LAM SON 719

The Cargo Must Get Through

Richard E. Killblane

Transportation Corps Historian

US Army Transportation School 

Fort Lee, Virginia

2017
Library of Congress 

Catalog-in- Publication Data

Killblane, Richard E., 1955 -

Lam Son 719; the Cargo Must Get Through. / 

Richard E. Killblane p. cm.

1. Vietnam War. 2. United States Army – History – 1st century. I.

Killblane, Richard E., 1955- . Title.

DS

Map Illustration: Stephen A.Campbell and Charles Bissett

Book Design/Production: Enterprise Multimedia Center, Fort Eustis,VA

Photos: Countless veterans have provided their photographs to the

Transportation Corps History Office and Army Museums to help tell

their story, and where possible the names of the person submitting

them will be provided. In other cases the units collected the

photographs and the source will be referenced to them.

First Edition

The US Army Transportation School publications cover a variety of

military history topics. The views expressed in this publication are

those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department

of the Army or the Department of the Defense.

ISBN: 978-0-9910108-D-8

Front cover photo: Convoy arriving at Khe Sanh.

Courtesy of Michael Lavin.

Back cover photo: Convoy arriving at Khe Sanh.

Courtesy of Michael Lavin.

Title page photo: QL9 in I Corps Tactical Zone.

Courtesy of Transportation Museum.

Contents page photo:

Courtesy of Danny Cochran.
Contents

Vietnam

 

The Context

The Participants

Preparations

Lam Son 719

Aftermath

Bibliography

Index

48

31

40

89

98

99
4 LAM SON 719
The Context 5

The Context

hen students of war think of heroic battles, truck drivers usually do not come to mind, but the Vietnam 

War changed that. By 1970, the long drawn-out ground war for the Americans had entered its fifth year. 

Accumulating intelligence indicated that the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) was building up their logistical 

bases across the Laotian border. General Creighton Abrams, the new Commander of Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam (MACV), rightfully anticipated that the NVA was planning a major offensive to coincide with the 1972 United 

States’ national elections. To do so the enemy had to stockpile supplies early in 1971 before the rainy season slowed 

down traffic along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Consequently, Abrams wanted to strike first and disrupt this buildup of 

supplies. Since the U.S. Congress had passed a law after the Cambodian incursion that prevented U.S. ground troops 

from crossing the border again, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) would have to conduct the cross-border 

operation alone. Three ARVN divisions would march into Laos just south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to sever the 

enemy supply line. The 5th Mechanized and 101st Airborne Divisions would reopen and secure Route 9 to the North 

Vietnamese border. The American artillery would provide the ARVN troops indirect fire support from Khe Sanh and 

the law did not restrict American combat helicopters from providing support to ground troops across the border. So 

helicopters and artillery from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) would directly support the operation. All other 

American support was to these units. The Americans called this Operation Dewey Canyon II; the Vietnamese named 

it Lam Son 719. This became one of the great heroic operations by truck drivers during the Vietnam War.

W

Convoy driving along QL9. Courtesy of Dan Hill.
6 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

While the enemy frequently ambushed convoys 

during the Vietnam War, only twice did the enemy make 

a concerted effort to shut down any main supply routes 

in Vietnam. The first was along Route (QL) 19 in the 

Central Highlands as a prelude to the 1968 Tet Offensive 

and the second was trying to close Route (QL) 9 during 

Lam Son 719. This latter operation would result in an 

intense two and half months of convoy ambushes for 

those who drove the roads in I Corps Tactical Zone.

From previous experience, truck drivers had quickly 

learned they could not entirely depend upon the combat 

arms units to keep the roads clear of enemy since 

the infantry just could not cover every mile of road. 

Instead, the truck companies needed a form of 

immediate security to protect their convoys in the 

event of an ambush until the nearest combat arms unit 

or gun ships could respond. So starting in late 1967, 

the truck companies of 8th Transportation Group in 

the Northern II Corps Tactical Zone began building gun 

trucks. These were steel boxes on the bed of the cargo 

trucks loaded with pedestal mounted machineguns. 

The preferred weapon of choice was the M -2 .50 caliber 

machinegun. Drivers generally carried the M -79 40mm 

grenade launcher. By 1970, the gun truck design and 

doctrine had reached fruition. Experimentation had 

ended. Elaborate art work reminiscent of the nose art 

on World War II bombers decorated the sides of the gun 

trucks with names that reflected the élan of the crew 

and only the best drivers crewed the gun trucks. Convoy 

ambushes had made the truck drivers of Vietnam front 

line combat soldiers and Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam recognized this in 1969 with the awarding of 

the Line Haul tab. It was the equivalent of the Combat 

Infantry Badge for an infantryman. The enemy in 

I Corps Tactical Zone would face some of the most 

battle -hardened truck drivers of the war.

By 1970, Americans at home; however, saw the war 

as a lost cause as President Richard Nixon sought an 

honorable exit through peace negotiations in Paris. The 

events back home were in complete contradiction to 

what was about to happen in I Corps Tactical Zone. The 

anti-war protests coupled with the civil rights movement 

inspired nationwide civil unrest, which culminated with 

the Ohio National Guard shooting of unarmed college 

students at Kent State University on 4 May 1970. The 

American public was tired of the war and wanted out. 

All the while, the United States was still sending young 

men, many still in their teens, to fight a war their national 

leaders saw as unwinnable. Lam Son 719 would also 

take place during the third year of the retrograde of 

American forces from the Republic of Vietnam. Having 

left the safety of civilian life to go fight a war that few at 

home supported, arriving in the midst of the downsizing 

of American forces, the Army would ask these men to 

risk their lives for one last 

offensive during war. In spite 

of all this, these young soldiers 

would rise to the challenge.

 Lam Son would take 

place in Northern I Corps 

Tactical Zone of Vietnam. 

The U.S. Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam had 

divided responsibility for the 

counter-insurgency into four 

corps tactical zones starting 

with I Corps in the north 

and ending with IV Corps 

in the south. These were 

merely geographical areas 

of responsibility not to be 

confused with Army corps 

Rear twin .50s on the Eve of Destruction. Photo by Teneyck, courtesy of Logan Werth. headquarters. The Military 
The Context 7

Assistance Command, Vietnam had created XXIV Corps 

in August 1968 to assume control over Army divisions 

that replaced the U.S. Marines in I Corps Tactical Zone. 

Since Vietnam was mostly coastline, logistics 

flowed through the ports. I Corps Tactical Zone had 

only one deep draft port at Da Nang and the rest were 

beach ramps at Hue/Phu Bai, Quang Tri and Dong Ha. 

Logistical support for I Corps Tactical Zone fell under the 

U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang. These support 

commands were multifunctional logistics headquarters 

built around major supply depots in each corps tactical 

zone. Responsibility for logistical units in the southern 

portion of I Corps Tactical Zone belonged to the 80th 

General Support Group while the logistical units in the 

north belonged to the 26th General Support Group. On 

13 January 1971, BG Arthur Sweeney, Commander 

of the U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang, was 

assigned to provide logistical support up to the 

Laotian border.1

The supply route for Lam Son would stretch from 

beach ramps and supply bases at Da Nang, Hue/Phu 

Bai, Quang Tri and Dong Ha along the coastal Highway 1 

then turn west from Dong Ha along Route 9 to Forward 

Support Activity 1 at Camp Vandergrift then, finally 

Forward Support Activity 2 at Khe Sanh. M-52 tractors 

with M-127 trailers, known to truck drivers as stake 

and platforms (S&P), would push cargo over the Hai Van 

Pass to Quang Tri and then to Vandergrift. Negotiating 

Hai Van Pass required trucks to slow down making this 

an ideal location for ambushes. During the Tet Offensive, 

the enemy had tried to sever north-south military traffic 

there in order to starve the 1st Cavalry Division’s effort 

to break the siege of Khe Sanh. They would try it again. 

For Lam Son 719, though, M -54 5-ton cargo trucks 

would pick up supplies from Vandergrift and then push 

them to Khe Sanh and, on occasions, the forward fire 

bases. Because of the extended supply line to the west 

and increasing need for supplies, I Corps Tactical Zone 

would need additional truck companies. The Da Nang 

Support Command only had two truck battalions, the 

39th at Gia Le and the 57th at Chu Lai.

Convoy arriving at Khe Sanh. Courtesy of Michael Lavin.

1 Keith William Nolan, Into Laos; The Story of Dewey Canyon II/Lam Son 719; Vietnam 1971, Novato, Ca: Presidio Press, 1986. 
8 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

The Participants

istory of ground warfare is made by soldiers. Collectively the American soldiers formed squads, platoons, 

companies, battalions and larger organizations to accomplish an assigned mission. In the case of convoy 

operations during Lam Son 719, the men identified primarily with their truck company. Most of these 

companies had been activated solely for service in Vietnam and consequently had no oral tradition handed down 

through decades of continued service. The quality of their leaders and the élan inspired by previous tours of duty in 

Vietnam shaped the personality of the individual companies. The type of truck, condition of the road and nature of 

the enemy threat also had as much to do with shaping the character of the truck companies as the men who served 

in them. They were light truck, medium truck or POL. Some roads like Route 19 in the Central Highlands had bad 

reputations. The heroes the Army called upon to deliver the goods through the second most intense period of 

convoy ambushes would drive in I Corps Tactical Zone, which bordered with North Vietnam.

The company grade officers involved in this operation for the most part earned their commissions through the 

Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) or rising up from the ranks through the Officer Candidate School (OCS). At that 

time, West Point commissioned its graduates into combat arms and combat support, not into the logistics branches. 

If members of the Transportation Corps, they had attended the Transportation Officer Basic Course at Fort Eustis, 

H

Logan Werth and Mike Cameric on the Eve of Destruction of the 523rd Transportation Company at Qui Nhon.

Courtesy of Logan Werth.
The Participants 9

Virginia upon commissioning where they learned 

basic convoy operations among other transportation 

management skills. With the downsizing of units in 

Vietnam, the truck companies began to receive Infantry 

officers who would learn convoy operations from their 

non-commissioned officers (NCO). The officers of the 

U.S. Army generally came from similar low and middle 

class backgrounds as the enlisted soldiers but were 

generally separated by four years of college. Because 

of the need for company commanders, the Army had 

begun promoting officers rapidly. They would make first 

lieutenant in one year and captain in another. While 

a few wanted to make a career out of the Army, the 

majority wanted to fulfill their military obligation and start 

another career. Another thing most had in common with 

the enlisted men was that they had fathers, uncles and 

grandfathers who had served in the previous wars. The 

family tradition of military service was the main reason 

most answered their nation’s call to arms.

Many enlisted soldiers were draftees who had not 

volunteered for the war but did not hesitate to answer 

their nation’s call to arms. Many explained that while 

they had not volunteered, out of a sense of patriotism 

or tradition of military service, they were willing to serve 

if called. Yet their service was a contradiction to the 

sentiment back home. By 1968, American support 

for the war began waning as the anti-war protests, 

especially in the big cities and on the college campuses 

increased. Still, Middle America was supportive of 

soldiers. To compound matters, in 1969, President 

Richard Nixon had announced the incremental 

withdrawal of American ground troops from Vietnam 

giving evidence that America was losing the war. When 

these young men arrived in Vietnam, many others were 

going home. The music they listened to reflected the 

rebellious nature of youth and the anti-war sentiment 

with such chart toppers by the Temptations, “Ball of 

Confusion” and Edwin Starr’s, “War.” The sentiment back 

home did not reflect what was going on in Vietnam. 

These young truck drivers would participate in a major 

offensive operation while the general populace at home 

saw the war as a lost cause. Yet, these truck drivers 

were being asked to risk their lives for one 

final offensive.

Draftees owed their country two years of their life, 

as compared to a three -year enlistment of a volunteer, 

with the first six months spent in Basic Training and 

Advanced Individual Training in the Light Wheeled Vehicle 

The officers of the 363rd Transportation Company standing in front of Canned Heat. Front row: Devon Brinton, 

Buz Harvey, and Chris Aichele, back row: John Dragavon, Dennis Cook, Bob Mitten. Courtesy of Robert Mitten.
10 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

Operators’ Course. Soldiers served individual one -year 

tours in Vietnam rather than deploying with a cohesive 

unit. While this may not have encouraged cohesion 

because the older veterans did not want to become 

friends with the newbies, it did maintain continuity. For 

every new soldier there were many more experienced 

veterans, some with almost a full year in Vietnam. 

During their one-year tours in Vietnam they could 

attain the rank of E- 5 sergeant. Nineteen and 20 - year 

old men would become squad leaders or gun truck 

non - commissioned officers - in-charge (NCOIC). 

At the end of their tours, the draftees would still owe 

Uncle Sam six more months, but if they extended for 

three months, the Army would drop their last three 

months and discharge them upon return to the 

United States. Quite a few extended.

The men drove nearly every day with few days off. 

Their day usually began before the sun came up with 

breakfast and then they received their assigned load to 

pick up. Depending upon the destination they returned 

early or late, but had to be off the road before the sun 

went down. This late in the war, the use of recreational 

drugs was more common in American and more readily 

available in Vietnam, so on average close to half of 

any truck company smoked marijuana and the rest 

drank beer in their company enlisted clubs to relax at 

the end of the day. No problems occurred if they left 

each other alone. Regardless of whether they were 

drafted or had volunteered, they were there to do their 

job and go home. Most resented the career soldiers, 

commonly referred to as “lifers,” trying to enforce what 

they considered petty discipline. “Fragging” was rare but 

did happen. The term came from tossing a fragmentary 

grenade in the “hooch” of an officer or NCO one felt was 

a threat. The men had great respect for those officers 

who shared their burden and expected nothing more 

from them than to do their jobs. 

A Transportation Corps truck company consisted 

of 60 trucks and 120 drivers divided into three platoons 

each with a lieutenant as a platoon leader and staff 

sergeant as a platoon sergeant. A captain commanded 

the company with the help of a first lieutenant as his 

executive officer and first sergeant as his senior enlisted 

soldier. A sergeant first class served as the truck master 

and assigned drivers and trucks to convoys. Convoys 

were generally organized by load and destination rather 

than by unit. So there was often no unit integrity in 

the organization of a convoy except with regard to the 

escorts. The truck master tried to assign the convoy 

commander and gun trucks from the same company 

because they knew how to work together. As many as 

six truck companies could fall under the control of one 

truck battalion headquarters. The truck companies 

were attached to the battalion headquarters instead 

of being permanently assigned. That way the companies 

could be moved around and attached where needed. Of 

the two truck battalions involved in Lam Son, the 57th 

was stationed in southern I Corps Tactical Zone and 

the 39th was stationed in the north.

The 57th Transportation Battalion in the southern 

part of I Corps Tactical Zone had several truck 

companies attached to it. All but the 363rd “Road 

Runners” Transportation Company (Medium Truck) ran 

local haul. The 363rd was a medium truck company with 

M - 52 tractors that hauled 12- ton M -127 trailers, fuel 

tankers and Sea Land vans stationed at Camp Adenir 

adjacent to Da Nang just north of the Marble Mountain. 

Consequently, the 363rd answered directly to the 80th 

General Support Group for line haul missions up and 

down the coastal highway – Highway 1.

From April 1970 to May 1971, the 363rd Medium 

Truck ran the entire line haul mission out of Da Nang 

earning them the title, “Da Nang Trucking Company.” 

The company assumed operation of the trailer transfer 

point in Da Nang and established another in Chu Lai in 

April 1970.1 The 363rd routinely hauled ammunition, 

food, medical supplies, construction materials, clothing 

and other materials both north and south along Highway 

1 and the Da Nang area. The southern destinations were 

depots near Chu Lai and the northern destinations were 

Phu Bai and Quang Tri. On the way north, the convoys 

passed over the Hai Van Pass (an estimated 3,000 

feet in elevation) and by the walled city of Hue. After 

reaching their destinations, the drivers would deliver 

their “packages” and then pick up a backhaul load. 

The backhauls usually consisted of retrograde materials 

(old tires, recyclable metals, wire, etc.) destined for the 

local “dump” near Marble Mountain where reusable 

materials were prepared for shipment back to 

Okinawa for processing.2

Convoys generally consisted of 30 to 40 vehicles 

but were sometimes as small as ten. The larger convoys 
The Participants 11

would have a gun jeep and up to three gun trucks as 

escorts. The convoy commander, usually a lieutenant, 

rode in the gun jeep at the head of the convoy. 1LT John 

Dragavon usually placed trucks hauling food up front 

followed by ammunition loads and then fuel with the 

bobtails, tractors without trailers, in the rear. Generally 

all convoy commanders interspersed the gun trucks 

throughout the convoy.

CPT Pierre D. Kirk had assumed command of the 

363rd Medium Truck on 18 March 1970.3 CPT Kirk was 

a very resourceful career Transportation Corps officer 

who did not always follow the book. 2LT Edward J. “Buzz” 

Harvey arrived in the company in August 1970 and was 

assigned to the 1st Platoon. 1LT John A. “Drag” Dragavon 

arrived in September and was assigned to the 2nd 

Platoon. Both were Transportation Corps officers but 

the rest of the lieutenants came from the infantry. This 

late in the war, infantry divisions were downsizing so U.S. 

Army, Vietnam (USARV) began sending excess infantry 

lieutenants to truck companies because the convoy 

ambushes made them combat units. Devon Brinton 

was the first infantry lieutenant to arrive in the 363rd. 

The next infantry officer, Robert “Bob” Mitten, arrived 

in November 1970, just before Thanksgiving. Christian 

“Chris” Aichele and Dennis Cook followed later. Whether 

school trained on convoy operations or not, these 

lieutenants had to quickly learn how to run convoys 

in Vietnam.

For his first convoy, Dragavon rode with a senior 

enlisted man in the command jeep to learn the route. 

The first time he was shot at, another experienced 

sergeant was showing him the ropes of the convoy route. 

When he heard what sounded like gravel hitting the side 

of his jeep, Dragavon looked down at the holes and then 

turned to the sergeant, “Hey Sarge! What was that?” 

He replied, “I think they’s shootin’ at us, sir!” Dragavon 

responded, “No shit!” To which the sergeant answered, 

“Yeah!” Dragavon then asked, “What do we do now?” 

thinking they should turn back and engage the enemy. 

The NCO said, “Too late, sir...we’ve done gone too far 

now...” At 40 mph a vehicle could travel about a third of 

a mile in 30 seconds. So, by the time this well-trained, 

ready for everything lieutenant had figured out he was 

being shot at, the convoy was well beyond range. He 

learned an important lesson – don’t stop.4

When 2LT Harvey arrived in the 363rd, the company 

had three gun trucks but only one was named. The 

Colonel was an armored personnel carrier (APC) gun 

truck assigned to the 1st Platoon and CPT Kirk had 

named The Colonel in honor of the commander of the 

LT Bob Mitten next to his gun jeep. With the retrograde of infantry units, USARV assigned infantry officers to 

truck companies. Photo by Joe McGinnis.
12 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

80th General Support Group who had allowed them to 

acquire the M -113 APC hull to build the gun truck. The 

top heavy gun truck, however, was hard to keep running 

as the mountain passes stressed the engine so it was 

often undergoing maintenance.5

The other two gun trucks had steel gun boxes 

mounted on the beds of M - 54 5-ton cargo trucks 

with mounts for .50 cal. machineguns forward and aft 

with M-60s in the middle or waist. Harvey had been a 

disc jockey for three years to help pay his way through 

undergraduate school and the 3rd Platoon Sergeant had 

been a professional sign painter back in the world. They 

wanted to increase esprit de corps by naming the other 

two gun trucks. So either before or after a card game 

of Cardinal Puff at the Hillbilly Honker’s Last Chance 

Saloon, they came up with the names Canned Heat and 

Iron Butterfly, two 1960s rock bands. The logo for Iron 

Butterfly was exactly the same as a similarly named gun 

truck in the 512th since it came from the “In-A- GaddaDa-Vida” album. They also came up with the idea of 

painting “Heaven Can Wait” on the rear of the Canned 

Heat. Canned Heat belonged to the 2nd Platoon and 

Iron Butterfly was assigned to the 3rd Platoon.6

The convoys had two radio networks. The first was 

between the convoy commander and the net control 

operator, code name Rio Grande, who turned out to be 

a U.S. Marine lieutenant. He monitored the progress 

as the convoys calling in checkpoints along the coastal 

highway. He could call in air support or artillery support if 

needed. Going north, the convoys lost Rio Grande going 

up the Hai Van Pass, and after that, they were on their 

own. The second network was internal to the convoy. 

The convoy commander maintained contact with 

the security vehicles and could use them to monitor 

progress, intervals and address problems. One day, 

Dragavon received a call from a gun truck saying there 

had been some shooting and a man was injured. He 

raced back to their location and did not find a soldier, 

but instead a young Vietnamese boy shot through his 

shoulder. Apparently one of the drivers thought he 

would have a little fun shooting monkeys out of trees 

and mistakenly shot the kid. Dragavon performed first 

aid on the wound and had him taken to a medical 

facility on Hawk Hill at Camp Adenir.7

The company had been short 5-ton tractors and 

stake and platform (S&P) trailers. So it received new 

multi-fuel M- 52A2 multi-fuel tractors as replacements, 

but they did not have as much horsepower as the diesel 

M-52A1s. Thus, they were not as efficient in hauling 

heavy loads, particularly in reaching and maintaining 

convoy speed. It was especially detrimental when driving 

up the Hai Van Pass. Hauling loads up the mountain 

Gun jeep of the 363rd Transportation Company. Courtesy of Bob Mitten.
The Participants 13

pass caused them to slow down and bunch up in a 

particularly dangerous area. Sometimes the diesels 

would violate the convoy interval and push the slower 

tractors up the hill. The company also drew ten rebuilt 

tractors from Okinawa. One was turned back on issue, 

six never lasted more than 10,000 miles and three wore 

out before they reached 17,000 miles. From then on 

they tried to replace them with diesels.8

CPT Earl B. “Rusty” Burch replaced CPT Kirk as 

commander of the 363rd Medium Truck on 16 December 

1970. Roger Rahor then joined the 363rd in January 

1971 and was assigned as a driver to the 1st Platoon. 

He considered CPT Burch a great man who respected 

the job they were doing. He would ride on convoys, fight 

alongside them and stand up for the men. They also had 

a revolving door of first sergeants though, and Rahor 

considered the last the worst. Typical of draftees, he 

did not care much for “Lifers.” He respected those 

officers who shared the burden of their men and 

had no respect for those who did not.9 

Traffic accidents in built-up areas around Da Nang 

and in villages along the way were a frequent occurrence. 

The roads were narrow, the vehicles in the convoy 

were huge, and traffic discipline by the local nationals 

was non-existent. The trucks ran the risk of running 

over Vietnamese zigging and sagging in and out of the 

convoys, those who stepped in front of trucks, or just 

people who were not watching where they were going 

and so forth. Dragavon remembered one day they 

killed seven people that way. In addition, with the 

Americans pulling out of Vietnam, the local attitude 

toward Americans was changing. On at least one 

occasion, some of their drivers were held captive 

by the local national militia due to a traffic accident. 

2LT Brinton stopped to help out victims of an accident 

and was detained by the Ruff Puffs10 in a bamboofenced enclosure for several days. The company was 

about to take a gun truck and ram the fence with all 

“guns a blazin’” to pull him out when he was finally 

released. Needless to say, driving through villages 

created its own special tension.11

In January 1971, 2LT Mitten was leading a convoy 

south to Chu Lai and had a new staff sergeant riding 

with him as a machine gunner to learn the route. They 

called in checkpoints to the Marine radio network 

controller and the rule was not to let convoys pass each 

other in a village. As his convoy entered a small village 

south of Tam Ky, Mitten looked up and saw an oncoming 

Marine convoy. He exclaimed, “Oh, No.” His convoy 

reached the Ruff Puff compound south of the village, 

which was one of their checkpoints, and then heard 

small arms fire in the rear of his convoy. He stopped the 

APC gun truck, The Colonel. The 363rd Transportation Company had three gun trucks. Courtesy of Bob Mitten.
14 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

convoy and was about 

to turn his jeep around 

when two of his drivers 

came running up. One 

was shaking and Mitten 

asked him what the 

matter was. He said, 

“I hit an old lady.” The 

old woman had walked 

between the Marine 

convoy and stepped 

right out in front of the 

oncoming 5-ton tractor. 

She bounced off the 

bumper and was barely alive.12

So they went back and Mitten tried to call in a 

medevac for the injured woman. The villagers would 

not let them take her. They also wanted to detain the 

truck and drivers, so Mitten told the staff sergeant, 

“The convoy’s yours. I’m going to stay with these two 

guys.” He told him that his driver, Martinez, knew all the 

checkpoints since Mitten had let him call them in every 

now and then. He added, “Don’t worry about calling 

them in. The convoy’s yours. Take it. Go.” 

