[Cite as State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-1273.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 108438 

 v. : 

 

JUMAINE JONES, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED 

 IN PART; REMANDED 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 2, 2020 

 

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case Nos. CR-17-614411-A and CR-17-614412-A 

 

Appearances: 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Gittel L. Chaiko, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Erin R. Flanagan, Esq., Ltd. and Erin R. Flanagan, for 

appellant. 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.: 

Defendant-appellant Jumaine Jones appeals from the trial court’s 

orders in Cuyahoga C.P. Nos. CR-17-614411 (“614411”) and CR-17-614412 (“614412”) 

imposing previously suspended jail sentences and ordering Jones to pay $2,532.30 
in extradition costs after Jones violated community control sanctions. For the 

reasons that follow, in 614412, we vacate Jones’ consecutive sentences and remand 

for resentencing. In both cases, we vacate the trial court’s orders requiring Jones to 

pay extradition costs. We otherwise affirm the trial court. 

Procedural History and Factual Background 

On February 16, 2017, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Jones 

in 614411 and 614412. In 614411, Jones was indicted on two counts of criminal 

nonsupport in violation of R.C. 2919.21(B). In 614412, Jones was indicted on four 

counts of criminal nonsupport in violation of R.C. 2919.21(B). The charges related 

to Jones’ failure to pay child support for two minor children. Each of the counts 

included furthermore specifications, indicating that Jones had failed to provide 

child support for a total accumulated period of 26 weeks out of 104 consecutive 

weeks, making them fifth-degree felonies. Jones initially pled not guilty to all 

charges. 

The parties reached a plea agreement and, on August 14, 2018, Jones 

pled guilty to two amended counts of criminal nonsupport in violation of R.C. 

2919.21(B) in 614411 and four amended counts of criminal nonsupport in violation 

of R.C. 2919.21(B) in 614412. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the specifications 

were deleted, making each of the counts a first-degree misdemeanor. 

The trial court proceeded directly to sentencing. The trial court 

sentenced Jones to six months in jail on each count and suspended his jail sentences. 
In its August 14, 2018 sentencing journal entry in 614411, the trial court stated: 

“Jones is sentenced to the Cuyahoga County Jail for a term of 12 month(s). 

Execution of sentence suspended.” In its August 14, 2018 sentencing journal entry 

in 614412, the trial court stated: “Jones is sentenced to the Cuyahoga County Jail for 

a term of 24 month(s). Execution of sentence suspended.” After suspending his 

sentences, the trial court sentenced Jones to five years of community control 

sanctions1 under the supervision of the adult probation department’s nonsupport 

unit. The trial court advised Jones that if he failed to comply with the terms and 

conditions of his community control sanctions, he would “be sent to the county jail 

for six months on each of these counts.” The trial court also ordered Jones to pay 

restitution of $199,803.79 and $1,581.31 per month in child support in 614411, 

restitution of $128,303.38 and $1,795.72 per month in child support in 614412 and 

entered judgment against Jones in both cases “in an amount equal to the costs of 

this prosecution.” 

Jones did not object to, or appeal, his sentences. On August 15, 2018, 

Jones was granted permission to travel. Jones failed to comply with the terms and 

conditions of his community control sanctions and the trial court scheduled a 

 1 The terms and conditions of Jones’ community control sanctions were as follows: 

(1) abide by all rules and regulations of the probation department; (2) be assigned to 

appropriate level of supervision based on risk score and assessment results; (3) report as 

directed by the probation officer; (4) attend nonsupport programming as determined by 

the probation officer; (5) attend additional programming as directed by the probation 

officer or indicated in case plan; (6) make monthly child support payments as directed; 

(7) pay a monthly supervision fee of $20; and (8) comply with drug and alcohol testing as 

determined by the probation officer. These terms and conditions were subject to 

modification by the probation officer with court approval. 
community control violation hearing for November 28, 2018. When Jones failed to 

appear for the community control violation hearing, a capias was issued for his 

arrest. On March 24, 2019, Jones was apprehended at McCarren Airport in Las 

Vegas, Nevada and extradited to Cuyahoga County. 

On April 9, 2019, the trial court held a community control violation 

hearing. Jones’ probation officer stated that during the time Jones was under 

community control sanctions he had failed to make any child support payments, had 

not complied with his reporting obligations to his probation officer and had 

outstanding fees and costs that he owed to the court. Jones admitted these 

community control violations. 

