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47–008 2009

EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY 

VERIFICATION SYSTEMS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 7, 2007 

Serial No. 110–45 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Ways and Means 

( 

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ii 

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 

CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York, Chairman 

FORTNEY PETE STARK, California 

SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan 

JIM MCDERMOTT, Washington 

JOHN LEWIS, Georgia 

RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts 

MICHAEL R. MCNULTY, New York 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

XAVIER BECERRA, California 

LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas 

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota 

STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, Ohio 

MIKE THOMPSON, California 

JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut 

RAHM EMANUEL, Illinois 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

RON KIND, Wisconsin 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland 

KENDRICK MEEK, Florida 

ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

JIM MCCRERY, Louisiana 

WALLY HERGER, California 

DAVE CAMP, Michigan 

JIM RAMSTAD, Minnesota 

SAM JOHNSON, Texas 

PHIL ENGLISH, Pennsylvania 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

KENNY HULSHOF, Missouri 

RON LEWIS, Kentucky 

KEVIN BRADY, Texas 

THOMAS M. REYNOLDS, New York 

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin 

ERIC CANTOR, Virginia 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

DEVIN NUNES, California 

PAT TIBERI, Ohio 

JON PORTER, Nevada 

JANICE MAYS, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

BRETT LOPER, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY 

MICHAEL R. MCNULTY, New York, Chairman 

SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan 

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota 

ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

XAVIER BECERRA, California 

LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas 

STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, Ohio 

SAM JOHNSON, Texas 

RON LEWIS, Kentucky 

KEVIN BRADY, Texas 

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin 

DEVIN NUNES, California 

Pursuant to clause 2(e)(4) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House, public hearing records 

of the Committee on Ways and Means are also published in electronic form. The printed 

hearing record remains the official version. Because electronic submissions are used to 

prepare both printed and electronic versions of the hearing record, the process of converting 

between various electronic formats may introduce unintentional errors or omissions. Such occurrences are inherent in the current publication process and should diminish as the process 

is further refined. 

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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Advisory of June 7, 2007, announcing the hearing ............................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Frederick G. Streckewald, Assistant Deputy Commissioner for Program Policy 

Office of Disability and Income Security Programs, Social Security Administration ................................................................................................................... 6 

Steve Schaeffer, Assistant Inspector General for the Office of Audit, Social 

Security Administration Office of the Inspector General ................................. 9 

Richard Stana, Director of Homeland Security and Justice, Government Accountability Office ................................................................................................ 11 

Tyler Moran, Employment Policy Director, National Immigration Law Center, 

Boise, Idaho .......................................................................................................... 34 

Angelo I. Amador, Director of Immigration Policy, U.S. Chamber of Commerce ..................................................................................................................... 46 

Sue Meisinger, The Human Resource Initiative for a Legal Workforce, Society 

for Human Resource Management, Alexandria, Virginia ................................. 63 

Peter Neumann, Principal Scientist, Computer Science Laboratory, SRI International, Menlo Park, California, on behalf of U.S. Public Policy Committee 

of the Association for Computing Machinery ..................................................... 68 

Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center .... 77 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

National Border Patrol, statement ......................................................................... 96 

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(1) 

EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY 

VERIFICATION SYSTEMS 

THURSDAY, JUNE 7, 2007 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in 

Room B–318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R. 

McNulty (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

[The Advisory of the hearing follows:] 

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ADVISORY 

FROM THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY 

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: (202) 225–1721 

June 07, 2007 

SS–3 

McNulty Announces A Hearing on Employment 

Eligibility Verification Systems 

Congressman Michael R. McNulty (D–NY), Chairman, Subcommittee on Social Security of the Committee on Ways and Means, today announced that the Subcommittee will hold a hearing on current and proposed employment eligibility 

verification systems and the role of the Social Security Administration in authenticating employment eligibility. The hearing will take place on Thursday, June 

7, in room B–318 Rayburn House Office Building, beginning at 10 a.m. 

In view of the limited time available to hear witnesses, oral testimony at this 

hearing will be from invited witnesses only. However, any individual or organization 

not scheduled for an oral appearance may submit a written statement for consideration by the Subcommittee and for inclusion in the printed record of the hearing. 

BACKGROUND: 

Since 1986, United States immigration law has prohibited employers from knowingly hiring or continuing to employ aliens who are not authorized to work under 

the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). All employers are required to request 

that employees, once hired, produce documents that show they are authorized to 

work in the United States. Verification of the validity of the documents is not mandatory. The Social Security card is one of a number of items that an employee may 

use in combination with other identity documents to demonstrate work authorization. 

While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for enforcing 

the INA prohibitions on unauthorized employment, the Social Security Administration (SSA) plays a key role in the verification process. Since 1996, employers have 

had the option of verifying names and Social Security numbers (SSNs) of new hires 

against SSA’s database through an employment eligibility verification system 

(EEVS, formerly known as the Basic Pilot) operated jointly by SSA and DHS. Until 

2003, the Basic Pilot was restricted to operate in only five states, but has since been 

expanded nationally. Currently, about 16,700 employers at 73,000 hiring sites (less 

than 1 percent of all establishments) participate in the EEVS. Most participating 

employers do so voluntarily, but some are required to use the EEVS by law or because of prior immigration violations. 

In 2006, the system received over 1.6 million requests for verification. Of these, 

1.4 million cases were resolved by SSA. The bulk of the remaining cases were referred to DHS for further verification of work-eligibility. 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the SSA Inspector General have 

found that the current system is hampered by inaccuracies in the records maintained by DHS and SSA. GAO and other auditors also have found that the current 

EEVS is vulnerable to identification document fraud, prohibited and privacy-violating uses by employers, as well as discriminatory abuse. 

Recent immigration reform proposals have included provisions to expand some 

version of an employment eligibility verification system. Some of the proposals 

would build on the current EEVS and require employers to verify all new hires, 

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3 

making the system mandatory for all 7.4 million private and 90,000 public sector 

employers in the United States. These employers account for 60 million hires per 

year, according to SSA. Other proposals include a requirement that the Social Security card be enhanced with tamper-proof, counterfeit-resistant or biometric features. 

In announcing the hearing, Chairman McNulty stated ‘‘If employment eligibility verification is to be a key enforcement tool for immigration policy, 

we must ensure the system is effective, efficient and feasible. We need a 

better understanding of the possible consequences and impact on the Social Security Administration if they are to undertake this expanded responsibility without compromising their core mission of administering Social 

Security.’’ 

FOCUS OF THE HEARING: 

The hearing will examine the current EEVS system and proposed expansions, including the potential costs and increased workloads that would be faced by SSA. 

The hearing also will examine the potential impact on workers and employers; how 

it would interact with REAL ID and other identification methods; and the privacy 

implications, especially in light of proposed data-sharing arrangements between 

agencies. 

DETAILS FOR SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN COMMENTS:: 

Please Note: Any person(s) and/or organization(s) wishing to submit for the hearing record must follow the appropriate link on the hearing page of the Committee 

website and complete the informational forms. From the Committee homepage, 

http://waysandmeans.house.gov, select ‘‘110th Congress’’ from the menu entitled, 

‘‘Committee Hearings’’ (http:waysandmeans.house.gov/Hearings.asp?congress=18). 

Select the hearing for which you would like to submit, and click on the link entitled, 

‘‘Click here to provide a submission for the record.’’ Once you have followed the online instructions, completing all informational forms and clicking ‘‘submit’’ on the 

final page, an email will be sent to the address which you supply confirming your 

interest in providing a submission for the record. You MUST REPLY to the email 

and ATTACH your submission as a Word or WordPerfect document, in compliance 

with the formatting requirements listed below, by close of business Thursday, 

June 21, 2007. Finally, please note that due to the change in House mail policy, 

the U.S. Capitol Police will refuse sealed-package deliveries to all House Office 

Buildings. For questions, or if you encounter technical problems, please call (202) 

225–1721. 

FORMATTING REQUIREMENTS: 

The Committee relies on electronic submissions for printing the official hearing record. As always, submissions will be included in the record according to the discretion of the Committee. 

The Committee will not alter the content of your submission, but we reserve the right to format 

it according to our guidelines. Any submission provided to the Committee by a witness, any supplementary materials submitted for the printed record, and any written comments in response 

to a request for written comments must conform to the guidelines listed below. Any submission 

or supplementary item not in compliance with these guidelines will not be printed, but will be 

maintained in the Committee files for review and use by the Committee. 

1. All submissions and supplementary materials must be provided in Word or WordPerfect 

format and MUST NOT exceed a total of 10 pages, including attachments. Witnesses and submitters are advised that the Committee relies on electronic submissions for printing the official 

hearing record. 

2. Copies of whole documents submitted as exhibit material will not be accepted for printing. 

Instead, exhibit material should be referenced and quoted or paraphrased. All exhibit material 

not meeting these specifications will be maintained in the Committee files for review and use 

by the Committee. 

3. All submissions must include a list of all clients, persons, and/or organizations on whose 

behalf the witness appears. A supplemental sheet must accompany each submission listing the 

name, company, address, telephone and fax numbers of each witness. 

Note: All Committee advisories and news releases are available on the World 

Wide Web at http://waysandmeans.house.gov. 

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The Committee seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. 

If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202–225–1721 or 202–226– 

3411 TTD/TTY in advance of the event (four business days notice is requested). 

Questions with regard to special accommodation needs in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats) may be directed to the Committee as noted above. 

f 

Chairman MCNULTY. I want to welcome all of our witnesses 

and all of our guests here today. Our hearing today will focus on 

current and proposed systems for verifying the employment eligibility of American workers under immigration law. 

We are particularly interested in the impact of these proposals 

on the Social Security Administration, an agency in which this 

Subcommittee has a keen interest, and which already is very busy 

administering retirement, disability, and survivor benefits. 

The employment eligibility verification process relies heavily on 

SSA to confirm the validity of Social Security numbers assigned to 

workers. We currently have a modest employment eligibility 

verification system, formerly called Basic Pilot and now called 

EEVS. It is used by about 17,000 employers at 73,000 hiring sites. 

The major immigration reform proposals being considered all envision a massive expansion of the system to cover all employers, at 

an estimated 71⁄2 million hiring sites. These employers account for 

about 60 million hiring decisions per year. 

This expansion would present a very substantial new burden on 

SSA, which would receive upward of 60 million queries per year. 

If an employee’s information does not match SSA’s records, he or 

she must contact SSA, often in person, to present documentation 

and correct the record in order to keep their job. 

We will hear from SSA and other experts about how there are 

errors and discrepancies in the databases that would be used by 

the system. Even a low error rate of 4 percent, the estimated percentage of errors in a key SSA database, would result in millions 

of American workers having to contact SSA before they can be 

hired. Most of them would be U.S. citizens. 

We will also hear from an EPR panel of witnesses who will testify on how the proposed system would impact workers, their employers, and the privacy rights of American taxpayers, all of whom 

will be affected by the proposed EEVS legislation. 

Finally, we must also be wary of proposals that depend on the 

Social Security Administration to create a new national ID card, 

which is very costly and runs counter to efforts here and in the 

states to combat identity theft. 

If EEVS is to be a key enforcement tool for immigration policy, 

we must ensure that the system is effective, efficient, and feasible 

for SSA, for employers, and for employees. We must also ensure 

that if SSA is going to be given a major new role in enforcing immigration law, it must be provided with adequate resources to fulfill 

this new charge without compromising its core duty to administer 

Social Security. 

At this time I would like to yield to my very good friend, distinguished veteran, and colleague, Sam Johnson, for an opening statement. 

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Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank my colleague 

from New York. With New York and Texas on board, we can probably get it done. What do you think, Sandy? 

Mr. LEVIN. I think so. That is called power. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I appreciate you holding this hearing on current 

and proposed employment eligibility verification systems. I support 

helping employers who want to do the right thing and obey our immigration laws. I want to see our immigration laws enforced to 

deter those employers from knowingly breaking the law and hiring 

illegal immigrants. 

Because ID verification is an essential component of worksite enforcement, I want to protect workers from having their identities 

stolen by someone working under their name and their Social Security number. 

Right now the Social Security Administration works with the Department of Homeland Security to help employers voluntarily 

verify the identifying information and employment eligibility of 

their new hires. This verification system, known as the Employment Eligibility Verification System, or EEVS, formerly referred to 

as the Basic Pilot Program. Now any employer can use it for free 

if they choose. 

Our colleagues in the Senate are now debating immigration overhaul. One section of the Senate bill would require employers to 

verify that all their employees are work-authorized. In other words, 

for the first time, businesses would be required to obtain Federal 

approval for their employees from a law enforcement agency. 

I find this to be a little chilling, and I think most Americans 

would oppose having to go through a law enforcement agency to 

gain work authorization. Also, this new and unfunded employer 

mandate would place significant burdens on employers, particularly small business, and the Social Security Administration. 

GAO and others have raised concerns regarding the accuracy of 

the underlying databases this system would rely on and whether 

responses would be timely if all employers were required to use the 

system, as opposed to less than 1 percent of employers using the 

system today. 

Worse, the current system relies on a number of so-called identity documents which don’t stop identity thieves or the creation of 

false documents. We need to find common sense solutions to these 

problems. 

The lure of employment opportunities in the United States has 

long been acknowledged as a major reason for immigration, both 

legal and illegal. Cutting off the demand for illegal workers 

through enforcement of employment laws will help us secure our 

borders. 

This Subcommittee has had eight hearings in the past 4 years 

focusing on Social Security number verification as well as ID 

issues. It is now time for us to improve the employment eligibility 

verification process so that American employers can confidently 

hire people to work. Today’s witnesses will help us determine the 

best way how. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCNULTY. I thank the distinguished Ranking Member. Without objection, any additional opening statements by Memwwoods2 on PROD1PC60 with HEARING

6 

bers of the Committee will be included in the record. Of course, the 

statements by the witnesses will be included in the record in their 

entirety. We would ask, as usual, that in your testimony, you summarize your testimony within about 5 minutes so that we can allow 

for a maximum amount of time for the various questions. 

Panel No. 1 consists of Frederick Streckewald, Assistant Deputy 

Commissioner for Program Policy, Office of Disability and Income 

Security Programs, of SSA; Steve Schaeffer, Assistant Inspector 

General for the Office of Audit, Social Security Administration, Office of the Inspector General; and Richard Stana, Director of Homeland Security and Justice, Government Accountability Office. 

I thank all of you for being here today. We will start with Mr. 

Streckewald, and take all of your testimony together, and then proceed to questions. 

Mr. Streckewald. 

STATEMENT OF FREDERICK G. STRECKEWALD, ASSISTANT 

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER FOR PROGRAM POLICY, OFFICE OF 

DISABILITY AND INCOME SECURITY PROGRAMS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here today to discuss SSA’s 

role in helping to administer the Department of Homeland Security’s Employment Eligibility Verification System or EEVS. This 

system, formerly known as the Basic Pilot Program, allows employers to verify the employment eligibility information provided by 

newly hired employees. 

Worksite enforcement is key to successful immigration reform, 

and a critical component of worksite enforcement is a strong employer verification system. The Administration supports mandatory 

participation in an employment eligibility verification system by all 

United States employers. We are pleased that you are holding the 

hearing today to discuss the impact of the expansion of EEVS on 

SSA, employers, and their employees. 

Let me begin with a little background on the current system. In 

1996, Congress enacted the Immigration Reform and Immigrant 

Responsibility Act, which required testing three alternative methods of providing an effective, nondiscriminatory employment eligibility confirmation process. The current EEVS was one of these 

methods. 

Today there are more than 17,000 employers participating in 

EEVS at more than 77,000 worksites. So, far in 2007, we have handled more than 1.8 million queries, an increase of 96 percent over 

the same period last year. 

Employers participate voluntarily, and they register with DHS to 

use the automated system to verify an employee’s Social Security 

number and work authorization status. The employer submits to 

the system information from the employee Form I–9. DHS then 

sends this information to SSA to verify for all new employees that 

the Social Security number, name, and date of birth match SSA 

records. 

For individuals alleging U.S. citizenship, SSA will also confirm 

citizenship status, thereby confirming work authorization. For all 

non-citizens, if there is a match with SSA, DHS then determines 

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the current work authorization status. DHS then notifies the employer of the result. Ninety-two percent of initial verification queries are confirmed within seconds. 

Proposals pending in Congress would require all employers in 

the United States to use the EEVS to verify employment eligibility 

and the identity of all new hires. These proposals would phase in 

participation over a period of time. Every year, however, approximately 60 million individuals start a new job. Therefore, we would 

expect mandatory participation to have a substantial effect on our 

Agency. 

SSA’s role in EEVS relies upon the information in our Numident 

database, which houses the name, date of birth, and Social Security 

number of more than 441 million individuals. We have great confidence in the integrity of the Numident, but in any large system 

of records there will be some that require updating or correcting. 

Our current experience with voluntary EEVS shows that for 

every 100 queries submitted to the system, SSA field offices or 

phone representatives are contacted three times. We anticipate 

that in a mandatory system, the percentage of individuals coming 

to us will be higher than in the current voluntary system. 

If Congress enacts a mandatory EEVS, it is crucial that the tools 

and resources be in place to ensure that the system works efficiently and effectively, and that the proper safeguards are built in 

to guarantee that United States citizens and work-authorized noncitizens receive prompt confirmation of their work authorization 

status. 

Again, thank you for inviting me here today. We are grateful for 

your ongoing efforts to ensure the Agency has the funding it needs 

to accomplish its mission. On behalf of SSA, I want to thank you 

for your continuing support for the Agency, for our mission, and for 

our dedicated workforce. 

I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Streckewald follows:] 

Chairman MCNULTY. Thank you. 

Prepared Statement of Frederick G. Streckewald, Assistant Deputy Commissioner for Program Policy, Office of Disability and Income Security 

Programs, Social Security Administration 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the Social Security Administration’s (SSA’s) role in helping to administer the Department of Homeland Security’s 

(DHS) Employment Eligibility Verification System (EEVS). This system, formerly 

known as the Basic Pilot Program, allows employers to verify the employment eligibility information provided by newly hired employees. 

