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Air University Press

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Please send inquiries or comments to

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The Wright Flyer Papers

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00-inside cover.indd 1 7/30/08 6:57:56 
AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

Slovakia 1944

The Forgotten Uprising

Sean M. Judge

Major, USAF

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 34

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

May 2008

01-frontmatter.indd 1 7/30/08 6:58:22 
ii

This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are 

available electronically at the Air University Research 

Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU 

Press Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely 

those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the 

United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government 

agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

01-frontmatter.indd 2 7/30/08 6:58:22 
iii

Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright 

Flyer Papers series. In this series, the Air Command and 

Staff College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes our best 

student research projects from the prior academic year. 

The ACSC research program encourages our students to 

move beyond the school’s core curriculum in their own 

professional development and in “advancing air and space 

power.” The series title reflects our desire to perpetuate the 

pioneering spirit embodied in earlier generations of Airmen. 

Projects selected for publication combine solid research, 

innovative thought, and lucid presentation in exploring war 

at the operational level. With this broad perspective, the 

Wright Flyer Papers engage an eclectic range of doctrinal, 

technological, organizational, and operational questions. 

Some of these studies provide new solutions to familiar 

problems. Others encourage us to leave the familiar behind 

in pursuing new possibilities. By making these research 

studies available in the Wright Flyer Papers, ACSC hopes 

to encourage critical examination of the findings and to 

stimulate further research in these areas.

JIMMIE C. JACKSON, JR.

Brigadier General, USAF

Commandant

01-frontmatter.indd 3 7/30/08 6:58:22 
01-frontmatter.indd 4 7/30/08 6:58:22 
Abstract

The Slovak National Uprising of 1944 is ignored and/

or treated as a nonevent in the Western historiography 

of World War II. The political climate during World War II 

and the Cold War that followed obscured and distorted the 

history and understanding of this revolt. The raising of the 

Iron Curtain in the 1990s removed the veil of secrecy from 

much of Eastern Europe’s wartime history, and Western 

historians are exploring the new resources available, but 

coverage of Slovakia’s story and uprising remains very 

limited. This work aims to fill some of the void.

Fully understanding the uprising requires an analysis of 

a number of different viewpoints in order to avoid capture 

by the political views of the parties involved: the Slovaks, the 

Germans, or the Soviets. Each group had different plans and 

goals: the Slovaks found themselves precariously between 

the Allies and Germany, the Germans fought to maintain 

their strategic position in central Europe while the Soviets 

hoped to expand their influence through eastern and central 

Europe. Each group naturally interpreted events differently 

and acted accordingly. Ultimately the Germans crushed 

the Slovak rebellion.

Events surrounding the uprising remain cloudy to this 

day. The Slovaks won only short-term political gains, but 

their Jewish and ethnic German populations paid a heavy 

price. The Germans won their last significant victory in 

the war and maintained their presence in Slovak territory 

until the very end. The Soviet Union suffered significant 

casualties, but saw Communist influence increase in the 

region. Recriminations swirl around the lack of Allied 

support and the duplicity of Stalin. Western historians 

have excluded coverage of the uprising in part to avoid 

embarrassment. Significantly, the Slovaks remain at odds 

among themselves about the importance and the meaning 

of the uprising.



01-frontmatter.indd 5 7/30/08 6:58:23 
01-frontmatter.indd 6 7/30/08 6:58:23 


Introduction

“By this uprising Slovakia showed its adherence 

to the ideals of democracy, freedom and plurality,” Caplovic told CTK [the Czech News Agency], 

adding “it was necessary to more emphasize the 

international aspect of the uprising. It will only be 

young historians who will approach the topic in an 

unbiased way,” he said. “The current perception 

has been distorted by communist historians who 

did not deal with broad international connections 

of the uprising by which Slovakia joined the allies 

and returned to the ideals of the first Czechoslovak 

Republic,” he said.

––Dusan Caplovic

Slovak Deputy Prime Minister

paraphrased on the Anniversary of

the Slovak National Uprising, 2006

The story of the Slovak National Uprising of 1944 is a

complicated and tragic one that has been obscured and distorted by the politics that it surrounds. Slovakia’s relationship to Nazi Germany during World War II stemmed from

the unique history of the Slovak people and their precarious

position in Europe during 1939, but it created political tension both internally and externally for the small nation. The

war situation in the summer of 1944 exacerbated these

tensions and presented an opportunity for the Slovak

opposition to stage an uprising against their puppet

government, under Monsignor Jozef Tiso and thereby, the

power of Nazi Germany. The three primary actors in the

uprising included the Slovaks, Germans, and Soviets. Each

group had its own viewpoint derived from diverging political aims and goals that guided their actions throughout

the rebellion. The successful suppression of the uprising

by Germany required nearly two months of heavy fighting with dire consequences for the Slovaks, including their

Jewish and ethnic German compatriots. The Slovaks won

only short-term political gains for their efforts. The failure

of the uprising has resulted in postwar recriminations and

accusations, often colored and skewed by Cold War ideology and Czechoslovak politics. The resulting confusion and

02-Judge.indd 1 7/30/08 6:58:40 
polarization has obscured the Slovak rebellion particularly

in Western historiography. Recent publications indicate

an increasing Western interest in the World War II history

of Eastern Europe. The raising of the Iron Curtain in the

early 1990s granted greater access to historical resources

throughout those nations once dominated by Communist

governments and historians are taking advantage of the

opportunity. Norman Davies revisited the Warsaw Uprising

with his well-received work Rising 1944: The Battle for 

Warsaw, published in 2003, just in time for the 60th anniversary of that revolt. Author David Glantz has published

study after study focusing on the operational campaigns of

the Red Army, with his latest piece being Red Storm over 

the Balkans: The Failed Soviet Invasion of Romania. Richard

DiNardo followed this trend when he published Germany and 

the Axis Powers: From Coalition to Collapse in 2005. Unfortunately, Slovakia and its rebellion are not even mentioned

in DiNardo’s work, and they receive only passing acknowledgement in most others.1 A careful review and analysis of

the varying points of view on the Slovak National Uprising

will fill some of this void and reveal a more complete picture

of what really occurred that fateful fall in 1944.

Setting the Stage: Slovak History and

the Alliance with Germany

Prior to the creation of the Czechoslovak state following

the First World War, the Slovaks as a people resided in the

backwaters of the international stage. Long dominated by

Hungarian influence, a Slovak nationalist movement began

in the late nineteenth century when the pressure for

assimilation into Hungary’s culture, a process known as

Magyarization, became acute.2 Slovaks began to seek unification with the Czech people to throw off the Hungarian

yoke and forge a critical chapter in Slovak history.3

Support for Czech and Slovak unity first came from

abroad, significantly from outside of Europe. Czech and

Slovak American organizations recognized an opportunity

to exert influence during the First World War and signed

the Cleveland Agreement of 1915 and the Pittsburgh Pact of

1918, both seeking the creation of a unified Czech–Slovak

state with varying degrees of autonomy for the smaller Slo02-Judge.indd 2 7/30/08 6:58:41 
vak population.4 The dreams were fulfilled on 28 October

1918 when the Czech National Committee in Prague declared a new “Czecho-Slovak” state and the Slovak National

Council, formed on 30 October, proposed a union with the

Czechs, breaking affiliation with Hungary.5 Slovaks would

soon see that the newly created state did not meet their

fullest expectations.

Slovak hopes for autonomy in the new Czechoslovak state

proved illusory. The West was instrumental in the creation

of Czechoslovakia, but was ignorant about the Slovak

people, allowing the Czechs to assert their own influence and exploit the new state for their own agenda.6 The

Slovaks’ own limitations also played a role in their subordination. Decades of Hungarian dominance left them with

weak political organizations, inexperienced administrators,

and a psychological profile that deferred to authority, accepting lower status in the social order of their new country.7

These failings, combined with the numerical superiority of

the Czech population, predictably resulted in benevolent

domination of the Slovaks in the Czechoslovak construct.

