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PROTECTING EMPLOYEES AND RETIREES IN 

BUSINESS BANKRUPTCIES ACT OF 2007 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON

H.R. 3652 

JUNE 5, 2008 

Serial No. 110–181 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

PERRY APELBAUM, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California, Chairwoman 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

MICHONE JOHNSON, Chief Counsel 

DANIEL FLORES, Minority Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

JUNE 5, 2008 

Page 

TEXT OF THE BILL 

H.R. 3652, the ‘‘Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies 

Act of 2007’’ .......................................................................................................... 2 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Linda T. Sa ́nchez, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Commercial and 

Administrative Law ............................................................................................. 1 

The Honorable Chris Cannon, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Utah, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law ........................................................................................................... 10 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, and Member, 

Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law .................................. 17 

WITNESSES 

Babette Ceccotti, Esquire, Cohen, Weiss and Simon LLP, New York, NY, 

on behalf of the AFL-CIO 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 20 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 22 

Marcus C. Migliore, Esquire, Air Line Pilots Association, International, Washington, DC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 105 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 107 

Michael L. Bernstein, Esquire, Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington, DC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 113 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 115 

Karen Friedman, Esquire, Pension Rights Center, Washington, DC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 121 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 123 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Chris Cannon, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Utah, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee 

on Commercial and Administrative Law ........................................................... 11 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Steve Cohen, a Representative in Congress from the State of Tennessee, and Member, Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law ............................................................................... 18 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Michigan, Chairman, Committee on the 

Judiciary, and Member, Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative 

Law ........................................................................................................................ 140

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Betty Sutton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Ohio, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary ....... 141 

(1) 

PROTECTING EMPLOYEES AND RETIREES IN 

BUSINESS BANKRUPTCIES ACT OF 2007 

THURSDAY, JUNE 5, 2008 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL

AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in Room 

2237, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Linda T. 

Sa ́nchez (Chairwoman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Sa ́nchez, Conyers, Lofgren, Watt and 

Cannon. 

Staff Present: Susan Jensen, Majority Counsel; Adam Russell, 

Majority Professional Staff Member; and Zachary Somers, Minority 

Counsel. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. This hearing of the Committee on the Judiciary 

Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law will now 

come to order. 

Without objection, the Chair will be authorized to declare a recess of the hearing at any time. 

I will now recognize myself for a short statement. 

The headlines this past week have been particularly disturbing 

regarding our Nation’s auto manufacturing industry. GM announced that it was closing four truck and SUV plants in North 

America. Chrysler reported a 25 percent drop in sales for last 

month as compared to May 2007. Likewise, Ford reported a 16 percent drop in sales for last month; and, in May, its F-150 pickup 

truck lost its status as best-selling vehicle in the United States for 

the first time since 1991. 

The airline industry, with fuel costs almost tripling since 2000, 

also is cutting costs in trying to raise revenue. In addition to increasing fares, some airlines are now charging for checked baggage 

and seat selection, and others are eliminating basic amenities. 

Yesterday, the Wall Street Journal reported that United Airlines 

was planning to ground its less fuel-efficient planes and possibly 

furlough some of its employees. And while many of the principal 

airlines are well into their bankruptcy reorganization process, 

there has been another wave of bankruptcy filings by airlines in recent months, including Aloha Airlines, ATA Airlines, Skybus Airlines, Frontier Airlines and Eos Airlines. 

As the economic forecast of these companies becomes bleaker and 

bleaker, we are forced to consider the need to preserve jobs, emVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:14 Mar 05, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\COMM\060508\42723.000 HJUD1 PsN: 42723
2 

ployment benefits and protections for retirees against the backdrop 

of how these issues would be treated under Chapter 11 of the 

Bankruptcy Code. How do we protect the jobs and livelihood of 

American workers while preserving the economic viability of U.S. 

companies? 

As many of you know, last year our Subcommittee conducted two 

oversight hearings on how American workers and retirees are 

faring in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. Our first hearing revealed 

a series of cases where chief executive officers of businesses in 

Chapter 11 receive outrageously large salaries and bonuses while 

they simultaneously slash the wages, benefits and even jobs of 

workers who are the backbones of these businesses. It is clear that 

under these practices Chapter 11 is becoming a place where the 

rich are getting richer while the poor are getting poorer. 

Then, in September, we heard how Chapter 11 is being used by 

some businesses to bust unions and deprive retirees of hard-won 

wages and benefits, including pension and health insurance that 

long-time employees had already factored into their retirement 

plans. Sam Giordano, Executive Director of the nonpartisan American Bankruptcy Institute observed in case after case, bankruptcy 

courts have applied congressional intent favoring long-term rehabilitation to sweep aside wage and benefit concessions won at the 

bargaining table. 

Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code was originally enacted to 

give all participants an equal say in how a business, struggling to 

overcome financial difficulties, should reorganize. Unfortunately, 

this laudable goal does not reflect reality, especially for American 

workers. 

I commend House Judiciary Committee Chairman John Conyers 

for his leadership in attempting to address these problems by his 

introduction of H.R. 3652, the ‘‘Protecting Employees and Retirees 

in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2007.’’ 

[The text of the bill, H.R. 3652, follows:] 

I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3652 

To amend title 11, United States Code, to improve protections for employees and 

retirees in business bankruptcies. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 25, 2007 

Mr. CONYERS (for himself, Ms. LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ of California, Mr. NADLER, Mr. 

COHEN, Ms. SUTTON, Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California, and Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

3 

A BILL 

To amend title 11, United States Code, to improve protections for employees and 

retirees in business bankruptcies. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States 

of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business 

Bankruptcies Act of 2007’’. 

SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

The Congress finds the following: 

(1) Recent corporate restructurings have exacted a devastating toll on workers through deep cuts in wages and benefits, termination of defined benefit pension plans, and the transfer of productive assets to lower wage economies outside the United States. Retirees have suffered deep cutbacks in benefits when 

companies in bankruptcy renege on their retiree health obligations and terminate pension plans. 

(2) Congress enacted chapter 11 of title 11, United States Code, to protect 

jobs and enhance enterprise value for all stakeholders and not to be used as 

a strategic weapon to eliminate good paying jobs, strip employees and their families of a lifetime’s worth of earned benefits and hinder their ability to participate in a prosperous and sustainable economy. Specific laws designed to treat 

workers and retirees fairly and keep companies operating are instead causing 

the burdens of bankruptcy to fall disproportionately and overwhelmingly on employees and retirees, those least able to absorb the losses. 

(3) At the same time that working families and retirees are forced to make 

substantial economic sacrifices, executive pay enhancements continue to flourish in business bankruptcies, despite recent congressional enactments designed 

to curb lavish pay packages for those in charge of failing enterprises. Bankruptcy should not be a haven for the excesses of executive pay. 

(4) Employees and retirees, unlike other creditors, have no way to diversify 

the risk of their employer’s bankruptcy. 

(5) Comprehensive reform is essential in order to remedy these fundamental inequities in the bankruptcy process and to recognize the unique firmspecific investment by employees and retirees in their employers’ business 

through their labor. 

SEC. 3. INCREASED WAGE PRIORITY. 

Section 507(a) of title 11, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) in paragraph (4)— 

(A) by striking ‘‘$10,000’’ and inserting ‘‘$20,000’’; 

(B) by striking ‘‘within 180 days’’; and 

(C) by striking ‘‘or the date of the cessation of the debtor’s business, 

whichever occurs first,’’; 

(2) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking— 

(A) ‘‘within 180 days’’; and 

(B) ‘‘or the date of the cessation of the debtor’s business, whichever occurs first’’; and 

(3) in paragraph (5), by striking subparagraph (B) and inserting the following: 

‘‘(B) for each such plan, to the extent of the number of employees covered by each such plan, multiplied by $20,000.’’. 

SEC. 4. PRIORITY FOR STOCK VALUE LOSSES IN DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS. 

(a) Section 101(5) of title 11, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘or’’ at the end; 

(2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ‘‘or’’ after the semicolon; and 

(3) by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(C) right or interest in equity securities of the debtor, or an affiliate 

of the debtor, held in a defined contribution plan (within the meaning of 

section 3(34) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 

U.S.C. 1002(34)) for the benefit of an individual who is not an insider or 

1 of the 10 most highly compensated employees of the debtor (if 1 or more 

are not insiders), if such securities were attributable to— 

4 

‘‘(i) employer contributions by the debtor or an affiliate of the debtor, other than elective deferrals (within the meaning of section 402(g) 

of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986), and any earnings thereon; or 

‘‘(ii) elective deferrals and any earnings thereon.’’. 

(b) Section 507(a) of title 11, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) by redesignating paragraphs (6) through (10) as paragraphs (7) through 

(11), respectively; 

(2) by inserting after paragraph (5) the following: 

‘‘(6) Sixth, loss of the value of equity securities of the debtor or affiliate of 

the debtor that are held in a defined contribution plan (within the meaning of 

section 3(34) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 

U.S.C. 1002(34)), without regard to when services resulting in the contribution 

of stock to the plan were rendered, measured by the market value of the stock 

at the time of contribution to, or purchase by, the plan and the value as of the 

commencement of the case where an employer or plan sponsor that has commenced a case under this title has committed fraud with respect to such plan 

or has otherwise breached a duty to the participant that has proximately caused 

the loss of value.’’; 

(3) in paragraph (7), as redesignated, by striking ‘‘Sixth’’ and inserting 

‘‘Seventh’’; 

(4) in paragraph (8), as redesignated, by striking ‘‘Seventh’’ and inserting 

‘‘Eighth’’; 

(5) in paragraph (9), as redesignated, by striking ‘‘Eighth’’ and inserting 

‘‘Ninth’’; 

(6) in paragraph (10), as redesignated, by striking ‘‘Ninth’’ and inserting 

‘‘Tenth’’; and 

(7) in paragraph (11), as redesignated, by striking ‘‘Tenth’’ and inserting 

‘‘Eleventh’’. 

SEC. 5. PRIORITY FOR SEVERANCE PAY. 

Section 503(b) of title 11, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) in paragraph (8) by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end; 

(2) in paragraph (9) by striking the period and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 

(3) by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(10) severance pay owed to employees of the debtor (other than to an insider, other senior management, or a consultant retained to provide services to 

the debtor), under a plan, program, or policy generally applicable to employees 

of the debtor, or owed pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, but not 

under an individual contract of employment, for termination or layoff on or 

after the date of the filing of the petition, which pay shall be deemed earned 

in full upon such layoff or termination of employment.’’. 

SEC. 6. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION UPON EXIT FROM BANKRUPTCY. 

Section 1129(a)(5) of title 11, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end; and 

(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the end and inserting the 

following: ‘‘; and 

‘‘(C) the compensation disclosed pursuant to subparagraph (B) has been 

approved by, or is subject to the approval of, the court, as reasonable when 

compared to persons holding comparable positions at comparable companies 

in the same industry and not disproportionate in light of economic concessions by the debtor’s nonmanagement workforce during the case.’’. 

SEC. 7. LIMITATIONS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ENHANCEMENTS. 

Section 503(c) of title 11, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ‘‘or for the payment of performance or incentive compensation, or a bonus of any kind, or other financial returns designed to replace or enhance incentive, stock, or other compensation in effect 

prior to the date of the commencement of the case,’’ after ‘‘remain with the debtor’s business,’’; and 

(2) by amending paragraph (3) to read as follows: 

‘‘(3) other transfers or obligations, to or for the benefit of officers, of managers, or of consultants retained to provide services to the debtor, before or after 

the date of filing of the petition, in the absence of a finding by the court based 

upon evidence in the record, and without deference to the debtor’s request for 

such payments, that such transfers or obligations are essential to the survival 

of the debtor’s business or (in the case of a liquidation of some or all of the debtor’s assets) essential to the orderly liquidation and maximization of value of the 

assets of the debtor, in either case, because of the essential nature of the servVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:14 Mar 05, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\COMM\060508\42723.000 HJUD1 PsN: 42723
5 

ices provided, and then only to the extent that the court finds such transfers 

or obligations are reasonable compared to individuals holding comparable positions at comparable companies in the same industry and not disproportionate 

in light of economic concessions by the debtor’s nonmanagement workforce during the case.’’. 

SEC. 8. REJECTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. 

Section 1113 of title 11, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) by striking subsections (a) through (c) and inserting the following: 

‘‘(a) The debtor in possession, or the trustee if one has been appointed under 

this chapter, other than a trustee in a case covered by subchapter IV of this chapter 

and by title I of the Railway Labor Act, may reject a collective bargaining agreement only in accordance with the provisions of this section. 

‘‘(b)(1) Where a debtor in possession or trustee (hereinafter in this section referred to collectively as a ‘trustee’) seeks rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, a motion seeking rejection shall not be filed unless the trustee has first met 

with the authorized representative (at reasonable times and for a reasonable period 

in light of the complexity of the case) to confer in good faith in attempting to reach 

mutually acceptable modifications of such agreement. Proposals by the trustee to 

modify the agreement shall be limited to modifications to the agreement that— 

‘‘(A) are designed to achieve a total aggregate financial contribution for the 

affected labor group for a period not to exceed 2 years after the effective date 

of the plan; 

‘‘(B) shall be no more than the minimal savings necessary to permit the 

debtor to exit bankruptcy, such that confirmation of such plan is not likely to 

be followed by the liquidation of the debtor or any successor to the debtor; and 

‘‘(C) shall not overly burden the affected labor group, either in the amount 

of the savings sought from such group or the nature of the modifications, when 

compared to other constituent groups expected to maintain ongoing relationships with the debtor, including management personnel. 

‘‘(2) Proposals by the trustee under paragraph (1) shall be based upon the most 

complete and reliable information available. Information that is relevant for the negotiations shall be provided to the authorized representative. 

‘‘(c)(1) If, after a period of negotiations, the debtor and the authorized representative have not reached agreement over mutually satisfactory modifications and the 

parties are at an impasse, the debtor may file a motion seeking rejection of the collective bargaining agreement after notice and a hearing held pursuant to subsection 

(d). The court may grant a motion to reject a collective bargaining agreement only 

if the court finds that— 

‘‘(A) the debtor has, prior to such hearing, complied with the requirements 

of subsection (b) and has conferred in good faith with the authorized representative regarding such proposed modifications, and the parties were at an impasse; 

‘‘(B) the court has considered alternative proposals by the authorized representative and has determined that such proposals do not meet the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (b)(1); 

‘‘(C) further negotiations are not likely to produce a mutually satisfactory 

agreement; and 

‘‘(D) the court has considered— 

‘‘(i) the effect of the proposed financial relief on the affected labor 

group; 

‘‘(ii) the ability of the debtor to retain an experienced and qualified 

workforce; and 

‘‘(iii) the effect of a strike in the event of rejection of the collective bargaining agreement. 

‘‘(2) In reaching a decision under this subsection regarding whether modifications proposed by the debtor and the total aggregate savings meet the requirements 

of subsection (b), the court shall take into account— 

‘‘(A) the ongoing impact on the debtor of the debtor’s relationship with all 

subsidiaries and affiliates, regardless of whether any such subsidiary or affiliate 

is domestic or nondomestic, or whether any such subsidiary or affiliate is a 

debtor entity; and 

‘‘(B) whether the authorized representative agreed to provide financial relief 

to the debtor within the 24-month period prior to the date of the commencement 

of the case, and if so, shall consider the total value of such relief in evaluating 

the debtor’s proposed modifications. 

‘‘(3) In reaching a decision under this subsection, where a debtor has implemented a program of incentive pay, bonuses, or other financial returns for insiders 

or senior management personnel during the bankruptcy, or has implemented such 

6 

a program within 180 days before the date of the commencement of the case, the 

court shall presume that the debtor has failed to satisfy the requirements of subsection (b)(1)(C).’’; 

(2) in subsection (d)— 

(A) by striking ‘‘(d)’’ and all that follows through paragraph (2) and inserting the following: 

‘‘(d)(1) Upon the filing of a motion for rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, the court shall schedule a hearing to be held on not less than 21 days notice 

(unless the debtor and the authorized representative agree to a shorter time). Only 

the debtor and the authorized representative may appear and be heard at such 

hearing.’’; and 

(B) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2); 

(3) in subsection (f), by adding at the end the following: ‘‘Any payment required to be made under this section before the date on which a plan confirmed 

under section 1129 is effective has the status of an allowed administrative expense, as provided in section 503.’’; and 

(4) by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(g) The rejection of a collective bargaining agreement constitutes a breach of 

such contract with the same effect as rejection of an executory contract pursuant 

to section 365(g). No claim for rejection damages shall be limited by section 

502(b)(7). Economic self-help by an authorized representative shall be permitted 

upon a court order granting a motion to reject a collective bargaining agreement 

under subsection (c) or court-authorized interim changes under subsection (e), and 

no provision of this title or of any other Federal or State law shall be construed to 

the contrary. 

‘‘(h) At any time after the date on which an order is entered authorizing rejection, or where an agreement providing mutually satisfactory modifications has been 

entered into between the debtor and the authorized representative, at any time 

after such agreement has been entered into, the authorized representative may 

apply to the court for an order seeking an increase in the level of wages or benefits, 

or relief from working conditions, based upon changed circumstances. The court 

shall grant the request so long as the increase or other relief is consistent with the 

standard set forth in subsection (b)(1)(B). 

‘‘(i) Upon request by the authorized representative, and where the court finds 

that the prospects for reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement would be aided 

by granting the request, the court may direct that a dispute under subsection (c) 

be heard and determined by a neutral panel of experienced labor arbitrators in lieu 

of a court proceeding under subsection (d). The decision of such panel shall have 

the same effect as a decision by the court. The court’s decision directing the appointment of a neutral panel is not subject to appeal. 

‘‘(j) Upon request by the authorized representative, the debtor shall provide for 

the reasonable fees and costs incurred by the authorized representative under this 

section, after notice and a hearing. 

‘‘(k) If a plan to be confirmed under section 1129 provides for the liquidation 

of the debtor, whether by sale or cessation of all or part of the business, the trustee 

and the authorized representative shall confer regarding the effects of such liquidation on the affected labor group, in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law, 

and shall provide for the payment of all accrued obligations not assumed as part 

of a sale transaction, and for such other terms as may be agreed upon, in order to 

ensure an orderly transfer of assets or cessation of the business. Any such payments 

shall have the status of allowed administrative expenses under section 503. 

‘‘(l) A collective bargaining agreement that is assumed shall be assumed in accordance with section 365.’’. 

SEC. 9. PAYMENT OF INSURANCE BENEFITS TO RETIRED EMPLOYEES. 

Section 1114 of title 11, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) in subsection (a), by inserting ‘‘, whether or not the debtor asserts a 

right to unilaterally modify such payments under such plan, fund, or program’’ 

before the period at the end; 

(2) in subsection (c)(1), by adding at the end the following: ‘‘Where a labor 

organization elects to serve as the authorized representative, the debtor shall 

provide for the reasonable fees and costs incurred by the authorized representative under this section after notice and a hearing.’’; 

(3) in subsection (f), by striking ‘‘(f)’’ and all that follows through paragraph 

(2) and inserting the following: 

‘‘(f)(1) Where a trustee seeks modification of retiree benefits, a motion seeking 

modification of such benefits shall not be filed, unless the trustee has first met with 

the authorized representative (at reasonable times and for a reasonable period in 

7 

light of the complexity of the case) to confer in good faith in attempting to reach 

mutually satisfactory modifications. Proposals by the trustee to modify retiree benefits shall be limited to modifications in retiree benefits that— 

‘‘(A) are designed to achieve a total aggregate financial contribution for the 

affected retiree group for a period not to exceed 2 years after the effective date 

of the plan; 

‘‘(B) shall be no more than the minimal savings necessary to permit the 

debtor to exit bankruptcy, such that confirmation of such plan is not likely to 

be followed by the liquidation of the debtor or any successor to the debtor; and 

‘‘(C) shall not overly burden the affected retirees, either in the amount of 

the savings sought or the nature of the modifications, when compared to other 

constituent groups expected to maintain ongoing relationships with the debtor, 

including management personnel. 

