Filed 4/5/23 In re K.C. CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re K.C., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

F.E.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D081171

 (Super. Ct. No. J519962C)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Margie G. Woods, Judge. Conditionally reversed and remanded with 

directions. 

William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy 

County Counsel, and Tahra Broderson, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff 

and Respondent. 
2

F.E. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her

parental rights as to her son, K.C. under Welfare and Institutions Code1

section 366.26. She argues the juvenile court should have applied the 

beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption pursuant to section 

366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). She also contends the court’s order must be 

conditionally reversed because the San Diego County Health and Human 

Services Agency (Agency) failed to satisfy its further inquiry obligations 

under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and 

California law adopted to pursuant to ICWA. The Agency maintains the 

juvenile court properly found that the beneficial parent-child relationship 

exception to adoption did not apply. It concedes, however, that conditional 

reversal is appropriate to ensure ICWA compliance. Agreeing with the 

Agency, we conditionally reverse the order and remand for the limited 

purpose of ensuring ICWA compliance.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In December 2021, the Agency petitioned the juvenile court under 

section 300, subdivision (b), claiming that K.C. suffered, or there was 

substantial risk he would suffer, serious physical harm or illness due to 

Mother’s inability to provide regular care for him as a result of her substance 

abuse. The petition alleged that K.C. tested positive for amphetamine and 

methamphetamines in November 2021. Mother tested positive for the same 

substances and admitted using drugs during her pregnancy.

K.C. was initially allowed to remain in Mother’s care on a safety plan

because she agreed to attend substance abuse treatment. When she failed to 

do so, however, the Agency obtained a protective custody warrant for K.C. on 

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code. 
3

December 3. K.C. was detained in a licensed foster home that same day. At 

the detention hearing three days later, the juvenile court found the Agency 

made a prima facie showing that K.C. was a person described by section 300, 

subdivision (b), and ordered him detained. It granted Mother liberal 

supervised visitation at a minimum of twice per week. 

Three weeks later, the Agency reported that Mother had completed an 

intake for substance abuse treatment at KIVA. She had also visited K.C. 

twice a week, was attentive and loving during her visits, and the visitor 

monitors had no concerns. According to K.C.’s caregivers, he seemed to 

adjust well after his visits with Mother and he preferred to be held all the 

time. 

By early February, Mother left KIVA due to a family emergency. Her 

visitation during this period was inconsistent. Meanwhile, K.C. was 

adjusting well to being with the caregivers and was also doing well in 

daycare. 

K.C. was placed in a different foster home on February 18 and adjusted

well. By mid-March, Mother had completed a drug treatment intake with 

Parent Care and was participating in parenting classes, but canceled or noshowed to four classes in February. Mother also no-showed to visits with 

K.C. 

In May, the Agency reported that Mother tested positive for 

methamphetamine at her intake with Parent Care and she had not 

participated in treatment since then. K.C. was still thriving in his current 

placement and meeting all his developmental milestones. He was eating 

solid foods and formula throughout the day and loved to babble. The Agency 

indicated K.C. was healthy, growing, and a very happy baby. It

recommended that he be placed in the current foster home, Mother be 
4

granted supervised visitation, and Mother’s reunification services be 

bypassed. 

At the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing on May 5, the 

court found that K.C. was a person described by section 300, subdivision (b), 

removed him from Mother’s custody under section 361, subdivision (c)(1), and 

ordered that he continue his placement in a foster home. Pursuant to section 

361.5, subdivision (b)(10)-(11), it determined that no reunification services 

would be provided to Mother and set a section 366.26 hearing. 

Following disposition, Mother had seven visits with K.C. in June and 

July; all went well with no concerns. She played with K.C., did tummy time, 

and told him she loved him. During these visits, Mother was affectionate, 

loving, appropriate, and attended to his needs. However, she was again 

inconsistent with visits in August. 

