United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Alex Anderson, Jr., Plaintiff,

v.

Social Security Administration 

Representative and others, 

Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 22-21676-Civ-Scola

Order

This matter is before the Court upon pro se Plaintiff Alex Anderson, Jr.’s

motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 3.) Having reviewed the

motion, the record, and the relevant legal authorities, the Court dismisses 

without prejudice Anderson’s complaint, with leave to amend. (ECF No. 1.)

Moreover, the Court denies without prejudice Phillip’s motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3) and denies without prejudice

Anderson’s motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 4).

1. Background

On May 9, 2022, Alex Anderson, Jr. visited a Social Security 

Administration office in Miami to address an issue with his supplemental 

security income. (ECF No. 1 at 8–11.) Once his ticket number was called, he 

approached the counter, but, soon after, an announcement was made over the 

PA system requesting security, who promptly asked Anderson to leave. (Id.

at 12–13.) When Anderson asked to speak to a supervisor, a second security 

guard arrived and carried three bags that belonged to Anderson outside. (Id.

at 14.) Anderson believes that he was asked to leave because he is homeless. 

(Id. at 16.) In all, these events made Anderson “feel small, mortified, 

demean[ed], debased, and to lose face.” (Id. at 14.) 

Anderson now brings “claims of First Amendment rights of access to the 

court; U.S. Constitutional rights under the 14th Amendment Rights of due 

process and equal protection of laws,” and “the Eight Amendment prohibition 

of cruel and unus[u]al punishment.” (Id. at 4–5.) Anderson seeks $75,000 in 

damages. (Id. at 18.)

2. Legal Standard

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) provides that a district court must dismiss an in 

forma pauperis action if certain defects are evident from the complaint:

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Notwithstanding any filing fees, or any portion thereof, that may 

have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the 

court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or 

malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; 

or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune 

from such relief. 

A claim “is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. 

Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001). Moreover, a court must apply the 

familiar Twombly standard to determine whether the complaint fails to state a 

claim. See Hilderbrandt v. Butts, 550 F. App’x 697, 699 (11th Cir. 2013) (“A 

complaint states a claim if it contains enough factual allegations to raise a 

right to relief ‘above the speculative level.’”) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While courts must “liberally construe pro se 

pleadings,” courts cannot rewrite a deficient pleading that fails to state a claim. 

See Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020). And while 

courts must “accept as true all” well-pled allegations, a court need not accept 

conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). 

3. Analysis 

 The Court finds that Anderson fails to state a claim. The crux of 

Anderson’s claim appears to be that he was asked to leave a public building 

because he is homeless.1 However, he has alleged no cognizable constitutional 

violations. 

First, Anderson’s First Amendment claim fails to state a claim. While the 

basis of this claim is not clear, the Court construes Anderson’s motion as 

complaining of his removal from government property.2 However, “[t]he 

Government’s ownership of property does not automatically open that property 

to the public.” United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990). Rather, 

“[t]he existence of a right of access to public property and the standard by 

which limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the 

character of the property at issue.” Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ 

Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983). The public property at issue here—a government 

office building—is a “nonpublic forum . . . which is not by tradition or 

designation a forum for public communications[.]” See Crowder v. Hous. Auth. 

of City of Atlanta, 990 F.2d 586, 591 (11th Cir. 1993); cf. Watkins v. U.S. Postal 

1 The Court notes that Anderson does not allege that he was physically injured or physically 

touched in any way.

2 Anderson’s motion states that his First Amendment claim is based on his “rights of access to 

the court.” (ECF No. 1 at 5.) As Anderson never alleges that he was denied access to a court, 

the Court construes this claim as referring to denial of access to the Social Security 

Administration building. 

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Emp., 611 F. App’x 549, 552 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that the post office is a 

“nonpublic forum” because “the principal purpose of the post office is not the 

‘free exchange of ideas’”) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 

473 U.S. 788, 800, 802 (1985)). Therefore, as Anderson challenges his denial of 

access to a nonpublic forum, any restriction on access is examined only “for 

reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality.” See Watkins, 611 F. App’x at 552. 

