### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Ja nuary13, 200 6 S es sio n
DAVID MOSL EY, ET AL 

### . v. PHI LLI P L. M C 

### CA NLE SS, THE

METRO POLI TAN GOVE RNMENT
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 01C-190 M ariet ta Ship ley, Judge

No. M2005- 00145-COA-R 3-CV - F iled on May 16, 2006

T h e tr i a l c o u r th e l d t h e M e tr o p o l i t a n G o v e r n m e n tc o m p ar a t i v e l y l i ab l e f o r i n j u r i e s s u s t a i n e d b y a motorist inj ured in a

vehicular acc ident. The Metropolitan Government was held comparatively at fault base d upon the finding the intersec tion where the wre ck occ urre d was dang erous, it had notice of the da ng er, an d i t fa i l ed to re medy the situation. I t appea ls, contending the desig n of the intersec tion and whether

to install a stop si g n or traf fic lig ht is a discretionary function, for which it is i mmune under the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The evidenc e supports the finding s that the intersec tion was dang erous a nd that the Metropolitan Gove rnment had notice of the dang er, but faile d to take re me dia l a c tio n. We the re fo rea ff ir m. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., and W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., joined.

Erica Kruse and J ohn Kenne dy , Nash v i l l e, T ennesse e, for the appe llant, The Metropolitan G o v e r n m e n to f

N a s h v i l l e a n d D a v i d s o n C o u n t y.
L a n c e B

. M a y e s a n d B il l H o d d e , M a d is o n , T e n n e s s e e , f o r th e ap p e ll e e , D a v idM o s le y , e t u x.
OP IN ION

David Mosl ey , Plaintiff, and Philli p McCanless, a de fendant, were involved in a vehicula r acc ident at the interse ction of Pol k Av en u e an d Hutton Drive on Septembe r 15, 2000. Plaintiff sustained s ignif

icant inj uries as a

result of the a ccide nt, including loss of he aring , memory loss, and defic its in hi s conce ntration, motor speed, and dexterity

. Pla int if f f ile d su it ag a ins t Mc Ca nle ss c on te nd ing thea c c ide nt w a s d ue to M c Ca nle ss’ neg li g e n c e in f

a il in g to o b e y a s to p s ig n a n d to y ie ld

. M c Can le s s d e n ie d li ab il ity a n d , in the alternative, conte n d e d

th eM e tropolitan Governme nt of Nashville, Da vidson County , Tenne ssee wa s-2-

compar atively

at fault due to the fac t the intersec tion was dang erous. As a conseque nce, Plaintiff amende d his Compl aint to add the Metropolitan Gove rnment as a co-de fendant.
Th e Me tr op oli ta n Gov e rn me nt de fe nd e d the c a se re lying g e ne ra lly on the immun ity de fe ns e under the Governmental Tort LiabilityAc t an d , particula rly , the discre tionary

function def

ense. McCanless settled with Plaintiff, leaving only the Metropolit an Gove rnment to defe nd the ac tion. The c ase pr ocee ded to trial.

The re cord r eve al s P l ai ntiff was tra veling on Polk Avenue and ha d the rig ht-of-w ay at the intersec tion with Hutton Drive. M cCanless wa s driving on H utton Drive. A stop sig n direc ted mot orist s o n H utt on Drive to s top a s th e y app ro a c he d Polk Av e nu e
. Mc Ca nle ss al le g e dly faile d to stop at the stop sign, pulled out in front of Plaintiff, and the vehicula r ac cident re sulted.