In the beginning of September, the Agency reported that K.C., who was 

10 months old at the time, was still in the foster home that he had been in 

since February 18, and the caregivers wanted to adopt him. It characterized

K.C. as a happy baby who did not display distress upon separation from 

Mother when visits ended and easily transitioned back to daycare or the 

caregiver. 

Mother subsequently visited with K.C. once in September, which went 

well. She read him a book, showed him how to roll a plush soccer ball across 

the room, and motivated him to crawl with baby biscuits. At the end of the 

visit, Mother brought K.C. out to the car. When she strapped him into his car 

seat, he started to cry and Mother comforted him with his pacifier. 

Mother attended two visits in October, during which she was attentive, 

engaged in appropriate play, and told K.C. she loved him. In its section 
5

366.26 reports, the Agency recommended that the court terminate Mother’s 

parental rights and order a permanent plan of adoption. 

At the section 366.26 hearing on November 1, Mother explained that 

she attended the majority of her scheduled visits with K.C. to the best of her 

ability. While acknowledging that she missed visits, she testified that she 

saw him develop since birth and was involved as much as possible. She 

claimed K.C. knows who she is, he knows she is his mother, and they have an 

amazing time together. When she meets the visitor monitor outside and K.C. 

sees her, he has a “big surprise look” and stops crying. Mother testified that 

he hates being in the car and when she takes him out of the car seat, he 

immediately calms down. Also, in the last month, he started to notice a 

pattern and would start to get “antsy” with a worried look on his face when 

the visit is almost over. According to Mother, at the last three or four visits, 

K.C. started calling her “mama” at the end of the visit and it “makes it really 

difficult for the both of us.” She emphasized that she loves him and he loves 

her, and she has built a relationship with him as much as she could. Mother

believed that her relationship with K.C. was just like any other mother who 

loves and cares for her child from “a difficult stance,” but when they are 

together, she is “a mother to him.”

The Agency asked the court to find that K.C. was both generally and 

specifically adoptable and argued the beneficial parent-child relationship 

exception to adoption did not apply because Mother’s visitation had not been 

regular and consistent. If the court were to find sufficiently regular 

visitation, the Agency contended there was no evidence of a substantial 

positive emotional attachment between K.C. and Mother, urging the court to 

take into account the amount of time that K.C. had been out of Mother’s 

care—virtually his entire life—and his very young age. He was also in a 
6

stable environment and had a relationship with his prospective adoptive 

parents. Thus, any relationship K.C. and Mother did have was outweighed 

by the benefits K.C. would receive through adoption. Minor’s counsel agreed 

with and adopted the Agency’s arguments. 

Mother’s attorney argued that the beneficial parent-child relationship 

exception to adoption should apply because Mother visited K.C. to the extent 

she could and had strong, positive visitation. She also argued K.C. would 

benefit from a continued relationship with Mother and it would be 

detrimental to sever the relationship because K.C. knew that Mother is his 

mother, he gets excited to see her, and he gets upset at the end of visits. 

In issuing its ruling, the juvenile court observed that K.C. would be 

turning one year old in one week. It found that he was adoptable and moved 

on to the question of whether the beneficial parent-child relationship 

exception to adoption applied, stating: 

“So as far as visitation is concerned, the court would have 

to agree with the assessment of minor’s counsel and the 

Agency’s counsel that there has been visitation, but not one 

where the court can determine and find that the two other 

elements exist, that the child would benefit from continuing 

the relationship, and that terminating the relationship 

would [be] detrimental to the child.” 

Specifically, the court found that the evidence did not show “by a 

preponderance or by any other lower level,” that K.C. had a significant 

positive emotional attachment to Mother. It also found that the 

preponderance of the evidence did not show that the harm of severing the 

relationship between K.C. and Mother would outweigh the benefit of K.C. 

being placed in a new adoptive home such that severing the relationship

would be detrimental to K.C.’s health, well-being, or development. 

Concluding that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption
7

did not apply, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights as to K.C. and 

ordered the permanent plan of adoption.