Worksite enforcement is key to successful immigration reform, and a critical component of worksite enforcement is a strong employer verification system. The Administration supports—and proposals currently pending before Congress incorporate—mandatory participation in an employment eligibility verification system by 

all United States employers. We are pleased that you are holding this hearing today 

to discuss the impact of the expansion of EEVS on SSA, employers and their employees. We are keenly aware of the need to ensure that the system works the way 

it is intended. 

The History of the Current Voluntary System 

The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 required employers for 

the first time to examine worker documents to check the employment eligibility of 

newly hired employees. Ten years later, in 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which required testing 

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three alternative methods of providing an effective, nondiscriminatory employment 

eligibility confirmation process; the current EEVS was one of the three methods. 

The law required the voluntary EEVS to be implemented in a minimum of 5 of 

the 7 States with the highest estimated population of noncitizens not lawfully 

present in the United States. The five states were California, Florida, Illinois, New 

York and Texas. 

In March 1999, Nebraska was added to assist employers in the meatpacking industry. Employers in those six states were also allowed to include their work sites 

located in other states. In 2002, Congress extended authorization for the system for 

an additional 2 years. In 2003, Congress again extended the EEVS and expanded 

the voluntary participation to include employers in all 50 States. The system will 

expire in 2008 under current law. 

In December 2004, before the nationwide expansion, there were 2,924 participating employers. Today, there are more than 17,000 employers participating in the 

EEVS at more than 77,000 sites, and participation is growing by more than 1,000 

employers every month. As the number of participating employers has grown, so has 

the number of queries we handle. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2005, SSA handled approximately 980,000 queries; in FY 2006, we handled over 1,740,000. So far, in FY 2007, 

we have handled more than 1,800,000 queries, an increase of 96 percent over the 

same period last year. 

The Process 

Employers participate voluntarily and register with DHS to use the automated 

system to verify an employee’s SSN and work authorization status. The employer 

inputs information into the system from the Form I–9, the Employment Eligibility 

Verification Form. DHS then sends this information to SSA to verify for all new employees that the Social Security number, name, and date of birth submitted match 

information in SSA records. For individuals alleging United States citizenship, SSA 

will also confirm citizenship status, thereby confirming work authorization. For all 

non-citizens, if there is a match with SSA, DHS then determines the current work 

authorization status. Within three to five seconds, through the system, DHS notifies 

the employer of the result; employment authorized, SSA tentative nonconfirmation, 

DHS verification in progress, or DHS tentative nonconfirmation. 

Ninety-two percent of initial verification queries are confirmed within seconds. If 

SSA cannot confirm that the information matches SSA records or cannot confirm 

United States citizenship, DHS will notify the employer of the SSA tentative nonconfirmation. The employer must notify the employee of the tentative nonconfirmation in order to provide the employee the opportunity to contest that finding. If the 

employee contests the tentative nonconfirmation, he or she has eight days to visit 

an SSA office with the required documents to correct the SSA record. The employer 

must re-query the system to verify that the tentative nonconfirmation has been resolved. 

SSA has a good ongoing working relationship with DHS. Together, we continue 

to work to improve upon the operation of the current system—to make it work more 

efficiently and more smoothly for employers and their employees. We have begun 

laying the groundwork to increase our capacity to handle substantially heavier volumes of verification transactions, as the voluntary program continues to grow. If 

Congress mandates the use of the system, these improvements will facilitate nationwide expansion. 

Mandatory Participation 

There are several proposals now pending in Congress that would require all employers in the United States to use the EEVS to verify the employment eligibility 

and identity of all new hires. The bills we have seen provide for some kind of 

phased-in approach to mandatory participation and require employers operating in 

the Nation’s critical infrastructures to be the first participants. Some proposals also 

require employers to verify the employment eligibility and identity of their entire 

workforce and to periodically re-verify the work authorization status of individuals 

whose temporary work authorization is set to expire. 

As I mentioned earlier, SSA and DHS are already working to lay the groundwork 

for broader employer participation in the current EEVS. Every year, approximately 

60 million individuals start a new job. Therefore, we would expect mandatory participation to have a substantial effect on our Agency. It is vitally important that, 

when Congress makes a decision regarding the implementation of a mandatory program, we have adequate lead-time and resources. With these tools, we can effectively expand the EEVS and ensure that it works successfully without impinging 

on our ability to handle our other workloads. 

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SSA Records 

SSA matches information submitted by the employer against the information in 

our Numident database, which houses the identifying information, including name, 

date of birth, and SSN of more than 441 million individuals. We have great confidence in the integrity of the Numident information. In fact, in a December 2006 

report issued to Congress, SSA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) commended the 

accuracy of Numident information. 

Of course, in any large system of records, there will be records that require updating or correcting. For example, the OIG found discrepancies in 4.1 percent of 

Numident records that might lead to tentative nonconfirmations and that 7 percent 

of naturalized citizens had not updated their Numident records to reflect their new 

citizenship status. In the administration of our programs, we update or correct our 

records at the time an individual applies for a replacement card, requests a change 

in the record—a name change, for example—or applies for a Social Security benefit. 

As part of the process to correct our records, we need to verify the identity of the 

individual whose records we are updating and the information we are adding to the 

individual’s records. That is why virtually all of these changes are made during a 

face-to-face interview in our field offices. 

One way we provide individuals the opportunity to review and, if necessary, correct their wage records is the annual Social Security Statement that goes to each 

worker 25 years or older. The Statement provides individuals with an annual report 

of wages recorded. In FY 2006, SSA mailed approximately 145 million Statements. 

Our current experience with voluntary EEVS shows that for every 100 queries 

submitted to the System, SSA field offices or phone representatives are contacted 

three times. As the number of participating employers increases, the number of related contacts with SSA will also increase. We anticipate that in a mandatory system the percentage of individuals coming to us will be higher than in the current 

voluntary system. 

As you know, the Agency is currently facing substantial challenges in meeting the 

workloads of our core programs. With timely and adequate funding, we will be able 

to meet the demands of a phased-in approach to mandatory participation. We are 

grateful for your ongoing efforts to ensure the Agency has the funding it needs to 

accomplish its missions. 

Conclusion 

At SSA, we have a proven performance record and can and will do what we are 

called upon to do. The Administration supports a strong employer verification system as a critical element of a successful and comprehensive approach to immigration reform. As increasing numbers of employers participate in the current voluntary EEVS, and considering the even greater number that will participate if mandated by Congress, it is crucial that the tools and resources be in place to ensure 

that the system works efficiently and effectively and that the proper safeguards are 

built in to guarantee that United States citizens and work authorized noncitizens 

receive prompt confirmation of their work authorization status. 

I want to thank the Chairman and members of the Subcommittee for inviting me 

here today. On behalf of SSA, I want to thank the Subcommittee for its continuing 

support for the Agency, for our mission, and for our dedicated workforce. 

I will be happy to answer any questions you might have. 

Mr. Schaeffer. 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN L. SCHAEFFER, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR 

GENERAL FOR THE OFFICE OF AUDIT, SOCIAL SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Mr. SCHAEFFER. Good morning, Chairman McNulty, Mr. Johnson, and Members of the Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be here 

today to provide the Social Security Administration’s Office of Inspector General’s perspective on Employment Eligibility 

Verification Systems, or EEVS. 

Each agency involved in EEVS has its own contribution to make 

to the system’s success. The SSA OIG’s role is to evaluate the use 

of SSA data within the EEVS process and recommend improvements with respect to the accuracy and the security of such data. 

SSA’s information constitutes the foundation of EEVS. The purpose of our evaluations and reviews is to assist SSA in improving 

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the accuracy of the employer wage reporting and reducing SSN 

misuse and identity theft. 

In 2006, the former Chairman of this Subcommittee, Mr. 

McCrery, asked us to conduct several reviews relative to EEVS. 

First, to assess the accuracy of the data used by EEVS, we turned 

to SSA’s Numident file. This file contains relevant information 

about Social Security number holders, including name, date of 

birth, place of birth, and citizenship status, and these data are 

used in the EEVS. 

Although we found SSA’s information to be generally accurate, 

we identified discrepancies in an estimated 18 million, or 4 percent, 

of the Numident records that could result in incorrect feedback to 

employers attempting to determine the employment eligibility of 

their workers. 

This incorrect feedback could lead to both false positives and 

false negatives for employees. In addition, verification problems 

may delay the hiring process and lead to an increase in visits to 

SSA’s field offices. 

In our second review, to assess the functionality of EEVS, we 

gathered information on the experience of employers who had used 

EEVS, as well as those who had used SSA’s Social Security number 

verification service or SSNVS. We found that 100 percent of the 

EEVS users interviewed rated the programs as excellent, very 

good, or good. In addition, at least 98 percent of the users indicated 

that their employers were very likely to continue to use the programs. 

About 10 percent of the EEVS users reported that they experienced minor problems using the two programs. In most of the 

cases, the user reported that SSA and/or DHS staff were able to 

resolve their problems timely. 

We also found, however, that approximately 42 percent of EEVS 

users were not using the program as intended. While the program 

is intended to verify the work authorization of newly hired employees within 3 days after they are hired, some employers conducted 

verifications for longstanding employees or individuals who were 

not yet hired. Monitoring appropriate use should be part of any enhanced system. 

In the third review conducted at the Subcommittee’s request, we 

assessed controls over EEVS and SSA’s SSNVS to monitor potential abuse by employers, as well as SSA and DHS’s experience to 

date with this monitoring. We found that SSA had established effective controls over access and use of sensitive data in its SSNVS 

program, as well as effective controls to detect anomalies in SSNVS 

usage and potential misuse of the program. 

While we found that EEVS did not have the same level of controls, we reported that DHS officials were meeting with counterparts from SSA and the IRS to discuss potential enhancements to 

EEVS, avenues for greater cooperation, and the potential for adopting some of the monitoring and applicant verification activities already being performed under SSNVS. 

We are now completing a fourth review where we are assessing 

controls over all of SSA’s employee verification programs as well as 

EEVS. This review will also highlight best practices, and as a part 

of the audit, we will determine whether employers are receiving a 

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consistent reply from all of these services. We expect to issue this 

report in the next few months, and as always, will share a copy 

with the Committee. 

Through reports such as these, our efforts to ensure the reliability of the data used by EEVS and the functionality and security 

of EEVS helps employers report accurate wages to SSA and minimize the improper use of SSNs. 

Thank you, and I will be happy to answer any questions. 

Chairman MCNULTY. Thank you, Mr. Schaeffer. 

Mr. Stana. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. STANA, DIRECTOR OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. STANA. Thank you, Chairman McNulty, Mr. Johnson, Members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on EEVS. As we and others have reported 

in the past, the opportunity for employment is a key magnet attracting illegal aliens to the United States. In 1986, Congress 

passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act, which established 

an employment verification process for employers to verify all new 

hired employees’ work eligibility, and a sanctions program for 

fining employers who do not comply with the Act. The availability 

and use of counterfeit documents, and the fraudulent use of valid 

documents belonging to others, have made it difficult for employers 

who want to comply with current employment verification processes to ensure that they hire only authorized workers. Counterfeit 

documents have also made it easier for employers who don’t want 

to comply and knowingly hire unauthorized workers to do so without fear of sanction. 

Over the years, immigration experts have said that the single 

most important step that could be taken to manage lawful immigration and reduce unlawful migration is to develop an effective 

system for verifying work authorization. DHS and SSA currently 

operate the EEVS program, which is a voluntary automated system 

authorized by the 1996 Immigration Act, for employers to electronically check employees’ work eligibility information against information in DHS and SSA databases. Of the 5.9 million employers in 

the U.S., about 17,000 employers are now registered to use the program, and only about half of these are active users. This program 

shows promise to help identify the use of counterfeit documents 

and assist U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in better 

targeting its worksite enforcement efforts, but the following areas 

would need to be addressed before it is expanded to all employers 

and is effectively implemented as envisioned in various immigration reform proposals. 

First, program capacity would need to be expanded. DHS estimated that increasing EEVS capacity could cost it $70 million annually for program management and $300 million to $400 million 

annually for compliance activities and staff. SSA officials estimated 

that expansion of the EEVS program to 100,000 participants from 

the current 17,000 would cost $5 to $6 million, and noted that the 

cost of a mandatory EEVS would be much higher and driven by inwwoods2 on PROD1PC60 with HEARING

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creased workload of its field office staff who resolve queries that 

SSA cannot immediately confirm. 

Second, data reliability issues would need to be addressed. The 

majority of EEVS queries entered by employers, about 92 percent, 

are confirmed within seconds that the employee is work-authorized. 

About 7 percent of the queries cannot be immediately confirmed by 

SSA, and about 1 percent cannot be immediately confirmed by 

DHS. Resolving these nonconfirmations can take several days, or 

in a few cases even weeks. DHS and SSA are considering options 

for using additional automated checks to immediately confirm work 

authorization, which may be important should EEVS be made 

mandatory for all employers. 

Third, while EEVS may help to reduce document fraud, it cannot 

yet fully address identity fraud issues, for example, when employees present borrowed or stolen genuine documents. The current 

EEVS program is piloting a photograph screening tool, whereby an 

employer can more easily identify fraudulent documentation. DHS 

expects to expand the use of this tool to all participating employers 

by September 2007. Although mandatory EEVS and the associated 

use of the photograph screening tool offer some remedy, limiting 

the number of acceptable work authorization documents and making them more secure would help to better address identity fraud 

issues. 

Finally, EEVS is vulnerable to employer fraud, such as entering 

the same identity information to authorize multiple workers. EEVS 

is also vulnerable to employer misuse that adversely affects employees, such as employers limiting work assignments or pay while 

employees are undergoing the verification process. Currently there 

is no formal mechanism for sharing compliance data with ICE 

agents. DHS is establishing a new compliance and monitoring program to help reduce employer fraud and misuse by, for example, 

identifying patterns in employer noncompliance with program requirements. Information suggesting employers’ fraud and misuse of 

the system could be useful in targeting limited worksite enforcement resources and promoting employer compliance with employment laws. 

As an aside, our report last summer on selected countries’ experiences with foreign worker programs found that while different approaches were used, and no country we studied did everything perfectly or effectively, many of the same issues existed in these countries as exist here. These include ensuring only that those authorized to work could obtain employment; that employers comply with 

laws governing worksite conditions; that taxes and social insurance 

payments are collected; and that appropriate mechanisms are 

available, including data matching and sharing among agencies, to 

help reduce immigration and labor law violations. 

In closing, both DHS and SSA have taken a number of steps to 

address weaknesses in the current EEVS program, but much more 

needs to be done if this is going to be expanded to all employers. 

This will require a substantial investment in staff and other resources, at least in the near term, in both agencies. Implementing 

an EEV program that ensures that all individuals working in the 

country are doing so legally, and that undue burdens are not 

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1Pub. L. No. 99–603, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. 

2 IRCA provided for sanctions against employers who do not follow the employment 

verification (Form I–9) process. Employers who fail to properly complete, retain, or present for 

inspection a Form I–9 may face civil or administrative fines ranging from $110 to $1,100 for 

each employee for whom the form was not properly completed, retained, or presented. Employers who knowingly hire or continue to employ unauthorized aliens may be fined from $275 to 

$11,000 for each employee, depending on whether the violation is a first or subsequent offense. 

Employers who engage in a pattern or practice of knowingly hiring or continuing to employ unauthorized aliens are subject to criminal penalties consisting of fines up to $3,000 per unauthorized employee and up to 6 months’ imprisonment for the entire pattern or practice. 3GAO, Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and Worksite 

Enforcement Efforts, GAO–05–813 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 2005). 4 Institute for Survey Research and Westat, Findings of the Basic Pilot Program Evaluation 

(Washington, D.C.: June 2004). 

placed on employers or employees, will not be an easy task within 

the timelines suggested in immigration reform proposals. 

This concludes my oral statement, and I would be happy to answer any questions that Members of the Subcommittee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stana follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Richard Stana, Director of Homeland Security and 

Justice, Government Accountability Office 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to participate in this hearing on 

electronic employment verification. As we and others have reported in the past, the 

opportunity for employment is one of the most powerful magnets attracting unauthorized immigrants to the United States. To help address this issue, in 1986 Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA),1 which made it illegal for individuals and entities to knowingly hire, continue to employ, or recruit or 

refer for a fee unauthorized workers. The act established a two-pronged approach 

for helping to limit the employment of unauthorized workers: (1) an employment 

verification process through which employers verify all newly hired employees’ work 

eligibility and (2) a sanctions program for fining employers who do not comply with 

the act.2

Following the passage of IRCA, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform and 

various immigration experts indicated a number of problems with the implementation of immigration policies and concluded that deterring illegal immigration requires, among other things, strategies that focus on disrupting the ability of illegal 

immigrants to gain employment through a more reliable employment eligibility 

verification process. In particular, the commission report and other studies found 

that the single most important step that could be taken to reduce unlawful migration is the development of a more effective system for verifying work authorization. 

In the over 20 years since passage of IRCA, the employment eligibility verification 

process has remained largely unchanged. The House and Senate are considering legislation to reform immigration laws and strengthen electronic employment 

verification. Some of this legislation includes proposals that would require implementing a mandatory, functional electronic employment verification program for all 

employers before other immigration-related reforms could be initiated. Currently, 

the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) administers, and Social Security Administration (SSA) supports, a voluntary electronic employment 

verification program, called the Employment Eligibility Verification (EEV) program. 

My testimony today is an update of our prior work regarding employment 

verification and worksite enforcement. Specifically, I will discuss our observations 

on the current electronic employment verification program and challenges to making 

the program mandatory for all employers. 

In preparing this testimony, we reviewed our past work on employment 

verification and worksite enforcement efforts.3 We analyzed updated information 

provided by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), USCIS, and SSA officials on steps they are taking to address weaknesses identified in our prior work, 

as well as challenges their agencies may face if an electronic employment 

verification program were made mandatory. We examined regulations, guidance, 

and other studies on the employment verification process. We also analyzed a report 

on the results of an independent evaluation of the electronic employment eligibility 

verification program, then known as the Basic Pilot program, conducted by the Institute for Survey Research at Temple University and Westat in June 2004.4 Furwwoods2 on PROD1PC60 with HEARING

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5 In 2004, the most recent year for which data are available, there were approximately 5.9 

million firms in the United States. A firm is a business organization consisting of one or more 

domestic establishments in the same state and industry that were specified under common ownership or control. Under EEV, one employer may have multiple worksites that use the system. 