The re cor d tells us the intersection of Polk and Hutton had a long history

of ac cidents and
wa s th e su bje c t of num e ro us c omp la int s by mot orist s. Th e a c c ide nts we rea lle g e d to be the re su lt of seve ral fa ctors. One was the f act ther e wa s a curve in P o l k Avenue near the intersec tion that impaired the sight distance of motorists stopped on Hutton Drive. Another fac tor was the loc ation of the stop sig n on Hutton Drive; it wa s positioned thirty -three fee t f rom Polk Avenue. A third f actor was the gr owth of vege tation at t he corner of Hutton Drive and Polk Avenue that re stricted and/or reduc ed the sight distance. As a c onsequenc e of the se and othe r fa ctors, motorists familiar with the int e rs e c tio n w ou ld e a se fo rw ardfo r a be tte r v ie w t o d e te rm ine wh e the r the y c ou ld turn o nto Pol k Avenue . Motorists unfamiliar with the intersec tion w er e l i k elyunawa re of the impaired sig ht dis ta nc e , a ndthe re wa s n o s ig na g e to p ut the m onno tic e of the se fa c tor s.
The Metr opolitan Governme nt was aw are of seve ral a ccide nts at the intersec tion long bef ore the a c c ide nt at iss ue
. Ad dit ion a lly , it re c e ive d nu me ro us c omp la int s fr om mot orist s ov e r the y e ars
. Some of th e c o mp lain ts p e r tain e d to v e g e tati o n th a t o b s c u r e d th e v ie w o f o n c o mi n g tr a f f ic. The
rec ord re veals that c omplaints ab o u t the veg etation had be en re ported to the Metr opolitan Government i n 1 9 9 3 , 1995, 1996, and 2000, in re sponse to which the Me tropolitan Governme nt dis patc he d c re ws to c ut the ve g e ta tio n. Of c ou rs e , th e ve g e ta tio n r e turne d, a s d id the c omp la int s.
The M et ro p o l i t an Go v er n m en tac k n o wl ed ges i th ad n o t i ce o f the wrecks a nd complaints prior to this acc ident. Neve rtheless, it c ontends its responses to the notices and the cor rec tive measure s t ak e n , a n d n o tt ak e n , w e r e d i s c r e t i o n ar y f u n c t i o n s o f

t h e g o v e r n m e n tf

o r w h i c h i th a s i m m u n i t y. Th us , it c on te nd s it

is n ot l ia ble fo r the a c tio n it

too k a ndthe a c tio n it

c ho se no t to take in r e sp on se to the no tic e s a ndc omp la int s.
Th e fo llo wi ng are so me of the re sp on siv e me a su re s tak e n b y the Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt. I n 1998, the Metropolitan Gove rnment sent eng ineer s to studythe intersec tion. This study showed the sig ht distance fr om the stop sign on H u t t on Drive w as limited to 310 feet along Polk Avenue. The e ng ineer s reported the re stricted si g ht distance was due to the horiz ontal curve in the roa d, not the over g rown ve g etation. B ased upon the amount of traf fic re ported in t he study , the Metropolitan Government determined the traf fic wa s not sufficient to war rant installing a t ra ff

ic sig nal at the-3-

intersec tion. The Metropolitan Gove rnment additi o n al l yconclude d from the study that the int e rs e c tio n o f P olk a nd Hu tto n wa s n ot s uf fi c ie ntl y da ng e ro us to w arr a nt the ins ta llatio n o f a tr a ff ic control devic e other

than a stop sig n.
The matter

went to trial with the Metropolitan Government as the only defe ndant. Following a bench t ri al, Plaintiff was a war ded $293,200 in damag es which de termination set into play the
com peting claims of compa rative f ault betwee n Plaintiff, McCanless and the Me tropolitan Government. The trial court found t he interse ction was da ng erous, of which fa ct the Metropolitan Government had notice. Ba sed upon that finding , the trial court proce eded to strike the Metropolitan Government’s def

ense of immunit y

under Te nn. Code Ann § 29-20- 203, and apportioned 55% of the fault to McCanless, 35% to the Metropolitan Gove rnment, and 10% to Plainti ff.

The Metr opolitan Governme nt appea ls, contendi n g t h e trial c ourt err ed by (1) a dmitti ng evidenc e of w rec ks subsequent to the one at issue, (2) deny ing its immunit y defe nse, (3) finding the intersec tion dang erous a nd that the Metropolitan Gove rnment had know ledg e of the dang er, and (4) fi nd ing the int e rs e c tio n w a s a c on tr ibu tin g fa c tor

to the a c c ide nt.
S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW
Th e stand ardof

re vie w o f a

tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f

a c t is de novo, and we presume that the fi nd ing s o f f

a c t a re c or re c t un le ss the pr e po nd e ranc e of the e vid e nc e is oth e rw ise

. Te nn . R. App . P. 13 (d ); Rawlings v. John Hancoc k Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 7 8 S