The trial court found Jones to have violated his community control 

sanctions, determined that he was not amenable to further community control 

sanctions, terminated his community control sanctions and imposed the previously 

suspended sentences. In 614411, the trial court sentenced Jones to an aggregate 12-

month jail sentence, i.e., six months in the Cuyahoga County jail on each of the two 

counts to be served consecutively to each other and concurrently with the sentences 

in 614412. 

In 614412, at the April 9, 2019 hearing, the trial court sentenced Jones 

to an aggregate 24-month jail sentence, i.e., six months in the Cuyahoga County jail 

on each of the four counts to be served consecutively to each other and concurrently 

with the sentences in 614411. In its April 15, 2019 sentencing journal entry, the trial 
court added that “70 days” of Jones’ sentence was “suspended” and that his 

“aggregate total sentence is reduced to less than 18 months per statute.” 

In both cases, the trial court granted Jones 104 days of jail-time 

credit, ordered him to pay $2,532.30 in “extradition fees” or “extradition costs”2 and 

entered judgment against him “in an amount equal to the costs of this prosecution.” 

Jones did not object to trial court’s assessment of the extradition expenses against 

him. 

Jones appealed, raising the following three assignments of error for 

review: 

First Assignment of Error: The trial court erred when it ordered 

consecutive service of the jail terms imposed within Case Numbers CR17-614411 and CR-17-614412 after revoking appellant’s community 

control because it was without authority to modify its prior sentencing 

judgments, which did not validly impose consecutive sentences. 

Second Assignment of Error: The trial court abused its discretion in 

sentencing appellant to maximum consecutive terms of imprisonment 

for failure to adhere strictly to the terms of his criminal nonsupport 

orders. 

Third Assignment of Error: The trial court plainly erred in ordering 

appellant to pay $2,532.30 in “extradition fees” after finding him 

indigent and, further, sentencing him as a misdemeanant. 

 2 In its April 15, 2019 sentencing journal entry in 614411, the trial court referred to 

the sum as “extradition costs.” In its April 15, 2019 sentencing journal entry in 614412, 

the trial court referred to the $2,532.30 as “extradition fees.” At the sentencing hearing, 

the trial judge stated: “I’m going to order the extradition costs to be paid as well, 

[$]2532.30. Reimbursement for extradition costs through our court.” He later 

distinguished the “extradition costs” from “court costs.” The trial court did not identify 

the statutory or other legal basis pursuant to which it was ordering Jones to pay the 

extradition expenses at the April 9, 2019 hearing or in its April 15, 2109 sentencing journal 

entries. 
Law and Analysis 

Imposition of Consecutive Sentences 

Jones’ first two assignments of error address the trial court’s 

imposition of “maximum consecutive” jail sentences within 614411 and 614412 after 

he violated the terms of his community control sanctions.3 In his first assignment 

of error, Jones contends that the trial court lacked authority to impose consecutive 

jail sentences in April 2019 after terminating his community control sanctions 

because the trial court did not “appropriately specify” that his sentences were to be 

imposed consecutively when he was originally sentenced in August 2018. 

Specifically, Jones contends that because the trial court did not make R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4) findings in support of the imposition of consecutive sentences when 

it originally sentenced Jones in August 2018, it lacked authority to impose 

consecutive sentences when it terminated Jones’ community control sanctions and 

reimposed his previously suspended sentences in April 2019. 

In his second assignment of error, Jones contends that the trial 

court’s imposition of “maximum consecutive terms of imprisonment” for “failure to 

adhere strictly to the terms of his criminal nonsupport orders” after terminating his 

community control sanctions was “unreasonable” and an abuse of discretion 

because (1) “no one is protected by — or benefits from [Jones’] extended 

incarceration”; (2) “it bars [Jones] from fulfilling his monetary obligations” and 

 3 Jones has not challenged the individual sentences imposed by the trial court. 

Accordingly, we do not address his individual sentences here. 
“does far more damage to the children and their mothers * * * when [Jones] has the 

desire and means to earn money to meet his obligations”; (3) is not necessary to 

protect the public from future crime by Jones or others because Jones “has no other 

children”; and (4) it “subjects him to a heavy punishment for actively and earnestly 

trying, but failing, to succeed.” 