The Ruff Puff confined Mitten and the two drivers 

in a small fenced-in compound with a hooch in the 

back and an area where they could sit at a table. Mitten 

told the other two drivers to face outward so no one 

would throw a hand grenade in there without their 

knowledge. Meanwhile, the White Mice13 were trying 

to calm down the villagers. Some MACV soldiers came 

down and surrounded the village with an ARVN unit. They 

brought with them a Vietnamese corporal who spoke 

excellent English who explained to Mitten they were in 

serious trouble. By that time the old lady had died. The 

interpreter pointed to a Vietnamese man yelling and said 

he was VC. “You don’t want to be here. You’re not going 

to make it overnight. You’ve got to get out of here before 

dark.” So Mitten thought to himself, “Oh, good. How’re 

we going to do that?” 

Eventually CPT Rusty Burch came down to check on 

his soldiers. So Mitten’s captors brought the lieutenant 

out to meet with his commander. To his surprise, Burch 

informed him, “You got yourself into this mess. Get 

yourself out.” 

Meanwhile, Roger Rahor remembered a group of 

drivers had their weapons and trucks ready to attack the 

ARVN compound. When the convoy came back through 

the village as it was getting dark, the three detainees 

knocked down their guard and ran for the jeep as it was 

passing by. All three jumped on the jeep and escaped, 

but left their truck.

When Mitten returned to Camp Adenir, he went to 

his hooch to pick up his spare .45 caliber pistol he had 

acquired from a Marine. He then walked over to the 

officers’ club and asked, “Where’s Rusty?” Someone 

said he was back playing pool. Mitten walked down 

the two steps. Burch was the only person in the room 

and when he saw an irritated Mitten approaching with 

the pistol in his hand, he picked the pool cue up like a 

baseball bat ready to hit the lieutenant. Mitten pointed 

the pistol and said, “Oh, good. You do that.” Mitten was 

walked toward him with the intention of shoving the 

pistol barrel down his mouth when the battalion 

executive officer grabbed him from behind. Evidently 

someone had yelled for him. They confined Mitten 

to his quarters under an armed guard. 

The next day, Mitten and Burch reported to the 

battalion commander, a West Point graduate and major. 

He looked at Mitten and said, “Explain yourself.” Mitten 

then explained the situation and how his commander 

told him, “You got yourself into this, now get yourself out.” 

The battalion commander then said, “That will be all, 

Lieutenant.” Mitten left while the battalion commander 

talked with CPT Burch. Mitten thought he might receive 

an Article 15 punishment, but nothing more happened 

from the incident.

Camp Adenir was located across the road from a 

523rd Transportation 

Company headquarters 

at Cha Rang Valley in 

Northern II Corps 

Tactical Zone. COL 

Richard Morton 

considered it the 

best truck company 

in the 8th Transportation Group. 

Courtesy of Don Voightritter. 
The Participants 15

Marine helicopter base, Marine Aircraft Group 

(MAG) 16, a target of nightly rocket attacks. Rockets 

fired at the Marine Air Station often fell short or rounds 

were “walked’ through the camp and across the road. 

Soon after Rahor arrived in January, an RPG 

damaged the front end of The Colonel. Three gun 

trucks clearly proved insufficient, so the company built 

two more. In the spring, the 1st Platoon was tasked 

with building a new gun truck. Its daily convoys north 

and south needed help and The Colonel was not always 

available. So, the drivers scrounged most of what they 

needed from in and around the Da Nang area. Some 

of the steel for the box came from the Marines. They 

worked at night after the daily assigned work and in 

between guard duty assignments. It was not just 1st 

Platoon that did the work. It seemed that guys from 

all over the company pitched in. They painted it black 

and held a contest to name it. One of the guys from 

maintenance held out for Mercenary and painted 

that name in blue on the side of the box. He did a 

great job, highlighting the name against the black 

gun box. The truck had blast shields separating the 

aft from the forward areas. It also had a wooden 

deck to stop ricochets. They named the other new 

gun truck, Pallbearers.14

For Operation Lam Son 719, I Corps Tactical Zone 

would need additional truck companies and would 

pull a seasoned company from the most heavily 

ambushed road in Vietnam. COL Richard Morton, 8th 

Transportation Group Commander, considered the 523rd 

Transportation Company (Light Truck) at Cha Rang Valley 

in the Northern II Corps Tactical Zone one the best in 

his command. The 523rd Light Truck had five veteran 

gun trucks; Ace of Spades, Black Widow, Uncle Meat, 

King Kong and Eve of Destruction. Most gun trucks 

were 5-ton cargo trucks with double-walled steel gun 

boxes on the bed armed with three to four .50 caliber 

machineguns on pedestal mounts. Due to a shortage 

of steel for the gun boxes, some gun trucks like King 

Kong were made from M-113 armored personnel carrier 

(APC) hulls mounted on the bed of a 5-ton cargo truck. 

Each gun truck was painted black, often with bright color 

trim, and the names of the gun trucks were painted 

as elaborate art work on the side of the trucks. These 

weapons platforms were designed to stand out and they 

had gained such a reputation that the enemy placed 

bounties on destroying the gun trucks. Each of the three 

platoons had one to two gun trucks. By then, new crew 

CPT Don Voightritter’s jeep and driver, SP4 West. Courtesy of Don Voightritter.
16 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

members were volunteers selected by consensus of 

the other crew members. The gun truck crews felt elite 

but the 523rd believed that by assigning two gun trucks 

to each platoon, rather than consolidated into a gun 

truck platoon, the crews felt more like members of the 

company. They lived with the drivers who they had to 

protect. Since they were the best, much was expected 

of them and if they failed to defend the trucks then they 

would have to face their brothers in arms when they 

returned to the barracks at night. 

By December 1970, the 25th Infantry Division 

had closed down on paper and infantrymen with 

incomplete tours ended up transferred to other units 

to complete their one-year tours of duty. The rapid 

promotion and other duties caused a shortage of 

lieutenants in the truck companies. So the burden of 

leading convoys fell heavily on the sergeants. Similar 

to the 363rd Transportation Company, the U.S. Army, 

Vietnam assigned three infantry officers to the 523rd 

Transportation Company. 1LT Ralph Fuller had recently 

served three or four months with the 25th Infantry 

Division but when it returned to Hawaii, he still had 

to complete his one-year tour in Vietnam, so he was 

assigned to the 523rd as the 2nd Platoon Leader in 

September 1970. He had prior enlisted service for a 

total of 15 years in the Army and was also airborne 

and Ranger qualified. He knew nothing about trucks, 

but was willing to listen to his men and they loved him 

for it. Second Lieutenants Tom Callahan and Jim Baird 

had both graduated from OCS 2-70 and were assigned 

directly to the 523rd as the 1st and 3rd Platoon Leaders 

respectively. The men called Callahan, “Tom Terrific” 

after a popular cartoon series on TV, and Baird, “Pig 

Farmer” because of his passion for breeding pigs. 

Since Ralph was Ranger qualified, the men called 

him, “Ranger Fuller.” These officers and the men 

shared a great mutual respect for each other.

The only logical reason they could conclude why the 

Army assigned infantry officers to truck companies were 

the gun trucks. This hinted that the Army felt that gun 

trucks were a combat arms mission and the leaders of 

the 8th Transportation Group wore the green leadership 

tabs of the combat arms. The infantry officers identified 

with the gun trucks and the men who crewed them. As 

combat arms officers they felt their place was on the 

road with their men. Most liked to ride in the gun trucks 

Above:

Ace of Spades

and crew.

Courtesy of

Logan Werth.
The Participants 17

Top Right: Officers of the 523rd Transportation 

Company: 1LT Dougherty, LT Jim Baird, 1LT 

Ralph Fuller, CPT Don Voightritter, LT Tom 

Callahan. Courtesy of Don Voightritter.

Above: 1LT Ralph Fuller still wearing his 25th 

ID patch in jeep. Courtesy of Don Voightritter.

Left: CPT Dan Hill was assigned to ACTIV to 

conduct a study convoy security in Vietnam. 

Courtesy of Dan Hill.
18 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

because they admired the crews, which endeared them 

even more with the crews.15

During one convoy, Fuller rode in King Kong when 

the convoy slowed down to negotiate a hairpin curve in 

Mang Giang Pass. An RPG hit a fuel tanker up ahead 

and it blocked the road. King Kong weaved past about 

15 trucks while blazing away at the enemy on the high 

ground to their right. Fuller believed VC had conducted 

the ambush since they did not stand and fight it out with 

the gun truck. King Kong’s suppressive fire took the fight 

out of them. SGT Michael Emory was the NCOIC of Kong 

and had been on it since he helped built it in 1969.16

The gun trucks were crewed and led by young men 

often not more 20-years old who would risk their lives to 

save those of others. PV2 Chester Israel and PV2 Calvin 

Bennett went through the wheeled vehicle operator (MOS 

64B) Advanced Individual Training (AIT) together and 

arrived in Vietnam a day apart; Chester on 20 September 

1970 and Calvin arrived the next day. Chester arrived 

at Bien Hoa and read about the 8th Transportation 

Group in the Stars and Stripes. Other veterans warned 

him he would have an easy tour unless he went to the 

8th Transportation Group at Qui Nhon. That very day 

Chester received orders for the 8th Group and as luck 

would have it, Calvin also received orders for 8th Group. 

They flew from Long Binh to Qui Nhon where both were 

assigned to the 3rd Platoon of the 523rd Transportation 

Company at Cha Rang Valley.17

Danny Cochran also arrived in the 523rd in 

September and was a gunner on King Kong. He had 

dropped out of high school to work full time, but lost 

his job. So he and a buddy voluntarily enlisted for 

the infantry and airborne on the “buddy system” so 

they would go through training together. Danny liked 

adventure and saw airborne as the answer, but he had 

broken his arches when young and his feet were swelling 

up during the runs with boots and road marches with full 

field pack in the Infantry Advanced Individual Training 

at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. His drill sergeant 

warned him he would not be able to complete jump 

school because of the swelling. He had passed all the 

mechanical tests, so the Army sent him to truck driver 

school on Fort Jackson instead. Unlike others, Danny 

wanted to go to Vietnam. Liking the adrenaline rush, he 

naturally migrated to a gun truck after a month or two in 

country and ended up as a gunner on the APC gun truck, 

Danny Cochran standing in front of the APC gun truck, King Kong, of the 523rd Transportation Company. 

Courtesy of Danny Cochran.
The Participants 19

King Kong, after a driver on Kong left Vietnam.18

David Rose, a draftee from California, had been 

picking up cigarette butts at Cam Ranh Bay for three 

days when 1LT Fuller drove down to pick up new 

replacements. Fuller walked in and asked who could 

drive trucks. He then warned them, “I might have bad 

news and might have good news. You are all truck 

drivers. You’re not going up on an LZ.” Instead of flying 

up to Qui Nhon, the eight or ten drivers went down to 

the port and picked up brand new cargo trucks off the 

boat. The gun truck, Uncle Meat, escorted them to 

Cha Rang Valley where they became drivers of the 

523rd Transportation Company.19

Rose drove a cargo truck the next day and upon 

his return the platoon sergeant told him to report to 

the commander. David thought, “I had only been in 

the company one day so how could I get in trouble?”

 Looking at his personnel file the commander said, 

“You’re weapons trained.” Rose had gone through 

a couple of days of sniper training at Fort Ord. So 

Voightritter assigned him as a driver to Uncle Meat. 

There he met the crew. Logan Werth had volunteered 

for the Eve of Destruction a couple of weeks after 

Logan Werth and Mike Cameric on Eve of Destruction. Courtesy of Logan Werth. Above: Uncle Meat was one of five gun trucks 

assigned to the 523rd Transportation Company at Cha Rang Valley. Courtesy of Logan Werth. 

arriving in country in late August. After a couple of 

months, Logan joined the crew of Uncle Meat as a 

gunner on the rear twin .50 caliber machineguns. 

Cameron was right gunner, and Danny Jones operated 

the left M- 60 machinegun. Before they headed north, 

they replaced the right and left front M-60s with M-2 

.50 caliber machineguns. They carried about 18,000 

rounds of .50 caliber ammunition on the floor of the gun 

box and kept a couple of spare M-60s tucked in the 
20 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

gun box. The driver carried an M-79 grenade launcher 

with a box of 40mm grenade rounds, flares and beehive 

rounds. The crew stored a box of concussion and white 

phosphorous grenades in the back corner of the gun box. 

They were ready for nearly any kind of attack.20

1LT Donald Voightritter arrived in the company as a 

first lieutenant and assumed command. Don Voightritter 

was a fair and respected officer. His twin brother Ronald, 

another Transportation Corps officer, had already earned 

the Silver Star Medal for valor in 8th Group. Unlike many 

company commanders, Don liked to ride on convoys. The 

personality of commanders defined the character of their 

commands and Voightritter created an atmosphere of 

mutual respect and camaraderie. This was the strongest 

asset of the company. The officers informally discussed 

what had happened during ambushes with the gun 

truck crews to understand what had happened and how 

the crews reacted. No two ambushes were the same 

Right: Leon Vance, 

Willie Strong, and 

Chester Isreal on 

Satan’s Lil’ Angel .

Courtesy of Don Voightritter.

Bottom: Black Widow of 

the 523rd Transportation 

Company. 

Courtesy of the Army 

Transportation Museum.
The Participants 21

so the gun truck crews reacted differently to each one. 

Consequently, these discussions inspired the lieutenants’ 

confidence in their crews.21

New drivers learned to drive in Vietnam by riding with 

veterans. Calvin Bennett rode with Robert Walter Thorne 

for a couple of days who taught him to drive “the Vietnam 

way,” which meant drive like hell and miss as many of the 

potholes as possible. Because Chester Israel had grown 

up driving, he drove on his first run and the veteran rode 

beside him as the passenger. His red hair earned Chester 

the nickname, “Red.” 22

The enemy ambushed Chester’s first convoy and 

shot up the hood and windows of his truck, which really 

pissed him off. The drivers in 8th Group only defended 

themselves with an M-16 and four “clips” (magazines) of 

ammunition. After the ambush, this irate private reported 

to his platoon leader and demanded, “Lieutenant 

Callahan, you have two choices. You can either send me 

CPT Ron and Don Voightritter at Cha Rang Valley. Both had overlapping assignments to 8th Transportation Group. 

Courtesy of Don Voightritter. Above: CPT Don Voightritter and 1SG Knetch at Cha Rang Valley. Courtesy of Don Voightritter.
22 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

home or give me a bigger weapon.” Chester felt he did 

not have enough ammunition. Callahan replied, “Red, I 

hate that you feel that way, but I have an opening on a 

gun truck if you want to go on it.” Israel asked, “Tom, 

what kind of weapons?” The lieutenant explained the 

gun trucks had .50 caliber machineguns. Israel asked, 

“How much ammo?” The lieutenant answered, “3,000 

rounds and if you run out, I’ll personally bring you more.” 

So the young soldier accepted on the logic, “If they 

want to kill me then I want to kill them.”23

So Israel was assigned as the rear gunner on the 

Black Widow just a couple of weeks after his arrival. 

He described his mission as to “just drive down the 

road until you get blown up.” Leon Vance, the right 

front gunner, advised Chester, “The ammo is free; 

don’t act like you’re paying for it. Everything belongs 

to the government.” Israel ended up fighting in a dozen 

ambushes prior to the move north, most of which had 

been just harassment and sniper fire, though, but it gave 

him plenty of experience under fire before Lam Son.24

The gun trucks also served as a reaction force in the 

event the night convoys were ambushed driving between 

the supply depots at Qui Nhon and the marshalling 

yard. A 545th gun truck, Matchbox, was ambushed at 

VC Village near the Republic of Korea (ROK) bridge on 

the night of 28 October. Eve of Destruction, King Kong 

and the 512th’s Godzilla raced out the front gate with 

the Black Widow in the lead. As the first gun truck to 

reach the kill zone, Black Widow drove straight into the 

middle of the kill zone. Because one civilian was killed, 

higher headquarters flagged the redeployment orders of 

everyone involved in the ambush until the investigation 

determined if there was a war crime. It turned out the 

enemy had forced the villagers to remain outside in the 

village to make everything look normal since drivers 

looked for changes in local activity as warnings of 

ambushes. The crews were exonerated of any crime, 

but this demonstrated the measures the enemy 

would take to ambush a convoy.25

Hanging out with the 523rd was CPT Richard Dan 

Hill, a career Transportation Corps officer assigned to 

the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) at Long 

Bien. This office collected lessons of the war and had 

assigned CPT Hill the duty to record the lessons from 

convoy ambushes. His office sent him to 8th Group to 

ride on convoys where COL Morton assigned him to 

his best truck company. Hill lived with the 523rd and 

rode in a gun truck on any convoy that anticipated an 

Trucks of the 523rd Transportation Company staging at the Ponderosa for the convoy north to I Corps Tactical Zone. 

Courtesy of Don Voightritter.
The Participants 23

ambush. In November, he experienced his first ambush 

in Mang Giang Pass, better known as “Ambush Ally” to 

the drivers, that resulted in one American dead and six 

enemy soldiers killed. The next month, his headquarters 

called him back based upon the information that a major 

operation would take place in I Corps Tactical Zone in 

January and U.S. Army, Vietnam Intelligence anticipated 

the enemy to try hard to disrupt logistical support.26

Besides the 523rd, the 1st Logistics Command 

would also assign the 2nd and 572nd Truck Companies 

to move north for the operation. That December, CPT 

Patrick I. Peters’ 572nd Transportation Company 

(Medium Truck), stationed down at Long Binh, loaded 

its tractors and trailers on Navy Landing Ship Tanks (LST) 

at Newport for transport to Quang Tri. LT Ernie K. Stafford 

took his platoon north two to three weeks ahead of the 

main body. The rest of the company flew from Bien Hoa 

Air Base north on a C-130 a few weeks later. Prior to 

their departure, they ravaged Long Binh and Bien Hoa 

Air Base. Three days after settling into Camp Eagle, the 

company moved to Quang Tri where the Military Police 

discovered the truck company had nine more jeeps than 

it was authorized. Subsequently, the 572nd acquired 

the name “Gypsy Bandits” because of its reputation for 

thievery and frequent moves. On 29 January 1971, the 

Gypsy Bandits became attached to the 39th Battalion 

for Lam Son 719. Since the 48th Transportation Group 

at Long Binh had not believed in the need for gun trucks, 

the 572nd had to borrow Highland Animals from the 

541st and Set Me Free and LT Calley from the 563rd. 

Fortunately, they would primarily push cargo up the 

coastal highway and as far as Vandergrift.27

In January 1971, the 2nd Medium Truck and 

523rd Light Truck Companies finally received orders 

to move north from their home in Cha Rang Valley 

to Phu Bai along the coastal highway (QL) 1. The 

companies were not informed of the reason for the 

move, but the drivers were instructed they could only 

take the minimum issue and had to send everything 

else home. Since the 523rd needed a total of six gun 

trucks, two per platoon, it picked up Satan’s Li’l Angel 

from the 669th Transportation Company. Once ready, 

the 523rd waited in the Ponderosa, the marshaling yard, 

for two days with no knowledge of when it would move. 

While newly promoted CPT Voightritter closed down 

the company at Qui Nhon, he sent the trucks 

north under the responsibility of 1LT Fuller. When he 

received instructions to lead the convoy north, Fuller 

had no idea why.28

On 22 January 1971, the Eve of Destruction led the 

523rd convoy of over a hundred trucks north with the 

Black Widow in the rear. When they climbed up over Hai 

Van Pass, it reminded the drivers of An Khe and Mang 

Giang Passes and they recognized it as ideal ambush 

country. It had windy roads, steep grades and the top of 

the mountain was often “socked in” by low cloud cover. 

The next day they delayed at Phu Bai and Fuller then 

told everyone to write home. From there, the company 

Gun trucks of the 523rd Transportation Company waiting to leave the Ponderosa for the convoy north. 

Courtesy of Don Voightritter.
24 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

waited to move to Quang Tri.29

The 2nd Medium Truck had two APC gun trucks, 

The Outlaw and Big Kahuna, the latter named by SSG 

Thomas Lee from Hawaii; and Madam Pele, formerly Tire 

Boss; and Maverick, both 5-ton maintenance gun trucks. 

David Boyd had become the NCOIC of the Big Kahuna 

because of his previous infantry experience. While 

serving with the 101st Airborne Division, he had both his 

arms and legs broken by a booby-trapped hand-grenade 

back on 19 December 1968. He then spent an extended 

stay at Naval Hospital Portsmouth was assigned to light 

duty at Fort Bragg. He refused a medical discharge in 

1970 because he would only receive half his base pay. 

So he returned to Vietnam hoping to rejoin the 101st 

but his injures had him assigned to the 2nd Medium 

Truck instead. It did not take his first sergeant and 

company commander long to realize he was more of a 

hazard driving a truck than a help. It just so happened 

that SSG Lee had an opening in his gun truck platoon 

so the company commander interviewed Boyd about 

his previous infantry training and experience. In asking 

about his wounds, the captain learned the former 

infantryman had not received a Purple Heart Medal, 

combat infantryman’s badge or any other awards. So the 

Top: The convoy line up of the 523rd Transportation Company leaving for I Corps Tactical Zone. Courtesy of Don Voightritter.

Bottom: Fraiser, Baird and Callahan reconnoitering the route north along QL1. Courtesy of Don Voightritter.
The Participants 25

commander pushed through the paperwork and awarded 

Boyd his Purple Heart during a company formation. 

Because of his infantry background, SSG Lee put Boyd 

in charge of the care and inspection of the machineguns. 

His company also drove north, resting overnight at the 

Seabee camp at Da Nang then stopping at Hue.30

Up north, the two truck companies from Qui 

Nhon were attached to LTC Alvin C. “Big Al” Ellis’ 39th 

Transportation Battalion. There CPT Voightritter joined up 

with his 523rd Light Truck. Now that they fell under a new 

command, the 2nd and 523rd Transportation Companies 

received instructions to paint over the yellow stripe on the 

front hood of their trucks, which identified them 

as belonging to 8th Group. Ellis’ 39th Battalion already 

had four truck companies: the 515th Transportation 

Company (Light/Medium Cargo) at Phu Bai, the 585th 

Transportation Company (Medium Cargo) at Gia Le, the 

666th Transportation Company (Light Cargo) at Camp 

Evans, and the 805th Transportation Company (Light 

Truck) at Phu Bai. This battalion became known as 

“Big Al and his Money Makers.”31

Ellis selected the 515th Transportation Company 

(Light/Medium Cargo) to join the 523rd as one of two 

light truck companies to extend the supply line to Khe 

Sanh. It was stationed at Camp Eagle near Gia Le along 

with the 666th Transportation Company. The 515th 

“Road Runners” drove M-54A1 5-ton cargo trucks and 

like the 523rd had an interesting assortment of leaders.

1LT Cornelius Roger Maloney correctly anticipated 

that upon graduating from Gettysburg College he would 

end up going to Vietnam, so he enrolled in ROTC during 

his last two years, because he would rather give orders 

than take them. He ended up the cadet battalion 

commander at the school and was named Distinguished 

Military Graduate in 1969. Although he could apply for 

a Regular Army commission later, he chose a Reserve 

commission in the Transportation Corps because he 

Big Al Ellis assuming command of the 39th 

Transportation Battalion by accepting the colors 

from his sergeant major. Courtesy of Michael Lavin.

The 523rd Transportation Company climbing up 

Hai Van Pass. Courtesy of Don Voightritter.
26 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

wanted to fly helicopters. While 

attending the cargo officer’s 

course at Fort Eustis, he applied 

for flight school. Sears and 

Roebuck had granted him four 

years’ military leave to serve 

out his military obligation of 

two years active duty and four 

in the Reserve. Initially flight 

school took a year to complete 

followed with an additional 

two-year military obligation. 

While at Fort Eustis, Virginia, 

the Army increased the active 

duty commitment to four years, 

which was one year more than 

his leave and he was not so 

certain at that point he wanted 

to make the military a career. He assumed if he liked 

the Army and did his job well he could later apply for a 

Regular Army commission later and attend flight school. 

Roger Maloney had arrived in Cam Ranh Bay, 

Vietnam in September 1970, during the in-processing 

he wrote down Cam Ranh Bay as his first choice. As a 

cargo officer he was trained to work the piers, but was 

instead assigned to I Corps Tactical Zone, which was 

not even on his wish list. Roger flew on a C-130 into 

Da Nang, then rode a helicopter and a jeep to Phu Bai. 

There he ran into Bill Litton 

with whom he had attended 

the Transportation Officer Basic 

Course (TOBC, pronounced 

Tow-back). Bill showed him 

around Phu Bai and then 

Roger received orders to the 

515th Transportation Company 

at Camp Eagle. He did not 

remember what platoon he was 

assigned to since the officers 

rode on convoys regardless 

of what platoon the drivers 

came from. Upon his arrival, 

he was shown the company 

headquarters, where he would 

sleep, and then introduced 

to the platoon sergeants. 