DISCUSSION

Mother raises two issues on appeal, contending: (1) the juvenile court 

erred in failing to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to 

overcome the statutory preference for adoption; and (2) the requirements 

under ICWA were not satisfied. 

A. The Beneficial Parent-Child Relationship Exception

Mother argues that the evidence does not support the juvenile court’s 

findings and that the juvenile court abused its discretion in declining to apply

the beneficial parent-child relation exception. We conclude, however, that

substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that K.C. did not have a 

substantial, positive, emotional attachment to Mother such that K.C. would 

benefit from continuing a relationship with her, and the juvenile court was 

within its discretion to decline to apply the beneficial parent-child 

relationship exception. 

“ ‘At a permanency plan hearing, the court may order one of three 

alternatives: adoption, guardianship or long-term foster care. [Citation.] If 

the dependent child is adoptable, there is a strong preference for adoption 

over the alternative permanency plans.’ [Citation.]” (In re B.D. (2021) 66 

Cal.App.5th 1218, 1224.) Once the juvenile court finds the child is adoptable, 

the burden then shifts to the parent to demonstrate that a statutory 

exception applies. (Id. at p. 1225; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) If the parent does 

not establish the applicability of a statutory exception, the juvenile court 

must terminate parental rights. (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 

303, 316 (Katherine J.).) 
8

One such statutory exception is the beneficial parent-child relationship 

exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) It applies if “[t]he court finds a 

compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to 

the child” because “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and 

contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the 

relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) This exception requires the 

parent to prove three elements: “1) regular visitation and contact with the 

child, taking into account the extent of visitation permitted; (2) a substantial, 

positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment 

implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship; and 3) 

a showing that terminating the attachment would be detrimental to the child 

even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive 

home.” (In re M.G. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 836, 847.) 

“We review the juvenile court’s findings as to whether the parent has 

maintained regular visitation and contact with the child, as well as the 

existence of a beneficial parental relationship, for substantial evidence.” (In 

re B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1225 [citing to In re Caden C. (2021) 11 

Cal.5th 614, 639–640 (Caden C.)].) We do “ ‘not reweigh the evidence, 

evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts’ ” and 

will not disturb the juvenile court’s findings even where substantial evidence 

to the contrary also exists. (Caden C., at p. 640, citations omitted.) “[T]he 

ultimate decision—whether termination of parental rights would be 

detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship with [the] parent—is 

discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.) A court 

abuses its discretion “ ‘ “ ‘by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently 

absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.) 
9

The Agency contends that although the juvenile court’s finding 

regarding the first element was unclear, the record would support a 

conclusion that Mother failed to have regular visits and contact with K.C.2 

Mother argues that the juvenile court acknowledged her visits with K.C. and

this court cannot imply a finding that she failed to satisfy the first element. 

She suggests we should reverse and remand the matter to resolve any 

unclarity. 

Based on our review of the juvenile court’s oral ruling, it is reasonably 

clear the court found that Mother satisfied the first element of regular 

visitation and contact with K.C., but that such visitation and contact was not 

enough to establish the two remaining elements of the exception. Because we 

conclude the court found in favor of Mother on the first element, and because 

we agree with the juvenile court on the second and third elements even with 

the first element in Mother’s favor, we need not address the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the first element nor reverse for clarification.

Turning to the second element—the existence of a beneficial parentchild relationship—the juvenile court must “consider the evidence showing 

whether the parent’s actions or inactions ‘continued or developed a 

significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.’ ” (In re B.D.,

supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1230 [italics added].) To determine whether the 

parent has established this element, the court considers factors including the 

age of the child, the amount of time the child spent in the parent’s custody, 

the interaction between parent and child, and the child’s needs. (Caden C., 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The court should also examine “how children 

feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.” (Ibid.) 

