UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DENISE TENNANT,

Plaintiff,

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Defendant.

Civil Action No. 19-2949 (BAH)

Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Denise Tennant, a former Probation Officer in the Court Social Services 

Division (“CSSD”) of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, has sued her former 

employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and the Family and

Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq., alleging discrimination and retaliation 

based on sex and her disabilities, and interference with her FMLA rights in a five-count 

complaint, Compl., ECF No. 1. Defendant has moved to dismiss three of those five counts,

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim on which relief can be 

granted. See Def.’s Mot. to Partially Dismiss Pl.’s Compl. (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 7. For the 

reasons explained below, defendant’s motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff worked as a CSSD probation officer for almost nine years, from March 29, 

2010, until her December 3, 2018 termination, and never received a rating of less than 

commendable performance. Compl. ¶¶ 12–13.1 As a probation officer, plaintiff “supervised 

 

1 While the Complaint states plaintiff’s termination date to be December 3, 2018, Compl. ¶ 12, which date is 

confirmed in her opposition to the pending motion, see Pl.’s Mem. of Points & Auths. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot.

(“Pl.’s Opp’n”), at 17, ECF No. 8, the complaint also suggests other termination dates, see, e.g. Compl. ¶ 74 (noting 
2

juveniles charged with or convicted of criminal offenses [and] conducted home curfew visits and 

school visits.” Id. ¶ 18. Over her tenure with CSSD, plaintiff conducted that work from several

different offices. As relevant to this action, between March 2014 and December 3, 2018, 

plaintiff was assigned to the Northeast Regional Office’s Leaders of Today in Solidarity (LOTS)

Balanced and Restorative Justice Center (“BARJ”). Id. ¶ 17. This assignment was “in addition 

to . . . her juvenile caseload.” Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff describes BARJ as a “healthy and secure 

environment for juvenile offenders to attend after-school activities, including group and 

individual counseling,” educational programs and mentorship events. Id. Her duties included 

helping juvenile participants develop their social skills, overseeing the juveniles’ mentors and 

tutors, and even preparing meals. Id. Plaintiff complains about several incidents that occurred 

while she was assigned to BARJ, as described below.

A. The Anthony Brooks Incident

Sometime in 2016, plaintiff and one of her supervisors, Acting Supervisory Probation 

Officer Stephanie Lea, saw a CSSD-affiliated mentor, Anthony Brooks, behaving 

inappropriately with a 14-year-old juvenile. Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff reported her concerns to several 

people, including her “immediate supervisor[],” id. ¶ 17, Supervisory Probation Officer 

Lawrence Weaver, id. ¶ 24, and Shelia Roberson-Adams, the Program Manager/Assistant 

Deputy Director for the entire Northeast Regional Office, id. ¶¶ 17, 24. For her part, Lea “wrote 

a memorandum documenting her concerns about Mr. Brooks’ inappropriate actions.” Id. ¶ 24. 

According to plaintiff, those concerns fell on deaf ears. Id. Indeed, after Lea authored her 

memorandum, she was demoted and replaced. Id.

 

plaintiff received “Final Determination” of her termination on November 26, 2018); id. ¶ 75 (noting that following 

appeal of her termination “a final decision on Plaintiff’s termination was issued on May 15, 2019”).
3

In “August or September 2017,” plaintiff received a call from the father of the juvenile 

with whom plaintiff had witnessed Brooks acting inappropriately. Id. ¶ 25. The father reported 

that Brooks had engaged in “sexual conduct” with his daughter. Id. Not long after, in September 

2017, Brooks was arrested and charged with “criminal offenses involving sexual abuse of a 

minor.” Id. As Brooks’ prosecution began, Terri Odom, CSSD’s Director, instructed plaintiff 

not to cooperate voluntarily with the authorities. Id. ¶¶ 15, 26. In October 2017, plaintiff 

received a subpoena from the Office of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia 

directing her to meet with the Assistant United States Attorneys (“AUSAs”) prosecuting Brooks’

case. Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiff alerted her supervisor Weaver, who explained that, if she wanted, 

someone from the Superior Court’s general counsel’s office would accompany her to any 

meeting with the prosecuting authorities. Id. Plaintiff declined and told Weaver “that she was 

comfortable meeting with the AUSA without the Court’s general counsel present.” Id. ¶ 28. 

Plaintiff alleges that this did not sit well with Odom, who “angrily told Plaintiff that she did not 

like how Plaintiff had handled the situation,” and ordered plaintiff to “report to the Court’s 

general counsel’s office the next day to provide a full accounting of the information that she had 

provided” to the authorities. Id. Plaintiff did so.2 Nevertheless, plaintiff claims Odom “several 

times expressed” dissatisfaction over plaintiff’s cooperation with prosecuting authorities and 

informed plaintiff that “the Brooks criminal proceedings reflected poorly on the [Superior] Court 

and the CSSD in particular.” Id. ¶ 31.

The investigation was a source of tension between plaintiff and Odom, and contributed to 

plaintiff’s medical problems as well. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that she suffers from “posttraumatic stress disorder” (“PTSD”) as a result of sexual abuse she suffered as a child and later 

 

2

In May 2018, plaintiff received a second subpoena, this time directing her to testify at Brooks’ trial. 

Compl. ¶ 30. That trial never occurred, as Brooks apparently pled guilty. Id.
4

as an adult in 2006. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff claims that, upon learning of the sexual abuse involved in 

the Brooks incident, she “began experiencing issues with her PTSD, including anxiety, 

depression, panic attacks and headaches.” Id. ¶ 32.

B. Plaintiff’s Supervisor Makes Inappropriate Sexual Comments

Plaintiff’s problems at work were not limited to the Brooks investigation. In November

2017, her “immediate supervisor[],” id. ¶ 17, Weaver engaged plaintiff in conversation while the 

two were at work, id. ¶ 34. Unsolicited, Weaver told plaintiff that he had begun having sex with 

prostitutes when he was in the military and, after being married, he continued to have sex with 

prostitutes. Id. Plaintiff was “shocked and offended” and told Weaver that “his comments were 

inappropriate and left his presence.” Id. According to plaintiff, this was not the first time 

Weaver had “ma[de] . . . inappropriate remarks about females” in her presence. Id. ¶ 33. For 

instance, plaintiff recalls Weaver saying in a 2016 meeting that, to break up a fight between two 

female juveniles, he “had to slam that bitch.” Id. Plaintiff also asserts that on another occasion, 

as CSSD staff attempted to restrain a female juvenile, Weaver stated “[y]ou are a bunch of 

pussies.” Id. According to plaintiff, Weaver’s November 2017 comments about sex with 

prostitutes triggered symptoms of her PTSD, causing “anxiety, depression, panic attacks and 

headaches.” Id. ¶ 35. 