He began riding on convoys the very next day and 

the NCOs taught him how to run convoys.

In preparation for the upcoming mission, LTC Ellis 

made several leadership changes in battalion to improve 

the 515th in December 1970. 1LT Lawrence J. “Larry” 

Hurley was a Transportation Corps officer who had 

served a year at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and attended 

jump school. He had arrived in Vietnam in September 

1970 and served as the battalion intelligence officer 

until assigned as a platoon leader to the 515th on 

2LT Don Bartletti of the 515th Transportation 

Company. Courtesy of Michael Lavin.

CPT Lavin and crew of Baby Sitters; Walter Crow, CPT Lavin, PFC Michael Boatwright, and Pete Aragon. 

Courtesy of Michael Lavin.
The Participants 27

1 December.32 He joined 2LT Don Bartletti who was a 

short, high energy and high pitched voice, infantry officer 

from sunny California that had arrived in the company 

just prior to Thanksgiving. 

The lieutenants were made convoy commanders of 

the larger convoys and those traveling farther than usual. 

The NCOs ran the shorter convoys. The 515th ran a lot 

of convoys to Phu Bai and down to Da Nang through the 

Hai Van Pass. They also picked up cargo at the Tan My 

Ramp at Hue. They would offload cargo from the LSTs 

and then haul the cargo out to the fire bases and a lot 

of ammunition to the ammo dump. When they went down 

to Da Nang, they hauled mostly frozen food on the big 

Sea Land refrigeration vans destined for the officer and 

NCO clubs. The 515th Transportation Company only had 

one gun truck, Baby Sitters, and Maloney liked to ride in 

it when he escorted convoys. He considered it an honor 

to ride in a gun truck. Hurley also liked to ride in the gun 

truck more because it had radios. SGT Roger Bittner 

was its NCOIC.

Then SP4 Bittner, a 22-year old draftee, had arrived 

at Cam Ranh Bay in June 1970 and after a couple of 

days in-processing, flew up to Phu Bai where he was 

assigned to the 515th. A week later he was promoted to 

sergeant. The company then assigned him as the NCOIC 

of Baby Sitters. The crew consisted of Gene Jones as 

the driver, Walter Crow from Texas was an M-60 gunner, 

Keith Shed M-60 gunner and Pete Aragon was another 

gunner. Bittner manned the .50. They carried three and 

a half pallets of ammunition on the floor. They always 

took an extra man with them in case a gunner was 

wounded and also took along a medic. Similar to all gun 

truck crews, they bonded into a special brotherhood. 

Day and night they always hung out together.33

Like his predecessors, Bittner learned the job 

by doing it, and fortunately he was a quick learner. If 

in contact, the gunners would respond to the enemy 

fire first. They would stop and lay down suppressive 

fire. They carried three and a half pallets of ammo on 

the floor of the truck, probably 50,000 rounds and 

there were many times they only had a few hundred 

rounds left after an ambush. They shot at anything and 

everything. Eighty percent of the time they could not 

see the enemy, but at night they could see the muzzle 

flashes. If anyone was hurt, they would quickly assess 

his injuries and then call in the medevac helicopter 

to get them out of danger as fast as they could.34

Since the 515th only had one gun truck, Baby 

Sitters escorted convoys over the most dangerous 

route. The enemy liked to set up ambushes along Hai 

Van Pass because the switchbacks slowed down the 

convoys making them easier targets. So 90 percent of 

the missions run by Baby Sitters were to Da Nang over 

the Hai Van Pass. Not only was the enemy a danger 

but many of the drivers would not properly tie their 

loads down, which would shift and fall off. The gun 

Medic Ted Fry standing in front of The Babby Sitters in Hai Van Pass. Courtesy of Ted Fry.
28 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

truck would then have to stay and provide security 

while the truck recovered the cargo. This would 

cause a late return.35

Returning at night was extremely dangerous 

because the ARVN strung concertina wire across the 

bridges at night, which required them to stop. There were 

an estimated 20 bridges going into Phu Bai. Whenever 

Brittner returned late, he would fire his .50 caliber in 

the air warning the ARVN bridge guards his convoy was 

approaching. That way they would have the bridge open 

by the time he arrived. He had no intention of waiting for 

the Vietnamese soldiers to open the bridge after dark, 

but intended to keep on driving.36

Although there was a requirement for a lieutenant 

to ride on the gun trucks, Brittner did not have much 

use for officers. The new ones, called “Cherry Boys,” 

did not know much more than he did, and if they did 

something stupid in combat, they were a hazard to 

everyone else. Sometimes while staging, he would just 

leave without the lieutenants because he did not want 

them on the convoy. What he wanted in an officer was 

someone who would work with the men without adhering 

to strict military rules. Brittner, however, hit it off with 

Maloney from the beginning. He also considered CPT 

Mike Lavin and some of the other lieutenants very good, 

but some unfortunately came over with the attitude 

that this was their war.37

The most important 

change to the company 

leadership came when 

LTC Ellis relieved the 

commander of the 515th 

after the company had 

failed its Command 

Maintenance Management 

Inspection (CMMI), an 

Inspector General (IG) 

Inspection and placed 

an Ordnance officer, CPT 

John M. “Mike” Lavin, in 

command on 1 December. 

Mike Lavin descended from 

veterans of the American 

Revolution and Civil War 

and had always wanted to 

serve in the military. With 

such a demand for captains, the Army automatically 

promoted officers to captain after only two years of 

service. Lavin was 25 years old when he assumed 

command of the 515th. Two years did not provide 

much military experience and the 515th had problems. 

Lavin first needed to quickly gain the support of 

his senior NCOs – staff sergeants and sergeants first 

class. So he called the company together and explained 

the rules. To show he meant business, he would issue 

an Article-15 punishment within 24 hours of any 

infraction or not at all. While on battalion staff, Lavin 

had worked on the plan for Lam Son and knew they 

did not have the luxury of time to resolve minor issues. 

By Christmas, he had issued about 20 Article-15s and 

no longer had any disciplinary issues. This won the 

trust of the senior NCOs. If a soldier refused to follow 

instructions, the NCO would threaten to take the soldier 

to the commanding officer. Knowing they would lose 

$40 of their meager 125 to 140 dollars a month 

encouraged them to obey orders.38

This did not endear him with everyone and one day 

Lavin received a phone call from an anonymous person 

who said he did not like what was going on and if the 

captain did not watch his back he would be “fragged.”39

Lavin did not worry about it, since he had to focus on 

getting the job done.40

After assuming command, CPT Mike Lavin liked to 

walk around his company 

area every night to see 

what was going on. One 

night he walked up the 

hill when a screen door of 

the NCO barracks swung 

opened in his face and 

the man holding the door 

open yelled to four soldiers 

sitting under the water 

tower, “Who’s next?” None 

of them answered but 

pointed with their fingers 

toward the captain behind 

the screen door. The 

soldier did not see Lavin, 

but asked again, “Come on, 

who’s next.” They just kept 

pointing. The man finally 

CPT Mike Lavin, Commander of the 515th Transportation 

Company, aka SP4 Smith on right. Courtesy of Michael Lavin.
The Participants 29

figured out they were not responding. He turned around, 

recognized the captain, saluted and said, “Oh, good 

evening, sir.” As Lavin stepped past the door, he saw 

to his left rear a Vietnamese prostitute cleaning herself. 

He then asked, “Well, who’s next?” and walked away. 

After that he put prostitutes off limits in the company, 

since he felt Vietnamese running around loose in the 

camp at night was a security risk.41

Lavin was not without humor though. While he 

was the adjutant on the 39th Transportation Battalion 

staff, the battalion held a Halloween party and MAJ 

William Beane dressed as Nero. So CPT Lavin wore 

red shorts with a cardboard “S” logo on his T-shirt. 

He was also the staff duty officer and performed his 

duties in the makeshift superman costume rather than 

change. Someone later gave him a blue T- shirt with 

the superman logo, so he occasionally wore it under his 

jungle fatigues while in command of the 515th. For that 

reason the men remembered him as “Superman,” and 

many did not remember his real name. They described 

him as having a heart of gold because they knew he 

cared about them. When he took command, Lavin placed 

a roster of the company dated 1 December 1970 in his 

duffel bag with the goal to keep everyone on it alive.42

Lavin was fond of his soldiers and by January 1971 

was earning their respect. If one was having a “short 

timer” party, he might enter the orderly room and ask 

the first sergeant, “Could Spec-4 Smith come to my 

short timer party?” The first sergeant would say he 

would ask SP4 Smith if he could attend. SP4 Smith 

was CPT Lavin’s alter ego. He had a jungle fatigue shirt 

with SP4 rank on it. If there was an enlisted party he 

wanted to attend, he would slip into the enlisted club 

about 2000 hours. Someone would ask, “Would Spec-4 

Smith like a beer or does he want a soda?” Lavin would 

drink his one token beer and then remove himself. He 

had done this three or four times and believed a mutual 

respect between officers and enlisted would later pay 

dividends in combat. 

Vietnam would once again prove that war was a 

young man’s business. Men barely out of their teens 

would risk their lives to deliver the goods needed to 

sustain the push into Laos. Men only a few years older 

at most would lead them. Fortunately for this final 

offensive, the truck companies had the right caliber of 

drivers, NCOs and junior officers to confront the enemy’s 

desperate effort to shut down this vital supply line.

CPT Don Voightritter with the company mascot, Tina. Courtesy of Don Voightritter.
30 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

1 Memo, 363rd Transportation Company (Medium Truck) Subject: National 

Defense Transportation Award, 19 May 1971. The NDTA Award claimed 

the company ran all the line haul missions, but the veterans admitted 

the other companies also hauled missions.

2 John Dragavon email to Richard Killblane, May 21, 2015.

3 CPT Earl B. Burch, Annual History of the 363rd Transportation Company 

(Medium Truck) period ending 31 December 1970, 26 March 1971.

4 John Dragavon email to Richard Killblane, May 21, 2015.

5 Edward Harvey email to Richard Killblane, May 29, 2015; and 

Roger Rahor email to Richard Killblane, August 18, 2004.

6 Edward Harvey email to John Dragavon, May 27, 2015, and email 

to Richard Killblane, May 29, 2015.

7 John Dragavon email to Richard Killblane, May 21, 2015.

8 Burch, 363rd Annual History 1970.

9 Burch, 363rd Annual History 1970; and Rahor email, August 18, 2004.

10 Regional Force/Provisional Force (RFPF).

11 John Dragavon email to Richard Killblane, May 21, 2015.

12 Robert L. Mitten interview by Richard Killblane in Lawrenceville, Va, 

on 17 June 2015. The conversation in the following paragraph is taken 

from this interview.

13 Vietnamese Police were called White Mice because of their 

white uniforms.

14 Rahor email to Richard Killblane, 18 August 2004; and Harvey 

email to Killblane, May 29, 2015.

15 Ralph Fuller interview by Richard Killblane at Ft Eustis, VA, 19 June 2004; 

and Jim Baird interview by Richard Killblane at Branson, Mo, 2006.

16 Fuller interview.

17 Chester Israel and Calvin Bennett interview by Richard Killblane 

at Pigeon Forge, TN, 9 September 2008.

18 Sammy Seay and Danny Cochran interview by Richard Killblane at 

Fort Eustis, Va, 14 June 2003.

19 David Rose telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 23 July 2013.

20 Rose interview, and Logan Werth interview by Richard Killblane at 

Fort Eustis, Va., 12 June 2003.

21 Israel and Bennett interview.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Israel and Bennett interview; and Fuller interview.

25 Israel and Bennett interview.

26 LTC (R) Richard Dan Hill, Proud of What I Was ... A Soldier,

Xlibris Corp., 2011.

27 Bill Hampton, “Gypsy Bandits Move to Quang Tri,” ATAV Web page, 

http://academic.uofs.edu/faculty/gramborw/atav/hampton.htm.

28 Israel and Bennett interview; Fuller interview.

29 Israel and Bennett interview; Fuller interview; and CPT Donald K. 

Voightritter letter to BG Alton G. Post, Subject: Item Contribution to 

the Transportation Museum, 31 May 1971.

30 David Boyd email to Richard Killblane, August 24, 2004.

31 Bill Wullenschneider letter to Wayne Chalker, January 29, 1984.

32 Larry Hurley interview by Richard Killblane at Kirkwood, Mo, 

28 June 2013; and LTC Alvin C. Ellis, Operational Report – Lessons 

Learned, 39th Transportation Battalion (Truck), Period Ending 

30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2), 4 May 1971. Hereafter referred 

to as the 39th ORLL.

33 Roger Bi...ttner interview by Richard Killblane at Kirkwood, Mo, 

28 June 2013.

34 Brittner interview.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Mike Lavin interview by Richard Killblane at Branson, Mo, 

17 June 2005; and Mike Lavin interview by Richard Killblane 

at Kirkwood, Mo, 29 June 2013.

39 Killed by a fragmentary hand grenade.

40 Lavin interview.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

CPT Lavin in Superman T-shirt at Halloween party, sitting next to CPT Vettedo and MAJ William Bean. 

Courtesy of Michael Lavin.
Preparations 31

Preparations

-Day for the operation would kick off on 30 January 1971 with everything - combat units with their support in 

tow - pushing down Route 9 toward Khe Sanh, which would serve as the Forward Support Activity 2. So as the 

day approached everyone rushed to get into place. This required a number of final preparatory measures and 

unit moves. Additional supplies had to be prepositioned and units involved in the offensive had to stage as far forward 

as possible. As early as two days prior (D -2), the 39th Transportation Battalion began convoy line haul operations from 

Quang Tri Combat Support Base (CSB) to the Forward Support Activity 1 at Camp Vandergrift. Quang Tri, therefore, 

became the staging point for the American units involved in the offensive. 

Although the medium truck companies could haul cargo up and down the coastal highway, Route 9 could not 

support the weight of tractors and trailers past Camp Vandergrift. Route 9 was a two-lane paved road all the way to 

Vandergrift. It cut through a valley of tall elephant grass up past the Rock Pile, a rocky outcrop that rose 210 meters 

above the surrounding terrain. From Vandergrift, a narrow, single lane, unimproved dirt road snaked along the ridge 

with a river anywhere from 50 to 100 feet below. The heavy tropical rains could cause the red clay road to cave way 

down the steep embankment below it. The demand for supplies, however, would require the two light truck companies 

to deliver cargo around the clock, day and night. To prevent driving off the road at night, the trucks would have to drive 

with their lights on giving the enemy ample warning of their approach. The steep slopes with thick jungle vegetation 

growing right up to the road made this ideal ambush country. With the commencement of Lam Son 719, the guerrillas 

D

Proof/Replace?
32 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

would step up the frequency and ferocity of their 

ambushes hoping to cut off the American support.

While the 2nd and 523rd were driving north, other 

truck companies had begun to build up the two forward 

support bases. The 57th Transportation Company 

(Light Truck) at Quang Tri was attached to the 63rd 

Maintenance Battalion. The 1st and 2nd Platoons had 

5-ton cargo trucks and the 3rd platoon had M-49C 

5,000 -gallon fuel trailers. The company had acquired 

the fuel tankers back in October 1969. The 57th was 

the only dedicated truck company that hauled fuel in 

Corps Tactical Zone. Barges would bring fuel in balloon 

bags to the Tam My Ramps at Dong Ha. The 57th would 

bring up tankers, fill up and haul the fuel back to the 

tank farm at Quang Tri. From there the tankers then 

made daily runs to Camp Carroll, Da Nang and other 

bases. When heading south the convoys received small 

arms fire going over Hai Van Pass where trucks had to 

slow down from 15 to 5 mph snaking 

up and down that mountain. They occasionally lost a 

couple of trucks to enemy fire, but lost many more when 

trucks hauling 5,000 gallons of fuel coming down the 

mountain lost their brakes. The convoys also received 

small arms fire near Phu Bai, where the 101st Airborne 

Division was stationed. To cross the single-lane railroad 

bridge converted for road traffic, the trucks sometimes 

parked on the side of the road for a half an hour until all 

the oncoming traffic had crossed. If hauling a van, the 

tractor had to cross that bridge perfectly or it would 

get stuck. Hauling fuel was the most difficult job for 

any truck driver.

The truck companies of the 8th Group, which ran 

on Route 19, were supposed to have six gun trucks 

but the truck companies up in I Corps did not have as 

many. The 57th only had three gun trucks: 1st Platoon 

had The Assassins, 2nd Platoon had The Protector, and 

3rd Platoon had The Justifier. When Claude “Robby” 

Roberson arrived in the 57th in January 1971, 

 

 Above: The 57th

 Transportation Company had both 

fuel tankers and 5 - ton cargo trucks. 

It would deliver fuel to Vandergrift. 

Courtesy of Paul Bader. 

Right: The railroad bridge was used for 

vehicular traffic. Courtesy of Paul Bader.
Preparations 33

the gun trucks impressed him. Robby had been an 

armored scout (MOS 11D) assigned to Germany. At the 

age of 17, the judge had given him the choice of enlisting 

or going to jail. Shortly after turning 18 he was levied for 

Vietnam and assigned to LT Gardner’s 3rd Platoon. The 

platoon sergeant assigned him to a truck and Robby 

explained he was an infantry scout and had never driven 

a truck before. The platoon sergeant said, “A convoy is 

leaving in an hour and you’ve got 45 minutes to learn.”1

The men respected their platoon leader and 

affectionately referred to Gardner as “LT.” He instructed 

his men, “Unless we’re around the order room or parade 

field, don’t salute me. When in the field I’m just like the 

rest of you guys.” The LT liked to ride in gun trucks. Prior 

to the move to Vandergrift, LT told his men, “We’re getting 

ready to go into an operation. I don’t know much about it, 

but I want my guys to stay alive.”2

SP5 Michael “Mike” 

McBride began his 

second tour with the 57th Light Truck Company in 

Vietnam in September 1970 and had served as a 

truck driver for the 25th Infantry Division down south 

at Cu Chi. He had been burned from his burning tanker 

during an ambush and during his recovery was offered 

an assignment to Fort Hood, Texas. Having heard bad 

things about Fort Hood, he preferred a second tour in 

Vietnam, but fortunately they sent him to sunny Fort 

Ord, California. He had earned a Bronze Star Medal for 

his performance in that ambush and began his tour 

with the 57th in September 1970. When the end of tour 

neared for a member of the gun truck, Protector, Mike 

was asked if he wanted to go on the gun truck because 

of his previous experience and rank. Mike accepted and 

learned the job while riding with the man he was going 

to replace. He became the NCOIC and manned the front 

gun and radio. Leroy Sherrill, Jr. was another gunner 

on the Protector.3

Meanwhile, the two light truck companies destined 

 

Top Center: The 57th 

Transportation Company had 

three gun trucks. Justifier as it looked 

during Lam Son 719. Courtesy of Paul Bader.

Above: The Assassins had sloping armor.

Courtesy of Paul Bader.

Above: The Protector and crew. Courtesy of Paul Bader.
34 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

to occupy Vandergrift staged for the move. CPT Lavin 

had gone on rest and recuperation (R&R) in late January 

when the 515th finally received orders to stage at Quang 

Tri. The company did not have an executive officer; but 

since Maloney was senior, he would serve as the acting 

company commander for the move north. He already 

knew they would participate in the upcoming operation 

since CPT Lavin had worked on the plan, but the date 

was secret. So LTC Ellis called him into his office and 

instructed the lieutenant to move three-quarters of the 

company and all their equipment from Camp Eagle to 

Quang Tri by the next evening. So Maloney assembled 

the NCOs to decide on who to take and who to leave 

behind, what trucks they would take and what they 

needed for maintenance. He left the decision of who 

remained behind to the platoon sergeants since they 

knew who they could count on and relied on their 

judgement on what they needed to make their 

operation work. Maloney trusted and depended 

on the judgement of his NCOs.4

The company then staged at Quang Tri and when 

CPT Lavin returned, he found only eight of his men left 

at Camp Eagle. Surprised, he asked his first sergeant, 

“Where to hell did the company go?”5 Lavin then caught 

up the company at Quang Tri and instructed Hurley to 

go reconnoiter Vandergrift. When the reconnoitering 

The convoy of the 523rd Transportation Company snaking 

its way down Hai Van Pass. Courtesy of Don Voightritter.

The trucks of the 523rd Transportation Company parked 

at Quang Tri waiting to head north. Courtesy of Don Voightritter.

The 523rd Transportation Company area while waiting at Quang Tri. Courtesy of Don Voightritter.
Preparations 35

party arrived, it was so dark Hurley could not see his 

hand in front of his face. There was nothing there except 

a Marine artillery detachment. He then spent a couple 

days selecting the real estate and laying out the camp 

that his company would call home.6

The 523rd joined the 39th Transportation 

Battalion just after the 515th had moved to Quang 

Tri. So Lavin sent Hurley down with three soldiers 

to Hue to meet the 523rd and escort the company 

to Quang Tri. There, Hurley recognized 1LT Ralph 

Fuller who he knew from jump school.7

The truck companies waited patiently for the 

maneuver units to make a combined ground 

and air assault to clear the road and secure the 

camps. In the early morning hours of 30 January, 

a mechanized infantry task force organized 

around the 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized 

Infantry Division launched a ground assault 

from Quang Tri along Route 9 and by the end 

of the day, the infantrymen occupied Khe Sanh. 

The 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry “Rakkasans,” of the 

101st Airborne Division then air assaulted into Khe 

Sanh, while the 3rd Air Cavalry Squadron; the 1st 

Battalion, 77th Armor; the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry; 

and the 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry linked up with 

them. The 5th Battalion, 4th Field Artillery and the 1st 

Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery then set up their fire base 

at the former Marine camp to provide indirect fire for 

the upcoming offensive. With everything in place, the 

1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division then assumed 

responsibility to keep Route 9 open.8

While the infantry and cavalry units secured the 

area, the Army engineers diligently worked to improve the 

road for vehicular traffic and clear it of mines and any 

other obstacles. The 7th and 14th Engineer Battalions 

upgraded the road, carved tank trails in the mountain, 

installed water points and improved the camps. A 

Company, 14th Engineers built ammunition storage 

areas, water blivet berms, vehicle staging areas at Camp 

Vandergrift while the 326th Engineers and a platoon of 

the 59th Engineer Company upgraded Route 9 to Khe 

Sanh. The 27th Engineers and the rest of the 59th 

Engineer Company continued improving the road to 

Laos. They also improved the runway at Khe Sanh.

 In spite of all their hard work, the road would still

 prove dangerous to vehicular traffic.9

At about 1000 hours in the morning of 31 January, the 

massive truck convoy finally left Quang Tri. The 515th and 

523rd Light Truck Companies traveled as one large convoy 

to Vandergrift with everything they needed to sustain 

operations. The drivers of the 523rd still had no idea of 

the nature of the upcoming operation. They 

assumed the move was 

Convoy of the 57th 

Transportation Company heading 

to Camp Vandergrift. Courtesy of Paul Bader.

the operation. Each time they stopped at a camp, they 

thought that might be their new home. However, the 

further they moved north the more nervous they became 

because they were approaching the demilitarized zone 

(DMZ) that separated North and South Vietnam. Some 

in the 523rd feared they were going to invade North 

Vietnam, so when the convoy turned west at Dong Ha 

and drove along Route 9, they finally relaxed.10

The Army Concept Team down in Long Bien rightly 

anticipated that Lam Son 719 would provide an excellent 

opportunity to study convoy security. The day after New 

Year’s, CPT Dan Hill flew up to Quang Tri City to attend 

the XXIV Corps briefing on the operation. He had been 

warned the Corps was conducting a major offensive 

operation with a high probability of convoy ambushes. 

The road to Camp Vandergirft was opened by midJanuary and to Khe Sanh on 30 January. On the morning 

of 31 January, the two-lane road heading west to 

Vandergrift became a complete gridlock with vehicles of 

the 5th Mechanized Infantry Division, Americal Division 

and 101st Airborne Division interspersed with trucks of 

the 515th and 523rd Transportation Companies.11

The massive convoy finally arrived at Vandergrift 
36 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

Above: Infantry and Armor occupied Camp Vandergrift first. 

Courtesy of Michael Lavin.

Right Top: Bunker of the 523rd 

Transportation Company at 

Camp Vandergrift. Courtesy of 

Don Voightritter.

Right Middle: Mess tent of the 

523rd Transportation Company 

at Camp Vandergrift. Courtesy of 

Don Voightritter.

Right Bottom: Captain Voightritter’s hooche at Camp Vandergrift. 

Courtesy of Don Voightritter.