Even as late as 1938 Slovak representation in the government only totaled 131 out of 7,470 civil servants, one out

of 139 military generals, and 33 out of 1,246 foreign affairs

officials.8 Making matters worse, while Slovaks were 75

percent Catholic, the representation in their allotted 54 National Assembly seats consisted of 31 Protestant Slovaks,

13 Czechs, and only 10 Catholic Slovaks.9 The stage was

set for the political turmoil that would accompany the 1938

Munich Agreement and the resulting breakup of the young

Czechoslovakian state.

Nazi Germany, under Adolf Hitler, had an unquenchable desire for expansion in the late 1930s. Following his

successes in remilitarizing the Rhineland and absorbing

Austria into Germany without war, Hitler turned next to

Czechoslovakia by using its ethnic German population as

a pretense to manufacture a crisis. His ultimate aims towards Czechoslovakia were simple: he planned to control

the Czechs by German domination and to control the Slovaks by ensuring their allegiance as an ally with a small

measure of independence.10 The international crisis came

to a head in September 1938 with the Munich Conference where Germany, with the aid of Italy as a suppos02-Judge.indd 3 7/30/08 6:58:41 
edly neutral arbitrator, treated with Britain and France to decide Czechoslovakia’s fate. The results were disastrous for

the Czechs, whose new Czechoslovak republic consisted of

truncated Czech lands (some border territory ceded to Germany) and autonomous regions in Slovakia and Ruthenia.11

Dr. Eduard Beneš, the president of Czechoslovakia and

a Czech, resigned on 5 October 1939 in the immediate aftermath of the Munich Agreement.12 The increased Slovak autonomy, decreased Czech influence, and German–Hungarian

relations would soon force the Slovak people to secede from

Czechoslovakia.

The Czechoslovak government arising from the ashes of

the Beneš administration was attempting to retain as much

legitimacy as possible and, fearing a Slovak move for independence, made plans for a military occupation of Slovak

territory and declared martial law on 9 March 1939.13 After

a meeting between Hitler and Monsignor Jozef Tiso, an influential priest in Slovak politics, it was clear that Slovakia had to choose between independence and alliance with

Germany, or continued rule from Prague likely followed by

Hungarian reoccupation of Slovak lands with German permission.14 The Slovak parliament unanimously approved

independence and installed a government with Tiso at its

head.15 The new and vulnerable government immediately

signed a Treaty of Protection with Germany on 23 March

1939, aligning its foreign and defense policies with the Nazi

regime and avoiding occupation in return for protection

against Czech or Hungarian dominance.16 The move was

an affront to the Czechs, while the Catholic roots of the

new government alienated Slovakia’s own protestant population, sowing the seeds for future political turmoil that

would play a role in the 1944 uprising.

Czech bitterness and disappointment with the Slovak

maneuverings were immediately evident. Historically, while

the Slovaks had been at odds with the Hungarians, the

Czechs’ enemy was Germany, making the Slovak defection

to the Nazi camp even more galling.17 Beneš, the deposed

Czech president, began a vigorous and organized campaign

in 1939 to reverse the Munich Agreement and revive the

Czechoslovak Republic through the creation of a government in exile.18 Beneš made no effort to hide his animosity toward the Slovak Republic, declaring the entire affair

02-Judge.indd 4 7/30/08 6:58:41 
treasonous and its leaders traitors.19 The Western powers were slow to recognize Beneš’ exile government, stubbornly adhering to the Munich accord, but by 1942–43,

nearly all the major powers, including the Soviet Union,

supported this organization as the legal representative of

all of Czechoslovakia.20 Beneš tried to rally Slovak support

for his government against their new republic by pointing

out that Germany was sure to lose the war, by declaring his

exiled government would spare the Slovaks the stigma of

defeat because he represented them too, and by accusing

the Tiso regime of complicity in Hungarian intrigue against

Slovakia.21 These two competing governments would vie for

Slovak legitimacy and support the entire war, even during

the Slovak uprising itself.

The war situation in August 1944 played a key role in

the launch of the Slovak National Uprising. The scent of

impending Allied victory over Germany lingered on every

front. In the West, the successful invasion of Normandy enabled Operation Cobra, 25 July, and the subsequent breakout that was liberating France.22 Rome had fallen on 4 June

of that same year; the first Axis capital to be captured.23

Finally, Operation Dragoon, the Allied invasion of southern France in mid August, seemed to reaffirm the Western

Allies’ mastery of the situation. The view on the Eastern

Front, close to Slovakia, was very similar.

The Soviet Union was making remarkable gains against

Germany in the East. A massive Soviet offensive was

launched against the center of the German Eastern Front

on 22 June 1944 (the third anniversary of Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union), using 166 Red Army divisions,

2,700 tanks, and over 1,300 assault guns.24 The attack was

an astonishing success; tearing a 200-mile opening in the

German lines and costing the Nazis nearly 200,000 men,

2,000 tanks, 10,000 heavy guns, and 57,000 trucks in the

first week alone; and bringing the front ever closer to Slovak

borders.25 Meanwhile, other German allies, such as Finland, were tottering on the verge of collapse or defection to

the Allied camp.26 Slovaks were not the only people watching current events in 1944; the French and Poles were well

aware of the tide of war.

Spurred by the combined successes of the Allies and

various other motivations, uprisings seemed to overtake

02-Judge.indd 5 7/30/08 6:58:41 
Nazi-occupied lands. On 1 August 1944, the Polish Home

Army seized the center of Warsaw from the Germans and

hoped to hold their gains until the arrival of the Red Army,

which was already tantalizingly close.27 The Poles waged a

valiant two-month campaign to hold out against Germany,

hoping for Soviet assistance that never materialized, before

they succumbed on 27 September.28 The Germans killed

200,000 of the city’s inhabitants with their violent suppression of the insurrection.29 The Parisians staged their own

uprising at nearly the same time when, as Allied forces approached the city, they raised the “Standard of Revolt” on 18

August 1944.30 The Allied armies rushed to assist the rebels, and Free French forces liberated Paris by 25 August.31

The advance of the Allies and the examples of Warsaw and

Paris set the stage for the Slovak revolt. Unfortunately, for

the Slovaks, who could not foresee the tragic end of the Polish uprising, their revolt would mimic the Polish course.

The Slovak National Uprising:

The Slovak, German, and Soviet Views

The military situation only partially explains the Slovak

rising. Given Clausewitz’s dictum that war is an act of policy

and a continuation of politics by other means, the Slovak

National Uprising must be viewed politically.32 The Slovaks,

Germans, and Soviets each had their own view of the uprising and their own associated political agenda, which helped

determine the course of action they followed and colored

their perspective of the events. It is the Slovak view that is

the most complex and difficult to dissect.

Resistance in Slovakia was the result of a confluence of

events and policies that culminated in the formation of an

outwardly unified, though internally divided, opposition

movement. The Tiso regime and its Catholic heavy handedness, as already noted, alienated the Slovak protestant

populace, who had enjoyed a somewhat privileged place in

the Czechoslovak construct. The progress of the war and allegiance to Nazi Germany began costing Tiso support, with

the disaffection resulting in two primary resistance groups:

the Democratic Party under Jozef Lettrich and the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS).33 The opposition groups began

cooperating in 1943 and consolidated their efforts into one

02-Judge.indd 6 7/30/08 6:58:41 
movement under the Christmas Agreement of 1943, which

created the Slovak National Council (SNC) with 50 percent

membership from both groups.34 The stated political charter included the reestablishment of Czechoslovakia with

greater Slovak autonomy, a democratic political structure,

and freedom of religion within a secular state.35 The now

unified opposition movement began to plan for an uprising

with these specific goals in mind.

Yet Slovakia, by the time of the uprising, was politically

isolated from the Allies. The three years following Slovakian

independence saw the tiny state recognized by 28 other

nations, including Britain, the Soviet Union, and prewar

France, but these three later withdrew their recognition,

and the United States was never to grant it.36 The exiled

Czech government managed to isolate Slovakia and had

even made an agreement with the Soviets in May 1944.