‘‘(2) Proposals by the trustee under paragraph (1) shall be based upon the most 

complete and reliable information available. Information that is relevant for the negotiations shall be provided to the authorized representative.’’; 

(4) in subsection (g), by striking ‘‘(g)’’ and all that follows through the semicolon at the end of paragraph (3) and inserting the following: 

‘‘(g) If, after a period of negotiations, the debtor and the authorized representative have not reached agreement over mutually satisfactory modifications and the 

parties are at an impasse, the debtor may apply to the court for modifications in 

the payment of retiree benefits after notice and a hearing held pursuant to subsection (k). The court may grant a motion to modify the payment of retiree benefits 

only if the court finds that— 

‘‘(1) the debtor has, prior to the hearing, complied with the requirements 

of subsection (f) and has conferred in good faith with the authorized representative regarding such proposed modifications and the parties were at an impasse; 

‘‘(2) the court has considered alternative proposals by the authorized representative and has determined that such proposals do not meet the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (f)(1); 

‘‘(3) further negotiations are not likely to produce a mutually satisfactory 

agreement; and 

‘‘(4) the court has considered— 

‘‘(A) the effect of the proposed modifications on the affected retirees; 

and 

‘‘(B) where the authorized representative is a labor organization, the effect of a strike in the event of modification of retiree health benefits;’’; 

(5) in subsection (k)— 

(A) in paragraph (1)— 

(i) in the first sentence, by striking ‘‘fourteen’’ and inserting ‘‘21’’; 

and 

(ii) by striking the second and third sentences, and inserting the 

following: ‘‘Only the debtor and the authorized representative may appear and be heard at such hearing.’’; 

(B) by striking paragraph (2); and 

(C) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2); and 

(6) by redesignating subsections (l) and (m) as subsections (n) and (o), respectively, and inserting the following: 

‘‘(l) In determining whether the proposed modifications comply with subsection 

(f)(1)(A), the court shall take into account the ongoing impact on the debtor of the 

debtor’s relationship with all subsidiaries and affiliates, regardless of whether any 

such subsidiary or affiliate is domestic or nondomestic, or whether any such subsidiary or affiliate is a debtor entity. 

‘‘(m) No plan, fund, program, or contract to provide retiree benefits for insiders 

or senior management shall be assumed by the debtor if the debtor has obtained 

relief under subsection (g) or (h) for reductions in retiree benefits or under subsection (c) or (e) of section 1113 for reductions in the health benefits of active employees of the debtor on or after the commencement of the case or reduced or eliminated active or retiree benefits within 180 days prior to the date of the commencement of the case.’’. 

SEC. 10. PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN A SALE OF ASSETS. 

Section 363 of title 11, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) in subsection (b), by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(3) In approving a sale under this subsection, the court shall consider the extent to which a bidder has offered to maintain existing jobs, has preserved retiree 

health benefits, and has assumed the obligations of any defined benefit plan, in deVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:14 Mar 05, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\COMM\060508\42723.000 HJUD1 PsN: 42723
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termining whether an offer constitutes the highest or best offer for such property.’’; 

and 

(2) by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(q) If, as a result of a sale approved under this section, retiree benefits, as defined under section 1114(a), are modified or eliminated pursuant to the provisions 

of subsection (e)(1) or (h) of section 1114 or otherwise, then, except as otherwise provided in an agreement with the authorized representative of such retirees, a charge 

of $20,000 per retiree shall be made against the proceeds of such sale (or paid by 

the buyer as part of the sale) for the purpose of— 

‘‘(1) funding 12 months of health coverage following the termination or 

modification of such coverage through a plan, fund, or program made available 

by the buyer, by the debtor, or by a third party; or 

‘‘(2) providing the means by which affected retirees may obtain replacement 

coverage on their own, 

except that the selection of either paragraph (1) or (2) shall be upon the consent 

of the authorized representative, within the meaning of section 1114(b), if any. Any 

claim for modification or elimination of retiree benefits pursuant to section 1114(i) 

shall be offset by the amounts paid under this subsection.’’. 

SEC. 11. UNION PROOF OF CLAIM. 

Section 501(a) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by inserting ‘‘, including a labor organization,’’ after ‘‘A creditor’’. 

SEC. 12. CLAIM FOR LOSS OF PENSION BENEFITS. 

Section 502 of title 11, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 

the following: 

‘‘(l) The court shall allow a claim asserted by an active or retired participant 

in a defined benefit plan terminated under section 4041 or 4042 of the Employee 

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, for any shortfall in pension benefits accrued as of the effective date of the termination of such pension plan as a result 

of the termination of the plan and limitations upon the payment of benefits imposed 

pursuant to section 4022 of such Act, notwithstanding any claim asserted and collected by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation with respect to such termination.’’. 

SEC. 13. PAYMENTS BY SECURED LENDER. 

Section 506(c) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 

the following: ‘‘Where employees have not received wages, accrued vacation, severance, or other benefits owed pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement for services rendered on and after the date of the commencement of the case, 

such unpaid obligations shall be deemed necessary costs and expenses of preserving, 

or disposing of, property securing an allowed secured claim and shall be recovered 

even if the trustee has otherwise waived the provisions of this subsection under an 

agreement with the holder of the allowed secured claim or successor or predecessor 

in interest.’’. 

SEC. 14. PRESERVATION OF JOBS AND BENEFITS. 

Title 11, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) by inserting before section 1101 the following: 

‘‘SEC. 1100. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE. 

‘‘A debtor commencing a case under this chapter shall have as its purpose the 

reorganization of its business and, to the greatest extent possible, maintaining or 

enhancing the productive use of its assets, so as to preserve jobs.’’; 

(2) in section 1129(a), by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(17) The debtor has demonstrated that every reasonable effort has been 

made to maintain existing jobs and mitigate losses to employees and retirees.’’; 

(3) in section 1129(c), by striking the last sentence and inserting the following: ‘‘If the requirements of subsections (a) and (b) are met with respect to 

more than 1 plan, the court shall, in determining which plan to confirm, consider— 

‘‘(1) the extent to which each plan would maintain existing jobs, has preserved retiree health benefits, and has maintained any existing defined benefit 

plans; and 

‘‘(2) the preferences of creditors and equity security holders, and shall confirm the plan that better serves the interests of employees and retirees.’’; and 

(4) in the table of sections in chapter 11, by inserting the following before 

the item relating to section 1101: 

9 

‘‘1100. Statement of purpose.’’. 

SEC. 15. ASSUMPTION OF EXECUTIVE RETIREMENT PLANS. 

Section 365 of title 11, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) in subsection (a), by striking ‘‘and (d)’’ and inserting ‘‘(d), and (q)’’; and 

(2) by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(q) No deferred compensation arrangement for the benefit of insiders or senior 

management of the debtor shall be assumed if a defined benefit plan for employees 

of the debtor has been terminated pursuant to section 4041 or 4042 of the Employee 

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, on or after the date of the commencement 

of the case or within 180 days prior to the date of the commencement of the case.’’. 

SEC. 16. RECOVERY OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION. 

Title 11, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 562 the following: 

‘‘§ 563. Recovery of executive compensation 

‘‘(a) If a debtor has obtained relief under subsection (c) or (e) of section 1113, 

or subsection (g) or (h) of section 1114, by which the debtor reduces its contractual 

obligations under a collective bargaining agreement or retiree benefits plan, the 

court, as part of the entry of such order granting relief, shall determine the percentage diminution, as a result of the relief granted under section 1113 or 1114, in the 

value of the obligations when compared to the debtor’s obligations under the collective bargaining agreement or with respect to retiree benefits, as of the date of the 

commencement of the case under this title. In making its determination, the court 

shall include reductions in benefits, if any, as a result of the termination pursuant 

to section 4041 or 4042 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 

of a defined benefit plan administered by the debtor, or for which the debtor is a 

contributing employer, effective at any time on or after 180 days before the date of 

the commencement of a case under this title. The court shall not take into account 

pension benefits paid or payable under the provisions of title IV of such Act as a 

result of any such termination. 

‘‘(b) Where a defined benefit plan administered by the debtor, or for which the 

debtor is a contributing employer, has been terminated pursuant to section 4041 or 

4042 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, effective at any time 

on or after 180 days before the date of the commencement of a case under this title, 

but a debtor has not obtained relief under subsection (c) or (e) of section 1113, or 

subsection (g) or (h) of section 1114 of this title, the court, upon motion of a party 

in interest, shall determine the percentage diminution in the value of benefit obligations when compared to the total benefit liabilities prior to such termination. The 

court shall not take into account pension benefits paid or payable under the provisions of title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 as a result 

of any such termination. 

‘‘(c) Upon the determination of the percentage diminution in value under subsection (a) or (b), the estate shall have a claim for the return of the same percentage 

of the compensation paid, directly or indirectly (including any transfer to a self-settled trust or similar device, or to a nonqualified deferred compensation plan under 

section 409A(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) to any officer of the debtor 

serving as member of the board of directors of the debtor within the year before the 

date of the commencement of the case, and any individual serving as chairman and 

any individual serving as lead director of the board of directors at the time of the 

granting of relief under section 1113 or 1114 of this title or, if no such relief has 

been granted, the termination of the defined benefit plan. 

‘‘(d) The trustee or a committee appointed pursuant to section 1102 may commence an action to recover such claims, except that if neither the trustee nor such 

committee commences an action to recover such claim by the first date set for the 

hearing on the confirmation of plan under section 1129, any party in interest may 

apply to the court for authority to recover such claim for the benefit of the estate. 

The costs of recovery shall be borne by the estate. 

‘‘(e) The court shall not award postpetition compensation under section 503(c) 

or otherwise to any person subject to the provisions of subsection (c) if there is a 

reasonable likelihood that such compensation is intended to reimburse or replace 

compensation recovered by the estate under this section.’’. 

SEC. 17. EXCEPTION FROM AUTOMATIC STAY. 

Section 362(b) of title 11, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) in paragraph (27), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end; 

(2) in paragraph (28), by striking the period at the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’ 

and 

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(3) by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(29) of the commencement or continuation of a grievance, arbitration, or 

similar dispute resolution proceeding established by a collective bargaining 

agreement that was or could have been commenced against the debtor before 

the filing of a case under this title, or the payment or enforcement of an award 

or settlement under such proceeding.’’. 

SEC. 18. PREFERENTIAL COMPENSATION TRANSFER. 

Section 547 of title 11, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 

the following: 

‘‘(j) The trustee may avoid a transfer to or for the benefit of an insider (including an obligation incurred for the benefit of an insider under an employment contract) made in anticipation of bankruptcy, or a transfer made in anticipation of 

bankruptcy to a consultant who is formerly an insider and who is retained to provide services to an entity that becomes a debtor (including an obligation under a 

contract to provide services to such entity or to a debtor) made or incurred on or 

within 1 year before the filing of the petition. No provision of subsection (c) shall 

constitute a defense against the recovery of such transfer. The trustee or a committee appointed pursuant to section 1102 may commence an action to recover such 

transfer, except that, if neither the trustee nor such committee commences an action 

to recover such transfer by the time of the commencement of a hearing on the confirmation of a plan under section 1129, any party in interest may apply to the court 

for authority to recover the claims for the benefit of the estate. The costs of recovery 

shall be borne by the estate.’’. 

SEC. 19. FINANCIAL RETURNS FOR EMPLOYEES AND RETIREES. 

Section 1129(a) of title 11, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(18) In a case in which the debtor initiated proceedings under section 1113, 

the plan provides for recovery of rejection damages (where the debtor obtained 

relief under subsection (c) or (e) of section 1113 prior to confirmation of the 

plan) or for other financial returns, as negotiated by the debtor and the authorized representative (to the extent that such returns are paid under, rather than 

outside of, a plan).’’; and 

(2) by striking paragraph (13) and inserting the following: 

‘‘(13) With respect to retiree benefits, as that term is defined in section 

1114, the plan— 

‘‘(A) provides for the continuation after its effective date of payment of 

all retiree benefits at the level established pursuant to subsection (e)(1)(B) 

or (g) of section 1114 at any time prior to the date of confirmation of the 

plan, for the duration of the period for which the debtor has obligated itself 

to provide such benefits, or, if no modifications are made prior to confirmation of the plan, the continuation of all such retiree benefits maintained or 

established in whole or in part by the debtor prior to the date of the filing 

of the petition; and 

‘‘(B) provides for allowed claims for modification of retiree benefits or 

for other financial returns, as negotiated by the debtor and the authorized 

representative, to the extent that such returns are paid under, rather than 

outside of, a plan).’’. 

Æ 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. This important bill will do much to preserve jobs 

and relevel the playing field for American workers in Chapter 11 

business bankruptcy cases. 

Accordingly, I very much look forward to the testimony of the 

witnesses for today’s hearing; and at this time I will recognize my 

colleague, Mr. Cannon, the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, 

for his opening remarks. 

Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I ask unanimous consent to have my written statement included 

in the record. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cannon follows:] 

11 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRIS CANNON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF UTAH, AND RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


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Mr. CANNON. Let me just say briefly, the hearing here today is 

an important hearing. The ideas are important ideas. 

Fundamentally, the question is, can Government make the market work or can Government actually protect employees or, in 

America, where we typically have had a system of a free market 

and robust market and a market where wages are bid up, is it not 

the better way—as we go through the process of transition that you 

laid out, is it not a better way to deal with or to respond to or allow 

the market to respond to these problems in an unfettered fashion 

not going to get us better employment, higher wages and greater 

benefits for all concerned? So I look forward to hearing our witnesses today as they discuss these ideas and yield back the balance 

of my time. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Thank you, Chris. 

At this time, I would like to recognize Mr. Conyers, a distinguished Member of our Subcommittee and the Chairman of the full 

Judiciary Committee, for his opening statement. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Linda Sa ́nchez, our Chair of number 

five. This is a measure that I brought forward for our examination 

today, and I thank you for holding the hearing. 

Now, Chapter 11, just briefly, is intended to give all participants 

an opportunity to work out economic differences. But we know 

what happens in bankruptcy. Namely, as a matter of fact, one of 

the most common threats that occur when a company is having 

hard times in their negotiating the collective bargaining terms for 

a new contract is that somewhere along the way, delicately or not 

so subtly, they are told this by management: ‘‘If we don’t work this 

out, we are going to end up in bankruptcy.’’ He doesn’t say, ‘‘and 

then you know what that means,’’ because you don’t have to say 

that. It means that all contracts become undone, everything, including pensions, health care, everything; and the bankruptcy 

judge is then empowered to rewrite, terminate, diminish in any 

way he or she sees fit whatever the existing agreements were. 

Another thing always happens is that a lot of workers lose their 

jobs. This is why I wrote the bill. If anybody needs to know why 

this legislation has been proposed—and I want to thank all of my 

colleagues. As I recall, I think this is a bipartisan work effort here. 

But sometimes these disparities that we talk of don’t wait for 

chapter bankruptcy to kick in. One time we had a hearing, this 

same Subcommittee. A company used Chapter 11 to extract drastic 

pay cuts and benefit reductions from workers and retirees or take 

away their jobs and benefits entirely. And it never fails. In these 

mergers and bankruptcies, guess what? The people that caused it 

get multi-million dollar, extravagant bonuses and stock options as 

if they are being congratulated for driving the company out of business. The automobile industry is replete with examples, if anybody 

would like to learn more about this. 

And so we have tried to stop executive compensation. We had a 

hearing, and both the Chairman and Ranking Member were at it. 

We had five heads of oil companies, three of whom told us their 

compensation, and they—I don’t think they blushed or stammered 

or were embarrassed by it, but two of them made so much money 

they couldn’t remember how much. They didn’t know what to tell 

us. 

18 

We are remedying that by referring them to—I presume they 

filed tax returns on April 15, but we would like to know for the 

record what this excessive competition that rewards the failures in 

the American industry are. 

And so I thank you, Madam Chair, for allowing me this opportunity. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. I thank the gentleman for his opening statement. 

Without objection, other Members’ opening statements will be included in the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEVE COHEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TENNESSEE, AND MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Workers and retirees have been hit very hard by the growing number of corporate 

bankruptcies in recent years. Workers and retirees have been asked, and in many 

cases forced, to make substantial sacrifices in pay and benefits, including wholesale 

defaults by their bankrupt employers on their pension obligations. The sting of 

these sacrifices may have been slightly easier for workers and retirees to stomach 

were it not for the fact that these same bankrupt employers would pay their CEO’s 

and other senior management executives almost obscene amounts of compensation. 

That is why I am an original cosponsor of H.R. 3652, which makes urgently needed 

changes to the Bankruptcy Code to ensure that the interests of workers and retirees 

are protected in corporate bankruptcies and to ensure that executive compensation 

is reasonable and fair. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. I am now pleased to introduce the witnesses on 

our panel for today’s hearing. 

Our first witness is Babette Ceccotti. Ms. Ceccotti is a partner 

at Cohen, Weiss and Simon LLP in New York city, a law firm specializing in the representation of labor organizations, employee 

benefits plans, and individual employees. Ms. Ceccotti divides her 

time between the firm’s bankruptcy practice and employee benefits 

practice. She has represented labor organizations in numerous 

bankruptcy cases in a wide range of industries and has served as 

an outside counsel to the AFL-CIO on bankruptcy matters since 

1998. 

Ms. Ceccotti is a frequent speaker and contributor to programs 

on labor and employee benefit interests in bankruptcy cases, including programs sponsored by the American Bar Association, the 

AFL-CIO Lawyers Coordinating Committee, the American Bankruptcy Institute and the National Conference of Bankruptcy 

Judges. She has written numerous articles and has been a contributing editor of the Employee and Union Member Guide to Labor 

Law and a contributing author of the Employee Benefits law treatise Supplement. 

I want to welcome you to today’s hearing. 

Our second witness is Marcus Migliore. Mr. Migliore is a managing attorney for the Air Line Pilots Association, International 

and joined the union in 1993. He started his legal career as a law 

clerk to Chief Judge William C. Pryor of the District of Columbia 

Court of Appeals. After his appellate clerkship, Mr. Migliore joined 

the law firm of Dickson, Shapiro and Warren, where he represented labor unions. Mr. Migliore has spent most of his career as 

a labor litigator representing ALPA and other unions in Federal 

court, handling cases in most of the United States Court of Appeals. He also represented ALPA and other unions in arbitration 

19 

proceedings before the National Mediation Board and in collective 

bargaining associations. 

Welcome to our panel. 

Our third witness is Michael Bernstein. Mr. Bernstein is a partner at Arnold & Porter LLP and represents secured and unsecured 

creditors, creditors’ committees, bondholders, investors, asset purchasers, debtors and other parties in a wide variety of bankruptcy 

and workout matters and in related litigations throughout the 

United States. He has been involved in large bankruptcy cases, including US Airways, TWA, Adelphia, Asarco, Mirant, Fannie Mae, 

FoxMeyer Drug, Alterra Healthcare Corporation, Fruit of the Loom 

and Continental Airlines, as well as many other cases throughout 

the United States. 

Mr. Bernstein’s bankruptcy experience spans many industries, 

including telecommunications, energy, real estate, finance, mining, 

manufacturing, technology, retail, airline, health care and pharmaceuticals. He has co-authored two books and has published many 

articles on bankruptcy related topics. He is a frequent lecturer and 

has also testified previously before Congress as an independent expert on the status of collective bargaining agreements and retiree 

and pension benefits in bankruptcy. 

Welcome to our panel. 

Our final witness is Karen Friedman. Ms. Friedman is a policy 

director at the Pension Rights Center, the Nation’s only consumer 

rights organization dedicated solely to protecting and promoting 

the pension rights of American workers, retirees and their families. 

She has more than 20 years of experience in retirement policy and 

communications and regularly represents the perspective of consumers in congressional hearings, speeches and interviews with the 

media. 

Ms. Friedman has written articles for The Washington Post, The 

New York Times, the Los Angeles Times and the San Francisco 

Chronicle and is featured regularly in print and electronic media, 

including appearances on different news programs. She also is the 

director of the Conversation on Coverage, a Pension Rights Center 

initiative that has brought together 45 experts of varying viewpoints to develop common recommendations to increase pension 

coverage, particularly for low and moderate wage earners. 

I want to thank all of you for your willingness to participate in 

today’s hearing. Without objection, your written statements will be 

placed into the record; and we will ask that you limit your testimony today to 5 minutes. 

You will note that we have a lighting system which we sometimes remember to turn on and sometimes don’t. You will get a 

green light when your time begins. After 4 minutes, you will see 

a yellow light, which will warn you you have 1 minute remaining 

in your testimony; and when your time has expired you will see the 

red light. If you are caught mid-thought or mid-sentence when your 

time expires, we will of course allow you to finish your thought before we move on to our next witness. 

After each witness has presented her or his testimony, Subcommittee Members will be permitted to ask questions subject to 

the 5-minute limit. 

20 

So, with that, I am going to invite Ms. Ceccotti to please proceed 

with her testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF BABETTE CECCOTTI, ESQUIRE, COHEN, WEISS 

AND SIMON LLP, NEW YORK, NY, ON BEHALF OF THE AFL-CIO 

Ms. CECCOTTI. Thank you and good morning. Again, Madam 

Chairwoman, Chairman Conyers, Representative Cannon, on behalf of the AFL I would like to thank you for this opportunity to 

appear today in support of H.R. 3652. 

Congress designed the business bankruptcy system to prevent 

the liquidation of viable businesses. At the heart of the concerns of 

the system is the preservation of jobs, specifically jobs worth having. But workers’ experience with the bankruptcy system is the opposite of what Congress intended. 

Business bankruptcy works very well for powerful, moneyed constituencies, but workers who cannot diversify risk or absorb losses 

the way other constituents can end up losing jobs, decent wages, 

pensions, health care and other valuable benefits. Business bankruptcy has become a process in which management lowers the living standards of its employees and enriches itself in the process. 

H.R. 3652 would remedy many defects in the current system and 

provide important protections for workers and retirees. I will briefly touch on some of these changes and refer you to my written 

statement for a more extensive description of the benefits of this 

bill. 

First, the bill would rectify serious deficiencies in the section 

1113 process when debtors seek to modify labor agreements. Section 1113 was supposed to protect workers from paying too high a 

price for their employer’s bankruptcy by requiring a debtor to use 

the collective bargaining process to negotiate modifications by placing limits on how much of a burden workers would bear. But debtors have been grossly overreaching in their concessionary demands 

and running roughshod over the collective bargaining process with 

heavy handed, expensive litigation which they used for litigation to 

try and force concessionary deals and detract from the bargaining 

process. Rather than a check on debtors’ ability to reject a collective bargaining agreement, section 1113 has become a blank check 

for debtors. 

Recent bankruptcies in the airline and steel and auto industries 

have taken broad aim at workers’ living standards through deep 

pay cuts, benefit cuts, cuts in pension and workforce reductions 

that will send thousands of jobs to lower-cost economies. Court decisions in recent cases show that the court’s view of section 1113 

is completely dominated by the debtors’ perspective, even though 

Congress designed section 1113 to incorporate labor policies and 

protect workers in reaching decisions under section 1113. 

The bill would remedy these defects through amendments that 

would rein in overbroad, overaggressive cuts, put an end to contracts that last long after emergence from bankruptcy. 

The bill would require courts to consider solutions proposed by 

the union in addition to the modifications proposed by the debtor 

and would add several other protections designed to bolster the collective bargaining process and stop debtors from using the courts. 

21 

The bill would also clarify what has been a well understood until 

very recently—what has been well understood until only very recently the unquestioned right of workers to strike when their contracts are rejected. 

The bill would also add important protections for retirees. Congress designated retiree health benefits for special treatment in 

bankruptcy through section 1114, which was intended to limit a 

debtor’s ability to eliminate those obligations. But debtors had been 

aggressively targeting retiree health benefits in their bankruptcy 

cases, and even modest programs are slated for total elimination in 

order to get liability off of the company’s balance sheets. 

In addition, debtors have tried to avoid the section 1113 process 

altogether by claiming that nonbankruptcy law allows it to make 

unilateral changes in these benefits without involving retirees at 

all. The bill would stop this practice by requiring debtors that seek 

modifications to use the section 1114 process so that retirees receive the enhanced protection that the process would require. 

Other amendments reaffirm Congress’s intent that business reorganizations preserve good jobs. For example, a buyer of a debtor’s 

assets that retains the debtor’s employees and adjusts the purchase 

price to do just that would be able to have its bid approved over 

other bidders who would not keep the workers. 

The bill would also place greater restrictions on debtors’ ability 

to implement executive pay schemes in bankruptcy. Despite Congress’ effort to crack down on these schemes, under new section 

50(c)(3) bankruptcy continues to be a safe haven for executive pay, 

even as debtors cut pay and benefits for rank and file workers. Section 50(c)(3) has been thwarted through schemes devised through 

so-called incentive programs, devised with targets that are watered 

down for bankruptcy or other questionable milestones, practices 

that are criticized in nonbankruptcy compensation but have become 

successful strategies for avoiding the section 50(c)(3) standards. 

The bill would close the loopholes and impose consequences on 

debtors who implement executive pay enhancement schemes while 

at the same time using bankruptcy to cut pay and benefits. 

In closing, the bill would remedy many harsh, financially devastating defects in the current system; and we urge you to take 

prompt action on this bill. Thank you again for the opportunity to 

appear in support of this very important bill. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Thank you, and we appreciate your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ceccotti follows:] 

22 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BABETTE CECCOTTI


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Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. At this time, I would invite Mr. Migliore to please 

begin his testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF MARCUS C. MIGLIORE, ESQUIRE, AIR LINE 

PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. MIGLIORE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Good morning, Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee. I am Marcus Migliore, managing attorney with the Air 

Line Pilots Association, International, a labor union representing 

55,000 pilots who fly for 40 airlines in the United States and Canada. 

The proposed legislation before the Subcommittee is urgently 

needed to restore balance and fairness to the 1113 process in bankruptcy which has been hijacked by employers who use the courts 

to assist in the rapid execution of workers’ wages, working conditions and retirement benefits achieved over years of collective bargaining. 

The one-sided nature of the pressure put upon workers under 

1113 has prevented the parties from reaching superior negotiated 

solutions, contrary to the statute’s intent. Instead, airline and other 

employees have been locked into long-term, harsh and unwarranted concessions going well beyond those needed for reorganization, while at the same time multi-million dollar payouts for the 

debtors’ corporate executives have been routinely approved. 

This legislation will stop these outrageous dictated abuses, ensure the concessions are necessary and proportionate to those of 

corporate executive and other stakeholders and restore balance on 

the issue of breach damages and the right to strike, thereby supporting superior negotiated solutions. 

Pilots and employees of United, US Airways, Northwest, Delta, 

Comair and Mesaba have already seen their long-term wages and 

working conditions slashed through the 1113 process. Just this 

year, ATA, Kitty Hawk Air Cargo and Aloha pilots have been 

added to the growing list of airline employees caught in the vise 

of the bankruptcy process. And given the price of jet fuel, as 

Madam Chairwoman noted, there will very likely be more airline 

bankruptcies in the coming year. The bill before you is therefore 

more relevant and important than it ever has been. 

Here are examples of why the legislation is urgently needed: 

Pilots at United had their defined benefit pension plan terminated and were locked into a 7-year concessionary agreement. Pilots at both United and Northwest suffered wage cuts of approximately 40 percent and had working conditions reduced or eliminated. At the same time, the CEOs of both carriers were rewarded 

with huge salary increases, bonuses and stock options worth many 

millions of dollars. 

A profitable Hawaiian Airlines used section 1113 to wrest employee concessions to improve its competitive position and profitability. This was after the pilots had previously made in the recent 

past pre-petition concessions to avoid the 1113 filing. 

Comair used the 1113 process because the operation simply was 

not profitable enough for corporate parent Delta, which, at the 

same time, Delta was claiming to have plenty of money on hand 

to fight off US Airways and America West when they tried to take 

106 

over the airline. The Comair bankruptcy judge in fact ignored evidence that the company’s demands for a 22 percent pay cut would 

qualify junior pilots for Federal welfare and food stamp assistance. 

He simply dismissed it on the basis it wasn’t relevant to the economics. 

However, the most extreme example of the one-sided nature of 

the current processes is in the Second Circuit’s Northwest Airlines’ 

decision. That decision allows management to reject with impunity 

binding collective bargaining and impose greatly reduced rates of 

pay and working conditions without having to face contractual 

breach damages from the employees or the possibilities of a responsive strike. 

The Second Circuit justified this amazingly one-sided result 

under the theory that the labor agreement is not actually being 

breached but is being abrogated with judicial permission in 1113, 

ignoring the Supreme Court’s view in Bildisco that rejection in 

bankruptcy is a breach. The Northwest court’s holding represents 

a radical departure from existing law and leaves wronged employees with no recourse for a bankruptcy breach claim, while they remained under the threat of contempt if they ceased to work under 

the imposed conditions, unlike all other creditors who with rejected 

agreements are allowed to refuse to perform under the circumstances. 

This decision will have lasting consequences as companies will 

file 1113 petitions in New York. Therefore, the standards of the 

Second Circuit will effectively govern most of the 1113 practice in 

this country. 

Congress must overrule this decision with the proposed corrective legislation. The legal flaws of the Second Circuit’s approach 

under the status quo provisions of the Railway Labor Act and the 

anti-strike injunction mandates of the Norris-LaGuardia Act are 

spelled out in my written testimony. However, I wish to emphasize 

here the practical import of this decision. 

The willingness of the courts to enjoin a strike in response to 

management imposition of unilateral terms under section 1113 has 

taken away any incentive for airlines to negotiate in good faith 

rather than dictate terms to employees in bankruptcy, leaving employees powerless, chained to the railroad tracks as the 1113 Express bears down upon them. 

By making it clear that a rejection is a breach of contract and 

that such a rejection can trigger a lawful strike, the bill will end 

the situation where the courts unfairly single workers out and restore them to the position that all other providers of services are 

under in the bankruptcy laws. Balance will be restored, and management will be forced to act responsibly and fairly in bankruptcy 

toward its employees and negotiate consensual solutions only if it 

is faced with a real possibility of a responsive strike. 

In sum, Madam Chairwoman, while I also recognize that substantial economic sacrifices may be necessary and we have led the 

effort to save many airlines, the courts have moved the 1113 process far from where it was intended to be in 1984. The bill is proper 

restorative legislation that is urgently needed to fix the misinterpretation and abuse of the 1113 process that has taken place over 

the last 7 years. This Congress must act to protect employees from 

107 

unfair dictated sacrifices made while the corporate chieftains reap 

huge pay offs. 

Madam Chairwoman, I appreciate very much the opportunity to 

testify here today; and I will be happy to answer any questions you 

or the Subcommittee may have. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Migliore follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARCUS C. MIGLIORE

Good morning Madame Chairwoman and members of the Subcommittee. I am 

Marcus Migliore, Managing Attorney with the Air Line Pilots Association, International (‘‘ALPA’’). ALPA represents 55,000 professional pilots who fly for 40 airlines in the United States and Canada. On behalf of our members and the hundreds 

of thousands of other airline employees whose lives have been turned upside down 

by the machinations of the bankruptcy process, I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify today about how ALPA’s experiences in the bankruptcy courts show 

why the proposed legislation before this body—the Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act—is urgently needed to restore balance and basic 

fairness for workers under the Bankruptcy Code. 

Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the procedures by which employers can seek judicial permission to reject and thereby breach collectively-bargained 

obligations to their employees, and impose in their place dictated pay and working 

conditions. This Section 1113 process was originally intended to prevent employers 

from using the Chapter 11 process as an ‘‘escape hatch’’ to simply wipe away with 

a bankruptcy filing the binding, long and hard-fought pay and working condition 

achievements of workers secured by their collective bargaining agreements. 

Prior to Section 1113’s enactment in 1984, the Supreme Court ruled in NLRB v. 

Bildisco, 465 U.S 513 (1984) that an employer could walk away from a binding collective bargaining agreement after a bankruptcy filing without first making any 

showing of need to reject the terms of the agreement. In response, Congress, at the 

urging of ALPA and other unions, acted swiftly to establish procedures in the Bankruptcy Code—the so-called 1113 process—to protect the rights of employees to prevent such harsh and unfair results. The 1113 process requires labor and management to bargain in good faith over concessions sought by the debtor. Under Section 

1113, only after failure to reach a consensual agreement through such good faith 

bargaining and a determination by the court that the concessions are truly necessary to the survival of the employer can management impose dictated terms on 

its employees. 

However, instead of safeguarding employees, the 1113 process has been hijacked 

by employers and is now used as a 51-day countdown to threaten a court-assisted 

execution of the long-term wage and working condition achievements of airline and 

other employees. The one-sided nature of the pressure brought through the swift 

1113 process by employers has led to cataclysmic results for airline and other employees. These same employers have also used the bankruptcy process to rubber 

stamp multi-million dollar payouts for the corporate executives who led the carriers 

into these financial problems and who decimated the employees’ working conditions. 

Over the past seven years, the employee-protective purpose of Section 1113 has 

simply been gutted by bankruptcy and federal court judges overly sympathetic to 

debtor corporations. Airline managements, with the approval of the bankruptcy 

courts, have been able to easily achieve in case after case precisely the contract-destroying results that Congress originally sought to prevent in 1984. The courts have 

paid little heed to the mandates of Congress in Section 1113 to take into account 

the contract rights and personal financial security of employees called upon to sacrifice to help save their employers, essentially doing away with the required demonstration of the necessity of concessions limited in scope and time to those required 

to ensure the survival of the business. 

Pilots and other employees of United, US Airways, Northwest, Delta, Comair and 

Mesaba have all seen their wages and working conditions slashed through the 1113 

process, while corporate chieftains often received huge bonuses, blessed by the bankruptcy courts. 

Just this year, ATA, Kitty Hawk Air Cargo, and Aloha pilots have been added 

to the growing list of airline employees caught in the vise of the bankruptcy process. 

Given the astronomical, continually rising price of jet fuel, and our weak economy, 

these airline employees almost certainly will not be the last to face this severe probVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:14 Mar 05, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\COMM\060508\42723.000 HJUD1 PsN: 42723
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lem. There will very likely be more airline bankruptcies in the coming year, and the 

bill before you is therefore more relevant and important than ever. 

Some of the most extreme examples of the one-sided nature of the current process 

are found in recent court decisions such as Northwest Airlines v. AFA, 483 F.3d 160 

(2d Cir. 2007), a decision of the Second Circuit which allows management to reject 

with impunity binding collective bargaining agreements and impose greatly reduced 

rates of pay and working conditions without having to face contractual breach damages from workers. At the same time, the court prohibited those employees from 

withdrawing their services under those agreements, as other parties facing such rejection are routinely allowed to do under bankruptcy law. The corrective legislation 

before this Subcommittee is urgently needed to restore the original intent and purpose of Section 1113 to ensure that the impact of the bankruptcy process on honest 

and innocent workers is balanced and fair. 

Because the 1113 process has been significantly eroded and undermined in the 

courts, broad restorative legislation is necessary. This bill properly attempts to restore the employee-protective purpose of the Section 1113 process by: (1) tightening 

the standards governing what concessions management may fairly ask for in required, good-faith negotiations with the employees’ representative prior to being 

able to seek to reject their contractual obligations to workers, so that a breach of 

a collective bargaining agreement can be permitted only when truly necessary, and 

only to provide the employer with no more than is truly necessary to ensure the 

competitive survival of the business for a limited period of time; (2) ensuring fair 

treatment and equitable sacrifices from both executives and workers in the bankruptcy process so as to prevent further outrageous abuse by corporate officers lining 

their own pockets while their employees disproportionally sacrifice to help save the 

company; and (3) making it clear that employees have the right to strike and seek 

contract damages in response to a breach of their collective bargaining agreements 

if a consensual agreement between the parties cannot be reached and the contract 

is rejected. These clarifications are all desperately needed to restore balance to the 

1113 process and to help foster superior, mutually acceptable labor-management solutions to bankruptcy crises through collective bargaining. 

I will now describe in greater detail a number of examples of what has gone 

wrong from ALPA’s recent experiences in the administration of the 1113 process in 

the courts, and illustrate how the bill before you will bring to an end the abuse of 

employees which has flourished in the current environment. 

I. THE REFORMS TO 1113 IN THE BILL ARE NECESSARY TO STOP BANKRUPTCY COURTS

FROM ALLOWING EMPLOYERS TO USE THE BANKRUPTCY PROCESS AS LEVERAGE TO

GUT LABOR CONTRACTS ON A LONG-TERM BASIS WITHOUT REQUIRING EMPLOYERS TO

SHOW THAT SUCH LASTING CONCESSIONS ARE NECESSARY OR PROPORTIONATE. 

The courts, egged on by opportunistic employers, have progressively undermined 

the ‘‘necessity’’ standard for granting employer relief in Section 1113. Congress 

adopted this standard in 1113 to ensure that only those changes in working conditions that are truly ‘‘necessary to permit the reorganization’’ of the employer would 

be permitted. In practice, these limits have all but been ignored by both employers 

and the bankruptcy courts. The bankruptcy process has been used as leverage to 

simply jam long-term and draconian wage and benefit cuts down employees’ throats. 

These scorched-earth tactics of using the short 51-day period in the current 1113 

procedures to force extraction of protracted, multi-year concessions that are not 

truly necessary or otherwise achievable in consensual bargaining have led to widespread tension and resentment among airline employees, creating lasting damage 

to labor relations in a labor-intensive industry critical to the national economy. 

ALPA’s experience has shown that circumstances where consensual solutions have 

been reached by the parties have led to far superior outcomes for airlines, their employees and the flying public. Congress needs to take steps to restore support for 

consensual negotiations in such circumstances and to rein in employers from overreaching in bankruptcy. 

ALPA has even seen profitable airlines use Section 1113 as a bargaining lever to 

wrest employee concessions to either facilitate a sale or other transaction or just to 

improve the competitive position or profitability of the carrier. This was the case 

in the bankruptcy of Hawaiian Airlines, where pilots faced a Section 1113 motion 

by a profitable company after having made pre-petition concessions demanded to 

avoid a Chapter 11 filing. All this after management approved a self-tender of the 

airline’s stock at a substantial premium to market value following September 11 

and before the bankruptcy filing. This scheme by Hawaiian was an outrageous 

abuse of the process. 

109 

Similarly, in the Comair bankruptcy, pilots were forced into Section 1113 litigation because the operation was simply deemed not profitable enough to its corporate 

parent, Delta, while at the same time Delta proclaimed that it had plenty of money 

on hand as a justification to creditors for fighting a hostile takeover attempt by 

America West/US Airways. 

In the case of Delta Airlines, even after many months of litigation before the 

bankruptcy court, management continued to demand extreme concessions. Only 

after the establishment of a special neutral mediation-arbitration tribunal, which 

took the matter out of the hands of the bankruptcy court and had the power to 

make a binding determination of the dispute if the parties did not reach agreement, 

did management finally reduce its demands and, in response to ALPA’s demands, 

offer the pilots a bankruptcy claim and corporate notes in exchange for substantial 

concessions. After a consensual agreement was reached on this basis, the Company 

completed its successful reorganization and returned to profitability. Section 1113(i) 

of the bill attempts to build off this demonstrated success at encouraging consensual 

solutions and would allow the bankruptcy court to appoint, at the request of the authorized representative, an expert arbitration panel versed in the industry as an alternative to court proceedings in 1113, and whose rulings would have the same effect as those of the bankruptcy court. This system would lead to a superior outcome 

for everyone. 

Additionally, testimony at the hearings on Comair’s Section 1113 motion established that the Company’s demands for a 22% pay cut would qualify some full-time 

pilots for federal welfare assistance. In response to testimony from a pilot whose 

family would qualify for federal food stamps were he to work full-time under the 

Company’s demands, the bankruptcy judge indicated that he would not be persuaded by these facts of employee hardship and suffering, because he viewed the 

issue purely in economic terms. In fact, in his decision granting Comair’s Section 

1113 motion, the judge failed to take into consideration the impact the Company’s 

1113 proposal would have on the pilot group and its families. A concessionary agreement was only reached after the airline effectively moderated its demands by offering the pilots meaningful ‘‘upside’’ benefits. 

In the case of Mesaba Aviation, the bankruptcy court approved as ‘‘necessary’’ a 

wage cut of almost 20% that would have lasted for 6 years, within a structure that 

did not envision any reversal or mitigation of the cuts during that lengthy period, 

even if they were no longer actually required for the survival of the business. After 

the federal district court agreed with ALPA that such overreaching amounted to 

bad-faith conduct and an abuse of the bargaining process, and subsequent consensual negotiations, the Company finally agreed to a contract that, while definitely 

concessionary, provided a significantly smaller, shorter-term pay cut that did not 

prevent the Company from successfully reorganizing under a plan that is expected 

to provide close to a 100% recovery for all creditors. 

All of these circumstances show that the 1113 process as currently interpreted 

and applied by the bankruptcy courts does not impose effective limits on the ‘‘necessity’’ of employer concession demands, is open to employer abuse and grants inappropriate leverage for employers to wrest long-term, unwarranted concessions from 

employees. These examples also clearly show that consensual solutions to financial 

crises are superior to the imposed alternatives. The 1113 process today undercuts 

employees and undermines consensual, legitimate solutions to financial crises. Necessary modifications to that process must be enacted to correct these imbalances 

and foster superior consensual solutions. As we will explain, the bill before you does 

just that. 

A. The Bill’s Key Substantive 1113 Reforms 

Section 8 of the bill makes a number of necessary changes to Section 1113 to ensure that workers are not forced to make unnecessary, unfair and overly-lengthy 

concessions. It requires that specific provisions and requirements be followed in 

order for an employer to obtain relief from a collective bargaining agreement. It retains the general principle that labor cost relief should be limited to the minimum 

necessary and not be disproportionately burdensome. The information-related requirements of the current statute remain, but added are specific standards and time 

limits for concession requests in the 1113 process designed to foster good-faith negotiated solutions and counteract open-ended, long-term labor cost relief that under 

today’s system can be ‘‘locked in’’ by employers for an unreasonable period that well 

outlasts any justifiable need. 

Subsection (b) of 1113 would be amended to require a clearly-defined, reasonable 

and time-limited ‘‘ask’’ for concessions on the part of the company, which must be 

made to the employees’ authorized representative over a course of good-faith barVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:14 Mar 05, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00113 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\COMM\060508\42723.000 HJUD1 PsN: 42723
110 

gaining that must be at reasonable times over a reasonable period before the debtor 

may apply to the court to reject an agreement. 

In addition to requiring good-faith bargaining as a prerequisite to seeking court 

rejection of a labor agreement, Subsection b(1) would require the concessions to be: 

(1) limited to achieve a total aggregate financial contribution for the affected labor 

group for a period of up to two years after the effective date of the plan; (2) be no 

more than the minimal savings necessary to permit the debtor to exit bankruptcy 

such that the confirmation of the plan or reorganization is not likely to be followed 

by the debtor’s liquidation; and (3) not overly burden the affected labor group in either the amount of savings sought from each group or the nature of the modifications, when compared to other constituent groups expected to maintain ongoing relationships with the debtor, including management personnel. In addition, Subsection 

(b)(2) would require that the proposal be based on the most complete and reliable 

relevant information available, which must be shared with the employees’ representative. 

The amendment to Section 1113(c) would tighten the standards for the court to 

approve the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement. As amended, Section 

1113(c) provides that a debtor may file a motion seeking to reject a collective bargaining agreement if, after a period of good-faith negotiations, the debtor and the 

authorized representative have not reached agreement over mutually-satisfactory 

modifications and the parties are at an impasse. 

Section 1113(c)(1) would further provide that a court may grant a rejection motion 

only if it finds that: (1) the debtor complied with the substantive requirements of 

Subsection 1113(b) (pertaining to the concession proposal for modification of the 

agreement); (2) the debtor has conferred in good faith with the authorized representative regarding such proposal and the parties were at an impasse; (3) the court has 

considered alternative proposals by the authorized representative and has determined that such proposals do not meet the substantive requirements for relief of 

up to two years duration, no more than is necessary for the employer to avoid liquidation and not be unduly burdensome compared to other stakeholders and management; and (4) further negotiations are not likely to produce a mutually satisfactory agreement. In addition, the court must first consider: (1) the effect of the proposed financial relief on the affected labor group; (2) the debtor’s ability to retain 

an experienced and qualified workforce; and (3) the effect of a strike in the event 

that the collective bargaining agreement is rejected. 

Amended Section 1113(c)(2) would require bankruptcy judges, in making their 

burden and proportionality analyses, to also take into account recent concessions 

made by employees within 24 months of a rejection petition, and to aggregate these 

recent concessions with any new ones made or demanded by the employer. 

B. The Bill’s Key Procedural 1113 Reforms 

Employees are currently severely disadvantaged by the 51-day countdown to the 

rejection of collectively-bargained rights which begins after a debtor files an 1113 

rejection motion. The bill amends Section 1113(d)(1) to require the court to schedule 

a hearing on such motion on not less than 21 days notice, unless the parties agree 

to a shorter period, and the amendment also deletes section 1113(d)(2), which now 

requires the court to rule on such motion within 30 days. The amendment also 

specifies that only the debtor and the authorized representative may appear and be 

heard at the rejection hearing. All of these improvements, taken together, will help 

lessen the timeline panic that management as well as other creditors now take advantage of in the current highly compressed process, and help foster reasonable consensual solutions instead. 

New Section 1113(h) would also ensure that workers are not locked into concessions that once struggling but now profitable companies no longer need. It allows 

an authorized employee representative, at any time after the court enters an order 

authorizing rejection or upon reaching an agreement providing mutually satisfactory 

contract modifications, to apply to the court for an order increasing wages or benefits or providing relief from working conditions, based on changed circumstances. 

The court must grant such request as long as the increase or other relief is consistent with the standard set forth in Section 1113(b)(1)(B), pertaining to the minimal savings necessary to permit the debtor to exit bankruptcy without liquidating. 

New Section 1113(j) would allow for procedures for an employee representative to 

request that it be reimbursed for costs and fees associated with the 1113 process, 

after notice and hearing. This provision would, in our view, properly help incentivize 

employers to bargain in good faith for consensual solutions and motivate debtors to 

move quickly to reach negotiated solutions. 

111 

II. THE BILL ALSO WILL END THE CURRENT DOUBLE STANDARD UNDER CHAPTER 11: 

DEEP SACRIFICE FOR WORKERS, HUGE PAYOUTS FOR THOSE AT THE TOP. 

The bill also provides urgently needed modifications to ensure that economic relief 

sought from employees not be disproportionate to the treatment of executives and 

other groups. These changes are required to restore basic fairness and credibility 

to the 1113 process. The current system has led to outrageous unfairness, with 

workers absorbing huge, long-term cuts in pay, work rules, and retirement benefits 

while management executives have enjoyed huge payouts which appear to be nothing more than rewards that are directly tied to the level of pain they have inflicted 

on the employees. For example: 

• Pilots at United Airlines, who took concessions of 40% or more in pay, lost 

numerous important work rules, had their defined-benefit pension plan terminated in multiple rounds of Section 1113 litigation, and were locked into a 

nearly seven-year deeply concessionary agreement, saw the injustice of the 

United Board of Directors raising the pay of Chief Executive Glenn Tilton 

40% just months later. This staggering increase is on top of stock grants to 

Mr. Tilton and other United executives worth in excess of $20 million, as well 

as stock options worth millions more, made as part of United’s plan of reorganization. 

• Northwest Airlines’ pilots were also forced to accept huge wage cuts of nearly 

40%, as well as accept numerous rollbacks to their quality of life by losing 

key protective working conditions. By contrast, the CEO was rewarded with 

$1.6 million in salary and bonus payments last year. The revelation that he 

will also be rewarded with more than $26 million in stock-related compensation over the next few years under a court-approved management equity plan 

further demonstrates the basic unfairness and abuse of the 1113 process. 

• Pilots at Hawaiian Airlines faced demands for concessions despite a plan of 

reorganization that paid unsecured creditors in full. 

• Professional advisors, banks, economic experts, financial managers and executives who participate in the Section 1113 process on behalf of airlines do not 

share in the sacrifices. Instead they earn lucrative fees and even ‘‘success’’ bonuses with the approval of the bankruptcy court, while the workers’ pay, 

work rules and pensions are allowed to be gutted. 

The bill properly requires the bankruptcy courts to ensure that concessions by employees are not disproportionate in light of the state of compensation provided to 

and concessions made by other employees and stakeholders during bankruptcy, including management. First, the bill applies a desperately needed ‘‘unfair burden’’ 

test in Section 1113(b)(1)(C) to determine whether the proposed modifications would 

overly burden the affected labor group compared to management or other stakeholders. This provision will help ensure that employees do not comparatively suffer 

while management, advisors and other are given large bonuses. Furthermore, Section 8(1) of the bill would amend Section 1113(c)(3) to require the court to presume 

that the debtor failed this undue burden test if the debtor implements a program 

of incentive pay, bonuses, or financial returns for insiders or the debtor’s senior 

management during the pendency of the bankruptcy case, or within 6 months of the 

filing of the 1113 petition. ALPA believes that these provisions are absolutely necessary to stop any future court-assisted looting of employees by greedy executives 

and advisors so as to restore credibility and basic fairness—airline and other executives must be reined in from massively profiting as a result of their employees’ misery in the 1113 process. 

III. THE BILL WILL ALSO END THE BLATANT UNFAIRNESS OF AIRLINES BEING ALLOWED

TO USE 1113 TO AVOID BINDING EMPLOYEE OBLIGATIONS WHILE BEING IMMUNIZED

FROM EMPLOYEE SELF-HELP. 

The last item I wish to highlight for the Subcommittee is what ALPA perceives 

as the most egregious of the many aspects of unfairness that exist in the court’s 

administration of the current 1113 system. As I have explained, airlines have used 

the compressed timeline and largely unchecked judicial authority of the 1113 process as leverage to obtain what they could never obtain in consensual bargaining— 

deep, lasting and unfair changes to avoid the binding commitments that they made 

to their employees in collective bargaining agreements. But employers have not 

stopped there, they have gone to the bankruptcy and federal courts and asked them 

to declare that (1) an 1113 rejection is not a compensable breach of contract for employees, and (2) employees do not have the right to respond to these fundamental 

112 

breaches of labor agreements by withholding their services, as other creditors whose 

agreements are rejected can do. 

Employers have succeeded with the courts on both counts, requiring broad restorative legislation. Three bankruptcy courts, two federal district courts, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals have ruled that under Section 1113, airline employees 

can be forced to accept the utter destruction of their fundamental rates of pay and 

working conditions in binding agreements by the bankruptcy process, but may not 

strike in response. In fact, a split panel of the Second Circuit in the Northwest Airlines case could only justify this highly inequitable result with the fiction that management is not actually breaching a collective bargaining agreement when it obtains 

judicial permission to reject a labor contract through the Section 1113 process, a notion wholly at odds with settled bankruptcy doctrine, and one that would leave 

wronged employees with no recourse for a bankruptcy breach claim, as other creditors are allowed. 

We believe that under a proper reading of the mutual, status quo requirements 

of the Railway Labor Act, the law that governs airline employees, workers have a 

right to strike after a bankruptcy court grants an employer motion to reject the status quo—defining collective bargaining agreement under Section 1113 and imposes 

new inferior rates of pay, benefits, job security and/or working conditions. Further, 

under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. a101 et seq. (which was enacted in the 

1930’s to generally preclude injunctions against strikes after egregious abuse in railroad reorganization cases), bankruptcy judges and U.S. District Court judges do not 

have jurisdiction to issue injunctions against lawful strike activity when management has acted unilaterally to destroy the contractual status quo and tear up a 

binding labor contract outside of the elaborate negotiations and mediation process 

mandated by the status quo provisions of Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act, 45 

U.S.C. a156. 

Additionally, from a practical perspective, the willingness of the courts to enjoin 

a strike in response to management imposition of unilateral terms under Section 

1113 has taken away any incentive for airlines to negotiate in good faith rather 

than dictate terms in bankruptcy. The current situation leaves employees powerless, 

chained to the railroad tracks as the 1113 Express bears down on them. Airline employees are being singled out unfairly by being denied the right to take self-help and 

withhold future services after their contract is rejected and in the absence of a consensual agreement, which is a right that every other party to a rejected contract 

has under the current bankruptcy code. For example, aircraft lessors are free to stop 

performance of their agreement and take back their aircraft from the debtor airline 

upon rejection of their lease, but airline employees are, in the view of the Second 

Circuit and other courts, required to continue to perform under penalty of contempt 

and under judicially-dictated terms even though their binding labor agreements are 

rejected. 

Given this blatantly unfair treatment of workers today under 1113, it is therefore 

essential that any reform legislation explicitly conclude that a rejection of a binding 

labor agreement is a compensable breach of contract and also preserve the right of 

employees to strike after a Section 1113 contract rejection. This bill does that. By 

making it clear that a rejection is a breach of contract and that such a rejection 

can trigger a lawful responsive strike, the bill will end the situation where the 

courts unfairly single workers out and restore workers to the position that all other 

providers of services are in under the bankruptcy laws—ensuring that they can attempt to collect damages for the employer’s breach of their agreement, and be allowed to withhold services if their contracts with the debtor are rejected. New section 1113(g) would therefore restate what had been well understood before the 

Northwest case—that like rejection of other executory contracts in bankruptcy, the 

rejection of a collective bargaining agreement constitutes a breach of such agreement. It further provides that no claim for rejection damages may be limited by Section 502(b)(7). Section 1113(g) also establishes that an authorized representative 

may engage in economic self-help if the court grants a motion rejecting a collective 

bargaining agreement or the court authorizes interim changes pursuant to Section 

1113(e) and that no provision of the Bankruptcy Code or of any Federal or State 

law may be construed to the contrary. 

This provision is essential to restoring the economic balance contemplated in the 

anti-strike injunction mandates of Congress in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which the 

Supreme Court found ‘‘was designed primarily to protect working men in the exercise of organized, economic power, which is vital to collective bargaining.’’ Brotherhood of Trainmen v. Chicago R & I. R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 40 (1957). Balance will be 

restored and management will be forced to act responsibly and fairly in bankruptcy 

towards its employees only if it is faced with the real possibility of a responsive 

strike. 

113 

In sum, while ALPA recognizes that substantial economic sacrifices may be necessary by employees during severe economic disturbances, and in fact has repeatedly acted in a leadership role to help many airlines survive the ravages of the post 

9-11 environment, management and the courts have moved the 1113 process far 

from its original intent to protect workers. Today, it is an extreme and one-sided 

process that is used to destroy workers’ lives. ALPA believes the bill is proper restorative legislation that is urgently needed to fix the misinterpretation and abuse 

of the 1113 process that has taken place in the last seven years. All of these proposed changes to Section 1113 are necessary to ensure that the sacrifices extracted 

from employees are truly fair, reasonable and necessary. The Congress must act to 

restore the original intent of this legislation and protect employees from unfair, dictated sacrifices made while the corporate chieftans reap huge payoffs. 

Madame Chairwoman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify here today, and I 

would be happy to answer any questions you have. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. At this time, I would invite Mr. Bernstein to 

please proceed with his testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL L. BERNSTEIN, ESQUIRE, 

ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman Sa ́nchez, 

Ranking Member Cannon and Members of the Subcommittee. 

Thank you for inviting me to appear before your Subcommittee 

today. 

I am a partner in the law firm of Arnold & Porter LLP and chairman of the firm’s national bankruptcy and corporate restructuring 

practice group. However, I am appearing today at the invitation of 

the Committee in my individual capacity and not on behalf of my 

law firm or any of its clients. 

Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is intended to enable financially troubled businesses to restructure their obligations and operations so that they are able to emerge as viable, going concerns. A 

debtor that achieves this objective benefits its creditors, its suppliers, its customers, its employees, its local community and other 

constituencies. 

H.R. 3652 would modify many provisions of the Bankruptcy 

Code. Some of these modifications are difficult to reconcile with the 

fundamental goal of Chapter 11 and would be likely to impair the 

ability of Chapter 11 debtors to reorganize. 

I want to make five points in this regard. 

First, some of the proposed modifications in this bill would increase the cost of Chapter 11 reorganizations, including by creating 

substantial new administrative and priority expenses. Debtors that 

would be unable to pay such expenses would be forced to shut 

down and liquidate. 

Second, the legislation would create additional hurdles for a business that needs to modify its labor and retiree costs in order to remain viable. It would do so in several ways. First, it would raise 

the already very stringent standard for obtaining 1113 or 1114 relief. Second, it would effectively preclude labor cost modifications 

where a debtor is paying incentive-based compensation to management even if such management compensation is at a market-competitive level. Third, it would slow down the court process. Fourth, 

it would allow unions to strike in retaliation for a debtor’s implementation of court-approved modifications, even if such a strike 

would destroy the company. Finally, the bill would limit cost modification proposals to a 2-year period, which makes it much more 

114 

likely that the company would have to file bankruptcy again 2 

years down the road. It would also prohibit creditors and other interested parties from even participating in the 1113 hearing. So the 

court would be precluded from even hearing their views, notwithstanding the fact that the outcome of the proceeding may have a 

profound impact on their recoveries. 

If these provisions are implemented, it is almost certain that 

some Chapter 11 debtors who truly need to modify burdensome and 

above-market labor costs would be unable to do so. Such companies 

would be unable to attract new capital and instead would be forced 

to liquidate. This would be detrimental to all stakeholders, including the employees who lose their jobs in a liquidation. 

Third, several of the proposed modifications would make it materially more difficult for Chapter 11 debtors to attract and retain 

management employees. Managers with the skill necessary to navigate a company successfully through the Chapter 11 process are in 

great demand and tend to have many opportunities available to 

them. Indeed, competitors of a Chapter 11 debtor often see the 

bankruptcy filing as an opportunity to cherry-pick the best management talent from the debtor. 

In order to retain and attract management talent, the debtor 

must be able to pay market competitive wages and benefits to its 

management employees, including in many cases incentive-based 

compensation. The 2005 amendments compounded this challenge 

by effectively precluding debtors from paying stay bonuses to management employees. The further restrictions in this proposed legislation would make it even more difficult for a Chapter 11 debtor 

to attract and retain management employees. 

Several provisions in the bill would directly link the wages and 

benefits paid to managerial employees with the wages and benefits 

to hourly employees. While there may be a superficial appeal to 

this linkage, it fails on take into account the economic reality that 

there are different labor markets for different types of employees. 

Fourth, certain of the proposed provisions would substitute inflexible, one-size-fits-all rules for judicial discretion that exists 

under existing law. For example, the bill would tax any asset sale 

that results in the termination of retiree benefits at the flat right 

of $25,000 per employee, regardless of the magnitude of the transaction or the magnitude of retiree benefits that are being lost and 

regardless of any other facts or circumstances. It would also limit 

1113 relief in all cases to 2 years of cost savings, regardless of the 

actual cost savings that would be necessary to attract investment 

capital which would merge as a viable company. 

In any case, where there are competing plans of reorganization 

proposed, it would require the court automatically to favor the one 

that benefits employees, regardless of the merits of the plans or the 

impact they may have on any other constituency in the case. 

Because each company and each industry in each Chapter 11 

case is different, the reorganization goal of Chapter 11 is better 

served by allowing judges to make decisions in each case based on 

the evidence before them, rather than trying to create identical 

rules for every case without regard to the facts. 

Finally, the proposed provisions would create potentially substantial new priority claims, including a new and apparently unVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:14 Mar 05, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00118 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\COMM\060508\42723.000 HJUD1 PsN: 42723
115 

1The views expressed herein are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily represent 

the views of my firm or any of its clients. 

limited priority claim for diminution in the value of debtor stock 

in the defined contribution plan. Viewed in isolation these new priority claims may not seem particularly problematic. However, in 

evaluating the extent to which such priority should be created, it 

is worthwhile to consider two factors. First, priority claims must be 

paid in full in order for a debtor to reorganize under a Chapter 11 

plan. Thus, the creation of new priority claims will make it more 

difficult for companies to reorganize. Second, the new employee priorities will leave less money for the holders of other types of 

claims. Thus, while it may be appealing to say we are giving greater priority to employee claims, it is important to keep in mind that 

by doing so you are likely to be diminishing the recovery of other 

types of creditors such as, for example, taxing authorities, trade 

creditors, individual customers or tort victims injured by a debtor’s 

products. 

In conclusion, 30 years ago when it enacted the Bankruptcy 

Code, Congress observed that the goal of Chapter 11 would promote reorganization because it was the best way to maximize value 

for creditors and preserve jobs. Over 30 years of Chapter 11 history, this has proven to be true. 

If H.R. 3652 is enacted, it will make reorganization more difficult 

to achieve, particularly for companies that have substantial labor 

forces and substantial labor costs. The likely result will be that 

more companies end up in liquidation. This will be damaging to all 

stakeholders including employees, and it is inconsistent with the 

purpose of Chapter 11. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bernstein follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL L. BERNSTEIN

Madam Chairman Sμnchez, Ranking Member Cannon, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify at your hearing on H.R. 3652, the 

‘‘Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2007.’’ My name 

is Michael Bernstein. I am a partner in the law firm of Arnold & Porter LLP and 

the chair of the firm’s national bankruptcy and corporate restructuring practice.1

We represent debtors, creditors, committees, investors and other parties in a wide 

variety of bankruptcy and corporate restructuring matters. I have advised and represented debtors and other parties in connection with matters at the intersection 

of bankruptcy and labor law, and I have lectured on this subject, as well as on numerous other bankruptcy-related subjects. I have also written various books and articles. For example, I am co-author of Bankruptcy in Practice, a comprehensive treatise on bankruptcy law and practice published by the American Bankruptcy Institute. 

Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is intended to enable a financially troubled 

business to restructure its operations and obligations so that it is able to remain 

a going concern, and to emerge from bankruptcy as a viable and competitive enterprise. A debtor that achieves this objective benefits its creditors, suppliers, customers, employees, local communities, and other constituencies. A successful reorganization ordinarily requires a debtor to achieve a competitive cost structure. This 

includes paying market-competitive wages and benefits to all employee groups, from 

hourly workers to administrative and clerical employees, to mid-level management 

and senior executives. 

H.R. 3652, the ‘‘Protecting Employees and Retires in Business Bankruptcies Act of 

2007,’’ would modify many provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Some of these modifications are difficult to reconcile with the fundamental goals of chapter 11, and 

would be likely to impair the ability of chapter 11 debtors to reorganize. 

116 

2This would turn what is now an equity interest into a claim, and then give that claim priority over general unsecured claims as well as certain other priority claims. 

First, some of these proposed modifications would increase the already substantial 

cost of chapter 11, making reorganization more difficult to achieve. 

Second, certain of the proposed modifications would create substantial additional 

hurdles for a business that needs to modify its labor and retiree cost structure in 

order to remain viable. If a chapter 11 debtor that needs to reduce above-market 

labor costs is precluded from doing so, it will likely be unable to attract new capital 

and unable to reorganize. This is detrimental to all constituencies, including the employees who lose their jobs in a liquidation. 

Third, several of the proposed modifications would make it materially more difficult for chapter 11 debtors to attract and retain management employees. Because 

of the substantial risks, burdens and uncertainties that typically come with managing a company in chapter 11, it has historically been a challenge for debtors to 

retain and attract management talent. Numerous debtors have suffered from management defections, as their competitors cherry-pick the best management talent. 

The 2005 modifications to the Bankruptcy Code, as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse 

and Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), compounded this 

problem by effectively precluding debtors from paying ‘‘stay bonuses’’ to management employees. These bonuses had previously been an important means to compensate management employees for the risk and uncertainty of working for a debtor, and incentivizing such employees to remain with the debtor even though they 

may have more attractive, and more stable, opportunities elsewhere. The additional 

proposed modifications in H.R. 3652 would make it materially more difficult for a 

chapter 11 debtor to attract and retain managerial employees. 

Several provisions in the bill would link, in a direct way, the wages and benefits 

paid to managerial employees to the wages and benefits of hourly employees. While 

there may be a superficial appeal to this linkage, it fails to take into account the 

different labor markets that exist for different types of employees. Simply put, a 

debtor must pay its hourly employees the going rate in the community in which it 

operates for employees with comparable skills and expertise. The same is true for 

all other employees, up to and including the most senior executives. Thus, while it 

may sound good to say ‘‘if labor suffers a ten percent pay cut, management employees must suffer the same pay cut,’’ a more rational approach would be to say that: 

(i) each employee should be paid as close as possible to market-competitive wages 

and benefits, and (ii) the overall labor cost structure should not exceed what the 

company can afford to pay, in light of its financial circumstances. 

Fourth, certain of the proposed provisions would substitute inflexible, one-sizefits-all rules for the judicial discretion that exists under current law. Because each 

company, each industry and each chapter 11 case is different, the reorganization 

goal of chapter 11 is better served by allowing judges to make decisions in each 

case, based on the evidence before them, rather than trying to create identical rules 

for every case, without regard to the facts. 

Finally, some of the proposed provisions would create potentially substantial new 

priority claims. Viewed in isolation, this may not seem particularly problematic. 

However, in evaluating the extent to which such priorities should be created, it is 

worthwhile to consider two factors. First, priority claims must be paid in full in 

order for a debtor to reorganize under a chapter 11 plan. Thus, the creation of new 

priority claims will make it more difficult, or perhaps impossible, for some companies to reorganize. Second, priorities create ‘‘creditor versus creditor’’ issues more 

than ‘‘debtor versus creditor’’ issues. In other words, whenever you give priority to 

one type of claim, you are leaving less money for the holders of other types of 

claims. Thus, while it may be appealing to say ‘‘we are giving a greater priority to 

employee benefits claims,’’ it is important to keep in mind that, by doing so, you 

are likely to be diminishing the recovery of other types of creditors, such as taxing 

authorities, trade vendors, customers, or tort victims. 

I will now address some specific provisions of the proposed legislation, and point 

out some of the consequences that I believe would be likely to result if these provisions were enacted. 

SECTIONS 3-5: Priorities 

These provisions would increase the existing wage priority and create new types 

of priority claims, including a priority for diminution in the value of equity securities in a defined contribution plan,2 and an administrative expense priority for severance pay. Some of these new priority claims could be substantial, and would have 

to be paid in full in order for a debtor to confirm a plan of reorganization and 

117 

3This is true not only because bonus and incentive compensation is a typical component of 

executive pay, but also because, unlike their competitors, debtors ordinarily cannot offer their 

management employees compensation in the form of equity (stock or options), since equity is 

most often out-of-the-money. 4See Comair, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l (In re Delta Air Lines, Inc.), 359 B.R. 491, 

498 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (‘‘Congress enacted Section 1113 not to eliminate but to govern a 

debtor’s power to reject executory collective bargaining agreements, and to substitute the elaborate set of subjective requirements in Section 1113(b) and (c) in place of the business judgment 

rule as the standard for adjudicating an objection to a debtor’s motion to reject a collective bargaining agreement.’’). 

emerge from bankruptcy. If these new priorities are established, there are likely to 

be some cases in which the debtor will not be able to confirm a reorganization plan 

because it will not be able to pay its priority claims in full. Instead, these debtors 

would be forced to liquidate. 

In addition, as I noted above, claim priorities pit one creditor group against another. The new proposed employee priorities will, except in those relatively rare 

cases in which there is enough money to pay all claims in full (in which case the 

priorities are largely irrelevant), diminish or eliminate entirely the recovery of other 

creditors. This creates fairness issues—for example, whether it is fair to increase 

the recovery of employees at the expense of tort victims injured by a debtor’s products, customers who paid the debtor for goods or services but did not receive what 

they paid for, taxing authorities, or small businesses that sold goods to a debtor. 

SECTIONS 6 AND 7: Limitations on Executive Compensation 

These sections of the bill would make it substantially more difficult for a debtor 

to pay bonus or other incentive-based compensation to management employees. By 

doing so, it will make it more difficult for chapter 11 debtors to attract and retain 

management talent. The job of managing a debtor through the chapter 11 process 

is quite challenging and requires substantial skill. The people who can do this job 

well tend to be in great demand, and have many opportunities. In order to retain 

and attract management talent, a debtor must be able to pay market-competitive 

wages and benefits to its management employees. In many cases, this will include 

bonus or other incentive-based compensation.3 If debtors are precluded from paying 

market-competitive compensation, including incentive and bonus compensation, 

their best managers are likely to find alternative employment, thereby imperiling 

the debtor’s reorganization efforts. 

The requirement in section 6 of the bill (relating to compensation upon emergence) and section 7 of the bill (relating to compensation during the chapter 11 case) 

that management compensation be ‘‘not disproportionate in light of economic concessions by the debtor’s nonmanagement workforce during the case’’ could be problematic, depending on how it is interpreted. If it is interpreted to mean that hourly 

workers should not be paid materially below market while management is paid materially above market, that would be reasonable and should not unduly interfere 

with the reorganization process. However, if this provision were interpreted to preclude a debtor that has obtained labor cost reductions through the § 1113 or § 1114 

process, or through negotiations, from paying market-competitive wages and benefits (including incentive compensation) to management employees, that would be 

problematic because it would essentially punish management for undertaking difficult but necessary cost-cutting measures, and would interfere with the debtor’s 

ability to retain management employees. 

SECTION 8: Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements 

Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code deals with the modification and rejection of 

collective bargaining agreements. Unlike other contracts that can be rejected by a 

debtor if doing so is found to be a reasonable exercise of the debtor’s business judgment, the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement is evaluated using a far 

more stringent standard.4 In order to reject a collective bargaining agreement under 

present law: 

(1) The debtor in possession must make a proposal to the union to modify the collective bargaining agreement; 

(2) The proposal must be based on the most complete and reliable information 

available at the time of the proposal; 

(3) The proposed modifications must be necessary to permit the reorganization of 

the debtor; 

(4) The proposed modifications must assure that all creditors, the debtor and all 

of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably; 

118 

5The test was initially articulated by the court in In re Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907, 908 

(Bankr. D. Minn. 1984), and has subsequently been adopted by many other courts. See, e.g., In 

re Family Snacks, Inc., 257 B.R. 884 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001). 6See, e.g., In re Delta Air Lines (Comair), 342 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (debtor failed 

to confer in good faith); In re Nat’l Forge Co., 279 B.R. 493 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2002) (debtor did 

not meet its burden of proving that the proposed modifications were fair and equitable); In re 

U.S. Truck Co., 165 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2521 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000) (debtor failed to meet its 

burdens of proving the proposal to be necessary, fair and equitable); In re Jefley, Inc., 219 B.R. 

88 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (court concluded ‘‘that the proposal, as presented, is not ‘necessary’ 

to the Debtor’s reorganization; [and] does not treat the union workers ‘fairly and equitably’’’); 

In re Liberty Cab & Limousine Co., 194 B.R. 770 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (debtor’s proposal was 

not fair and equitable); In re Lady H Coal Co., 193 B.R. 233 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1996) (debtor 

failed to treat all parties fairly and equitably and did not bargain in good faith); In re Schauer 

Mfg. Corp., 145 B.R. 32 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992) (debtor ‘‘has failed to show that the Proposal 

which it made to the Union makes ‘necessary modifications . . . that are necessary to permit 

the reorganization of the debtor... .’’); In re Sun Glo Coal Co., 144 B.R. 58 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 

1992) (‘‘the debtors have failed to sufficiently quantify the results of such proposed changes to 

allow this Court to find that they are ‘necessary’ to the reorganization of the debtors.’’). 7 But see Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC, 791 

F.2d 1074, 1088 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that ‘‘[t]he ‘necessary’ standard cannot be satisfied by 

a mere showing that it would be desirable for the trustee to reject a prevailing labor contract 

so that the debtor can lower its costs’’ and suggesting that the use of the word ‘‘necessary’’ 

equates to ‘‘essential’’ and that rejection under § 1113 should be used only when necessary to 

prevent liquidation). 

(5) The debtor must provide to the union such relevant information as is necessary to evaluate the proposal; 

(6) Between the time of the making of the proposal and the time of the hearing 

on approval of the rejection of the existing collective bargaining agreement, the 

debtor must meet at reasonable times with the union; 

(7) At the meetings the debtor must confer in good faith in attempting to reach 

mutually satisfactory modifications of the collective bargaining agreement; 

(8) The union must have refused to accept the proposal without good cause; and 

(9) The balance of the equities must clearly favor rejection of the collective bargaining agreement.5

The debtor must satisfy all nine of these standards in order to obtain relief. There 

are many cases in which a debtor’s request for relief under § 1113 has been denied.6

The additional requirements in the proposed bill would make it more difficult to 

modify or reject a collective bargaining agreement. For example, under existing law 

any proposed modifications must be ‘‘necessary to permit the reorganization of the 

debtor.’’ In Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 89–90 (2d 

Cir. 1987), the court concluded that ‘‘’necessary’ should not be equated with ‘essential’ or bare minimum. . . . [rather] the necessity requirement places on the debtor 

the burden of proving that its proposal is made in good faith, and that it contains 

necessary, but not absolutely minimal, changes that will enable the debtor to complete the reorganization process successfully.’’ 7 The proposed bill, among other 

things, would replace ‘‘necessary to permit the reorganization’’ with ‘‘no more than 

the minimal savings necessary to permit the debtor to exit bankruptcy, such that 

confirmation of such plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation of the debtor 

or any successor to the debtor.’’ Depending on how it is interpreted, this standard 

might be nearly impossible to satisfy. It may require a debtor to leave itself, in creating a post-emergence cost structure, so little leeway that even a minor unforeseen 

‘‘bump in the road’’ after emergence could cause another bankruptcy filing. The 

‘‘necessary’’ standard under present law is sufficient to assure that modifications are 

achieved only where they are needed in order for the debtor to reorganize and 

emerge as a viable enterprise. A more stringent standard would be likely to impede 

successful reorganizations. The more stringent standard would also be likely to reduce the number of negotiated resolutions because, if the rejection standard is nearly impossible to satisfy, the unions will have great leverage and therefore less incentive to negotiate. Such a change in the standard could upset the delicate balance 

that exists under present law, which in the vast majority of cases has resulted in 

negotiated rather than litigated resolutions. 

The bill would also amend § 1113(d) to slow down the § 1113 process. This provision is not in any constituency’s interest. Resolution of § 1113 issues is often a prerequisite to obtaining commitments for new investments or exit financing and negotiating and implementing a plan of reorganization. As a general matter, the faster 

this can be achieved, the lower the costs of chapter 11 and the greater the debtor’s 

prospects for success. Thus, slowing down the § 1113 process would be counterproductive. The bill would also prohibit creditors and other interested parties from 

119 

8Similarly, proposed § 1113(c)(1)(D)(iii) would require the court to consider the threat of a 

strike by a union in evaluating whether to grant relief to the debtor in the first place. In my 

opinion, this provision would be a mistake. A union should not, by threatening to strike, be able 

to compel a court to deny relief that is necessary for a successful reorganization. This would 

give the union too much leverage, to the detriment not only of the debtor, but also all of its 

creditors and other stakeholders who would benefit from a reorganization. 9 Under existing law, courts have suggested that in cases governed by the National Labor Relations Act a union has the right to strike upon entry of a § 1113 order. See Briggs Transp. Co. 

v. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters, 739 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1984) (rejecting request for injunctive relief 

in an NLRA case based on the NLGA’s protection of right to strike); see also Northwest Airlines 

Corp. v. Assn. of Flight Attendants—CWA, AFL—CIO (In re Northwest Airlines Corp.), 349 B.R. 

338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 483 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2007). By contrast, under the Railway Labor 

Act (which governs, inter alia, the airline industry), the Second Circuit has held that the right 

to strike does not exist. See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 483 F.3d at 167–68. 10This would be inconsistent with § 1129(a)(11), which requires that, in order to confirm a 

chapter 11 plan, a debtor must show that it is not likely to be followed by the subsequent need 

for further restructuring or liquidation. 11The Report further provides that: ‘‘Modifications that can, in just two years, provide significant economic relief for the company’s survival may necessarily require economic concessions 

that are too burdensome to be acceptable because of the effect on paychecks is too great. Conversely, modifications that last no more than two years but also have a smaller effect on payContinued 

participating in a § 1113 hearing, even though their recoveries could be substantially 

affected by the outcome. 

The proposed legislation would also add a requirement that the debtor’s proposal 

‘‘not overly burden the affected labor group, either in the amount of savings sought 

from such group or the nature of the modifications, when compared to other constituent groups expected to maintain ongoing relationships with the debtor, including management personnel,’’ and would create a presumption that a debtor who implemented any incentive compensation or similar plan for management employees 

during the case or within 180 days before the filing fails to satisfy this requirement. 

Existing law already requires that a § 1113 proposal assure that all creditors, the 

debtor and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably. Seeking to 

create some sort of more precise equivalence between the treatment of hourly employees and other constituencies, without regard to market factors, would be counterproductive. The guiding principal should not be that every group must take the 

exact same pay cut or reduction in benefits, but instead that each employee or group 

of employees should be paid and receive benefits at, or as close as possible to, a market-competitive level, and the resulting overall cost structure should be manageable 

for the debtor. 

In addition to the foregoing modifications, the proposed bill would add six new 

provisions to § 1113. Some of these provisions would likely undermine the purpose 

of chapter 11 or make reorganization significantly more costly. For example, proposed § 1113(g) would authorize ‘‘self help’’ (presumably a strike or other job action) 

by labor representatives if the court grants a motion to reject a collective bargaining 

agreement or a motion for interim modifications to such an agreement.8 If a labor 

union, after the court finds that it unjustifiably refused to accept a fair and equitable modification proposal that is necessary for the debtor’s reorganization, and 

therefore grants § 1113 relief, is able to torpedo the reorganization by engaging in 

a retaliatory strike or other job action, the purpose of § 1113 (and of chapter 11 more 

generally) will be undermined, and the company and its stakeholders will suffer. 

The union will also have less incentive to negotiate because it can always turn to 

the ‘‘nuclear option’’ of a strike if the debtor does not accede to its demands, or as 

retaliation for the debtor’s implementing § 1113 relief. A more balanced provision 

would be to authorize the bankruptcy court to enjoin a strike or similar job action 

after granting § 1113 relief, but only where such an injunction is necessary in order 

to enable the debtor to reorganize and remain in business as a going concern.9

Another newly proposed section, § 1113(j), would require a debtor to pay the 

union’s fees and expenses. Chapter 11 is already quite expensive, and this would 

create an additional administrative burden, to the detriment of creditors and other 

constituencies. 

Finally, the bill would preclude a debtor from making a § 1113 proposal that 

would achieve cost savings for more than a two-year period. This is a particularly 

short-sighted provision. A chapter 11 debtor should restructure its costs and obligations in a manner calculated to make it economically viable for the foreseeable future, not only for two years. If a debtor were to look only two years in the future, 

the probable result would be repeat bankruptcy filings.10 As noted in the CRS Report for Congress, ‘‘limiting the duration of modifications to a CBA may limit the 

debtor’s ability to successfully reorganize.’’ 11

120 

checks may not provide sufficient economic relief to allow the debtor company to survive, effectively forcing the company into liquidation.’’ See C. Pettit, CRS Report for Congress, Rejection 

of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies: Legal Analysis of Changes to 

11 U.S.C. Section 1113 Proposed in H.R. 3652—The Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2007, at CRS-5 (May 9, 2008). 12This provision also does not address the situation in which the assets sold are subject to 

a lien securing a debt that is greater than the sale proceeds, meaning that there are no 

unencumbered proceeds. The intent may be, in this situation, that the $20,000 per retiree would 

be a forced ‘‘carve-out’’ from the secured lender’s lien. This would likely have implications for 

the availability and pricing of secured credit to companies that have retiree medical obligations. 13 As a hypothetical, if two plans were proposed, one of which would not require any job cuts 

while the second would require cutting five percent of the workforce, but the second plan would 

result in an 80% recovery to creditors rather than a 10% recovery under the first plan, it would 

be more equitable to consider the interests of creditors as well as employees, rather than to consider only the interests of employees and ignore the interests of creditors. 

SECTION 9: Payment of Insurance Benefits to Retired Employees 

Most of the proposed modifications to § 1114 track the modifications to § 1113. As 

a result, the proposed modifications to this section would create many of the same 

impediments to reorganization discussed previously with regard to § 1113. Current 

law is sufficient to guard against any modification in retiree benefits other than in 

those cases where such modification is essential for the company to be able to reorganize and emerge from bankruptcy. 

SECTION 10: Protection of Employee Benefits in a Sale of Assets 

This section would impose a flat $20,000 per retiree charge upon all § 363 sales 

that result in a cessation of retiree benefits. This flat charge apparently does not 

take into consideration the value of the transaction, the number of retirees, or the 

magnitude of lost benefits. Indeed, in some cases $20,000 per retiree could be greater than the entire value of the asset sale transaction, rendering the sale impossible 

to consummate even if it were the best transaction available to the bankruptcy estate and its creditors. This is an example of an attempt to create a one-size-fits-all 

rule without regard to the facts of a particular case.12

SECTION 13: Payments by Secured Lender 

Bankruptcy Code § 506(c) currently provides that the trustee may surcharge a secured creditor’s collateral to pay the reasonable and necessary costs and expenses 

of preserving or disposing of the collateral to the extent the secured creditor benefits 

from the expenditures. This surcharge right is sometimes waived by a debtor in exchange for the prepetition secured lender’s consent to the use of cash collateral or 

providing postpetition financing. 

The proposed modifications to § 506 would treat postpetition wages and other benefits as necessary costs and expenses, for surcharge purposes, regardless of any 

waiver of the surcharge right. The proposed modifications to § 506 are likely to decrease the availability, and increase the cost, of secured credit, including 

postpetition financing. Particularly in a tight credit environment, such as we are 

currently facing, this surcharge provision could be problematic for companies seeking secured financing. 

SECTION 14: Preservation of Jobs and Benefits 

This provision would mandate that in a situation where competing chapter 11 

plans were proposed, the court must confirm the plan that better serves the interests of retirees and employees. It seems reasonable for a court to consider the interests of retirees and employees in evaluating which competing plan to confirm. However, to consider only the interests of employees and retirees, while ignoring the interests of creditors and other constituencies, would be inconsistent with the approach historically taken in chapter 11 cases, which is to take into account and balance the interests of all stakeholders.13

SECTION 15: Assumption of Executive Retirement Plans 

Section 15 would preclude a debtor from assuming a management deferred compensation plan if the debtor has terminated its defined benefit plans during or within 180 days prior to bankruptcy. There are many cases in which it is necessary to 

terminate a defined benefit plan in order for a company to be able to remain a viable going concern. Under these circumstances, termination of the plan is consistent 

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121 

agement for the proper exercise of their fiduciary duty by eliminating what is often 

an important element of management compensation. It would thereby make the job 

of attracting and retaining management talent to a company in or on the verge of 

bankruptcy materially more difficult. This section also seeks to create an equivalence between two unrelated plans—a management deferred compensation plan and 

an employee defined benefit plan. Instead of this artificial linkage, a company (and 

a court) should look at each plan in terms of whether it serves a legitimate business 

purpose, whether it provides benefits that are competitive in the marketplace, 

whether the debtor’s obligations under the plan are affordable in light of the debtor’s financial circumstances, and what would be the likely consequences of a proposed assumption, rejection or termination. 

SECTION 16: Recovery of Executive Compensation 

This provision would create a cause of action against certain officers and directors 

for the return of their personal compensation in an amount equal to the percentage 

reduction of collective bargaining obligations or retiree benefits implemented by a 

debtor pursuant to §§ 1113 and 1114. This provision apparently seeks to create a 

disincentive for a company to seek to modify collective bargaining agreements or retiree benefits by threatening the personal compensation of some of the individuals 

involved in making the decision to seek such relief. 

As discussed above, §§ 1113 and 1114 relief is available only when a clear case 

has been made that such relief is necessary for the debtor to reorganize. Where such 

circumstances exist, and yet the negotiation process has failed to generate an agreement, it is appropriate for a debtor to seek relief. Indeed, in such a situation, the 

debtor’s failure to seek relief may well result in liquidation, and the resulting loss 

of jobs and creditor recoveries. The debtor’s officers and directors should not be 

forced to operate under a threat that, if they do what is in their company’s best interest, they will be sued and required to disgorge their own compensation. This 

would create an inappropriate disincentive for officers and directors. It would put 

such individuals in a ‘‘Catch 22’’ position—they either decline to implement labor 

cost reductions that are necessary for their company to reorganize, or they implement such reductions but thereby expose themselves to a lawsuit to disgorge their 

own compensation. As with several other provisions in the bill, this provision would 

make it more difficult for a troubled company (particularly one with labor cost 

issues) to retain and attract officers and directors. 

In enacting chapter 11, Congress observed that , ‘‘[i]t is more economically efficient to reorganize than liquidate, because it preserves jobs and assets.’’ H. Rep. 95– 

595, 95th Cong.,1st Sess. 220 (1977). Thirty years of chapter 11 history proves that 

this is true. Where a company is able to reorganize, creditors tend to recover more, 

customers and suppliers enjoy continued relationships, taxing authorities continue 

to receive revenues, employees retain their jobs, and local communities benefit. Unfortunately, chapter 11 reorganization is not easy. First, it is expensive. Second, it 

requires a talented management team to lead the effort. Third, it requires hard decisions, including sometimes painful cost cutting, to bring costs in line with revenues, and with the competitive marketplace. Fourth, it typically requires financing, 

which is increasingly hard to obtain. Fifth, it requires a balancing among competing 

interests which are often difficult to reconcile. 

In an effort to protect the interests of, and maximize value for union employees, 

H.R. 3652 is likely to impede chapter 11 reorganizations. It will increase costs. It 

will make attracting and retaining talented management much more difficult. It will 

impair a debtor’s ability to bring labor costs into line with the competitive marketplace, even when doing so is necessary in order for the company to remain viable. 

It will make financing less available and, where available, more expensive. And it 

will, by moving labor to the front of the line, diminish the recoveries of other constituencies, and thereby make the balancing of interests that is at the heart of the 

chapter 11 process more difficult to achieve. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. At this time, I would invite Ms. Friedman to 

please begin her testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF KAREN FRIEDMAN, ESQUIRE, 

PENSION RIGHTS CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. FRIEDMAN. Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Cannon 

and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity 

122 

on testify today. I am Karen Friedman, the policy director of the 

Pension Rights Center; and we are the only consumer rights group 

in the country that works exclusively to promote and protect the 

pension rights of workers, retirees and their families. 

In today’s economic environment, where companies are restructuring, cutting back benefits, it is more important than ever to provide strong safeguards for American families. I am going to focus 

my comments today on the important pension protections in the 

Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcy bill, 

H.R. 3652. 

The bill will provide critical retirement protections to employees 

and retirees when their companies go bankrupt. While companies 

once used bankruptcy proceedings only when they were truly in 

trouble as a tool of last resort, they now commonly view bankruptcy as a viable business strategy that allows them to unfairly 

eliminate long-standing pension obligations to their workers and 

retirees. 

United Airlines is a case study of how a giant corporation used 

the bankruptcy system to shed billions of dollars in pension obligations with devastating consequences for tens of thousands of American families. By going into bankruptcy, United was able to transfer its pension liabilities to the PBGC, which, as you know, is the 

Federal private pension insurance program. United then paid its 

creditors. It gave multimillion dollar pay packages to its executives, 

and it emerged profitable from bankruptcy. But who were the losers? The hard-working middle-class flight attendants, the mechanics, the ticket agents, the pilots and other airline employees whose 

pensions were reduced by $2 billion collectively. 

This corporate strategy is the subject of Fran Hawthorne’s new 

book called Pension Dumping, which traces how companies have 

moved from honoring pension promises as sacrosanct to viewing 

them as a burden to eliminate. 

The PBGC was created as a backstop to protect workers’ pensions when a company goes belly up. The agency ensures that those 

who spent a lifetime working for a company would not lose their 

retirement security. And the majority of workers and retirees in 

terminated plans will indeed get all of the benefits owed to them. 

And this is a great part of the PBGC. But there are limits on how 

much the PBGC can guarantee. The agency does not insure all the 

benefits workers are promised. For instance, it does not guarantee 

certain subsidized early retirement benefits or benefits improvements made within 5 years of a plan’s termination. These are benefits that were earned in exchange for other compensation. In addition, shutdown benefits are now only partially guarantied. 

H.R. 3652 recognizes that many individuals are left without recourse when the PBGC pays them only partial benefits. The bill 

would enable active workers and retirees whose benefits are not 

fully insured by the PBGC to file a claim in bankruptcy court for 

the full amount they earned. Under current law, individual workers and retirees are precluded from making such a claim for the 

difference between what the PBGC provides and what the plan had 

promised. 

This provision will make a world of difference to employees 

across the country who give up wage increases for the promise of 

123 

a full pension. When the pension plan is terminated through no 

fault of their own, employees experience, in essence, a retroactive 

pay cut, losing benefits they earned and can never ever get back. 

H.R. 3652 also includes provisions to ensure that executives cannot enrich themselves while employees suffer benefit cuts in bankruptcy. The bill provides that if an employer terminates a plan, the 

executive compensation arrangements have to be terminated as 

well. The provision would put an end to such an unfair situation 

such as when Glen Tilton paid himself over $25 million in executive compensation after the company’s restructuring. 

Finally, the bill provides important protections to employees in 

401(k) plans. At a time when defined benefit plans are being replaced by do-it-yourself savings plans, employees need to know that 

their money is protected. H.R. 3652 provides individuals with a 

new priority claim in bankruptcy court when the value of their 

company stock in a 401(k) plummets because of corporate misdeeds 

or fraud. 

Enron is the most notorious example of such corporate abuse. 

The ending of that story is well-known. Thousands and thousands 

of workers lost their retirement money because they were misled 

by Enron executives. And who better to have a claim for their 

money? But while the Enron collapse may have occurred 6 years 

ago, its lessons are still valid and similar situations could happen 

today. 

In closing, we thank the Subcommittee for holding this hearing 

on this important bill and taking steps toward protecting American 

workers and their families’ retirement security. 

I will be happy to answer any questions. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Thank you for your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Friedman follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KAREN FRIEDMAN

Madame Chairwoman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am Karen Friedman, Policy Director of the Pension Rights 

Center, a 32-year-old consumer rights organization dedicated to promoting and protecting the retirement security of workers, retirees, and their families. 

In today’s economic environment, where increasingly companies are restructuring 

and cutting benefits, it is more important than ever to provide strong safeguards 

for American families. I will focus my comments today on how corporate practices 

are affecting employees’ and retirees’ retirement security and discuss the important 

pension protections included in the ‘‘Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business 

Bankruptcies Act of 2007,’’ (H.R. 3652). 

H.R. 3652 will provide critical retirement protections to employees and retirees 

when their companies fail or restructure under the bankruptcy code. While companies once used bankruptcy proceedings only when they were truly in trouble, as a 

tool of last resort, they now commonly view bankruptcies as a viable business strategy that allows them to unfairly eliminate long-standing pension obligations to their 

workers and retirees. 

United Airlines is a case study of how a giant corporation used the bankruptcy 

system to shed billions of dollars in pension obligations—leading to devastating and 

irreversible losses to tens of thousands of American families. By going into bankruptcy, United was able to transfer its pension liabilities to the Pension Benefit 

Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the federal private pension insurance program. 

United then paid off its creditors, gave multimillion-dollar pay packages to its executives, and emerged profitable from bankruptcy. The losers were the hard-working 

middle-class flight attendants, mechanics, ticket agents, pilots, and other airline employees, whose pensions were reduced by $2 billion. 

This corporate strategy is the subject of Fran Hawthorne’s new book Pension 

Dumping, which traces how companies have moved from honoring pension promises 

124 

1 Hawthorne, Fran, Pension Dumping: the Reasons, the Wreckage, the Stakes for Wall Street, 

pp. 143–144 (2008) 

as ‘‘sacrosanct, stronger perhaps than any other business contract,’’ to viewing them 

as a burden they want to eliminate. 

Hawthorne says that even companies that are reluctant to cut benefits are often 

forced to terminate the plan by so-called ‘‘vulture investors,’’ who will only provide 

financing to a company if the pension obligations disappear. 

While some of these companies emerge financially healthy—at least in the shortterm—the workers and retirees often lose hundreds of thousands of dollars of the 

earned benefits that they were relying on to make it through retirement. In short, 

pension dumping is a short-term strategy with devastating long-term consequences. 

The PBGC was created as a backstop to protect workers’ pensions when companies go belly-up, in order to ensure that those who spent a lifetime working for a 

company would not lose their retirement security. And the majority of participants 

in terminated plans will, indeed, get all the benefits owed to them. But there are 

limitations created by Congress on how much the PBGC can guarantee. For instance, the PBGC pays a maximum age-65 benefit of $4,312.50 per month (or 

$51,750 annually) for plans terminated in 2008. This amount is adjusted for inflation every year. The agency, however, does not insure all the benefits on which 

workers’ rely. The PBGC does not guarantee certain subsidized early retirement 

benefits or fully insure benefit improvements made within five years of a plan’s termination, benefits that were gained in lieu of other compensation. In addition, 

under the most recent amendments to federal law, shutdown benefits, negotiated by 

unions, are now only partially guaranteed if the shutdown occurs within five years 

of the plan termination. 

H.R. 3652 recognizes that many individuals are left without recourse when the 

PBGC only pays them partial benefits. This bill would enable active workers and 

retirees whose benefits are not fully insured by the PBGC to file a claim against 

the plan sponsor in bankruptcy court for the full amount they earned. Under current law, individual workers and retirees are precluded from making such a claim 

for the difference between what the PBGC provides and what the plan had promised. 

This reasonable provision will make a world of difference to employees in hundreds of corporations and industries across the country, employees who meet their 

end of the bargain by working throughout their career with the promise of getting 

a pension based on all their years of work. Employees give up wage increases in 

exchange for the company contributing to the defined benefit pension plan on their 

behalf. When the pension plan is terminated—through no fault of their own—employees, in essence, experience a retroactive pay cut, losing benefits they earned and 

can never get back. And unlike other creditors who know they are taking risks in 

lending money to a corporation, workers—at least in the past—assumed their 

money was safe in the pension plan. 

H.R. 3652 also includes provisions to ensure that executives cannot enrich themselves while employees suffer benefit cuts. The bill fairly provides that if an employer terminates a plan, the executive compensation arrangements must be discontinued as well. This provision would put an end to such unfair situations as when 

United CEO Glen Tilton, after the restructuring, paid himself $4.5 million in pension and other benefits—an astounding $25 million worth of stock and $6 million 

in stock options—not to mention his more than $3 million in salary and bonuses.1

It is unjustifiable for executives to pay themselves lavish compensation packages 

while terminating their employees’ pension plan as well as reducing their salaries 

and other benefits. 

Finally, the bill provides important protections to employees in 401(k) plans. At 

a time when defined benefit plans are being replaced by do-it-yourself savings plans, 

employees need to know that their money is protected. H.R. 3652 provides individuals with a new priority claim in bankruptcy court when the value of their company 

stock in a 401 (k) plan plummets because of corporate misdeeds or fraud. Enron is 

the most notorious example of such corporate abuse. Although Enron executives Ken 

Lay and Jeffrey Skilling were well aware the company was tanking, they persuaded 

their employees to continue to invest their 401(k) money in Enron stock—at the 

same time they were selling their own company stock. The ending of that sad story 

is well-known, as thousands of workers lost all their retirement money. But while 

the Enron collapse may have occurred six years ago, its lessons are still valid. Employees still are permitted to invest all their 401(k) money in company stock. If company executives breach their fiduciary duty by misleading individuals as to the 

value of that stock, then employees should have their day in court. 

125 

The Pension Rights Center thanks the Subcommittee for holding a hearing on this 

important bill that takes some important steps towards protecting American workers’ and their families’ retirement security. This bill recognizes that workers have 

upheld their end of their bargain—giving their labor and loyalty to companies—and 

at the very least they should have their day in court to protect what they have 

earned. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. We are now going to begin our first round of questioning; and I believe our Chairman, who has another hearing, 

must leave, so I am going to allow him the opportunity to question 

first. 

Mr. CONYERS. Is it okay with Mel Watt if I go first? 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Sure. I am sure Mr. Watt has no objection. 

Mr. WATT. If she lets me go second. 

Mr. CANNON. Which I have no objection. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Mr. Conyers, you are recognized if you like. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thanks so much. 

Look, there isn’t much secret about this. I only wish we had more 

people like Mr. Bernstein who we can talk to about this. 

For your homework, I want you to read all of your fellow panelists’ statements and then report back to me and Chris Cannon and 

we will give you a—it won’t be part of your final grade, but we will 

test you out on this. 

Because you are not representing your company or your clients. 

This is you talking to us. And so we want to try to sort our way 

through this in a reasonable way. 

I mean, workers are getting screwed big-time, massively. We 

have got 51 sponsors of this, more than half a dozen in the Senate. 

Everybody is clamoring for this legislation to get some kind of reasonable control. 

So, Mr. Bernstein, in all fairness to you—because we could have 

a panel next time, if somebody wants it, on the Committee. We will 

have three witnesses against the bill and one witness for it and see 

how it comes out then. It may be different, but it may not be. But, 

look, let’s get down to this thing. 

What would you want the Chairwoman, Linda Sa ́nchez, the 

Ranking Member, Chris Cannon, Mel Watt and me to do to make 

this at least easier for you to swallow? It may be like taking medicine. You are going to have to take it. Do you want tap water or 

you want a Coke light? How can we make this more palatable to 

you? That is I want to do today. 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Congress, in enacting 1113, sought to encourage 

negotiated solutions. That was the stated objective. And it is in fact 

what has happened. 

Although we all hear about the very few cases that some of my 

other witnesses here have mentioned that result in litigation, there 

are very, very few cases that result in litigation compared to the 

enormous number that are resolved. So what Congress sought to 

do by drafting a bill that gave some leverage to companies in bankruptcy and considerable leverage to unions as well is to give each 

side the incentive to bargain. And it has worked exactly as it 

should. 

Now I understand that the representatives of labor unions would 

like more leverage. And they say that negotiations are very difficult 

for us and the company runs over us and makes the threats. And 

if you had a bunch of managers here of Chapter 11 debtors, they 

126 

would tell you that the union has a lot of leverage and the union 

always threatens to strike and the statute as it exists sets such a 

high standard that it is very difficult to satisfy. So everybody would 

like more leverage, and everybody would like a better bargaining 

position. But Congress really achieved what it sought to achieve 

here in leveling the playing field, and the best evidence of that is 

the number of negotiated solutions that have arisen. 

Now, I recognize that the cuts in pay and benefits that employees have been asked to take in Chapter 11 cases are significant and 

very difficult. The question in these cases is whether it is better to 

implement the necessary cuts so that the company can survive and 

emerge from bankruptcy or whether it is better instead to say, 

well, labor doesn’t want to take cuts and the standard is so high 

we can’t force them to so we will just shut down the company and 

all the creditors get nothing and all the union employees lose their 

jobs. And I think it is because survival of the company is so important that the unions have recognized this and in the overwhelming 

majority of cases have worked together with management to come 

up with a solution that is less than ideal but saves the company. 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, I have more work on my hands than I 

thought originally. Let me close down by having the other three 

witnesses help us move this toward some reality here. Ms. 

Ceccotti? 

Ms. CECCOTTI. Yes. Well, I would certainly agree that negotiated 

solutions are preferable. I think that that is a hallmark of labor negotiations generally and certainly the bankruptcy process. 

But I think the problem that I have with the witness’ answer is 

that even though there may be negotiated solutions eventually, in 

many cases, first, debtors in Chapter 11 are simply using the litigation process as a lever to get there. It is not the situation where 

there are so few court cases that, you know, we can count them on 

the fingers of one hand. Debtors routinely start litigation processes. 

They spend enormous time and money, creditors’ money I might 

point out, starting these expensive litigations over contract rejection when really what Congress intended in 1113 is for the parties 

to engage in negotiations over a proposed solution. 

The problem with this two-track approach, which is very common 

now, is that it is distracting, it is expensive, and the union very 

quickly gets the idea that the court process is going to work against 

it. Once that mindset sets in, it makes the search for genuine and 

fair solutions extremely difficult for the union and for the rank and 

file members to swallow. So I would say that we cannot simply look 

at the number of negotiated solutions versus the number of court 

decisions, because that will give you a very distorted view of how 

the process works. 

Mr. CONYERS. I will ask the Chairwoman to get both the people 

to your right and left’s view to my question, because I am out of 

time. But let’s continue this discussion. 

I will just leave asking you, Mr. Migliore, what do you think of 

the proposed Northwest/Delta merger? 

Mr. MIGLIORE. Well, the merger itself, you know, obviously has 

to be worked out between the pilots; and we always have internal 

issues between that. 

127 

But in terms of the general issue of mergers, I mean, there is 

definitely increased pressures on almost all of the employees when 

you are in a scrunching situation. When two groups are being put 

together into a smaller group, there is going to be pressures applied. And there is no question that the merger situation, in addition to all of this that we are talking about in terms of bankruptcy, 

is this is going to raise the pressure on employees further, as a 

whole, looking at the industry as a whole, looking at it broadly. 

But I have to tell you, you know, the biggest thing that I see 

right now in the bankruptcy sphere that we are talking about right 

here is what the Second Circuit did in that case. Regardless of 

what Mr. Bernstein said, that is going to be—the theory of that 

case is going to be too powerfully attractive for management to resist at this point. They are going to use it to jam things down the 

employees’ throats. 

They don’t have a right to get damages when their contracts are 

cut in half. They don’t have the right to respond to even say, hey, 

if you break my binding agreement, if you breach my agreement 

which the court says you can’t breach anymore, I am going to 

strike you. They say you can’t do that either. 

So if you are put in that situation as an employee and as a manager, what do you think the managers are going to do? They are 

going to steamroll these guys, and they are doing it, and they are 

going to do more of it. 

So I want everybody to realize, regardless of how this has played 

out before, going forward this is going to get a whole lot worse. Because these employers are all going to come to New York. Almost 

anybody can file an 1113 in Manhattan. They are all going to go 

there, and they are all going to take advantage of that case, and 

they are going to steamroll the employees. 

Mr. CONYERS. We four are going to be following this carefully. 

And I thank you, Chairwoman Sa ́nchez. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Thank you. The gentleman yields back his time. 

I will recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions, and I want to 

start out with a little anecdote, because I think it sort of highlights 

the problem that we are talking about here today. 

I tend to fly quite a lot for work, for obvious reasons. And I was 

on a plane recently, and I won’t say what carrier, but I was sitting 

in the front seat, and I was listening to the flight attendants talk 

with the mechanics and the folks that were loading things onto the 

plane. And I overheard a discussion that they were talking about, 

which was this bonuses incentive pay that they were promised if 

they could keep their record on on-time departures at a certain percentage. There was an incentive program that some CEO sitting at 

the top had thought would really motivate folks to get the planes 

cleaned and stocked and ready to go for their departure times, and 

so these employees had really put themselves out to make sure 

that each flight left on time as often as possible. 

And then the guy said, yeah, and when the bonuses came, when 

it came time to hand out the bonuses, the people that got the bonuses were the managers, not the people that are doing the work 

on the ground. 

And I think that sort of illustrates the problem that we are seeing here with bankruptcy. We are seeing Chapter 11 bankruptcy 

128 

and CEOs who, when there is pain, when there have to be cuts, 

it is not being shared equally in the way that when things that are 

good that are happening that are helping the airline are not being 

shared with the people who are really responsible for them. And it 

is the people who are on, you know, the front line doing the grunt 

work to make sure that these businesses continue to run. 

And so I am very pleased that you are all here, and I understand 

there are difference of opinions, but I think what I am seeing is 

that things are skewed in one side’s favor. And I think what we 

are trying to get at is how do we balance that playing field. 

My first question is for Ms. Ceccotti. Section 8 of this bill would 

limit the effect of a labor group’s concessions to no more than 2 

years, and I am interested in knowing why that limitation is necessary. 

Ms. CECCOTTI. Well, I think we heard—I think we have heard already about the United situation. I guess I will use that as an example. But it is by no means the only example. 

What happens is that in an 1113 negotiation the proposals that 

can be made by the debtor are supposed to be limited by economic 

proposals that are supposed to be clearly necessary. But duration, 

the duration of the length of time the agreement is going to be in 

effect is always something that it is part of these negotiations. 

And United, for example, was very successful in this effort and 

got 7-year contracts, almost unheard of. These were negotiations 

that occurred very early on in the case. No one obviously foresaw 

how the case would turn out. When United finally did emerge from 

bankruptcy, of course with its balance sheet much improved by the 

plan terminations and all, something like $11 billion in labor costs 

savings, it did very well. It did so well in fact that it was able to 

make a special dividend payment to shareholders of $230 million 

just earlier this year. 

We have already heard about the executive pay awarded to CEO 

Tilton and others. So the workers, seeing that the company was 

doing very well, asked the company to begin talks early on its 7- 

year agreement; and the company has said, no, the amendable date 

of those agreements is not for another year. Those workers are 

going to be working under cuts in pay and all of the onerous working conditions that they undertook to get the company out of bankruptcy for another year before United will even start to talk to 

them about a replacement contract, even though United has been 

able to pay shareholders extra money. It has prepaid part of its 

term loan to its exit lenders. It is clearly doling out money that it 

has reaped based on the successes of its very successful bankruptcy 

case to other constituencies, and workers are left to left to live 

under these harsh contracts. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. So, to clarify, when companies who unusually file 

bankruptcy return the profitability like the United case, there is no 

renegotiation of these concessionary agreements? 

Ms. CECCOTTI. There certainly could be. And there is nothing, absolutely nothing preventing United or any other carrier or any 

other company that has emerged from bankruptcy from saying, 

hey, we are doing much better than we thought. We will—like our 

shareholders, we will give you an extra bonus or we will snap back 

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129 

ning rod in these bankruptcy negotiations because workers rightly 

believe that if the company actually does better than anticipated, 

they should share in the gains. 

In fact, the anecdote that you told goes right really to the heart 

of this issue. Because really the reason that the company turned 

around, in addition to the concessions, is the fact that workers 

were showing up and doing exactly the types of tasks that you witnessed. They are the vital lifeblood of the business’ recovery. 

The limitation that is in the bill is intended to say to companies, 

look, you are going to have to be much more measured in what you 

take out of workers during this process. Because we have seen 

what happens when duration clauses and contract lengths are simply left open-ended. There is nothing that would force a company 

to share the gains that it has reaped from bankruptcy. So this is 

an effort to say, in that case, you are only going to take but so 

much. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Thank you. My time has expired, so I will recognize Chris Cannon for his 5 minutes of questions. 

Mr. CANNON. One is tempted looking at the dais to yield back, 

except that I know the Chairwoman has questions that will go on, 

so I thought I would take a few minutes and get to the core of some 

of these issues. 

Let me say, first of all, bankruptcy is not a partisan issue. It is 

a philosophical issue. It is a control issue, a State control issue 

versus a market control issue, but it is not a partisan issue. And 

it is complicated. The issues that Ms. Friedman raised about pensions are complicated issues of which a small piece is before us and 

to solve those problems I think we need a broader forum. 

And I might add that it also has tended here to be a union 

versus management issue. 

Let me just say that I was a member of a union. I earned my 

way through college by being a teamster, and I believe there is a 

constitutional right to organize unions. 

The question when we deal with bankruptcy becomes much more 

difficult. It becomes how do you balance the context for continuing 

jobs against some of the other priorities. And I think, Mr. Bernstein, you laid out those issues very, very well. Thank you. 

I note that the Chairman of this panel and the Chairman of the 

full Committee and two of our panelists used the term ‘‘outrageous’’, and I would just say that there are outrageous profits to 

be made or compensation to be made if you become a business leader, and therefore we hope that more people move into that field 

and bid down the cost of leadership. Because the amounts that are 

made are actually really outrageous, but they are outrageous in the 

context of a market. It is not a very fluid market; and, in fact, the 

bankruptcy itself takes out some of that fluidity and distorts some 

of the decisions that are made by people. 

On the other hand, we can take out some of the risk that goes 

along with that in what we do in bankruptcy or how we deal with 

bankruptcy so that there are—there is more fluidity, more openness to the market. 

I have followed one bankruptcy where all the creditors were paid 

off. The pensions were—it was a defined benefit or—pardon me— 

it was a defined contribution pension plan, and therefore the emVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:14 Mar 05, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00133 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\COMM\060508\42723.000 HJUD1 PsN: 42723
130 

ployees were all thrilled at the end because they took pensions that 

were more significant than their defined benefits would have been. 

But after coming through a remarkably difficult, complex set of 

proceedings, with everyone paid off, the managers were attacked by 

the trustee and ended up settling for a small portion of the compensation that I think they earned in the process. 

So the uncertainty of bankruptcy clearly adds to the value proposition that a manager needs when he looks forward to making a 

decision that could be a career-ending decision or it could be a profitable phase of his life. 

With all of those things in mind, it seems to me that what we 

need to be looking for here is not sort of the extreme positions of 

this is outrageous, but rather what can we do to actually make 

some adjustments. 

So let me ask Ms. Ceccotti and Mr. Bernstein because you differ 

very clearly on section 1113, is there a way we draft the section 

in your minds that would get closer to where we each want to go 

without creating this destabilizing of what I think has been historically a fairly good balance? 

I might preface my question by saying I started practicing law 

about the time we did the last bankruptcy reform in 1978. I was 

actually working in a law firm and got my law degree in 1980 and 

thrust into a really nasty bankruptcy. I was disgusted by the process. I thought there were a bunch of leeches that lived off the bankruptcy process. But in the last 30 years I have been amazed how 

we have taken it from an awful system that very few people understood to a system that has actually worked to preserve many companies and many, many jobs. 

In that context are there some narrow things that we can do 

with the language before us that would help us balance without destroying what I think we have achieved where more jobs stay in 

place as opposed to destroying more jobs, Ms. Ceccotti? Is there 

such language? 

Ms. CECCOTTI. Sure. I think I understand your question. 

I think what has happened here is that the courts have really 

not—the courts really didn’t take Congress’ direction in 1984. Some 

courts got it. But many courts simply didn’t, or didn’t like it, and 

the judges found not enough guidance, frankly, in the language 

that was drafted in 1984. 

So watching that development, and I have attached actually to 

my testimony which you might find interesting an article that was 

just published in the ABI law journal that really does track with 

some degree of specificity what has happened, what happened very 

soon after the enactment of 1114 with the courts and what they did 

with the language and how it is reflected in the decisions today. 

So in looking in just having to accept the fact that the courts 

simply didn’t know what to do with the statute, the notion would 

be here, and what the bill I think tries to do is to say to the courts, 

okay, we, Congress, will have to give you better guidance and that 

means more specific guidance on exactly how the two elements that 

I think are reflected in 1113 and have been completely distorted 

beyond recognition must operate. 

First, you must have a good chunk of time to do the bargaining. 

So where we have perhaps more provisions or more words used, 

131 

more language that has to be brought to bear on defining what 

that means, the intent I think is to say to the courts you really 

cannot let companies start litigation early. So there are certain 

changes that are in here now that are really geared toward process. 

They are really geared toward giving the parties the time to function in a serious way to figure out what is wrong and what would 

be the labor group’s fair share. 

The second piece of this that 1113 was designed to do that the 

courts have simply been terrible at figuring out how to apply is 

what is the labor group’s fair share. So here again, while I understand that there are more words and more provisions and some 

might consider this, the current iteration to be, the way the bill 

does it, to be less flexible, really the intention here is again to do 

the same thing, which is to say to the courts okay, here is what 

we mean when we say that labor’s share must be proportionate. 

So I am afraid that by starting to tweak the language and so 

forth we would just be back to the situation that spectacularly 

failed with section 1113, which is absent clearer guidance the 

courts didn’t know what to do and have simply let the debtors run 

away with the store. 

Mr. CANNON. Ms. Ceccotti, let me follow up with one aspect of 

what you said. You would like more time for bargaining, but isn’t 

time a critical factor in many of these bankruptcies? 

Ms. CECCOTTI. Well, I am very glad that you asked that question, 

actually. In fact, one of the concerns in drafting 1113 originally was 

that Chapter 11 practice was—the modern Chapter 11 practice was 

much newer then. The Code had been revamped in 1978. There 

really wasn’t that much time for companies to be operating under 

the new rules, and there were still companies who were waiting too 

long, getting too close to the brink of liquidation before filing bankruptcy cases. And that was one of the things that the 1978 Code 

tried very hard to correct. Obviously if a company can go into 

Chapter 11 sooner, there are better chances to save the business. 

Now in 2008, particularly with the more recent round of cases involving entire industries, or what seem like entire industries, they 

need all of the time that they can get, frankly, because really bankruptcy for them can only solve but so much. Bankruptcy can’t bring 

the fuel prices down or deal with the trade situation which caused 

the glut of the drop in steel prices and can’t deal with changing demands for OEM cars. 

It can do certain things, but these problems are so complicated 

that now in 2008, as opposed to in 1984, companies actually do 

need a fair amount of time. Adelphi Corporation, for example, 

started its 1113 process virtually the day it filed for bankruptcy, 

and it took years to reach agreements with five unions simply because the case was that complex. 

So while I do think that the statute does deal with time exigencies, there is an emergency relief provision which provides stopgap 

measures so workers and the company can work on the bigger picture. 

I think that the time element now has vastly changed with the 

complexity of the cases that are being filed, and I want to note that 

Congress in the 2005 amendments has said to all stakeholders that 

the debtor only has 18 months to figure out how it wants to come 

132 

out of bankruptcy, so everybody really does have to kind of put 

their shoulders to the wheel and figure out in a very timely way 

how to get to a plan that is going to work. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. The time of the gentleman has expired, but there 

is tremendous interest in receiving more information from the witnesses. So we are going to move to a second round of questions. I 

will recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Migliore, I am interested in hearing from you what bankruptcies mean to the typical pilot, for example, in terms of their 

wage cuts and pension cuts, et cetera. 

Mr. MIGLIORE. At least at United and Northwest, which are recent examples we had, both pilot groups lost about 40 percent of 

their pay. 

The United pilots lost their pensions, and so they went to the 

PBGC, and they basically will get at most a third what they expected to get. Mr. Tilton got his 40 percent bonus and in the tens 

of millions of dollars worth of stock options and benefits. The pilots 

are certainly looking at this and saying we have lost 40 percent of 

our pay and we have lost two-thirds of our retirement. The CEO 

gets 40 percent more pay and he gets some $20 million worth of 

a golden parachute. 

The reactions from these people is what you would expect. It is 

total outrage. And if I was in their shoes, I would be more outraged. 

I understand there are market forces at issue here, but why we 

are here is to try to put a brake on this so people will get a fair 

break and have an opportunity to have a living standard that they 

have built up. Pilots have built this up over 20-30 years, and these 

people are seriously being knocked out of the middle class today. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. With respect to bargaining, and I have some familiarity with negotiating for employment contracts, and it has been 

my experience and I am interested in knowing if it is yours as well, 

that oftentimes employees will agree to no increases in pay so that 

they can retain their pensions or other types of benefits. So they 

are willing to sacrifice in increased wages, they are willing to sacrifice increased wages so that they can retain a safety net through 

pension benefits or health care benefits. 

So it seems to me, and I am interested in your comments, that 

it is almost, in a sense, sort of an illusory promise that if you are 

going to take the wage cuts or no wage increases so that you can 

have a pension that will be there when you need it, and then you 

go through something like this and see it completely wiped out, it 

is almost an illusory promise to the employees. 

Mr. MIGLIORE. That is exactly what happened to the pilots of 

U.S. Airways. They had multiple 1113 rounds, as did United, and 

they made some significant wage cuts to try to save their pension 

plan, their defined benefit plan, and then they ended up losing it 

in the last round they had. I am sure that they felt that way. They 

were very angry about it because again the pension vehicle, the defined benefit plan, really was a primary vehicle for moving people 

into the middle class in this country, to have retirees not be, you 

know, struggling on a small Social Security check, and that has 

been removed from lots and lots of pilots and all sorts of other employees, too. 

133 

You think of pilots that are highly paid, but there they are all not. Some fly for the feeder carriers and make $22,000 a year. A 

number of them took wage cuts, too. For example, Comair and 

other feeders we have. Some of them were knocked back down to 

the level where their families would qualify for welfare and food 

stamps. 

The market is great, but we have to decide whether there is a 

role to try to tame the excesses of the market so people have a 

chance not to be destitute basically, and that is really what we are 

talking about in this legislation. The system has gotten so far out 

of whack where if management can come in and say we are free 

to cut your pay in half and we are free to your take your pension 

but you can’t strike in response and you can’t come after us after 

we breach your agreement, that is about the most one-sided thing 

that I have seen in the 23 years I have practiced labor law. That 

is all I can say about it. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. I am interested in getting your thoughts about the 

ramifications of the Second Circuit’s recent ruling that enjoined 

airlines employees from striking. 

Mr. MIGLIORE. Legally I think it is wrong, and I have stated in 

my written testimony why under section 6 of the Railway Labor 

Act we think the Second Circuit got it 100 percent incorrect and 

under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 

Putting aside the technicalities of it, the practical import of that 

decision I cannot state more clearly how much that is going to negatively affect going forward the ability to get anything done consensually in 1113. That is what 1113 was designed for in 1984. The 

Congress looked at the Bildisco decision and said that looks pretty 

one-sided and we need to fix it. So they put the 1113 procedures 

in effect. Perhaps they were not as specific as they could have been 

and should have been. We are trying to deal with that. But now 

the Second Circuit comes along and says going forward in 1113, 

employees won’t have the right to strike. It has been unquestioned 

when someone tears up the agreement saying you have to come to 

work, you have the right to respond by saying I’m not going to 

work because you just tore up my agreement. Now the Second Circuit says no, you have to go to work, and when they tore up your 

agreement, you don’t get any breach damages for them breaching. 

It wasn’t really a breach. The court bailed you out with an abrogation, so we are going to let that go. The bottom line is management 

has no intent of negotiating in light of that decision because they 

can say they can’t come after us. They can’t threaten to strike or 

come after us to try to get compensation for breaching their labor 

agreement, so why should we do anything other than tell you this 

is what you are going to take and you are going to take it or we 

are going to—you know, and do the typical threat routine that they 

do. 

Everybody on this Committee, that decision is going to totally 

decimate any ability to negotiate anything under 1113. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Mr. Bernstein, in 2005, the Bankruptcy Code was 

amended to stop CEOs and other top executives from giving themselves lucrative bonuses and other compensation at the same time 

that they are using the bankruptcy process to slash wages and benefits and jobs for rank and file workers. And from the testimony 

134 

and some of the examples we have heard today, it appears some 

of those abuses are still continuing. I am interested in knowing 

whether you think Congress should tighten the law to stop those 

kinds of abuses from happening, or do you not think they are 

abuses? 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. I would question the premise as to whether the 

system is rife with abuse. I think the reality is that the system is 

rife with very difficult problems to solve, and each side having 

some leverage and bargained solutions being the result. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Do you think there is leverage in the case that Mr. 

Migliore talked about where they can basically say, ‘‘We don’t have 

to honor this collective bargaining agreement; and, by the way, you 

still have to come to work and you can’t strike and, by the way, 

you don’t get damages for us not upholding our end of the collective 

bargaining agreement?’’ Do you think there is leverage there? 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Let me provide a little background and context 

about the Northwest Airlines case which our firm represented the 

airline in because the full story hasn’t come out. 

Northwest had negotiations like all other airlines do with all of 

its labor unions. It made a deal with all but one of its labor unions. 

They all negotiated solutions and those were approved. I am leaving out some of the details. It then made a deal with the flight attendants union as well. The members of the flight attendants union 

then rejected their own union’s deal. So there was briefing and litigation filed with respect to that one union. The flight attendants 

also made a deal, but twice their own membership rejected their 

union’s agreement. The union in its own brief referred to its own 

members as recalcitrant employees because they wouldn’t accept 

the negotiated solution. It was clear, I think it is fair to say, to everybody in that case that if the flight attendants union had struck 

the airline it would have destroyed the airline. It is in that context 

that the strike was enjoined where the airline made a deal with all 

of its unions. With respect to the flight attendants, it met an extraordinarily high standard showing that the modifications that is 

implemented were essential for the airline to survive and reorganize, that it had made a good faith, fair and equitable proposal, 

and that the union had wrongfully refused the proposal. Those 

were all the findings that were made. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Let me follow up with a question. Do you think 

there are instances in which it would be appropriate for people to 

be able to strike, or do you think—do you agree that it is a good 

thing that employees be forbidden from striking? 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. There is a difference in the law between NLR 

cases and RLA cases. The Second Circuit case was only an RLA 

case, so it involves railways and airlines, and the law is different 

for other airlines. 

But in terms of the policy question that you asked, my personal 

view is that the bankruptcy court, the way to achieve balance here 

is that the bankruptcy court should be able to enjoin a strike but 

only in those situations where the court finds that the strike would 

be likely to destroy the reorganization and therefore destroy the 

company. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Let me ask you this sort of fundamental question. 

Why shouldn’t all participants in Chapter 11 cases, including CEOs 

135 

and other managerial types, share the pain that the line workers 

have to endure over the course of a company’s financial restructuring? And my second question is with respect to what we talked 

about earlier with respect to time deadlines and once a company 

has returned to profitability, why there is no sort of renegotiation 

of the concessions that were made to help the company out while 

it was struggling? 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. On the first question, the sharing the pain issue, 

there are many cases where not only senior management but midlevel management and salaried employees have suffered substantial pay and benefit cuts. The way to structure compensation—— 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. A follow-up question, sorry. Were their pensions 

wiped out entirely? Has that happened to middle managers where 

a whole class of middle managers’ pensions were wiped out completely in a restructuring? Are you aware of any cases where that 

has happened? 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. I can’t think of a case offhand, but there are 

many cases I know of where the middle level managers didn’t have 

any pension benefits. 

Look, I understand it is appealing to say that labor took a 20 

percent pay cut and so management should take a 20 percent pay 

cut or something like that, but it ignores economic reality. What 

you have to do is pay every employee group at as close as possible 

to a market competitive level. So you should not pay union workers 

below market because otherwise they will leave and get jobs elsewhere. Similarly, you cannot pay middle level management materially below market, or they will get another job. And the same is 

true for the chief executive officer. If you pay him half of what the 

market is, and he has the risk of working for a Chapter 11 debtor, 

he will get a job somewhere else. So for every employee group, from 

the assembly line worker to the accountant to the clerical employee 

to the CEO, you need to pay that employee as close as the company 

can to a market-competitive wage, and then you have to look at the 

aggregate and make sure that it is not beyond the ability of the 

company to survive. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. I understand where you are coming from. I am not 

sure that I necessarily agree 100 percent with what you have just 

said. What about the issue of companies that return to profitability 

and employees are stuck in the same concessions and there is no 

renegotiation to try to help restore them a little bit to where they 

were since they are working hard to make sure that the company 

got back to profitability? 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. So this goes to the 2-year limitation provision in 

the bill that is intended to address the issue that you have identified. The problem is that when a company is undertaking a restructuring in Chapter 11, it typically needs new capital, new debt financing and new investment, new equity financing. And in order 

to do that, it needs to make projections about its future cost structure and it can’t make those projections over only a 2-year period. 

Nobody is going to put hundreds of millions of dollars into a company based on a cost structure that is only going to exist for the 

next 2 years without the slightest notion what is going to happen 

after the next 2 years. So a company in order to reorganize and attract new capital is going to have to make a business plan that inVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:14 Mar 05, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00139 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\COMM\060508\42723.000 HJUD1 PsN: 42723
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cludes its cost structure, one part which is the labor cost structure, 

over a much longer period of time than 2 years in order to be able 

to reorganize. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Do you think 7 years is fair? 

Mr. BERNSTEIN. Under some circumstances it may well be necessary to have a 7-year cost structure, including 7 year labor cost 

structure, in order to attract the new capital that is necessary in 

order to reorganize a company. 

These new outside investors who put money into Chapter 11 

have a lot of choices on what to do with their money. And unlike 

the creditors who are already stuck in the case, they have no obligation to this company. They have a choice whether they want to 

make an investment or not. And they are only going to make an 

investment if the company looks like it has a reasonable prospect 

of being profitable, and not only for a 2-year period. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Thank you. My time has long since expired, and 

I recognize Mr. Cannon. 

Mr. CANNON. Thank you. What Mr. Bernstein has said was eloquent and right to point on all factors, and direct to the fact that 

what we do here is actually complicated and we need to be 

thoughtful as we move forward. 

Let me just say as a matter of summary that what we really 

want in Congress on this Committee and what we do on this Committee as part of all Congress is create an environment in which 

a robust economy emerges, less regulation, less interference, more 

market control. I think we have proved that out over a long period 

of time in American history. When that happens, everyone in the 

system, and Mr. Bernstein eloquently pointed out, you can’t pay 

labor, the union members, less than market because people will 

leave. What we really want is a robust market so people have jobs. 

The reason that middle managers tend not to get the outrageous 

benefits that we talked about earlier is because there are a lot 

more of those people and it is easier to fill those jobs. It is hard 

to fill the senior jobs. What we need to do is have a robust market 

and create a legal context in which we can have continuity of businesses that get in trouble, but a robust economy so that other companies can emerge. 

Much of the discussion we had here today is about two really 

troubled industries, the airline industry and the auto industry. And 

we have had minor discussions about some other companies like 

Enron. But basically they are troubled industries, and they are 

troubled for reasons that are way beyond bankruptcy, and yet we 

are looking at those cases as though they can tell us something 

about how the whole market can work, recognizing that these are 

huge dislocations that are happening in the airline industry and 

the automobile industry. We as Congress need to step back and say 

what do we do so we optimize the opportunity for entrepreneurial, 

innovative people to come in and save those industries, and what 

can we do in the environment to create more opportunity for more 

jobs. It seems to me that is where we need to go. 

I think that in this case with bankruptcy reform we need to be 

very, very thoughtful because companies plan long into the future, 

and capital has many, many choices. One of the really disturbing 

things about our oil imports and the money we are spending on oil 

137 

coming to American is the depreciation of the American dollar, and 

in the process the benefit that countries that have the oil and other 

currencies are benefiting and drawing capital away from what we 

would be doing here. 

If we are going to retain our status as the premier economy in 

the world, we need to do it by attracting capital, and what we do 

on this panel with this bill is remarkably important in that regard. 

I yield back. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. I do have two last questions that I would like to 

ask, and so we will start the third round. I wanted to give Ms. 

Friedman an opportunity to answer some questions. 

It appears to me that there are circumstances when bankruptcy 

seems to be inevitable for certain companies, but if I am not mistaken, I also heard testimony that companies sort of look prospectively to the threat of bankruptcy at least to exact concessions from 

their labor force. 

Ms. Friedman, why are more and more companies seeking to 

shed their pension obligations in Chapter 13? 

Ms. FRIEDMAN. More and more companies are trying to shed 

their pension responsibilities in general. 

Before you said this seemed to be a union versus management 

issue. The Pension Rights Center hears from thousands of whitecollar employees throughout the country whose pensions are also 

being cut back. And I would like to say there is going to be a pension revolution, as I like to say, among green pants wearing, Izodwearing, golf toting people, too, because they are equally angry 

about this. 

Mr. CANNON. Madam Chair, if the witness will yield, let me just 

point out, when I was talking about the conflict between union and 

nonunion, that was not related to pensions, which you are clearly 

right. They are way beyond that issue. 

Ms. FRIEDMAN. I think a lot of this is both through shareholder 

pressure but also creditor pressure. There has been pressure on 

companies to shed pension obligations. And in this book which I 

would highly recommend called ‘‘Pension Dumping’’ by Fran Hawthorne, who is a New York Times reporter, formerly a reporter 

with Institutional Investor, she points out that in some situations 

you have companies that don’t want to necessarily terminate the 

plan and what they call ‘‘vulture investors’’ are forcing them to do 

so. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. I am going to interrupt. Can you explain that phenomenon about vulture investors? 

Ms. FRIEDMAN. Just in terms of creditors and probably—and Babette can do a better job, but creditors in bankruptcy court who put 

pressure on the judge saying we are not going to give financing to 

this company unless these billions of dollars of pension obligations 

are eliminated. The reality is both companies and employees used 

to look at pensions as being sacrosanct. It is not just that employers are providing these pensions, workers give up wages so that 

employers can put money into these defined benefit plans with the 

expectation of getting a certain benefit. 

It has only been in the last 10 years or so where we have seen 

this restructuring mania where suddenly companies have recognized that they can walk into a bankruptcy court, dump their penVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:14 Mar 05, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00141 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\COMM\060508\42723.000 HJUD1 PsN: 42723
138 

sion liabilities onto the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, and 

so basically the PBGC gets stuck with this huge bill. And in its defense, PBGC does the best job possible. Congress has authorized 

them to pay certain benefits, and some of them are not paid out. 

So there is a maximum benefit and because of that workers who 

either their pensions go beyond that maximum—and there are 

other benefit levels that I talk about in my statement that are not 

insured. Basically who gets hurt in this situation? The creditors get 

paid off. The employers can emerge at least in the short term from 

bankruptcy as a profitable company. But who is getting hurt? It is 

the workers. The workers, who have no other chance of getting 

these benefits. And I think a good point to make in this is when 

creditors lend money to a corporation they know there are risks involved. But when employees in good faith take a job and are told 

hey, you meet your end of the bargain, you work for us and in exchange for doing your work we give you wages, but not just wages 

but also deferred compensation in the form of pensions, they rely 

on that. They have been loyal to the company and expect loyalty 

in return. 

They are not expecting that one day, because a company wants 

to restructure, the company will go into the bankruptcy court and 

just be able to dump these liabilities. So it is really unfair to workers, which is why I think the bill we are discussing today has reasonable provisions to allow an individual to go back, to have a 

claim in bankruptcy court, and this is basically just a very modest 

provision, just to allow them to say hey, I didn’t get all that I was 

promised that I worked for all of these years, so I have a chance 

to get back the difference between what the PBGC provides and 

what I earned. I think that is a highly reasonable provision. 

But again, as I said before, and there was also a quote in this 

from David Walker, who is the former Government Accountability 

Office Executive Director, who said there used to be a stain on 

bankruptcy and it is just not there any more. 

So we have to go back to respecting workers and we have got to 

go back and say if people are giving themselves to companies, they 

should get what they expect. 

I have a lot that I wanted to say. Two more things. We have to 

keep in mind that defined benefit plans are the most efficient and 

best way of providing guaranteed adequate income to workers 

when they retire. And as much as 401(k) plans are a good supplemental source of income, they were never meant to be the whole 

enchilada. And in the context of bankruptcies, a defined benefit 

plan has the backup of the PBGC, so even in the worst situation 

people will get something. 

But in an Enron where you have this corporate abuse that could 

happen again, and we are looking at all of these situations like 

Bear Stearns, which could be the next one to go, those workers are 

plum out of luck. 

I just wanted to makes those points. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Thank you. My time has expired. Mr. Cannon. 

Mr. CANNON. Creditors have rights and a certain role in bankruptcy which you have referred to as vulture capital, and that is 

free capital. That is something that has no obligation in bankVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:14 Mar 05, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00142 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\COMM\060508\42723.000 HJUD1 PsN: 42723
139 

ruptcy and it only comes in if the conditions are appropriate; is 

that right? 

Ms. FRIEDMAN. I am quoting from this book that was written by 

Fran Hawthorne as one example of this. I think there are a lot of 

pressures on companies to be able to restructure. We understand 

that there is pressures on companies. I think where the Pension 

Rights Center would come down on this is to say are there any 

other places where a company can cut costs besides getting rid of 

the long-term pension plan and hurting workers. 

Mr. CANNON. Clearly that is the objective to cut costs all of the 

way around, and a company that wants to come out of bankruptcy 

is going to put together a plan that does that. I don’t think of them 

as vulture capital. The fact is that if you are in trouble and in 

bankruptcy, you are going to pay a higher rate. And the people who 

want to take on that kind of risk are willing to do it. 

What I want is an environment where you minimize the regulatory risk or the court’s discretionary risk so that more capital 

comes in and we reduce the cost and so reduce the program. 

My other point is if a company goes out of business, then there 

is no pension funding. If it liquidates whatever assets are available 

go to the creditors in priority and the pension ends up with whatever assets it has and whatever incremental obligations that are 

owed to that pension fund by the company, either assets remaining, that goes to the pension fund. But generally speaking, there 

are few assets available to fund an underfunded pension; isn’t that 

the case? 

Ms. FRIEDMAN. When a company terminates that is in distress, 

when the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation takes over that 

company, it will have a claim against the company to make sure 

that PBGC pays a certain level of benefits that have been authorized by Congress to do so. When there is additional money, the 

PBGC will go after that money. And in some situations, it is not 

very often, the PBGC is able to collect enough money to pay everybody all of their benefits. 

Mr. CANNON. Pensioners are much better off if that company can 

come out of bankruptcy and fund its pension liabilities, and is better for the PBGC. The purpose of bankruptcy is in part to protect 

pensions. 

Ms. FRIEDMAN. In most cases what the companies have done is 

terminate the plan. There are situations like in United where they 

were able to set up a multi-employer plan after they terminated 

the first plan. But in many cases after a company terminates its 

plan, it is just going to set up a 401(k) plan. Every study shows 

that there is no way that a 401(k) plan in any situation is going 

to be able to make up the difference of what is lost in the defined 

benefit plan, particularly for older employees. 

Mr. CANNON. Clearly if you have older employees who end up 

with a 401(k), they have less time to build that 401(k). But I will 

just tell you that in the long term I think that it is pretty clear 

that 401(k)s where people have control of that 401(k) are going to 

be happier. The problem with Enron is you had people that 

didn’t—the whole pension fund was the company stock. So if you 

had individuals with the ability to choose their own risk profile, 

140 

typically then we would be better off, I believe. But that transcends 

the scope of this hearing, I think. 

Ms. FRIEDMAN. Knowing that, in all deference, I would like to 

talk to you more about that, Congressman. But just so you know, 

right now half of all 401(k) accounts have about $27,000 in them. 

And even for people between 45 and 65, the median account balance is about $60,000. 

So going back to my white-collar employees, I think most people 

that we deal with actually think that 401(k)s are a poor substitute 

for defined benefit. 

Mr. CANNON. Society is evolving dramatically. In many cases 

401(k)s worked very well, but it is an evolution. 

If I were young and just starting a career, I would probably be 

very chary of a corporate defined benefit plan as opposed to my 

own directed 401(k). 

But that is it, Madam Chair. I yield back. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. The gentleman yields back. I think that one of the 

points that should not get lost here is that defined benefit pension 

plans can be wiped out, whereas other CEOs and top executives 

walk away with significant bonuses and other types of compensation that I think really illustrates some of the problems that we 

have been talking about today. 

I do have two opening statements that I am going to ask unanimous consent to insert into the record. One was the Chairman’s 

opening statement and one was from Ms. Sutton who is a Member 

of the full Judiciary Committee. So without objection, those are entered into the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Conyers follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN CONYERS, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, AND MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Bankruptcy—and Chapter 11 in particular—is intended to give all participants an 

opportunity to work out their economic differences with the shared goal of maximizing the return for all. 

So much for theory. Now here’s the reality. 

It is abundantly clear that the rights of workers and retirees have greatly eroded 

over the past two decades, particularly in the context of Chapter 11. Let me just 

cite three reasons. 

First, it is no secret that some of our courts interpret the law to favor the reorganization of a business over all other priorities, including job preservation, salary 

protections, and other important interests. Part of the problem is that the law is 

simply not clear, leading to a split of authority among the circuits. 

This is particularly true with respect to the standards by which collective bargaining agreements can be rejected and retiree benefits can be modified in Chapter 

11. 

Businesses are aware of this, and take advantage of their venue options and file 

their Chapter 11 cases in employer-friendly districts. According to the American 

Bankruptcy Institute, this is among the reasons that Delphi, a Michiganheadquartered company, filed for bankruptcy in New York. 

Second, some businesses are using Chapter 11 to bust unions, or to at least give 

their management unfair leverage in its negotiations with unions. These companies 

also use Chapter 11 to take advantage of section 1114, which allows employers to 

modify retiree benefits. 

Let me be specific here. What we are talking about is terminating retiree health 

care benefits, medical benefits, prescription drug benefits, disability benefits, and 

death benefits, among other protections. 

Remember that these benefits were bargained for by Americans who gave their 

all to their employers and now are in retirement. Jettisoning them in Chapter 11, 

141 

for the sake of allowing the company who made these commitments to shed them 

and go on its merry way, is a travesty. 

Third, as a result of Chapter 11’s inequitable playing field, the top company executives are all too often not making the same sacrifices. 

As the Subcommittee was told at a hearing last year, while a company is using 

Chapter 11 to extract drastic pay cuts and benefit reductions from workers and retirees, or take away their jobs and benefits entirely, company executives may receive 

extravagant multi-million-dollar bonuses and stock options. 

Even though we tried to stop excessive executive compensation in Chapter 11 by 

amending the Bankruptcy Code in 2005, creative practitioners have already found 

loopholes to exploit, and the problem still continues. 

And this disparity is not limited to companies who are actually in bankruptcy. As many of you know, the Ford Motor Company reported a record $12.7 billion loss for 

2006. But what many of you may not know is that Ford paid $28 million to its new 

CEO, Alan Mulally, in his first four months on the job. 

Enough is enough. In response to these problems, I introduced H.R. 3652, the 

‘‘Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2007,’’ to guarantee that workers and retirees are treated more fairly in Chapter 11 cases. It does 

that by: 

• requiring greater oversight and approval of all forms of excessive executive 

compensation; 

• ensuring earned wages and severance payments are accorded their proper 

payment priority; 

• requiring the bankruptcy court to take into account a company’s foreign assets before allowing the debtor to break its collective bargaining agreements 

with its American workers, or to modify its retirees’ health benefits. 

Most importantly, H.R. 3652 restores procedural and substantive balance with respect to how employees and retirees are treated in Chapter 11. 

In the last nine years, Congress went to great lengths to grant advantages to 

creditors and big business interests over ordinary Americans. It is time that we return to including the interests of working families in the bankruptcy law, and consider how we can add a measure of fairness to a playing field that is overwhelmingly tilted against workers. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sutton follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BETTY SUTTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO, AND MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Madam Chairwoman, I was proud to introduce H.R. 3652 with you and Chairman 

Conyers last fall. Thank you for holding this important hearing today and thank you 

to our distinguished witnesses for appearing before us to testify about inequities in 

our nation’s bankruptcy laws. 

Before coming to Congress, I served as a labor lawyer in Northeast Ohio where 

I represented workers fighting for fair wages and benefits. I have seen firsthand the 

toll that blatant disregard for workers’ rights can take on our families and communities. 

We introduced this bill last fall during a turbulent time for our nation’s working 

families and our economy, which sadly continues to this day. 

From the mortgage foreclosure crisis and skyrocketing energy and food prices to 

unfair trade practices, American workers are under siege. They face cuts to their 

wages and healthcare, all while facing the constant fear that their jobs will be 

shipped overseas. 

When executed fairly, bankruptcy allows companies in distress to reorganize and 

successfully continue in business. But too often, companies have commandeered the 

bankruptcy process as a business strategy to achieve labor parity with competitors 

at the expense of American workers. 

Republic Technologies International (RTI), a steel company located in my district, 

filed for bankruptcy in 2001. Its pension benefit plan was underfunded, resulting 

in the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) stepping in to become the 

trustee of the fund in 2003. 

The pension benefits that were promised by RTI exceed the legal amounts that 

can be assumed by PBGC, and now PBGC is recouping overpayments that were 

errantly made by reducing each worker’s monthly pension benefits. 

This is a troubling example of how the bankruptcy process is failing to protect 

American workers when their companies are struggling or are forced out of business. 

142 

In its current form, the bankruptcy code allows businesses to sign collective bargaining agreements and then abrogate them at will, slashing wages and benefits. 

This tactic contradicts reason, and exhibits utter disregard for the welfare of American working families and it should be stopped. 

H.R. 3652 provides a new model for bankruptcy that works for American workers 

and businesses. Businesses on the verge of collapse will be able to recover, while 

workers, the backbone of the American economy, will still be treated honestly and 

fairly. 

I hope we are able to move forward on this bill in the near future. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. I want to thank all of the witnesses for their 

thoughtful testimony today. 

Without objection, Members will have 5 legislative days to submit any additional written questions, which we will forward to the 

witnesses and ask that you answer them as promptly as you can 

so they will be made part of the record. And without objection, the 

record will remain open for 5 legislative days for submission of additional materials. 

Again, I want to thank everyone for their time, and this Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:09 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

Æ