A few months later, in January 2018, plaintiff was off duty when she received a call from 

Weaver asking her to accompany him as he dropped off a juvenile. Id. ¶ 36. “[A]nxious and 

worried” on account of Weaver’s November 2017 comments, plaintiff refused and told Weaver 

that “she was off duty and,” in any event “she had another commitment.” Id. Weaver responded 

that she was being “insubordinate.” Id. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff discussed the incident with 

another of her “immediate supervisors,” Acting Supervisory Probation Officer Lisa McCants, id. 
5

¶¶ 17, 37. Plaintiff explained to McCants why she had declined Weaver’s request to join him

and specifically described Weaver’s November 2017 conversation and that she now “felt very 

uncomfortable working with him.” Id. ¶ 37. She also divulged that “Weaver’s comments were 

causing issues with her PTSD and anxiety,” id. ¶ 38, and ultimately “requested a transfer from 

under [Weaver’s] supervision.” Id. ¶ 37. McCants responded by assuring plaintiff that “she was 

a good, valued employee” and that “she could report to her, rather than” Weaver. Id. ¶ 38. 

Although “McCants told plaintiff that she would speak to . . . Weaver about his behavior,” 

plaintiff alleges that McCants “attempted to excuse or minimize” his comments. Id. According

to plaintiff, McCants did not report Weaver’s conduct to Assistant Deputy Director RobersonAdams and “no effective corrective actions were taken.” Id. In fact, plaintiff asserts that 

Weaver “[s]ubsequently . . . continued to make inappropriate comments that were sexual in 

nature.” Id.

C. A New Health Condition Causes Plaintiff’s Increased Absences

Plaintiff’s work issues were compounded when, in January 2018, she was diagnosed with 

adenomyosis. Id. ¶ 39.

3

 According to plaintiff, adenomyosis is “a debilitating physical 

condition that affects multiple physical and mental activities, including, but not limited to, 

walking, sitting, lifting, breathing and working.” Id. ¶ 8. The condition “causes severe pain that 

adversely affects Plaintiff’s ability to work, focus and concentrate.” Id. In March 2018, two 

months after plaintiff’s diagnosis, she informed McCants that she suffered from adenomyosis 

 

3 Both plaintiff in her complaint and defendant in its briefing consistently refer to “andeomyosis.” See, e.g., 

Compl. ¶ 8; Def.’s Mem. of Points & Auths. Supp. Def.’s Mot. (“Def.’s Mem.”), at 3, ECF No. 7. In plaintiff’s 

charge of discrimination submitted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), however, she 

explains that “adenomyosis” is among her disabilities. Def.’s Mot., Ex. 1 at 2, ECF No. 7-1. The spelling in 

plaintiff’s EEOC charge appears to be correct and is thus used throughout this opinion. Compare Adenomyosis,

Merriam-Webster.com Medical Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/adenomyosis (last visited 

Aug. 3, 2020), with Andeomyosis, Merriam-Webster.com Medical Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/medical/andeomyosis (“The word you’ve entered isn’t in the medical dictionary.”) (last visited Aug. 3, 

2020). 
6

and described its effects. Id. ¶ 39. One day, in May 2018, plaintiff was experiencing “severe 

pain from her” adenomyosis, so she called in sick “[c]onsistent with CSSD practices.” Id. ¶ 40. 

The same day, Robert Smith, a male probation officer with no disabilities failed to appear for his 

shift without reporting sick or requesting a day off. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Weaver rebuked 

and criticized her for calling in sick but did not discipline Smith in any way. Id.

The next month, on June 2, 2018, plaintiff and a male co-worker were on duty at BARJ. 

As no youth were present at the facility that day, plaintiff and her co-worker asked McCants for 

permission to leave early. Id. ¶ 42. McCants responded “okay,” and plaintiff and her co-worker 

left for the day. Id. On July 12, 2018, however, Weaver recommended a 10-day suspension for 

plaintiff’s actions on June 2, without recommending a suspension for her co-worker. Id. ¶ 43. 

On August 7, 2018, plaintiff appealed the proposed suspension to CSSD Director Odom. Id. 

¶ 44. At a meeting one week later with Odom and McCants about the proposed suspension, 

plaintiff told both supervisors about her disabilities, which she explained were the reason she 

was frequently reporting off from work. Id. ¶ 45. She also told McCants and Odom that her 

PTSD had been exacerbated by Weaver’s November 2017 comments about prostitutes and that 

her physician had recommended that she take FMLA leave. Id. During the meeting, Odom 

agreed to lower the proposed suspension to a letter of reprimand. Id.

Following that meeting, in mid-August 2018, plaintiff asked for the appropriate forms to 

request intermittent FMLA leave, which she and her physician completed in early September of 

that year. Id. ¶¶ 46–47. After she submitted the completed forms, plaintiff was approved for 

“continuous and intermittent FMLA leave.” Id. ¶ 47.

On August 25, 2018, plaintiff again met with Odom and McCants, but this time both

Weaver, and CSSD Deputy Director Malcolm Woodland were also present. Id. ¶ 48. While the 
7

complaint is unclear as to what precipitated this meeting, plaintiff explains that she told all of the 

staff present about Weaver’s November 2017 comments and that she found them “offensive and 

unwelcome.” Id. Plaintiff noted that she had reported Weaver’s conduct to McCants in January 

2018, and McCants acknowledged receiving this report but admitted that she had never spoken 

to him about his conduct, despite having promised to do so. Id. In plaintiff’s telling, Odom was 

unimpressed and “blandly told Plaintiff that she and . . . Weaver needed to find a way to get 

along.” Id.

D. The Juvenile Incident and Plaintiff’s Termination

On September 19, 2018, both plaintiff and Weaver were on duty at BARJ when Weaver, 

“without provocation or explanation,” threw a stress ball at a 13-year-old female juvenile whom

plaintiff calls “JN.” Id. ¶ 49. This caused JN to become “highly agitated.” Id. ¶ 50. After 

dinner that evening, JN “demanded a second juice box” from plaintiff. Id. ¶ 51. When plaintiff 

told her that she could not have a second juice box, JN ignored her and took one from the cooler 

anyway. Id. Plaintiff asked JN repeatedly to return the juice box and not to open it. Id. ¶ 52. JN 

ignored these directions, too. Id. She “opened the juice box and advanced aggressively to hit 

Plaintiff.” Id. Plaintiff attempted to restrain JN by holding her wrist and simultaneously reached 

around JN’s shoulder to attempt to grab the juice box. Id. JN squeezed the juice box in 

plaintiff’s face and ran away down a hallway. Id. She tripped as she was running and was 

“restrained by [a] Court security officer.” Id. ¶ 53. Plaintiff felt that she had been assaulted and 

“asked the Court security to detain JN and to call” the police to report the assault. Id. Officers 

arrived at the scene and plaintiff described what had happened. Id. ¶ 54. She was asked to report 

to the District of Columbia’s Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) the next day for a followup interview. Id. ¶ 55. JN was taken into custody. Id. ¶ 54. Before she left BARJ that night, 
8

plaintiff sent an e-mail to both Weaver and McCants informing them of the incident. Id. ¶ 57. 

The next day, plaintiff “prepared an incident report” and sent it to both McCants and Weaver. 