The agreement granted the Red Army military operational

authority in Czechoslovakia in exchange for Czech administrative authority behind the lines of liberated territory.37

Beneš went on to declare that there would be a “settling

of accounts with all collaborators” after the war.38 Slovak

politicians were on the outside looking in and needed to

take action to put themselves in a more agreeable position

following the end of the war.

Motivations for the uprising created the strange bedfellows of Beneš and the SNC. The exile government needed

some form of overt resistance under the Czech banner to

increase its legitimacy and negotiating power at the end

of the war, while the SNC needed to justify its own claim

to lead the Slovak people, so the two agreed to work together.39 Specific SNC goals for the uprising included

reestablishing a Czechoslovakia with two equal nationalities, switching to the side of the victors by aiding in the

defeat of Hitler, avoiding physical destruction of Slovakia

by German scorched-earth policies, establishing a democracy, and allowing a quick strategic advance through the

Carpathian mountains towards Vienna by the Red Army.40

Meanwhile, a group of midlevel dissident Slovak officers, including Lt Cols Ján Golian, Mikuláš Ferjencík, Mirko Vesel,

and Dezider Kišš-Kalina, also recognized Slovakia’s political

predicament and contacted the Beneš government in February 1944 in the hopes of instigating a resistance movement

02-Judge.indd 7 7/30/08 6:58:42 
in the tiny nation.41 Accordingly, the exiled Czechoslovak

government, the SNC, and these sympathizers in the Slovak military set out to make plans for a revolt.

The planning for an uprising was extensive, but very difficult, given the multitude of actors, the surrounding political intrigue, and the geographic separation of the parties.

In April 1944 the SNC named Golian as the leader of its

military preparations for revolt, and on 14 May the Beneš

government confirmed his position.42 The first task was dividing the Slovak Army officer corps into three groups: active participants in the uprising; anti-fascists who would be

notified just prior to the start of the uprising; and unreliable

officers, loyal to the Tiso regime, who would be removed

as soon as possible after the revolt began.43 Local industry

produced uniforms, boots, blankets, rations, mines, concrete fortifications, explosives, and even some improvised

armored cars in advance of the uprising.44 By June 1944

secret stockpiles in central Slovakia amounted to three

months of food, 1.3 million liters of gasoline, and 3.5 billion

Slovak crowns.45 Golian’s military plan called for the use of

two Slovak Army field divisions in joint operations with the

Red Army to hold open the Carpathian passes and allow

the Soviets to rush into Slovakia from the east, while the

rear army would hold on to central Slovakia until relieved.46

The movement would kick off on either a coordinated signal

with the Red Army advance (the preferred method), or as a

response to German military occupation of Slovakia, which

to that date had been left largely unmolested by the Nazis.47

Despite the planning, the rapid pace of events in August

1944 would soon force the SNC’s hand.

Events beyond the control of the SNC, rather than coordination with the Red Army, triggered the start of the uprising. The Soviet Union, in advance of its main force attack

of the summer, had begun fomenting a partisan movement

under its control in Slovakia, which forced the Tiso government to appeal to Germany for assistance, resulting in German occupation of Slovakia beginning on 29 August 1944.48

This was the first indication of the command and control

problems that would plague the uprising throughout, as

the SNC and Golian tried desperately but unsuccessfully

to slow the partisan operations by communicating to Moscow via the exile government in London.49 Presented with a

02-Judge.indd 8 7/30/08 6:58:42 
fait accompli, Golian declared the uprising at 2000 hours

on 29 August, calling for the mobilization of the reservist

classes of 1938–39.50 Questions remain about how much of

this poor coordination and communication was the fog and

friction of war, and how much was deliberate obfuscation

by the Soviets.

The initial breakdown of strength inside Slovakia showed

18,000 army troops with the uprising, 9,000 remaining

loyal to the Tiso government, and 29,000 reservists joining the revolt, while the higher estimates claim the partisan movement boasted between 18,000–26,000 members

of varying nationalities including Czech, Slovaks, Russians,

Ukrainians, Poles, Yugoslavs, Jews, and even Frenchmen.51

The uncoordinated start of the uprising, due to the partisan

activities, resulted in confusion that allowed the Germans

to capture and disarm the two eastern field divisions of the

Slovak Army slated to hold the Carpathian passes for the

Red Army.52 It also resulted in the loss of crucial supplies

in Kvetnica, including 40 million rounds of ammunition,

62,000 artillery rounds, 112,000 grenades, 181 heavy machine guns, and 632 light machine guns.53 On balance, the

rebellious Slovaks initially edged the Germans and Tiso loyalists in numbers, but they faced an enemy who benefited

from superior training and weaponry.

Despite this inauspicious start, Golian’s forces managed

to seize a portion of Slovakia and fought gallantly to hold

it while waiting for Allied, especially Soviet, support. The

loss of the two divisions in eastern Slovakia combined with

the steadfast loyalty of Slovak garrisons to Tiso in western Slovakia confined the insurgency to the middle of the

country.54 The insurgents consolidated their forces in and

around the Hron Valley, hoping to keep the Germans out

of the strategic triangle of Brezno–Banská Bystrica–Zvolen,

with Banská Bystrica as the nominal rebel capital.55 After

the initial and confusing opening of hostilities, the mountainous terrain of central Slovakia dictated the character

of combat, forcing brigade-sized conventional engagements

for control of key passages in strategic river valleys, such as

the Váh.56 Meanwhile, as the fighting raged, conditions in

the insurgent territory resumed a surreal sort of normalcy,

as the trains ran on time, five newspapers continued print02-Judge.indd 9 7/30/08 6:58:42 
10

ing, and the rebel government collected taxes.57 Hope for

success now rested on Allied reaction.

Questions concerning Allied support for the uprising,

both from the West and the Soviet Union, remain the most

contentious issues surrounding the Slovak National Uprising to this day. The original SNC plan relied heavily on

Soviet support. Many Slovaks feel that help never arrived

because the Soviets intentionally withheld it. Alexander

Dubček, future leader of communist Czechoslovakia and

an active partisan during the revolt, put the blame for poor

coordination and a lack of support squarely on the Soviets

who, in his view “were simply not interested in such coordination” for political reasons.58 Dubček goes on to fault the

Soviets for belatedly launching an offensive into Slovakia,

one week too late to save the two Slovak divisions disarmed

by the Germans only 30 miles from the Russian front.59 In

contrast, the Red Army delivered lavish supplies to Slovakia to sustain the Soviet-run partisan movement, not the

native SNC and its troops who operated independently of

Moscow.60 Even the substantial Soviet contribution of the

Red Army–trained Czechoslovak Parachute Brigade, flown

into Tri Duby airfield in late September and early October,

is derided as too little too late.61

The lack of large-scale aid from the West is generally

forgiven or overlooked. Many blame Western failures, once

again, on the duplicity of Stalin who severely limited the

West’s freedom of action in or near its zones of operation.62

As early as the beginning of October, the insurgents saw

the undeniable parallels to Warsaw and made frequent

analogies to the Polish situation when pleading for Allied

support.63 Many in the SNC and those sympathetic to the

uprising believed the United States to be a champion of democracy and a source of hope. They more readily yielded the

benefit of the doubt to the West and the United States than

they did to the Soviets.64 Regardless of who was to blame,

the lack of weapons and supplies was only one problem

faced by the insurrectionists.

The plethora of actors involved in the Slovak uprising

also resulted in political divisions that hampered command

and control and unity of purpose throughout the course of

the uprising and thereby left plenty of room for postconflict

recriminations. The internal forces involved in Slovakia in02-Judge.indd 10 7/30/08 6:58:42 
11

cluded the SNC, with its communist and noncommunist

elements, the Moscow-directed partisans, and the supporters of Tiso and Slovak nationalism. Externally, Beneš competed with Stalin and Tiso for influence and legitimacy. The

uprising’s Slovak commanders were never able to control,

and could only marginally influence, the operations of the

Soviet partisans who took their orders from partisan headquarters in Kiev, Ukraine.65 Dubček confirms this, stating,

“This divided chain of command later posed very serious

problems.”66 Some also claim that there was extreme internal dissent within Slovakia, as the majority of the Slovak

population never supported the rebellion and were loyal to

Tiso and his Slovak government until the end of the war.67

Dubček expounds upon the external factors at play between

Beneš and Stalin, saying that in the Czechoslovak–Soviet

Alliance Treaty signed around the same time as the Christmas Agreement of 1943 Beneš effectively delivered Czechoslovakia to the Soviet sphere of influence by subordinating

its external policies to Moscow.68 Ultimately, these divisions

and the political intrigue they entailed ceded the initiative

to the Germans and proved disastrous for the Slovak National Uprising.