For example, a hotel chain could have multiple individual hotels using EEV. This hotel chain 

would represent one employer using the pilot program. 6 In general, in cases when the EEV system cannot confirm an employee’s work authorization 

status through the initial automatic check, the system issues the employer either an SSA or 

a DHS tentative nonconfirmation of the employee’s work authorization status, which requires 

the employee to resolve any data inaccuracies if he or she is able or chooses to do so. 

thermore, we received updated data on employer use of the current electronic employment eligibility verification system. We reviewed these data for accuracy and 

completeness and determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. We conducted the work reflected in this statement from September 2004 through July 2005 and updated this information in May and June 2007 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Summary 

A mandatory EEV would necessitate an increased capacity at both USCIS and 

SSA to accommodate the estimated 5.9 million employers in the United States.5 As 

of May 2007, about 17,000 employers have registered for the EEV program, about 

half of which are active users. USCIS has estimated that a mandatory EEV could 

cost USCIS $70 million annually for program management and $300 million to $400 

million annually for compliance activities and staff, depending on the method for implementing the program. The costs associated with other programmatic and system 

enhancements are currently unknown. SSA is currently refining its estimates and 

was not yet able to provide estimates for the cost of a mandatory EEV. According 

to SSA officials, the cost of a mandatory EEV would be driven by the field offices’ 

increased workload required to resolve queries that SSA cannot immediately confirm. 

USCIS and SSA are exploring options to reduce delays in the EEV process. According to USCIS, the majority of EEV queries entered by employers—about 92 percent—confirm within seconds that the employee is authorized to work. About 7 percent of the queries cannot be immediately confirmed by SSA, and about 1 percent 

cannot be immediately confirmed by USCIS. With regard to the SSA-issued tentative nonconfirmations,6 USCIS and SSA officials told us that the majority occur 

because employees’ citizenship or other information, such as name changes, is not 

up to date in the SSA database. Resolving some DHS nonconfirmations can take 

several days, or in a few cases even weeks. USCIS and SSA are examining ways 

to improve the system’s ability to use additional automated checks to immediately 

confirm work authorization. 

EEV may help reduce document fraud, but it cannot yet fully address identity 

fraud issues, for example, when employees present borrowed or stolen genuine documents. The current EEV program is piloting a photograph screening tool, whereby 

an employer can more easily identify fraudulent documentation. This tool is currently being used by over 70 employers, and USCIS expects to expand the use of 

the tool to all participating employers by the end of summer 2007. Although mandatory EEV and the associated use of the photograph screening tool offer some remedy, further actions, such as limiting the number of acceptable work authorization 

documents and making them more secure, may be required to more fully address 

identity fraud. 

EEV is vulnerable to employer fraud that diminishes its effectiveness and misuse 

that adversely affects employees. ICE officials stated that EEV program data could 

indicate cases in which employers may be fraudulently using the system and therefore would help the agency better target its limited worksite enforcement resources 

toward those employers. EEV is also vulnerable to employer misuse that adversely 

affects employees, such as limiting work assignments or pay while employees are 

undergoing the verification process. USCIS is establishing a new Compliance and 

Monitoring program to help reduce employer fraud and misuse by, for example, 

identifying patterns in employer compliance with program requirements. Information suggesting employers’ fraud or misuse of the system could be useful to other 

DHS components in targeting limited worksite enforcement resources and promoting employer compliance with employment laws. 

Background 

In 1986, IRCA established the employment verification process based on employers’ review of documents presented by employees to prove identity and work eligibility. On the Form I–9, employees must attest that they are U.S. citizens, lawfully 

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7 Eight of these documents establish both identity and employment eligibility (e.g., U.S. passport or permanent resident card); 12 documents establish identity only (e.g., driver’s license); 

and 7 documents establish employment eligibility only (e.g., Social Security card). 8 U.S.C. 1324a(b). IIRIRA was enacted within a larger piece of legislation, the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009. 9The other two pilot programs mandated by IIRIRA—the Citizen Attestation Verification Pilot 

Program and the Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program—were discontinued in 2003 due 

to technical difficulties and unintended consequences identified in evaluations of the programs. 

See Institute for Survey Research and Westat, Findings of the Citizen Attestation Verification 

Pilot Program Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: April 2003) and Institute for Survey Research and 

Westat, Findings of the Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program Evaluation (Washington, 

D.C.: May 2003). 

admitted permanent residents, or aliens authorized to work in the United States. 

Employers must then certify that they have reviewed the documents presented by 

their employees to establish identity and work eligibility and that the documents 

appear genuine and relate to the individual presenting them. In making their certifications, employers are expected to judge whether the documents presented are 

obviously counterfeit or fraudulent. Employers generally are deemed in compliance 

with IRCA if they have followed the Form I–9 process in good faith, including when 

an unauthorized alien presents fraudulent documents that appear genuine. Following the passage of IRCA in 1986, employees could present 29 different documents to establish their identity and/or work eligibility. In a 1997 interim rule, the 

former U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) reduced the number of 

acceptable work eligibility documents from 29 to 27.7

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 8 of 

1996 required the former INS and SSA to operate three voluntary pilot programs 

to test electronic means for employers to verify an employee’s eligibility to work, one 

of which was the Basic Pilot Program.9 The Basic Pilot Program was designed to 

test whether pilot verification procedures could improve the existing employment 

verification process by reducing (1) false claims of U.S. citizenship and document 

fraud, (2) discrimination against employees, (3) violations of civil liberties and privacy, and (4) the burden on employers to verify employees’ work eligibility. 

In 2007, USCIS renamed the Basic Pilot Program the Employment Eligibility 

Verification (EEV) program. EEV provides participating employers with an electronic method to verify their employees’ work eligibility. Employers may participate 

voluntarily in EEV, but are still required to complete Forms I–9 for all newly hired 

employees in accordance with IRCA. After completing the forms, these employers 

query EEV’s automated system by entering employee information provided on the 

forms, such as name and Social Security number, into the EEV Web site within 3 

working days of the employees’ hire date. The program then electronically matches 

that information against information in SSA’s NUMIDENT database and, for noncitizens, DHS databases to determine whether the employee is eligible to work. EEV 

electronically notifies employers whether their employees’ work authorization was 

confirmed. Those queries that the DHS automated check cannot confirm are referred to DHS immigration status verifiers, who check employee information against 

information in other DHS databases. The EEV process is shown in figure 1. 

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10 Active users are those employers who have run at least one query in fiscal year 2007. 

Figure 1: Electronic Employment Verification Program Verification Process 

In cases when EEV cannot confirm an employee’s work authorization status either 

through the automatic check or the check by an immigration status verifier, the system issues the employer a tentative nonconfirmation of the employee’s work authorization status. In this case, the employers must notify the affected employees of the 

finding, and the employees have the right to contest their tentative nonconfirmations by contacting SSA or USCIS to resolve any inaccuracies in their records within 

8 days. During this time, employers may not take any adverse actions against those 

employees, such as limiting their work assignments or pay. After 10 days, employers 

are required to either immediately terminate the employment or notify DHS of the 

continued employment of workers who do not successfully contest the tentative nonconfirmation and those who the pilot program finds are not work-authorized. 

The EEV program is a part of USCIS’s Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements Program, which provides a variety of verification services for federal, state, 

and local government agencies. USCIS estimates that there are more than 150,000 

federal, state, and local agency users that verify immigration status through the 

Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements Program. SSA also operates various 

verification services. Among these are the Employee Verification Service (EVS) and 

the Web-based SSN Verification Service (SSNVS), which can be used to provide 

verification that employees’ names and Social Security numbers match SSA’s 

records. These services, designed to ensure accurate employer wage reporting, are 

offered free of charge. Employer use is voluntary, and the services are not widely 

used. 

EEV Would Require An Increase in Capacity at USCIS and SSA 

Mandatory electronic employment verification would substantially increase the 

number of employers using the EEV system, which would place greater demands 

on USCIS and SSA resources. As of May 2007, about 17,000 employers have registered to use the program, 8,863 of which were active users,10 and USCIS has estiwwoods2 on PROD1PC60 with HEARING


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11 In general, in cases when the EEV system cannot confirm an employee’s work authorization 

status through the initial automatic check, the system issues the employer a tentative nonconfirmation of the employee’s work authorization status. 12Thirty-eight immigration status verifiers were available for completing secondary 

verifications. According to USCIS, at any one time about 3 to 5 immigration status verifiers 

work to resolve tentative nonconfirmations. The other immigration status verifiers work on 

other verification programs, such as the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements Program. 13 USCIS officials noted that this does not include staff for monitoring and compliance functions. 

mated that employer registration is expected to greatly increase by the end of fiscal 

year 2007. If participation in the EEV program were made mandatory, the program 

may have to accommodate all of the estimated 5.9 million employers in the United 

States. USCIS officials estimate that to meet a December 2008 implementation 

date, this could require about of 30,000 employers to register with the system per 

day. The mandatory use EEV can affect the capacity of the system because of the 

increased number of employer queries. USCIS has estimated that a mandatory EEV could cost USCIS $70 million annu- ally for program management and $300 million to $400 million annually for compliance activities and staff. The costs associated with other programmatic and system 

enhancements are currently unknown. According to USCIS, cost estimates will rise 

if the number of queries rises, although officials noted that the estimates may depend on the method for implementing a mandatory program. SSA officials told us 

they have estimated that expansion of the EEV program to levels predicted by the 

end of fiscal year 2007 would cost $5 to $6 million, but SSA was not yet able to 

provide us estimates for the cost of a mandatory EEV. According to SSA officials, 

the cost of a mandatory EEV would be driven by the increased workload of its field 

office staff due to resolving SSA tentative nonconfirmations.11

A mandatory EEV would require an increase in the number of USCIS and SSA 

staff to operate the program. For example, USCIS had 13 headquarters staff members in 2005 to run the program and 38 immigration status verifiers available for 

secondary verification.12 USCIS plans to increase staff levels to 255 to manage a 

mandatory program, which includes increasing the number of immigration status 

verifiers who conduct secondary verifications.13 USCIS officials expressed concern 

about the difficulty in hiring these staff due to lengthy hiring processes, which may 

include government background checks. In addition, according to SSA officials, a 

mandatory EEV program would require additional staff at SSA field offices to accommodate an increase in the number of individuals visiting SSA field offices to resolve tentative nonconfirmations. According to SSA officials, the number of new staff 

required would depend on both the legislative requirements for implementing mandatory EEV and the effectiveness of efforts USCIS has under way to decrease the 

need for individuals to visit SSA field offices. For this reason, SSA officials told us 

they have not yet estimated how many additional staff they would need for a mandatory EEV. 

USCIS and SSA Are Exploring Options to Reduce Delays in the EEV Proc- ess 

In prior work, we reported that secondary verifications lengthen the time needed 

to complete the employment verification process. The majority of EEV queries entered by employers—about 92 percent—confirm within seconds that the employee is 

authorized to work. About 7 percent of the queries are not confirmed by the initial 

automated check and result in SSA-issued tentative nonconfirmations, while about 

1 percent result in DHS-issued tentative nonconfirmations. With regard to the SSAissued tentative nonconfirmations, USCIS and SSA officials told us that the majority occur because employees’ citizenship status or other information, such as name 

changes, is not up to date in the SSA database. SSA does not update records unless 

an individual requests the update in person and submits the required evidence to 

support the change in its records. USCIS officials stated that, for example, when 

aliens become naturalized citizens, their citizenship status is often not updated in 

the SSA database. In addition, individuals who have changed their names for various reasons, such as marriage, without notifying SSA in person may also be issued 

an SSA tentative nonconfirmation. According to SSA officials, although SSA instructs individuals to report any changes in name, citizenship, or immigration status, many do not do so. When these individuals’ information is queried through 

EEV, a tentative nonconfirmation would be issued, requiring them to go to an SSA 

field office to show proof of the change and to correct their records in SSA’s database. 

USCIS and SSA are exploring some options to improve the efficiency of the 

verification process. For example, USCIS is exploring ways to automatically check 

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14 According to USCIS, providing these data to employers would be voluntary to help ensure 

that naturalized citizens are not subject to discrimination. 15 Currently, once an individual resolves the reason for the SSA tentative nonconfirmation, the 

employer must then re-query the EEV system in order to finalize the verification. 16GAO–05–813. 

for naturalized citizens’ work authorization using DHS databases before the EEV 

system issues a tentative nonconfirmation. Furthermore, USCIS is planning to provide naturalized citizens with the option, on a voluntary basis, to provide their Alien 

Number or Naturalization Certification Number so that employers can query that 

information through the EEV system before referring the employees to SSA to resolve tentative nonconfirmations.14 SSA is also coordinating with USCIS to develop 

an automated secondary verification capability, which may reduce the need for employers to take additional steps after the employee resolves the SSA tentative nonconfirmation.15 USCIS and SSA officials told us that the agencies are planning to 

provide SSA field office staff with access to the EEV system so that field office staff 

can resolve the SSA tentative nonconfirmation directly in the system at the time 

the employee’s record is updated at the field office. According to SSA officials, the 

automated secondary verification capability is tentatively scheduled to be implemented by October 2007. While these steps may help improve the efficiency of the 

verification process, including eliminating some SSA tentative nonconfirmations, 

they will not entirely eliminate the need for some individuals to visit SSA field offices to update records when individuals’ status or other information changes. 

USCIS and SSA officials noted that because the current EEV program is voluntary, the percentage of individuals who are referred to SSA field offices to resolve 

tentative nonconfirmations may not accurately indicate the number of individuals 

who would be required to do so under a mandatory program. SSA and USCIS officials expressed concern about the effect on SSA field offices’ workload of the number 

of individuals who would be required to physically visit a field office if EEV were 

made mandatory. 

May Help Reduce Employee Document Fraud, but Cannot Yet Fully Address Identity Fraud Issues 

In our prior work, we reported that EEV enhances the ability of participating employers to reliably verify their employees’ work eligibility and assists participating 

employers with identification of false documents used to obtain employment.16 If 

newly hired employees present false information, EEV would not confirm the employees’ work eligibility because their information, such as a false name or social 

security number, would not match SSA and DHS database information. However, 

the current EEV program is limited in its ability to help employers detect identity 

fraud, such as cases in which an individual presents borrowed or stolen genuine documents. 

USCIS has taken steps to reduce fraud associated with the use of documents containing valid information on which another photograph has been substituted for the 

document’s original photograph. In March 2007, USCIS began piloting a photograph 

screening tool as an addition to the current EEV system. According to USCIS officials, the photograph screening tool is intended to allow an employer to verify the 

authenticity of a Lawful Permanent Resident card (green card) or Employment Authorization Document that contain photographs of the document holder by comparing individuals’ photographs on the documents presented during the I–9 process 

to those maintained in DHS databases. As of May 2007, about 70 employers have 

been participating during the pilot phase of the photograph screening tool, and EEV 

has processed about 400 queries through the tool. USCIS expects to expand the program to all employers participating in EEV by the end of summer 2007. 

The use of the photograph screening tool is currently limited because newly hired 

citizens and noncitizens presenting forms of documentation other than green cards 

or Employment Authorization Documents to verify work eligibility are not subject 

to the tool. Expansion of the pilot photograph screening tool would require incorporating other forms of documentation with related databases. In addition, efforts 

to expand the tool are still in the initial planning stages. For example, according 

to USCIS officials, USCIS and the Department of State have begun exploring ways 

to include visa and U.S. passport documents in the tool, but these agencies have 

not yet reached agreement regarding the use of these documents. USCIS is also exploring a possible pilot program with state Departments of Motor Vehicles. 

In prior work we reported that although not specifically or comprehensively quantifiable, the prevalence of identity fraud seemed to be increasing, a development 

that may affect employers’ ability to reliably verify employment eligibility in a mandatory EEV program. The large number and variety of acceptable work authorizawwoods2 on PROD1PC60 with HEARING

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tion documents—27 under the current employment verification process—along with 

inherent vulnerabilities to counterfeiting of some of these documents, may complicate efforts to address identity fraud. Although mandatory EEV and the associated use of the photograph screening tool offers some remedy, further actions, such 

as reducing the number of acceptable work eligibility documents and making them 

more secure, may be required to more fully address identity fraud. 

Most Employers Complied with EEV Procedures, the Program Is Vulnerable to Employer Fraud That Diminishes Its Effectiveness and Misuse 

That Adversely Affects Employees 

While Most Employers Complied with EEV Procedures, the Program Is Vulnerable to Employer Fraud That Diminishes Its Effectiveness and Misuse That Adversely Affects Employees. 

EEV is vulnerable to acts of employer fraud, such as entering the same identity 

information to authorize multiple workers. Although ICE has no direct role in monitoring employer use of EEV and does not have direct access to program information, 

which is maintained by USCIS, ICE officials told us that program data could indicate cases in which employers may be fraudulently using the system and therefore 

would help the agency better target its limited worksite enforcement resources toward those employers. ICE officials noted that, in a few cases, they have requested 

and received EEV data from USCIS on specific employers who participate in the 

program and are under ICE investigation. USCIS is planning to use its newly created Compliance and Monitoring program to refer information on employers who 

may be fraudulently using the EEV system, although USCIS and ICE are still determining what information is appropriate to share. 

Employees queried through EEV may be adversely affected if employers violate 

program obligations designed to protect the employees, by taking actions such as 

limiting work assignments or pay while employees are undergoing the verification 

process. The 2004 Temple University Institute for Survey Research and Westat 

evaluation of EEV concluded that the majority of employers surveyed appeared to 

be in compliance with EEV procedures. However, the evaluation and our prior review found evidence of some noncompliance with these procedures. In 2005, we reported that EEV provided a variety of reports that could help USCIS determine 

whether employers followed program requirements, but that USCIS lacked sufficient staff to do so. Since then, USCIS has added staff to its verification office and 

created a Compliance and Monitoring program to review employers’ use of the EEV 

system. However, while USCIS has hired directors for these functions, the program 

is not yet fully staffed. According to USCIS officials, USCIS is still in the process 

of determining how this program will carry out compliance and monitoring functions, but its activities may include sampling employer usage data for evidence of 

noncompliant practices, such as identifying employers who do not appear to refer 

employees contesting tentative nonconfirmations to SSA or USCIS. USCIS estimates 

that the Compliance and Monitoring program will be sufficiently staffed to begin 

identifying employer noncompliance by late summer 2007. 