Id. She also reported to OAG as directed by police officers the night before and again “truthfully 

recounted the previous evening’s events.” Id. ¶ 58. 

Neither McCants nor Weaver discussed the JN incident with plaintiff until September 25, 

when she met with McCants, Weaver, and Roberson-Adams. Id. ¶¶ 60–61. At the meeting, 

plaintiff described in detail her actions during the JN incident while Roberson-Adams asked 

questions and, according to plaintiff, listened only “partially.” Id. ¶ 61. Although plaintiff 

explained how she had held JN’s wrist in order to keep JN from hitting her and how she had 

reached around JN’s shoulder in an effort to retrieve the juice box in her hand, “RobersonAdams apparently failed to capture that explanation in the notes that she was entering in her 

laptop computer.” Id.

That evening, after the meeting had concluded, Roberson-Adams sent plaintiff follow-up 

questions via e-mail, many of which plaintiff felt she had already answered at the meeting. Id. 

¶ 62. The message was sent to plaintiff’s work e-mail address. Id. Plaintiff called in sick on 

both September 26 and 27 owing to “cramping from her [adenomyosis], anxiety and panic 

attacks,” and, consequently, missed both Roberson-Adams’ September 25 e-mail and another email Roberson-Adams sent on September 27. Id. ¶¶ 63–64. On her return to work on September 

28, 2018, plaintiff saw Roberson-Adams’ e-mails for the first time, but did not respond. Id. ¶ 65. 

During her shift that day, Weaver “questioned her about her whereabouts” and “interrogated” her 

about an entry she had made in a Superior Court computer system on September 26, when she 

was supposedly on sick leave. Id. Weaver also “expressed doubts that Plaintiff accurately had 

recorded her activities” in that same system for work she completed on September 20, 2018. Id. 
9

Plaintiff explained that her entries were accurate. Id. Following what plaintiff calls Weaver’s 

“baseless accusations,” she became ill and reported off as sick for the remainder of her shift. Id.

The next day, September 29, 2018, while plaintiff was on duty at BARJ, RobersonAdams demanded plaintiff send her written answers to the questions in her September 25 e-mail. 

Id. ¶ 67. Plaintiff did not respond to the e-mail until October 1, 2018. Id. ¶ 68. RobersonAdams responded “expressing skepticism concerning[] Plaintiff’s explanations.” Id. That same 

day, plaintiff met with CSSD Director Odom to discuss the JN incident. Id. ¶ 69. Plaintiff 

asserts that Odom showed her video of the incident which “verified” plaintiff’s account of 

events. Id. Nonetheless, “Odom accused Plaintiff of assaulting JN,” a charge which plaintiff 

“adamantly denied.” Id. Plaintiff complained that she had been “provided no training on how to 

de-escalate situations involving belligerent, non-compliant juveniles.” Id. Indeed, according to 

plaintiff, she and other probation officers had “frequently . . . pleaded with CSSD managers to be 

provided training and written policies and procedures to enable them to better manage juveniles’ 

behavior,” especially in “situations involving non-compliant and aggressive juveniles.” Id. ¶ 22.

Ultimately, on October 9, 2018, plaintiff was issued a letter of reprimand. Id. ¶ 70. 

Moreover, plaintiff was “assessed two . . . hours of AWOL” for leaving work early back on June 

2, 2018. Id. On October 22, Roberson-Adams recommended plaintiff’s termination and, on 

October 24, Odom issued a notice of intent to recommend termination. Id. ¶¶ 71–72. Plaintiff 

responded on October 31 “disput[ing] vigorously the basis for her proposed termination,” but 

nevertheless received a “Final Determination” terminating her employment on November 26,

2018. Id. ¶¶ 73–74. Plaintiff appealed her termination and was given an evidentiary hearing on 

March 25 and 27, 2019, but to no avail. Id. ¶ 75. Her termination was affirmed on May 15, 

2019. Id.
10

As her internal appeal of her termination was pending, plaintiff filed a charge of 

discrimination with the EEOC on January 7, 2019. Id. ¶ 76; see also Def.’s Mot., Ex. 1 (“EEOC 

Charge”), ECF No. 7-1.

4

 On her EEOC charge cover sheet, plaintiff marked boxes indicating 

that she was charging “discrimination based on” sex, disability, and retaliation. EEOC Charge at 

1. The EEOC chose not to take action and plaintiff received a “Dismissal and Notice of Rights” 

from the EEOC on July 3, 2019. Compl. ¶ 6. On October 1, 2019, plaintiff filed the instant suit 

alleging (1) discrimination on the basis of her sex (Count I), id. ¶¶ 85–92; (2) retaliation in 

violation of Title VII (Count II), id. ¶¶ 93–101; (3) discrimination on the basis of her disabilities 

(Count III), id. ¶¶ 102–09; (4) retaliation in violation of the ADA (Count IV), id. ¶ 110–21; and 

(5) interference with the exercise of her FMLA rights (Count V), id. ¶ 122–29. She requests, 

inter alia, $300,000 in damages. Id. at 25. As noted, pending before the Court is defendant’s

motion to dismiss Counts II, III, and IV, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

for failure to state a claim. See Def.’s Mem. of Points & Auths. Supp. Def.’s Mot. (“Def.’s 

Mem.”), ECF No. 7. That motion is now ripe for review.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the “complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 757–58 (2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009)). A facially plausible claim pleads facts that are not “‘merely consistent with’ a 

defendant’s liability” but that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

 

4 At the motion to dismiss stage, consideration of “matters outside the pleadings” typically requires that the 

motion instead be “treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). That conversion, 

however, is not triggered by consideration of “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference [or] matters 

of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). 

As defendant points out, and plaintiff does not contest, the charge of discrimination plaintiff filed with the EEOC is 

“incorporated by reference into the complaint,” Def.’s Mem. at 1 n.1, and thus may be considered in resolving the 

pending motion for partial dismissal. 
11

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)); see also Rudder v. Williams, 666 F.3d 790, 794 (D.C. Cir. 

2012). In deciding a motion under 12(b)(6), the court must consider the whole complaint, 

accepting all factual allegations as true, “even if doubtful in fact.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Courts do not, however, “assume the truth of legal conclusions, nor do [they] ‘accept inferences 

that are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.’” Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Islamic Am. Relief 

Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claim, in Count II, that she was the victim of 

“unlawful retaliation in violation of . . .Title VII,” Compl. at 20 (capitalization altered); her 

claim, in Count III, that she suffered “discrimination in violation of . . . the ADA,” id. 21 

(capitalization altered); and her claim, in Count IV, that she was the victim of “unlawful 

retaliation in violation of . . . the ADA,” id. at 22 (capitalization altered). As the analytical 

framework for defendant’s bid to dismiss Counts II and IV are nearly identical, those two counts 

are discussed first, before turning to Count III.

A. Count II Survives

Title VII’s retaliation provision makes “unlawful” action by an “employer to discriminate 

against” an employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 

practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 

manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 

Phrased disjunctively, Title VII thus protects two kinds of conduct from an employer’s 

retaliatory acts: (1) opposition to “practice[s] made” unlawful by Title VII; and 
12

(2) “participat[ion] in any manner” in proceedings related to Title VII. Id. To maintain a 

retaliation claim successfully, plaintiff “must show” that (1) she “engaged in” one of those two 

kinds of “statutorily protected activit[ies]”; (2) that she “suffered a materially adverse action” at 

defendant’s hands; and (3) that a “causal link connects” the protected activity and the adverse 

action. Howard R. L. Cook & Tommy Shaw Found. ex rel. Black Emps. of the Lib. of Cong. v. 

Billington, 737 F.3d 767, 772 (D.C. Cir. 2013). At the motion to dismiss stage, plaintiff’s 

“complaint must ‘contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,’ to plausibly establish those 

three elements.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

Defendant asserts that plaintiff’s complaint falls short of establishing the first and third 

elements. According to defendant, (1) “plaintiff has not alleged any protected activity under 

Title VII,” Def.’s Mem. at 7 (capitalization altered); and (2) in any event, “plaintiff has not 

alleged a causal connection between any allegedly protected act and her reprimand or 

termination,” id. at 11 (capitalization altered). Each of defendant’s challenges to Count II is 

addressed in turn.

1. Plaintiff Has Adequately Alleged Protected Conduct under Title VII

To satisfy the first element of her retaliation claim, plaintiff maintains that both Odom 

and Roberson-Adams recommended her termination in retaliation for “opposing unlawful 

employment practices and participating in” what she terms “EEO activities.” Compl. ¶ 95. 

Specifically, plaintiff says she was fired because she “participat[ed] in the Brooks criminal 

investigation and oppos[ed] . . . Weaver’s offensive and harassing sexual comments about 

prostitutes.” Id. ¶ 94. She also notes that she “engaged in further protected activities when she 

filed her Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC.” Id. ¶ 97.
13

Defendant first takes issue with plaintiff’s allegation that she “engaged in protected 

activities” when she “participat[ed] in the Brooks criminal investigation.” Id. ¶ 94. In

defendant’s view, Brooks’ actions were not practices “made unlawful by” by Title VII and, 

moreover, the investigation into his misconduct was not “an investigation, proceeding, or hearing 

under” Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); see also Def.’s Mem. at 8–9. No matter how 

vociferously plaintiff opposed Brooks’ conduct and no matter how active she was in the 

investigation into his misdeeds, defendant argues that such opposition and participation could not 

trigger Title VII’s retaliation provisions. Plaintiff does not respond to this argument and has 

therefore conceded that her participation in the investigation of and opposition to Brooks’ 

conduct were not protected activities. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 15 (focusing entirely on plaintiff’s 

“vociferous[] oppos[ition to] what she considered inappropriate sexual comments and 

harassment by . . . Weaver”); see also Damarcus S. v. Dist. of Columbia, 190 F. Supp. 3d 35, 48 

(D.D.C. 2016) (explaining that when a party “does not respond to [an] argument,” the argument 

is “deemed conceded” (citing DIRECTV, Inc. v. FCC, 110 F.3d 816, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).

Remaining, then, is defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s conduct following Weaver’s 

November 2017 comments does not constitute protected activity under Title VII. Defendant’s 

challenge in this regard is difficult to pin down. Initially, defendant relegates to a footnote the 

argument that plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient because she did “not allege that she believed, 

much less stated, that Weaver’s isolated comments constituted any type of unlawful 

discrimination.” Def.’s Mem. at 9 n.5. Following plaintiff’s concession that her participation in 

the Brooks investigation did not trigger Title VII’s retaliation protection, defendant’s focus 

shifted to plaintiff’s opposition to Weaver’s comments. In reply, defendant again argues that 

plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient because she “never alleged she believed that Weaver’s 
14

isolated comments violated Title VII, much less that she told Weaver or anyone else that she 

believed they did.” Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n (“Def.’s Reply”), at 2, ECF No. 10. In addition, 

defendant asserts that, even if plaintiff had expressed her subjective belief that she was opposing 

conduct made unlawful by Title VII, she had “not alleged specific facts that, if true, would show 

that” her belief was reasonable. Id. at 3. Defendant thus appears to mount a two-pronged attack 

on this aspect of plaintiff’s complaint: (1) plaintiff has failed to allege she believed she was 

opposing a Title VII violation and failed to tell anyone that she believed Weaver’s conduct 

violated Title VII; and (2) even if she had, her subjective belief that Weaver’s comments violated 

Title VII was unreasonable.

Defendant’s apparent contention that, in order to constitute protected activity, plaintiff 

was required to voice her belief that Weaver’s comments violated Title VII finds no support in 

fact or, for that matter, in law. Indeed, the Supreme Court has made clear that “ostensibly 

disapproving account[s] of sexually obnoxious behavior” are “covered by the opposition clause” 

of Title VII’s retaliation provision. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., 

Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009). Plaintiff in this case alleges that she gave just such 

“disapproving account[s]” of what she perceived to be “sexually obnoxious behavior” on no less 

than three occasions. Id. In January 2018, plaintiff told McCants that after “her November 2017 

conversation” with Weaver about his activities with prostitutes, “she felt very uncomfortable 

working with him and requested a transfer.” Compl. ¶ 37. On August 14, 2018, when plaintiff 

met with McCants and Odom after Weaver had recommended her suspension, she told them both 

that her PTSD symptoms had been exacerbated by Weaver’s comments. Id. ¶ 45. Finally, in a 

meeting with McCants, Odom, Weaver, and CSSD Deputy Director Woodland on August 25, 

2018, plaintiff again “described [Weaver’s] November 2017 comments” and expressed that she 
15

found the comments both “offensive and unwelcome.” Id. ¶ 48. Defendant may be right that 

plaintiff nowhere alleges that she said the magic words “I believe Weaver’s comments violated 

Title VII,” but nothing in Title VII required her to do so. Cf. Crawford, 555 U.S. at 277 (noting 

that merely “standing pat, say, by refusing to follow a supervisor’s order to fire a junior worker 

for discriminatory reasons” would constitute opposition). She need only have expressed her 

opposition to the conduct, which she adequately alleges she did by repeatedly complaining to her 

superiors that she found Weaver’s comments “offensive and unwelcome.” Compl. ¶ 48.

Defendant’s second contention that even if plaintiff believed she was opposing unlawful 

conduct, her belief was unreasonable, is similarly unavailing. Although the opposition clause of

Title VII’s retaliation provision states that it protects only employees who have “opposed [a]

practice made an unlawful employment practice” by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), the D.C. 

Circuit has “interpreted this phrase as extending to a practice that the employee reasonably and 

in good faith believed was unlawful under the statute,” even if the practice was not actually a 

violation of the anti-discrimination law, McGrath v. Clinton, 666 F.3d 1377, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 

2012) (emphasis omitted) (citing George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2005) and 

Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). If, however, the 

practice a plaintiff opposes “is not one that could reasonably and in good faith be regarded as 

unlawful under Title VII, this element is not satisfied.” Id. (citing Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. 

Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001)). Defendant maintains that “[e]ven if Plaintiff found 

Weaver’s November 2017 statements about prostitutes offensive,” it was not reasonable to 

believe that those comments constituted a violation of Title VII. Def.’s Reply at 2–3.

Defendant relies on George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405 (D.C. Cir. 2005), in which case a 

black woman alleged that her co-workers “made insulting and demeaning statements to her,” 
16

including telling her “go back to Trinidad” and to “go back to where [she] came from.” Id. at 

408 (alteration in original). The woman reported each of these incidents to her supervisor. Id. 

She was ultimately terminated. Id. at 409. She sued, claiming, inter alia, that she had been 

subjected to a hostile work environment and that she had been retaliated against for making her 

complaints. On summary judgment, the Circuit rejected both claims. Id. at 416–17. First 

addressing her hostile work environment claim, the Circuit explained that, although Title VII is 

violated “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and 

insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment 

and create an abusive working environment,” no such violation occurs unless the allegedly 

harassing conduct is truly “extreme.” Id. at 416 (first quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 

Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998), then quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 

788 (1998)). Indeed, “simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless 

extremely serious) will not amount to” Title VII violations. Id. (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 

788). The Circuit determined that the allegedly harassing acts about which the plaintiff 

complained were “[a]t best . . . exactly the sort of ‘isolated incidents’ that the Supreme Court has 

held cannot form the basis for a Title VII violation.” Id. at 417. Moving on to her retaliation 

claim, the Circuit held that “the incidents of which [the plaintiff] complained could not 

reasonably be thought to constitute an abusive working environment in violation of Title VII,”

and her retaliation claim was thus doomed. Id.

Defendant’s reliance on George is misplaced. That case was an appeal from the grant of 

summary judgment, a far different procedural posture than this one. In the employment 

discrimination context, the Supreme Court has time and again cautioned against allowing the 

“evidentiary standard[s]” used to evaluate motions for summary judgment like the one at issue in 
17

George, to morph into “rigid pleading standard[s]” at the motion to dismiss stage. Swierkiewicz 

v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–12 (2002). While a summary judgment plaintiff may be 

required to “establish[] a prima facie case” of discrimination, id. at 511, which, for retaliation 

claims includes “showing . . . that [she] engaged in statutorily protected activity,” Jones v. 

Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009), a plaintiff resisting a motion to dismiss need not 

“establish” anything. At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff need only plead facts that could 

“plausibly” establish the elements of a retaliation claim. Billington, 737 F.3d at 772. This sets 

the instant inquiry apart from the one the Circuit undertook in George, which was uninterested in 

the plausibility of the plaintiff’s claims, but rather asked whether the elements of a prima facie 

case had in fact been established.

The relevant standard here is far less exacting. Plaintiff’s complaint need not establish 

that the conduct she opposed was unlawful. Since one way to engage in protected activity is to 

oppose “a practice that [she] reasonably and in good faith believed was unlawful” under Title 

VII, McGrath, 666 F.3d at 1380 (emphasis omitted), the question to be answered on the instant 

motion is: Has plaintiff alleged “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678, plausibly to establish the reasonableness of her belief regarding Weaver’s comment

violating Title VII? 

The answer to that question is “yes.” Plaintiff explains that she considered Weaver’s

November 2017 comments about his exploits with prostitutes to be “inappropriate” and 

expressed her belief that the comments amounted to “harassment by her immediate supervisor.” 

Pl.’s Opp’n at 15. Plaintiff thus appears to suggest that Weaver’s comments created a hostile 

work environment in violation of Title VII. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 

66 (1986) (“[A] plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination 
18

based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.”). Defendant attempts to brush 

off the incident as merely a single “offensive utterance” that fails to “satisfy Title VII’s 

demanding standard” to establish a hostile work environment. Def.’s Reply at 2 (quoting 

George, 407 F.3d at 416). True enough, “cases in which a single incident can create a hostile 

work environment are rare[,] . . . [b]ut saying that a single incident of workplace conduct rarely 

can create a hostile work environment is different from saying that a single incident never can 

create a hostile work environment.” Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 579 (D.C. Cir. 

2013) (emphasis in original) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). As already explained above, 

moreover, plaintiff need not establish or even plausibly allege that Weaver’s comments fall in 

the narrow class of meritorious single-incident hostile work environment claims. Instead, she 

need only allege facts to establish that her belief those comments violated Title VII was plausibly 

reasonable. Plaintiff has alleged that her immediate supervisor, unsolicited, regaled her with 

stories of his past and ongoing exploits with prostitutes. That she might reasonably and in good 

faith believe that such an incident was “sufficiently severe” so as to “create a hostile work 

environment” is doubtless plausible. Id. Plaintiff has thus done enough to allege that she 

engaged in activity protected by Title VII’s retaliation provision.

2. Plaintiff Has Adequately Alleged a Causal Connection between Her 

Title VII Protected Activity and Her Termination

Defendant next takes aim at the third element of a Title VII retaliation claim: whether 

plaintiff has plausibly alleged that a “causal link connects” her protected activity and the adverse 

action she suffered. Billington, 737 F.3d at 772. Specifically, defendant contends that the 

adverse actions suffered by plaintiff are too temporally “remote” from her protected activities 

and plaintiff has failed to allege any “other causal connection.” Def.’s Mem. at 11–12. Plaintiff 

responds that “there was close temporal proximity between [her] protected activities and the 
19

materially adverse actions taken against her,” and even if not, “there are additional indicia of 

causality” contained in her complaint. Pl.’s Opp’n at 17–18.

“It is well established that evidence of a pattern of antagonism following closely on the 

heels of protected activity and related to the challenged employment action may establish the 

causation element of a Title VII plaintiff’s” retaliation claim. Allen v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 34, 46 

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344, 1357–59 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). The 

precise point in time when an adverse action becomes too temporally remote to, on its own, raise 

an inference of causation is not fixed. Nevertheless, “the Supreme Court has recognized that the 

cases that accept mere temporal proximity . . . as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a 

prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be very close” and cited 

“approvingly cases where three- and four-month intervals were found insufficient.” Pueschel v. 

Chao, 955 F.3d 163, 167 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted) 

(quoting Breeden, 532 U.S. at 273).

In order to measure the temporal proximity between plaintiff’s protected activities and 

the adverse actions she allegedly suffered, the dates of each must be determined. As discussed 

above, plaintiff has adequately alleged that she engaged in protected activities on three 

occasions. First in January 2018, Compl. ¶ 37, next on August 14, 2018, id. ¶ 45 and finally on 

August 25, 2018, id. ¶ 48. The parties dispute, however, which actions taken by plaintiff’s 

superiors were “materially adverse.” Billington, 737 F.3d at 772; compare Def.’s Mem. at 11 

(identifying “four allegedly retaliatory acts” all occurring in “October and November 2018”) 

with Pl.’s Opp’n at 17 (explaining that plaintiff’s superiors “rebuked [her] in May 2018,” see

Compl. ¶ 40, “recommended her for a 10-day suspension on July 12, 2018,” see id. ¶ 43, and 

then recommended and effectuated her termination in October and November of 2018). They 
20

agree, or at least do not dispute, that when plaintiff was “issued a letter of reprimand” on October 

9, 2018, she suffered an adverse action. Def.’s Mem. at 11; Pl.’s Opp’n at 17. Two of plaintiff’s 

alleged protected activities thus occurred less than two months prior to an action the defendant 

concedes was adverse. See Hamilton, 666 F.3d at 1358 (indicating that it is the protected activity 

that occurs latest in time that matters for the calculation of temporal proximity). Plaintiff’s 

superiors recommended her termination not long after that reprimand, Compl. ¶¶ 71–72, and her 

termination was completed a few weeks later, id. ¶ 74. 