The German view of the event is generally more straightforward than that of the Slovaks or Soviets. The war had

stretched the Nazis thin and left them with limited resources in the area, but they were certainly not caught unaware in Slovakia. Many of the ethnic German population

of Slovakia, including those who were soldiers in its army,

had previously been mobilized or transferred for employment in Hitler’s Schutzstaffel (SS, meaning Protective

Echelon). The resulting absence of a German fifth column in the Slovak army aided the elaborate Slovak planning and stockpiling prior to the revolt.69 Nevertheless, the

Germans maintained good enough intelligence in Bratislava

and in each Slovak Army division to realize that something

was in the works.70 Following the defection of another key

ally, Romania, on 24 August 1944, German Army Group

North Ukraine prepared a plan for Operation Potato Harvest (Fall Kartoffelernte) to disarm and intern the East

Slovak Army Corps.71 The Germans had good reason to

be concerned.

02-Judge.indd 11 7/30/08 6:58:42 
12

The German goals in relation to the uprising stemmed

from Slovakia’s strategic geographic position in Central Europe. The switching of sides by Romania, followed by the

Slovak revolt, threatened to encourage a similar movement

in neighboring Hungary, something the Germans desperately wanted to avoid.72 They also recognized the Slovak

situation was, according to Gerald Reitlinger, a “much

more dangerous situation than Warsaw, because the rebellion cut off the retreat of the routed German Eighth Army

in Galicia.”73 The immediate goals of intervention included

stabilizing the situation in the industrial regions of Slovakia

and propping up the Tiso government with 10,000–15,000

men for about one week.74 This indicates they did not think

the fight to secure Slovakia would be very difficult. They

were wrong.

The initial German reaction was swift and effective. Following Tiso’s appeal for help in combating the growing partisan threat, the Germans ordered several ad hoc SS units

including Kampfgruppe (KG or battle group) Schill and KG

Wittensmeier, as well as two better-organized units: the SS

Horst Wessel Division, and the SS 18th Freewillig Panzer

Grenadier Regiment into Slovakia.75 Reichsführer (Equivalent to field marshal and leader of the SS) Heinrich Himmler

took control of the operation and appointed SS Obergruppenführer (lieutenant general equivalent) Gottlob Berger as

commander.76 Berger viewed this as a simple police action,

which would take no more than four days.77 Because of the

confusion the premature partisan triggering of the uprising

caused, the Germans rapidly disarmed the Eastern Slovak

Army Corps, removing the two best Slovak divisions, consisting of 24,000 of its finest troops, from the fight.78 Despite their ad hoc composition, the German units retained

a strong advantage in training and experience over their

Slovak opponents, consistently defeating the larger but

poorly armed foe.79 The large scale of the rising, however,

frustrated the German attempts to quell it quickly. Himmler

reacted by appointing a new and more operationally focused

SS commander, Herman Höffle, in late September and by

increasing the troop commitment to seven divisions, with a

total of nearly 45,000 troops with armor, artillery, and air

support.80 By early October, the Germans had assembled

the resources needed to crack the uprising’s defensive pe02-Judge.indd 12 7/30/08 6:58:43 
13

rimeter in the center of the country, and they put them to

good use.

German conduct during the suppression of the revolt

stemmed from Nazi ideology and its explanation of the nature of partisan warfare. Slovakia, as late as the summer of

1944, had been a quiet backwater where German children

vacationed without raising any special concern.81 Hitler

viewed the uprising through his typically anti-Semitic lens:

But the matter went deeper. Why had a country, not as yet menaced

with Russian occupation, welcomed British-trained parachutists?

And why had part of the army been willing to go over to the enemy?

For Hitler there could only be one answer. In Slovakia the Jews had

been allowed to survive. In March 1942 Slovakia had set a good

example to other satellite countries by deporting her own Jews to

Poland. But later in that year, when fifty-six thousand had been

sent, it was discovered that resettlement in Poland meant the gas

chambers of Auschwitz, Treblinka, Belsec, and Sobibor. Henceforward, under cover of a complicated codex of laws, thirty-five thousand Jews had remained in the country.82

This ideological sentiment ensured the remaining Jews

would suffer heavily during the suppression. Brutal partisan fighting also enraged and motivated the Germans. Most

of the partisan activity occurred under the supervision of

the Soviets, who had let loose a reign of terror specifically

targeting the ethnic German population.83 Although the

SNC and Golian waged an essentially conventional campaign during the uprising, Slovaks would pay for the

Soviet-directed partisan excesses and suffer the reprisals

of the SS who began a series of mass executions in the region.84 The now stereotypical acts of Nazi brutality became

commonplace.

The Soviet accounts and perspectives of the Slovak National Uprising follow a party-line construct. The Soviets

recognized the strategic position of Slovakia in Europe

and the lack of German forces in the country and began

to plan accordingly.85 They, like the Nazis, were aware that

something was in the works in Slovakia through their own

communist contacts in the resistance movement.86 Independent of the internal Slovak resistance, Moscow pressed

ahead with its own vision for operations in Czechoslovakia,

which included the use of large-scale partisan warfare directed from Kiev, and the employment of Red Army trained

Czechoslovak units during the nation’s liberation from the

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14

fascist grip.87 When the Slovaks did send a mission to try

to coordinate with the Red Army, the Soviets found the

proposed plan for a linkup through the Carpathians wishful thinking rather than actual capability, and rejected the

conventional plan in favor of the popular uprising they believed their partisan struggle would ignite.88 Additionally,

the Soviets viewed the Beneš government’s request for a

Soviet timetable of operations with great suspicion, refusing to disclose their operational plans to the “bourgeois”

body.89 Naturally, Soviet planning and secrecy were in line

with its own goals in the region.

Those goals contradicted the German aims, obviously,

but also conflicted with the aims of Beneš and even the

majority of the Slovaks themselves. Repeatedly the Soviets

fault the planners of the rebellion for not considering an

“uprising of the masses,” but instead focusing on their own

interests in the political realm: “all the representatives of the

Beneš government had invariably striven (covertly) to prevent the Czechoslovak antifascist movement from breaking

out on a large scale. Beneš and the members of his cabinet

were far-seeing, experienced people who realized very well

that the activation of the people’s forces meant a great class

danger for a bourgeois republic.”90 Stalin wanted a “social

revolution” aided by the great socialist power, the Soviet

Union, not a victory for the exiled regime: “To allow the

proponents of the ‘London Concept’ to triumph without any

challenge would have been foolish and pointless political

benevolence. Once a Soviet-controlled partisan movement

was entrenched on Slovak territory there was an instrument in being to ‘activate’ the struggle, to place the leadership of this fight firmly in the hands of the ‘progressives’

and to preempt the bourgeois nationalists by precipitating

revolt.”91 “Political benevolence” not being Stalin’s strongest

suit, the Soviets behaved accordingly during the uprising.

The Soviets’ initial primary focus in Slovakia was on

the operations of its partisans, which forced the premature launching of the general uprising by provoking German intervention. The Russians had been building up their

partisan strength in the region since the first group of 11 

men, commanded by P. A. Velichko, was parachuted into

the area near Ružomberok on 20 July 1944.92 The official

Soviet version of events states that by August of 1944 Red

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Army successes left no doubt about the outcome of the war,

stirring up “an underground struggle by the Slovak people

against fascism.”93 Once fighting broke out, the Soviet regime determined, as an ally, it had an obligation to support

the Slovaks as a “manifestation of proletarian internationalism.”94 The predominant amount of support was delivered

to the partisans, not the organized Slovak resistance, via

nightly flights into the area delivering millions of bullets,

thousands of rifles and machine guns, and hundreds of

antitank weapons.95 While this partisan struggle raged, the

Soviets did attempt to establish contact with those Slovak

forces engaged against the Germans via a hastily organized

offensive through the Carpathian mountain passes.

