Filed 6/20/23 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re H. B

. , A Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B 322 472

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

S.B

. ,
Defendant and Appellant

. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 1 9 CCJP0 7101 A)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Gabriela H. Shapiro

, Juvenile Court Referee

. Affirmed

. Richard L. Knight

, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Daw y n R. Harrison , County Counsel, Kim Nemoy

, Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong

, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent

.

_________________________________2 INTRODUCTION
S.B. ( fa ther ) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights over his daughter H.B. pursuant

to Welfare and Institutions Code 1 section 366.26

. Father contends only that the juvenile court erred in finding the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA ; 2 5 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) inapplicable based on the record of inquiry made by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department ) with H.B.’s extended family members

. Finding no error, we affirm

. BACKGROUND
H.B. was born November 2016 to father and R.V. (mother). Just days after her birth

, the Department received a report that
mother had used methamphetamine during her pregnancy w ith H.B. and that father was also a methamphetamine user. The Department’s investigation into general neglect of H.B. was
closed as inconclusive. This case began about three years later. A t the time, father was on probation for methamphetamine charges. Law enforcement conducting a probation check on him at the family
home turned up “large amounts of methamphetamines

. . . in plain sight and completely accessible to [H.B.].” Law
enforcement contacted the Department

. A Departmen t social worker joined law enforcement at the home

. The social worker noted the home was dirty and in disarray, with trash piled around and large rat traps , in addition to methamphetamine, in
areas accessible to H.B. The social worker removed H.B. Mothe r

1 Un designated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.3

and father were both arrested and detained. The Department filed a dependency petition and these proceedings ensued.
As the issue on appeal is limited to the adequacy of the Department’s inquiry supporting the juvenile court’s ICWA findings, we limit ou r recitation of the facts accordingly. The Department filed its petition on November 1, 2019. Attached to the petition was a form ICWA

- 010(A) reflecting that
the D epartment had questioned mother about Indian 2 ancestry
, and she denied having any.
At the November 2019 detention hearing, paternal grandmother, paternal aunt, and maternal great

- grandmother were present in court. The parents were not present. The juvenile court found ICWA did not apply based on the
information before it but ordered the parents to keep the Department , their counsel, and the court aware of any new information relating to possible ICWA status. P aternal grandmother, paternal aunt, and maternal great

- grandmother
made no statements in response to the court’s ICWA finding.
Later in November 2019, on the day of the arraignment hearing, father and mother filed their respective form
ICWA

- 020 ’s , stating they had no Indian ancestry as far as they
knew. At the hearing, in addition to the pare nts, paternal grandmother, paternal grandfather, paternal stepgrandmother,
and paternal aunt were present in court. The juvenile court noted the parents’ ICWA

- 020 forms were filed and found no
reason to know H.B. was an Indian child. The juvenile court

2 In this opinion, we use the term “Indian” as defined in section 1903 of title 25 of the United States Code.4

ordered H.B. detained and se t the case for an adjudication hearing.
In its January 2 020 j urisdiction al and dispositional report,
the Department reported mother was raised by maternal grandmother and maternal grandfather until she was 10 years

o ld

, when maternal grandmother left the family home. After her parents’ separation, m other stayed in the home with maternal grandfather and maternal great

- grandmother for a time. But when she was 14, mother moved in with maternal great

grandfather to be clos er to maternal grandmother ( who had been
incarcerated ) when she was released from jail

. Mother has since
lost contact with maternal grandfather

. Father ’s parents are similarly separated. He was raised by paternal grandmother and pate r nal stepgrandfathe r until he was
in ninth or 10th grade. Then he moved in with paternal grandfather. He has a half brother and half sister on paternal grandmother’s side, two half sisters on paternal grandfather’s side, a full sister, and a stepbrother through paternal

st epgrandmother. Father is in contact with his parents and all of his siblings. At the January 2020, adjudication hearing, paternal grandmother, paternal stepgrandfather, and maternal aunt were present in court. The juvenile court sustained amended counts in the section 300 petition and set the case for a disposition al hearing.
At t he disposition al hearing the following month

, the presence of a “ maternal step

- sister ” was noted on the record

. The juvenile court ordered the Department to place H.B. with paternal grandfather if there were no safety concerns and

, alternatively, with pat ernal grandmother. The juvenile court5

declared H.B. a dependent of the court and ordered family reunification services for the parents.
H.B. was initially placed in the home of paternal grandmother and paternal stepgrandfather. Shortly thereafter
she wa s moved to the home of paternal grandfather and paternal stepgrandmother. In January 2021, the Department reported visiting maternal great

- uncle’s home , where mother was living , t o assess its suitability for visits between mother and H.B. The Department made an unannounced visit to the same home in
March 2021 and met maternal great

- a unt, maternal great

- uncle,
and a maternal cousin. In January 2022, the juvenile court terminated family reunification services for the parents and set the case for a section 366.26 hearing.
In its May 2022 s ection 366.26 r eport, the Department recommended termination of parental rights