The temporal proximity between protected activity and adverse action alleged in 

plaintiff’s complaint could plausibly establish a causal link between the two. Indeed, a twomonth gap between protected activity and a defendant’s “first step toward [an] adverse action” 

was held to be sufficient to meet a plaintiff’s summary judgment burden in a retaliation case. 

Hamilton, 666 F.3d at 1358–59. If a showing “is sufficient to satisfy a plaintiff’s burden of 

establishing a prima facie case at the summary judgment stage,” that showing “is certainly 

enough to survive a motion to dismiss.” Harris v. Dist. of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 791 

F.3d 65, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. 506).

Even if the two-month period between plaintiff’s complaints about Weaver’s comments 

and her reprimand were not enough plausibly to establish causality, plaintiff’s complaint 

contains other allegations that buttress a potential causal link. For instance, plaintiff alleges that 

“[d]uring her tenure as a” probation officer, her “performance frequently was rated as ‘Exceeds 

Expectations’ and Plaintiff never was rated as less than ‘Commendable.’” Compl. ¶ 13. She 

also alleges that she was told “she was a good, valued employee.” Id. ¶ 38. Such allegations are 

circumstantial evidence of causation because they plausibly discredit one of the “most common 

legitimate reasons for termination: performance below the employer’s legitimate expectations.” 
21

Harris, 791 F.3d at 69 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting George, 407 F.3d at 412). 

Moreover, plaintiff’s complaint contains a list of three male co-workers who, she alleges, did not 

engage in protected activities. According to plaintiff, when these individuals assaulted juveniles 

in their care—as plaintiff was alleged to have done—none were disciplined. Compl. ¶ 78. These 

comparators also help to make out a plausible causal link, because, if they are accepted as true, 

they cast doubt on another possible legitimate reason for plaintiff’s termination, namely the 

incident with JN.

***

Count II of plaintiff’s complaint adequately alleged both that she engaged in protected 

activities and a causal link between those activities and her reprimand and termination. Given 

that defendant does not dispute that plaintiff suffered an adverse action, her complaint contains 

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to plausibly establish” the three elements of a 

retaliation claim. Billington, 737 F.3d at 772. Plaintiff has thus done enough to shepherd Count 

II of her complaint past defendant’s motion to dismiss.

B. Count IV Survives

Count IV of plaintiff’s complaint alleges that she suffered “unlawful retaliation in 

violation of the . . . ADA.” Compl. at 22 (capitalization altered). Like Title VII, the ADA 

contains a retaliation provision. Also like Title VII, the ADA’s retaliation provision makes it 

unlawful to “discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or 

practice made unlawful” by the ADA or “because such individual made a charge, testified, 

assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under the 

ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). The three elements of an ADA retaliation claim are identical to 

those necessary to state a Title VII retaliation claim. See Smith v. Dist. of Columbia, 430 F.3d 
22

450, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (listing the “three elements of a prima facie case of [ADA] retaliation” 

as (1) the plaintiff has “engaged in protected activity”; (2) the plaintiff “was subjected to adverse 

action by the employer”; and (3) “there existed a causal link between the adverse action and the 

protected activity” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

With respect to her ADA retaliation claim, plaintiff asserts that, “[b]etween January 2018 

and December 2018,” she “oppose[d] the interference with her rights protected by the ADA by 

informing” her superiors “of her protected disabilities, as well as [by] making formal and 

informal complaints of disability discrimination to Defendant’s representatives, including”

defendant’s human resources office, Odom, Roberson-Adams, Weaver and McCants. Compl. 

¶ 111. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of plaintiff’s pleading of her ADA retaliation claim 

on three grounds, contending that plaintiff (1) has not exhausted her ADA retaliation claim; 

(2) has not adequately alleged that she engaged in protected activities; and (3) has failed to allege 

a causal link between any alleged protected activity and the adverse employment action she 

suffered. Def.’s Mem. at 9–13. Those challenges to Count IV are addressed seriatim.

1. Plaintiff Has Exhausted Her ADA Retaliation Claim

Before a plaintiff may make an ADA claim in federal court, she “must exhaust [her] 

administrative remedies by filing an EEOC charge and giving that agency a chance to act on it.” 

Marshall v. Fed. Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12117(a) (explaining that the enforcement procedures applicable to Title VII claims also apply 

to ADA claims)). Plaintiff did so on January 7, 2019. Compl. ¶ 5; see also EEOC Charge at 1. 

Five months later plaintiff’s EEOC charge was dismissed, Compl. ¶ 6, giving her the right to file

suit, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (explaining that if an EEOC charge “is dismissed by the 

Commission” the “person claiming to be aggrieved” may file suit “within ninety days” of 
23

receiving notice of such dismissal). An ADA lawsuit “following the EEOC charge,” however, 

“is limited in scope to claims that are “like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge 

and growing out of such allegations.” Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1995)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th 

Cir. 1994)). A claim is “reasonably related” to an EEOC charge if, “at a minimum” it would 

“arise from the administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected to follow the charge 

of discrimination.” Haynes v. Dist. of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 924 F.3d 519, 526–27 

(D.C. Cir. 2019). This exhaustion requirement serves to “give the agency an opportunity to 

resolve the claim administratively before the employee files her complaint in district court.” Id. 

at 527 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Payne v. Salazar, 619 F.3d 56, 

65 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).

Defendant’s argument that “[n]othing in the extensive declaration that Plaintiff filed with 

her EEOC charge alleges retaliation for activities protected by the ADA,” appears premised on 

the assertion that plaintiff failed to allege adequately that she engaged in activities protected by 

the ADA. Def.’s Mem. at 13. This misconstrues the exhaustion inquiry. The question is not 

whether plaintiff adequately alleged retaliation for activities protected by the ADA in her EEOC 

charge, but rather whether the factual allegations in the EEOC charge would have set the EEOC 

down the path to “uncover[ing] evidence relevant to [plaintiff’s] . . . discrimination claims” in 

any resulting investigation. Haynes, 924 F.3d at 528. There are several indications that 

plaintiff’s EEOC charge would have done just that. For one, when the EEOC charge form asked 

plaintiff for the basis of her charge of discrimination, she checked the boxes for “sex,” 

“disability,” and finally, “retaliation.” EEOC Charge at 1. This immediately sets plaintiff’s 

charge apart from those at issue in cases relied on by defendant. Def.’s Mem. at 13 (citing 
24

Jouanny v. Embassy of Fr. in the U.S., 280 F. Supp. 3d 3, 7 (D.D.C. 2017) (finding plaintiff 

failed to exhaust retaliation claim when she “marked the box for ‘Age,’ but not the box for 

‘Retaliation’”) and Grosdidier v. Chairman, Broad. Bd. of Governors, 774 F. Supp. 2d 76, 97 

(D.D.C. 2011) (finding plaintiff did not exhaust a race discrimination claim when “she did not 

list race as a basis for her claims on her . . . EEO complaint”)).