Conventional Red Army forces were relatively close to the

Slovak border in late August 1944. After the completion

of the massive Operation Bagration (Oперация Багратион) offensive in the summer, the front stabilized on the far side

of the Carpathians, 50 kilometers from the northeastern

Slovakian frontier.96 According to the Soviet claims (which

are not without some justification), their forces were worn

down and under strength from the summer combat and

had recently stood down to a defensive posture.97 Despite

their condition, the units under the command of Marshal

Ivan Koniev in the 1st and the 4th Ukrainian Fronts (army

group equivalents), supported by the Soviet-trained 1st

Czechoslovak Corps, were ordered to launch an offensive

at the outbreak of the uprising through the mountains to

try and reach the rebels.98 Lack of communication with the

resistance organizers reared its ugly head here once again.

The Soviets still expected support from the Eastern Slovak

Army Corps, not knowing it had already been disarmed.99

S. M. Shtemenko’s account calls the failure of these Slovak divisions an act of treason, incorrectly accusing the

unit’s commander, Gen August Malar, of going over to the

Germans.100 The Soviet offensive faced difficult terrain and

strengthened German defenses, but still made some substantial initial progress, including a 40-kilometer advance

by 14 September, before its advanced units were cut off

and stalled by German reaction.101 The pace then slowed

dramatically, and it was not until 6 October that the 1st

Czechoslovak Corps seized the Dukla Pass from the Germans and entered its own country from the east.102 These

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efforts yielded little immediate results, as the previous failure of the Eastern Slovak Army Corps to hold its position

meant the forces under Koniev, despite their advances, were

still far from the uprising confined in central Slovakia.

October 1944 saw the Germans fully regain the initiative and suppress the revolt. They had been grinding away

at the Slovaks throughout September, making slow but

steady gains, with KG Schill demonstrating excellent tactical prowess.103 The forces facing each other in mid October

consisted of nearly 36,000 Slovaks in the organized force,

of which about 9,000 had no personal equipment, and approximately 48,000 German troops of varying quality, age,

and health.104 Each side received a small measure of air

support. The Germans enjoyed excellent results from Stuka

dive-bombing attacks.105 The Slovaks benefited with a brief

spate of support from the 1st Czechoslovak Fighter Regiment that arrived at Tri Duby airfield from the Soviet Union,

an episode that deserves further investigation.106 Nonetheless, throughout the month of October, the insurgents were

forced on the defensive until the Germans launched their

final effort. The offensive began on 17 October, when 35,000

troops pushed up from the south out of Hungary facilitated

by that country’s regime change.107 The unreliability of the

Soviet-controlled partisan groups, who frequently failed at

their assigned missions or simply vanished from the field

of battle leaving other units exposed to the enemy, handicapped efforts to resist the German advance.108 Banská

Bystrica, the nominal capital of the resistance forces, fell

to the Germans 10 days later.109 While the fighting raged

in the center of Slovakia, the Soviet efforts in the east were

falling short as well.

The Soviet offensive was unable to generate any momentum following the capture of the Dukla Pass. Further gains

eluded the Soviets, despite continued fighting in the mountainous area, until late November.110 The offensive into Slovakia cost the Soviet Union 80,000 casualties, 20,000 of

which were killed, while the 1st Czechoslovak Corps itself

had 6,500 dead and was ground down to half strength.111

These numbers are proof positive that the Soviets made a

serious effort to force the mountains. On 28 October, facing

a German counteroffensive and realizing the failure of the

Red Army to progress any further, Gen Rudolf Viest, who

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had succeeded Golian as military commander of the uprising, accepted defeat. Viest did not formally surrender, but

ordered the remaining insurgents to head for the mountains to revert to partisan warfare, which would continue

until the end of the war.112 Organized Slovak resistance had

collapsed after two long, hard months of fighting.

The Slovak National Uprising had failed to liberate the

country for a number of reasons. The uprising was triggered

prematurely, and the Slovak forces were not yet totally prepared for the fight. This resulted in the immediate loss

of its two best fighting units, and the state of training and

armament of the remaining insurgents was low.113 Divided

and competing chains of command further diluted the efforts

of the organized insurgents and the partisans, allowing the

superior operational prowess of the Germans to decide the

issue.114 The final major contributor to Slovak failure was

the stark lack of outside support.115 The preceding failures

made this need for support all the more important. Even

though the uprising failed in its most ambitious goal of liberating the country, it produced some significant political

and military effects.

The uprising ended up benefiting each of the key players

to some degree. Beneš and the Czechoslovak government in

exile received some pro-Allied activity to boost their influence at the end of the war.116 The Germans secured their

last clear-cut success of the war and managed to stabilize the Eastern Front and blunt a Soviet push into central

Europe.117 They remained in place until April 1945. Militarily,

the uprising only marginally affected German war efforts, and

those Slovak manufacturing plants under German control

continued war production in support of the Reich throughout the entire period of the rebellion.118 The Soviets saw

the influence of the Communist movement in Slovakia

strengthened vis-à-vis their “bourgeois” opponents.119 The

Slovaks garnered their own pro-Allied credentials, which

averted potential postwar treatment as a defeated nation,

and they could take pride in the fact that it was almost

entirely a Slovak affair, despite Beneš’ efforts to paint it

otherwise.120

None of these benefits came without a cost. The numbers of casualties for the uprising are difficult to establish with any degree of accuracy. Conservative estimates

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of Slovak losses for the uprising amount to 1,700 killed,

580 missing, and 3,600 wounded, but there are plausible

estimates that claim 2,500–3,000 dead, and 5,000–6,000

wounded for the two months of active combat.121 On 30 October, the Germans collected 10,000 prisoners of war in the

Bystrica–Zvolen–Donovaly area and shipped them to Germany for use as forced labor.122 German losses in fighting

the Slovaks are in the neighborhood of 3,000 men killed,

wounded, or missing.123 Soviet losses on the Eastern Front

in and around the Carpathian passes have already been

described.

The uprising proved disastrous for the ethnic German

population in Slovakia. Partisan bands played particular

havoc with these Slovaks of German descent. Large-scale

killings were commonplace: 30 civilians killed in DeutschProben, 70 murdered in Hochwies-Paulisch, 130 killed in

Krickerhau, another 187 slaughtered in Glaserhau, 143

killed in Rosenberg, and so on.124 The partisans were even bold

enough to massacre 150 “German” civilians who were assisting the Slovak insurgents with construction of defensive positions, which then brought retribution by the

Slovak military, who executed the murderers.125 Himmler, ever

protective of German blood, ordered the evacuation of the

ethnic German population from central and eastern Slovakia in November 1944, while many of the rest fled from the

Russian advance. This left only 5,000 ethnic Germans of a

once-thriving population in Slovakia by 1950.126 The brutal partisan activity against the Slovak Germans brought

fear of reprisals from the Nazi security forces.127 These fears

proved to be well founded.

The Germans had terror on their mind from the beginning of their intervention, and they continued their persecutions well after organized resistance had ceased.

There is no clearer indication of Nazi intent than the public declaration in early September 1944. They promised to

exact a “two-thousand-fold revenge” against anyone who

harmed a German in Slovakia, and the Slovak insurgents

were labeled “murderers and bandits.”128 The brutality began

almost immediately as the German troops, aided by the Tiso

government’s loyal Hlinka Guard, plundered livestock and

equipment for their own needs and torched scores of Slovak communities.129 The fear of the local populations

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was palpable. This fear limited assistance to the Slovak

army as ordinary citizens learned the Germans were murdering entire families and burning down the homes of anyone

caught sympathizing with the rebels.130 Following their brutal suppression of the Warsaw uprising, the infamous

SS Sturmbrigade Dirlewanger arrived to assist with the

suppression, using its notorious “medieval methods” against

the Slovaks.131 Once the conventional fighting culminated

and then subsided into partisan warfare, the German efforts at repression became more furious. They followed the

standard Nazi program by employing Einsatzgruppen (special

action units) infamous for their early role in extermination

of Soviet Jews and Commissars. The Germans established five units under Einsatzgruppe H in Slovakia which,

in the six weeks before 9 December, reported 18,947 people captured including 9,653 Jews, 3,409 “bandits,” 2,186

deserters, and 714 others “who offered resistance.”132 “Special

treatment,” better known as immediate execution was administered to 2,257 victims, while 10,000 others, mostly

Jews, were sent into concentration camps.133 The numbers

above indicate an undeniable truth: the Jews were once

again a favorite target of the Nazis.

The outcome of the Slovak National Uprising would write

the tragic final chapter in the forlorn story of Slovakia’s

Jews. As previously stated, Slovakia’s Jews had under-gone

significant persecution under the Tiso regime, including

the mass deportation of 56,000 people. Yet the deportations had stopped, once the Slovaks learned the Jews were

being executed, leaving between 20,000–35,000 Jews incountry at the time of the uprising.134 The Germans forced

the resumption of deportations on 30 September 1944,

with the last train departing as late as 31 March 1945.135

During the uprising itself, the Germans summarily executed

any Jew caught in the area of the fighting.136 The purge was

so thorough that by the end of the war only six out of an

original 180 rabbis survived, and there was no significant

Jewish population remaining.137 The Nazis had concluded

their postscript to the history of the Slovak National Uprising with a bloody exclamation point.

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Political Obscurity and the Tides of History

The failure of the uprising, in concert with the political

climate of the Cold War, colored the historical coverage of

this remarkable rebellion. Stanislav Kirschbaum notes the

steady subordination of the Slovaks to the Czechs in the late

1940s resulted in the willful distortion, by the Communists

in the 1950s, of the objectives and the historical record of

the uprising.138 Divisions existed even among the Communists themselves; the Czechoslovak Communist Party and

the CPS vied for postwar power, while the Communist Party

of the Soviet Union sought to expand its own international

influence. The Czech communists went so far as to accuse

many of those Slovak communists involved in the uprising of being “bourgeois elements” and “deviationists,” more

interested in nationalism than socialism.139 This competition between these three Communist parties is yet another

aspect of the Slovak story that deserves more study. The

political thaw that followed the federation of Czechoslovakia in the late 1960s saw the beginning of more accurate

coverage of the uprising, only to see it lost again in the subsequent repression after 1968.140 Alexander Dubček, the

partisan veteran and communist leader, claimed something

of an epiphany when he realized “that of the many officially

sanctioned books and studies published in the past about

the uprising, only a few were more than propaganda.”141

Discerning the full truth about the Slovak National Uprising is extremely difficult, at best, and requires proper consideration of the differing viewpoints and the motivations of

each of their protagonists.

Western accounts of World War II have virtually ignored

the Slovak National Uprising for a number of reasons. Embarrassment at the treatment of Czechoslovakia with appeasement and the Munich Agreement in 1938, and then

failure to hold Germany to that same agreement in March

1939, which led to the creation of bastard Slovakia, has

played a role.142 Additionally, both Britain and the Unites

States played only a minor role in the uprising. They were

largely bystanders looking in from the outside, powerless to

do anything. The British had deliberately limited aid, with

their Special Operations Executive restricted to sabotage

and guerrilla activities, not major uprisings.143 The Ameri02-Judge.indd 20 7/30/08 6:58:44 
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cans and the British tried to support the uprising with very

small, secret military missions that resulted in the capture

and execution of 17 of their agents.144 These covert missions

focused their efforts on the Tri Duby airfield near Banská

Bystrica and managed to fly out dozens of downed Allied

airmen, while flying in military and medical supplies for

the insurgents.145 In a way, the Western countries tried to

exonerate themselves by blaming the Soviet Union for prohibiting them from assisting the Slovaks and denying them

operational freedom in the area.146 In truth, US and British priorities were elsewhere. Operation Market Garden’s

launch and subsequent failure in mid September 1944,

the 20 October 1944 surrender of Aachen, the first large

German city to be captured, and the Warsaw uprising all

garnered more attention. Since then these efforts have enjoyed extensive coverage in Western media, overshadowing

the events in Slovakia.147 This lack of exposure in the West

contrasts sharply with the accounts from the Soviets and

Communists.

The Soviets, ever mindful of the value of propaganda,

worked diligently to present their view of the uprising as

the true history and in so doing to further their own political aims in Europe. The orthodox view portrayed the Soviet

Union as a strong and willing ally of the Czechoslovak people, which was ready to help when the government in exile requested assistance.148 Their version of history makes

no mention that partisan activity prematurely triggered

the uprising, but implies that Hitler just decided to occupy

Slovakia according to his own timetable.149 Communist accounts try to claim leadership in the struggle by inaccurately portraying the SNC as a Communist construct, calling it a “people’s front” fighting the Nazis, ignoring the true,

even representation of communists and noncommunists in

the body.150 Red accounts aim to paint a vivid picture of

Communist resolve and glory: “At the most trying moments

the insurgents—especially the Communists—courageously

looked danger in the eye and went on fighting hard. They

knew that the Red Army was hurrying to relieve them, so

they held out to the last.”151Given such resolve, failure of

the uprising had to be attributed to Beneš, his officers, and

the Slovak bourgeoisie who conspired against the “people’s”

revolt.152 Soviet writers also made sure to fault the West,

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in general, for its paltry amount of aid given, while claiming to have granted the insurgents extensive help.153 Lastly,

to ensure their version of events was accepted, the Soviets

rounded up and arrested those Slovaks, even many of the

communists, involved in the uprising and placed individuals that were more “reliable” in their stead following the end

of the war.154 While the Soviets were able to provide a unified, if distorted, account of the uprising, the Czechs’ views

on the affair are slightly more complex.

Two basic Czech views of the situation prevail: the version

of the Beneš government and noncommunists and the postwar version of events proffered by the communist regime.

The Beneš government in exile desperately needed to portray

this revolution as their own, and attempted to lay claim to

inspiring and organizing it for the Slovaks, who needed to

atone for their sin of independence.155 One simple statistic

refutes this claim: only about 1,000 Czechs participated in

the rising.156 The Beneš government was also keenly aware

of the accusations made against the Soviet Union in the Warsaw uprising and saw the same duplicity and hence reasons

for failure in Slovakia.157 Ultimately, Beneš laid the failure of

the Allies to provide support on the results of the Teheran

Conference in late 1943, which yielded up Czechoslovakia to

the Soviet sphere of influence.158

The Czech communists who came to power in the postwar period held a slightly different position. Those communists involved in the revolt were small in number and

did not receive prominent appointments in the government

because they drew Soviet suspicions.159 Those who were in

power endeavored to paint the uprising as a Communist

ventur, while at the same time portraying the democratic

groups as having collaborated with the Nazis.160 They focused their efforts on the prominent democratic patriots

who opposed them politically and tried to extort others into

making signed statements defaming the enemies of Communism.161 In their efforts to bolster the Communist image, they attempted to switch the blame for the murder

of many of the ethnic German population to the German

SS.162 These efforts seem to have convinced many ordinary

Czechoslovaks who believed the uprising failed simply because of the vagaries of war and saw the Communists as

the primary victors over Germany.163 The complexity of the

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Czech viewpoint is replicated to an even greater degree in

the Slovak position.