2 Significantly, the Agency does not assert there is insufficient evidence

to find that Mother maintained regular visitation with K.C. 
10

Here, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that

K.C. did not have a significant, positive, emotional attachment to Mother. 

Notably, he was in her care only until he was three and a half weeks old. By 

the time of the section 366.26 hearing, he was just days from his first 

birthday. Although the record shows Mother had positive visits with K.C.—

and according to Mother, K.C. did not want the visits to end—the reports also 

reflect that he did not display distress upon separation from her and adjusted

well after the visits, transitioning easily back to daycare or the caregiver. 

Mother argues that at the beginning of visits, K.C. would immediately calm 

down when she took him out of the car seat; however, she also testified that 

he hated being in the car. Similarly, while she claims K.C. is extremely 

happy with her, the record shows that he was generally a very happy baby 

and very social. 

Mother cites to her testimony that her visits with K.C. were amazing 

and contends the Agency’s reports “are consistent with such loving and 

attentive relating.” But the report to which Mother cites simply states that 

visitation monitors have reported that Mother “was attentive and loving 

towards the child during her visits. They have not expressed any concern.” 

Although Mother may have been appropriate, attentive, and loving during 

the visits, the observations did not necessarily indicate that K.C. had a 

significant emotional attachment to her. (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 

Cal.App.5th 303, 318.)

The third element of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception 

requires the juvenile court to determine whether terminating the parental 

relationship would be detrimental to the child. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 

at p. 633.) “[I]n assessing whether termination would be detrimental, the 

trial court must decide whether the harm from severing the child’s 
11

relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of placement 

in a new adoptive home. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 632.) This requires the 

juvenile court to determine “how the child would be affected by losing the 

parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the child in an 

adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Id. at p. 633.) The 

juvenile court must then weigh the loss of this relationship with “the benefit 

of placement in a new, adoptive home . . . .” (Ibid.) 

Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion because in 

weighing the harm of severing K.C.’s relationship with her against the 

benefit of a new adoptive home, the juvenile court assigned a benefit only to 

the adoptive home, and “failed to recognize the countervailing benefit of 

continuing [K.C.’s] significant, positive emotional attachment with [her].” 

The juvenile court, found, however, that K.C. did not have a 

substantial, positive, emotional attachment to Mother, and we have 

concluded there is substantial evidence to support this finding. While this 

finding addresses the second element, the second and third elements of the 

exception “significantly overlap.” (Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 317, fn. 7.) “For example, evidence that terminating the parental relation 

would cause harm indicates that the child would lose important relational 

benefits if severed from parent.” (Ibid.) “When the relationship with a 

parent is so important to the child that the security and stability of a new 

home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, termination would be ‘detrimental to the 

child due to’ the child’s beneficial relationship with a parent.” (Caden C., 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633–634.) 

Here, because K.C. did not have a substantial, positive, emotional 

attachment to Mother, there was no beneficial relationship between them. 

Mother does not point to facts or identify what benefits the court should have 
12

but failed to assign to the continuation of K.C.’s relationship with her. The 

record further shows K.C. would suffer minimal harm from the termination 

that relationship. Again, while Mother testified that he would get “antsy” at 

the end of visits, reports indicate that he did not display distress upon 

separation from her and adjusted well after the end of a visit. Mother does 

not point to specific facts or detail how K.C. would suffer harm from the loss 

of a relationship with her. 

On the other hand, the record shows that K.C. would derive great 

benefit from the permanency of adoption. He adjusted well to his first foster 

home where he was placed for two and a half months. His current placement

with the prospective adoptive parents began on February 18, 2022. By the 

time of the section 366.26 hearing, he had been with them for almost nine 

months. The Agency reported that K.C. was thriving in his placement and 

meeting all his developmental targets. He was a happy and healthy baby, 

eating solid foods, sleeping well, and learning to self-soothe. 

