alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
ACL/AoD/Developmental Disabilities Protection and Advocacy (PADD) Awards for the States/Territories

FY 2021 Estimated Allocation

4/22/2020

Disclaimer: ACL is aware the President's proposed FY 2021 budget 

is below the final Congressional appropriations for FY 2020. 

Awards for FY 2021 will be made based on the approved FY 2021

Congressional Appropriations.

State/Territory

FY 2020 Current 

Level Amounts FY 2021 Estimates

Alabama 501,457 498,925

Alaska 405,053 384,693

Arizona 763,559 758,902

Arkansas 405,053 384,693

California 3,969,393 3,945,169

Colorado 519,961 516,780

Connecticut 405,053 384,693

Delaware 405,053 384,693

District of Columbia 405,053 384,693

Florida 2,104,749 2,091,936

Georgia 1,076,316 1,069,771

Hawaii 405,053 384,693

Idaho 405,053 384,693

Illinois 1,258,238 1,250,540

Indiana 646,387 642,442

Iowa 405,053 384,693

Kansas 405,053 384,693

Kentucky 473,501 470,623

Louisiana 513,994 510,879

Maine 405,053 384,693

Maryland 568,723 563,658

Massachusetts 626,611 622,772

Michigan 989,187 983,137

Minnesota 524,585 517,759

Mississippi 417,863 401,042

Missouri 592,934 589,317

Montana 405,053 384,693

Nebraska 405,053 384,693

Nevada 405,053 384,693

New Hampshire 405,053 384,693

New Jersey 804,196 799,266

New Mexico 405,053 384,693

New York 1,914,219 1,902,525

North Carolina 1,064,735 1,058,245

North Dakota 405,053 384,693

Ohio 1,168,368 1,161,235

Oklahoma 409,755 394,632

Oregon 418,896 412,727

Pennsylvania 1,268,209 1,260,465

Rhode Island 405,053 384,693

South Carolina 494,393 491,382

South Dakota 405,053 384,693

Tennessee 658,063 654,047

Texas 2,850,798 2,833,444

Utah 405,053 384,693

Vermont 405,053 384,693

Virginia 774,724 769,986

Washington 744,133 739,570

West Virginia 405,053 384,693

Wisconsin 525,953 522,731

Wyoming 405,053 384,693

American Samoa 216,701 205,808

Guam 216,701 205,808

Northern Mariana Islands 216,701 205,808

Puerto Rico 809,089 807,807

Virgin Islands 216,701 205,808

Native American Protection and Advocacy Inc. 216,701 205,808

TOTAL $39,447,660 $38,734,000
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

WEST PALM BEACH DIVISION

DONALD J. TRUMP,

Plaintiff,

- against -

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

SPECIAL MASTER ORDER

No. 22-81294-CIV-CANNON

RAYMOND J. DEARIE, Special Master

Counsel are directed to appear before the undersigned in Courtroom lOA-S of the

Brooklyn Federal Courthouse on Tuesday, September 20, 2022 at 2:00 PM for a preliminary

conference in the above-captioned matter.

Counsel are invited to submit proposed agenda items for discussion by docketed letter to

be filed before the close of business on Monday, September 19, 2022.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York

September 16, 2022 RAY

United St

DEARIE

istricl Judge

Case 9:22-cv-81294-AMC Document 94 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/16/2022 Page 1 of 1
# ToC