Moreover, plaintiff’s EEOC charge contained the facts upon which she bases her ADA 

retaliation claim in the instant suit. As explained in more detail below, plaintiff claims that she 

engaged in protected activity when “she disclosed her medical conditions to . . . McCants” and 

when she “requested an accommodation by requesting a transfer away from [Weaver’s] 

supervision.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 16. Defendant may disagree that these actions amounted to 

protected activity, but cannot deny that the EEOC charge contains nearly identical allegations. 

EEOC Charge at 3 (Plaintiff declaring “I . . . told Lisa that I was having issues with my anxiety” 

and that “I felt uncomfortable working with Lawrence, and I wanted to transfer”). Although 

plaintiff’s focus when she filed her charge may have been on the retaliation she believed she 

suffered “for complaining about [Weaver’s] sexual comments,” EEOC Charge at 5, her current 

ADA retaliation claim doubtless “grow[s] out of [the] allegations” in her EEOC charge, Haynes, 

924 F.3d at 526 (quoting Park, 71 F.3d at 907). She has thus exhausted her ADA retaliation 

claim.

2. Plaintiff Has Adequately Alleged Protected Activity under the ADA

As with the Title VII retaliation claim, defendant contends that plaintiff has failed to 

allege adequately that she engaged in conduct protected by the ADA’s retaliation provision. In 

the main, defendant takes issue with plaintiff’s allegation that she engaged in protected activities 
25

by “informing [her superiors] of her protected disabilities.” Compl. ¶ 111.5 According to 

defendant “[t]he ADA is clear that disclosing a medical condition is not a protected act.” Def.’s 

Mem. at 10. Plaintiff does not respond to this argument and has thus conceded her opportunity 

to do so. Damarcus S., 190 F. Supp. 3d at 48. Instead, plaintiff responds by arguing that she 

engaged in protected activities when she “requested an accommodation by requesting a transfer 

away from [Weaver’s] supervision” in a January 2018 meeting with McCants. Pl.’s Opp’n at 

16.6

The D.C. Circuit has joined its “sister circuits in holding that the act of requesting in good 

faith a reasonable accommodation is a protected activity under” the ADA. Solomon v. Vilsack, 

763 F.3d 1, 15 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (collecting cases). Plaintiff’s allegations plausibly 

establish that she made such a good faith request. As she puts it, she told “McCants that . . . 

Weaver’s comments were causing issues with her PTSD and anxiety” and “requested a transfer 

from under his supervision.” Compl. ¶¶ 37–38. The ADA defines “reasonable accommodation” 

as including “job restructuring,” “reassignment,” and “other similar accommodations.” 42 

U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). A transfer from the supervision of an individual whose presence 

exacerbates plaintiff’s alleged disability could certainly constitute a reasonable accommodation. 

 

5 Defendant also takes issue with plaintiff’s allegation that she made “formal and informal complaints of 

disability discrimination” to CSSD officials. Compl. ¶ 111. Defendant claims that “the narrative portion of 

[plaintiff’s] complaint . . . does not mention any formal complaints of disability discrimination and says nothing 

about when the alleged complaints were made or what specifically she complained about.” Def.’s Mem. at 10 n.6. 

Plaintiff does not respond to this argument. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 16. Although plaintiff’s complaint details numerous 

occasions on which she “informed” her superiors of her alleged medical conditions, see, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 39, 45, 

defendant is correct that nothing suggests plaintiff ever made a formal or informal complaint about disability 

discrimination to CSSD staff.

6 Plaintiff suggests that she also requested an accommodation in an August 2018 meeting with Odom and 

McCants, citing paragraph 45 of her complaint. Pl.’s Opp’n at 16. That paragraph, however, indicates only that 

plaintiff “informed . . . Odom and . . . McCants of her physical and mental conditions” and “explained that her 

anxiety, depression and panic attacks, as well as her PTSD had been exacerbated by . . . Weaver’s comments about 

having sex with prostitutes.” Compl. ¶ 45. Although she told Odom and McCants “that her physician 

recommended that she take FMLA leave,” this is not the same as requesting an accommodation for her alleged 

disabilities during that meeting. Id.
26

Defendant does not disagree, but instead takes issue with whether plaintiff’s request was made in 

good faith by noting that, in her opposition brief, she includes the statement that she “has not 

alleged that [her medical] conditions can be ameliorated by effecting a transfer.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 

20. Plaintiff made this statement in response to the suggestion by defendant, described in more 

detail below, see infra Part III.C, that plaintiff’s disabilities were caused by her workplace and 

that they “would abate if [she] worked somewhere else.” Def.’s Mem. at 15 (quoting Belton v. 

Snyder, 249 F. Supp. 3d 14, 24–25 (D.D.C. 2017)). The context of plaintiff’s statement thus 

clarifies that she was not arguing that a transfer would have been an ineffective accommodation, 

but was instead simply stating that a different job would not heal or resolve her PTSD. Nothing 

in plaintiff’s filings calls into doubt plaintiff’s good faith in making her transfer request.

Finally, defendant argues that plaintiff’s contention that her transfer request was in fact a 

request for an accommodation is nothing more than an attempt to “amend her complaint in [her] 

opposition brief.” Def.’s Reply at 3. To be sure, in describing Count IV, plaintiff focused on the 

fact that she “inform[ed] [her supervisors] of her protected disabilities” and “made formal and 

informal complaints of disability discrimination,” but plaintiff’s contention that she requested an 

accommodation does not amend her complaint, as it relies entirely on the factual allegations 

contained therein. Compl. ¶ 111. More clarity in her description of Count IV may have been 

desirable, but plaintiff’s complaint, in describing her transfer request, has alleged sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, plausibly to establish that she engaged in ADA protected 

activities.