Far Right Top: Truck drivers 

of the 515th Transportation 

Company unloading their trucks 

at Camp Vandergrift. Courtesy of 

Michael Lavin.

Far Right Bottom: Truck drivers 

of the 515th Transportation 

Company building bunkers 

at Vandergrift. 

Courtesy of Michael Lavin.
Preparations 37

where the paved road ended and the truck drivers found 

a wide open field cleared of vegetation by Agent Orange. 

There the drivers could at least erect tents and sleep 

above ground. The 523rd did not erect tents, but slept 

on cots beside their trucks. Gun truck crews slept in their 

gun boxes with their machineguns ready. The engineers 

brought in a dozer with a big scoop to dig out a hole and 

the drivers constructed bunkers with sandbags covering 

timber and perforated steel planking (PSP), used to 

build runways. Ten to 12 men lived in each bunker. 

The 515th set up a general purpose (GP) large tent for 

its headquarters but most of its drivers slept in the 

“Bedrock Hotel,” a large bunker also built with perforated 

steel planking (PSP), timber and sandbags. Lieutenants 

Hurley and Maloney dug a “Rat Hole” about four feet 

deep, big enough for two cots. They found some steel 

culvert material and covered it with sandbags. They lived 

there for the duration. Camp Vandergrift offered few 

amenities that previous camps had offered. In addition, 

the battalion felt that the engineer support failed to 

construct enough bunkers to protect the drivers against 

an enemy ground attack or heavy rocket barrage.12

The 57th Transportation Company also took up 

residence at Vandergrift where the drivers lived either 

in and under their trucks or in bunkers. Roberson liked 

to sleep on the canvas top of his truck when not under 

a mortar or rocket attack. The 57th learned it would 

run the first convoy to Khe Sanh since the Marines 

had abandoned it back in 1969. The fuel convoy 

was supposed to accompany the engineers and fill 

up the fuel bladders but stopped short of Khe Sanh 

because the engineers had not yet opened the road. 

Consequently, the convoy had to turn back to Vandergrift 

where the company would run daily convoys back and 

forth from Quang Tri to build up a marshalling area.13

The arrival at Vandergrift resulted in one immediate 

change in personnel assignment. On 1 February, SGT 

Chester Israel became the NCOIC of Satin’s Li’l Angel 

and Callahan told Chester to select his crew. Callahan’s 

driver, Richard B. Frazier, wanted to be a gunner. Frazier 

liked to call himself the “Montana Roughneck.” As the 

NCOIC, Chester would man the left .50 near the radio 

and picked Calvin Bennett to man the rear .50. He also 

recruited Robert W. Thorne as his driver, because he 

also had maintenance experience.14

The austerity of Vandergrift offered few amenities 
38 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

other than what the drivers brought with them. LTC Ellis 

told CPT Lavin he did not want any trucks returning to 

their home base at Camp Eagle. So Lavin just did not tell 

Ellis his company sent one truck back to Camp Eagle for 

soda, beer and other sundries to fill a refrigerator they 

had buried in the ground. The field mess needed ice, and 

the 515th kept half of any ice it delivered. The men then 

used this ice to cool the beer and soda, which they sold to 

raise money for the party at the end of the operation.15

As miserable as the living conditions would be, the 

soldiers surprisingly enjoyed one aspect of their stay 

at Vandergrift; they were left alone to do their job. They 

had no time for any kind of disciplinary infractions that 

disrupted the normal routine of camp life. There were 

no distractions from work and survival. Drivers were 

told where and when to pick up their loads and then 

take their place in the convoy. Life had become 

reduced to its simplest terms and in simplicity 

men found a form of bliss.

Roberson remembered there was no “Mickey 

Mouse” army stuff at Vandergrift. The drivers just did 

their duty. Nobody bothered them. Half the company 

was “pot heads” and the other half “juicers,” but at 

Vandergrift everyone did their job and watched each 

other’s backs.16

Top: GP Medium of the 515th Transportation Company at Camp 

Vandergrift. Courtesy of Michael Lavin.

Above: The 515th Transportation Company sold cold beer and 

soda at Camp Vandergirft to make money for a company party 

after the operation. Courtesy of Michael Lavin.

Right: M-60 tank at Camp Vandergirft. Courtesy of Michael Lavin.

1 Claude Roberson telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 22 July 2013.

2 Roberson interview.

3 Michael McBride interview by Richard Killblane at Ft Eustis, Va, 

9 July 2004.

4 Maloney interview.

5 Mike Lavin and others remembered their experiences before the Vietnam 

veteran reunion of the 515th at Kirkwood, Mo, 29 June 2013.

6 Hurley interview.

7 Ibid.

8 Robert Cody Phillips, Operation Lamson 719; The Laotian Incursion 

During the War in Vietnam, Masters Thesis, May 1979; and Ellis, 

39th ORLL.

9 Nolan, Into Laos. 10 Israel and Bennett interview.

11 Hill, A Soldier. 12 Lavin interview; Werth interview; Israel and Bennett interview, Ellis, 

39th ORLL.

13 McBride interview, and Roberson interview.

14 Israel interview.

15 Mike Lavin and others remembered their experiences at the Vietnam 

veteran reunion of the 515th at Kirkwood, Mo, 29 June 2013.

16 Claude Roberson telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 22 July 2013.
Preparations 39
40 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

Top: Tractor and trailer left behind by the Marine Corps near the pontoon bridge. Courtesy of Dan Hill. Right Middle: At the 

Rock Pile, QL9 turned south toward Camp Vandergrift. Courtesy of Michael Lavin. Right Bottom: Military pontoon bridge on 

QL9 one mile east of Vandergrift. Courtesy of Dan Hill. Left Bottom: QL9 heading west toward the Rock Pile. Courtesy of 

Michael Lavin. Insert: Fire Base Command and Control west of Vandergrift. Courtesy of Dan Hill.
Lam Son 719 41

Lam Son 719

nce the operation began, the enemy very quickly recognized the vulnerability of the narrow life line and the 

importance of logistics to operational success. All troop movements and supplies had to drive down this 

narrow, unimproved jungle road. If the enemy could shut it down then the whole operation would come to a 

standstill. So while the ARVN troops advanced toward the NVA logistical bases so vital to next year’s enemy offensive, 

the NVA conversely tried to sever the American and ARVN supply line. 

A two -lane paved road wound through a valley of tall elephant grass from Dong Ha to Vandergrift. Where Route 

9 turned south, a jungle covered rocky hill rose 210 meters (or 690 feet) out of the open plain north of the end in the 

road known to the soldiers as the “Rock Pile.” From Vandergrift, the narrow, single lane, clay road snaked along the 

ridge with a river 50 to 100 feet below. This unimproved road could only support 2 1⁄2 and 5-ton cargo trucks, so the 

demand for supplies required the two light truck companies to deliver cargo around the clock, both day and night. 

The conditions of the road only permitted tractors and trailers to deliver as far as Vandergrift.

O
42 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

Consequently, the tractors and trailers of the 

medium truck companies would push from Da Nang, 

Phu Bai and Quang Tri to Vandergrift where the two light 

truck companies would push it the rest of the way. On 

1 February, the two truck battalions commenced line 

haul operations between Da Nang and Vandergrift. The 

next day, the 39th Transportation Battalion extended 

the line haul mission to Khe Sanh and the 506th 

Transportation Detachment established a trailer transfer 

point at Forward Support Activity 2 at Khe Sanh. There 

the cargo handlers would expeditiously unload and 

load trucks with regular monotony in order to speed the 

flow of traffic. Meanwhile, the other truck companies 

of the 39th Transportation Battalion continued convoy 

operations from Phu Bai to Da Nang, clearing cargo from 

the Tan My Ramp and delivering it to Phu Bai and Quang 

Top: Port Tan My Ramp. Courtesy of Don Voightritter. 

Bottom: US Army Port Tan My. Courtesy of Don Voightritter. 

Top: The former Marine camp at Khe Sanh was overgrown 

with grass. Courtesy of Michael Lavin. Bottom: Parachutes 

hanging in the trees as ghostly reminders of the siege 

of Khe Sanh. Courtesy of Don Voightritter. 
Lam Son 719 43

Tri, clearing cargo from the Phu Bai railhead, and clearing 

cargo from the Dong Ha Ramp to Quang Tri.1

On 3 February, ARVN units finally arrived at Khe Sanh 

and the next day, American infantry and artillery occupied 

the abandoned border village of Tabat. On 8 February, ARVN 

troops crossed the border and invaded Laos. Their objective 

was to advance in a series of air assaults by the 1st ARVN 

Airborne Division and three ARVN Ranger battalions and 

ground pushes by the 1st ARVN Armored Division to the 

Tchepone with Route 9 as their supply route.2

CPT Hill remembered riding on the first logistical 

convoy to enter Khe Sanh on 5 February. Khe Sanh was 

an eerie place. No previous structures remained since 

the engineers had bulldozed the entire camp when the 

Parachutes in the trees. Courtesy of Michael Lavin. 

M48 tank at Khe Sanh. Coutesy of Michael Lavin.
44 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

Marines evacuated it years before. Only tall grass and 

thick red dust covered the area. Lots of little white 

parachutes from burnt out flares hung eerily in defoliated 

trees like ghostly reminders of previous battles. For this 

operation the engineers had cleared an area and C-130 

aircraft began to land on the once again operational air 

strip.3 Because of the unexploded ordnance left behind 

by the Marines, the engineers warned the truck drivers 

to stay within the designated cleared areas. The trucks 

off loaded their cargo onto the perforated steel planking 

(PSP) linked together to provide a hardstand 

for supplies. In spite of the warning, PFC Eugene 

Callahan decided to wander off several hundred 

yards from the defined area to relieve himself when he 

accidentally stepped on some ordnance that exploded, 

killing him. He was the first casualty among the truck 

drivers, but not the last. With the commencement of 

the ground phase of the operation, the sheer volume 

of traffic demanded the need for some kind of 

movement control.4

Top: Staging area at Khe Sanh. Courtesy of Michael Lavin. Bottom: Road to Khe Sanh. Courtesy of Michael Lavin. 
Lam Son 719 45

Since the road from Vandergrift westward was 

only one lane, the XXIV Corps G -4 established a Joint 

Movement Control Center (JMCC) to coordinate the 

movement schedule of US and ARVN forces on the road. 

The JMCC scheduled convoys and coordinated with the 

Military Police as far in advance as possible. The JMCC 

permitted individual vehicles, however, to infiltrate on 

the road during daylight hours depending upon the 

level of security.5

To control traffic at the two forward logistical 

nodes, the Joint Movements Control Center needed a 

Transportation Corps officer at both Vandergrift and Khe 

Sanh, so the tasking was sent to the 24th Transportation 

Battalion down at Cam Ranh Bay. The battalion 

commander selected 2LT Don Malmstrom and 1LT John 

Doyle. Malmstrom had been in country since August 

1970, and Doyle had transferred in from the 1st Brigade, 

5th Mechanized Infantry Division after extending his 

tour for an early drop on his active duty commitment. 

He had hoped to finish out his tour in Vietnam in the 

relative safety of Cam Ranh Bay, so returning to I Corps 

Tactical Zone did not make him happy. Malmstrom was 

picked because he was the only unmarried officer in 

the battalion. Both flew up to Da Nang where they met 

with MAJ Butler, a transportation officer from Saigon 

who would be their commander during the operation. 

Top: Landing strip at Khe Sanh. Courtesy of Michael Lavin. 

Bottom Left: Supply dump at Khe Sanh. Courtesy of Danny 

Cochran. Bottom Right: Crew of King Kong. Danny Cochran 

on the left. Courtesy of Danny Cochran.
46 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through
Lam Son 719 47

The next day they rode north in a jeep to Quang Tri. 

MAJ Butler continued on to Khe Sanh while the two 

lieutenants waited at Quang Tri. They then hitched a 

ride to Dong Ha where they spent the night with the 5th 

Mech. They asked around and no one seemed to know 

exactly what they were supposed to do, so they returned 

to Quang Tri. There they were told to go down the road 

and returned to Dong Ha where a colonel told them to 

“get your asses down that road.” MAJ Butler met them 

on the road outside Vandergrift and informed them that 

one would set up a convoy control point at Vandergrift 

and the other at Khe Sanh. Doyle wanted to stay at 

Vandergrift and Malmstrom wanted to see Khe Sanh 

since a friend had fought in the 1968 siege of the base.6

Malmstrom was assigned two Military Police 

specialists and a jeep with a radio. The lieutenant 

would report by radio directly to MAJ Butler at 

Vandergrift. Initially Khe Sanh did not have an area 

cleared for a staging yard, so convoys had to pull over 

to the side of the road and wait their turn to unload. 

Malmstrom complained to no avail, so he borrowed 

Top: Trucks of the 57th 

Transportation Company 

at Vandergrift. Courtesy of Paul Bader. 

Middle Left: Tankers pulling 

maintenance on M60 tank. 

Courtesy of Michael Lavin.

Middle Right: APC crews relaxing. 

Courtesy of Michael Lavin. 

Bottom: The road between Camp 

Vandergrift and the Laotian border

was a hazard. Courtesy of Michael Lavin.

Field mess at Vandergrift. Courtesy of Logan Werth.
48 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

the jeep and found engineers on the way to Vandergrift 

widening the road with dozers. Malmstrom explained 

to the engineer lieutenant that he needed three dozers 

to clear a 300 by 100 - foot staging area. The engineer 

officer said one Caterpillar dozer could clear that much 

area in one hour. A young engineer followed Malmstrom 

back and cleared the area in the northwest corner of 

the check point intersection. It turned out to be too 

small so the next day, Malmstrom returned and the 

engineer lieutenant sent another dozer to expand a 

second staging area. An ARVN infantry battalion landed 

by helicopter in one of his staging areas and claimed 

it was given to them as their base camp. This created 

friction between the ARVN soldiers and the truck drivers 

and one ARVN officer was beaten after snooping around 

the trucks. The truck drivers loved their trucks and had 

little regard for the ARVN soldiers. The ARVN battalion 

commander and his American advisor consequently 

tried to hold Malmstrom responsible for the discipline 

of the truck drivers while in the staging area, but 

Malmstrom explained the drivers answered to their 

own chain of command.7

The 515th and 523rd ran convoys both day and 

night, 18 to 20 -hour days and many drivers just slept 

Drivers cleaning the M-2 .50 caliber machinegun 

at Vandergrift. Courtesy of Michael Lavin. 

CPT Hill interviewing soldiers at Vandergrift. 

Courtesy of Dan Hill.
Lam Son 719 49

on their trucks. When they rolled in to unload, about five 

to six trucks would pull into to the unloading area and 

the drivers would fall asleep at the wheel of their trucks. 

Each vehicle would take about 30 minutes to unload and 

after that group was unloaded, the convoy commander 

or a gun truck crew member would wake the remaining 

drivers and have the next group pull into an area to be 

unloaded and the rest move forward. While the trucks 

were unloaded, the gun truck crews would pass the time 

cleaning weapons and changing tires. If there was no 

material handling equipment to unload the cargo then 

it was unloaded by hand at Firebase “Tailgate.”8

Khe Sanh became the forward-most logistic base 

for operations and over the next couple weeks it rapidly 

grew into a major supply dump, but the living conditions 

remained very austere. Since it was only a turnaround point for convoys, living conditions were not 

an improvement over those at Vandergrift. At Khe 

Sanh, the men simply dug holes and lived like moles 

when they remained overnight.

Chester Israel drove back and forth to Khe Sanh 

for a week never knowing they supported an offensive 

operation. The 523rd had made so many moves, the 

drivers naturally assumed they would make a night move 

to Khe Sanh and then keep moving west. Fortunately 

Vandergrift was the last move for the 515th and 523rd 

until that operation was over.9

While the 39th Transportation Battalion extended 

its route westward, the 57th Battalion likewise extended 

its route northward. This required a couple of its truck 

companies to shift northward in order to extend the 

supply line. To better supervise the southern leg of the 

line haul operation, the 57th Transportation Battalion 

would likewise move its headquarters northward. 

CPT Walter Anderson’s 563rd Medium Truck Company 

accompanied the battalion headquarters from Chu Lai 

up to Phu Bai to assume control of truck companies 

there. Anderson’s company had six gun trucks: The 

Preacher, The Lifer, War Monger, Peace Maker, The 

Private, and Smiling Death. All his platoon leaders 

were Transportation Corps lieutenants but, typical of 

other truck companies, he picked up additional officers 

from other branches. Anderson received one Engineer 

officer and several Infantry officers, who he assigned 

as commanders of gun trucks. The Infantry officers 

definitely liked riding on the hardened trucks better 

than walking on the ground.10

During the 563rd’s first night at Phu Bai, the 

enemy probed their perimeter making them glad they 

posted gun trucks on the perimeter. That night, the 

57th Battalion also asked for volunteers to lead a night 

convoy from Phu Bai to Camp Vandergrift. As their 

first night convoy, it was a frightening experience. So 

CPT Anderson and LT Al Jones volunteered to lead it. 

Entrance to Khe Sanh. Courtesy of Danny Cochran.
50 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

Since Anderson had not driven the road, he did not 

know where the obstacles and trouble spots were. 

Consequently, night convoys became the norm.11

Anderson’s 563rd Medium Truck Company remained 

at Phu Bai for a week and a half. Each night the battalion 

sent out one convoy and each serial was no larger 

than 20 vehicles including gun trucks with a 15 minute 

interval. None of the officers of the 563rd Medium Truck 

were made convoy commanders, but were allowed to 

ride in the gun trucks though. During the first week 

and a half, the convoys only ran into two ambushes 

and fortunately they were short and quick. During 

one, the enemy opened up with RPGs and .51 caliber 

machineguns destroying the lead fuel tanker and 

then fled the area.12

CPT Burch’s 363rd Medium Truck Company moved 

to Red Beach, Camp Haskins on the north side of Da 

Nang. After a week and a half, the 563rd Medium Truck 

returned with its three gun trucks, but left some tractors 

and trailers at Phu Bai. The 363rd Medium Truck then 

resumed its normal runs in support of the Americal 

Division. During Lam Son 719, the 363rd seemed to run 

more convoys north to Quang Tri where they encountered 

their counterparts from other truck companies, including 

the 563rd Medium Truck Company. The 572nd Medium 

Truck moved up from Long Binh in January where 

the lieutenants of the 363rd met up with LT Stafford. 

1LT Dragavon also ran into a fellow lieutenant he knew 

from Transportation Officer Basic Course, Wiley Williams. 

The shuffling of truck companies provided a reunion 

of sorts as many of lieutenants had come in the Army 

about the same time and attended the same courses.13

When not out escorting convoys, gun trucks provided 

perimeter security with a man on the guns at all times. 

There were always reports the enemy was going to 

Top: Courtesy of Logan Werth. Bottom: Courtesy of Michael Lavin.
Lam Son 719 51

attack. “June Bugs” were Transportation soldiers that 

went out at night with a radio and set up claymores 

outside the perimeter. One night the team went out, 

reported lots of movement and finally blew 

the claymores. The battle damage assessment 

revealed they had killed monkeys.14

The ARVN convoys had priority of use of Route 9 

during the day, so the American convoys ran mostly 

at night. To prevent driving off the road at night, the 

trucks rolled with their lights on giving the enemy 

ample warning of their approach. The steep slopes 

with thick jungle vegetation growing right up to the road 

made this ideal ambush terrain. During Lam Son, the 

guerrillas stepped up the frequency and ferocity of their 

ambushes hoping to starve off the American support. 

The 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Infantry Division had 

responsibility for the security of that section of the road 

from Vandergrift to Khe Sanh, but no matter how hard 

they tried, they could not secure the entire route. 

Due the inability of the infantry to secure the main 

supply route and the shortage of internal gun trucks, 

the 39th Transportation Battalion borrowed four M -113 

armored personnel carriers (APC) from the 1st Brigade, 

5th Mechanized Infantry Division for convoy security. 

Because the 515th had only one gun truck, it received 

one M -113 and CPT Lavin liked to ride it back and 

forth to Khe Sanh.15

Left: Changing tires in the rain and mud. 

Courtesy of Michael Lavin. 

Below: CPT Lavin liked riding around in the APC. 

Courtesy of Michael Lavin. 
52 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

Because the 57th Transportation Company only 

had three gun trucks, it also received an APC with 

a turret-mounted .50 on front and two left and right 

M-60s in the open hatch in the back. SGT Mike 

McBride, former NCOIC of The Protector, was assigned 

to it, and picked Leroy Sherrill and another kid named 

Spears, as his gunners. Since the convoys ran at about 

25 mph due to the condition of Route 9, the APC had no 

problem keeping up. Besides the normal pot holes, the 

road was scarred with 

B-52 bomb craters. The 

B- 52s carpet bombed 

suspected enemy 

positions and supply 

routes. One morning while 

Mike and his men were 

cleaning the weapons, the 

ground started shaking 

and they looked up to 

see the bombs falling out 

of B -52s. The biggest 

problem of APCs running 

with convoys everyday 

was maintenance. 

Tracked vehicles were not designed for continuous 

driving like wheeled vehicles. Mike was lucky that his 

APC never “threw a track” because his crew consisted 

of truck drivers who did not know how to replace the 

track on the road wheels.16

One night an M - 88 tracked recovery vehicle threw 

a track by a bridge eight to ten kilometers near Khe 

Sanh. The commander of the 57th Light Truck Company 

sent Mike’s APC out alone at night to secure the M - 88. 

Because the 57th and 515th Transportation Companies did not have many gun trucks, the infantry loaned them M -113 Armored 

Personnel Carriers. The 515th named theirs Cracker Box and its replacement, Cracker Box II. Courtesy of Michael Lavin. 

Drivers cooling off in the river below Vandergrift. Courtesy of Danny Cochran.
Lam Son 719 53

McBride called back on the radio to let the commander 

know they had arrived. It was pitch black and he and his 

crew were scared. On the hillside they saw a flashlight 

blinking, then another flashlight blinking. He called in that 

there were people out there signaling back and forth. The 

captain told Mike to wait and he would check to see if 

those were other Americans out there. Mike called again 

and told him they had a lot more movement around there 

to which they were finally told to turn around and “beat 

feet” out of there. The APC had traveled half a kilometer 

when someone opened up on it with small arms fire. 

The crew of the APC returned fire and continued to 

Vandergrift. Mike was more scared waiting than when 

he was ambushed. His crew went to sleep in the APC 

but was awaken by mortar fire, which destroyed 

another bunker.17

The morning of 7 February, BG Sweeney called 

COL Richard Morton, Commander of 8th Transportation 

Group down at Qui Nhon, and told him a Beechcraft L-23 

Seminole would land at his base at 1400 hours to fly him 

up to Quang Tri. COL Morton took his sergeant major with 

him and wondered what was so pressing that needed to 

take him away from his duties in Qui Nhon. Upon arrival, 

they met with COL Emil Konopnicki, Commander of the 

26th General Support Command. The next morning, BG 

Sweeney flew in to discuss the problem. Morton quickly 

learned from Konopnicki the road was in shambles 

and getting worse. So over the next two days, Sweeney, 

Morton and Konopnicki flew in Sweeney’s helicopter 

from Camp Eagle to Vandergrift, to Khe Sanh and then 

to Lang Vei to assess the complexity of the problem.18

Because of the size and complexity of the line 

haul operation, US Army Support Command, Da Nang 

required a dedicated truck headquarters to manage 

it. So the 8th Transportation Group would move its 

headquarters from Qui Nhon to trailer vans in an empty 

field at Quang Tri and assume command of the 39th and 

57th Transportation Battalions from the 26th General 

Support Group in addition to the 8th Group’s three 

battalions still in Northern II Corps. Thus, the 8th Group 

supervised five truck battalions and convoy operations 

in two corps tactical zones on the most heavily 

contested roads in Vietnam. No other transportation 

group embraced such responsibility. 

For the first week of the operation, the convoys ran 

without any interference from the enemy causing leaders 

to wonder why. CPT Hill received word that three senior 

officers of ACTIV were flying up to Dong Ha to observe 

Two M-88 tracked recovery vehicles at Vandergrift. Courtesy of Michael Lavin.
54 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

the operation. He went over to the 5th Mechanized 

Infantry Division and convinced a maintenance warrant 

officer to loan him a jeep. The warrant officer gave him 

a beat up jeep with a leaky radiator. Hill picked up COL 

Robert Johnson, LTC Peterson and an Australian major 

named Russell. About halfway to Vandergrift, they 

stopped to fill the radiator with water. COL Johnson was 

examining the countryside when he walked up to Hill 

and said, “We need to get moving quickly. Don’t look up 

quickly, but slowly glance up the hillside and you’ll see 

firing lanes have been cut into the vegetation.” Evidently 

the enemy had prepared a kill zone and they had 

unwittingly stopped in it. Hill decided the radiator had 

enough water to get them to Vandergrift and left. 