# B-10 Other Comp by State

&"Arial Narrow,Regular"Table B-10: p. &P	

# B-10 Other Comp by Region

&"Arial Narrow,Regular"Table B-10: p. &P
§ 160.113 Prohibition of vessel operation and cargo transfers. ( a ) Each District Commander or Captain of the Port may prohibit any vessel, subject to the provisions of chapter 37 of Title 46, U.S. Code, from operating in the navigable waters of the United States, or from transferring cargo or residue in any port or place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and within the district or zone of that District Commander or Captain of the Port, if the District Commander or the Captain of the Port determines that the vessel's history of accidents, pollution incidents, or serious repair problems creates reason to believe that the vessel may be unsafe or pose a threat to the marine environment.
( b ) The authority to issue orders prohibiting operation of the vessels or transfer of cargo or residue under paragraph (a) of this section also applies if the vessel: ( 1 ) Fails to comply with any applicable regulation;
( 2 ) Discharges oil or hazardous material in violation of any law or treaty of the United States;
( 3 ) Does not comply with applicable vessel traffic service requirements;
( 4 ) While underway, does not have at least one deck officer on the navigation bridge who is capable of communicating in the English language.
( c ) When a vessel has been prohibited from operating in the navigable waters of the United States under paragraphs (a) or (b) of this section, the District Commander or Captain of the Port may allow provisional entry into the navigable waters of the United States, or into any port or place under the jurisdiction of the United States and within the district or zone of that District Commander or Captain of the Port, if the owner or operator of such vessel proves to the satisfaction of the District Commander or Captain of the Port, that the vessel is not unsafe or does not pose a threat to the marine environment, and that such entry is necessary for the safety of the vessel or the persons on board.
( d ) A vessel which has been prohibited from operating in the navigable waters of the United States, or from transferring cargo or residue in a port or place under the jurisdiction of the United States under the provisions of paragraph (a) or (b)(1), (2) or (3) of this section, may be allowed provisional entry if the owner or operator proves, to the satisfaction of the District Commander or Captain of the Port that has jurisdiction, that the vessel is no longer unsafe or a threat to the environment, and that the condition which gave rise to the prohibition no longer exists.
[CGD 79-026, 48 FR 35404, Aug. 4, 1983, as amended by CGD 96-026, 61 FR 33668, June 28, 1996; USCG-1998-3799, 63 FR 35531, June 30, 1998; USCG-2006-24371, 74 FR 11212, Mar. 16, 2009]
Exhibit 31.2CERTIFICATIONI, Ronald R. Remick, certify that:1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2006 ofK-Tron International, Inc.;2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport;4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:     (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is madeknown to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;     (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and proceduresand presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and     (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter thathas materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting.5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the registrant’s board of directors:     (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and     (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.     Date: November 8, 2006 RONALD R. REMICK     Ronald R. Remick    Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer    and Treasurer
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 97-30002

KIMBERLY ANN GREENWELL,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

VERSUS

RAYTHEON AEROSPACE, INC., ET Al.

Defendants

RAYTHEON AEROSPACE, INC. and WAYNE LEESE,

Defendants - Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

(95-CV-2138) 

December 22, 1997

Before DAVIS, JONES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM*

Appellants Raytheon Aerospace, Inc. (“Raytheon”) and Wayne

Leese (“Leese”) appeal a jury verdict in favor of Kimberly Ann

Greenwell on her claims of sex-based discrimination under Title VII

and Louisiana anti-discrimination laws. 
2

Having considered the oral and written arguments of counsel 

and the record in this case, we see no reversible error in the

rulings or judgment of the district court, except as to the award

of punitive damages. With respect to the latter issue, however, we

conclude that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence

from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Raytheon

engaged in discriminatory practices “with malice or with reckless

indifference to the federally protected rights of [the plaintiffappellee].” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1); see Patterson v. P.H.P.

Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927, 943-44 (5th Cir. 1996); FarpellaCrosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803, 809-10 (5th Cir. 1996).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED in

part, to vacate the award of punitive damages, and AFFIRMED in all

other respects.
§ 138.70 Issuance and renewal of COFRs. ( a ) *Types of COFRs.* The Director issues the following three types of COFRs as provided further in § 138.80: Individual Certificates, Fleet Certificates and Master Certificates.
( b ) *Requirements before issuance and renewal of COFRs.* The Director will issue or renew a COFR only after NPFC receives a completed Application or request for COFR renewal, and satisfactory evidence of financial responsibility.
( c ) *COFRs are issued only to designated COFR Operators.* Each COFR of any type is issued only in the name of the COFR Operator designated in the Application or request for COFR renewal.
( d ) *Form of issuance.* All COFRs are issued by the Director in electronic form on NPFC's COFR program website (*https://npfc.uscg.mil/cofr/default.aspx*) for a term of no more than 3 years from the date of issuance.
( e ) *Information included in COFRs.* The following information is available on NPFC's COFR program website for each COFR issued by the Director: ( 1 ) The name of the COFR Operator;
( 2 ) The date of COFR expiration;
( 3 ) The COFR number;
( 4 ) For an Individual Certificate, the name of the covered vessel, and the vessel's gross tonnage information, including the measurement system(s) used;
( 5 ) For a Fleet Certificate, the gross tons of the largest unmanned, non-self-propelled, non-tank barge within the fleet, including the measurement systems(s) used; and
( 6 ) For a Master Certificate, the gross tons of the largest tank vessel and largest vessel other than a tank vessel eligible for coverage by the Master Certificate, including the measurement systems(s) used.
§ 141.5 Applicability. ( a ) This subpart applies to employment of personnel on units engaged in OCS activities, except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section.
( b ) This subpart does not apply to employment of personnel on any: ( 1 ) Vessel subject to the citizenship requirements of 46 U.S.C. 8103 for pilots, crew, and officers holding a valid license or MMC with officer endorsement when the vessel is transiting to or from an OCS facility or a United States port;
( 2 ) Vessel subject to the citizenship requirements of 46 U.S.C. 7102 and 8103 for officers and crew on federally subsidized or documented vessels; or
( 3 ) Unit over 50 percent of which is owned by one or more citizens of a foreign nation or with respect to which one or more citizens of a foreign nation have the right effectively to control, except to the extent and to the degree that the President determines that the government of such foreign nation or any of its political subdivisions has implemented, by statute, regulation, policy, or practice, a national manning requirement for equipment engaged in the exploration, development, or production of oil or gas in its offshore areas.
( c ) The Commandant may, upon request or upon that person's own initiative, determine whether over 50 percent of a particular unit is owned by citizens of a foreign nation or whether citizens of a foreign nation have the right effectively to control the unit.
( d ) In determining whether ownership or a right effectively to control exists, the Commandant may consider operational control of a unit, management responsibility, title, lease and charter arrangements, and financial interests.
( e ) The owner or operator of any unit affected is notified of the Commandant's determination.
(Information collection requirements contained in paragraph (c) were approved by the Office of Management and Budget under OMB control number 2130-0182) [CGD 78-160, 47 FR 9379, Mar. 4, 1982, as amended by CGD 97-023, 62 FR 33363, June 19, 1997; USCG-2006-24371, 74 FR 11212, Mar. 16, 2009]
Opinion filed January 16 , 201 4



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

____ _ ______



### No. 11

- 1 4

- 00 011

- C R

_____ _

_____



### IN RE THE STATE OF TEXAS

Original Mandamus Proceeding

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
The State of Texas filed an application for emergency stay and writ of

mandamus relating to trial court cause nos. 13

- 4347, 13

- 4370, and 13

- 4373 in the
106th District Court of Gaines County . The State has now filed in this court a

motion for dismissal. I n the motion, the State verified that all outstanding issues in
this proceeding “have been resolved to the satisfaction of all parties, and no further
assistance is required” from this court. The motion is signed by the district

attorney.

The State’s motion for dismissal is granted, and this proceeding is dismissed.