Challenges to Sentences Imposed in 614411 

As an initial matter, we note that Jones’ first and second assignments 

of error are moot as to 614411. In these assignments of error, Jones challenges only 

the length of his sentences. In 614411, Jones was sentenced to an aggregate 12-

month jail term with 104 days of jail-time credit. There is no indication in the record 

that this sentence was stayed pending appeal. Accordingly, Jones has already served 

this sentence, and his assigned errors challenging his sentences in 614411 are, 

therefore, moot.4 See, e.g., State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107277, 2019-

 4 We note that in State v. Christian, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-828, the Ohio 

Supreme Court recently held that a defendant may be resentenced “on a specific count 

after the sentence related to that count has been vacated on direct appeal” 

notwithstanding that the defendant has already “been confined for the length of the 

original term that had been attached to that count.” Id. at ¶ 1. The court reasoned that 

“because a defendant in these circumstances has no expectation of finality in the original 

sentence once it has been vacated on direct appeal, the trial court has the ability to 

resentence the defendant de novo.” Id. We do not believe that Christian governs the 

circumstances here. In Christian, the individual sentences on several counts were vacated 

in the direct appeal. Id. at ¶ 1, 5. Because those sentences had been vacated, the court 

held that the trial court had the authority to resentence the defendant de novo on those 

counts. Id. at ¶ 18, 29. In this case, Jones has not challenged his individual sentences, 

only the consecutive nature of his sentences. Even if Jones were otherwise entitled to the 

relief he seeks in 614411, any resentencing would be limited to the consecutive nature of 

the sentences; it would not be a de novo resentencing. Because there is no relief this court 

could give Jones even if it were to find that consecutive sentences should not have been 

imposed with respect to the sentences within 614411, i.e., because he has already served 
Ohio-1126, ¶ 2, 13 (“‘If an individual has already served his sentence, there is no 

collateral disability of loss of civil rights that can be remedied by a modification of 

the length of that sentence in the absence of a reversal of the underlying 

conviction.’”), quoting State v. Beamon, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2000-L-160, 2001 Ohio 

App. LEXIS 5655, 4 (Dec. 14, 2001); State v. Oglesby, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C180177 and C-180178, 2019-Ohio-1456, ¶ 19-20 (where defendant challenged only 

the imposition of consecutive sentences and not his convictions, defendant’s 

completion of his sentences, rendered the appeal moot because there was “no 

redress” the appellate court could provide). 

 Challenges to Sentences Imposed in 614412 

Turning to Jones’ challenges to the sentences imposed in 614412, this 

court generally reviews misdemeanor sentences for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., 

Lakewood v. Bretzfelder, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98925, 2013-Ohio-4477, ¶ 35; see 

also S. Euclid v. Bickerstaff, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107526, 2019-Ohio-2223, ¶ 11

(“When a misdemeanor sentence is not contrary to law, the sentence is reviewed for 

an abuse of discretion.”). We likewise review a trial court’s decision in a community 

control violation proceeding for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Oglesby at ¶ 7; State 

v. Huckaby, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-14-028, 2015-Ohio-3302, ¶ 14. A trial court 

abuses its discretion where its decision is unreasonable, arbitrary or 

 

maximum consecutive sentences in that case, his assignments of error related to those 

consecutive sentences are moot. 
unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 

(1983). 

Misdemeanor community control sanctions are governed by R.C. 

2929.25. R.C. 2929.25, in relevant part, gives a trial court two options when 

sentencing a misdemeanor offender: (1) directly impose a sentence that consists of 

a community control sanction; or (2) impose a jail sentence, suspend some or all of 

that sentence and place the offender on community control. R.C. 2929.25(A)(1)(a)-

(b). “Under either circumstance, the sentencing court retains jurisdiction over the 

offender for the duration of the sanctions imposed.” In re A.R.H., 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 18AP-554, 2019-Ohio-1325, ¶ 13, fn. 1, citing R.C. 2929.24(H) and 

2929.25(C). 

If a defendant violates a term or condition of a community control 

sanction imposed for a misdemeanor, R.C. 2929.25(D)(2) states that “the 

sentencing court may impose upon the violator one or more of the following 

penalties:” 

(a) A longer time under the same community control sanction if the 

total time under all of the community control sanctions imposed on the 

violator does not exceed the five-year limit specified in division (A)(2) 

of this section; 

(b) A more restrictive community control sanction; 

(c) A combination of community control sanctions, including a jail 

term. 