He reported what they had seen to the leaders at 

Vandergrift and thought nothing more of it.19

After their visit to Vandergrift, CPT Hill drove his VIPs 

to the airfield at the Quang Tri and dropped them off for 

their flight back to Long Bien. He then drove to Dong Ha 

to return the jeep. Needing a ride back to Vandergrift, 

CPT Dan Hill, COL Robert Johnson, MAJ Russell and the borrowed jeep. Courtesy of Dan Hill.

Ace of Spades. Courtesy of Danny Cochran.
Lam Son 719 55

he caught a ride with a passing convoy of fuel tankers 

that had formed up at Dong Ha. He climbed into a gun 

truck and the convoy left about midnight 7 February. 

He had traveled north to witness ambushes and he 

would find one.20

Bad weather prevented C -130 Hercules from flying 

desperately needed JP4 aviation fuel bladders into Khe 

Sanh for the start of the offensive. So on 7 February, 

the 57th Transportation Company sent a small convoy 

of tractors hauling empty M - 49C 5,000 - gallon fuel 

trailers to see if they could negotiate the narrow road to 

Khe Sanh. The captain arrived enthusiastic that the test 

worked.21 Later that day, three gun trucks and an M -113 

escorted a convoy 

of fifteen to twenty -

four 5,000 - gallon 

fuel trailers of the 3rd 

Platoon of the 57th 

Transportation Company 

to Vandergrift. The 

convoy departed Quang 

Tri at dusk. The gun 

trucks came from three 

different companies.22

The lead truck was a 

regular cargo truck, that 

knew the route, followed 

by cargo truck, that 

knew the route, followed 

five more tankers. CPT 

Hill and SGT Brittner 

remembered the Ace of 

Spades from the 523rd 

Light Truck Company was in the convoy. The Ace had 

both right and left front mounted .50s and rear twin 

.50s mounted on a pedestal. It had the unique double 

steel wall design with filler material in between the walls 

to reduce the blast effect of an RPG. The entire bed of 

the gun box was covered with cans of M-2 .50 caliber 

ammunition. Coming up from Route 19 in the Central 

Highlands, the crew of the Ace had plenty of combat 

experience. These gunners from 8th Transportation 

Group used spraying fire instead of short three to 

six-round bursts. So they would easily run out of 

ammunition in ten minutes of steady firing.

The Protector belonged to the fuel platoon of the 

57th Transportation Company and was the second gun 

truck in line of march. It had two side mounted M - 60s 

and a rear pedestal-mounted M -2 .50 caliber machine 

gun. SGT Healy’s crew of The Protector consisted of 

Sam Bass manning the .50 and Kurtz as the driver. SP4 

Charles H. Soule was not a regular crew member, but 

had wanted to go out on a gun truck so an M - 60 

gunner allowed him to take his place. LT Sam Hoskins 

was riding as the officer in charge of the gun truck and 

LT Ernie Stafford, of the 572nd “Gypsy Bandits,” was 

just hitchhiking on a convoy. The next gun truck in line 

was The Baby Sitters, which belonged to the 515th 

Light Truck Company.23

The 515th only had 

one gun truck, The 

Baby Sitters, armed 

with a forward and rear 

pedestal - mounted M -2 

.50 caliber machine 

gun and two side -

mounted M - 60s. SGT 

Roger Brittner had 

been the NCOIC of the 

gun truck since his 

arrival in Vietnam last 

June. Brittner’s crew 

had joined about the 

same time he had, 

which consisted of 

Gene Jones as the 

driver, Walter Crow from 

Texas was an M- 60 

gunner, Keith Shed the 

other M - 60 gunner and Pete Aragon had the rear .50. 

Brittner manned the forward .50. The gun truck also 

carried M79s and LAWs and about 10,000 to 15,000 

rounds per machine gun. The gunners either fired short 

bursts or spraying fire depending upon the situation or 

how the gunner felt at the time. They had just rebuilt 

the gun truck in December with a new 5 - ton, ballistic 

glass, single wall of 1⁄2 -inch armor plating and added 

the rear .50. Most of their previous enemy contact had 

occurred in Hai Van Pass but nothing like what they 

would experience that night. Brittner did not have much 

use for officers, but hit it off with 1LT Roger Maloney who 

had joined the company in September. Maloney liked 

Protector after the ambush. Courtesy of Paul Bader.
56 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

riding in gun trucks and was riding in The Baby Sitters 

that night.24

Maloney remembered The Baby Sitters was up front 

that night but Brittner remembered it was behind The 

Protector with ten trucks and two gun trucks ahead of 

it. There were five tankers between each gun truck 

with an APC in the rear.

With gun trucks from three different companies, 

each had different policies for reaction to contact. The 

515th policy was for every truck to clear the kill zone; 

even the vehicles not in the kill zone were going to drive 

through it. The 523rd policy was for only the vehicles in 

the kill zone to clear it, and the gun trucks would remain 

in the kill zone to protect any drivers in the kill zone. 

The convoy halted by the Rock Pile to reestablish 

their interval. Not too far away parked a couple M -113 

scouts from the 1st Battalion, 77th Armor of the 5th 

Mechanized Infantry Division. Suddenly, the convoy 

received a couple mortar rounds and Maloney saw the 

muzzle flash from the back side of the hill, so he moved 

the convoy further down the road. The Rock Pile was 

on the right side of the road and there was a bend in 

the road that took a sharp turn to the left. The convoy 

continued down into a draw, crossed the bridge and 

staged up again near a short bridge with embankments 

on both sides. As the convoy slowed down to negotiate 

Above: Fuel tanker system in ambush. Courtesy of Don 

Voightritter. Below: Fuel tanker system in ambush. Courtesy 

of Don Voightritter..

QL9 where the ambush occurred on 7 February. Courtesy of Michael Lavin.
Lam Son 719 57

the sharp bend in the road at 

0115 hours, it was then hit by 

intense small arms fire from 

tall grass mostly on the right 

(passenger) side.25

The enemy hit the front 

of the column as if they 

knew what the convoy was 

hauling. The enemy hit a 

couple of tankers from the 

right (passenger) side of 

the road and they 

exploded. The kill zone 

contained the vehicles 

between the lead truck 

and The Baby Sitters. 

In the dark, the gunners 

could see the muzzle 

flash and green tracers. 

Maloney fired M -79 

grenades as fast as he 

could while everyone 

else blasted away. So 

Brittner swung his .50 

around while firing and 

shot out the antenna 

causing him to lose radio 

communication with 

everyone else.26

An RPG slammed into driver’s side of The 

Protector killing Soule, blew the rest of the crew out 

and blinded LT Stafford in back. The enemy poured 

small arms, rockets and mortars into three different 

parts of the convoy setting three tankers on fire. Brittner 

saw a lieutenant in The Protector stand up when the 

second or third tanker was hit; he then fell down as if 

he had melted. Brittner did not like lieutenants on gun 

trucks, because he did not trust them to keep their 

heads down.27

The enemy destroyed The Protector and three 

fuel tankers behind it had exploded. The Baby Sitters, 

however, cleared the kill zone with 10 -12 holes and a 

couple flat tires on the right side. The one-way road 

was so narrow there was no place anyone could drive 

past the tankers except a place next to the bridge wide 

enough for a truck to park. McBride’s APC in the rear 

was undamaged. The sound of explosions startled the 

1/77 Armor scouts at the security check point by the 

Rock Pile. The scouts looked to their west and saw a 

ball of fire illuminate the area followed by the sound of 

small arms fire. They cranked up their APCs and saw a 

lone APC speeding away from the kill zone. LT Revelak 

ordered his APC into the kill zone where they saw three 

burning fuel tankers, one of which had run over the 

embankment. SP4 Harold Spurgeon saw figures moving 

in the brush but could not distinguish friend from foe 

so he held his fire. The tracks advanced further into the 

kill zone and Spurgeon looked down. He saw a soldier 

wearing a helmet running alongside yelling at him, but 

could not hear what he was saying. He later learned the 

guy was warning them not to enter the kill zone. Revelak 

yelled at his scouts to open fire and they sprayed the 

sides of the road. They drove past burning trucks and 

across a bridge then saw a burning gun truck ahead of 

Close up view of damage to Protector. 

Courtesy of Paul Bader.
58 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

them. Spurgeon saw what he thought was a baldheaded 

NVA soldier crawling in a ditch ten feet from his APC and 

was about to shoot him with his M -60 when he realized 

it was an African - American soldier.28

As the APC rolled further into the kill zone, another 

soldier emerged from the shadows and ran at a crouch 

beside his APC yelling something up at the crew, which 

they could not hear. When the track pulled up next to the 

gun truck, its machineguns hung down and the gun truck 

appeared empty and lifeless. They saw nothing past this 

point, so the APC pivot steered in the road and headed 

back. The lieutenant yelled at his crew to open fire again. 

They then stopped and dismounted in the kill zone next 

to one burnt out truck and four others riddled with bullet 

holes. All the drivers were missing.29

The Baby Sitters sat at the bridge letting the other 

trucks pass. Brittner remembered guilt took over so he 

wanted to go back in because it was the right thing to 

do. Maloney remembered telling Brittner and the driver, 

Gene Jones, they had to go back and help the others 

because the trucks were getting hammered. They then 

had to figure out how to turn around on a narrow road in 

the dark and get back in the kill zone. By the time The 

Baby Sitters returned, the enemy had broken contact. 

The Baby Sitters found five or six wounded drivers in 

a ditch beside the road and could hear enemy voices 

out in the bush.30

Meanwhile, the medevac came in to take away the 

wounded. It seemed like it took forever for the medevac 

to come in because the area still received sporadic 

small arms fire. After they loaded the wounded in the 

helicopter, the convoy continued on to Vandergrift.31

The Baby Sitters had to figure out how to get a 

burning tanker off the road. Because the road was so 

narrow, there was no room to pass the disabled trucks 

so drivers could jump on passing vehicles. So the trucks 

in the rear of the convoy picked up drivers from five 

damaged trucks and drove in reverse back to Quang Tri.

32

Maloney remembered CPT Ken Colucci, of the 

585th Transportation Company at Vandergrift, came to 

Maloney and said he had one driver unaccounted for. 

So Maloney and CPT Colucci took The Baby Sitters 

back into the kill zone. There were at least two or three 

burning tankers still in the kill zone. Maloney jumped up 

on the running board of one and swore he saw the driver 

in there. However, he was not. The injured driver had 

escaped the vehicle and another truck drove him to the 

medevac station at Vandergrift. The convoy delayed at 

The artillery firebase at Khe Sanh. Courtesy of Michael Lavin.
Lam Son 719 59

Vandergrift for a couple of days then continued on to Khe 

Sanh delivering its load of vital aviation fuel. BG Arthur H. 

Sweeney, Jr., Commander of US Army Support Command, 

Da Nang was waiting for them at 

the gate.33

A fuel convoy was ambushed the next night and the 

tankers sustained damage on the underside of the tanks 

indicating the enemy engagement 

had been at very close range. 

Despite the patrolling by the 

mechanized infantry, the enemy 

was able to infiltrate within close 

range of the road. The Rock Pile, 

Check Points 6 and 44 proved to 

be the enemy’s favorite locations 

for ambushes. While the friendly 

forces in the area may not have 

deterred enemy ambushes, it 

prevented the gun trucks from 

conducting reconnaissance by 

fire for fear of accidently hitting 

friendly troops. The frequent 

rainy weather also prevented 

the use of Cobra gunships 

as escorts. So the convoys 

 had to rely mainly on their

 gun trucks for immediate security.34

The convoy had nine wounded and Charles H. Soule 

killed. One gun truck was destroyed, and three tankers 

Constructing sleeping bunkers at Vandergrift. Courtesy of Logan Werth.

After repairs, the crew renamed

Protector the Executioner. Courtesy of Paul Bader.
60 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

and two other gun trucks were damaged. The Protector 

was repaired and renamed the Executioner. The 57th 

Transportation Company never tried to send fuel tankers 

to Khe Sanh again, because the road did not allow for 

vehicles to pass in the event of an ambush. From then on, 

the 57th ran day convoys from Quang Tri to Da Nang.35

The convoy dela this ambush hinted at the increasing

danger that awaited the truck drivers for the rest of the 

operation. The elephant grass provided the enemy ample 

concealment so they could approach right up to the side 

of the road. As the convoys of the 8th Transportation 

Group had learned in An Khe Pass, areas flanked by 

tall elephant grass where convoys had to slow down 

made good kill zones. Deliberately stopping in an area 

that provided similar concealment for the enemy invited 

trouble. While the interval at the time of the halt was 

not known, the initial kill zone included four vehicles. 

Because the 515th had never faced an ambush on 

this scale before, the policy of clearing the kill zone left 

disabled trucks and their drivers undefended in the kill 

515th Transportation Company award ceremony. Courtesy of Michael Lavin.

515th Transportation Company award ceremony. Courtesy of Michael Lavin.
Lam Son 719 61

zone for a short period. Fortunately, the APC of a nearby 

check point arrived in short order to defend the truck 

drivers of the damaged vehicles. The crew of The Baby 

Sitters made the right decision to turn back into the kill 

zone, but passing trucks escaping the kill zone on that 

narrow road delayed its return. This same stretch of dirt 

road between the Rock Pile and Vandergrift, however, 

would be the scene of another costly convoy ambush 

two weeks later. The next time, the enemy would attack 

a convoy of the 523rd, a hardened veteran of 

Route 19 ambushes.

Besides the deteriorating condition of the road, COL 

Morton considered the elephant grass growing right up to 

the road as a serious threat to the convoys, since it could 

conceal the enemy all the way up to the side of the road. 

Falling back on his experience along Route 19, Morton 

requested a Rome plow to clear the vegetation away from 

the road and to assign combat units along sectors of the 

road. He did not receive any reason why the engineers 

were not available, and the infantry explained the best 

way to defend the road was to push the enemy deep into 

the countryside. In concept, taking the offensive against 

the enemy made sense, but reality had shown along 

Route 19 that offensive operations could not keep a 

determined enemy away from the road.36

The XXIV Corps Commander, LTG James W. 

Sutherland, Jr., made an agreement with the ARVN that 

the Americans would deliver 100 vehicles per day into 

Khe Sanh. The ARVN stationed a colonel at Khe Sanh 

counting trucks to make sure they had at least 100 

trucks. If the convoy had one less than 100 vehicles, he 

raised hell. So the 515th and 523rd sent up 100 trucks 

whether they carried cargo or not. Some drivers risked 

their lives hauling nothing. The soldiers blamed LTC Ellis 

for this, but he was just as upset about it as they were.37

Meanwhile, the ARVN advanced toward their 

objective. On 10 February, the bad weather finally 

cleared. ARVN airborne forces landed at Objective Aluoi 

and the armored forces linked up with them. The NVA 

then began committing more divisions against the ARVN 

and the incursion ground to a halt. The NVA began to 

surround and overwhelm the Ranger landing zones.

With the Laotian incursion in full swing, the enemy 

increased their attacks in order to shut down the flow 

of supplies to this operation. The VC stepped up the 

number of attacks in the Hai Van Pass. There was rarely 

a day that did not go by that the VC did not fire on the 

convoys traveling through the Pass. Slowing down to 

negotiate the switchbacks, the trucks made better 

targets to mortar, rocket and small arms fire. The VC 

would often wait until the convoys were driving up the 

northern side of the mountain from Phu Bai. Observation 

helicopters and “Birddogs” observation aircraft usually 

accompanied the convoys through the Pass and called 

in Cobra attack helicopters when enemy contact was 

made. Anderson’s 563rd Medium Truck Company had 

to modify their gun trucks because the enemy in Hai 

Van Pass might hide in the culverts just five feet below 

the road, so the gunners needed to be able to depress 

their machineguns. They moved the machineguns from 

Maintenance area at Vandergrift. Courtesy of Logan Werth.
62 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

pedestals in the middle of the gun box to pedestals 

welded on the sides.38

In the beginning, enemy attacks on convoys were 

small scale but frequent. Any time a convoy drove 

by the Rock Pile from Dong Ha to Vandergrift, it was 

shot at and usually the convoys just accelerated. One 

afternoon, Fuller rode on Uncle Meat in the rear of the 

convoy heading toward 

Vandergrift. They 

received fire and Meat’s 

left front tire was hit 

and went flat. So Fuller 

radioed ahead for the 

convoy to continue on, 

and informed whoever 

was in the convoy to 

take charge. Uncle Meat 

stopped with an open 

field to its right and an 

embankment to its left. 

The driver, David Rose, 

and one of the crew 

members were changing 

the tire while Fuller and 

the rest manned the 

guns. David said something 

to Fuller who lifted his helmet when a B - 40 rocket 

flew past the lieutenant, struck the hillside, causing 

everybody to instinctively drop down. Fuller received a 

small piece of shrapnel in the back of his head, and one 

crew member joked, “Oh, hey, sir, you get a slow reaction 

badge [Purple Heart Medal] now.” Fuller responded, 

“No way, and don’t tell anybody about it.”39

They then started receiving heavier contact and a 

Forward Air Controller (FAC) flying overhead came on 

station and asked, “Do you need anything down there.” 

Fuller replied, “Yeah. We’d like a little support. What’ve 

you got?” He said, “I’ve got the world up here. I’ve got 

all kinds of radios. What would you like?” To which Fuller 

said, “Well, I’d like to light up this tree line over here 

because we’re receiving fire from it. “The lieutenant 

popped a smoke grenade, relayed the grid coordinates, 

and the pilot asked, “Would you like a little napalm?” 

“I would just love it,” answered Fuller and he called in 

a napalm strike. The crew of Meat changed the tire 

changed and then caught up with the convoy.40

On another ambush, King Kong and Uncle Meat 

escorted a convoy to Khe Sanh where the enemy hit a 

cargo truck and set a fuel tanker on fire. The next driver 

stopped his truck and exited his vehicle. King Kong 

turned back and raced into the kill zone. They made the 

driver climb back into his truck and lead the rest of the 

convoy through the kill zone because there was no room 

to turn around. Someone 

radioed that they thought 

a driver was left in the 

kill zone, so Kong drove 

back to look for him. They 

could not find a driver 

since he had already 

been picked up, so Kong 

turned around, but about 

that time mortar rounds 

began to fall in the kill 

zone behind Kong. They 

landed close to Uncle 

Meat that was bringing 

up the rear and splashed 

mud on its armor.41

Southerly convoys to Chu 

Lai also ran into trouble. 

The VC would incite the 

Captured B - 40 rocket. Courtesy of Don Voightritter.

Waterfall area of Hai Van Pass with the ARVN check point. 

Courtesy of Don Voightritter.
Lam Son 719 63

local civilians to cause trouble. They might have someone 

in a crowded town push an old lady or small child into the 

path of an approaching 5-ton. The 19 to 20 year olds had 

enough trouble driving huge overloaded trucks through 

crowded towns and cities. Kids would drop fragmentation 

grenades with the handles taped and the pins pulled 

into the fuel tanks of the trucks when they stopped near 

populated areas. The fuel would dissolve the tape and 

the grenade would explode. Fortunate drivers would 

find these in fuel tank filters at night while topping 

off their tanks.42

On 15 February, the 572nd Gypsy Bandits were 

attached to the 57th Transportation Battalion and on 

16 February, the 57th Battalion assumed the line haul 

mission to Vandergrift as well as other missions of the 

39th Battalion. From Quang Tri, the 572nd delivered 

Waterfall area of Hai Van Pass with the ARVN check point. Courtesy of 363rd TC.

The Colonel. Courtesy of 363rd TC.
64 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

cargo to Vandergrift along with the 363rd Medium Truck 

Company. Although not a part of the battalion, the 528th 

Quartermaster Petroleum Supply Company delivered 

fuel to the forward base camps under the escort of 

39th Battalion gun trucks. Many of the new drivers of 

the 572nd could not handle the Hai Van Pass and the 

company lost too many trucks to accidents. Soon the 

363rd Road Runners had the Phu Bai run for themselves since the level road to Chu Lai was better 

for new guys.43

Operation Lam Son 719 nearly doubled the missions 

of the 363rd, mostly heading north. The VC then stepped 

up activity in an effort to close the Hai Van Pass north of 

Da Nang in order to keep the flow of supplies from getting 

north to Phu Bai in support of the invasion of Laos.44

The waterfall area was full of caves and tunnels 

that faced a long stretch of switchbacks where the trucks 

could only drive about 5 to 15 miles an hour. So the drivers 

called that place “Ambush Alley.” RPGs, mortars and 

automatic fire kept the drivers in a high state of anxiety. 

Gun trucks and the gun jeeps drove into the kill zone and 

returned fire while talking to their top cover. They had a 

light observation helicopter (LOH) and a Bird Dog, fixed 

wing aircraft, assigned to their convoys when they drove 

through the Hai Van Pass. These aircraft would send for 

Cobra gunships to come in and suppress the VC’s fire.45

The 363rd experienced three 

major ambushes in Hai Van Pass where the enemy tried 

to inflict serious damage to a convoy. The first ambush 

was near the waterfall in the middle of February. The 

enemy ambushed Dennis Cook’s convoy and then 

Aichele’s convoy.

2LT Chris Aichele led a convoy back from Phu Bai 

with 2LT Dee Brinton riding in The Colonel in the rear of 

the convoy. The convoy was half way up the north side of 

Gun jeep of the 363rd Transportation Company. Courtesy of 363rd TC.

Marble 

Mountain. 

Courtesy of 

Paul Bader.
Lam Son 719 65

the mountain when Aichele heard explosions behind him. 

He recognized they were rockets and thought it might 

have included mortars. He continued to the top of Hai 

Van Pass and waved the lead part of the convoy that 

had escaped the kill zone past him. He could not 

get Brinton on the radio and feared the worst. So he 

told his driver, Runyon, to turn around and head back 

down the mountain. Runyon spun the gun jeep around 

and sped down into the kill zone.46

When the jeep got close enough to see The Colonel 

and some trucks, Aichele called for gunship support, 

but none were available. A Black Ace pilot from Marble 

Mountain was flying support and contacted the USS 

Enterprise out in the bay. The pilot informed Aichele 

that if he could provide the grid coordinates, the pilot 

could relay them to the carrier. Because of overcast 

conditions, Aichele could not see the enemy but could 

see where The Colonel was shooting because of the 

tracers. Aichele carried a French map and read the 

eight- digit coordinates to Black Ace. The pilot excused 

himself to relay the coordinates to the carrier, came 

back on the radio only to excuse himself again to warn 

the other aircraft in the area “to un-ass the place.” He 

did not come back on the radio causing Aichele to think, 

“Oh, crap!” He had no idea how to adjust fire with naval 

artillery, but fortunately the first round was on target and 

the next two or three were spaced out on either side. 

This was followed by an eerie silence.

When Aichele saw The Colonel start to drive, he 

likewise headed up the pass. Aichele stopped at Check 

Point 88 to watch the rest of the convoy pass. Several of 

the trucks had blown out windshields and some drivers 

had been injured but nothing serious. When The Colonel 

passed by, Aichele had his gun jeep fall in behind it. 

At some point, Aichele noticed his left arm was 

entirely covered in dried blood. When the convoy 

Trailer Transfer Point at Vandergrift. Courtesy of Don Voightritter.

Ace of Spades after having rolled down into the river. Courtesy of Army Transportation Museum.
66 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

returned to Adenir, SGT Lane saw the blood and asked 

if the lieutenant wanted to go to the 85th Evacuation 

Hospital to get his wound cleaned. Aichele had no 

interest in staying in the Army. He cared more about 

getting a cold beer than the Purple Heart Medal. He said 

he would clean himself up. 

When he stood in front of 

the mirror, he also noticed 

the left side of his neck 

and face was covered with 

dried blood from hundreds 

of tiny abrasions. He could 

only assume his heart was 

beating so fast which caused 

the little cuts to bleed so 

much. He earned the Army 

Commendation Medal with 

V device for that ambush. 

As truck units shifted 

north for Lam Son, the 585th 

Medium Truck Company 

moved from Gia Le to Tan 

My Ramp and the 39th 

Transportation Battalion 

headquarters moved from 

Quang Tri to Vandergrift 

on 16 February. The 57th 

Transportation Battalion 

then assumed the line haul 

mission to Vandergrift. 

The 585th Medium Truck 

Company would pick up 

cargo at Tan My Ramp and 

deliver it to Camp Eagle near 

Quang Tri. The 39th Battalion kept C Company 23rd 

Supply and Transportation (S&T) Company with its 5 -ton 

cargo trucks; the 666th Light Truck Company, which 

continued its direct and general support mission to 

the 101st Airborne Division at Camp Eagle; XXIV Corps 

King Kong. Courtesy of Danny Cochran.
Lam Son 719 67

Company (Provisional); FLC Light 

Truck Company (USMC); and the 

57th Light Truck Company. It still 

had the 506th Transportation 

Detachment, which ran the trailer 

transfer point at Vandergrift.