January 16 , 201 4 PER CURIAM
Do not publish. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., Willson , J., and Bailey, J.
China Biologic Products, Inc.: Exhibit 4.3 - Filed by newsfilecorp.com






Letter of Undertaking


To: Madrone Partners, LP


June 6, 2012

Dear Sirs: 


We refer to the warrant numbered “022” (the “Warrant”)
issued to Madrone Partners, LP (the “Holder”) by China Biologic Products,
Inc. (the “Company”). In connection with the Holder’s exercise of the
Warrant to acquire 187,500 shares of common stock of the Company (the
“Warrant Shares”), the Company hereby undertakes to, upon issuance of a
share certificate representing the Warrant Shares by the Company to the Holder,
use its reasonable best efforts to register or qualify or cooperate with the
Holder in connection with the registration or qualification (or exemption from
the registration or qualification) of the Warrant Shares for the resale by the
Holder under the securities or Blue Sky laws of such jurisdictions within the
United States as the Holder reasonably requests in writing (including via
e-mail) and to do any and all other acts or things reasonably necessary to
enable the disposition in such jurisdictions of the Warrant Shares; provided,
that the Company shall not be required to qualify generally to do business in
any jurisdiction where it is not then so qualified, subject the Company to any
material tax in any such jurisdiction where it is not then so subject or file a
general consent to service of process in any such jurisdiction. 

Very truly yours, 

China Biologic Products,
Inc.


	By:    	/s/ Ming Yang 
	  	Name: 	Ming Yang 
	  	Title: 	Interim Chief Financial Officer 
	  	  	& Compliance Officer
Exhibit 23.1






Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm



We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (No.
333-50890) on Form S-8 of Main Street Trust, Inc. of our reports, dated March
14, 2007 relating to our audits of the consolidated financial statements and
internal control over financial reporting, which appear in the Annual Report on
Form 10-K of Main Street Trust, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2006.

/s/ McGladrey & Pullen, LLP

Champaign, Illinois
March 15, 2007


McGladrey & Pullen LLP is a member firm of RSM International -
an affiliation of separate and independent legal entities.
#### THE EXCELSIOR PETROLEUM COMPANY *v.*AUGUSTUS EMBURY AND OTHERS.

*Manufacturing corporations*— *frustees of.*

Appeal from a judgment entered on the report of a referee.

The defendants in this action were charged with a violation of the provisions of the second section of the eighteenth chapter (title 4) of the first part of the Revised Statutes (voí. 1 [4th ed.], 1175), in having paid dividends, not from the surplus profits of the plaintiff, but by withdrawing and dividing a part of the capital stock without the consent of the legislature.

They were the trustees of a manufacturing corporation, organized under the act of 1848 and the acts amendatory thereof. The General Term was of opinion that, by the thirteenth section of the act of 1848, the legislature substantially designed to provide for the cases in which individual liability should result from the acts prohibited. *(Rochester*v. Barnes, 26 Barb., 657.) That the two statutes were repugnant to each other, and that it was not the meaning or object of the law makers to apply both of these statutes to trustees of a *649Corporation created under the law of 1848. (Sedgw. on Stat. and Const. Law, 124; *Rochester*v. *Barnes, supra,*and cases cited; *Dash*v. *Van Kleeck,*7 Johns., 477; *Columbian Manufacturing Co.*v. *Vanderpoel,*4 Cow., 556; *Livingston*v. *Harris,*11 Wend., 329; *Harrington*v. *Trustees of Rochester,*10 id., 547.)

*W. H. Dickinson,*for the plaintiff.

*John E. Parsons,*for Lacey’s executors.

*Benj. T. Kissam,*for the defendant Embury.

*Geo. C. Blanke,*for defendants Fancher and James McChesney.

*G. P. Androus,*for defendants Dayton and Patchen.

Opinion by

Brady, J.

Davis, P. J., and Daniels, J., concurred.

Judgment affirmed.
1 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-20365

Summary Calendar

 

JOE EARL THOMAS-EL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ROBERT S. LOSACK, LIEUTENANT, 

MELISSIA CARTER, LVN,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-97-CV-1843

- - - - - - - - - -

April 20, 1999

Before DAVIS, DUHÉ, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:1

Joe Earl Thomas-El’s motion to expand the record on appeal is

DENIED as unnecessary. 

