IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-17-00319-CV

DAWN BENTLEY,

Appellant

v.

CASEY DON SNODGRASS,

Appellee

From the 413th District Court

Johnson County, Texas

Trial Court No. DC-C201500694

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In two issues, appellant, Dawn Bentley, challenges a judgment rendered in favor 

of appellee, Casey Don Snodgrass, involving a motor-vehicle collision. Because we 

overrule both of Bentley’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I. BACKGROUND

This dispute arises out of a motor-vehicle collision between Bentley and Snodgrass 

that occurred on August 28, 2014, at the intersection of Alsbury Boulevard and Spring 
Bentley v. Snodgrass Page 2

Meadows Drive in Burleson, Texas. At the time of the incident, Snodgrass was 

approaching the intersection on Spring Meadows, while Bentley was driving on Alsbury. 

After stopping at the stop sign on Spring Meadows, Snodgrass proceeded into the 

intersection, where his vehicle was broadsided by the vehicle driven by Bentley. Bentley 

characterized Snodgrass’s act of proceeding into the intersection at that time as negligent 

because he did not have the right of way.

Thereafter, Bentley filed suit, alleging that Snodgrass was negligent in pulling 

from the stop sign into the intersection when it was not safe to do so. The case was tried 

to a jury, and at the conclusion of the trial, the jury rendered its verdict in favor of 

Snodgrass, finding that his negligence, if any, did not proximately cause the accident. 

The trial court subsequently entered judgment on the jury’s verdict. Bentley filed a 

motion for new trial, which was denied by the trial court. This appeal followed. 

II. FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In her first issue, Bentley argues that the jury’s finding of no negligence as to 

Snodgrass is factually insufficient because she presented unrebutted evidence, including 

admissions by Snodgrass that he caused the collision by pulling into the intersection 

without having the right of way. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

In a factual-sufficiency challenge, an appellate court must consider the weigh all 

of the evidence. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam). The verdict 
Bentley v. Snodgrass Page 3

should be set aside only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence 

as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Id. We may not pass upon the witnesses’ credibility 

or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder, even if the evidence would support 

a different result. 2900 Smith, Ltd. v. Constellation New Energy, Inc., 301 S.W.3d 741, 746 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.). If we determine the evidence is factually 

insufficient, we must detail the evidence relevant to the issue and state in what regard 

the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence supporting the trial court’s 

judgment; we need not do so when affirming the judgment. Id.

B. Discussion

“It is the plaintiff’s burden to prove specific acts of negligence on the part of the 

driver and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.” Gomez v. Adame, 

940 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ) (citing Smith v. Cent. Freight 

Lines, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied)). The 

mere occurrence of a collision does not establish negligence as a matter of law. Id. (citing 

Smith, 774 S.W.2d at 412 (“The occurrence of an accident or collision is not of itself 

evidence of negligence.”)); see Madara v. Marshall, 578 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tex. Civ. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.). “Whether negligence and proximate cause 

have been proved by a preponderance of the evidence is within the jury’s province to 

determine.” Gomez, 940 S.W.2d at 252 (citing Smith, 774 S.W.2d at 412).
Bentley v. Snodgrass Page 4

Here, Snodgrass testified that, at the time of the collision, he was on his way home 

from an open house at his three-year-old son’s day care. His son was in a booster seat in 

the car at the time. In any event, Snodgrass stopped at a stop sign at the intersection of 

Alsbury and Spring Meadows and waited a long time for traffic to clear. He recalled 

looking both ways numerous times and proceeded into the intersection only when he 

thought it was clear. Snodgrass noted that he did not see Bentley’s vehicle and that he 

would not have entered the intersection had he known a car was coming. Snodgrass 

denied eating, drinking, adjusting the radio, or consuming alcohol at or near the time of 

the accident, and he stated that he was driving with ordinary care when he entered the 

intersection. Snodgrass characterized the incident as “just an accident, not necessarily 

anybody was at fault.”

However, in response to questioning by Bentley’s counsel, Snodgrass admitted 

that this collision would not have occurred if he had not pulled from the stop sign when 

it was unsafe and that his actions were the sole cause of Bentley’s damages and injuries. 

He further acknowledged that he failed to yield the right-of-way to Bentley and that 

Bentley did not do anything wrong to cause or contribute to the collision. And when 

asked who should be financially responsible for the collision, Snodgrass stated the 

following: “I mean, I mean, she hit me so it was my fault because I pulled out when I 

wasn’t supposed to, so, yeah, you would say that I would be responsible for the actions 

that happened or for all that.”
Bentley v. Snodgrass Page 5

Bentley also proffered the testimony of Brian Dixon, an eyewitness to the collision. 

Dixon recounted that he was stopped on Spring Meadows behind Snodgrass. Dixon saw 

Snodgrass pull from the stop sign when it was unsafe and immediately into the path of 

Bentley’s vehicle. Dixon recalled saying at the time of the collision, “From what I could 

see, it looked like she [Bentley] just didn’t have an opportunity to stop.” Dixon did not 

hear tires screeching or a car horn honking, nor could he determine how fast Bentley was 

traveling.

Bentley indicated that she was driving westward on Alsbury while going the 

speed limit and with the flow of traffic. However, on cross-examination, Bentley noted 

that she was driving the speed limit and that she thought the speed limit on Alsbury was 

forty miles per hour, though she conceded that the police report stated that the speed 

limit on Alsbury was actually thirty-five miles per hour. In any event, Bentley was in the 

left lane of the two westbound traffic lanes, and there was no traffic-control device facing 

her as she was driving through the intersection. Bentley then saw Snodgrass pull out in 

front of her, and she “hit [her] brake, and the next thing I know we’re hitting. I hit him.” 

Bentley did not see Snodgrass’s vehicle “until it was too late.” 