USCIS’s newly created Compliance and Monitoring program could help ICE better 

target its worksite enforcement efforts by indicating cases of employers’ egregious 

misuse of the system. Currently, there is no formal mechanism for sharing compliance data between USCIS and ICE. ICE officials noted that proactive reduction of 

illegal employment through the use of functional, mandatory EEV may help reduce 

the need for and better focus worksite enforcement efforts. Moreover, these officials 

told us that mandatory use of an automated system like EEV could limit the ability 

of employers who knowingly hired unauthorized workers to claim that the workers 

presented false documents to obtain employment, which could assist ICE agents in 

proving employer violations of IRCA. 

Concluding Observations 

Although efforts to reduce the employment of unauthorized workers in the United 

States necessitate a strong employment eligibility verification process and a credible 

worksite enforcement program and other immigration reforms may be dependent on 

it, a number of challenges face its successful implementation. The EEV program 

shows promise for enhancing the employment verification process and reducing document fraud if implemented on a much larger scale, and USCIS and SSA have undertaken a number of steps to address many of the weaknesses we identified in the 

EEV program. USCIS has also spent the last several years planning for an expanded or mandatory program, and has made progress in several areas, but it is 

unclear at this time the extent to which USCIC’s efforts will be successful under 

mandatory EEV. It is clear, however, that a mandatory EEV system will require a 

substantial investment in staff and other resources, at least in the near term, in 

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both agencies. There are also issues, such as identity fraud and intentional misuse, 

that will remain a challenge to the system. Implementing an EEV system to ensure 

that all individuals working in this country are doing so legally and that undue burdens are not placed on employers or employees will not be an easy task within the 

timelines suggested in reform proposals. 

This concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions you and the subcommittee members may have. 

f 

Chairman MCNULTY. We thank all of the witnesses for their 

testimony. Let me just begin by generally framing the issue, and 

then we will go to some of my colleagues for questions. 

This Committee has been working for some time, and as a matter of fact for some years, on the whole issue of the backlog in the 

disability claims and so on, and all of the problems related to that. 

And the situation as it exists right now I believe is a national embarrassment. When people are legitimately entitled to a government benefit and come to the government to apply for that benefit, 

and are told, you have to wait a year and a half or two years just 

to get an answer, I think that is a disgrace. 

So we are working on that as a separate issue, and we made 

some progress in the budget resolution this year, and we hope to 

have some results during the appropriations process. 

With that as a backdrop, when I look at this issue I see a massive new undertaking here that is going to cost an awful lot of 

money and require an awful lot of additional backup. I just want 

to elicit from you your views as to how effective you think we can 

be in a reasonable timeframe in setting up such a new system. 

Now, Mr. Schaeffer, you mentioned additional visits to field offices. If we were to expand this program to the estimated 60 million new hires this year, how many additional field office visits do 

you think that would entail? 

Mr. SCHAEFFER. I would hesitate to put an exact number, but 

it would be a substantial increase on the visits that are now taking 

place, and without increased staff, would obviously lead to the disability backlog problem probably being exacerbated as opposed to 

being addressed timely. 

Chairman MCNULTY. Based upon how past Administrations 

and Congresses have addressed the backlog issue, how confident 

are you that the resources would be there? 

Mr. SCHAEFFER. I would refer to Mr. Streckewald to answer 

that question. 

Chairman MCNULTY. That is fine. 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. I really can’t hazard a guess, but our position is that we can do whatever Congress asks us. We always have, 

but need to be funded for it. This, as you said, Mr. Chairman, is 

a huge new workload for us if we go to mandatory EEVS. I think 

the estimate of 2 or 3,000 more work years, more people, hundreds 

of millions of dollars of more money each year, is in the ballpark. 

We need time to hire, equip and train new people so that they 

can do this. We don’t know if we would expand our field offices. We 

would probably try to fit them into the existing field offices and 

tele-service centers. Our position is we hope Congress does see the 

need to fund us for this workload so that it doesn’t disrupt our 

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other critical workloads. As you mentioned, one of them is a top 

priority—the disability hearings. 

Chairman MCNULTY. Could you be any more specific with regard to the additional number of work years that would be involved? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. We are still working on our final figures. 

We are looking at a couple of key elements that get us to that figure. One critical element is the fallout rate. Right now, for every 

100 queries, we have three contacts to the field office or the teleservice centers. 

So, we are trying to use these key elements as a base and think 

through what a mandatory system would look like instead of a voluntary system because our assumption is that companies that volunteer for EEVS probably have fewer people trying to pass off as 

legal workers. 

So, we have roughly, in our estimates for mandatory EEVS that 

we are working on now, doubled the full-out rate. So, we figured 

it may be as high as 6 percent fallout rate. That fallout rate means 

that 6 percent of, let’s say, 60 million new hires per year will be 

3.6 million extra visits or phone calls to our field offices. 

Each one of those takes 15 to 20 minutes to resolve, and most 

of them will be resolved, as my colleague said, in probably just a 

short period of time. Some of them may take a little longer if we 

have to go through some additional verification processes. 

That is the business process that we already are set up to do. It 

would just greatly increase the volume of that business process. 

That is why the funding is so critical. 

Chairman MCNULTY. As we move along further in this process 

and you do your additional analysis, can you give us more specific 

information? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. I would be glad to do that, and work with 

the Committee to do that. 

Chairman MCNULTY. Great. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to follow up on that, Mr. Streckewald. Why do you 

need more money and employees if it is all computerized? Theoretically, according to the way I am told it operates, you punch a button and a guy gets an instant response. You just said that. 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. Now, 92 percent of the time, you are right. 

Employers get an instant response. What we are looking at is the 

ones that don’t have an instant response, the ones that don’t match 

our records. It is about 7 percent for our records, I think 1 percent 

for DHS records. 

So, if you look at 7 percent, out of that, some people would never 

contact SSA because they are illegal workers. A lot of them are 

legal workers, are citizens, where their records just don’t match our 

records. So, they come into our offices. They show us the proofs 

that they need to show. We change our records to make sure that 

they are up to date and then they fit what the employer has. Then 

employees are authorized to work, and life goes on. 

There is a lot of work, depending on the volume, if we go to a 

mandatory EEVS. 

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Mr. JOHNSON. How do you report the ones that don’t check out? 

Do you report them to—— 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. The ones that come through the system 

and are verified? 

Mr. JOHNSON. That aren’t verified. 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. Well, we do have a system for reporting 

those, and we are working on a system that allows us to report 

back to the employer to tell them the status of the resolution of the 

mis-match. So, we are building that system so that the employers 

will know and we will know and DHS will know how many cases 

we get and what the resolution of each case is. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. It is amazing to me that MasterCard 

and Visa can do it instantly all over the world, and you can’t do 

it here. 

Mr. Stana, Mr. Rotenberg, a witness on our next panel, tells us 

last month the Department of Homeland Security lost the employment records of 100,000 Federal employees containing names, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, and bank account information. 

At a time when we are considering a massive expansion of the 

collection of personal information by DHS, how can we be sure that 

DHS can adequately safeguard workers’ personal information? 

Mr. STANA. Well, let me say right up front that GAO has not 

done a stress test, a privacy test, or we haven’t done any penetration testing of the system. We have spoken with DHS about their 

system, and they capture this sensitive information on an Oracle 

database. They have done privacy testing, and they are of the opinion that they can safeguard the records. They have done the privacy checks in accordance with law. 

Now, having said that, any time you collect data on hundreds of 

thousands or millions of people, there is always the chance that 

something may go awry. By the way, the 100,000 example you 

used, I believe, was a TSA laptop. This is a little bit different. This 

is a mainframe application, mainly. 

Now, we have watched—as Members of the Subcommittee may 

have—watched USCIS test the EEVS system using a phony name 

to see what happens. The EEVS system is password protected, and 

it does have the certain kinds of protections that you would expect 

to see in remote applications. 

So, I guess it would remain to be seen exactly how safe it is. 

They do need to keep information in these databases because they 

do want to do pattern testing over time. So, another issue is how 

long do they keep the information? and DHS hasn’t really resolved 

that yet, either. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, thank you. According to what I understand, less than 1 percent of the employers are participating in 

that program now. On page 8 of your testimony, you say that according to DHS, in order to begin implementation for all employers 

beginning in December 2008, you need 30,000—or 30,000 employers would be required to register with the system per day. 

With that, substantial investment will be needed in staffs, systems, resources. Can you assure the Congress that such an enormous data collection processing system can be established? 

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Mr. STANA. If you ask them to put something in place, something will be in place. Something is in place right now, and it has 

17,000 registrants, and 8800 consistent users. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Is the ‘‘something’’ going to work? Is that system 

going to work? 

Mr. STANA. They are trying to expand EEVS to about 6 million 

businesses. It is a very hard thing to do. If I could just put it into 

perspective, everyone on the dais is working on a two-year term, 

and there are approximately 18 months left in your term. 

So, if you figure it that way, by the end of your term of office 

for this term—whether you go on to the next term is another 

thing—DHS has to hire 255 program staff, 1800 monitoring staff, 

procure office space, develop operating procedures, inform employers how to work the system, support worksite enforcement areas, 

register approximately 30,000 businesses per day starting now. The 

longer you wait—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, how did you get those figures? You said 

GAO hasn’t even looked at it yet. 

Mr. STANA. Oh, no. We looked at the program. We did not look 

at the stress testing on the computer system. These are all things 

that would have to be done so that by December 2008, it is ready 

to service 5.9 million employers. 

Now, there are ways to manage that. You can phase it in, or you 

could enroll certain industries first, perhaps those involving critical 

infrastructure. That is what it would take. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I am over my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCNULTY. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. Levin may inquire. 

Mr. LEVIN. So, what would be the cost of what you just read? 

Mr. STANA. What USCIS estimated for the first year of oper- ation, I believe, was $70 million in management costs and about 

$300 to $400 million for compliance and investigative staff. That 

doesn’t include computer upgrades that would be necessary. It 

doesn’t include ICE investigators that follow up on any leads of employer abuse of employees or misuse. It is going to be substantial. 

Now, having said that, any immigration expert would probably 

tell you that of the handful of things that are must-haves in an immigration reform proposal, this would be one of them. So, it is 

probably more a question of what type of a verification program 

you have, not whether you would have one. 

Mr. LEVIN. I think the Senate is going to be acting. They may 

act this week. And the odds seem to be that they are going to pass 

a bill. And so the odds are that we are going to need to address 

this in the House. And so we need to begin to prepare for the possibility, if not the probability. 

To pick up what the Chairman said, who is doing the hard work 

of itemizing the costs of this? Who is doing that? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. In Social Security, we have a budget shop 

that works with the systems people and the programs people, and 

our field office people, everybody that has a role in this. They have 

a process they go through for any new workload. They try to budget it and figure what the total cost would be. They are just now 

revising those figures, so we don’t have them here today. We will 

be happy to, again, submit them when they are available. 

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Mr. LEVIN. When is that going to be? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. When is that going to be? 

Mr. LEVIN. More or less? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. More or less, it should be shortly. I don’t 

know exactly when, but in the next few weeks or shorter, I would 

guess. 

Mr. LEVIN. No. I think if it is a few weeks, it will be before we 

pass the bill. 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. What has been very helpful to us in getting ready for this has been the expansion of the system that DHS 

and SSA have partnered in. DHS is registering more employers 

onto the system, which means we both have to build greater capacity, and we have to make sure our business processes are sound, 

and we have to move forward on building additional functionality 

into the system. 

So, that is in essence preparing us for great expansion, just by 

preparing for moderate expansion. 

Mr. LEVIN. Yes, but there is a cost to that, too. Right? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. Yes, there is. We have a reimbursable 

agreement that we have developed between DHS and SSA that is 

not yet signed, but at this point I think it is with the lawyers from 

each agency, looking to make sure everything is right from their 

agency’s perspective. 

Mr. LEVIN. And it has a cost estimate? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. It has a cost estimate in there for this 

year. It is based upon—— 

Mr. LEVIN. When you say for this year, you mean—— 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. 2007. 

Mr. LEVIN. This fiscal year? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. Right. 

Mr. LEVIN. And who is making the projection for next fiscal 

year? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. Well, that is the budget shop that I was 

talking about a little bit earlier. They are waiting to see what the 

exact elements of a bill will be, and then they will plug in those 

provisions and do the math and come up with an estimate. 

Mr. LEVIN. So, you would expect that there will be available to 

the Congress within the next short period a detailed itemization of 

what this would cost, assuming there is complete coverage. What 

kind of timeline is being assumed, and which bill? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. For getting it implemented, from our perspective? I think the timeline—the ramp-up approach—that is in 

the current bill is probably sufficient for us. It kind of starts slowly, 

then builds up. 

Mr. LEVIN. When you say the current bill, you mean? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. The Senate bill. 

Mr. LEVIN. The Senate bill. 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. It starts over a several-year period, starts 

with critical infrastructure, moves to new hires, and then moves to 

everybody, your whole payroll. So, that allows us—as long as we 

get the money early in the fiscal year—it allows us to hire, train, 

and equip new employees to deal with the increased business and 

increased workload. 

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As that ramps up, so will our efforts to hire, train, and equip 

new employees. So, we think that that is very doable with the appropriate funding at the beginning of each year. 

Mr. LEVIN. The appropriate funding is going to be major, is it 

not? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. Well, as I mentioned, in the neighborhood, 

if you will, without giving any specific figures yet because they are 

not done with our estimates, it could be in the peak years as much 

as 2 to 3,000 work years or, as I say, people, extra people, new 

hires, and up to $300 million a year during the peak years. So, that 

is significant for us. 

Mr. LEVIN. Two to 3,000? That is included in the figure you 

gave? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. Yes. I tried to convert it to millions of dollars. Basically—the major cost of that is people. 

Mr. LEVIN. As I close, Mr. Chairman, I think that underlines 

the need for this Congress and the Administration to face up to the 

additional costs, because we do not want it to deter the effort to 

get hold of the disability issue. You are going to be very blunt and 

direct about what is needed, right? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. We are going to have our estimates shortly, and I will make sure that everybody is aware of them. 

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you. 

Chairman MCNULTY. Mr. Streckewald, what about the old estimate I saw here of the agency estimating that it would cost approximately $10 billion to issue these new cards? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. That estimate—— 

Chairman MCNULTY. That estimate is in the budget of Social 

Security. 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. Yes. We were talking about a different 

process here. If we are talking about issuing new cards—I think 

the $10 billion was reference to new cards—— 

Chairman MCNULTY. Right. 

Mr. STRECKEWALD [continuing]. What we had been talking 

about was the fallout from the employer verification system. If we 

go to issuing new cards to all new workers of all people in the 

United States over 14 years of age. Yes, that figure is still approximately right. If you did it over 2 years or 5 years, it is going to 

take about $10 billion to issue new cards to most of the people in 

the United States. I don’t think it is much different today. It might 

be a little higher today than when that was estimated a year ago. 

Chairman MCNULTY. And I would again state for the record 

that is more than the entire SSA operating budget right now. 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. That is right. 

Chairman MCNULTY. Mr. Lewis may inquire. 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to go back to the privacy issue just for a minute here. 

Mr. Schaeffer, your office supports data sharing and disclosure restrictions between the Social Security Administration and the Department of Homeland Security. At the same time, I am sure you 

would agree that the importance of protecting the privacy of taxpayers is important. 

So, what information should be shared with the Department of 

Homeland Security? 

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Mr. SCHAEFFER. Well, currently there is a limit on the information that we can share because of IRS rules and regulations. 

Some of the information that may be useful to share if you really 

want to get a handle on people working in the country illegally 

would be to focus on the employers that consistently have a large 

number of items going into the earnings suspense file, which 

means that the name and the Social Security number could not 

match up within SSA’s records to a legitimate number holder; and 

then have the appropriate enforcement action take place. 

It is really difficult to try to go after the individuals because you 

are really talking about millions of items that are going into the 

ESF. So, the number of employers are much more finite, and that 

is where it starts with. These employers are giving individuals a 

job where their name and Social Security number do not match up 

to SSA’s records. 

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Stana, would you like to comment? 

Mr. STANA. You know, I would be a little cautious about sharing 

a lot of data quickly with DHS if I were in SSA’s shoes. The reasons are that, first, we haven’t had the full certification testing of 

the databases, and we’d just want to make sure that they are in 

good shape security-wise. 

Second, the data that has been available to DHS in the past, 

hasn’t been used. So, why would you want to release a lot of information that they are not likely to use? Certainly SSA would want 

to, on a case by case basis, at least, start out and to DHS say, what 

is most useful to you, how can we help you, and let’s limit it to that 

initially. 

Once, DHS ramps up its compliance units, maybe there will be 

opportunities for more broadly sharing information. I think the 

kind of information that would be most useful to them, knowing 

how their worksite and employer/employee compliance efforts work, 

the kind of information that would be most useful would be information dealing with Social Security numbers over time that keep 

being used again and again by workers or employers. 

Information about patterns over 10 years of noncompliance might 

be in the earnings suspense file, maybe in other documents or 

databases. I would be very carefully initially about opening it up 

wholesale until we really had a better sense of what is useful. 

Mr. LEWIS. Very good. Thank you. 

Chairman MCNULTY. Thank you. 

Mr. Becerra may inquire. 

Mr. BECERRA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all of 

you for your testimony. And Mr. Chairman, thank you for this 

timely hearing. I think it is important for us to move on this as 

quickly as we can in the event there is comprehensive immigration 

reform. 

Gentlemen, let me ask a question, and first focus on the cost of 

the current EEVS system. I suspect I should probably first ask Mr. 

Streckewald this: How much did the EEVS system cost the SSA to 

administer or to conduct last year, in 2006? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. It cost us $891,000. 

Mr. BECERRA. Under an agreement you have with DHS, Homeland Security, you are to be reimbursed for those costs of doing 

those inquiries? 

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Mr. STRECKEWALD. Yes. 

Mr. BECERRA. Have you yet been reimbursed? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. No. Not for that money. 

