this circuit uses to analyze use-of-force claims). 

We do not scrutinize whether it was reasonable for the officer “to create the circumstances.” Id. 

(quotation marks and citations omitted). Even if an officer approaches a scene recklessly, this 

will not necessarily render a later decision to protect himself unreasonable. See Chappell v. City 

of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 915–16 (6th Cir. 2009). 

Thus, we cannot, as Mr. Thomas urges, find a constitutional violation based on how 

Officer Kaufman approached the crime scene. Arguably, Officer Kaufman’s decisions to rush 

toward the apartment without backup violated Columbus Police Department procedures. 

Arguably, his violations increased the likelihood that Officer Kaufman might have to use force. 

But those decisions were not seizures. Their reasonableness is not at issue. 

Instead, we must consider the circumstances that Officer Kaufman faced in the moment 

he decided to use force. Officer Kaufman had responded to a dangerous call in a high-crime 

area. He was alone. He ran towards the breezeway between two vehicles and then stopped at the 

parking lot’s edge. Meanwhile, two people exited an apartment and then ran towards him, the 

first with a gun. About 40 feet initially separated Officer Kaufman from that person, and the 

distance only shrank as the person closed in on him. At this range, a suspect could raise and fire 

a gun with little or no time for an officer to react. Given these facts, a reasonable officer would 

perceive a significant threat to his life in that moment. Thus, Officer Kaufman’s decision to fire 

his gun—even if Destin never raised his—was objectively reasonable. 

Mr. Thomas’s arguments to the contrary underplay the danger that Officer Kaufman 

faced. And they rely on the hindsight bias that we guard against. Consider three propositions 

that Mr. Thomas advances. First, that Officer Kaufman should have warned Destin and then 
No. 16-3375 Thomas v. City of Columbus, et al. Page 7

waited to see if he complied. Second, that Officer Kaufman should have reflected on the 

situation and then pieced together that Destin was the victim because he was shirtless. 

Third, that Officer Kaufman should have waited to see if the person running towards him with a 

gun would point it at him. If Officer Kaufman had followed Mr. Thomas’s advice, tragedy may 

have been avoided here. But if Destin had been an actual criminal with a loaded gun, an officer 

who followed this advice could well be dead. 

That Mr. Thomas’s attorney elicited a different legal conclusion from Officer Kaufman 

does not change this analysis. The Fourth Amendment inquiry here relies on an objective 

reasonableness standard—not on an officer’s opinion. Cf. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (“[T]he 

‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether 

the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances 

confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”). And objective 

reasonableness is a legal conclusion reserved for this court. Chappell, 585 F.3d at 909 (“[O]nce 

the relevant set of facts is determined and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the 

plaintiff, to the extent supported by the record, the question whether the detectives’ actions were 

objectively unreasonable is a pure question of law.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Similarly, Mr. Thomas cannot avoid summary judgment by citing his use-of-force 

expert’s legal conclusions. See DeMerrell v. City of Cheboygan, 206 F. App’x 418, 426 (6th Cir. 

2006) (holding that the district court did not err in ignoring expert’s legal conclusions on 

objective reasonableness). Mostly, that expert worked from the same faulty legal premise as 

Mr. Thomas—he focused on Officer Kaufman’s reasonableness in approaching the scene. 

When pressed about whether an officer has probable cause to believe someone running at him 

with a gun poses a significant risk of death, the expert adopted Mr. Thomas’s categorical rule 

that force can only be reasonable if a suspect raises his gun. That conclusion, however, is ours to 

make. And we reiterate that the circumstances here would give an officer reason to fear 

someone running towards him with a gun and leave him with little to no time to react if the 

suspect raised it. 

To be clear, we do not hold that an officer may shoot a suspect merely because he has a 

gun in his hand. Whether a suspect has a weapon constitutes just one consideration in assessing 
No. 16-3375 Thomas v. City of Columbus, et al. Page 8

the totality of the circumstances. See Perez v. Suszczynski, 809 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2016) 

(“Where the weapon was, what type of weapon it was, and what was happening with the weapon 

are all inquiries crucial to the reasonableness determination.”). Sometimes, the time or space 

available to an officer may mean that the reasonable thing to do is to monitor the suspect, issue a 

warning, or take cover. See, e.g., Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1163 (6th Cir. 1996); 

Brandenburg v. Cureton, 882 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1989). But Officer Kaufman acted 

objectively reasonably when he used deadly force here—even if facts beyond his knowledge 

meant that he actually faced no threat. 

B 

 As to Mr. Thomas’s Fourteenth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious 

medical needs, we adopt the district court’s reasoning. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 

police officers from acting with reckless disregard to those they injure. See, e.g., Scozzari 

v. Miedzianowski, 454 F. App’x 455, 466 (6th Cir. 2012); Estate of Owensby v. City 

of Cincinnati, 414 F.3d 596, 604 (6th Cir. 2005). They cannot unreasonably delay medical 

treatment. Scozzari, 454 F. App’x at 464. They also cannot prioritize activities “unrelated to 

securing the scene” or “unnecessary to their duties” over trying to save the suspect’s life. Id. at 

465–66. 

As the district court recognized, however, an officer does not act with reckless disregard 

when he immediately summons help and then focuses on his own safety. Here, Officer Kaufman 

was alone at a crime scene where multiple suspects exited a burglary—including one with a gun. 

He called for a medic and then took cover and waited for backup to arrive. He did not violate the 

Constitution by failing to render aid when doing so appeared both dangerous and futile. 

C 

 Because no constitutional violations occurred, the district court properly granted 

summary judgment on Mr. Thomas’s failure-to-train claim against the city and Chief Jacobs. 

For a municipality to be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show harm “caused by a 

constitutional violation.” Lee v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 432 F. App’x 435, 

449 (6th Cir. 2011). No constitutional violation means no municipal liability. See id. 
No. 16-3375 Thomas v. City of Columbus, et al. Page 9

V 

Officer Kaufman faced a tense, uncertain situation. Someone ran towards him with a gun 

after exiting a burglary about 40 feet away. Officer Kaufman fired when the person with the gun 

closed the distance to around 10 feet. A reasonable officer would find a significant threat to his 

safety under these circumstances. Under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness 

standard, he could respond with deadly force. Thus, we affirm.