. W

. 3 d 2 9 1 , 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). For the evid en ce to pr eponder ate a g ainst a trial court’s finding of fa ct, it must support another finding of fa ct with g reater c onvincing eff ect. W alke r v . S idn ey Gi lre ath & As so c s. , 40 S.W .3d 66, 71 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 0) ; The Realty Shop, Inc. v. R.R. W estminster Holding, Inc ., 7 S.W .3d 581, 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). Wher e the tria l court does not ma k e fi n d i n gs o f fa ct, there is no p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o rr e c t n e s s a n d w e “ m u s t c o n d u c t o u r o w n i n d e p e n d e n t r e v i e w o f t h e r e c or d to determine wher e the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e lies.” Brooks v. Brook s , 992 S.W .2d 403, 405 (T e nn . 1 99 9) . We a lso g ive g re a t we ig ht t o a tria l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio ns of c re dib ili ty

of wi tne sse s. Estate of W

alton v. Y oung , 95 0 S .W .2 d 95 6, 95 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) ; B & G Con str ., In c . v . P olk , 37 S.W .3d 462, 465 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). I ssues of law a re r eviewe d de novo with no pr esumption of cor rec tness. Nelson v. W

al-Mart Stores, Inc. , 8 S.W .3d 625, 628 (Tenn. 1999)

.

A N A L Y SIS
Governmental entities are immune from suit for any i n j u ry “which may

result from the activities of such g overnme ntal entities where in such g overnme ntal entities are eng ag ed in the exercise a nd discharge o f an y of their f

unctions, g overnme ntal or proprietary ” pursuant to the Government Tort L iability Act (GTLA). Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201( a). This immuni ty can be
remove d when an employ ee acting within the scope of his employ ment commits a neg lige nt act or omi ssi on that is the pr oximate c aus e of a n inju ry e xce pt wh e n the inj ury ari se s o ut o f " the e xer c ise or per formanc e or the failure to exercise or pe rform a discre tionary function, whe ther or not the discretion is abused, . . ." Tenn. Code Ann.§ 29- 20-205(1) . A g overnme ntal entity ’s immunitymayB ec au se w e h av e fo un d t ha t t he d ec i si o n no t t o i nstall t he t raff i c d ev i ce wa s i m m un e fro m suit as a 1 d i scre t i o na ry f

un cti o n, we ne ed no t rea ch t he i ssue o f wh ethe r t he fail ure to install t he d ev i ce wa s t he p ro xim ate c au se of t h e ac ci den t

. T h e i n qu i r y of pr ox i mat e ca u s e i s on l y a ppl i ca bl e t o a n a n al y s i s u n der T en n
. Code An n
. § 29- 20- 205.
-4- a lso be re mov e d f

or a ny inj ury c aus e d b y

“ a de fe c tiv e , u ns a fe , o r d a ng e ro us c on dit ion of a ny str e e t, alley , sidewalk or h i gh wa y , owned a nd controlled by such g overnme ntal entity ” provide d it has

“ c on str uc tiv e a nd

/or a c tua l no tic e ” of

su c h c on dit ion . T e nn . Co de An n. § 2 9- 20 -2 03 (1 ), (2 ). We w ill first examine the discre tionary function def

ense.
The Te n n e s s e e Su p r e me Co u r t h a s d e te r mi n e d th e ap p li c ab le a n a ly s is f o r d e te r mi n ing whether a ce rtain ac tivityfalls within a municipality ’s discre tionary function under

Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 29-20-205( 1). See Bowers v. C ity of Chatt anooga , 8 2 6 S

. W

. 2 d 4 2 7 ( T e n n
. 1 9 9 2 )

. In Bo we rs , t h e S u preme Court adopted the planning -oper ational test, explaining that “[u]nder the planning -oper ational t est, decisions t hat rise to the leve l of planning or policy -making are considere d discretionary

acts whic h do not give rise to tort liability , while dec isions that are merely operational
are not considere d discretionary acts a nd, there fore , do not give rise t o i m munity .” Bo we rs , 826 S

. W

. 2 d at4 3 0 (c i t i n g Car lso n v . S tate , 598 P.2d 969, 972 (Alaska 1979) ).