In addition to the foregoing, Bentley tendered Plaintiff’s Exhibit 29, which is the 

police report corresponding with the collision. In this report, Burleson Police Officer 

Cody Austin indicated the following:

Unit #1 (Snodgrass) was stopped at the stop sign in the 800 Blk of Spring 

Meadows Dr. Unit # 2 (Bentley) was traveling southwest in the 500 Blk of 
Bentley v. Snodgrass Page 6

NE Alsbury Blvd in the inside lane of traffic. Unit #1 Failed to Yield the 

Right of Way, pulling onto the 500 Blk of NE Alsbury Blvd., to head 

northeast. At this time[,] Unit #2 struck Unit #1 in the left side. 

Despite the aforementioned evidence presented by Bentley, there was credible 

evidence before the jury upon which its decision rests. Specifically, Snodgrass testified 

that he stopped at the stop sign at the intersection of Alsbury and Spring Meadows, 

looked both directions on numerous occasions, and entered the intersection only when 

he believed it was clear. The record contains no evidence that Snodgrass ran the stop 

sign; that Snodgrass was distracted or otherwise was not paying attention when he 

entered the intersection; or that he even saw Bentley’s vehicle before entering the 

intersection. Instead, the facts established the existence of an accident, not specific acts 

of negligence on the part of either party. See Gomez, 940 S.W.2d at 252 (concluding that 

the plaintiff failed to establish negligence when the record showed that the defendant 

stopped at a stop sign, looked in both directions, and entered what she thought was a 

clear intersection). Therefore, based on the evidence, we cannot say that the jury erred in 

failing to conclude that Snodgrass was negligent as a matter of law. See id.

Nevertheless, Bentley relies heavily on Snodgrass’s purported admissions that he 

failed to yield the right of way and that he was financially responsible for the damages 

caused by the collision, as well as the police report, to establish that Snodgrass was 

negligent by failing to yield the right of way. First, we note that the failure to yield the 

right of way does not, in and of itself, establish negligence. See id.; see also Madara, 578 
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S.W.2d at 790 (“However, if the driver intending to make a left turn misjudges the speed 

of the approaching vehicle or its distance from the intersection, this does not necessarily 

establish a want of due care on his part. Thus, in the case at bar[,] it was the plaintiff’s 

burden to prove the defendant’s negligence upon the common law standard of whether 

he acted as a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances existing at the time of 

the occurrence.” (internal citations omitted)); Dedear v. James, 184 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Tex. 

Civ. App.—Austin 1944, writ ref’d w.o.m.) (“The foregoing facts sustain the jury finding 

that while the truck driver failed to keep a proper lookout and failed to yield the right of 

way to the approaching automobile, that neither of such acts was negligence. The settled 

rule is that negligence is generally a question of fact for the jury to determine.”). 

Second, a review of the record demonstrates conflicts in the evidence, which were 

within the province of the jury to resolve. See O’Connor v. Miller, 127 S.W.3d 249, 254 

(Tex. App.—Waco 2003, pet. denied) (noting that it is within the province of the factfinder 

to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony). 

Moreover, the jury was entitled to believe one witness and disbelieve another witness, 

may resolve inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness, and it may accept lay testimony 

over that of experts. McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. 1986). Therefore, 

we may not pass upon a witness’s credibility or substitute our judgment for that of the 

jury, even if the evidence might clearly support a different result. See Maritime Overseas 
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Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Tex. 1998) (citing Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 

634 (Tex. 1986)). 

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the jury’s finding 

that Snodgrass’s negligence, if any, was not the proximate cause of the collision is so 

contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. 

See Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176; see also In re Ybarra, No. 04-17-00245-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 

9700, at *14 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 18, 2017, orig. proceeding) (concluding that, in 

a rear-end collision case, the trial court erred in granting a new trial and setting aside the 

jury’s no-negligence finding because the “jury chose to believe Ybarra’s version of the 

events leading to the collision, and determined that Ybarra had not failed to use ordinary 

care. That determination was within the jury’s province. We are not free to disregard 

the jury’s conclusion, and neither was the trial judge”); Laday v. Pedraza, No. 14-13-00638-

CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 1232, at **5-7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 10, 2015, 

pet. denied) (mem. op.) (rejecting a factual-sufficiency issue in a rear-end-collision case 

based on testimony by the defendant that he failed to stop on time and that the collision 

was an accident and testimony by the plaintiff that he did not see the defendant’s truck 

before the collision, nor did he hear brakes or tires squealing before the collision); Gaskey 

v. One Source Sec. & Found., No. 14-07-00850-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 4708, at **9-14 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 18, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming a nonegligence finding despite the defendant’s admissions that he could have prevented the 
Bentley v. Snodgrass Page 9

accident, that he was partly at fault, and that he was following too closely); Zelbst v. 

Harkins, No. 10-07-00293-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2705, at **3-5 (Tex. App.—Waco May 

21, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). We therefore overrule Bentley’s first issue.

III. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

In her second issue, Bentley contends that the trial court erred by allowing the 

judgment on the jury’s verdict to become final and for denying her motion for new trial 

without a hearing. However, neither in her appellant’s brief nor in her reply brief did 

Bentley provide argument or authorities in support of this issue. Accordingly, we hold 

that this issue is inadequately briefed and, thus, waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); see also 

Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Nabors Drilling U.S.A., 106 S.W.3d 118, 128 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (noting that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 requires a 

party to provide the reviewing court with “a succinct, clear, and accurate statement of 

the argument made in the body of the brief”). We overrule Bentley’s second issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled both of Bentley’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of 

the trial court.

AL SCOGGINS

Justice
Bentley v. Snodgrass Page 10

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed September 26, 2018

[CV06]