The narrow road snaked 

along the river without any 

guard rails and the rains 

weakened the clay soil to 

where it would collapse under 

the weight of the trucks. It 

was not uncommon to see 

ARVN trucks rolled down the side of the 

embankment. The Ace of Spades was escorting a 523rd 

convoy to Khe Sanh on 16 February when the dirt road 

collapsed under it and the gun truck rolled down into the 

river bed. SP4 Michael R. Hunter was killed in the wreck. 

The truck gun box was destroyed beyond repair.47

Four days later, 2LT Baird had been sent back to Phu 

Bai to pick up 17 brand new 5 -ton trucks. His convoy 

would return after dark. The convoy doctrine at the time 

limited convoys to no more than 30 trucks with a gun 

truck ratio of 1:10. Uncle Meat led the convoy with King 

Kong in the middle and Satan’s Li’l Angel in the rear. All 

gun trucks had three M -2 .50 caliber machineguns. The 

M -2 .50 was the most successful design in American 

weapons and had seen very little change in its design 

since its original issue in 1919. This time Baird rode close 

to the rear in 

a 3⁄4 - ton “beep”48 gun truck 

with twin M - 60 machineguns. He noticed that some 

Transportation Corps officers preferred to ride up front. 

He knew that if there was trouble it would invariably 

occur in the rear and that was where the key decisions 

would have to be made. If an ambush split the convoy, 

by doctrine, the trucks out of the kill zone would continue 

to drive to the next security check point or camp. If the 

convoy commander was in the lead then he would be 

unable to make the key decisions for the rest of the 

convoy either trapped in the kill zone or behind.49

Satan’s Li’l Angel had escorted a convoy that had 

delivered ARVN soldiers to Laos. They had been on the 

road for 36 hours when they pulled into Dong Ha that 

Baird’s 3⁄4-ton gun beep. Courtesy of 

Danny Cochran. Right: Uncle Meat 

and crew. Courtesy of Logan Werth.
68 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

Clockwise: Battle damage to Satans Li’l Angel. Courtesy 

of Logan Werth. Close up of where RPG hit the front tire 

and engine. Courtesy of Danny Cochran. Close up of where 

the RPG hit gun box. Courtesy of Danny Cochran.

Page 69: Battle damage to Baird’s 3⁄4 -ton gun beep. 

Courtesy of Danny Cochran.
Lam Son 719 69

night. They planned to RON because their convoy could 

not unload until morning, then 1LT Baird called them 

on the radio, “Hey Red, I’m a little light on security and 

expect some movement.” They had received a lot of 

reports of enemy movement along the route and SGT 

Chester Israel had also seen movement on the way 

down. Baird only had two gun trucks and his 3⁄4 - ton at 

Dong Ha. He needed some “heavy hitters” in the rear 

and asked Chester if he would go back with him. 

Chester asked his crew and they volunteered to 

return to Vandergrift that night.50

An average of 80 sorties ran from Vandergrift to 

Khe Sanh a day and some days the number reached 

as high as 265. The gun trucks made the daily runs 

several times. The 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Infantry 

had responsibility for route security and had a difficult 

time keeping the enemy away from the convoys. The 

convoys of the 39th Battalion were ambushed 23 times 

along Route 9. The frequent number of ambushes made 

LTC Ellis consider the route security totally inadequate. 

The battalion commander responsible for security of 

the stretch of road between Quang Tri and Vandergrift, 

however, boasted the route was “secure enough to 

walk along with your wife.” Two hours later, the enemy 

ambushed Baird’s convoy two kilometers east of 

Vandergrift. Needless to say, this did not impress Ellis.51

Uncle Meat led with King Kong in the middle, and 

then Satan’s Li’l Angel followed by Baird’s 3⁄4- ton in the 

rear. It was dark on 20 February as the convoy neared 

Camp Vandergrift. The road turned south, the mountain 

ridge to the east came within yards of Highway 9 and 

tall elephant grass covered the valley to the ridge line 

to the west. At 2311 hours, a mile and a half from their 

destination, Baird heard an explosion followed by an 

intense volume of small arms fire from the jungle on 

the ridge to his left.52

An RPG fired from the right (west) side of the road 

struck Satan’s Li’l Angel’s gun box right under SP4 

Richard B. Frazier’s gun, killing him instantly. The same 

explosion blew Israel to the side of the left wall then 

knocked him down. Shrapnel had peppered his back and 

left a hole in his right calf. The initial blast was followed 

by small arms fire from both sides of the road, but Satan 

did not stop. Israel climbed over and checked Frazier but 

already knew he was dead. He then rose up and looked 

out at the tracer fire. Calvin Bennett was firing to the 

right side with the rear .50. Israel then stood up to return 

fire. Shrapnel rendered Frazier’s .50 inoperable and 

Israel’s .50 would only fire single shots.53

A second RPG came through the right front wheel, 

slammed into the engine and took out a piston. The 

engine locked up and the truck lurched into a nose 

dive, then smoke boiled out the hood and cab. SGT 

Israel was again thrown down. He stood back up and 

saw small arms fire from both sides of the road. They 

were right in the middle of the kill zone. Bennett fired his 

left rear .50 until it jammed. Small arms fire shot out the 

tires of the gun truck. The NVA had learned to take out 

the gun trucks first before they went after the rest of the 

trucks and this time concentrated their fire on Satan. 
70 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

Israel was shot in the shoulder and side.54

Baird’s 3⁄4 - ton raced ahead and passed a disabled 

5 - ton cargo truck in the ditch. He ordered his driver to 

stop so they could check on the driver. They came to 

a halt a hundred feet ahead of the truck. Baird did not 

want to leave the disabled truck until he was sure that 

its driver was safe. To do so required him to wait 

in the middle of the kill zone. As soon as his gunner, 

SGT Richard Downard, tried to return fire, both M - 60s 

failed to fire. Evidently, he had put the gas plugs in 

backwards when he reassembled them. The three 

men only had one M -79 grenade launcher and their 

M -16s to defend against an NVA company. Baird 

immediately radioed the two lead gun trucks and told 

them to come back. The one thing that Baird could 

depend on was the loyalty of his gun trucks to rescue 

him or any other truck in trouble.55

SGT Israel looked back at Baird’s 3⁄4 -ton and saw it 

had stopped and was taking fire. It was sitting cockeyed 

with the wheel in the road. Chester could not see any 

fire coming from Baird’s vehicle. Thorn then climbed into 

the gun box from the cab and asked, “Chester, are you 

hit?” Israel answered, “I’m fine. The only hope we got is 

for you to get this started and get us out of here!” Thorne 

climbed back into the driver’s seat and started up the 

engine. It clanged and another RPG hit the right front 

rear duals and the truck bounced. Thorne kept that 

truck going and it crawled about 25 yards, enough to 

clear he kill zone, before the engine shut down. They 

continued to return fire.56

Neither the crew of Uncle Meat nor King Kong 

had heard the gunfire behind them. The majority of 

the convoy had continued to Vandergrift as if nothing 

had happened. Uncle Meat had already entered the 

compound and King Kong had just made the right hand 

turn into Vandergrift when they heard Baird’s call for 

help. They immediately backed up, turned around 

and raced back to the kill zone as fast as their 

trucks would carry them.57

Baird knew his gun truck crews and had confidence 

in their judgment. He also knew that too much chatter 

on the radio would cause confusion and tie up the radio 

net. He quickly and precisely informed the gun trucks of 

the situation. Satan’s Li’l Angel had been hit, his “beep” 

gun truck and one 5 -ton were still in the kill zone. The 

crews asked which side of the road the enemy was on 

and Baird informed them that he was taking small arms 

fire from the ridge to his south and the field of elephant 

grass to his north. The enemy was close enough to throw 

hand grenades at his vehicle. He then quit talking. He 

would count on their judgment about what to do.58

Ten minutes of steady small arms fire had elapsed 

Danny Cochran and crew repairing King Kong after the ambush. Courtesy of Danny Cochran.
Lam Son 719 71

since the beginning of the ambush. By then, Baird was 

taking fire from both sides of the road. Enemy was closing 

in through the elephant grass while others fired down on 

them from the ridge to the south. His gunner, Downer, 

tapped him on the shoulder and said, “I see one. What 

do I do?” Baird turned, looked back down the road and 

saw an enemy soldier about 15 meters away on a berm 

alongside the road loading 

an RPG. He told his gunner 

to shoot him. The gunner 

fired his M -79 grenade 

launcher at him. The enemy 

soldier was too close for 

the 40mm grenade to arm 

in flight. It struck him with 

enough velocity to either 

kill or incapacitate him, 

because he did not fire 

his rocket.59

Around ten minutes 

after the initiation of the 

ambush, King Kong raced 

past Satan and up to their 

convoy commander’s 

3⁄4-ton, parking right in front 

of it at an angle facing to the north. Uncle Meat similarly 

parked near Satan’s Li’l Angel. Baird was never as glad 

as when he saw the tracers of those .50s. There was 

a reassurance that everything would turn out alright. 

He knew his gun truck crews knew what to do. Baird 

called on the radio, “They’re in the ditches. They’re in 

the ditches.” The gunners on the Kong swung their .50s 

around and sprayed the 

ditches. Kong and Uncle 

Meat took the pressure 

off of Satan as the enemy 

concentrated their fire on 

the two new gun trucks.60

The success of an 

ambush depended upon 

surprise and extreme 

violence. The gun truck 

crews had learned to 

turn the fight back on the 

enemy as fast as they 

could with even more 

violence. This would take 

the psychological advantage 

away from the enemy 

forcing them to break 

Spent brass and links on King Kong after the ambush. 

Courtesy of Danny Cochran.

King Kong after the ambush showing where the oil dripped down the side. Courtesy of Danny Cochran.
72 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

contact. The .50s blazed away in four to six round bursts 

at the muzzle flashes to their left and right. The gunners 

poured 30 -weight oil from plastic canteens to help cool 

the barrels and ensure the smooth function of their 

breeches after firing off about three to four boxes 

of ammunition.61

An RPG hit the rear right duals and exploded in all 

the colors of the rainbow under left rear gunner, Danny 

Cochran, knocking him backwards on Larson manning 

the right .50. Cochran then jumped back up, grabbed 

his .50 and went back to work. King Kong was an APC 

gun truck. Large chunks of hot shrapnel had come up 

through the aluminum floor of the hull and lodged in the 

top of the box right under his machinegun. One piece 

of shrapnel had burnt a hole in the charging handle 

and others had left five or six holes in the barrel, 

but it still fired.62

The hot barrels glowed red and as soon as the 

gunners saw the rounds curve after they left the barrel 

they knew it was time to change them. Each time 

Emery, manning the turret gun, swung his barrel toward 

Cochran, Cochran grabbed the asbestos glove, spun 

the barrel off then picked up a new barrel and spun it 

on tight, by feel counted three clicks back and let go. 

Gunners had different methods of setting the headspace 

and timing and none used the timing gage during an 

ambush. They knew their guns. Some memorized the 

number of clicks for each breech. Others wrote the 

number of clicks needed on each barrel. Cochran did it 

by feel. He backed off the three clicks and depending 

upon the rate of fire of his .50 he added more clicks. 

He knew his .50. He changed three barrels for the TC 

and a similar number for himself that night.63

The one advantage to fighting at night was that 

the gunners returned fire in the direction of the enemy 

muzzle flashes which betrayed their positions. There was 

no concealment in the dark once one fired his weapon.

The tactic worked. After about ten minutes of firing, 

Uncle Meat and King Kong had turned the fight back 

on the enemy and they broke contact. During the fight, 

the driver of the disabled 5 -ton had run to his convoy 

commander’s vehicle. 

The medic from Baird’s 3⁄4 - ton ran up and stopped 

in front of Satan. Bennett remembered the dustoff 

helicopter hovered over the road ahead of their gun 

truck and threw down a stretcher. Bennett, Thorne and 

the medic lifted Frazier’s body over the cab onto the 

hood. With blood everywhere in the truck, they were 

slipping and stumbling, but managed to lift Frazier’s body 

onto the stretcher. Israel had several wounds and did not 

want to leave when the dustoff helicopter landed. The 

medic hit Chester with a shot of morphine as soon as he 

got on the ground, and then put him on the dustoff.64

That close to Vandergrift, Uncle Meat loaded the rest 

of the crew from Satan’s Li’l Angel into their gun truck 

then drove off the road and backed up to Baird’s vehicle. 

Close up of King Kong where rounds hit. Courtesy of Danny Cochran.
Lam Son 719 73

The drive shaft had broken and the vehicle could not 

drive. The crew of Uncle Meat hooked up the 3⁄4 - ton to 

Uncle Meat, which towed it into Vandergrift. The two gun 

trucks that came to the rescue also received damage but 

could roll under their own power. After the initial volley of 

fire, no other casualties were taken. King Kong limped 

back to Vandergrift on its rims.

The 2nd Platoon, C Troop, 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry 

swept the area the next day and saw no enemy dead 

on the east side of the road but there were two fighting 

positions 30 meters from the west side of the road with 

an RPD machinegun and one empty rucksack. There 

were plenty of tracks running away from the road. While 

waiting for a tracker dog team, the cavalry platoon saw 

an NVA soldier armed with an RPG approach. He tried 

to throw a hand grenade but was shot and killed in the 

Uncle Meat coming in off the road. Courtesy of Logan Werth.

Baird’s 3⁄4-ton as it looked after towed into Vandergrift. Courtesy of Don Voightritter.
74 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

process. The grenade exploded in his hand. The infantry 

were then engaged by small arms fire and the fight 

resulted in two NVA killed. They found another dead NVA 

from the contact and a large amount of weapons and 

ammunition. The enemy usually made great effort to 

recover their dead and conceal their losses, so no one 

could accurately determine the total enemy losses.65

CPT Voightritter was furious about the attacks on 

his convoys and blamed the ability of the enemy to get 

so close to the road to running convoys at night. So he 

took Frazier’s bloody helmet and flak jacket to battalion 

and told them, “Night convoys have got to stop!”

Whether it was his demand or to avoid conflict with 

Infantry securing the kill zone the next day. Courtesy of Don Voightritter.

523rd Transportation Company award ceremony. Above: Courtesy of Don Voightritter. Bottom: Courtesy of Logan Werth.
Lam Son 719 75

US and ARVN use of the same road, the Joint Movements 

Control Center eventually published a schedule change. 

From 0600 to 0730 hours, all traffic would leave Khe 

Sanh and from 0730 to 1100 hours, all traffic would 

leave from Vandergrift to Khe Sanh. The traffic would wait 

at Khe Sanh while others swept the road from Vandergrift 

to recover damaged or broken vehicles. Upon completion 

of the sweep at 1300 hours, traffic from Khe Sanh would 

return and between 1500 and 1630 hours would wait for 

the sweep team to return to Vandergrift. The last traffic 

out of Vandergrift would depart after 1700 hours. Any 

convoys from Vandergrift to Khe Sanh would have 

to travel during those times.66

With Frazier killed and Israel in the hospital, Thorne 

and Calvin Bennett returned to Vandergrift and salvaged 

parts from Satan to rebuild their gun truck. Thinking that 

the name Satan’s Li’l Angel might be jinxed, the crew 

renamed the gun truck Proud American, but had not time 

to paint the new art work on the side, which they planned 

would be the head of a bald eagle.67

On 20 February, COL Morton’s 8th Transportation 

Group headquarters arrived at Quang Tri. This allowed 

him better observation of convoy operations during Lam 

Son. With that move, the 8th Group controlled five truck 

battalions operating in the two most heavily contested 

Corps Tactical Zones. The other two truck groups 

commanded no more than two truck battalions. No 

other logistical headquarters in Vietnam had ever 

faced such a challenge.

It was not enough that the enemy tried to kill the 

truck drivers when they rolled out of the camp, but also 

regularly tried to kill them in their camp. For a week to 

ten days, 120 mm rockets and mortar rounds slammed 

into Vandergrift between 1630 and 1700 hours every 

day, which the American occupants called, “Happy Hour.” 

“Six O’clock Charlie” would get up on Hill 180 and fire 

rockets at the helicopter landing strip every afternoon. 

The landing strip was close to the hill, but the enemy 

never hit anything except the perforated steel planking. 

One day he hit the ammo dump and the explosion felt 

like it lifted up the Bedrock Hotel. Debris rained down on 

everybody. One day someone finally spotted him and the 

Cobra attack helicopters killed him. With that, the daily 

rocket attacks ended.68

The third major ambush of the 363rd occurred on 

26 February. 2LT Bob Mitten was leading a large convoy 

of over 80 vehicles of the 363rd north over Hai Van 

Pass to Phu Bai with an NCO in the rear of the convoy 

on Canned Heat. The convoy reached the MP station 

atop the mountain and Mitten pulled his convoy over to 

the side of the road to wait for the gun truck to reach the 

top. Hai Van Pass was socked in the clouds so he could 

not see the trucks. Two MPs walked over and said he 

had to move that convoy. Mitten said, “I’m waiting for the 

gun truck and then I’m going to go.” About that time he 

heard Canned Heat say they were at the top. The MPs 

then said, “We’re going down with you. We’ll get in the 

middle.” Mitten replied, “Fine, come along.”69

The convoy started down the mountain and still 

could not see anything. It came out of the clouds as 

soon as it reached the double switchback. As soon 

as Mitten’s gun jeep cleared the clouds, he heard a 

Ammunition dump on fire and explosion at Vandergrift after 122 mm rocket attack. Courtesy of Don Voightritter. 
76 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

rushing sound. He looked to his left and saw an RPG 

coming his way. As soon as he saw the rocket, he lifted 

his M-79 grenade launcher over his head and fired. He 

instinctively looked down at his watch and saw it was 

1130 hours. The gun jeep pulled over and the next truck, 

a mail truck. Mitten always put a senior driver in the lead 

truck in case something happened to him, so the driver 

knew what to do. The driver pulled up next to the gun 

jeep and Mitten told him, “Go!” He knew to drive down to 

the next check point. When Mitten looked up the road to 

his left he saw the next truck was a stake and platform 

hauling black gun powder tubes. A rocket had hit them 

and they were exploding like fireworks on the Fourth 

of July. The truck was weaving down the road while the 

road was sprayed with small arms fire. Mitten could 

not see the driver so he ran up to the truck, jumped 

on the running board, looked in and did not see the 

driver. Mitten then looked back and saw the driver, 

named Moore, running past him with the back of 

his head on fire. 

Mitten had to get that truck off the road. It was 

heading down the switchback and if it hit the rock wall 

it would block the turn in the road. While holding onto 

the M -79 with one hand, he turned the steering wheel 

with the other. He wanted to steer the truck off the 

edge of the road and down the mountain. He waited 

until the truck hit the bump and then he jumped off. 

The truck went over the edge and went straight down 

the mountain. Mitten looked up and saw two drivers 

trapped in a ditch to the right of the road shooting back 

at the enemy. Their two trucks were to the left by the 

road berm. They had been caught in the kill zone and 

Canned Heat. Courtesy of 363rd TC.

Enemy fire came from this location. Courtesy of 363rd TC. Kill zone was the on the switchback seen above the 

barrel of the M-60 machinegun. Courtesy of 363rd TC.
Lam Son 719 77

could not move because the truck was weaving in front of 

them, so they had jumped out. The rest of the convoy had 

stopped short of the kill zone as per SOP. Mitten heard 

the MP jeep had been hit by an RPG.

Mitten intended to get up on the hill and fire his M-79 

so the drivers could get down the hill. He ran down the 

concrete abutment when an RPG exploded at the end of 

the abutment knocking him down the hill into the brush. 

He lay there stunned but still had his M-79 grenade 

launcher in his hand although he had lost his helmet and 

bag with the 40mm rounds. As he crawled up the hill he 

saw the bobtail driving into the kill zone. Canned Heat 

had already driven down the road below him and was 

shooting over his head at the enemy. Mitten reached up 

to wipe the sweat from his brow only to discover it was 

blood. Shrapnel had hit his flak vest and, as he would 

find out years later, his left wrist. Walt Hines was standing 

on the running board of the bobtail yelling, “Come down! 

Come Down!” Suddenly Mitten’s legs started to freeze up. 

Before the war, Mitten had an accident where he lost the 

feeling in his legs and feared it was the same thing again. 

Walt yelled over at him by his nickname, I’m coming to get 

you, Dog. I’m coming to get you.” Walt crawled up through 

the vegetation and grabbed the lieutenant. Mitten said 

he did not know how he was going to get down because 

of losing the feeling in his legs; so Walt grabbed him and 

together they rolled down the road. They put him in the 

gun truck, took him down the mountain and called in 

a medevac for Mitten. Walt then tried to start the truck 

but it would not.

Mitten remained in the 85th Evac Hospital for a 

day and then returned to duty. He received the Purple 

Heart and Bronze Star Medal for valor. Walt Hines 

also received the Bronze Star Medal for valor. 

To be different, LTG Sutherland did not want to 

leave any debris behind as the Marines had after their 

withdrawal, so he assigned the 39th Battalion the 

mission to recover any battle damage. LTC Ellis assigned 

the 515th the mission and issued 2LT Bartletti an M - 88 

tracked recovery vehicle to recover tracked vehicles. 

Bartletti had a crew of four, mostly African - Americans, 

and Don bonded with them. He told them not to call 

him ‘sir,’ but not to give him a stupid nickname either. 

The recovery team drove Route 9 every day looking for 

vehicles just as a tow truck might drive up and down the 

highway recovering broken down vehicles, but one day 

they found an APC destroyed by a mortar round. The 

hot shrapnel had melted the exterior of the aluminum 

hull and they saw the scattered remains of soldiers 

torn apart by the explosion. Bartletti found a boot with 

the foot still in it and recovered the soldier’s billfold. At 

that moment he connected the battle damage with the 

human loss which deeply affected him.70

According to the plan, the Americans delivered cargo 

to Khe Sanh where the ARVN trucks pushed it the rest 

of the way to the border. This changed on 5 March. 

Eve of Destruction. Photo by Teneyck courtesy of Logan Werth.
78 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

Fuller received the task 

to lead a convoy loaded 

with crates of 105mm 

artillery projectiles farther 

west from Khe Sanh than 

any previous convoy. He 

was told if they did not 

arrive by 1800 hours, the 

artillery troops would be 

defenseless. The artillery 

battery was going to shoot 

off everything it had. Dan 

Hill remembered the convoy 

was destined for Khe 

Sanh where it arrived at 

midnight and learned the 

ammunition was needed 

immediately by the ARVN 

battery. The ARVN would meet 

the American convoy with trucks at the border to take 

the ammunition the rest of the way. During the convoy 

brief, Fuller explained the importance of the mission 

and told his drivers how important it was that everybody 

understood the route. The convoy needed to make the 

two right turns. He reminded them, “Be sure when you 

come to an intersection that you take a 

right.” It was the quietest 

briefings Fuller had ever 

held. Fuller would ride in the 

Eve of Destruction. CPT 

Hill hitched a ride on Uncle 

Meat and someone told 

him he was crazy to ride 

on that convoy, but having 

ridden up to Khe Sanh, 

he did not want to look 

like a coward and back 

out at that point. Fuller 

remembered his convoy 

ranged between 50 and 

100 vehicles and he 

placed a gun truck every 

ten cargo trucks. Roberson 

remembered the convoy 

consisted of 10 to 15 cargo 

trucks, while CPT Hill remembered five or six. The lead 

cargo truck had a PRC -25 radio. The convoy took off 

in the dark with head lights on.71

David Rose, driver of Uncle Meat, remembered 

 flipping a coin with the driver of Eve of Destruction and 

lost. So Eve led the convoy with King Kong in the 

middle and Uncle Meat in the 

end. They placed the gun trucks

about every 25 trucks. Fuller 

remembered riding in the Eve 

in the rear of the convoy.72

 They had been on the road 

for a couple of hours, when 

one of the gun trucks radioed 

back, “Hey, 26.” (Fuller’s call 

sign) “Be advised. I think the 

cargo truck behind me took 

a left when we came to the 

juncture.” So Fuller replied, 

“Thank you very much.” The 

Eve kicked out and raced to 

the front. Sure enough, when 

it reached the intersection 

trucks had turned to the left. 

As the Eve came up beside 

Crater left by the mine that damaged Uncle Meat. 

Courtesy of Logan Werth.

