UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ MARIA MAGDALENA SEBASTIAN JUAN; JENNIFER ALVARADO SEBASTIAN, Petitioners,

v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent. No. 15-9539 (Petition for Review)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before LUCERO , McHUGH , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Maria Magdalena Sebastian Juan (“Seba stian”), a citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of a decision by th e Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her application for asylum, withhol ding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (“ CAT”). The parties are familiar with the facts of this case, which we need not recite here. Ex ercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), we deny her petition.

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judica ta, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consiste nt with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### December 6, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 I We review the BIA’s lega l conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. Witjaksono v. Hold er, 573 F.3d 968, 977 (10th Cir. 2009). Under the substantial evidence standard, the record must compel reversal. Id.; see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992). To secure asylum, Sebastian must demonstrate that she is a “r efugee,” defined as a person outside of her country who is “unable or unwilling to re turn to . . . that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of pe rsecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particul ar social group, or political opinion. ” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(A). An applicant can establish persecution by: (1) demonstrating past persecution, wh ich gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of future persecution; (2) de monstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution; or (3) demonstrating “past persecution so seve re as to demonstrat e compelling reasons for being unwilling or unable to return,” even absent any danger of future persecution. Krastev v. INS, 292 F.3d 12 68, 1270-71 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)). Seba stian asserts refugee status based on the first and second prongs. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’ s conclusion that the harms Sebastian suffered in Guatemala were in sufficiently “extreme” to ri se to the level of past persecution. See Tanuwidjaja v. Holder, 352 F. App’x 28 1, 283 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (quoting Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 1998)); see also Sidabutar v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 11 16, 1124 (10th Cir. 200 7) (finding no past3 persecution when asylum applic ant was repeatedly beaten and robbed for years, twice resulting in serious injury). Moreover, during the two years before she entered the United States, Sebastian lived without majo r incident. Although she received some threats during that period, “[t]hreats alone generally do not constitute actual persecution.” Vatulev v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2003). Sebastian argues that the BIA im permissibly ignored evidence and mischaracterized the record. We disagree. Although the BIA recounted the facts in neutral language, such objective descriptions do not amount to mischaracterization. Nor does the BIA need to expressly state th at it considered sp ecific facts in its persecution analysis. Reciting those re levant facts is sufficient to show consideration. See Mena-Flores v. Hold er, 776 F.3d 1152, 117 1 (10th Cir. 2015) (noting the BIA’s obligation to consider a ca se does not require it to “expressly parse or refute on the record each indivi dual argument offered by the petitioner” (quotations and a lteration omitted)). Relatedly, Sebastian argues that the BIA failed to eval uate the evidence cumulatively. See Ritonga v. Holder, 633 F. 3d 971, 975 (10th Cir. 2011). But again, the BIA does not need to explicitly state that it weighed the record cumulatively. Its aggregate assessment is evid ent on the face of the BIA’ s decision and its reliance on the immigration judge’s order: both describe the multiple bases from which Sebastian claims past persecu tion, but conclude that this evidence is insu fficient for asylum.4 Sebastian also contends that the BIA ignored expert and country conditions evidence relevant to her claims. However, the BIA’s failure to expressly elaborate on the country condition documentation does not compel a conclusion that it ignored the evidence. Moreover, ev en if a country’s broader cultural and political context generally supports an asylum applicant’s claim, such evidence “does not substitute for an analysis of the fact s of each applicant’s indivi dual circumstances.” de la Llana-Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093, 1098 (10t h Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted). Thus, although the evidence submitted supports Sebastian’s claims generally, it does not compel a conclusion that she personally suffered harm rising to the level of persecution. Accordingly, we affirm the BIA’s finding of no past persecution. “Without a showing of past persecuti on, an [asylum applicant] must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that [she] w ill be individually persecuted in the future.” Witjaksono, 573 F.3d at 977. Se bastian’s claim of future persecution is based on the same events and country co nditions that she reli es upon to establish past persecution. Having determined that those events do not rise to the level required to prove past persec ution, we conclude that th ey also do not demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution. See Gallego-Arroyave v. Holder, 505 F. App’x 749, 754 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).
II Because Sebastian has not met the standa rd for asylum, she necessarily has not met the more stringent standard for withhol ding of removal. See Karki v. Holder, 715 F.3d 792, 801 (10th Cir. 2013). Similarly, Sebastian relies on the same evidence5 to support her claim that she will face a substantial likeli hood of torture upon returning to Guatemala under the CAT. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208. 16(c)(2). Because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s fi nding that Sebastian is unlikely to face future persecution in Guatemal a, “it is likewise against the odds that she would be tortured by the government or a proxy for the government.” Ritonga, 633 F.3d at 979 (quotation omitted). Thus, Sebastia n is ineligible for CAT relief.
III For the foregoing reasons, Sebast ian’s petition for review is DENIED . Her motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED

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Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge