SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2763-17T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LAWRENCE D. THOMAS, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________

Submitted March 11, 2019 – Decided March 21, 2019

Before Judges Fasciale and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 12-01-0191.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Louis H. Miron, Designated Counsel, on the 

brief).

Dennis Calo, Acting Bergen County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Marky A. Suazo, Special 

Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, 

of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant appeals from a July 24, 2017 order denying his petition for 

post-conviction relief (PCR). Defendant contends that his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance by failing to call "many" witnesses and by "pressur[ing]" 

defendant not to testify.1 We disagree and affirm.

On appeal, defendant argues:

POINT I

THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

[DEFENDANT'S] PCR PETITION BECAUSE THE 

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL 

DEPRIVED [DEFENDANT] OF A FAIR TRIAL AND 

RENDERED THE JURY'S VERDICT AS 

FUNDAMENTALLY UNRELIABLE.

POINT II

THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

[DEFENDANT'S] PCR PETITION WITHOUT 

HAVING CONDUCTED AN EVIDENTIARY 

HEARING TO ADDRESS [DEFENDANT'S] CLAIMS 

FOR WHICH HE ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE

CASE IN SUPPORT OF THE INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

We conclude that defendant's contentions lack sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm substantially for the 

 

1

 We affirmed defendant's drug and weapons convictions, State v. Thomas, No. 

A-3735-12 (App. Div. Jan. 13, 2015), and the Supreme Court denied defendant's 

petition for certification.
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reasons set forth by Judge Christopher R. Kazlau in his well-reasoned and 

thorough oral decision spanning twenty-nine pages in the transcript dated July 

10, 2017. We add the following brief remarks.

A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only when he "has 

presented a prima facie [case] in support of [PCR]," State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 

89, 158 (1997) (first alteration in original) (quoting State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 

451, 462 (1992)), meaning that a "defendant must demonstrate a reasonable 

likelihood that his . . . claim will ultimately succeed on the merits." Ibid. For a 

defendant to obtain relief based on ineffective assistance grounds, he is obliged 

to show not only the particular manner in which counsel's performance was 

deficient, but also that the deficiency prejudiced his right to a fair trial. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); accord State v. Fritz, 105 

N.J. 42, 58 (1987). We conclude that defendant failed to demonstrate a 

reasonable likelihood that his PCR claim will ultimately succeed on the merits. 

And we conclude further that defendant has failed to satisfy either prong of 

Strickland.

Defendant's trial counsel called two witnesses: one of defendant's sisters 

(the sister) and defendant's lifelong friend (the friend), who was arrested with 

defendant on the date of the incident. The PCR certifications of his other sister, 
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mother, and other friend assert that defendant did not live at the residence, which 

is what the sister and friend said at trial. Thus, they would not have added any 

new facts. Instead, they would have reiterated the testimony of the sister and 

the friend. Even if trial counsel should have called the three witnesses – which 

is not the case – there is no "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Contrary to defendant's contention, trial counsel did not dissuade him 

from testifying. During the trial, the judge questioned defendant on the record 

to determine whether defendant was knowingly and voluntarily waiving his right 

to testify:

Judge: You understand that you have the absolute right 

to testify or not to testify in any [c]ourt proceeding?

Defendant: I understand.

Judge: Okay. Now, [trial counsel] has provided legal 

advice to you, but ultimately the decision is yours to 

make. You could testify or not testify. It has been 

explained to you that once you are on the stand any 

prior convictions can be used to impeach your 

credibility.

Defendant: Yes, sir. 
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Judge: Understood? And as a result of this, this has 

become part of what you might call a trial strategy for 

you not to testify?

Defendant: Yes, sir.

Judge: In consultation with [trial counsel] you have 

made this decision?

Defendant: Yes, I understand.

Defendant conceded that the decision about whether to testify was solely his and 

that he knew if he testified, his prior convictions would be evidential. We 

conclude that defendant's election not to testify was knowing, voluntary, and 

without any evidence of pressure or coercion.

Affirmed.