In this case, the trial court did not sentence Jones directly to 

community control sanctions. The trial court chose the second option under R.C. 

2929.25(A)(1)(b) — i.e., to impose a jail term, suspend the jail term and then place 
Jones on community control sanctions. In 614412, the trial court sentenced Jones 

to six months on each count resulting in aggregate 24-month jail sentence. It then 

suspended Jones’ sentences and placed Jones on five years of community control 

sanctions. After Jones violated the terms of his community control sanctions, the 

trial court terminated the community control sanctions and reimposed his 

previously suspended sentences. 

R.C. 2929.41(B)(1) addresses the imposition of consecutive sentences 

for misdemeanors. That provision states: 

A jail term or sentence of imprisonment for a misdemeanor shall be 

served consecutively to any other prison term, jail term, or sentence of 

imprisonment when the trial court specifies that it is to be served 

consecutively or when it is imposed for a misdemeanor violation of 

section 2907.322, 2921.34, or 2923.131 of the Revised Code. 

When consecutive sentences are imposed for misdemeanor[s] under 

this division, the term to be served is the aggregate of the consecutive 

terms imposed, except that the aggregate term to be served shall not 

exceed eighteen months. 

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) applies to the imposition of consecutive prison

terms for felony offenses, not the imposition of consecutive jail terms for 

misdemeanor offenses. See, e.g., State v. Alexander, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

102708, 2016-Ohio-204, ¶ 2 (“R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) does not apply to a conviction that 

includes consecutive service of misdemeanor jail terms. R.C. 2929.41(B) authorizes 

consecutive service of jail terms up to 18 months without findings.”); State v. Burley, 

2017-Ohio-378, 83 N.E.3d 322, ¶ 10 (7th Dist.) (“In contrast to consecutive prison 

terms for felonies imposed under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), trial courts are authorized to 
order consecutive jail terms for misdemeanor offenses (up to 18 months) without 

making consecutive sentence findings.”). Thus, contrary to Jones’ assertions, the 

trial court was not required to make R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings to impose 

consecutive sentences for his misdemeanor offenses. See, e.g., Alexander at ¶ 2; 

State v. Jefferies, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27942, 2019-Ohio-1469, ¶ 34; State v. 

Whitman, 5th Dist. Ashland Nos. 18-COA-030 and 18-COA-031, 2019-Ohio-2307, 

¶ 71; Burley at ¶ 10. To impose consecutive sentences in this case, the trial court 

simply needed to “specify” that the sentences would be served consecutively. Even 

assuming the trial court was required to “specify” that the sentences would be served 

consecutively when Jones was originally sentenced in August 2018 (rather than 

when the sentences were “reimposed” after the termination of community control 

sanctions in April 2019), the record reflects that the trial court did that here. 

In this case, when the trial court originally sentenced Jones in 614412, 

it sentenced him to six months in jail on each count. Although the trial court did not 

use the term “consecutive” sentences, it is clear from the trial court’s August 14, 2018 

sentencing journal entry — imposing an aggregate jail sentence “for a term of 24 

month(s)” — that consecutive sentences were originally “specified” as to the four 

counts in 614412. The trial court likewise “specified,” when sentencing Jones in 

April 2019, that the sentences on the four counts in 614412 were to be served 

consecutively. At the April 9, 2019 hearing, the trial court expressly stated: “Case 

614412, you pled guilty to misdemeanors in Counts 1, 2, 3 and 4, six months on 

Count 1, six months on Count 2, six months on Count 3, six months on Count 4, 
consecutive to one another. 24 months.” The trial court’s April 15, 2019 sentencing 

journal states: “It is now ordered and adjudged that said defendant Jumaine Jones 

is sentenced to the Cuyahoga County jail for a term of 24 month(s). Count 1 — 6 

months. Count 2 — 6 months. Count 3 — 6 months. Count 4 — 6 months. 70 day 

suspended. Counts to run consecutive to each other.” 

Although the trial court was not required to make R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) 

findings in order to impose consecutive sentences for Jones’ misdemeanor offenses, 

there is an issue with the consecutive sentences the trial court imposed in 614412. 