Mr. BECERRA. Are you expecting to be reimbursed? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. We hope to be reimbursed. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. I assume our lawyers are still working to 

resolve it, but that is almost a million dollars. That is a lot of 

money. Actually, it is a million if you count a little bit of money 

left over from 2005 that they weren’t able to pay us. So, approximately a million dollars, and to us every million counts. So, we do 

hope to get that money reimbursed. 

Mr. BECERRA. You mentioned a scary word, lawyers. Is there 

a reason why a Federal Government agency, SSA, is having to employ its lawyers to talk to another Federal Government agency, the 

Department of Homeland Security, when it has an agreement, a 

document, that says that it is to be reimbursed? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. I can’t speak to that. I know that DHS felt 

that it didn’t get the funding in order to be able to reimburse us, 

and we said, well, we are doing work here. So there has been a 

friendly, so far, exchange of arguments. I hope that it does get resolved where we are reimbursed for the money. I don’t disagree 

with the point you are making. 

Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Chairman, we may want to inquire of DHS 

when we have that opportunity. 

My understanding is, and you can correct me, Mr. Streckewald, 

if I am wrong, but that for every million dollars, you could conduct 

some 565 additional disability hearings to help reduce that backlog 

of over 1.3 million cases of Americans waiting to have their disability claim processed through SSA. 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. That is true. 

Mr. BECERRA. So for every million dollars that DHS doesn’t reimburse you, under which they have an agreement to do so, then 

you have to either cut back on services or allow those individuals 

to wait even longer as they wait for their hearing to determine if 

they should be receiving disability benefits. 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. You are right. 

Mr. BECERRA. How much have you spent so far to date doing 

the inquiries that are required under the EEVS system, the employment verification system, for DHS? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. This year? 

Mr. BECERRA. Yes. 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. We have had 1.8 million inquiries, or queries. So, what we are doing is setting up a reimbursable agreement 

for the rest of the year because this was—— 

Mr. BECERRA. If you could try to just give me the answer. I 

apologize. It is just that I am going to run out of time. How much 

do you estimate you have spent to date conducting EEVS services 

for DHS? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. Well, I think it would be in the neighborhood of $2 million that SSA has not been reimbursed because last 

year it was nearly a million. This year, so far, we are about the 

pace of last year. So, approximately $2 million. We could probably 

submit the exact number for the record. [INSERT] 

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Mr. BECERRA. Could you do that? My understanding from some 

of the information we received from Committee staff was that it 

was now exceeding $5 million. 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. $5.9 million is the amount for all of FY 

2007. We have a reimbursable agreement that we are working on 

with DHS. They say they are going to sign it and that they have 

the money this year. So, for FY 2007, it is about $5.9 million, and 

that would cover us. 

Mr. BECERRA. I see. So, that is the projection for the entire 

year 2007? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. Yes. Yes. 

Mr. BECERRA. Maybe we can help because I think it is outrageous that you are conducting a service that is outside the core 

mission of your work for an agency under which you have an agreement to do this, which is essential work, yet you are having to 

underfund your programs that are helping lots of Americans who 

are in desperate need in some cases of this assistance. 

So, perhaps, Mr. Chairman, we can try to lend a hand to SSA 

to try to get reimbursed for the monies it is due for the work that 

it is done. 

Let me ask a question with regard to error rates. I know this has 

always been an issue with regard to the SSA and the Social Security card because the Social Security number was never meant to 

be a data-confirming number other than for purposes of Social Security benefits. 

Tell me when I am wrong. I understand from an inspector general report that was done back in December 2006—and Mr. Schaeffer, please tell me if I am incorrect on this—I understand that 

there are about 17.8 million employees who are erroneously categorized as nonconfirmed in these checks that are done simply as 

a result of discrepancies that are related to their name, birth date, 

or citizenship status. 

So, if someone gets married, the current file doesn’t reflect that 

that individual has changed his or her her name as a result of marriage. There are 17.8 million employees who don’t check out. That 

is about 4.1 percent. 

Mr. SCHAEFFER. That is basically correct. I wouldn’t say they 

are all employees. That is of the active Social Security numbers in 

SSA’s database, which theoretically they all could be employees, 

but they all may not be employees. 

Mr. BECERRA. Thank you for that correction. There are approximately about 5 million new hires per month in this country, more 

or less? 

Mr. SCHAEFFER. Right. 

Mr. BECERRA. So, if you take that 4 percent error rate and 

apply it to the 5 million or so new hires that occur every year, and 

you are talking about somewhere close to—or over 200,000 Americans on a monthly basis, about 2.5 million people on a yearly basis, 

who could, based on discrepancies, be misidentified as not eligible 

to work using the current Social Security database with its current 

list of errors. Have I said anything wrong here? 

Mr. SCHAEFFER. No. That is theoretically possible. One would 

hope that things would get better over time. 

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Mr. BECERRA. And, of course the error rate is higher, my understanding is, for foreign-born U.S. citizens. So, if you happen to 

be born in another country but you have citizenship by birthright, 

by your parentage, or for individuals who have come to this country 

and have since become citizens, the error rates are even higher for 

them. 

Mr. SCHAEFFER. That is correct. 

Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Streckewald, you wanted to say something? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. Yes. I don’t disagree with your figures. I 

would maybe just clarify by saying that it is tentative nonconfirmation. You are right, they are going to be told tentatively it looks 

like you don’t have authorization to work. They come in to us, we 

straighten it out, and then they are authorized to work. 

So, it is not pleasant to have to do that, but it gets updated and 

they get to work. 

Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired so 

I won’t ask any more questions other than to just make the following point. My understanding is that your field offices serve 

some 42 million visitors a year. You have lost—Social Security Administration has lost—some 2,400 positions in the past 19 months, 

and you are at your lowest staffing level now that you have been 

since the 1970s. 

Your processing time in most cases in most offices takes over 900 

days. You requested a budget of President Bush totaling $10.4 billion. The President’s budget allotted Social Security Administration 

$9.6 million. That is an $800 million loss right there. 

With all of these tasks that are placed upon you and with the 

burdens fiscally that you have, Mr. Chairman, I think it becomes 

very obvious that we have to really examine this and try to help 

make sure that SSA not only gets reimbursed from DHS for money 

that it is due, but also that we get the resources to the agency to 

make sure that if we do move forward on immigration reform, they 

are able to do this, and not at the expense of Social Security applicants for disability benefits or Social Security benefits. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCNULTY. Mr. Ryan may inquire. 

Mr. RYAN. Thank you. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I want to 

thank you for having this hearing. Very good timing on this. We 

need to do this. 

As I look at this and I see this immigration bill most likely passing the Senate, it seems, and probably next week, is what we hear, 

and then coming our way, we really have to get our hands around 

this. I think most Members of Congress believe we need comprehensive immigration reform. 

Then when you look at comprehensive immigration reform, most 

people conclude a central premise of that is an airtight worker 

verification system. So, we all kind of agree that that is necessary. 

Then when we look at this system, the word fiasco comes to my 

mind, to be honest with you. I guess here is the couple questions 

I want to ask. Number one, do you really believe we could get this 

thing up and running in 18 months and have a minuscule error 

rate? Do you really believe that? 

wwoods2 on PROD1PC60 with HEARING

30 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. From Social Security’s perspective, I think 

we will. Again, the funding is critical, but we have risen to challenges that we have been faced with. We will get it done. 

I can’t speak to what the error rate will be, but right now it is 

at about three contacts for every hundred queries. We would like 

to get that down, but it is unknown in the future what that will 

be if all employees must go through the system. We can get it done 

with the proper funding. 

Mr. RYAN. Then what pieces of personal information does Homeland Security think they are going to need at the end of the day 

to make this work? 

Mr. STANA. First, if I might address the question this way. 

Mr. RYAN. Sure. I would appreciate that. 

Mr. STANA. To say the least, this is going to be a tremendous 

challenge. You are talking about signing up 30,000 employers per 

day from now until December 2008. What if employers wait until 

fall 2008 to enroll? Then there’s the need to hire staff. Do background checks. Get office space. Procure new computer equipment. 

You never say never, and something will probably be available in 

December 2008. Is it going to be something that 5.9 million employers can use? It is going to be a challenge for DHS. 

Now, your other question was dealing with the—— 

Mr. RYAN. The pieces of information, all the pieces you think 

they need. 

Mr. STANA. The information that goes to Social Security for 

EEVS, I believe, are name, Social Security number, and date of 

birth. That is what goes, and it is checked against the Numident 

database. The information for checking against DHS databases include the name and the A number, alien number, or the employment authorization number. That is the extent of the information 

used. They get either a confirm or nonconfirm. 

Mr. RYAN. The goal of the system is twofold. Right? You are who 

you say you are, and you are eligible to work in this country. 

Mr. STANA. Also you are work-authorized. 

Mr. RYAN. Right? 

Mr. STANA. Yes. 

Mr. RYAN. Have you ever considered the idea of maybe having 

a private-based identity system for identifying who you are, and 

then referencing the Social Security database to see if you are eligible to work or not? Have you ever considered those kinds of ideas, 

those kinds of systems? 

Mr. STANA. GAO hasn’t seen those kinds of things being seriously considered. I have heard discussions of using other means. 

Mr. Johnson mentioned, swiping a credit card, and why can’t you 

get the verification done quicker? 

Mr. RYAN. Yes. Right. 

Mr. STANA. I have heard of using private sector facilities like 

credit card terminals but one of the stoppers, frankly, is getting the 

right equipment out to the employers to use for this quick 

verification. Right now it just requires a computer and Internet access. If you want to do something more with biometrics, it may require something more sophisticated. I have heard the ‘‘credit card’’ 

solution tossed around, but not seriously considered. 

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Mr. RYAN. So, $370 million is the number I just heard when I 

added up all that you said you think you need, Mr. Streckewald. 

So, $370 million I am taking as sort of the minimum up-front cost 

annually to get a system like this going. You are going to give 

us—— 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. We don’t have the exact figures yet, 

but—— 

Mr. RYAN. But you are going to give us a budget estimate in 

about three or four weeks, you told Mr. Levin? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. I hope to be able to. We will get it to you 

as soon as it is done. 

Mr. RYAN. So, that number will probably go up to half a billion? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. That was the figure for DHS. Three to $400 million for compliance staff, and another $70 million for program management. So, it could be $370 to $470 million. 

Mr. RYAN. By the end of our terms, we are going to be—I don’t 

see a clock so I don’t know what my time is—but by the end of our 

terms here, by 18 months, we are expecting every employer to 

verify every—actually, it is a four-year staggered process. Correct? 

So, can you walk me through that? I am not precisely familiar with 

the Senate bill, but it is—how do they roll in who all is checked? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. If I recall—— 

Mr. STANA. I have got that. 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. Why don’t you go ahead. It does ramp up. 

Mr. STANA. There are two—— 

Mr. RYAN. What is the ramp-up? 

Mr. STANA. Gutierrez-Flake is a different version, but I can give 

you both, if you like. The Senate version is in six months you want 

all new employees hired after the act is passed in critical infrastructure and government to be verified. By 18 months, you want 

new employees in all sectors to be verified. After three years, you 

want all employees, old and new to be verified. That is the Senate 

proposal. 

Mr. RYAN. Three years? Okay. 

Mr. STANA. On the Gutierrez-Flake proposal, the STRIVE Act, 

it is in year one, all employees working in critical infrastructure 

are to be verified. In year two, all large firms with 5,000 or more 

employees would have their employees verified. In the third year, 

mid-size firms would be added. In the fourth year, employees in 

small firms would be verified. Those criteria could probably be adjusted if need be. 

This gets to the stress that is put on the field offices. It depends 

on how you manage EEVS implementation. Once an employee’s 

data is validated in NUMIDENT, he or she is probably not going 

to get nonconfirms when seeking employment in the future unless 

there is a name change due to marriage, for example. 

Mr. RYAN. Well, I would simply just say, Mr. Chairman, I think 

we owe it to our constituents, our colleagues, and our country to 

try and fix this or figure this out if this train is really coming on 

the rails as fast as it looks like it might be. 

I would like to look into the possibility of not necessarily having 

a centralized database but a decentralized database, where we can 

use some of the ingenuity that is going out there in the private sector. 

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So, with that, I yield. Thanks. 

Chairman MCNULTY. Ms. Tubbs Jones may inquire. 

Ms. TUBBS JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I 

apologize for being late. In Congress they give us lots of things to 

do. 

I want to speak to Mr. Streckewald. You are real optimistic. You 

oversee the disability and income security programs. Do you know 

how many people there are in America that are waiting for a disability determination? We haven’t fixed that yet, to then give you 

a greater responsibility of doing an employment verification system. 

How many people do you need to fix that part before you do employment verification? 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. Well, we are still looking at what approach will work best. My understanding, we have come up with 

a multi-faceted approach that not only looks at the old cases to try 

to get them out and get decisions on them, but also tries to sort 

through the new ones so that they don’t become the old cases. So, 

I think the Commissioner is coming out with a plan shortly on 

that. 

Ms. TUBBS JONES. Then we are trying to figure out how we 

hire the employees to do the work that needs to be done. The issue 

was that there is a 10-year-old list of hearing officers and we have 

to hire some new ones. 

So, in employment verification, it is likely there is going to be a 

list, that we have to put the list together to hire the people from 

the list, and on and on and on? Come on. Be real with us. I know 

the Administration is saying what you can do, but the reality is 

that this is not going to happen. I know you don’t want to say it. 

I am going to say it for you. This ain’t going to happen. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. STRECKEWALD. We like to think with proper funding, this 

particular business process is doable. I apologize for seeming overly 

optimistic. 

Ms. TUBBS JONES. You know, that is what we heard about— 

and I am not pointing individually at you or any of your colleagues 

at the table. Realism has to set in somewhere in this process so 

that there is not an anticipation by the people of America that we 

can do what people are talking about doing within 18 months. 

I am more of a person that would say I love individual ingenuity, 

and privatization is something that could happen, but I also like 

people having jobs that are guaranteed and secure. There are people who would love to come and work at the Government till and 

have an opportunity to pursue this. 

So, I would like to encourage you to figure out, if everybody else 

is doing it, why can’t the Federal Government do it? Why can’t we 

come up with a system by which we can do the work of employment verification? 

I could ask a lot of questions, but the bottom line for me is, tell 

me the truth. Don’t—and I am not saying you are lying—don’t misunderstand me, but don’t make me anticipate more than I am really going to get. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, thank you so much for the opportunity to ask the questions. I am running. Thanks. 

wwoods2 on PROD1PC60 with HEARING

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Chairman MCNULTY. The Ranking Member has an additional 

question. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Schaeffer and Mr. Stana, I would like to ask 

you this one question: Is it possible to achieve a tamper-proof, 

fraud-resistant ID card? 

Mr. STANA. Is it possible? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. I want to listen to him first. 

Mr. SCHAEFFER. I would say anything is possible. However, 

the probability of achieving that, I think, would be very difficult. 

Most things that happen in that, once the card is out there and the 

people that want to circumvent that, once they start reverse engineering, almost always they develop the ability to do so. 

So, you may have a tamper-proof card today and it may last for 

a period of time. It may not be—to me, the probability that the 

tamper-proof card that you develop today, for it lasting forever, I 

would say a very small probability, that you would have to continually be revising that card, with the associated cost associated with 

it, to have to stay one step ahead of those who would be looking 

at a way to defeat it. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Stana? 

Mr. STANA. I would say it is possible. If you put the right security features on an identity card, it might be useful for some time. 

Those security features would be mainly biometric—retina scans, 

enhanced fingerprints, other digital information. 

I would also note for this purpose of verifying that the person 

who is sitting in front of you, if you are the employer—is the individual who they say they are—would probably require some expensive equipment for employers to maintain. So, that is the other aspect of it. 

There are secure cards that are used to verify identity in top secret locations, and I suppose you could use those kinds of cards. I 

agree with my friend here that it is a matter of time before secure 

cards and systems get hacked. You would have to probably renew 

a card periodically to keep it reliable and secure. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCNULTY. I thank all of the members of the panel. 

Members may have additional questions that they want to submit 

to you in writing, and I would ask that you would reply to them. 

I would ask you to respond to some staff inquiries that we may 

have as a result of your testimony at the hearing today, too. 

Mr. Streckewald mentioned that the Social Security Administration has risen to past challenges. I believe he is correct, when—and 

you had that big qualifier there—when the proper resources are 

made available. 

So that is a big qualifier on this whole issue. I would submit to 

you that the resources have not been made available with regard 

to the disability backlog. That is why that is an unmitigated disaster. 

There is no reason why a citizen of the United States of America 

should come to the Social Security agency or to a Member of Congress with an application for benefits, and be told, we will get back 

to you in a year and a half or two years. 

That is a disgrace. That is because you don’t have the proper resources to do that. So, before we embark on any new big expanded 

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program, one of my main concerns is going to be to make sure that 

if we do this, that we do have the proper resources. 

We thank all the members of the panel. We will now hear from 

panel two. 

[Pause.] 

Chairman MCNULTY. We thank all of the panel members for 

being here. Let me just begin by introducing the panel members. 

Tyler Moran, Employment Policy Director of the National Immigration Law Center. 

Angelo Amador, Director of Immigration Policy, U.S. Chamber of 

Commerce. 

Sue Meisinger, President and CEO, Society for Human Resource 

Management, on behalf of the Human Resource Initiative for Illegal Workforce. 

Peter Neumann, Principal Scientist, SRI International, on behalf 

of U.S. Public Policy Committee of the Association for Computing 

Machinery. 

Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center. 

So, we thank all of you for being here. Your entire testimony will 

be included in the official record. We ask that you summarize your 

comments to stay within 5 minutes. You see the little prompter in 

front of you; when the amber light comes on, we ask you to try to 

wrap up and conclude when the red light appears. 

Again, we thank you for taking time out of your busy schedules 

to help us address this issue. We will start with Ms. Moran. 

STATEMENT OF TYLER MORAN, EMPLOYMENT POLICY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, BOISE, IDAHO 

Ms. MORAN. Good morning, Chairman and Mr. Johnson, Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to allow me 

to address the critical issue of EEVS, or EEVS. This issue has not 

received the attention it deserves, and so it is critical that this 

Committee is holding a hearing today. 

My name is Tyler Moran. I am the Employment Policy Director 

for the National Immigration Law Center. NILC is a nonpartisan 

national legal advocacy organization that works to promote and advance the rights of low-income immigrants and their families. 

NILC has tracked the Basic Pilot Program since it was implemented in 1997, and we have extensive experience assisting immigrant advocates in responding to problems with the program, including the way in which it has been used to adversely affect workers. 

Because of this experience, we do not support a mandatory 

EEVS. However, because it enjoys almost universal support in Congress, we want to work with you all to ensure that a system is implemented that is accurate and that avoids negative consequences 

for workers, both U.S.-born and immigrant. 

While the focus of the Basic Pilot and the immigration reform debate has largely focused on DHS, as you heard this morning, SSA 

plays an integral role in its functionality. If it were to become mandatory, SSA would have to process 60 million queries per year 

versus the 1.8 it currently does. 

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So, a number of studies have found that the Basic Pilot Program 

has significant weaknesses, including its reliance on government 

databases that have unacceptably high error rates, and employer 

misuse of the program to take adverse action against workers. The 

significant weaknesses that exist in the current program, which 

serves approximately 17,000 employers, would be greatly exacerbated if the program were to surge to over six million. 

Improvements to the Basic Pilot have been made in the past 10 

years, but they are not sufficient enough for a mandatory program 

that, because of database errors, could take away people’s livelihood. Additionally, if the current flaws are not addressed before it 

is made mandatory, it could lead to noncompliance, which would 

result in certain businesses and workers moving into the underground, unregulated cash economy, which could result in billiondollar losses in Federal, state, and local tax revenues. A similar situation would occur if an EEVS were to be implemented outside the 

context of comprehensive immigration reform. 

So, the database errors: As you heard this morning, we have got 

a 4.1 percent error rate. The error rate affects all workers, but it 

disproportionately affects immigrants. The impact is the most on 

foreign-born naturalized citizens. 

Most people don’t know when you naturalize to tell SSA that 

they changed their status. So, there are over three million records 

that have incorrect information on those folks. So they are going 

to have to go into SSA field offices to correct the information. So, 

the burden on your constituents could be enormous. 

When workers receive a tentative nonconfirmation, they can’t 

call the SSA field office. They actually have to physically go into 

the SSA field office. Right now, one-third of people simply applying 

for an SSN have to go back to the office with additional documentation. They have to make two trips. 

From testimony from the National Council of Social Security 

Management Associations, wait times in field offices are running 2 

to 3 hours, with some over 4 hours. So, if you think you are getting 

calls on disability right now, just wait until this is implemented. 

So, the independent evaluation also found that employers misuse 

the Basic Pilot. For example, the law requires that you first extend 

a job offer and then you put the person’s information through the 

system. In violation of this requirement, 42 percent of employers 

put workers through Basic Pilot before extending a job offer. 

Why is this a problem? It is a problem because, because of these 

high error rates, most people who get tentative nonconfirmations 

are actually authorized to work. So, if they are not hired because 

of a tentative nonconfirmation, they never know that there is a 

problem, they are never hired, and then they can’t go and fix the 

database errors. It might happen again at their next job. 

Employers also penalize workers who receive tentative nonconfirmations, and 45 percent of employers subject people to pay cuts, 

delays in job training, and other restrictions on working. 

So, what do we need to do to have a workable system? First, I 

want to start out and say the STRIVE Act in the House is what 

we consider the best effort at addressing an EEVS in a meaningful 

and thoughtful way. I do want to mention, too, that there is an 

independent evaluation commissioned by USCIS that has not been 

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released to the public, and I would urge you all to get a copy of 

that report before you move forward. It is by the Westat Corporation. 

So, one, we need to phase in the system at a reasonable rate, and 

we need to have objective benchmarks. So, SSA and DHS have to 

prove to us they can meet certain levels of database accuracy, privacy, employer compliance with the system, and low error rates before the system is implemented. It is simple: Prove the system 

works before you implement it. 

Two, include meaningful due process protections because for the 

first time in the history of this country, your constituents are going 

to have to ask the Federal Government for permission to work. If 

they are wrongly denied, they are going to be mad, and there 

should be a way for them to correct those errors. 

Last, include workable documentation requirements that do not 

require a real ID license or a hardened SSN card, neither of which 

exist. Fifteen states thus far have said they will not implement the 

REAL ID Act. 

Last, I forgot, strong anti-discrimination protections that prohibit 

employers from misusing the EEVS to penalize workers. 

So, I just want to conclude by saying the House of Representatives is going to move forward on a immigration bill after the Senate finishes up this week. It is critical that it be guided by the lessons learned of the last 10 years of Basic Pilot. Since so much of 

the focus is on DHS, it will be critical for this Committee to work 

with the Judiciary Committee to help inform them about the impact of the system on SSA, and what resources will be needed to 

fix those database errors, and also how the agency can work with 

DHS to make sure that employers are following the rules and not 

taking adverse action against workers. 

So, I would be happy to answer any questions, particularly about 

any of the proposals before Congress right now. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Moran follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Tyler Moran, Employment Policy Director, National 

Immigration Law Center, Boise, Idaho 

Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to address the critical 

issue of current and proposed electronic employment verification systems (EEVS). 

My name is Tyler Moran, and I am the Employment Policy Director at the National 

Immigration Law Center (NILC). NILC is a nonpartisan national legal advocacy organization that works to advance and promote the rights of low-income immigrants and their family members. Since its inception in 1979, NILC 

has earned a national reputation as a leading expert on the intersection of immigration law and the employment rights of low-income immigrants. NILC’s extensive 

knowledge of the complex interplay between immigrants’ legal status and their 

rights under U.S. employment laws is an important resource for immigrant rights 

coalitions and community groups, as well as national advocacy groups, policymakers, attorneys and legal aid groups, workers’ rights advocates, labor unions, government agencies, and the media. 

Overview 

My testimony today will focus on (1) the limitations of the current electronic employment verification system—the Basic Pilot program—upon which most proposed 

EEVS are based; (2) a summary of the impact of a flawed EEVS on the Social Security Administration (SSA) and on foreign-born workers; (3) an explanation of what 

provisions must be included in any mandatory EEVS; and (4) an analysis of the 

EEVS proposed in the 2007 House and Senate comprehensive immigration reform 

bills. 

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1 According to former Commissioner Barnhart, SSA averaged 150,000 queries per month in 

2006. See Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Testimony before the House Committee on Ways and Means 

(Social Security Administration, July 26, 2006), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp? 

formmode=printfriendly&id=5172. 2 Jock Scharfen, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, 

Border Security, and International Law, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives: Problems in The Current Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement System 

(USCIS, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, April 24, 2007), http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/ 

Scharfen070424.pdf. 3For more information on the entire Basic Pilot process, see Basic Information Brief: DHS 

Basic Pilot Program (National Immigration Law Center, March 2007), www.nilc.org/ 

immsemplymnt/ircaempverif/basicpilot_infobrief_brief_2007-03-21.pdf. 

NILC has tracked the Basic Pilot program since it was implemented in 1997 and 

has extensive experience assisting immigrant advocates, attorneys, unions and other 

worker advocates in responding to problems with the program, including the way 

in which it has adversely affected workers. Because of this experience, we do not 

support expansion of a mandatory EEVS. However, because the concept enjoys almost universal support in Congress, and therefore will almost certainly be incorporated into any comprehensive immigration reform bill, we want to ensure that 

any proposed system be designed so as to avoid negative consequences for workers— 

both immigrant and U.S.-born. 

While the focus of Basic Pilot has largely been on the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) and its agency that administers the program—the U.S. Citizenship 

and Immigration Services (USCIS)—the SSA also plays an integral role in ensuring 

its functionality. In fact, SSA must verify the name, Social Security number (SSN), 

and date of birth (and citizenship status of U.S. citizens) of every worker in the 

country whose employer participates in the Basic Pilot. If Basic Pilot were to become mandatory (and apply only to new hires), this would mean that SSA would 

need to process 50–60 million queries per year, versus the 1.8 million queries that 

the agency processed in 2006.1

It is therefore essential that this Committee understand what it will take to create a system that functions with a high level of data accuracy, is properly monitored, and does not unintentionally promote employment discrimination. If implemented using the existing technology, procedures, and databases, the financial costs 

would be high and the inaccurate results would have a human cost borne by U.S.- 

born and immigrant workers. In addition, an expanded system would result in dangerous privacy breaches and increased discrimination against individuals who look 

or sound foreign. 

The Social Security Administration’s Role in the Basic Pilot Program 

The Basic Pilot Program is an Internet-based program that allows employers to 

electronically verify new workers’ employment eligibility by directly checking the 

records maintained by SSA and DHS. The program is one of the three pilots created 

by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, which 

began operating in six states in 1997. The other two pilot programs were discontinued. However, in December 2004 Congress extended the Basic Pilot to all 50 

states, and it is now available to employers who voluntarily choose to participate 

in the program, although certain employers who have been found to unlawfully hire 

unauthorized workers or who have discriminated against workers on the basis of national origin or citizenship status may be required to participate. According to DHS, 

16,000 employers are currently enrolled in the program.2

How the Verification Process Works at SSA 3

Before employers can use the Basic Pilot program, they must first sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU), which sets forth the points of agreement between 

SSA, DHS, and the employer regarding the employer’s participation in the program. 

Employers must also complete an online training and display a notice at the workplace from DHS indicating the employer’s participation in the program, and an antidiscrimination notice from the Office of Special Council for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices, Department of Justice. 

1. Step 1: Employer completes I–9 form. 

Employers participating in the Basic Pilot must still complete an I–9 employment 

eligibility verification form for each new employee hired as is required of all employers, but with one change to those procedures: Basic Pilot employers can accept a 

document as proof of a worker’s identity only if the document includes a photograph. 

It is still the employee’s choice, however, which documents to present to establish 

identity and employment eligibility. 

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4Minutes of the Social Security Administration and CIS AILA Liaison Meeting on SSA Related Issues (American Immigration Lawyers Association, May 8, 2006). 

2. Step 2: Employer verifies identity and employment eligibility using the 

Basic Pilot. 

For each newly hired worker, the employer must enter the worker’s information 

provided on the I–9 form—such as name, SSN, and citizenship status or alien number—into a form on the Basic Pilot website within three days of the worker’s hire 

date. If a worker has not yet been assigned an SSN (as can be the case with newlyarrived immigrants), however, the employer has to wait to enter that person’s information into the Basic Pilot form after the SSN is obtained. This procedure is in conflict with the requirements outlined in the MOU stating that the employer will put 

the worker’s information into the Basic Pilot within three days of hire. There continue to be delays in issuing SSNs at field offices—delays that can last for months. 

According to the American Immigration Lawyers Association, some of the delays 

arise from ‘‘front desk’’ errors, where an application is rejected for lack of a document that is not required.4

The information that is entered on the Basic Pilot website is first checked against 

information contained in SSA’s database, the Numerical Identification File 

(‘‘Numident’’). SSA verifies that the name, SSN, and date of birth are correct, regardless of the worker’s immigration status. SSA also confirms whether, if the employee has stated that he or she is a U.S. citizen, this is in fact the case; if it is, 

this establishes that the employee is employment-eligible. In the cases of naturalized citizens, however, SSA is sometimes unable to confirm their U.S. citizenship 

and must forward the inquiry to USCIS. 

For any non-U.S. citizen employee, USCIS verifies that the worker currently has 

employment-authorization. If the information provided by the worker matches the 

information in the SSA and USCIS records, the employer will receive a ‘‘confirmation’’ and no further action will generally be required, and the worker may continue 

employment. 

If SSA is unable to verify information presented by the worker, the employer will 

receive an ‘‘SSA tentative nonconfirmation’’ notice. Employers can receive an SSA 

tentative nonconfirmation notice for a variety of reasons, including lags in data 

entry in SSA’s database, inaccurate entry of information into the form on the Basic 

Pilot website, or name changes or changes in immigration status that are not reflected in SSA’s database. An SSA tentative nonconfirmation is also issued when the 

person attests to being a U.S. citizen but SSA records indicate that the person is 

a noncitizen with unknown work-authorization status. For example, a foreign-born 

U.S. citizen may have naturalized, but if the person does not inform SSA of this 

fact, SSA records will reflect his or her former immigration status. 

3. Step 3: Employee can challenge a ‘‘tentative nonconfirmation.’’ 

If the individual’s information initially does not match SSA’s records, the employer must first double-check that the information was entered correctly into the 

system. If the employer did not make an error, the employer must give the employee 

written notice of that fact, called a ‘‘Notice to Employee of Tentative Nonconfirmation.’’ The worker must then check a box on the notice stating that he/she contests 

or does not contest the tentative nonconfirmation notice, and both the worker and 

employer must sign the notice. If the worker chooses to contest the tentative nonconfirmation notice, the employer must print a second notice, called a ‘‘Referral Letter,’’ which contains information about resolving the tentative nonconfirmation notice, as well as the contact information for SSA. The worker then has eight Federal 

Government work days to visit an SSA office to try to resolve the discrepancy. SSA 

then has 10 Federal Government work days after the worker receives the referral 

notice to resolve the case. 

Under the MOU, if the worker contacts SSA (or USCIS) to resolve the tentative 

nonconfirmation, the employer is prohibited from terminating or otherwise taking 

adverse action against the worker while he/she awaits a final resolution from the 

Government agency—even if it takes more than 10 Federal Government work days 

for SSA to resolve the matter. In the case of an SSA tentative nonconfirmation notice, the employer must wait 24 hours after the worker visits SSA to resubmit the 

inquiry to the Basic Pilot program, and no later than 10 Federal Government work 

days after the date that the worker was referred to SSA. If the worker does not contest the tentative nonconfirmation notice, it automatically becomes a ‘‘final nonconfirmation’’ and the employer is required to fire the worker. 

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5See Findings of the Basic Pilot Program Evaluation (Temple University Institute for Survey 

Research and Westat, June, 2002), www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f 

614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=9cc5d0676988d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel= 

2c039c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD; Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses 

Hinder Employer Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts (Government Accountability 

Office, Aug. 2005) (hereafter ‘‘GAO’’), www.gao.gov/new.items/d05813.pdf; and Congressional Response Report: Accuracy of the Social Security Administration’s Numident File (Office of the Inspector General, Social Security Administration, Dec. 2006), (hereafter ‘‘SSA’’), 

www.socialsecurity.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/audittxt/A-08-06-26100.htm; Congressional Response Report: Employer Feedback on the Social Security Administration’s Verification Programs (Office 

of the Inspector General, Social Security Administration, Dec. 2006), www.ssa.gov/oig/ 

ADOBEPDF/A-03-06-26106.pdf; and Congressional Response Report: Monitoring the Use of Employee Verification Programs (Office of the Inspector General, Social Security Administration, 

Sept. 2006), www.ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/A-03-06-36122.pdf. 6SSA, Accuracy of the Social Security Administration’s Numident File, supra note 5. 7 Id. 

Concerns about Expanding the Basic Pilot Program 

Numerous entities, including those that researched and wrote an independent report commissioned by the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Government Accountability Office, and the Social Security Administration’s Office of the 

Inspector General (SSA–OIG), have found that the Basic Pilot program has significant weaknesses, including (1) its reliance on government databases that have unacceptably high error rates and (2) employer misuse of the program to take adverse 

action against workers.5 It is our understanding that the research corporation, 

Westat, has recently concluded another evaluation of the Basic Pilot for USCIS, 

though the results of that study have yet to be released to the public. It is critical 

that Congress review this evaluation before proceeding with any proposal to create 

a mandatory EEVS. 

The significant weaknesses that exist in the current program, which serves approximately 16,000 employers, would be greatly exacerbated if the program were to 

surge to over 7 million. In Fiscal Year 2005, when the latest evaluation took place, 

only half as many employers used the program as use it now. While improvements 

to the Basic Pilot have been made since its inception, they are not sufficient for a 

mandatory program that, because of inaccurate nonconfirmations, could cause workers and businesses irreparable harm. Additionally, if the current flaws in the Basic 

Pilot are not addressed before it is made mandatory, it will lead to flawed implementation, frustration, and even noncompliance, which will result in certain businesses and industries moving into the unregulated underground cash economy. 

When employers and workers move into the underground economy, the societal 

and economic costs are enormous. If enough of them abandon the ‘‘above-ground’’ 

economy, it could result in billion-dollar losses in federal, state, and local tax revenues, unfair competition, and further exploitation and abuse of all workers by unscrupulous employers. The similar situation would result if a mandatory EEVS were 

to be implemented outside the context of comprehensive immigration reform. In that 

case, the new system would start out with the insurmountable handicap of 8 million 

unauthorized workers and their employers seeking to uncover and exploit the weaknesses inherent in any system. 

Database inaccuracies 

One of the most significant problems identified in independent evaluations of the 

Basic Pilot program is that it is seriously hindered by inaccuracies and outdated information in SSA and DHS databases. For example, a sizeable number of workers 

who are identified as not having work authorization are in fact authorized, but for 

a variety of reasons the databases do not have up-to-date information on them. The 

SSA database used for the Basic Pilot program is the Numident file, which contains 

information on 435 million SSN holders, including name, date of birth, and place 

of birth, parents’ names, citizenship status, date of death (if applicable), and the office where the SSN application was processed and approved.6 As referenced earlier 

in this testimony, the Numident file is the first point of verification in the Basic 

Pilot process. 

According to a December 2006 report by SSA–OIG, 17.8 million (or 4.1 percent) 

of SSA’s records in the Numident file contain discrepancies related to name, date 

of birth, or citizenship status that could result in tentative nonconfirmation notices 

from Basic Pilot.7 Any time that SSA’s database conflicts with information presented by a worker, that worker must follow up with one of SSA’s field offices. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, there are 4.9 million new hires per month 

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8 Job Openings and Labor Turnover: February 2007 (U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, February 2007), www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/jolts.pdf. 9Patrick P. O’Carroll Jr., Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance: Administrative Challenges Facing the Social Security Administration (Office of the Inspector General, 

Social Security Administration, March 14, 2006), http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/31699.pdf. 10 Richard Warsinskey, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance: Funding Social Security’s Administrative Costs: Will the Budget Meet the Mission? (National Council of Social Security Management Associations, Inc., May 23, 2007), http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/ 

testimony/2007test/052307testrw.pdf. 11 Id. 12SSA, Accuracy of the Social Security Administration’s Numident File, supra note 5. 13 Barnhart, supra note 1. 14SSA, Accuracy of the Social Security Administration’s Numident File, supra note 5. 15Warsinskey supra note 10. 16 Richard Warsinskey, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance: Administrative Challenges Facing the Social Security Administration (National Council of Social Security 

Management Associations, Inc., March 14, 2006), http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/31699.pdf. 

in the U.S.8 If 4.1 percent of these new hires received a tentative nonconfirmation 

notice from SSA, field offices could potentially see 100,900 additional citizens and 

lawful immigrants per month seeking assistance with these alleged discrepancies. 

In 2006 testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, the Inspector General 

of Social Security expressed concerns about an ‘‘increased workload in the field offices and teleservice centers’’ that would result from workers challenging erroneous 

database findings.9 At a recent Senate Finance hearing, the President of the National Council of Social Security Management Associations, Inc., testified that if a 

mandatory EEVS and hardened SSN card are instituted as part of an immigration 

reform bill without necessary funding, ‘‘it could cripple SSA’s service capabilities.’’ 10

This problem is compounded by the fact that the agency is at its lowest staffing 

level since the early 1970s, and SSA field offices have lost 2,400 positions in the 

past 19 months.11 As noted in the December 2006 OIG report, ‘‘[I]f use of an employment verification service such as the Basic Pilot becomes mandatory, the workload of SSA and DHS may significantly increase—even if only a portion of these 

17.8 million numberholders need to correct their records with one of these agencies.’’ 12 Already, SSA field offices serve 42 million visitors per year.13

The cost and burden of SSA tentative nonconfirmation notices not only affects 

local SSA offices, but also workers. Although U.S. citizens’ records do have discrepancies, a disproportionate number of the database errors affect foreign-born U.S. 

citizens and work-authorized noncitizens. According to the December 2006 OIG report, approximately 4.8 million noncitizen records and 8 million foreign-born U.S. 

citizen records contain discrepancies that may result in a tentative nonconfirmation 

notice from the Basic Pilot.14 And, 3.3 million of foreign-born U.S. citizen records 

do not contain updated information on their citizenship status, so when they claim 

U.S. citizenship on their I–9 employment eligibility verification form, these workers 

receive a tentative nonconfirmation notice because their information does not match 

that in the SSA database. 

When workers receive a tentative nonconfirmation notice, they often have to take 

unpaid time off from work to follow up with SSA, which may take more than one 

trip. Waiting time at field offices are running two to three hours, with some visits 

lasting over four hours.15 According to the National Council of Social Security Management Associations, Inc., nearly one-third of the people currently coming into SSA 

Field Offices to apply for an original or duplicate SSN have to return with additional documentation.16 Additionally, an unknown number of work-authorized job 

applicants are not notified of tentative nonconfirmations by their employer or are 

wrongfully terminated by their employer before they even have the opportunity to 

prove that they are indeed authorized to work in the U.S. (For more information 

on this problem, see the section below regarding employer misuse of the program). 

Equally concerning is the fact that when workers do go to an SSA field office to 

correct their records, their information is sometimes not updated in a timely manner. Additionally, Basic Pilot rules instruct employers to wait 24 hours after a worker has updated his or her records to re-query the system; however, many times the 

employer will re-query the system before the 24-hour period has passed, or check 

before the employee visits SSA. In these instances, the employer will receive a default final nonconfirmation. According to Basic Pilot rules, the employer is then required to fire the worker. 

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17GAO, SSA, and Temple University Institute for Survey Research and Westat, supra note 

5. 18SSA, Employer Feedback on the Social Security Administration’s Verification Programs, 

supra note 5. 19Temple University Institute for Survey Research and Westat, supra note 5. 20SSA, Employer Feedback on the Social Security Administration’s Verification Programs, 

supra note 5. 21Temple University Institute for Survey Research and Westat, supra note 5. 22SSA, Monitoring the Use of Employee Verification Programs, supra note 5. 23Temple University Institute for Survey Research and Westat, supra note 5. 24 Richard M. Stana, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, 

and Citizenship, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Worksite Enforcement Efforts (Government Accountability Office, June 2006), 

www.gao.gov/new.items/d06895t.pdf. 

Employer misuse of the program 

The independent evaluations of Basic Pilot have also revealed that employers use 

the Basic Pilot program to engage in prohibited employment practices.17 According 

to the SSA–OIG, ‘‘We learned that a significant number of the Basic Pilot employers 

in our sample verified individuals outside the scope of the signed agreement between the employer, SSA and DHS.’’ 18 For example, the law requires that employers first extend a job offer to a worker and then complete the employment eligibility 

verification process, including the Basic Pilot procedure. In violation of this requirement, many employers put workers through Basic Pilot before extending the job 

offer, to avoid the potential costs of hiring and training employees who are not eligible to work (a practice known as ‘‘pre-screening’’). This practice is a problem because 

most workers who receive a tentative nonconfirmation are, in fact, authorized to 

work. If workers are not hired because of a tentative nonconfirmation and are never 

informed that there is a problem with their records, they not only are denied a job 

but also the opportunity to contest database inaccuracies. Moreover, pre-screening 

increases the likelihood that an employer may be discriminatorily selecting foreignlooking or foreign-sounding individuals for such screening, resulting in increased 

discrimination without the person even knowing he or she has been subjected to this 

unlawful practice. 

• In 2002, among employees who received a tentative nonconfirmation from the 

Basic Pilot, 23 percent said that they were not offered a job.19

• Four years later, in 2006, 42 percent of employees surveyed reported that employers used the Basic Pilot to verify their employment authorization before hire.20

• The 2002 evaluation found that 73 percent of employees who should have been 

informed of work authorization problems were not notified.21

Employers also illegally use the Basic Pilot to verify the employment eligibility 

of their existing workforce. The immigration regulations require employers to 

reverify workers’ employment authorization in very limited circumstances (including 

when their work authorization expires). This has helped minimize the potential discrimination that may ensue from employers constantly reverifying only noncitizens 

or from using the reverification system in a retaliatory manner. According to the 

September 2006 SSA–OIG report, 30 percent of Basic Pilot users admitted they had 

verified the employment authorization of existing employees.22

Employers also take adverse employment action based on tentative nonconfirmation notices, which penalizes workers while they and the appropriate agency (SSA 

or DHS) work to resolve database errors. For example, the 2002 independent evaluation found that 45 percent of employees surveyed who contested a tentative nonconfirmation were subject to pay cuts, delayed job training, and other restrictions 

on working.23 Some employers also compromised the privacy of workers in various 

ways, such as by failing to safeguard access to the computer used to maintain the 

pilot system, e.g., leaving passwords and instructions in plain view for other personnel to potentially access the system and employees’ private information. 

Although employers are prohibited from engaging in these practices under the 

MOU they sign, USCIS officials have told the GAO that their efforts to review and 

oversee employers’ use of the Basic Pilot program have been limited by lack of 

staff.24

Provisions That Must Accompany Any Nationwide, Mandatory Employment 

Eligibility Verification System 

After nearly a decade of experience with the Basic Pilot Program, it is clear that 

the existing program has significant flaws that must be addressed if Congress is to 

pursue the creation of a new EEVS. The creation of such a system without addressing the fundamental flaws in the current program is inadvisable and will result in 

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severe negative consequences for immigrants and U.S. workers on a much larger 

scale than they currently experience. 

The following features would address the flaws in the existing Basic Pilot program. 

• Phase-in with objective benchmarks. 

The best way to ensure implementation of an EEVS that is accurate and implemented in a nondiscriminatory manner is to set standards and expectations for system performance up front and to hold DHS and SSA accountable for meeting those 

standards. Experience confirms that federal agencies do not meet expectations if the 

standards they are given are vague and optional. Therefore, the EEVS should be 

phased in at a reasonable rate, by size of employer, and provide for certification by 

the Comptroller General that it meets benchmarks regarding database accuracy, low 

error rates, privacy, and measurable employer compliance with system requirements 

before implementation and each phase of expansion. 

The EEVS program is particularly vulnerable to poor planning because of its unprecedented scope and the disconnect between the agency mandate to get something 

up and running quickly and the requirements that would ultimately determine 

whether it is successful, such as the need for speed, efficiency, reliability, and information security. It is much easier to make design changes in a system before it goes 

fully online than afterwards. That is why software manufacturers produce ‘‘beta’’ 

versions of their programs to be tested in the real world before mass public marketing distribution. Once a system is designed and put in place for all employers 

and workers in our economy, it will be costly and difficult to implement needed 

changes. 

• Antidiscrimination protections. 

Experience has taught us that unscrupulous employers will use the system to unlawfully pre-screen potential employees, reverify work authorization, and engage in 

other unlawful activities when an employee lodges a complaint or engages in collective organizing. It has also demonstrated that DHS has not prioritized monitoring 

of employer misuse of the system, since 10 years after it was first implemented 

there is still no system in place for monitoring it. Thus, stronger enforcement and 

monitoring efforts and higher penalties for noncompliance are necessary to compel 

reluctant employers to comply with the law. 

Employers also must be explicitly prohibited from (1) conducting employment eligibility verification before offering employment; (2) unlawfully reverifying workers’ 

employment eligibility; (3) using the system to deny workers’ employment benefits 

or otherwise interfere with their labor rights, or to engage in any other unlawful 

employment practice; (4) taking adverse action against workers whose status cannot 

initially be confirmed by the EEVS; or (5) selectively excluding certain people from 

consideration for employment due to the perceived likelihood that additional employment eligibility verification might be required, beyond what is required for other 

job applicants. 

• Due process protections against erroneous determinations. 

For the first time in the history of this country, workers will need to seek approval from the federal government to secure their livelihood. If the database errors 

are not improved before the EEVS is implemented, it is likely that millions of workers could be wrongly identified as not authorized for employment. It is therefore 

critical that workers have access to a meaningful administrative and judicial review 

process that provides for remedies such as back pay and attorney’s fees if it is determined that a worker was terminated due to SSA or DHS error. Additionally, the 

EEVS must allow individuals to view their own records and correct any errors 

through an expedited process established by SSA and DHS. 

• Privacy and identity theft protections. 

The EEVS must protect information in the database from unauthorized use or disclosure. It is critical that privacy protections be included so that the information 

contained in the databases is not used for nonemployment eligibility verification 

purposes. The 2002 evaluation found several instances where employers or other unauthorized individuals gained access to the Basic Pilot program for uses other than 

the designated purpose. Civil and criminal penalties for unlawful use of information 

in the EEVS should also be included. 

• Studies of and reports on EEVS performance. 

Any EEVS should be independently evaluated to ensure that the program is meeting the needs of both employers and employees. Reports should specifically evaluate 

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25States include Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, and Washington. 26For a summary of the EEVS provisions in the STRIVE Act, see Employment Eligibility 

Verification System in the STRIVE Act of 2007 (National Immigration Law Center, April 2007), 

www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/cir/strive_eevs_2007-04-02.pdf. 27 Barnhart, supra note 1. 28Phil Gyford, ‘‘How Many Americans Own Passports?,’’ www.gyford.com/phil/writing/2003/01/ 

31/how_many_america.php. 29 Citizens Without Proof: A Survey of Americans’ Possession Of Documentary Proof of Citizenship and Photo Identification (Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, November 

2006), www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_39242.pdf. 

the accuracy of DHS and SSA databases, the privacy and confidentiality of information in the databases, EEVS’s impact on workers, and whether the program has 

been implemented in a nondiscriminatory manner. 

• Workable documentation requirements. 

Proposals to further limit which documents are acceptable to establish employees’ 

identity must be flexible enough to recognize the fact that not all work-authorized 

individuals have the same documents. Under no circumstances should a REAL IDcompliant driver’s license or ID card be required. No state is currently in compliance 

with REAL ID, and indeed 11 states thus far have decided not to implement the 

law or have placed significant conditions on their participation.25 In eleven additional states, legislation opposing REAL ID has passed one or more chambers of the 

state’s legislature. 

Employment Eligibility Verification Systems in the Context of Comprehensive Immigration Reform 

The two most significant immigration reform bills introduced in the House and 

Senate in 2007 include the ‘‘Security Through Regularized Immigration and a Vibrant Economy (STRIVE) Act of 2007’’ (H.R. 1645), introduced by Representatives 

Gutierrez and Flake, and the ‘‘Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007’’ (S. 1348) currently being negotiated in the Senate. Both 

bills include a mandatory EEVS, but there are significant differences between these 

two proposals. Most notably, the STRIVE Act makes a real attempt to address the 

shortcomings of the Basic Pilot program by including benchmarks, as well as privacy, antidiscrimination, and due process protections. Although it is unlikely that 

the STRIVE Act will be the immigration bill taken up by the House Judiciary Committee, it is helpful to analyze its EEVS provisions through the lens of accuracy, 

workability, and minimizing the harm to all workers. 

The ‘‘Security Through Regularized Immigration and a Vibrant Economy 

(STRIVE) Act of 2007’’ 

The STRIVE Act represents the best legislative effort to date to address the shortcomings of the Basic Pilot program.26 Unfortunately, the bill contains a couple of 

provisions that would limit its workability. First, the STRIVE Act significantly limits the documents that individuals can present to prove their identity when seeking 

employment. Most concerning is the requirement that workers present documents 

that do not exist, such as a REAL ID-compliant driver’s license and a biometric, machine-readable, tamper-resistant Social Security card. Former Commissioner 

Barnhart testified in July 2006 that the cost of issuing new cards with enhanced 

security features could cost approximately $9.5 billion and require 67,000 work 

years.27 This means that if U.S. citizens, including foreign-born U.S. citizens, do not 

have a REAL ID license or hardened SSN, they will have to present either a passport (passports are held by only approximately 20 percent of the U.S. population28) 

or a passport card, which is not yet available. The Brennan Center for Justice estimates that as many as 13 million U.S. citizens do not have ready access to citizenship documents, such as U.S. passports, naturalization papers, or birth certificates.29

Second, the STRIVE Act requires SSA to disclose private taxpayer identity information of employers and employees to DHS when DHS requests this information. 

Use of confidential tax information to enforce immigration law can have a negative 

affect on tax compliance and has the potential to increase discrimination against 

foreign-looking or -sounding workers. 

Provisions in the STRIVE Act that should be included in any EEVS proposal: 

• Benchmarks for system performance. Before the EEVS is implemented 

(and before any subsequent phase-in), the Comptroller General must study and certify that certain standards have been met, including database accuracy, measurable 

employer compliance with the EEVS requirements, protection of workers’ privacy, 

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30 Amendment 1150 to S. 1348 is the actual text of the bill being debated; however, there has 

not yet been a vote on the amendment, so S. 1348 still stands. This analysis refers to amendment 1150. 

and adequate agency staffing and funding. In conducting the studies, the Comptroller General must consult with representatives from immigrant communities, 

among others. The Comptroller General is also required to submit reports to DHS 

and Congress on the impact of the EEVS on employers and employees. • Protections against discrimination. The STRIVE Act amends section 274B 

of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), relating to unfair immigration-related employment practices, to explicitly apply to employment decisions related to 

the new EEVS. Additionally, it prohibits employers from misusing the EEVS, increases fines for violations, brings the INA into line with other civil rights laws, 

such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and provides funding to educate employers 

and employees about antidiscrimination policies. • Privacy protections. The STRIVE Act requires that information in the 

EEVS be safeguarded and that only minimum data elements be stored. It 

creates penalties for unlawfully accessing the EEVS and for using information in the EEVS to commit identity theft for financial gain. • Due process provisions. The STRIVE Act requires that workers can view 

their own records and correct or update information in the EEVS. DHS also must 

establish a 24-hour hotline to receive inquiries from workers and employers concerning determinations made by the EEVS. The STRIVE Act also creates an administrative and judicial review process to challenge a finding that a worker is not authorized for employment (a ‘‘final nonconfirmation’’). If, after 

the process, the worker is found to be authorized for employment and the 

error was DHS’s, the worker is entitled to back wages (although not during 

any period that the worker was not authorized for employment). However, 

attorney’s fees and costs are not included—even though employers can recover up 

to $50,000 in attorney’s fees when they challenge a finding that they violated immigrant law. Low-income workers are far less equipped than better-off workers to represent themselves or hire counsel, and the availability of fees is critical to their ability to pursue their rights. STRIVE also prohibits a private right of action, which 

also would drastically limit workers’ ability to correct abuses and errors of the system. • Annual study and report. The STRIVE Act requires the Comptroller General 

to conduct annual studies to be submitted to Congress that determine whether the 

EEVS meets the following requirements: demonstrated accuracy of the databases; 

low error rates and incidences of delays in verification; measurable employer compliance with EEVS requirements; protection of workers’ private information; adequate 

agency staffing and funding for SSA and DHS. 

The ‘‘Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 

2007’’ (S. 1348) 30

S. 1348 falls well short of creating a workable system. Its most troubling provision 

is the requirement that the guest worker and legalization programs for which it provides may not be implemented until the EEVS (including the use of ‘‘secure’’ documentation and digitized photographs that do not currently exist) is implemented. 

Because of this pressure, the focus will be on getting the EEVS up and running as 

quickly as possible, rather than on implementing an accurate system that actually 

works without adversely impacting authorized workers. 

It is expected that an amendment will be introduced this week (to amendment 

1150; see footnote 30) that will improve the EEVS provisions in S. 1348. Although 

the amendment will significantly improve the underlying bill, it will not address the 

database inaccuracies and will fall short on due process protections. Concerns with 

S. 1348 as introduced include the following: 

• The implementation timeline is unreasonable and unworkable. All employers must participate in the EEVS within 18 months of enactment, with respect 

to new hires and those with expiring work authorization documents or immigration 

status; and within 3 years, all employers must use the EEVS for all new and continuing employees, including those in ‘‘Z’’ status who have not previously presented 

secure documentation. DHS is also given the sole discretion to require employers to 

participate at an earlier date than outlined. This rigid timetable must be met regardless of whether the EEVS actually works and whether the technology exists to 

implement it; nor is the timetable subject to performance benchmarks. 