In sum, the record fully supports the juvenile court’s ultimate 

determination that any harm that might result from termination of K.C.’s

relationship with Mother was outweighed by the substantial benefits K.C.

would receive through the permanency of adoption. Accordingly, the court 

did not abuse its discretion when it declined to apply the beneficial parentchild relationship exception to adoption and terminated Mother’s parental 

rights.

B. ICWA

Mother argues the Agency failed to comply with its further inquiry 

obligations under ICWA because it should have contacted the Bureau of 

Indian Affairs (BIA) and the State Department of Social Services (SDSS) for 

assistance in identifying potentially relevant tribes. She also contends that 
13

because the Agency did not specify what information it included in its further 

inquiry communications with the Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel (Iipay 

Nation), it is unclear whether the Agency provided the necessary information 

for the tribe to make a determination regarding K.C.’s possible Indian 

heritage. 

The Agency responds there was no need to contact the BIA or the SDSS 

because the Iipay Nation was the only tribe implicated as a source of K.C.’s 

potential Indian heritage. It concedes, however, it would have been better to 

submit copies of the written letters and emails that it sent to the Iipay 

Nation so there would be a record of the information on which the tribe relied 

to determine that K.C. was not eligible for membership. 

We agree with Mother on both ICWA issues. The juvenile court’s 

finding that ICWA did not apply to the proceedings implied that the Agency 

fulfilled its further inquiry duties. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); see In re Austin J.

(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 885 [a finding that “ICWA does not apply” implies 

social workers and court “did not know or have a reason to know the children 

were Indian children and that social workers had fulfilled their duty of 

inquiry”].) The record does not support these findings. We therefore 

conditionally reverse and remand the matter for the limited purpose of 

ensuring ICWA compliance. 

1. Additional Facts

The Agency initially reported that Mother indicated maternal 

grandmother was part of the “Digueno Mission Indians.” At the detention 

hearing, the court found there was a reason to believe K.C. may be an Indian 

child and ordered the Agency to conduct further inquiry under section 224.2, 

subdivision (e). 
14

Mother then claimed she had Indian ancestry and that maternal 

grandmother and maternal aunt were registered tribal members. Maternal 

aunt reported that she was registered with Santa Ysabel Mission Indians and 

that she currently lived on the Sycuan reservation. Similarly, maternal 

grandmother indicated she was registered with the Santa Ysabel Mission 

Indians and grew up on the Sycuan reservation. 

The Agency sent inquiries to the Iipay Nation by email and certified 

mail, and also attempted to contact the tribe by telephone, leaving a 

voicemail message. Although the tribe did not return the call, the Agency 

reported receiving a letter from the tribe stating that Mother and K.C. were 

not eligible for enrollment. At both the next hearing and the contested 

jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the court found that ICWA did not apply 

to the proceedings. 

The Agency later reported that Mother’s cousin claimed she had Indian 

heritage, but indicated she was not affiliated with a tribe. At the section 

366.26 hearing, the court again found that ICWA did not apply to the 

proceedings. 

2. Applicable Law

Congress enacted ICWA to address concerns regarding the separation 

of Indian children from their tribes through adoption or foster care placement

with non-Indian families. (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 7.) Under 

California law adopted pursuant to ICWA, the juvenile court and Agency 

have an “affirmative and continuing duty to inquire” whether a child “is or 

may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re Isaiah W., at p. 9.) As 

outlined by this court in In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1052, “section 

224.2 creates three distinct duties regarding ICWA in dependency 

proceedings. First, from the Agency’s initial contact with a minor and his 
15

family, the statute imposes a duty of inquiry to ask all involved persons 

whether the child may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subds. (a), (b).) Second, if 

that initial inquiry creates a ‘reason to believe’ the child is an Indian child, 

then the Agency ‘shall make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian 

status of the child, and shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.’ (Id., 

subd. (e), italics added.) Third, if that further inquiry results in a reason to 

know the child is an Indian child, then the formal notice requirements of 

section 224.3 apply.” 