The 24-month aggregate consecutive sentence the trial court imposed at the April 9, 

2019 hearing exceeded the 18-month aggregate consecutive sentence permitted 

under R.C. 2929.41(B)(1). See State v. Pierce, 4th Dist. Meigs No. 10CA10, 2011-

Ohio-5353, ¶ 11 (vacating defendant’s sentences and remanding for resentencing 

where trial court’s aggregate misdemeanor jail sentence was 19 months “and, thus, 

exceeded the statutory maximum”). Apparently recognizing this problem, in its 

April 15, 2019 sentencing journal entry, the trial court attempted to modify the 

sentence it had imposed at the hearing by stating that “70 days” of Jones’ sentence 

was “suspended” and that his “aggregate total sentence is reduced to less than 18 

months per statute.” However, there is no statutory authority for the imposition of 

indefinite, aggregate consecutive sentences of “less than 18 months” for 

misdemeanor offenses. 

At oral argument, the state conceded that the trial court’s April 15, 

2019 sentencing journal entry requires “clarification” but claimed that the error 
could be remedied by a nunc pro tunc entry, imposing an aggregate 18-month 

sentence in accordance with R.C. 2929.41(B)(1). We disagree. While courts have 

inherent authority to correct clerical errors in judgment entries so that the record 

“speaks the truth,” nunc pro tunc entries are limited to memorializing what the trial 

court actually did, not what the trial court might have done, should have done or 

intended to do. See, e.g., State v. Hidvegi, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 108229 and 

108928, 2019-Ohio-3893, ¶ 20 (“[P]roper use of a nunc pro tunc order ‘is limited to 

memorializing what the trial court actually did at an earlier point in time, such as 

correcting a previously issued order that fails to reflect the trial court’s true action,’ 

[and] ‘not what the court might or should have decided or what the court intended 

to decide.’”), quoting State v. Spears, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94089, 2010-Ohio2229, ¶ 10, and State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 

142, ¶ 18. 

Based on the record before us and considering all of the relevant facts 

and circumstances, we believe the proper remedy is to vacate the consecutive 

sentences imposed in 614412 and remand for resentencing in that case. 

As they relate to 614411, Jones’ first and second assignments of error 

are moot. As it relates to 614412, Jones’ first assignment of error is sustained in part 

and overruled in part; based on our resolution of Jones’ first assignment of error, 

his second assignment of error is also moot as to 614412. 

 
Extradition Costs 

In his third assignment of error, Jones contends that the trial court 

committed plain error in ordering him to pay $2,532.30 in extradition costs 

associated with extraditing him from Las Vegas to Cuyahoga County, Ohio after he 

violated community control sanctions. Jones argues that the trial court lacked 

authority to order him to pay these extradition costs because (1) the trial court was 

required to impose any misdemeanor “financial sanctions” at the time of his original 

sentencing in August 2018; (2) Jones is indigent and (3) extradition costs can only 

be imposed on nonindigent felons under R.C. 2949.14. 

R.C. 2929.28 addresses the imposition of financial sanctions in 

misdemeanor cases. R.C. 2929.28(A) provides in relevant part: 

In addition to imposing court costs pursuant to section 2947.23 of the 

Revised Code, the court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a 

misdemeanor * * * to any financial sanction or combination of financial 

sanctions authorized under this section. If the court in its discretion 

imposes one or more financial sanctions, the financial sanctions that 

may be imposed pursuant to this section include, but are not limited to, 

the following: 

 

(1) Unless the misdemeanor offense is a minor misdemeanor or 

could be disposed of by the traffic violations bureau serving the 

court under Traffic Rule 13, restitution by the offender to the 

victim of the offender’s crime or any survivor of the victim, in an 

amount based on the victim’s economic loss. * * * 

(2) A fine of the type described in divisions (A)(2)(a) and (b) of 

this section payable to the appropriate entity as required by law: 

(a) A fine [limited in amount based on the degree of the 

offense] * * *. 

(b) A state fine or cost as defined in section 2949.111 of the 

Revised Code. 
(3) 

(a) Reimbursement by the offender of any or all of the 

costs of sanctions incurred by the government, including, 

but not limited to, the following: 

(i) All or part of the costs of implementing any 

community control sanction * * *; 

(ii) All or part of the costs of confinement in a jail or 

other residential facility * * * 

(iii) All or part of the cost of purchasing and using 

an immobilizing or disabling device * * *. 