Crew of Uncle Meat standing around the mine crater. Courtesy of Logan Werth.
Lam Son 719 79

a cargo truck the crew told the driver to turn around, go 

back to the intersection any way they could and make a 

left to catch up with the rest of the convoy. Fuller then 

radioed another gun truck to watch for them. The Eve 

then caught up with one cargo truck that had crossed a 

bridge and was starting up a steep road to the right. They 

stopped the driver and he said he was going to try and 

back the truck down in the dark. Backing over a bridge 

and turning at the same time, part of the truck went off 

the left side of the bridge and the driver bailed out. He 

escaped injury and the Eve put him on another cargo 

truck. Their destination was just a few hundred meters 

from the Laotian border and the truck that crossed the 

bridge had left Fuller’s map sheet, which was the end of 

South Vietnam.73

They finally had everybody turned around, heading 

in the right direction and reached their destination just 

before first light. Roberson asked where Laos was, and 

the ARVN soldier pointed to the ground.74 No American 

ground troops were permitted to cross the border. Upon 

arrival, the truck unloaded their ammunition while the 

artillery fired volley after volley. There were so many 

trucks in front of him, he could not see what else was 

there. Someone just told him to stay there and pull 

security. When it came time to leave, David said, “If I 

pulled tail then I get to pick my position going out of 

here.” So Uncle Meat would lead out on the return trip 

and CPT Hill climbed in to ride with them. The convoy 

headed back with Meat in the lead and Eve in the rear.75

David Rose could hear talking and saw the mine 

sweepers walking ahead of him. One mine sweeper 

waved him to pull forward. David backed up then pulled 

forward and Uncle Meat ran over a concussion land 

mine. The blast lifted the truck four to five feet in the 

air and knocked the crew around in the back. CPT Hill 

remembered slamming into the VRC-47 radio with his 

chest and knocking it off the stand from the force of 

impact. Fortunately his flak jacket absorbed most of 

the impact but he was in serious pain. When he looked 

around, the other crew members were dazed and just 

starting to get up when someone crawled up the back 

of the truck and said, “Don’t get out, there are land 

mines all over the place.”76

As soon as the convoy left, Fuller heard the 

explosion. It had blown the left two rear wheels off 

and, of the five men in the gun box, only CPT Hill was 

seriously injured. The others just had some scrapes or 

bruises. Rose injured his back but could still drive. Rose 

assessed the situation. The axle was down in the dirt 

and Fuller could not see how they could possibly drive 

Meat, so he said, “Take the guns, and ammunition and 

everything off, and we were going to leave.” But they 

replied, “Give us a minute, sir.” And they took a chain and 

tied the axle up to the frame, and said, “We can make it.” 

To which Fuller said, “If that’s all it takes.”77

While they were securing the axle, Fuller walked 

around and discovered the tire tread sandal tracks of 

one individual, who had planted the mine and gone back 

The gun box of Uncle Meat being transferred to a new 

5-ton chassis. Courtesy of Logan Werth.

Uncle Meat with a new paint job. Courtesy of Logan Werth.
80 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

the same way. So Fuller knew from his Ranger training 

the guy was not NVA. He would not have gone back the 

same way, or would not have been wearing sandals. The 

crew rigged the axle so a tow truck could tow it back to 

Khe Sanh. The convoy passed the rusted hulks of enemy 

tanks along the road from the attack on Khe Sanh during 

1968. Upon reaching Khe Sanh, they then took Meat 

on down to Vandergrift. Rose and Werth flew down to 

pick up a new 5-ton cargo truck. Upon return, they put 

Meat’s gun box on that chassis but did not repaint it 

until the operation was over.78

While at Khe Sanh, a helicopter evacuated CPT Hill 

to a field hospital where medical personnel assessed 

his injuries. He learned the impact had broken two 

ribs, his sternum and a bone in his foot. They then flew 

him down to the hospital in Cam Ranh Bay where he 

recovered for four days. Afterwards, he returned to 

duty at his headquarters in Long Binh where he spent 

the next month and a half writing up his report on 

convoy operations.79

The 523rd was not the only company to have 

the privilege of driving to the Laotian border. One day, 

Bartletti, Harvey and Jim Calvert drove to the border 

to recover a vehicle. Its transfer case was missing. 

The recovery team saw the sign marking at the border 

shot full of holes.80

The enemy was not the only danger the truck drivers 

had to face on Route 9. On 6 March, Telucci led a convoy 

of the 515th to Khe Sanh. The clay road gave way 

on the turn and PFC Kenneth H. Jones’ truck tumbled 

down into the river bed. Telucci immediately ran down 

to rescue Kenny but the truck was on top of him. He saw 

no bullet holes in the truck. It had just missed the turn. 

2LT Bartletti and his crew went out to recover the truck 

and body. Jones’ dead body was so heavy it took Bartletti 

and four others to pull it up. Bartletti tied Jones’ sleeves 

together and they dragged his body up the embankment 

then loaded it on a stretcher on a jeep. That was the 

second American death from a truck rolling down the hill. 

Jim Calvert took the shackle off an M - 88 down to the 

truck. Four times the shackle snapped pulling the truck 

up and it slid back down. After the fourth try, they were 

told to leave it. Colucci received the Silver Star Medal for 

risking his life. The loss of Kenny significantly affected 

CPT Lavin as he had failed to keep all his men alive. 

He personally wrote the letter home to Kenny’s parents. 

5-ton cargo trucks rolled down into the river. Courtesy of Don Voightritter. 
Lam Son 719 81

He did not even know him but in later years went on 

to learn everything he could about Kenny.81

After three weeks of fighting across the border, 

one ARVN Ranger Battalion was badly mauled, two had 

withdrawn from the area of operations. Two positions 

were overrun, six abandoned and the ground assault 

halted halfway to Tchepone. Beginning 3 March, the 

ARVN launched a series of air assaults leading to 

Tchepone. On 6 March, the ARVN launched their largest 

air assault yet and the next day forcibly took the NVA 

supply base at Tchepone. On 10 March, the ARVN forces 

abandoned Tchepone and began their withdrawal back to 

the border. On 12 March, two ARVN airborne companies 

landed by helicopter north of Tabat to clear the enemy 

route of withdrawal. The enemy counter-attacked not 

only in Laos but also in South Vietnam. Enemy artillery 

even began to hit Khe Sanh. Two NVA sapper attacks 

on a fire base east of Khe Sanh destroyed 8,200 rounds 

of ammunition and 36,000 gallons of aviation fuel.82

Further south, the 363rd Medium Truck pulled 

mostly fuel tankers, but on one convoy, the company 

dispatched 30 drivers to Quang Tri and then Vandergrift 

to haul supplies to Khe Sanh. Roger Rahor was one of 

the drivers sent north. He remembered driving to Khe 

Sanh at night and then four trucks hauled back dead 

ARVN soldiers. They loaded the dead on pallets into Sea 

Land refrigeration vans and drove them to the boat ramp 

near Phu Bai where they backed the vans onto Navy 

LSDs. They then picked up empty vans and repeated this 

process for two to three days. The stench was so bad the 

drivers burned their uniforms and washed their bodies 

with diesel fuel. Upon completion of the unpleasant 

task, they returned to their company.83

The 523rd Transportation Company encountered 

the last major ambush of the operation. On 12 March, 

Callahan had returned on a convoy from Khe Sanh 

and informed LTC Ellis his convoy had received enemy 

fire and thought that it was not safe to take another 

convoy up there especially since it would be dark by 

the time they returned to Khe Sanh. Nonetheless, the 

convoy kicked out from Vandergrift to Khe Sanh with 2LT 

Jim Baird as the convoy commander. Just in case the 

enemy tried to ambush the convoy, the detail left behind 

formed a reaction force of gun trucks. 1LT Fuller had all 

the remaining gun trucks lined up ready to go while he 

monitored the radio for contact.84

On Proud American, Robert Thorne was the driver, 

Calvin Bennett was the rear gunner, McDonald was the 

Damage to Proud American. Courtesy of Don Voightritter. 
82 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

Above: Inside the 

gun box of Proud 

American. Courtesy 

of Logan Werth.

Right: Willie Strong 

standing next to 

Proud American. 

Courtesy of Logan Werth.

Above: Damage inside 

the cab of Proud American. 

Courtesy of Logan Werth.

Left: Removing the driver’s door armor to Proud American. 

Courtesy of Danny Cochran.
Lam Son 719 83

right gunner, and Nelson Allen was the NCOIC. Both CPT 

“V” and Baird rode on the gun truck. A B - 40 rocket hit 

the gun truck, Proud American, between the cab and 

the gun box on the driver’s side mortally wounding the 

driver, SP4 Thorne. Fortunately Thorne managed to steer 

Proud American into the hillside instead of down the 

steep cliff into the creek thus saving the rest of the crew. 

Unfortunately, Baird had been kneeling by the radio 

mounted in the left front corner of the box when the 

rocket hit and received multiple fragmentary wounds to 

his left arm. McDonald, the right front gunner, received 

a facial wound. Two other tankers were immobilized.85

Fuller heard the call, “Contact, contact, contact,” on 

the radio and led his convoy of gun trucks. Heading out 

the gate in Daughter of Darkness, an engineer stopped 

Fuller, “Don’t go up there! They’re having an ambush! 

They’re having an ambush!” To which Fuller replied, 

“That’s what we’re going up there for.” Around six gun 

trucks rolled in and laid down suppressive fire which 

ended the enemy fire. Fuller saw that Baird was badly 

wounded and learned Thorne was dead. Callahan laid 

Baird on a stretcher and Fuller called for a medevac 

Fuller’s 3⁄4-ton gun beep, Daughter of Darkness. 

Courtesy of Army Transportation Museum.

Above: Damage to the driver’s side of 

Proud American. Courtesy of Don Voightritter.
84 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

then looked around for a good place for the dustoff 

helicopter to land. He found an opening by a bridge 

and Uncle Meat drove Baird to the bridge. The helicopter 

arrived but the pilot was afraid to land. Instead, the 

men lifted the stretcher up to the bird. Fuller told the 

medevac crew, “Take care of him. He was a good one.” 

They placed Thorne’s body in the Black Widow and took 

it back to Vandergrift. A squad from the 4th Battalion, 

3rd Infantry went out to block the enemy escape but 

found no enemy killed or wounded.86

The day after the ambush, Fuller left on his 

scheduled rest and recuperation (R&R). He and Thorne 

were both from Denver, Colorado; so after Fuller met his 

wife at the airport, he told her he had to visit Thorne’s 

Crew of the Eve of Destruction. Courtesy of Logan Werth.

Hauling a load to Khe Sanh. Courtesy of Logan Werth.
Lam Son 719 85

parents. His wife waited in the car 

while he went inside and told the 

parents how their son died. They 

thanked him profusely. Because of 

the close bonding on a gun truck, 

after the death of a crew member, 

the remaining crew members 

usually left the gun trucks. Calvin 

had lost two crews but filled in on 

Black Widow for a while. When 

asked why he kept going out on 

the gun truck, he admitted that 

he just did not feel it was his time. 

He had a feeling he was not 

going to die.87

Across the border, the 

1st ARVN Armored Division 

abandoned Objective Alouiand 

and the NVA counter-attacked 

with a fury. The ARVN paratroopers 

then panicked and the orderly withdrawal turned into a 

route. Meanwhile the enemy stepped up attacks along 

Route 9. On 23 March, 40 NVA soldiers with the support 

of mortars and rockets penetrated the perimeter Khe 

Sanh, destroying two helicopters, damaging four, and 

inflicting 22 casualties. In the latter half of March, as 

many as 20 rounds of mortar, rockets and artillery fire 

poured down daily on American fire support bases along 

the border. For two days, Route 9 could not be secured. 

As ARVN troops neared the border, American infantry 

and armored forces attacked west of Khe Sanh to clear 

Route 9. When it was reopened, convoys could only 

travel it “with acceptable risk.”88

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) assumed 

responsibility for the security of Route 9 on 28 March. 

The division provided constant aerial support to locate 

the enemy and strategically positioned armored vehicles 

to provide instant reaction. This minimized the attacks 

on convoys and LTC Ellis commended the 101st on 

their performance.89

One night near the end of March at Khe Sanh, 

LT Gardner came up and asked Roberson if he wanted 

to go on The Justifier, since the gun truck was short a 

gunner. When Roberson joined it, The Justifier had a 

.50 on center front and an M - 60 center rear with M - 60s 

midway on the right and left side. Later, they put a .50 

on back and put twin M - 60s on the sides. The crew 

consisted of a driver, NCOIC and four gunners. Roger 

“Hillbilly” Randolph was driver, Wayne Rogers was 

NCOIC, Dennis Butte was front .50 gunner, John Kanipe 

was back M - 60. Paul Banner was right side M - 60 and 

Robby was left side M - 60 gunner. Jose Garcia was 

on it for a short while and then went on The Assassins. 

When Wayne left, Roberson took over as an 18 - year 

old NCOIC of a gun truck.90

Lam Son 719 ended on 4 April 1971 with mixed 

results. They had reached their objective at Tchepone 

but failed to expand beyond and withdrew under serious 

pressure from the North Vietnamese. The ARVN attacks 

became bogged down claiming the lack of American 

helicopter support as the reason. After the Lam Son 

719, ambushes fell off to an irregular pattern of once 

every two to four weeks.

With the end of the operation, the Army had to 

vacate Khe Sanh and Vandergrift as had the Marines 

before them. CPT Lavin drove his APC to Khe Sanh 

to monitor vehicle spacing as they left the camp. The 

Americans abandoned everything and 600 trucks left 

with empty loads. Lavin’s M-113 was the last vehicle to 

leave Khe Sanh. The 515th remained at Vandergrift for 

three to five days waiting for clearance to leave. 

The battalion XO instructed Lavin to clean out the 

Danny Cochran eating a C-ration near 

his bunker. Courtesy of Danny Cochran.
86 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

CONEX bunker, burn the latrine and get rid of any 155m 

projectiles. He rolled the projectiles into puddles, made 

a deal with a local Vietnamese to trade the metal in the 

bunker for soda and then set the latrine on fire. As the 

last to leave Vandergrift, he remembered there was 

no noise. It was absolutely quiet. 

The day the truck companies left Vandergrift, they 

formed a 70 -vehicle convoy of the 515th, 523rd and 

possibly the 666th. It seemed they staged forever 

as they watched engineers blow up bunkers and burn 

anything left behind. LTC Ellis warned them to expect to 

get hit by 500 VC on the way out because of the convoy’s 

small size. So they had Cobra air cover and some V-100 

armored car escorts from the 101st Airborne Division, 

and fortunately did not get hit.91

2LT Bartletti remembered being the last to leave 

both Khe Sanh and Vandergrift with his recovery team. 

Someone told him he could leave after he removed a 

125 -pound projectile from the road. He also got rid of 

the of the latrine. Bartletti and his recovery team spent 

Saturday morning at Khe Sanh and drove around to 

make sure no vehicle remained. The day was sunny and 

quiet. Their departure ended the American participation 

in Lam Son 719.92

Above: M-48 tank and crew. Courtesy of Michael Lavin. Right: The Assassins rolling in with a convoy. Courtesy of Paul Bader.
Lam Son 719 87

1 Ellis, 39th ORLL.

2 Phillips, “Lamson 719.”

3 Lavin interview; and Fuller interview.

4 Hill, A Soldier. 5 Ellis, 39th ORLL.

6 Nolan, Into Laos. 7 Ibid.

8 Israel interview.

9 Ibid.

10 COL (R) Walter Anderson interview by Richard Killblane 

at Ft Eustis, Va, 26 July 2006.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Dragavon interview; and Roger Rahor email to 

Richard Killblane, 18 August 2004.

14 Israel and Bennett interview, and Michael McBride interview 

by Richard Killblane, 9 July 2004.

15 Mike Lavin interview, 17 June 2005; and Ellis, 39th ORLL.

16 McBride interview.

17 Ibid.

18 Nolan, Into Laos. 19 Hill, A Soldier. 20 Ibid.

21 Nolan, Into Laos. 22 Ellis, 39th ORLL.

23 The Protector, 57th Transportation Co Nam Nomads, 

http://nam_nomads.tripod.com/TheProtector/protector.html; and 

Claude Roberson telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 22 July 2013.

24 Roger Maloney interview by Richard Killblane 

at Kirkwood, Mo, 28 June 2013; and Brittner interview.

25 Maloney interview, and Roberson interview.

26 Brittner interview, and Maloney interview.

27 Brittner interview; and Bill Hampton, “Gypsy Bandits Move to Quang Tri,” 

ATAV, http://grambo.us/atav/hampton.htm.

28 Nolan, Into Laos. 29 Nolan, Into Laos. 30 Brittner and Maloney interview.

31 Maloney interview.

32 Brittner interview; and McBride interview.

33 Maloney interview.

34 Ellis, 39th ORLL.

35 The 5th ID (M) After Action Report stated one vehicle destroyed, 

five damaged, one driver killed and nine wounded.

36 Nolan, Into Laos. 37 Dan Hill telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 19 November 2015.

38 Rahor email, and Anderson interview.

39 Fuller interview.

40 Ibid.

41 Cochran interview.

42 Rahor email.

43 John Dragavon email to Richard Killblane, May 21, 2015 

and Rahor email, August 18, 2004.

44 Dragavon email to Killblane, May 21, 2015.

45 Rahor email, August 18, 2004.

46 Christopher Aichele email to Robert Mitten, June 1, 2013.

47 Israel interview; Seay and Cochran interview.

48 Since the 3⁄4-ton truck was a little bigger than the 1⁄4-ton jeep, 

they were called “beeps.”

49 Baird interview and Danny Cochran interview 

by Richard Killblane, 18 June 2005.

50 Israel interview.

51 Ellis, 39th ORLL.

52 The 504th MP Bn Forward Log recorded the ambush at 

0015 hours on 21 February 1971, but Baird and Israel remember 

it at 2355 hours or midnight.

53 Israel interview.

54 Ibid.

55 Baird interview.

56 Israel interview.

57 Baird and Cochran interview.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 Cochran interview.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 Israel interview.

65 The Fifth Infantry Division, Vietnam, Lam Son 719 CAAR, 

http://www.societyofthefifthdivision.com/vietnam/significantevents.htm. 

66 Ellis, 39th ORLL.

67 Will Abshire, untitled article on gun trucks in I Corps, 

1st Log News, April 15, 1971. 68 Mike Lavin and others remembered their experiences at the Vietnam 

veteran reunion of the 515th at Kirkwood, Mo, 29 June 2013; Israel 

and Bennett interview; McBride interview; and Hurley interview.

69 Mitten interview.

70 Don Bartletti presentation to the 515th TC reunion 

at Kirkwood, Mo, 28 June 2013. Dan Hill remembered the 

mission came from the corps commander.

71 Fuller interview, Roberson interview, and Hill, A Soldier. 72 Rose interview, and Fuller interview.

73 Fuller interview.

74 Roberson interview.

75 Rose interview, and Fuller interview.

76 Rose interview, and Hill, A Soldier. 77 Rose interview and Fuller interview.

78 Fuller interview.

79 Hill, A Soldier.
88 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

Top: CPT Mike Lavin, aka Superman, showing how short (time left in country) he is. Courtesy of Mike Lavin.

Bottom: Upon return from Lam Son, the 515th Transportation Company threw a party with the money raised from selling 

cold beer and soda. Courtesy of Mike Lavin.
Aftermath

lthough the ARVN offensive failed to disrupt the NVA buildup, the truck drivers overcame tremendous odds 

to deliver the cargo to the forward camps. The drivers lived in austere conditions, drove around the clock 

and encountered 23 ambushes. The trucks of the 39th Transportation Battalion drove 5,007 sorties moving 

29,329 short tons from Vandergrift to Khe Sanh. The two truck battalions lost 40 vehicles damaged or destroyed, 

12 men killed and 35 wounded. As a testament to their heroism, the 39th Transportation Battalion recommended 

soldiers for four Silver Star Medals, and awarded 20 Bronze Star Medals with Valor device, 37 Bronze Star Medals, 

10 Army Commendation Medals with Valor device, 108 Army Commendation Medals and 56 Purple Heart Medals 

during this two and a half month operation. As a testament to the intensity of the fighting, the gun trucks took a 

beating. King Kong was damaged by an RPG. Ace of Spades was destroyed early in the operation and The Protector, 

Satan’s Li’l Angel and, and Proud American were damaged, repaired and renamed. Hardcore took an RPG in the 

driver’s compartment. In spite of the enemy’s best effort, the truck drivers kept the supply line open.

At the close of operations, the 39th Transportation Battalion expanded the trailer maintenance facility at Phu 

Bai and began an extensive trailer repair program to repair 212 trailers used in the operation. To finish by June, the 

maintenance warrant officer and NCOs organized the crews into shifts so they could run 24-hour operations.1

After Lam Son, the 515th and 523rd returned to Camp Eagle for a short time. Upon return, the men found time 

to relax and celebrate. There the soldiers took delight in simple things like hearing a toilet flush. They had stage shows 

with Korean dancers. CPT Lavin had created a company slush fund selling beer and sodas. With the $1,000 profit, 

the 515th hired a band with women, bought a pig to roast, had the engineers build picnic tables and held a big party. 

CPT Lavin wore his superman outfit with “short” written in masking tape on his shirt. Most did not know why he 

wore it. One event at the party involved a tug of war contest over a mud pit. Soldiers and NCOs threw Lavin in the 

A

Aftermath 89

To show their 

appreciation, 

the men threw 

CPT Mike Lavin 

in the mud pit.

Courtesy of Mike Lavin.
90 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

mud pit. They then carried the muddy and drunk 

company commander to Big Al’s hooch and dropped him 

on the floor. A slightly intoxicated Lavin saluted from the 

prone position. He identified very closely with his enlisted 

men and having submitted his paperwork to leave the 

Army, the pretense of rank meant very little to him.

CPT Lavin knew Larry Simon was bringing the 

women onto post but not how. Larry was a very funny 

guy. He had lots of energy and liked to make people 

laugh. He wore had a little black short billed civilian hat 

similar to a “boonie” hat around camp to be different. 

He brought prostitutes into camp every night by slowing 

down in the village and letting them jump in his cab. He 

knew the MPs did not check the trucks as they came in 

on a convoy, so he would have the Vietnamese women 

duck their heads down so the MPs would not see them. 

After he finished with the prostitute, he released her to 

service the NCOs. By this time Lavin was comfortable 

with the discipline in the company and asked Larry not 

to bring them in as often. Larry just quit bringing them 

in every night, but still had his needs. One day, the NCOs 

were standing around the orderly room discussing who 

Simon was bringing in that night. One joked, “Ask the 

CO,” and Lavin yelled out, “He’s bringing in so-and-so 

and so-and-so.” The orderly room burst with laughter. 

The 515th then moved into new housing in Phu Bai. 

Having put in his paperwork to leave the Army, LTC Ellis 

asked Mike Lavin to extend in command. Lavin instead 

The 523rd Transportation Company’s new home at Phu Bai. Courtesy of Voightritter family.
Aftermath 91

passed the company guidon to 1LT Roger Maloney 

on 20 April and left Vietnam. Leaving the company 

was the hardest thing he ever did. Maloney commanded 

the company for about a month and a half as a first 

lieutenant. One day in May, LTC Ellis called Maloney 

and said BG Sweeney wanted to see him. Sweeney 

asked Maloney to be his aide. Maloney had less than 

30 days left in country so he turned him down. He 

left Vietnam in June and returned to his old job with 

Sears and Roebuck.2

The 572nd “Gypsy Bandits” only had a handful 

of tractors running out of 60 and those were virtually 

worn out. From early April until June, they were primarily 

regrouping and rebuilding.3

In April after Lam Son, the 363rd Medium Truck 

moved north to Camp Haskins on Red Beach, a former 

Sea Bee Base, where it was assigned to the 57th 

Transportation Battalion with the 64th, 563rd, 572nd 

Transportation Companies. From then on the convoys 

ran north every day. Because the trailer transfer point 

in Da Nang had worked so well under the control of 

the 363rd, the company was directed to establish 

and operate a trailer transfer point at Camp Haskins 

along with the POL point.4

The 523rd Light 

Truck pulled back 

to its new home 

at Phu Bai and 

remained under 

the 39th 

Transportation 

Battalion until the 

company’s departure 

from Vietnam in 

March the next year. 

The trucks were beat 

up and missing lots 

of parts. So Fuller 

told his PLL clerk to 

find whatever they 

were missing. They cannibalized parts from other trucks 

and scrounged or stole what they could not get legally. 

Fuller left Vietnam with an assignment to the Army’s 

shooting team at Fort Benning, Georgia. He retired as 

a captain in 1975.5

Not long after Lam Son, the 523rd turned King Kong 

over to the 173rd Airborne Brigade and SGT Mike Emory 

remained as its NCOIC. He could not part with the truck. 