After a “reason to believe” that an Indian child is involved has been 

established, further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child 

is required. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) The duty of further inquiry includes 

(1) interviewing the parents, Indian custodian, and extended family 

members; (2) contacting the BIA and the SDSS for assistance in identifying 

the names and contact information of the tribes in which the child may be a 

member, or eligible for membership; and (3) contacting tribes and anyone else 

who might have information regarding the child’s membership or eligibility 

in a tribe; contact with a tribe “shall include” information identified by the 

tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a membership or eligibility 

determination. (Id., subd. (e)(2)(A–C).) 

“On appeal, we review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings for 

substantial evidence.” (In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1051.) 

However, where the facts are undisputed, we independently determine 

whether ICWA’s requirements have been satisfied. (Ibid.) 

3. Analysis

As the Agency contends, the only claims of Indian membership

identified by the maternal family were with the “Digueno Mission Indians” 

and the “Santa Ysabel Mission Indians.” The Agency argues these claims 
16

implicated only one tribe—the Iapay Nation—which was previously 

recognized as Santa Ysabel Band of Diegueno Mission Indians of the Santa 

Ysabel Reservation. (See 87 Fed.Reg. 4636-4640 (Jan. 28, 2022).) According 

to the Agency, the variation of the tribal names included in its reports reflect 

the change in one tribe’s official name—the Iapay Nation. 

However, there are seven other Federally recognized tribes with 

“Diegueno Mission Indians” in its name. (See 87 Fed.Reg. 4636-4640 (Jan. 

28, 2022).) Additionally, maternal aunt reported she currently lived on the 

Sycuan reservation and maternal grandmother reported she grew up on the 

Sycuan reservation. While not addressed or acknowledged by the Agency, the 

Sycuan Band of the Kumeyaay Nation is a Federally recognized tribe. (Ibid.) 

Finally, Mother’s cousin claimed she had Indian heritage but did not identify 

a tribe. Given these ambiguities, the Agency should have contacted the BIA

and the SDSS for assistance in identifying tribes in which K.C. may be 

eligible for membership. 

The Agency acknowledges it should have submitted copies of the letters 

and emails it sent to the Iipay Nation so the record would show what 

information the tribe relied on in determining that K.S. was not eligible for 

membership. Unlike when a “reason to know” gives rise to the obligation to 

provide formal notice to tribes, the statute does not require the Agency to file 

its communications with the tribes where there was only a “reason to believe” 

requiring further inquiry. (See § 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C) [when there is a 

“reason to believe” a child is an Indian child, further inquiry includes 

contacting tribes by “telephone, facsimile, or electronic mail”], italics added; 

compare with § 224.3, subds. (a)(1), (c) [when there is a “reason to know” a 

child is an Indian child, formal notice “shall be sent by registered or certified 

mail with return receipt requested” and “[p]roof of the notice, including copies 
17

of notices sent and all return receipts and responses received, shall be filed 

with the court”], italics added.) However, the statue does require that the 

Agency’s further inquiry communications include information necessary for 

the tribe to make a membership or eligibility determination. (§ 224.2, subd. 

(e)(2)(C) [when conducting further inquiry, “[c]ontact with a tribe shall 

include sharing information identified by the tribe as necessary for the tribe 

to make a membership or eligibility determination”].) Without at least a 

summary in the record of what information it provided, there is insufficient 

evidence to support the trial court’s implicit finding that the Agency

conducted a proper and adequate further inquiry. 
18

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights is conditionally 

reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions for 

the Agency to comply with the further inquiry provisions of ICWA and section 

224.2 (and, if applicable, the notice provisions under section 224.3) as 

discussed in this opinion. If, after completing its further inquiry, neither the 

Agency nor the juvenile court has reason to know that K.C. is an Indian child, 

the order shall be reinstated. If the Agency or the juvenile court has reason 

to know K.C. is an Indian child, the Agency and the juvenile court shall 

proceed in conformity with ICWA and related California law. 

DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, Acting P. J.

DO, J.