The state asserts that the trial court properly ordered Jones to pay the 

extradition costs, not as a “financial sanction” under R.C. 2929.285 but as part of the 

“costs of prosecution” pursuant to R.C. 2947.23. The state further asserts that the 

costs associated with extraditing Jones from Las Vegas to Cuyahoga County for 

purposes of the community control violation hearing were properly imposed against 

Jones as part of the “costs of prosecution” because Jones had been extradited twice 

before, i.e., before Jones entered his guilty pleas in August 2018, Jones had been 

extradited twice — once from Georgia and once from Philadelphia — and Jones “had 

to pay” the “accrued fees associated with the cost of extradition” prior to pleading 

guilty.6 However, the fact that Jones may have previously reimbursed the state for 

 5 Because the state does not claim that the trial court could have properly ordered 

Jones to pay the extradition costs as “restitution” under R.C. 2929.28(A)(1), a fine or 

“state fine or cost” under R.C. 2929.28(A)(2)(a)-(b), “[r]eimbursement * * * of the costs 

of sanctions incurred by the government” under R.C. 2929.28(A)(3) or any other 

“financial sanction” authorized under R.C. 2929.28(A), we do not consider those issues 

here. 

 

6 In support of these claims, the state attaches (1) copies of two invoices from PTS 

of America, U.S. Corrections, U.S. Prison Transport to the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s 

Office dated January 6, 2018 and May 18, 2018 and (2) a copy of a check from Jones to 

the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office dated August 7, 2018 indicating that it is for 

“extradition reimbursement.” These documents were not presented to the trial court 
extradition costs as a condition of a plea agreement, pursuant to which the parties 

agreed Jones would pled guilty to misdemeanor criminal nonsupport charges 

instead of the felony nonsupport charges with which he had been originally charged, 

has no bearing on whether the trial court could order him to pay such costs in the 

absence of such an agreement. 

R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a) addresses the imposition of the “costs of 

prosecution” in criminal sentences. That section provides, in relevant part: 

In all criminal cases, including violations of ordinances, the judge or 

magistrate shall include in the sentence the costs of prosecution, 

including any costs under section 2947.231 of the Revised Code, and 

render a judgment against the defendant for such costs. 

Thus, under R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a), the trial court must assess the 

costs of prosecution against criminal defendants, including misdemeanants. 

Because the imposition of the costs of prosecution is mandatory, the trial court is 

not required to hold a hearing or otherwise determine a defendant’s ability to pay 

before ordering him or her to pay costs. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Ruiz, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 106743, 2018-Ohio-4604, ¶ 11, citing State v. Dean, 146 Ohio St.3d 

106, 2015-Ohio-4347, 54 N.E.3d 80, ¶ 231, and State v. Miller, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 106051, 2018-Ohio-2127, ¶ 22. The trial court, however, has the discretion to 

waive costs if the defendant moves for a waiver of costs. Ruiz at ¶ 13; Miller at ¶ 23; 

R.C. 2947.23(C) (“The court retains jurisdiction to waive, suspend, or modify the 

 

below and were not part of the record on appeal; therefore, they will not be considered by 

this court. 
payment of the costs of prosecution, including any costs under section 2947.231 of 

the Revised Code, at the time of sentencing or at any time thereafter.”). 

The phrase “costs of prosecution,” as used in R.C. 2947.23, has not 

been statutorily defined. Middleburg Hts. v. Quinones, 120 Ohio St.3d 534, 2008-

Ohio-6811, 900 N.E.2d 1005, ¶ 8. However, it has often been used interchangeably 

with “court costs.” See, e.g., R.C. 2929.28(A) (referring to the “costs of prosecution” 

imposed under R.C. 2947.23 as “court costs”); see also State v. Rice, 2d Dist. Greene 

No. 2011-CA-74, 2012-Ohio-4084, ¶ 7 (‘“costs of prosecution’ and ‘court costs’ have 

been found to be synonymous”); State v. Christy, 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-04-04, 

2004-Ohio-6963, ¶ 22 (“Although the statute does not define the term ‘costs of 

prosecution,’ we conclude after review that the term means ‘court costs’ in a criminal 

case.”); State v. Holmes, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-01-1459, 2002-Ohio-6185, ¶ 20 (“The 

‘costs of prosecution’ * * * are the court costs incurred in the prosecution of the 

case.”); State v. Lincoln, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-15-1080, 2016-Ohio-1274, ¶ 11 (“Costs 

of prosecution” as used in R.C. 2947.23(A)(1) “means court costs in a criminal case” 

and are ‘“those [expenses] directly related to the court proceedings * * *.’”), quoting 

State v. Perz, 173 Ohio App.3d 99, 2007-Ohio-3962, 877 N.E.2d 702, ¶ 36 (6th 

Dist.), quoting Christy at ¶ 22. 