The Slovak National Uprising represents many different

things to many different Slovaks. It should come as no surprise that internal disputes often yield the most vociferous

reactions and create deep wounds. The uprising “became

the object of many conflicting interpretations, not only by

those who condemn it and those who justify it, but also by

those who led it.”164 Those who opposed the uprising did

not see the event as liberation from fascism, but instead

viewed it as a betrayal of Slovak independence and a return

to subordination under the Czechs.165 Those that supported

the uprising claim that an overwhelming number of Slovaks

opposed the creation of Tiso’s independent state, viewing

the separatist movement as treasonous to the Czechoslovak state.166 They also view the uprising as part of a central

European, noncommunist democratic revolution, comparing it to the movements of Dragoljub Mihailović in Yugoslavia and Bor-Komorowski (Gen Count Tadeusz Komorowski)

in Poland.167 The prosecution of Slovak “collaborators” after

the war, only served to deepen the divide between these

groups. “People’s courts” tried Tiso and over 20,000 others, finding over 8,000 guilty of collaboration.168 Further

division between the Catholics, who were more likely to

have supported Tiso, and the Protestants, who favored

Czechoslovakia, occurred as the result of the internment of

10,000–20,000 of the former in the Soviet Union following

the war.169 Many Slovaks, and the Beneš government, saw

duplicity and treachery in the Soviet handling of the affair

and drew parallels to Warsaw.170 The debate continued even

after the war, as many remembered the short-lived period of

independence and relative prosperity as a positive legacy.171

Reverberations of these divisions are felt even today. The

62nd anniversary celebration of the 1944 Slovak National

Uprising was disrupted by a group of protestors from the

Slovenska Pospolitost (Slovak Community), which supports

Tiso’s legacy and derides the uprising anniversary celebration as a “festival of traitors.”172 Clearly, there remains in

Slovakia a deep-seated divide over the interpretation of this

historical event.

Despite the complexity and variance of views towards

the uprising, proper analysis can cut through the political

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24

haze to clarify some of the contentious aspects of the revolt.

Comparisons with the Warsaw uprising on both the politics involved and the atrocities committed are useful, but

only to a limited degree. Stalin was nothing if not a shrewd

politician, and there can be no doubt he was carefully maneuvering to ensure Soviet influence in Czechoslovakia, but

unlike in Poland, the Red Army did attempt a hasty offensive to reach the insurgents. In fact, the Red Army lost four

times as many men attempting to force the Carpathians as

they did on the approaches to Warsaw during the Polish

revolt.173 Reasons for this difference are unclear, but it may

be that the Russians believed they had a fleeting opportunity to seize passes through difficult geographic terrain

with the help of the insurgents, rather than having to fight

for it later under more challenging circumstances. It may

also be attributable to the well-known animosity that existed between the Poles and Russians in general, and Stalin and the exiled Polish regime at that time. Additionally,

although German reprisals against the Slovaks mimicked

the brutality against the Poles, they seem to be on a much

smaller scale. The figures for Warsaw are generally accepted as 200,000 civilians killed due to the uprising there,

while the previously cited, though undoubtedly incomplete,

Slovak figures fail to approach this level.174 Nor can all the

atrocities be attributed to the Nazis, much to Communist

chagrin, as partisan vengeance against Slovak Germans

has already been demonstrated. In laymen’s terms, the

Warsaw and Slovak uprisings may be siblings, but they are

certainly not twins.

The overarching reason for failure was the lack of a clear,

unified command, or at least unity of effort. The divergent

political aims of the SNC, the Beneš exile government, and

the Soviet Union prevented them from ever being able to

establish a single coordinated plan and thereby employ

their forces and resources in concert to greater effect. In

Slovakia, the insurgents had their own chain of command

which was working with the SNC and the exile government,

while the partisans answered to Moscow and, for all intents and purposes, ran their own independent operations.

Moscow would not subordinate its partisans to Beneš, and

his government refused to subordinate the Slovak army to

the Soviets. The mutual lack of trust was valid in that they

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25

all had different aims, but it proved fatal to each of their

efforts. Blame must be shared equally, as none of the key

participants were able to compromise effectively enough to

fight the mutual Nazi enemy.

Despite claims otherwise, the Slovak National Uprising was predominantly Slovak and democratic, not Czech,

Soviet, or Communist. The Beneš government was able to

portray the uprising as its own because the Allies had recognized it as the legitimate representative of the Czechs

and Slovaks. It was precisely this recognition, however, that

forced the Slovaks to work through Beneš because they had

no other means of communicating with the Allies. By slight

of hand, it appeared that the Czech government was indeed

running the show. The numbers speak for themselves, and

Czechs, as previously mentioned, did not make up a large

contingent of combatants during the revolt. Similarly, Communist attempts to take credit for leading the uprising and

conducting the larger share of fighting are patently false.

The Slovak army bore the main burden of combat throughout the rising.175 It is the unfortunate fate of the Slovaks

that history and politics cloud these facts.

The ongoing internal recriminations among the Slovaks

themselves are as unfortunate as they are inevitable. Taken

from an outsider’s perspective and leaving the debate about

the morality of the Tiso regime aside, one can see Slovak

patriots on both sides of this issue. The idealists among

the Slovak separatists naturally find the attempt to overthrow Slovakia’s first independent government abhorrent.

When looking at it from their perspective, one must remember that the German army did not occupy Slovakia

until the partisans triggered the intervention. These people

found being a relatively unmolested, but subservient, ally

to Germany preferable to complete political subordination

in a unified Czechoslovak state. The realists inside Slovakia

could see the writing on the wall and recognized Slovakia’s

best interests lay with switching to the Allied side before the

war was over. They viewed reincorporation into Czechoslovakia as inevitable and decided it would be better for their

tiny nation to avoid treatment as a defeated member of the

Axis alliance. Thus motivated, they decided to act. Regardless of these two views, the uprising had serious political

consequences for the Slovaks.

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26

The bottom line for the Slovak people, despite the shortterm gain of averting treatment as a conquered nation,

was long-term political weakness, which would cost them

during the Cold War. The uprising effectively ended Slovak

statehood by destroying the link between Tiso and the people and turning Slovakia into an occupied German puppet state without even the pretense of independence.176 The

failure of the uprising also weakened the Slovaks’ claim to

more autonomy and equality in the recreated Czechoslovak

state, as the Soviets, the Beneš government, and internal

Communist leaders all preferred a more centralized political

system emanating from Prague.177 The Communist Party of

Czechoslovakia was able to leverage Czech fears of renewed

Slovak separatism to its own benefit, and seized power in

1948. The Slovaks, who to the last voted against communism at a rate of two to one, now found themselves subordinate to the Czechs once again, and this time it would be

under a communist regime.178 It would remain so until the

now famous Velvet Divorce in 1993.

Conclusion

The true story of the Slovak National Uprising of 1944 can

only now be revealed. The passage of time and end of the

Cold War allow closer inspection of the different viewpoints

of this revolt and help wipe away some of the murkiness of

the political milieu that surrounds it. The unique history

of Slovakia, wedded to the tumultuous European political

scene of the late 1930s, resulted in the creation of an independent Slovakia closely allied to Nazi Germany. This move

toward independence and the close ties to Germany created great internal and external turmoil for the tiny new

state. Dramatic changes in the 1944 war situation provided

a fleeting opportunity for those internal and external actors

who opposed the Slovak government to rise up and redress

their grievances. The uprising forced three key participants

including the Slovaks, Germans, and Soviets into action.

Each of these players had their own plans and goals for the

uprising, which guided their actions therein and produced

independent and sometimes conflicting accounts of what

really happened during the fateful event. Two months of

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27

hard fighting ended in the collapse of organized resistance

in Slovakia with dire consequences for the Slovak Jewish

and ethnic German populations, while yielding only limited short-term political gains for the Slovaks. Following the

failure of the uprising and the end of the war, political maneuvering, influenced heavily by Cold War politics, yielded

accusations and countercharges between East and West, as

well as internally in Czechoslovakia and among the Slovak

people. These debates and disagreements further obfuscated the issues and actual history surrounding the revolt,

sending it into obscurity, particularly in Western accounts

of World War II. A disciplined analysis of each of these postwar accounts reveals some undeniable truths about the

uprising and paints a much clearer picture of many of the

more hotly contested aspects of the tragic event. It is time

to set the historical record straight.

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate

entry in the bibliography.)