3. Plaintiff Has Adequately Alleged a Causal Link between Her 

Protected Conduct and an Adverse Action

Finally, defendant again takes aim at the existence of a causal link vel non between 

plaintiff’s alleged protected activities and the adverse actions plaintiff suffered. As with 
27

plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim, defendant remains myopically focused on its perceived lack 

of temporal proximity. See Def.’s Reply at 4. The standard for determining whether an ADA 

complaint plausibly alleges a causal link between protected conduct and an adverse action is 

identical to the one applied to Title VII cases, so that ground need not be reploughed. See

Mogenhan v. Napolitano, 613 F.3d 1162, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (explaining that the “antiretaliation provisions” of Title VII and the ADA “are indistinguishable”). Plaintiff’s single act 

of ADA protected activity is certainly more temporally remote to any potential adverse action 

than plaintiff’s Title VII protected activities. Her transfer request was made in January 2018, 

Compl. ¶ 37, and though defendant seems to concede that Weaver’s recommended 10-day 

suspension in July 2018 was materially adverse, see Def.’s Reply at 4, that still leaves six months 

between the two events. Nevertheless, as explained above, plaintiff’s complaint contains more 

than a mere allegation of temporal proximity. See supra Part III.A.2. She also alleges that she 

received nothing but positive performance reviews and describes how similarly situated male 

employees who had not engaged in protected activities were not disciplined for their physical 

encounters with juveniles in their care. Id.; see also Compl. ¶¶ 13, 78.

The lengthier temporal distance between plaintiff’s ADA-protected activity and an 

adverse action may make her allegation of retaliation less likely, but it does not take the claim 

out of the realm of the plausible. Harris, 791 F.3d at 69 (holding that a gap of five months, when 

pled alongside allegations that would help rebut “common legitimate reasons for” adverse 

actions was “enough to survive a motion to dismiss” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Count 

IV of plaintiff’s complaint survives defendant’s motion to dismiss.
28

C. Count III Survives

Finally, defendant moves to dismiss Count III of plaintiff’s complaint, which alleges that 

plaintiff was the victim of “discrimination in violation of . . . the ADA.” Compl. at 21 

(capitalization altered). Specifically defendant urges “this Court [to] dismiss Plaintiff’s disability 

discrimination claim . . . because she has not alleged a qualifying disability.” Def.’s Mem. at 14. 

The ADA defines a disability as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially 

limits one or more major life activities . . . a record of such impairment; or . . . being regarded as 

having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The kinds of major life activities that must 

be substantially limited in order for a disability to qualify “include, but are not limited to, . . . 

walking, standing, lifting, bending, . . . concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 

Id. § 12102(2). As evident from the statutory text, “[m]erely having an impairment does not 

make one disabled for purposes of the ADA. Claimants also need to demonstrate that the 

impairment limits a major life activity.” Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 

195 (2002) (overturned by statute on other grounds); see also Haynes v. Williams, 392 F.3d 478, 

481–82 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[A] plaintiff is disabled under the ADA if: (1) he suffers from an 

impairment; (2) the impairment limits an activity that constitutes a major life activity under the 

Act; and (3) the limitation is substantial.”). At the motion to dismiss stage, plaintiff need not 

“demonstrate” that limitation, but plead facts, accepted as true, that could plausibly make that 

demonstration.

Plaintiff alleges that she has two disabilities. First, she states that she has adenomyosis, 

which is a physical condition she alleges affects “multiple physical and mental activities, 

including, but not limited to, walking, sitting, lifting, breathing and working.” Compl. ¶ 8. Her 

adenomyosis also “causes severe pain that adversely affects Plaintiff’s ability to work, focus and 
29

concentrate.” Id. Second, plaintiff alleges that she also “suffers from post-traumatic stress 

disorder,” which “stem[s] from childhood sexual abuse and a 2006 sexual assault by a dentist.” 

Id. ¶ 9. As a result, she “regularly experiences anxiety, depression and panic attacks” that “affect 

her ability to work, communicate, focus and concentrate.” Id. As described above, her PTSD 

“can be triggered by workplace stressors.” Id.

Defendant posits two reasons why plaintiff’s complaint does not adequately allege a 

qualifying disability. First, according to defendant, “[p]laintiff offers nothing more than 

conclusory descriptions of” her alleged disabilities “that copy the language of the ADA and its 

implementing regulations.” Def.’s Mem. at 14. Second, with respect to plaintiff’s allegation of 

PTSD, defendant maintains that “if workplace-specific stressors, such as her interactions with 

her supervisor, exacerbate Plaintiff’s post-traumatic stress disorder . . . , then Plaintiff does not 

have a qualifying disability.” Id. at 15. Defendant is wrong on both counts.

As to defendant’s first reason, although plaintiff’s description of which “major life 

activities” her disabilities impact includes many from the list of representative examples 

provided by the ADA, compare Compl. ¶¶ 8–9 with 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), her complaint is 

replete with examples of how both her PTSD and adenomyosis “substantially limit[]” her ability 

to engage in those activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). For example, after learning the details of 

the Brooks incident, “Plaintiff began experiencing issues with her PTSD, including anxiety, 

depression, panic attacks and headaches.” Compl. ¶ 32. She began suffering similar symptoms 

following Weaver’s 2017 comments about his exploits with prostitutes. Id. ¶ 35. As for the 

effects of her adenomyosis, “[i]n May 2018, Plaintiff was in severe pain” as a result of the 

condition and was forced to call in sick to work. Id. ¶ 40. She was similarly unable to work on 

September 26 and 27, 2018 owing in part to “cramping from her [adenomyosis].” Id. ¶ 63. 
30

Moreover, plaintiff alleges that she reported to Odom and McCants that both of her disabilities 

“were causing her to have to report off frequently from work.” Id. ¶ 45. Far from conclusory, 

these specific examples of plaintiff’s disabilities interfering with her ability to work substantiate 

her claim that those disabilities “substantially limit[] one or more major life activities.” 42 

U.S.C. § 12102(1).

Defendant’s second reason—that plaintiff’s PTSD is not a qualifying disability because 

the symptoms of that disorder are exacerbated by “workplace-specific stressors,” Def.’s Mem. at 

15—similarly fails. The cases on which defendant relies for that strange proposition, which is 

abandoned in reply, offer no support. Indeed, each of those cases considers circumstances in 

which an alleged disability was entirely caused by the plaintiff’s specific workplace and would 

“abate if [the plaintiff] worked elsewhere.” Belton, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 25; see also Franklin v. 

Pepco Holdings, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 66, 71 (D.D.C 2012) (plaintiff’s “stress” that was “caused 

by events” at her workplace was not a qualifying disability). Here, by contrast, plaintiff does not 

allege that her PTSD is caused by her specific workplace, but that her PTSD, caused by 

childhood trauma and trauma she suffered outside of work, has made certain aspects of her job 

more difficult. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 45. Indeed, the most recent amendments to the ADA’s definition of 

disability make clear that “[a]n impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it 

would substantially limit a major life activity when active.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D). That 

workplace stressors trigger episodic symptoms of plaintiff’s PTSD does not disqualify that 

disorder as a disability under the ADA. Moreover, EEOC regulations make clear that “it should 

be easily be concluded” that “post-traumatic stress disorder” is in the class of impairments that 

“will, at a minimum substantially limit . . . major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii). 

Just so.
31

In sum, neither of defendant’s arguments for dismissal of Count III of plaintiff’s 

complaint are availing. Thus, Count III also survives this motion to dismiss.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s partial motion to dismiss is denied. An Order 

consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered contemporaneously.

Date: August 3, 2020

__________________________

BERYL A. HOWELL

Chief Judge