Joe Earl Thomas-El appeals the district court’s dismissal of

his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that he was unfairly disciplined for

refusing to shave. Thomas-El’s claim that he had a valid clipper

shave pass and should not have been asked to shave is essentially

a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence at the disciplinary

hearing. “Federal courts will not review the sufficiency of the
 

2 Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985). 

evidence at a disciplinary hearing; a finding of guilt requires

only the support of ‘some facts’ or ‘any evidence at all.’” Gibbs

v. King, 779 F.2d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).

Prison disciplinary proceedings will be overturned "only where

there is no evidence whatsoever to support the decision of the

prison officials." Reeves v. Pettcox, 19 F.3d 1060, 1062 (5th Cir.

1994). 

The testimony at the Spears2 hearing provides sufficient

support for the finding of guilt at the disciplinary hearing. The

prison warden testified that the disciplinary forms on Thomas-El

indicated “[i]nmate did have a valid clipper shave pass but refused

to shave his mustache.” The warden testified that the clipper

shave pass apparently did not encompass the facial hair above the

lip. It was for the beard only, and Thomas-El was ordered to shave

his mustache and refused to do so. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing

Thomas-El’s § 1983 claim as frivolous. See Siglar v. Hightower,

112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997). Thomas-El’s appeal is likewise

frivolous and is therefore DISMISSED. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d

215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983); 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. We warn Thomas-El that

any additional frivolous appeals filed by him or on his behalf will

invite the imposition of sanctions. To avoid sanctions, Thomas-El

is cautioned to review any pending appeals to ensure that they do

not raise arguments that are frivolous.

APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTIONS WARNING ISSUED.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

 FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

DAVID D. HOLLOWAY,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D17-1709

JOHNA HOLLOWAY,

Appellee.

________________________________/

Opinion filed July 13, 2018

Appeal from the Circuit Court 

for Osceola County,

Diana M. Tennis, Judge.

Susan W. Savard and Jennifer R. Lawson, 

of Green Family Law, .P.A, Orlando, for 

Appellant.

Julie F. Weinberger and Morgan A. 

Weinberger, Kissimmee, for Appellee.

WALLIS, J.

Former husband, David Holloway, appeals from a final order granting his 

supplemental petition for modification of alimony and awarding former wife, Johna 

Holloway, a portion of her attorney's fees. Former husband raises numerous arguments 

attacking the trial court's decision to modify his monthly alimony obligation and to require 

him to pay former wife alimony arrears. Finding no error in the trial court's decision to 
2

modify alimony and to award alimony arrears, we affirm as to those points. We reverse, 

however, the court's order awarding former wife attorney's fees because that decision is 

not supported by the record. 

"An award of attorney's fees in a dissolution proceeding depends upon the relative 

financial circumstances of the parties." Kouzine v. Kouzine, 44 So. 3d 213, 215 (Fla. 5th 

DCA 2010). When considering the relative financial circumstances of the parties, the 

court must determine whether one party has a need for such fees and whether the other 

party has the ability to pay them. Id. It is error for the trial court to require one party to

pay attorney's fees where both parties are in equal financial positions. Id. at 216. 

Here, the evidence established that both parties are in a similar financial position,

and they are equally able to pay their own attorney's fees. Therefore, it was error for the 

court to order former husband to pay a portion of former wife's attorney's fees. See id.

(finding court abused its discretion in requiring husband to pay one-half of wife's attorney's 

fees where parties were in equal financial positions); Price v. Price, 951 So. 2d 55, 59 

(Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (requiring husband to pay wife's attorney's fees error where husband 

was in no better financial position than wife to pay her fees). Accordingly, we reverse the 

trial court's award of attorney's fees to former wife. 

AFFIRMED in Part; REVERSED in Part.

SAWAYA and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.