However, Anderson has not alleged facts to permit the Court to 

determine whether he was denied access or whether he voluntarily left after 

being asked to do so. Rather, Anderson’s complaint only provides conclusory 

assertions that he was asked to leave the building because he is homeless. 

(ECF No. 1 at 16.) Such conclusory assertions, without any supporting facts, 

cannot be accepted as true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. Therefore, Anderson 

has failed to state a claim. 

Second, Anderson’s due process claim similarly fails to state a claim. 

“The Due Process Clause requires ‘that a deprivation of life, liberty or property 

be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of 

the case.’” Catron v. City of St. Petersburg, 658 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 

2011) (quoting Cleveland Brd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985)). 

However, Anderson has not alleged any deprivation of life, liberty, or property. 

As discussed above, as Anderson has no general constitutional right to access 

the nonpublic Social Security Administration office, he does not allege a 

deprivation of any liberty interest in accessing public property. See Catron, 658 

F.3d at 1266 (holding that individuals only have a “protected liberty interest to 

be . . . [on] city lands of their choosing that are open to the public generally”). 

Moreover, at most, Anderson alleges that a security guard carried his property 

outside—this momentary curtailment of his property is insufficient to state a 

claim under the Due Process Clause. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 

(1972) (holding that only a “significant taking of property by the State is within 

the purview of the Due Process Clause”); see also Peterman v. Coleman, 764 

F.2d 1416, 1419 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that a “temporary curtailment” of 

one’s possession over property did not violate the Due Process Clause).3 

Third, Anderson’s equal protection claim also fails. To plead a violation of 

the right to equal protection, plaintiffs must allege that they are (1) “similarly 

situated with other persons who received more favorable treatment” and (2) the 

“discriminatory treatment was based on some constitutionally protected 

interest, such as race.” Mann v. Joseph, 805 F. App’x 779, 785 (11th Cir. 2020) 

3 It does not appear that Anderson alleges that the Defendants deprived him of any right to his 

supplemental security income. The Court notes that Anderson is pursuing separate claims 

regarding his supplemental security income in an earlier-filed action in this District, see 

Anderson v. Kijakazi et al., 22-cv-20900-BB (S.D. Fla.). 

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(quoting Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946–47 (11th Cir. 2001)). While Anderson 

alleges that he was asked to leave because he is homeless, homelessness is not 

a constitutionally protected class. See Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 

1357 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Homeless persons are not a suspect class[.]”).

Moreover, Anderson makes no attempt to allege the way in which he was 

similarly situated with any other individuals who received more favorable 

treatment. For these reasons, Anderson fails to state a claim under the Equal 

Protection Clause. 

Last, Anderson’s Eighth Amendment claim plainly fails as a matter of 

law. The Eighth Amendment has no application here, as it only “governs the 

treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is 

confined.” Jenkins v. Campbell, No. 2:09-cv-513, 2010 WL 11623024, at *2 

(M.D. Fla. Oct. 28, 2010); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 

(1977) (holding that the Eighth Amendment “was designed to protected those 

convicted of crimes”). Anderson does not allege that he has been convicted, let 

alone arrested, and therefore his Eighth Amendment claim has no merit. See 

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n.16 (1979) (“Eighth Amendment scrutiny is 

appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional 

guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.”).

Because Anderson has failed to state a claim, the Court dismisses

Anderson’s complaint. (ECF No. 1.) Anderson may file an amended complaint 

addressing these deficiencies on or before June 24, 2022. If Anderson does not

file an amended complaint by that date, his complaint will be dismissed 

without further leave to amend. Moreover, the Court denies without prejudice 

Anderson’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3) and 

denies without prejudice Anderson’s motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF 

No. 4). Anderson may renew his motions if and when he files an amended 

complaint. 

In the meantime, while there is no operative complaint, the Court directs 

the Clerk to administratively close this case. Any pending motions are denied 

as moot.

Done and ordered, in Miami, Florida, on June 7, 2022.

______________________________

Robert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge

Case 1:22-cv-21676-RNS Document 7 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/07/2022 Page 4 of 5
Copy via U.S. mail to: 

Alex Anderson, Jr.

1603 NW 7th Avenue

Miami, FL 33136

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