He remained on Kong until the 173rd left Vietnam in 

August 1971 and then the hull was removed. Emory had 

served with the same gun truck from its construction to 

the end for a total of two years. He never told anyone in 

his family about the war or what he did.6

Danny Cochran left King Kong and joined up with 

SGT Richard Downard as the NCOIC to form the new 

crew of Proud American. They restored the gun box to 

its original design and renamed the gun truck Ace of 

Spades. The bonding of gun truck crews was strong and 

the death of a crew member often resulted in the others 

leaving the gun truck. Calvin Bennett had survived two 

ambushes resulting in two deaths on his gun truck yet 

he remained on it. He believed it just was not his time to 

die. David Rose was sent to Cam Ranh Bay where they 

loaded him on a plane without even out-processing. 

The Army took care of that at Fort Lewis, Washington. 

Proud American 

was rebuilt and 

renamed Ace of 

Spades. Courtesy 

of Fred Teneyck.
92 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

He was issued a brand new green uniform and then 

returned to his wife in Los Angeles. Everyone tried to pick 

up where they left off two years prior. Since Cochran was 

Regular Army, he had to wait three years to get out.

The enemy could not close down the flow of supplies 

because of the fire power of the gun trucks and the 

heroism of their crews. The 5-ton gun trucks had 

proven themselves the best deterrent against a convoy 

ambush. COL Garland Ludy who was then the Assistant 

Commandant of the U.S. Army Transportation School 

and former 8th Group Commander in 1969 had written 

COL Morton back in February that the Army needed 

to preserve an example of the 5-ton gun truck. Ludy’s 

favorite had been Big Kahuna, an APC gun truck, and 

COL Morton considered it and Madam Pele as the best 

examples of the two types of gun trucks. Both belonged 

to the 2nd Transportation Company and 48 hours after 

learning of the request, the company commander had 

raised $800 from the officers and men to ship the gun 

trucks to Fort Eustis, Virginia. Morton could not accept 

the money and recommended the commander instead 

offer it to the Transportation Museum. With Lam Son 

over, Morton finally replied to BG Ludy on 17 May that 

the 2nd Transportation Company could not release 

those two gun trucks until the unit retrograded back 

to the United States scheduled sometime later. Morton 

instead decided to ship a gun truck from his favorite 

company, the 523rd Transportation Company. That 

company felt the Eve of Destruction best represented 

their gun truck history. On 31 May, CPT Voightritter wrote 

BG Alton G. Post, the current Assistant Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Logistics in U.S. Army Vietnam and former 

Assistance Commandant of the Transportation School, 

for assistance in shipping the gun truck. They loaded the 

Eve aboard the Pioneer Commander on 11 June and 

it arrived at Norfolk a month later where it became an 

iconic artifact of the Army Transportation Museum.7

After Lam Son, the 8th Transportation Group 

Headquarters convoyed south to a place north of Da 

Nang, possibly Phu Ni. Headquarters and Headquarters 

The Eve of Destruction’s new paint job complete with the rubber raised middle finger. Courtesy of Voightritter family.
Aftermath 93

Detachment, 8th Transportation Group was scheduled 

to inactivate on 28 April 1971. The soldiers of the 

headquarters were sent home or to the other two truck 

battalions. Three NCOs (an E8 and two E7s), who had 

come over with 8th Group in 1967, wanted to bid their 

farewell to the unit. They drove down in a jeep from 

Quang Tri and wanted to return that very night. On the 

return trip, they were killed. Only CPT Jess Perez, the 

HHD Commander, and COL Morton remained. They 

reported to Da Nang Airport with individual travel orders 

and were told that one had to stay since they did not have 

unit movement orders. Since Perez commanded the HHD, 

he had responsibility for the 8th Group colors and had 

to stay. COL Morton boarded the plane and left. Perez 

returned to Da Nang and spent the next three weeks 

getting an accounting classification for unit movement 

orders. He finally brought the 8th Group colors to Fort 

Lewis, Washington. They were uncased in a ceremony 

that resembled a change of command ceremony. He 

handed the colors over where they were cased and sent 

for storage until the headquarters was reactivated as a 

training brigade at Fort Eustis in July 1986. This ended 

another chapter in the history of the unit. The battlehardened truck drivers of the 8th Transportation 

Group had earned a respected place in the history 

of the Vietnam War.8

Most of the wounded recovered and lived fruitful 

lives. Chester Israel spent three months in a hospital 

and was later discharged from the Army. Stafford 

survived the war and although blind, earned a law 

degree from the University of Georgia. Baird went on 

to earn his graduate degree in Animal Husbandry at 

the University of Kentucky so he could breed pigs 

scientifically. He went on to serve in the Indiana 

House of Representatives in 2010. 

Although the ARVN had failed to destroy the enemy 

logistics bases in Laos, the Easter Offensive of 1972 

drove all the way to Quang Tri. The American combat 

veterans came home without any fanfare that greeted 

their fathers, uncles and grandfathers before them. 

Instead, protesters waited for them outside the gates 

intended to feel make them feel ashamed of their 

service. Those who were proud of it would not find 

much moral support since the public had grown tired 

of the war. Many had little time to transition from war to 

peace. They came off convoys one day, processed out 

of Vietnam in khakis the next day, flew to the States to 

draw their discharge and a new dress green uniform, 

and were civilians after that. Their bodies were at home 

but their minds were still in Vietnam. So the veterans 

tried to pick up where they left off and many avoided 

talking about their time in Vietnam.

Several of the officers stayed in the Army after 

Vietnam. Don Voightritter made the Army a career and 

Eve of Destruction on its way to the Army Transportation Museum at Fort Eustis, Virginia. 

Courtesy of Voightritter family.
94 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

retired as a colonel. Dan Hill likewise had a successful 

military career and retired as a colonel. Ralph Fuller 

retired from the Army in 1975 as a captain due to his 

accumulated enlisted time. He had wanted to leave 

the Army right after Lam Son but his wife convinced 

him to stay because of how close he was to his military 

retirement. The rest came home to pick up where they 

left off or start new lives. Tom Callahan became a lawyer 

after the war. Mike Lavin worked in construction for a 

year in Helbronn, Germany trying to figure out what to do 

with his life. Depressed, he returned home to Missouri 

where he started a career in light construction. As part 

of his healing process, he began talking with local high 

schools about his experience in Vietnam with other 

veterans. Ed Harvey retired as a hospital administrator 

and then became a college professor. John Dragavon 

returned to his wife and completed his graduate degree 

in Wildlife Sciences with the University of Washington. 

Surprisingly, he ran into a lot of Vietnam veterans in that 

program. This led to paid work with the National Park 

Service and US Fish and Wildlife Service. Seeking full 

time employment, he went to work for an engineering 

firm as a consultant. Don Bartletti returned to San Diego, 

California, grew his hair long and became a hippie. He 

started his photojournalist career with the Vista Press 

and joined the Los Angeles Times in 1984. For three 

decades he chronicled the struggles of migrant workers. 

In 2015, he became a Pulitzer Prize finalist for his 

series on Mexican farm workers. 

Of the enlisted men, Danny Cochran worked in 

a body shop after the war. Calvin Bennet worked in 

maintenance in the school system. Logan Werth worked 

as a handyman in a number of jobs. Each had different 

ways of dealing with their war experience. Many, 

especially the crews on the gun trucks, would suffer 

varying levels of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 

This one common bond of service in Vietnam would 

eventually bring them together again.

The United States and the Republic of Vietnam 

concluded a peace treaty with the Provisional 

Revolutionary Government and North Vietnam in Paris 

on 27 January 1973, thus ending the war. The United 

States then pulled out the remaining ground combat 

units. Two years later, the North Vietnamese Army 

violated the treaty and Saigon fell to an invasion of Sovietbuilt tanks on 30 April 1975. For this reason, the media 

would promote the myth that the United States had lost 

the war. This left the Americans who had lost friends and 

parts of themselves with a sense of bitterness. Had 

all this sacrifice been in vain? Deep inside the veterans 

knew they had not failed to accomplish any mission 

assigned. In spite of their best efforts, the enemy 

had never shut down the supply route. So the veterans 

felt they had won, but were cheated of their honor.

The ordeal of combat left some veterans with 

deep scares while, for many, it formed a strong bond 

of brotherhood among those who fought side-byside. The individual replacement system did not foster 

too much bonding except with the replacements one 

came over with and within the crews of the gun trucks. 

Never were any group of truck drivers closer during 

the Vietnam War than the gun truck crews. It was only 

a matter of time before the Vietnam veterans would 

begin to hold reunions as had their predecessors. In 

1989, the Vietnam veterans of the 359th Transportation 

Company held their first reunion. Surprisingly, the military 

stevedores would be responsible for getting the drivers 

of the other truck companies together.

In 1992, Rick Phillips, Bill Wandall, and a few 

other 4th Transportation Command veterans met in 

Washington D.C. and set up the organization, the 4th 

Trans Command Vietnam Association, for reunions and 

history preservation. It quickly evolved into the Army 

Transportation Association Veterans (ATAV) to include 

all Transportation Corps Vietnam veterans. Immediately 

after the first meeting in Washington, Dr. Ralph Grambo, 

Associate Professor of Economics- Finance, created 

a web page using his University of Scranton website. 

He was an early user of the web and had unlimited 

resources when working at the University of Scranton. 

Other units followed suit. 

ATAV then held reunions every two years and, 

during the July 2002 ATAV reunion in New Orleans, 

Larry Fiandt, a veteran of the 523rd Transportation 

Company, approached Richard Killblane, Transportation 

Corps Historian, about holding another reunion the next 

year at Fort Eustis. Killblane worked with Barbara Bower, 

the Army Transportation Museum Director, to host the 

reunion, which they simply called, “The Gathering.” The 

bulk of the attendees were veterans of gun truck crews. 

The attendance of veterans started at around 70, but 

the next year rose to a hundred. The Museum hosted the 
Aftermath 95

2003, 2004, and 2006 Gatherings and Barbara Bower 

and Kathy Blackstone continued as active members of 

the planning committee. They alternated the location of 

the reunions every year.

In 2008, the veterans held the Gathering at Pigeon 

Forge, Tennessee with attendance of a dozen members 

of the 566th Transportation Company. This was the best 

turn out of veterans of Cam Ranh Bay. By 2009, Bud 

Whitehead took an increasing role in the conduct of 

the reunion so he held a separate Gathering of primarily 

the Cam Ranh Bay veterans at Pigeon Forge while the 

original Gathering held theirs at the Army Historical 

and Education Center at Carlisle, Pennsylvania in 2010. 

This divided the reunions into the Cam Ranh Bay and 

8th Transportation Group reunions. Although the 

stevedores of the 71st Transportation Battalion at 

Newport had an active reunion organization, for some 

reason, the truck drivers out of the 48th Group in 

Long Binh had yet to turn out in large numbers. They 

were the only truck organization in Vietnam that did 

not build gun trucks.

As the Vietnam Transportation veteran reunions 

grew in attendance, they began to hold the company 

reunions. The 523rd and 359th Transportation 

Companies always had the best turnout at the 

Gatherings and several of the veterans even rebuilt 

replicas of their gun trucks. Finally, Mike Lavin fulfilled a 

promise he made to the men of his company and hosted 

the first 515th Transportation Company reunion in his 

hometown in Kirkwood, Missouri in June 2013. This 

provided the opportunity for healing and a chance to 

renew old friendships. They would always reflect 

on their service during Lam Son 719 as one of 

their greatest accomplishments. The truck drivers’ 

performance during this operation would stand out as 

one of the greatest acts of heroism of the Transportation 

Corps and in recognition of its sacrifice and service 

during Lam Son 719, the Transportation Corps Regiment 

inducted the 523rd Transportation Company into its 

Hall of Fame in 2012 and the 8th Group in 2018.

The 2008 Gathering at Pigeon Forge. Left to right: Willie Strong, wives, Logan Werth and Chester Israel. Photo by author.
96 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

Seven rebuilt gun trucks at the 2008 Gathering in Pigeon Forge. Photo by author.

Rebuilt copy of 

Satan’s Li’l Angel at 

the 2008 Gathering 

in Pigeon Forge. 

Photo by author.

Logan Werth and 

Mike Cameric on 

Uncle Meat giving 

the thumbs up 

after having 

survived another

ambush. Courtesy of

Logan Werth.
Aftermath 97

Above: 2008 Reunion 

of Transportation veterans of the Vietnam War 

called the Gathering 

at Pigeon Forge, 

Tennessee. Logan Werth 

sitting in right corner of 

photo. Photo by author.

1 Ellis, 39th ORLL.

2 Lavin interview, and 

Maloney interview.

3 Hampton, “Gypsy Bandits.”

4 Burch, 363rd Annual 

History 1970.

5 Fuller interview.

6 Larry Fiandt conversation 

with Richard Killblane, 

17 October 2008.

7 COL Richard L. Morton, 

Letter to COL Garland Ludy, 

25 May 1971. CPT Donald K. 

Voightritter, Memorandum, 

Subject: Item Contribution to 

the Transportation Museum, 

to BG Alton G.Post, 31 May 

1971. MAJ William A. Heizmann 

III, Subject: Shipment of 

Gun Truck to Transportation 

Museum, to Curator, 

Transportation Museum, 

no date.

8 Jesse Perez interview by 

Richard Killblane at Ft Eustis, 

Va, 7 August 2008.

John D. Krueger, “Nam 

Nomads,” VFW Magazine,

November 1985.

Rebuilt copy of Black Widow at the 2008 Gathering 

in Pigeon Forge. Photo by author.
98 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

Bibliography

Interviews

COL (R) Walter Anderson interview by Richard Killblane 

at Ft Eustis, Va., 26 July 2006.

Jim Baird interview by Richard Killblane at 

Branson, Mo, 2006.

Don Bartletti presentation before the 515th TC reunion 

at Kirkwood, Mo., 28 June 2013.

Roger Brittner interview by Richard Killblane at Kirkwood, 

Mo., 28 June 2013.

Chester Israel and Calvin Bennett interview by 

Richard Killblane at Pigeon Forge, Tn., 

9 September 2008.

Larry Fiandt telephone conversation with 

Richard Killblane, 17 October 2008.

Ralph Fuller interview by Richard Killblane at 

Ft Eustis, Va., 19 June 2004 

Dan Hill telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 

19 November 2015.

Larry Hurley interview by Richard Killblane at 

Kirkwood, Mo., 28 June 2013.

Mike Lavin interview by Richard Killblane at 

Branson, Mo., 17 June 2005.

Mike Lavin interview by Richard Killblane at 

Kirkwood, Mo., 29 June 2013.

Roger Maloney interview by Richard Killblane at 

Kirkwood. Mo., 28 June 2013.

Michael McBride interview by Richard Killblane, 

9 July 2004.

Robert L. Mitten interview by Richard Killblane 

in Lawrenceville, Va., on 17 June 2015.

Jesse Perez interview by Richard Killblane at 

Ft Eustis, Va., 7 August 2008

Claude Roberson telephone interview by 

Richard Killblane, 22 July 2013.

David Rose telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 

23 July 2013.

Sammy Seay and Danny Cochran interview by 

Richard Killblane at Fort Eustis, Va., 14 June 2003.

Logan Werth interview by Richard Killblane at 

Ft Eustis, Va., 12 June 2003.

Letters

CPT Donald K. Voightritter letter to BG Alton G. Post, 

Subject: Item Contribution to the Transportation 

Museum, 31 May 1971.

Bill Wullenschneider letter to Wayne Chalker, 

January 29, 1984.

Emails

Christopher Aichele email to Robert Mitten, June 1, 2013.

David Boyd email to Richard Killblane, August 24, 2004.

John Dragavon email to Richard Killblane, May 21, 2015.

Edward Harvey email to Richard Killblane, May 29, 2015. 

Edward Harvey email to John Dragavon, May 27, 2015.

Roger Rahor email to Richard Killblane, August 18, 2004.

Bibliography

504th MP Battalion Forward Log

Abshire, Will, untitled article on gun trucks in I Corps, 

1st Log News, April 15, 1971.

Burch, CPT Earl B., Annual History of the 

363rd Transportation Company (Medium Truck) 

period ending 31 December 1970, 26 March 1971.

Ellis, LTC Alvin C., Operational Report – Lessons Learned,

39th Transportation Battalion (Truck), Period Ending 

30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2), 4 May 1971.

Hampton, Bill, “Gypsy Bandits Move to Quang Tri,” 

ATAV, http://grambo.us/atav/hampton.htm.

Hill, LTC Richard Dan, Proud of What I Was - A Soldier,

Xlibris Corp. 2011.

Memo, 363rd Transportation Company (Medium Truck) 

Subject: National Defense Transportation Award, 

19 May 1971. 

Nolan, Keith William, Into Laos; The Story of Dewey 

Canyon II/Lam Son 719; Vietnam 1971, Novato, CA: 

Presidio Press, 1986.

Phillips, Robert Cody, “Operation Lamson 719; 

The Laotian Incursion During the War in Vietnam,” 

Masters Thesis, May 1979.

The Protector, 57th Transportation Co Nam Nomads, 

http://nam_nomads.tripod.com/TheProtector/protector.html.

The Fifth Infantry Division, Vietnam, Lam Son 719 CAAR, 

http://www.societyofthefifthdivision.com/vietnam/

significantevents.htm. 
Index 99

A

Aichele, Chris 9, 11, 64- 66

Anderson, Walter 49, 50, 61

Aragon, Pete 26, 27, 55

ARVN units:

1st ARVN Ranger Battalion 43, 61, 81

1st ARVN Armored Division 43, 85

1st ARVN Airborne Division 43, 61, 81, 85

B

Baird, Jim 16, 17, 24, 67-73, 81, 83, 84, 93

Bartletti, Donald 26, 27, 77, 80, 86, 94, 

Bass, Sam 55

Bennett, Calvin 18, 21, 37, 69, 72, 75, 81, 91

Bower, Barbara 94, 95

Brinton, Devon 9, 11, 13, 64, 65, 

Brittner, Roger 28, 55 -58

Boyd, David 24, 25

Burch, Earl B. 13, 14, 50

Butler, MAJ 45, 47

C

Callahan, Eugene 44

Callahan, Tom 16, 17, 21, 22, 24, 37, 81, 83, 94

Cameric, Mike 8, 19, 96

Colucci, Ken 58, 80

Cochran, Danny 18, 45, 70, 72, 85, 91, 92, 94

Cook, Dennis 9, 11, 64

Cracker Box 52

Crow, Walter 26, 27, 55

D

Dougherty, Bill 17

Downard, Richard 70, 91

Doyle, John 45, 47

Dragavon, John A. 9, 11-13, 50, 94

E

Ellis, Alvin C. 25, 26, 28, 34, 38, 61, 69, 

77, 81, 85, 86, 90, 91

F

Frazier, Richard B. 37, 69, 72, 74, 75

Fry, Ted 27

Fuller, Ralph 16-19, 23, 35, 62, 77-81, 

83, 84, 91, 94

G

Grambo, Ralph 94

Gardner, LT 33, 85

Gun truck

Ace of Spades 15, 16, 54, 55, 65, 

 67, 89, 91

Assassins 32, 33, 85, 86

Baby Sitters 26, 27, 55 -58, 61

Big Kahuna 24, 92

Black Widow 15, 20, 22, 23, 84, 85, 97

Canned Heat 9, 12, 75 -77

Colonel 11, 13, 15, 63- 65

Eve of Destruction 6, 8, 15, 19, 22, 

 23, 77, 78, 84, 92, 93

Godzilla 22

Highland Animals 23

Iron Butterfly 12

Justifier 32, 33, 85

King Kong 15, 18, 19, 22, 45, 62, 

 66, 67, 69 -73, 78, 89, 91

Lifer 49

Madam Pele 24, 92

Matchbox 22

Maverick 24

Mercenary 15

Outlaw 24

Pallbearers 15

Peace Maker 49

Preacher 49

Private 49

Proud American 75, 81- 83, 89, 91

Protector 32, 33, 52, 55 -57, 59, 60, 89

Satan’s Li’l Angel 20, 23, 37, 67-72, 

 75, 89, 92, 96

Set Me Free and LT Calley 23

Smiling Death 49 

Tire Boss 24

Uncle Meat 15, 19, 62, 67, 69 -73, 

 78, 79, 84, 96

War Monger 49

H

Harvey, Edward J. 9, 11, 12, 80, 94

Healy, SGT 55

Hill, Richard Dan 17, 22, 35, 43, 48, 

53-55, 78 - 80, 94

Hurley, Lawrence J. 26, 27, 34, 35, 37

I

Israel, Chester 18, 21, 22, 37, 49, 69, 

70, 72, 75, 93, 95

J

Johnson, Robert 54

Jones, Al 49

Jones, Danny 19

Jones, Gene 27, 55, 58

Jones, Kenneth H. 80

K

Killblane, Richard 94

Kirk, Pierre D. 11

Konopnicki, Emil 53

Kurtz 55

L

Lane, SGT 65

Lavin, John Mike 26, 28 -30, 34, 35, 38, 

51, 80, 85, 88 -90, 94, 95

Lee, Thomas 24, 25

Litton, Bill 26

Ludy, Garland 92

M

McBride, Mike 33, 52, 53, 57

McDonald 81, 83

Mitten, Robert 9, 11, 13, 14, 75-77

Maloney, Cornelius Roger 25 -28, 34, 37, 

55 -58, 91

Malmstrom, Don 45, 47, 48

Morton, Richard 14, 15, 22, 53, 61, 75, 92, 93

N

Nixon, Richard 6, 9

O

P

Perez, Jesse 93

Peters, Patrick I. 23

Peterson, LTC 54

Phillips, Rick 94

Post, Alton G. 92
100 LAM SON 719 The Cargo Must Get Through

Q

R

Rahor, Roger 13-15, 81

Revelak, LT 57

Roberson, Claude 32, 37, 38, 78, 79, 85

Rose, David 19, 62, 78-80, 91

Russel, MAJ 54

S

Shed, Keith 27, 55

Simon, Larry 90

Soule, Charles H. 55, 57, 59

Spurgeon, Harold 57, 58

Stafford, Ernie K. 23, 50, 55, 57, 93

Strong, Willie 20, 82, 95, 

Sutherland, James W., Jr. 61, 77

Sweeney, Arthur H., Jr. 7, 53, 59, 91

T

Thorne, Robert W. 21, 37, 70, 72, 75, 81, 

83, 84

Transportation units

8th Transportation Group 6, 14, 15, 

 16, 18, 20 -22, 25, 32, 53, 55, 

 60, 75, 92, 93, 95

48th Transportation Group 23, 95

26th General Support Group 7, 53

80th General Support Group 7, 10, 12

39th Transportation Battalion 7, 10, 23, 25, 

 29, 31, 35, 42, 49, 51, 52, 63, 64, 66, 

 69, 77, 89, 91

57th Transportation Battalion 7, 10, 49, 

 63, 66, 91

71st Transportation Battalion 95

2nd Transportation Company 92

57th Transportation Company 32, 33, 35, 

 37, 47, 52, 53, 55, 60, 67

359th Transportation Company 94, 95

363rd Transportation Company 9 -13, 16, 

 50, 64, 75, 81, 91, 

512th Transportation Company 12, 22

515th Transportation Company 25 -29, 

 34-38, 48, 49, 51, 55, 56, 60, 

 61, 77, 80, 85, 86, 88 -90, 95

523rd Transportation Company 8, 14-20, 

 22-25, 32, 34-37, 48, 49, 55, 56, 61, 

 67, 74, 80, 81, 86, 89 -92, 94, 95

528th Transportation Company 64

545th Transportation Company 22

563rd transportation Company 23, 49, 

 50, 61, 91

572nd Transportation Company 23, 91

585th Transportation Company 25, 58, 66

666th Transportation Company 25, 66, 86

669th Transportation Company 23

805th Transportation Company 25

506th Transportation Detachment 42, 67

U

US Army units

1st Cavalry Division 7

5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) 5, 35, 

 45, 47, 51, 54, 56, 69

25th Infantry Division 16, 33

101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) 5, 24, 

 32, 35, 66, 85, 86

XXIV Corps 7, 35, 45, 61, 66

US Army Support Command, Da Nang 

 7, 53, 59

Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) 

 17, 22, 53

3rd Air Cavalry Squadron 35

77th Armor 35

5th Cavalry 73

3rd Infantry 35

11th Infantry 35

187th Infantry 35

4th Field Artillery 35

82nd Field Artillery 35

7th Engineer Battalion 35

14th Engineer Battalion 35

27th Engineers Battalion 35

326th Engineer Battalion 35

59th Engineer Company 35

80th Engineer Company 35

23rd Supply and Transportation 

 Company 66

528th Quartermaster Petroleum Supply 

 Company 64

85th Evacuation Hospital 66, 77

V

Vance, Leon 20, 22, 

Voightritter, Donald 15, 17, 19 -23, 25, 29, 

36, 74, 92, 94

Voightritter, Ronald 21

W

Wandall, Bill 94

Werth, Logan 8, 19, 80, 94-97

West, SP4 15

Whitehead, Bud 95

Y

Z