COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

CAREY KARRON DAVIS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2918-95-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 NOVEMBER 5, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK 

Westbrook J. Parker, Judge 

 Denise Winborne, Assistant Public Defender, 

for appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Carey Karron Davis (defendant) was convicted in a bench 

trial of receiving stolen property valued in excess of $200. On 

appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

establish that the property was stolen and that he was aware of 

such circumstance, both necessary elements of the offense. We 

affirm the conviction. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this 

memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a 

disposition of the issue on appeal. 

 Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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therefrom. Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 

S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). The judgment of a trial court, sitting 

without a jury, is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict 

and will be disturbed only if plainly wrong or without evidence 

to support it. Id. The credibility of a witness, the weight 

accorded the testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from 

proven facts are matters solely within the province of the fact 

finder. Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194, 199, 379 S.E.2d 

473, 476 (1989). 

 Conviction for a violation of Code § 18.2-108 requires proof 

that the property was (1) previously stolen by another, and (2) 

received by defendant, (3) with knowledge of the theft, and (4) a 

dishonest intent. Starks v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 48, 54, 301 

S.E.2d 152, 156 (1983); see Code § 18.2-108. Lost or misplaced 

property may become the subject of larceny if the finder is aware 

or has the means of ascertaining the owner, or has reason to 

believe the owner may be discovered, but, nevertheless, intends 

to appropriate it to his own use. Hutchinson v. Commonwealth, 

133 Va. 710, 719-20, 112 S.E. 624, 627 (1922). The requisite 

guilty knowledge "is sufficiently shown if the circumstances 

proven are such as must have made or caused the recipient of 

stolen goods to believe they were stolen." Lewis v. 

Commonwealth, 225 Va. 497, 503, 303 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1983) 

(quoting Reaves v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 443, 451, 65 S.E.2d 559, 

564 (1951)). 
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 Circumstantial evidence "is as competent and is entitled to 

as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently 

convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of 

guilt." Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d 864, 

876 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1109 (1984). However, "[t]he 

Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence 

that flow from the evidence, not those that spring from the 

imagination of the defendant." Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. 

App. 751, 755, 433 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993). 

 Here, although Officer Panton could not testify that someone 

actually removed the radio from his belt during the fray, it 

could not be located in the immediate area thereafter, and no one 

made any related report or inquiry to police. Such evidence 

supports the inference that the radio was either stolen directly 

from the officer or otherwise removed from the proximity of the 

struggle with a larcenous intent. 

 The circumstantial evidence in the record is also sufficient 

to establish defendant's guilty knowledge. Possession of 

recently stolen property "constitute[s] prima facie evidence that 

the defendant received the stolen goods with guilty knowledge and 

cast[s] upon him the burden of going forward with evidence in 

explanation." Roberts v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 264, 271, 337 

S.E.2d 255, 260 (1985). The trial court was 

 "not obliged to accept" what it obviously 

found was an unreasonable explanation. . . . 

 [I]n the prosecution of this type of case, 

when a defendant's "hypothesis of innocence 

is [rejected as] unreasonable, evidence of 
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possession of recently stolen goods is 

sufficient to support a conviction." This 

proposition is especially true where . . . 

the prima facie case . . . is buttressed by 
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 other strong circumstantial evidence of 

guilt. 

Id. at 272, 337 S.E.2d at 260 (quoting Wescott v. Commonwealth, 

216 Va. 123, 127, 216 S.E.2d 60, 64 (1975)). 

 Additional circumstantial evidence of defendant's guilty 

knowledge included flight, see, e.g., Spitzer v. Commonwealth, 

233 Va. 7, 9, 353 S.E.2d 711, 713 (1987); Roberts, 230 Va. at 

270-72, 337 S.E.2d at 259-60, and his equivocal statements to 

police and testimony at trial. See Speight v. Commonwealth, 4 

Va. App. 83, 88-89, 354 S.E.2d 95, 98-99 (1987) (en banc). 

Moreover, defendant was present during the disturbance, was seen 

shortly thereafter within one-half block of the scene, in the 

vicinity of a "beeping sound" produced by the radio's "alert" 

feature, and initially concealed the radio from police. 

 Such evidence supports the reasonable hypothesis that 

defendant came into possession of the radio near in time and 

space to the theft, subsequently secreted it and ran from police, 

aware that it had been stolen and with a larcenous intent. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.