, and that H.B. be adopted by paternal grandfather and paternal stepgrandmother. On the date initially set for the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court ordered the Department to interview all known living relatives regarding possible Indian heritage. It continued the hearing for approximately two months to permit the Department to comply with its order.
At an in tervening hearing in July 2022, the juvenile court
asked father if he was aware o f any Native American heritage or any type of relationship with anyone in his familial lineage that might have lived on a reservation, have received benefits from a tribe, or be enrolled in a tribe. Father replied in the negative. The court reminded the Department of its continuing duty to6

inquire with extended family members and report its findings in
advance of the scheduled section 366.26 hearing. The Department provided a summary of its efforts to determine whether H.B. has Indian ancestry in a last minute information filed with the juvenile court on July 28, 2022. According to that report, a social worker spoke with paternal grandfather , who stated, “ ‘No, I do not have any Native American Heritage.’ ” The social worker asked him if there was anyone else that might have information , and he said “no,” but promised to inform the social worker if he had additional
information. He also provided contact information for pate rnal grandmother. The social worker asked father if he had any Indian heritage , and he again said “no.” The social worker asked father if there was anyone else the social worker could speak to about
Indian heritage , and he suggested only his parents, but

, from his understanding, he did not have any such heritage. By text message, paternal grandmother informed the social
worker that she w as not aware of any Indian heritage. Maternal grandmother also confirmed by text message she was not aware of any Indian heritage but promised to follow up with the social worker if she learned of any

. The social worker asked mother if she had any Indian heritage and mother reconfirmed that she did not

. Mother could not think of anyone else for the social worker to ask about Indian heritage. The social worker asked mother to provide contact
information for maternal grandfather and maternal great

- uncle

. Mother responded that she did not have contact information for maternal grandfather but would follow up with the i nformation
for maternal great

- uncle

. She apparently provided the7

information for maternal great

- uncle, who told the social worker
he did not think his family had any Indian heritage. 3 He explained his father was adopted so he did not know if his father’s biological parents were Indian

. He denied knowing anyone that would know about possible Indian heritage. He promised to let the social wo rker know if he learned anything
further. On July 29, 2022, the juvenile court found that H.B. was not an Indian child and terminated parental rights. On August 1, 2022, father’s counsel filed a notice of appeal
on father’s behalf.
DISCUSSION In involuntary state court proceedings concerning child custody, such as these dependency proceedings, ICWA requires
notice to the relevant Indian tribe “where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved.” (25 U.S.C. § 1912 (a) .) It is incumbent upon the court administering such a proceeding to inquire whether the subject child is an Indian child. The scope of the duty on the court, as w ell as certain participants in the proceeding, is defined by federal regulations and related state law. (See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 23.107 (202 3 ); Welf. & Inst

. Code, § 224.2; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481.) The duty of inquiry has three “phases.” Father c laims error
with respect to the first. This phase

— the “initial inquiry”

—

3 Maternal great

- uncle is referred to as “paternal uncle” in the Department’s last minute information. This is obviously a n

error

. M aternal great

- uncle is identified by name and shares a common surname with mother (which is not the same as father’s). Elsewhere in the record

, the same named individual is identified as mother’s uncle.8

applies in every case. In broad terms, the initial inquiry requires the court and the Department to ask certain persons related to the proceedings about the child’s possible Indian a ncestry. (See § 224.2, subds. (a), (b), (c); In re S.S. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 575, 581; In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.) As relevant to
father’s appeal, s ection 224.2, subdivision (b) requires a county welfare department, like the Department, to ask, among others, the child’s “extended family members” about “whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” ( Ibid .) “ Extended family
members ” include adults who are the child ’ s grandparent, aun t or uncle, brother or sister, brother

- in

- law or sister

- in

- law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).) A juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply in a proceeding implies that (a) neithe r the Department nor the court had a reason to know or believe the subject child is an Indian child; and (b) the Department fulfilled its duty of inquiry. ( In re Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 388, 401.) “ ‘ “ [W]e review the juvenile court ’ s ICWA findings under the substantial evidence test, which requires us to determine if reasonable, credible evidence of solid value supports the court ’ s order. [Citations.] We must uphold the court ’ s orders and findings if any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them, and we
resolve all conflicts in favor of affirmance. ” ’ ” ( Ibid .)
Father claims error based on the Department’s failure to inquire with maternal grandfather, paternal stepgrandmother,
and an unidentified paternal aunt and maternal stepsister. Father acknowledges that paternal step grandmother and maternal stepsister are not among the statutorily defined extended family members . Nonetheless, he asserts that because9

the initial inquiry duty in section 224.2, subdivi sion (b), is “not
limited to ” inquiring of extended family members , we should
treat the steprelatives as extended family members that should have been interviewed about Indian ancestry

. We reject this
argument.
The Legislature expressly adopted the definition of

“ extended family member ” contained in section 1903(2) of title 25 of the United States Code (§ 224. 1 , subd. (c)) and used that definition in defining the scope of the initial inquiry (§ 224.2, subd. (b))

. Nothing in section 224.2, subdivisi on (b) su ggests that a more expansive definition of “extended family members” was intended. That the inquiry may extend to classes of persons in
addition to “ extended family members ” and those other classes
referenced in the statute 4 does not expand who is an “ extended family member. ”
Aside from legally irrelevant family ties , father offers no
reason that the Department should have inquired with paternal stepgrandmother and maternal stepsister about Indian ancestry. Put another way, he interprets the words “not limited to ” in
section 224.2, subdivision (b) as making the duty of initial inquiry
limitless. Th is interpretation is absurd. A bsent some affirmative obligation to interview them under the statute, the Department’s failure to inquire with paternal stepgrandmother and maternal stepsister cannot form the basis for error

. Thus, the question comes down t o whether substantial

4 The other classes are: “ the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, .

. . others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect .

. . .” ( § 224.2, subd. (b).)10

evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings that the Department’s initial inquiry was adequate despite the Department failing to inquire with maternal grandfather and an
unidentified paternal aunt . We conclude that substantial

ev idence supports the court’s findings.
Father’s arguments notwithstanding, t he extended family
member inquiry mandated by section 224.2, subdivision (b) is
limited. ( In re S.S

. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 694, 704

- 705.) It is not
intended to obligate county welfare departments to search for possible Indian ancestry without regard to cost or other practical
considerations

. Rather, it is intended to ensure social workers
“ask an added question of extended family mem bers whom [they]
often already are investigating in their usual course of work.” ( Ibid. ) Despite its broad terms, s ection 224.2, subdivision (b) does

not require inquiry with every adult living extended family
member. “ [ C ] omplying with the literal langu age of the statute

— that is, making an initial and further ICWA inquiry of every
member of a child ’ s extended family

. . . — is absurd at best and impossible at worst.” ( In re Ezequiel G

. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1006.) Our review is therefore not a mechanistic analysis of
whether the record supports a finding of literal compliance with
the statute
, but “whether the ICWA inquiry conducted has reliably answered the question at the heart of the ICWA inquiry:
Whether a child involved in a proceeding ‘is or may be an Indian
child.’ ” ( Id

. at p. 1009.)
In answering this question, we must also consider the
limitations on the Department’s ability to carry out its inquiry
under the particular facts of the case

. “Where

. . . a parent largely fails

. . . to provide names and contact information for
extended family members, [the Department ’s ] ability to conduct11

an exhaustive ICWA inquiry necessarily is constrained. ” ( In re Q.M. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1082.) “[W] e cannot ask the [Department] to intuit the names of unidentified family members

or to interview individuals for whom no contact information has
been provided. ” ( Ibid .) Requiring the Department to track down
information about extended family member s beyond that offered by participants in the proceedings would impose an undue
burden on the Department and necessarily reduce the resources it has to otherwise protect the welfare of dependent children. ( Ibid .)
Whether remand for an expanded inquiry is appropriate

must also be assessed in light of how much information the Department has already obtained

. The more family members the Department has already inquired of

, the less the benefit that is likely to obtain from an additional inquiry. At the same time as the incremental value of another interview decreases, the burden
of locating and contacting the next family member typically
increases. The juvenile court has discretion to determine when enough is enough. ( In re Ezequiel G.

, supra , 81 Cal.App.5th at

p. 1008 .) In this case, the Department did not disregard its duty to inquire with extended family members about possible Indian
ancestry

. T he juvenile court specifically ordered the Department
to carry out such an inquiry. T he Department expanded its initially deficient inquiry and reported the scope and results of its expanded inquiry to the court. The court impliedly found the Department’s expanded inquiry was satisfactory in concluding the ICWA was inapplicable

. We find no basis for disturbing the juvenile court’s
conclusion. After the juvenile court ordered it to expand its12

inquiry, the Department asked both parents to direct them to other people who might have knowledge about possible Indian
ancestry. Father identified only his parents as an avenue for further inquiry. Paternal grandfather suggested only that the Department inquire also with paternal grandmother. The Department inquired with paternal grandmot her. The Department also inquired with maternal grandmother. After the Department informed mother it had done so , mother

was unable to suggest anyone else for the Department to speak
with on the topic. Nevertheless, t he Department asked mother for contact information for mother’s father, but mother explained
she did not have this information. In lieu of maternal grand father’s information , the Department requested and
obtained contact information for mother’s uncle

— maternal grandfather ’s brother

— and inquired with him about Indian ancestry. He denied it , denied knowing anyone who could provide more information, and further explained that, because
his father (maternal great

- grandfather) was adopted, the likelihood of getting reliable information o n the topic was limited

. In short, the Department inquired about Indian ancestry
with representatives from both sides of two generational levels of H.B.’s family. It contacted every person its interviewees identified as a likely source of information abo ut ancestry. The juvenile court had an adequate basis on which to conclude the Department fulfilled its inquiry obligations under section 224.2, subdivision (b), and that neither the Department nor the court
had reason to know or believe that H.B. is an Indian child. Under our deferential standard of review, t he juvenile court d id
not need the Department to contact every unnamed extended family member that had attended a court hearing, regardless of13

difficulty in doing so, to reach its conclusion.
DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights over
H. B . is aff

irmed

.

GRIMES , J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON , P. J.

VIRAMONTES

, J

.