The term “costs” has been defined as ‘“the statutory fees to which 

officers, witnesses, jurors, and others are entitled for their services in an action or 

prosecution, and which the statutes authorize to be taxed and included in the 

judgment or sentence.’” Middleburg Hts. at ¶ 8, quoting State ex rel. Franklin Cty. 
Commrs. v. Guilbert, 77 Ohio St. 333, 338, 83 N.E. 80 (1907); see also R.C. 

2949.111(A)(1) (“As used in this section * * * ‘[c]ourt costs’ means any assessment 

that the court requires an offender to pay to defray the costs of operating the court.”). 

“The expenses which may be taxed as costs in a criminal case are those directly 

related to the court proceedings and are identified by a specific statutory 

authorization.” Middleburg Hts. at ¶ 8, citing Christy at ¶ 22. 

Although extradition costs are no doubt a necessary expense in 

prosecuting a case against a criminal offender who has left (and fails to return to) 

the jurisdiction, the state has not identified any “specific statutory authorization” for 

the taxing of Jones’ “extradition fees” as costs in this case. See State v. Perz, 6th 

Dist. Lucas No. L-07-1330, 2008-Ohio-2383, ¶ 13-18 (trial court erred in imposing 

costs of special prosecutor in the “costs of prosecution” where there was no “specific 

statute” providing that such costs could be charged to the defendant). R.C. 2949.14, 

entitled “[c]ost bill in case of felony,” provides: 

Upon conviction of a non-indigent person for a felony, the clerk of the 

court of common pleas shall make and certify under the clerk’s hand 

and seal of the court, a complete itemized bill of the costs made in such 

prosecution, including the sum paid by the board of county 

commissioners, certified by the county auditor, for the arrest and 

return of the person on the requisition of the governor, or on the 

request of the governor to the president of the United States, or on the 

return of the fugitive by a designated agent pursuant to a waiver of 

extradition except in cases of parole violation. The clerk shall attempt 

to collect the cost from the person convicted. 

By its terms, R.C. 2949.14 is limited to “non-indigent” persons 

“convict[ed]” of a felony. Although Jones was originally charged with felony 
criminal nonsupport, he pled guilty to, and was convicted of, misdemeanor criminal 

nonsupport. There is no comparable provision for the payment of extradition costs 

by convicted misdemeanor offenders. See also 1929 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 29-183, 

paragraph one of the syllabus (concluding that “[t]he costs of extradition of a 

defendant charged under the laws of Ohio with a misdemeanor cannot be made a 

part of the costs of prosecution” when interpreting a prior version of the statute 

codified at G.C. 2491). 

 Further, even if R.C. 2949.14 otherwise applied to Jones, it is limited 

in application to convicted, “non-indigent” persons. In its April 15, 2019 sentencing 

journal entries, the trial court stated that Jones was “indigent.” 

Accordingly, we sustain Jones’ third assignment of error. We vacate 

the trial court’s orders in 614411 and 614412 requiring Jones to pay $2,532.30 in 

extradition costs. 

Conclusion 

Because Jones has already served his sentences in 614411, his 

challenges to the length of his sentences in that case are moot. In 614412, we vacate 

Jones’ consecutive sentences and remand for resentencing. On remand in 614412, 

if the trial court, in its discretion, determines that consecutive sentences should be 

imposed, it should comply with R.C. 2929.41(B)(1), i.e., specify that the sentences 

are to be served consecutively and specify the aggregate consecutive sentence to be 

served, which must not exceed 18 months. In both 614411 and 614412, we vacate 
the trial court’s orders requiring Jones to pay $2,532.30 in extradition costs. We 

otherwise affirm the trial court. 

Judgment affirmed in part; vacated in part; remanded. 

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee the costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry out this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE 

MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and 

PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, J., CONCUR