The re sponsibili ty

for laying out the roadw ay s for Nashville and D avidson County and for determining the a

ppropriate means of c ontrolling tra ffic lies w ith th eM e tro p o litan Governme nt. The Me tr op oli ta n G ov ernm ent c on du c te d a stu dy of the int e rs e c tio n in19 98 . A s p art of the stu dy , it considere d the sig ht distance at the intersec tion, as well as the amount of traff ic, and de termined that it was not f

easible to install a tra ffic c ontrol device . This decision, whethe r a tra ffic c ontrol device
wa s w arr a nte d, inv olv e d th e we ig hin g of va ri ou s f a c tor s andc on sid e ratio ns of pu bli c po lic y . T hu s, the dec ision no t t o i n s t al l a traf fic c ontrol device was a discretionary

decision for

which g overnme ntal immunit y

should be prese rved unde r Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205. 1 The discretionary function ex ception addressed in Bo we rs cover s “ac ts involving an ele ment of judg ment or choic e if they are based on considerations of publ ic pol icy .” Helton v. Knox County, Tennessee , 9 2 2 S

. W

. 2 d 8 7 7 , 8 8 6 (T en n
. 1 9 9 6 ) ( ci t i n g Berkov itz v . United States , 486 U.S.531, 536, 108 S.Ct . 1954, 1958, 100 L .Ed.2d 531 (1988)) . The trial c ourt corr ectly acknow ledg ed the dec ision whether to install a traff

ic control device at the intersec tion of Hutton D rive and Polk Ave nue wa s a discre tionary

function.

Th is d e c isi on , h ow e ve r, do e s n ot e ndou r i nq uiry of th e is su e s p re se nte d. We mus t a lso determine whether

Plaintiff’s injuries wer e ca used, at lea s t in part, by a def ective, unsa fe, or dang ero u s c o n d it io n o f

a n y s tr e e t o r

h ig h w a y , o w n e d a n d c o n tr o ll e d b y th e M e tr o p o litan Government. I ts im m u n i t y m ayalso be re moved for an injury cause d by

“a de fec tive, unsafe , or dang erous c ondition of any street .

. . or highw ay ” it owns or contr ols. The def inition for "stre et" or "hig hway " inc ludes traf

fic c ontrol device s thereon. T enn. Code Ann. § 29-20-203(1) . I n order for immunit y to be re moved under

this p rovision, however , “construc tive and/or a ctual notice to the g overnme ntal entity

of such c ondition [ must] be alleg ed and pr oved.” T enn. Code An n . § 29-20- 203(2).D e fe n da n t a s s e r t s t h e t r i a l c ou r t e r r e d i n c on s i de r i n g r e po r t s a n d i n for ma t i on a bo u t t h e i n t e r s e c t i on t h a t c a me 2 i n a f t er t h e dat e of

t h e a cc i den t

. W e a g r ee t h at t h e t r i al cou r t s h ou l d ha v e on l y con s i der ed e v i den ce of t h e i n t er s ec t i on
a s o f t h e d a te o f t h e a c c id e n t an d p rio r to tha t d a te . B e c a u se w e ha v e the e n tire re c o rd b e fo re us , t h e re is no ne e d to
re m a n d d u e to this issu e . W e m a y e v a lua te the issu e s b a s e d o n ly o n the e v id e n c e tha t wa s a v a ilab le o n a n d p rio r to Se pt embe r 15, 2000.
-5- The a naly sis reg arding the immunitydefe nse under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-203 require s a sepa rate and distinct inquiry

from that for

the discre tionary

functi o n immunit y

aff orded unde r Tenn. Code Ann.§ 29- 20-205. Helton, 922 S.W .2d at 880. Helton involved a vehic ular a ccide nt wher e Plaintiff’s husband c rashe d on a bridg e lined with a stone wall in lieu of g uardr ails. The man died when the wall g ave w ay and his ca

r fe ll over the side of

the bridg e. The Court identified the tw o is su e s b e fo re it a s
1. Whether t he failure to i nstall gua rdra ils . . . render ed the bridge“def ective, unsa fe, or dang erous” and, if so, whether Knox County had actua l or constructive notice of such condition for pur

poses of re moving Knox County ’s immunityunder § 29- 20- 203 of the GTL

A; and 2

. Whether under

the “ne g lige nt act or omission” provision of § 29-20- 205 of the GTLA the dec ision not t o install gua rdra ils . . . was a “disc retionary function” suc h
a s w o u l d p r e s e r v e K n o x C o u n t y’ s g o v e r n m e n t a l i m m u n i t y.
Helton , 922 S.W .2d at 880.