1. DiNardo, Germany and the Axis Powers. DiNardo covers the collapse

or defection of numerous Axis nations including Italy, Finland, Romania,

and Hungary in his chapter 9. He moves directly from Romania’s defection in August 1944 to address that of Hungary, declaring Hungary “the

last German ally to be dealt with” on page 188. Omission of Slovakia from

a book specifically about Germany’s allies indicates just how much this

tiny nation has been, and still is, overlooked by Western histories of World

War II.

2. Kirschbaum, History of Slovakia, 142.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., 150–51.

5. Ibid., 151–52.

6. Ibid., 158.

7. Ibid., 155–57.

8. Ibid., 175.

9. Ibid., 161.

10. Downs, World War II, 23.

11. Kirschbaum, History of Slovakia, 181.

12. Beneš, Memoirs, 50–51.

13. Kirschbaum, History of Slovakia, 182–83.

14. Oddo, Slovakia and Its People, 249.

15. Ibid.

16. Kirschbaum, History of Slovakia, 190.

17. Brown, “The S.O.E.,” 41.

18. Dubček and Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 42.

19. Beneš, Memoirs, 58.

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20. Oddo, Slovakia and Its People, 265.

21. Kirschbaum, History of Slovakia, 209–10.

22. Gilbert, Second World War, 561.

23. Ibid., 531.

24. Keegan, Second World War, 480.

25. Gilbert, Second World War, 544.

26. Keegan, Second World War, 481.

27. Ibid., 482.

28. Gilbert, Second World War, 597.

29. Ibid.

30. Keegan, Second World War, 414.

31. Ibid.

32. Clausewitz, On War, 87.

33. Kirschbaum, History of Slovakia, 206.

34. Dubček and Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 44. This SNC was a different

organization than the Slovak National Council that proposed union with

the Czechs in October 1918, referenced in note 6.

35. Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia, 199.

36. Kirschbaum, History of Slovakia, 191.

37. Erickson, Road to Berlin, 292.

38. Kirschbaum, History of Slovakia, 209.

39. Ibid., 215.

40. Downs, World War II, 24.

41. Axworthy, Axis Slovakia, 254.

42. Ibid.

43. Kliment and Nakladal, Germany’s First Ally, 92.

44. Axworthy, Axis Slovakia, 285.

45. Kliment and Nakladal, Germany’s First Ally, 90.

46. Erickson, Road to Berlin, 294.

47. Dubček and Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 45.

48. Weinberg, World at Arms, 712.

49. Erickson, Road to Berlin, 296.

50. Kliment and Nakladal, Germany’s First Ally, 93.

51. Ibid., 94. These numbers do not include the 24,000 soldiers of the

two eastern divisions who were immediately captured and disarmed by the

Germans, as related further in the paragraph.

52. Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia, 205.

53. Kliment and Nakladal, Germany’s First Ally, 97.

54. Downs, World War II, 30.

55. Axworthy, Axis Slovakia, 272.

56. Ibid., 277–78.

57. Downs, World War II, 103.

58. Dubček and Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 46–47.

59. Ibid., 47.

60. Ibid.

61. Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia, 210.

62. Ibid., 213.

63. Downs, World War II, 67.

64. Ibid., 91.

65. Oddo, Slovakia and Its People, 298.

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66. Dubček and Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 45.

67. Oddo, Slovakia and Its People, 299.

68. Dubček and Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 44.

69. Axworthy, Axis Slovakia, 257.

70. Kliment and Nakladal, Germany’s First Ally, 92.

71. Axworthy, Axis Slovakia, 259.

72. “Slovak Revolt,” New York Times.

73. Reitlinger, SS, 377–78.

74. Kliment and Nakladal, Germany’s First Ally, 93.

75. Hinze, To the Bitter End, 47.

76. Ibid., 43.

77. Axworthy, Axis Slovakia, 272.

78. Hinze, To the Bitter End, 45.

79. Downs, World War II, 51.

80. Erickson, Road to Berlin, 305.

81. Hinze, To the Bitter End, 37.

82. Reitlinger, SS, 378.

83. Hinze, To the Bitter End, 38.

84. Reitlinger, SS, 378.

85. Erickson, Road to Berlin, 295.

86. Downs, World War II, 24.

87. Ibid., 25.

88. Shtemenko, The Last Six Months, 290.

89. Ibid., 295.

90. Ibid., 287.

91. Erickson, Road to Berlin, 295.

92. Ibid., 292.

93. Shtemenko, The Last Six Months, 293.

94. Ibid., 302.

95. Ibid., 318.

96. Axworthy, Axis Slovakia, 256.

97. Shtemenko, Last Six Months, 298–99.

98. Erickson, Road to Berlin, 299–300.

99. Ibid.

100. Shtemenko, Last Six Months, 306.

101. Ibid., 308.

102. Ibid., 312.

103. Hinze, To the Bitter End, 51.

104. Axworthy, Axis Slovakia, 295–96.

105. Ibid., 280.

106. Hinze, To the Bitter End, 49.

107. Kirschbaum, History of Slovakia, 218.

108. Hinze, To the Bitter End, 40.

109. Kirschbaum, History of Slovakia, 218.

110. Dubček and Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 54.

111. Erickson, Road to Berlin, 307.

112. Kliment and Nakladal, Germany’s First Ally, 108.

113. Ibid., 110.

114. Ibid., 111.

115. Hinze, To the Bitter End, 49.

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116. Kirschbaum, History of Slovakia, 219.

117. Axworthy, Axis Slovakia, 307.

118. Ibid., 265.

119. Dubček and Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 48.

120. Axworthy, Axis Slovakia, 308.

121. Ibid.

122. Downs, World War II, 162.

123. Axworthy, Axis Slovakia, 307–8.

124. Downs, World War II, 31.

125. Ibid., 32.

126. Axworthy, Axis Slovakia, 313–16.

127. Downs, World War II, 117.

128. “Railways Held Objective,” New York Times.

129. Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia, 215.

130. Dubček and Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 56.

131. Downs, World War II, 131.

132. Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia, 216.

133. Ibid.

134. Axworthy, Axis Slovakia, 312. Estimates vary. Axworthy claims

20,000, while, as in note 83 above, Reitlinger estimates 35,000.

135. Ibid.

136. Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia, 190.

137. Ibid., 191.

138. Kirschbaum, History of Slovakia, 222.

139. Erickson, Road to Berlin, 306.

140. Kirschbaum, History of Slovakia, 222.

141. Dubček and Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 41.

142. Beneš, Memoirs, 59. For Beneš, the failure of the West to hold

Hitler to the guarantees of the Munich Agreement was a second blatant

betrayal of Czechoslovakia.

143. Downs, World War II, 108.

144. Ibid., 288–89.

145. Ibid., 287.

146. Korbel, Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 71.

147. Gilbert, Second World War, 593, 604.

148. Shtemenko, Last Six Months, 287.

149. Ibid., 298.

150. Ibid., 293–94.

151. Ibid., 318.

152. Toma, “Soviet Strategy,” 290.

153. Korbel, Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 72.

154. Davidson, Nuremberg Fallacy, 231.

155. Kirschbaum, History of Slovakia, 222.

156. Werth, Russia at War, 911.

157. Downs, World War II, 104.

158. Beneš, Memoirs, 252–53.

159. Korbel, Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 167.

160. Ibid., 170.

161. Ibid., 171.

162. Downs, World War II, 32.

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163. Dubček and Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 48–49.

164. Kirschbaum, History of Slovakia, 207.

165. Ibid., 218.

166. Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia, 6.

167. Ibid., 219.

168. Ibid., 229–30.

169. Oddo, Slovakia and Its People, 305.

170. Werth, Russia at War, 911.

171. Dubček and Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 49.

172. “Slovak Extremists Detained,” Czech News Agency.

173. Davies, Rising ‘44, 350.

174. Keegan, The Second World War, 483.

175. Axworthy, Axis Slovakia, 304.

176. Kirschbaum, History of Slovakia, 221.

177. Dubček and Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 48.

178. Korbel, Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 220–21.

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