The Court noted that “ even w hen the decision whether to install gua rdra ils is a discretionary function that pre serve s g overnme ntal immunit y under § 29-20-205( 1), it is possible that the lack of g ua rdrails mig ht re nd e r the bridg e or ro a dw a y so de fe c tiv e , u ns a fe , o r d a ng e ro us that im mun ity is waived unde r § 29-20- 203.” Helton , 9 22 S.W. 2d a t 882 (n . 10)

. Th e Cou rt we nt on t o s ta te , “ it i s conce ivable that either

provision might applyto remove g overnme ntal immunit y .” Id. at 885. There fore , even thoug h we ha ve sustained the Me tropolitan Governme nt’s discreti o n ar y function defe nse, we must consider whe ther the inter section wa s dang erous or defe ctive, and if

so, whether the Metropolitan Gove rnment had notice

. “Whether a

particula r site i s d ef

ec t i ve, unsaf

e, or dang erous f

or purpose s of waiving g overnme ntal immunit y

under § 29- 20-203 is a question of f act.” Helton , 922 S.W .2d at 882. The evidenc e prior to the Septe mber 15, 2000 , ac cident shows numerous re ports of sig ht problems at 2 the intersec tion. I n fac t, the intersec tion has been the subject of c omplai n t s s i n ce 1994. Additionally , a re port was introduc ed into e vidence that showed seven acc idents had occ urre d at the intersec tion prior to the acc ident at issue. The tria l court conc luded the interse ction of Hutton Drive and Polk Avenue was a

dang erous inter section and that the Metropolitan Government had ac tual and
co n s tru ct i v e n o t i ce o f t h e c o n d i t i o n
. T h e e v i d en ce d o es n o t p re p o n d er at e th e t ri al co u rt ’s fi n d i n g.-6-

The trial c ourt havin g found t he interse ction was da ng erous and that the Metropolitan Government had notice of the condition wa s theref

ore c orre ct to remove immunit y pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20- 203.

As an a dditional issue, the Metropolitan Government contends the tri al court erre d by admitting evide nce of

wre cks that occ urre d subsequent to the ac cident at issue. We have de termined it was err or to admit such evidenc e; howeve r, the rec ord contains evidenc e of e vents occ urring prior to the acc ident at i ssue t hat i s more than sufficie nt to support the trial court’s finding s. There fore , we fi ndthe a dmi ssi on of

su c h e vid e nc e ha

rm le ss.
The Metr opolitan Governme nt also challen ges the trial c ourt’s allocation of comparative fa ult . “ A t ri a l c ou rt ha s c on sid e ra

ble la titud e in al loc a tin g fa ult be tw e e n or amon g c ulp able pa rt ie s, an d t h e appellate court re views the same with a pre sumption of corre ctness.” Li n d g r e n v
. City of J oh ns on City , 8 8 S

. W

. 3 d 5 8 1 , 5 8 5 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g Coln v

. City of Savannah , 966 S.W .2d 34, 44 (Tenn. 1998)). The e vidence shows that McCanless pulled out in front of Plaintiff, but it also shows, as we have previously discussed, that the interse ction was da ng erous and defe ctive and that the Metropolitan Gove rnment had notice of the c ondition. The evidenc e showe d, inte r a lia , that the Hutton Drive stop sig n was thi rty -three fee t from the interse ction with Polk, t here was no traff ic advisory o n Hu t t o n about limited sight distance, and the Metropolitan Gove rnment had
re c e ive d n ume ro us c omp la int s a bo ut this pr ob le m. Con sid e ri ng the e vid e nc e be fo reus , w e fi ndit does not preponde rate ag ainst the trial court’s allocati o n o f fault, and w e af firm the trial c ourt’s decision on this issue. The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirmed, and this matter is re manded with costs of a ppeal
a sse sse d a g a ins t th e Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt.

___________________________________ FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR ., J UDGE