• The antidiscrimination protections are weaker than current law. Current law regarding ‘‘impermissible’’ uses of the EEVS would be weakened under the 

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Senate bill (existing requirements are outlined in the MOU that employers sign 

under the Basic Pilot) because the bill specifically prohibits these ‘‘impermissible’’ 

practices from being covered under the antidiscrimination protections in the INA by 

giving DHS exclusive enforcement authority and funding. Section 274B of the INA 

prohibits discrimination based on national origin and citizenship status, and provides a process for complaints, investigations, administrative and judicial review, 

and remedies. It is unlikely that DHS’s policy will include such procedures, since 

DHS has no expertise in this area. 

• The due process protections are insufficient. Under the administrative review provisions, a final nonconfirmation is stayed pending the administrative review 

decision unless SSA or DHS decides that the ‘‘petition for review is frivolous, unlikely to succeed on the merits, or filed for purposes of delay.’’ This means that the 

agency whose administrative decision is being appealed has sole authority to issue 

or deny a stay of a nonconfirmation notice while an appeal is pending. The employee 

appealing the decision faces irreparable harm through loss of employment if a stay 

is denied, and the legislation does not provide a method for recovery of back pay, 

costs or attorney’s fees for those who are wrongfully terminated due to SSA or DHS 

database errors, including where the agency fails to issue a stay during the appeal 

process. 

Workers have 30 days from the completion of the administrative appeal to file for 

judicial review in the U.S. Court of Appeals. However, the court can decide the petition based only on the administrative record, which may be limited. The burden is 

on the worker to demonstrate that the agency decision was ‘‘arbitrary, capricious, 

not supported by substantial evidence, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’’ 

Moreover, ‘‘findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would 

be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’’ That deferential review standard for factual findings is unwarranted. As with the administrative review process, the court 

must stay the final nonconfirmation notice, unless it determines that the ‘‘petition 

for review is frivolous, unlikely to succeed on the merits, or filed for purposes of 

delay.’’ 

• The documentation requirements are unattainable. Like the STRIVE Act, 

the documentation requirements are heavily focused on state compliance with the 

REAL ID Act and a biometrically-enhanced Social Security card. 

• Employers, state and federal government agencies, and SSA are required to turn over to DHS confidential information about workers. The bill 

permits data mining of SSA files, tax records, and other federal, state, and territorial databases covering everyone in the U.S. Multiple provisions requiring information-sharing give DHS expansive access to (a) personal employee information 

held by employers; (b) birth and death records maintained by states, passport and 

visa records, and state driver’s license or identity card information; and (c) as an 

exception to tax code confidentiality provisions, SSA records of taxpayers when the 

taxpayer’s SSN or name or address (for whatever reason) does not match SSA 

records, or when just two taxpayers have the same SSN. It also allows DHS to access ‘‘information’’ from SSA that DHS ‘‘may require.’’ The provisions do not require 

independent review, monitoring of disclosure, privacy protections, notice to workers 

that their private information or records have been disclosed, or recourse if 

overbroad information is sought or misused. 

Conclusion 

As stated in the first part of this testimony, based on our experience, NILC does 

not support the creation of a mandatory EEVS. However, when the House of Representatives moves forward with its immigration reform bill, which will inevitably 

include a mandatory EEVS, it is critical that it be guided by the lessons learned 

from ten years of experience with the Basic Pilot program. Put simply, if the shortcomings of the Basic Pilot are not addressed before it is expanded into a mandatory 

program, it will be a disaster for workers and employers, and will put an enormous 

strain on already overburdened SSA field offices. Because so much of the focus of 

EEVS proposals is on DHS, it will be important for this committee to work closely 

with the Judiciary Committee on any comprehensive immigration reform bill that 

creates a mandatory EEVS to ensure that SSA has the necessary funding and resources to carry out its duties. It will also be critical to ensure that the weaknesses 

of the Basic Pilot are addressed before it is expanded, including correcting SSA’s 

database errors, and implementing a monitoring system so employers do not use the 

system to take adverse action against workers. 

f 

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Chairman MCNULTY. Thank you. 

Mr. Amador. 

STATEMENT OF ANGELO I. AMADOR, DIRECTOR OF 

IMMIGRATION POLICY, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 

Mr. AMADOR. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman McNulty, 

Ranking Member Johnson, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify on EEVS today. My 

name is Angelo Amador. I am the Director of Immigration Policy 

for the Chamber. 

We also chair the Essential Workers Immigration Coalition, and 

are on the executive Committee of the Electronic Employment 

Verification System working group. That is a business group, but 

actually, as Tyler knows, we work very closely with groups on the 

left, unions, and this is a system that really is going to affect everyone, and we really need to work together to make sure that all of 

the main issues are addressed. 

The concerns of the business community about how this new 

mandate is going to affect us cannot be overstated. The Government Accountability Office, as was said earlier, estimate that the 

cost of a new EEVS system that would apply to all employees 

would cost about $11.7 billion per year, with employers bearing 

most of the cost. Still, the Chamber is willing to support a new 

EEVS as a necessary part of comprehensive immigration reform. 

While most of the press has concentrated on the issues of the undocumented and the new worker programs with regards to comprehensive reform, employers view the employer verification system provisions as equally important. In fact, some of my members 

view it as the most important part of comprehensive reform. 

As stated in my written testimony, the three issues are interrelated, and comprehensive reform remains crucial to both economic and national security for our country. Noted national security experts have also reinforced that enforcement alone at any 

level is not sufficient, and it would not be the solution. 

Everyone agrees that the current immigration system is broken 

and the status quo is unacceptable. But agreement on a solution 

has been harder to find. States and localities have responded to the 

lack of action at the Federal level with a patchwork of immigration 

laws and enforcement, exposing employers most deal with a broken 

legal structure of unfair liability. 

Many states and local governments are attempting to either force 

employers and retailers to bear the costs of helping shield undocumented workers, or are attempting to impose additional worksite 

enforcement provisions. must know what their responsibilities are, 

and having one Federal law with strong state law preemption language will help alleviate any confusion about employers’ role under 

the law. 

There are things that can be done immediately without legislation, such as limiting the number of documents accepted for 

verification under the I–9 system. Also, current documents should 

be retooled so as to provide employers with a clear and functional 

way to verify that they are accurate and relate to the prospective 

employee. 

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As you know, there are more than 27 documents and combinations of documents that you can use to prove your employment eligibility. Some of them don’t even have pictures. So, you could technically get a job without showing an ID that has a picture, and the 

employer is forbidden, because of the current anti-discrimination 

provisions, from asking for other pieces of ID. 

In addition, I would like to mention seven other critical things 

that are very crucial for the employer community. There are some 

others that are in my testimony, and actually some are addressed 

by Tyler as well, that I think are very important. 

Just for the time being, I want to mention that, first, enforcement of employment verification law resides properly within the 

Federal Government. Accordingly, the Chamber maintains that 

DHS, as the Federal enforcement authority with responsibility in 

enforcement of section 274A, which is the one that we are talking 

about, should remain. 

You may be aware that the Federal RICO statute has recently 

been used by private attorneys seeking to enforce immigration law. 

Not only does this invade the province of the Federal Government 

as sole enforcer of Federal immigration policy, it also perverts the 

Federal RICO statute into a use that is contrary to the intent of 

the statute. We do not want to create a trial attorneys relief act. 

Second, the power to investigate labor and employment violations 

should be kept out a system created exclusively for the purpose of 

verifying employment eligibility. The system needs to be implemented with full acknowledgment that employers already have to 

comply with a variety of employment laws. The Code of Federal 

Regulations—actually, I looked at it this morning—is more than 

5,000 pages long. 

Third, a new verification system should only apply to new hires. 

Trying to re-verify the entire existing workforce of over 140 million 

employees is a burden that is too high. Again, I will be happy to 

talk about the different versions, but the version of the Senate requires that you re-verify more than 140 million employees. 

What we hear from our members, especially those that are large, 

is that that is a monumental task. And there are other ways of 

doing this. Again, with the turnover today, everybody will be 

verified under the system in a couple of years. 

Fourth, an employer should also be responsible only to verify the 

work authorization of its own employees. 

Fifth, an employer needs to be able to affirmatively rely on the 

response as soon as possible. We think that 30 days should be more 

than enough for DHS or Social Security or somebody to tell us 

whether this person is authorized to work or not. 

There are concerns, as you might have heard, and it is in the testimony, of the cuts that are implied when you have a tentative nonconfirmation. For one, you cannot fire the worker. Second, DHS 

wants to use the fact that this individual that they told you not to 

fire to come and investigate and do raids and other things. 

Sixth, penalties must be tailored to the offense, and the system 

must be fair. Automatic debarment from Federal contract is not an 

authority that should be given to DHS. Indeed, a work in process 

already exists in current law under the Federal Acquisition Regulations. 

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Finally, let me know that we are concerned about undue expansion of liability and new causes of actions which we have seen in 

some formulations of electronic employer verification systems. For 

example, the STRIVE Act, which I agree with Tyler is probably the 

best effort right now at trying to address a workable EEVS, but it 

still has—it would even make it illegal for an employer to hire an 

American or a legal permanent resident over a temporary worker 

that should be in the United States only when employers cannot 

find enough of the first two. 

Discrimination protections should be retained, as in current law, 

to comport with the purposes of the program, monitoring the hiring 

and firing process, not other terms and conditions of employment. 

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to come before you 

today, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Amador follows:] 

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f 

Chairman MCNULTY. Thank you. 

Ms. Meisinger. 

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STATEMENT OF SUSAN R. MEISINGER, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 

Ms. MEISINGER. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Johnson, 

Members of the Committee, my name is Sue Meisinger and I am 

President and CEO of the Society for Human Resource Management. I appear today on behalf of the more than 200,000 members 

of the society, as well as being co-chair of the HR Initiative for a 

Legal Workforce. I am grateful for this opportunity. 

Our members represent the frontlines on workforce verification, 

and therefore offer a crucial viewpoint on the matter. We fully support and we are committed to the hiring of only work-authorized 

individuals through an effective, efficient, electronic employment 

verification system. 

We also recognize that the current employment verification system is in need of real reform. In fact, we believe that verification 

is the linchpin of really, truly reforming the immigration system. 

As the debate on immigration reform continues, we urge Congress to carefully consider the implications of any new employment 

verification system, keeping in mind that this is not just a debate 

about immigration reform. This is a debate about workplace management, which impacts all employers and all American workers, 

not just those who are foreign born. 

My remarks will focus on the current employment verification 

process, as well as our proposal to create a potentially alternative 

effective employment verification system. 

As you know, under IRCA, employers are required to review documents presented by employees, and after review, required to attest on a Form I–9 that they have reviewed the documents and 

that they appear genuine and authentic. 

Even under the best of circumstances, HR professionals encounter numerous challenges with the employment verifications of 

IRCA. They include maintaining the I–9 records when an employee 

presents a document that has an expiration date; verifying the authenticity, the quality, the quantity of documents presented by an 

employee for work authorization and identification purposes; and 

simply managing the current I–9 system, which is burdensome and 

time-consuming. 

The system is prone to fraud, forgeries, and identity theft. It is 

difficult if not impossible for an employer to differentiate between 

the legal and illegal worker in this process. In addition, if an employer questions the validity of documents too much, they are also 

vulnerable to potential claims of discrimination. 

Attempting to address the shortcomings of the paper-based system, Congress created the Basic Pilot Program that we have heard 

of this morning in great detail. Under this system, employers can 

voluntarily check each new employee’s work eligibility using the 

electronic verification system, while also having to do the paper 

check and maintaining the paper records. 

The system is supposed to respond to the employer within three 

days with either a confirmation or a tentative nonconfirmation of 

the employee’s work eligibility. In the cases of tentative nonconfirmation, a secondary verification process lasting 10 days is initiated to confirm the validity of the information provided and to prowwoods2 on PROD1PC60 with HEARING

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vide the employer with a confirmation of nonverification of worker 

eligibility. 

Although it has been operational since 1997, and despite the best 

efforts of the people in the government agencies managing it, we 

think it is just flat-out inadequate to meet the U.S. employer’s 

needs in a global verification system. 

As we heard this morning, over 92 percent of inquiries from employers receive an instantaneous employment authorized response. 

This means there is a no verification 8 percent of the time. With 

60 million new hires each year, this makes mandating the system 

having an impact on about 5 million people a year, as we have 

heard as well. 

Since a significant percentage of the Basic Pilot queries require 

human intervention, a lot of resources are going to be needed to 

purge the various agency databases and improve communication 

between the agencies. We think this is going to be problematic. 

Employers need the right tools to verify a legal workforce, but we 

cannot have HR, and we should not have HR, be America’s surrogate Border Patrol agents. Rather, employers are entitled to a clear 

answer to the query whether an employee is authorized to work, 

and be able to reply to that response. 

We believe that Congress must transform the current paperbased verification process into a state-of-the-art electronic system. 

Specifically, we advocate a system that would verify identity 

through additional background checks and the voluntary use of biometric enrollment conducted by government-certified private vendors. 

The system would be built upon background checks currently 

conducted by many employers. Our own survey shows that 85 percent of our members do employment verification checks, reference 

checks, to include forensic document examines and tailored data 

mining in publicly available databases. An individual’s identity 

could be locked to biometric or other secure identifiers through the 

process. Employees would not need to present an identity card, just 

themselves. 

Under our proposal, employers would be required to participate 

in one or two electronic employment verification systems. The first 

would be the current EEVS, but permitting employers to access the 

system via phone and internet. The second would be SEEVS, a 

more secure electronic employment verification system. The stateof-the-art system would identify, through additional background 

checks and voluntary biometric enrollment conducted by private 

employers. 

This system, we think, would answer two important questions: Is 

the person identified by name, date of birth, and Social Security 

authorized to work? Is the person actually who he or she claims to 

be? 

In the interests of time, I would like to conclude by encouraging 

Congress to look at this carefully. We are very concerned that in 

the rush to deal with immigration reform, which we believe needs 

to happen, that there is a push to just simply push this verification 

system through. And the word chaos, I thought, was apt in describing what we think is going to happen when this rolls forward. 

Thank you. 

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[The prepared statement of Ms. Meisinger follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Sue Meisinger, The Human Resource Initiative for 

a Legal Workforce, Society for Human Resource Management, Alexandria, Virginia 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Johnson, Members of the Committee. My name 

is Susan R. Meisinger and I am the President and CEO of the Society for Human 

Resource Management. I appear today on behalf of the Society for Human Resource 

Management. I am also the Co-chair of HR Initiative for a Legal Workforce. I am 

grateful for the opportunity to provide our views on this important issue. 

The Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM) is the world’s largest association devoted to human resource management. Representing more than 217,000 

individual members, the Society’s mission is both to serve human resource management professionals and to advance the profession. 

The Human Resource Initiative for a Legal Workforce is a coalition of human resource organizations and business groups, representing thousands of small and 

large U.S. employers from a broad range of sectors. The HR Initiative includes 

SHRM, the American Council on International Personnel, the College and University Professional Association for Human Resources, the Food Marketing Institute, 

the HR Policy Association, the International Public Management Association for 

Human Resources, and the National Association of Manufacturers. Our objective is 

to improve the current employment verification process by creating a secure, efficient and reliable system that will ensure a legal workforce and help prevent unauthorized employment. 

Our collective members represent the front lines on workforce verification, and 

therefore offer a crucial viewpoint on the matter. We fully support and are committed to the hiring of only work-authorized individuals through an effective, efficient electronic employment verification system. 

We also recognize that the current employment verification system is in need of 

real reform. In fact, we believe verification is the lynchpin for true immigration reform. Unfortunately, the current paper-based employment verification system is inadequate to meet current and future demands, and current proposals before Congress fall far short of what is needed. 

As the debate on immigration reform continues, we urge Congress to carefully 

consider the implications of any new employment verification system, keeping in 

mind that this is not just a debate about immigration reform, it is a debate about 

workplace management, which impacts all U.S. employers and all American workers, not just those who are foreign born. 

My remarks will focus on the employment verification process established in the 

Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, the state of the current electronic verification system, the Basic Pilot Program that was enacted in The Illegal 

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, as well as 

our proposal to create an effective electronic employment verification system in the 

effort to ensure compliance with immigration laws at the worksite, and to protect 

the civil rights and privacy of employees. 

Mr. Chairman, under IRCA employers are required to review documents presented by employees within three business days of hire demonstrating identity and 

authorization to work in the United States. After reviewing these documents, employers are required to attest on Form I–9 that they have reviewed the documents 

and that they appear genuine and authentic. Under current law, 27 paper-based 

documents are available to employees to demonstrate work eligibility, with 12 different documents authorized under law to prove identity. 

Even under the best of circumstances, HR professionals encounter numerous challenges with the employment verification requirements under IRCA. These include: 

maintaining the I–9 records when an employee presents a document that has an 

expiration date; verifying the authenticity, quality, and quantity of documents presented by an employee for work authorization and identification purposes; and managing the current I–9 process, which is burdensome and time-consuming. 

According to SHRM’s 2006 Access to Human Capital and Employment Verification 

survey, 60 percent of responding HR professionals indicated that they continue to 

experience problems with the current verification requirements of IRCA 20 years 

after its enactment. The most common challenge cited is ascertaining the authenticity of documents presented for employment (40 percent). 

The current document-based system is prone to fraud, forgeries and identity theft, 

making it difficult, if not impossible, for an employer to differentiate between the 

legal and illegal worker in this process. 

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U.S. employers, whether large or small, cannot be expected to consistently identify 

unauthorized workers using the existing system, but they are liable for severe sanctions if these workers find their way onto the payroll. Conversely, they are subject 

to claims of discrimination if they question the validity of documents too much. 

The proliferation of false or stolen documents can and does cause reputable employers to mistakenly hire individuals who are not eligible to work. At the same 

time, the lack of certainty and threat of government-imposed penalties may lead 

some employers to delay or forego hiring legal workers who are eligible. In either 

case, the costs are high for both U.S. employers and legal workers. 

In an attempt to address the shortcoming of the paper-based system, Congress 

created the Basic Pilot program for employers to voluntarily confirm an employee’s 

eligibility to work using an electronic verification system. Under the Basic Pilot program, employers are required to review an employee’s identity and work authorization documents consistent with IRCA requirements, including completing all Form 

I–9 paperwork. Employers are then required to check each new employee’s work eligibility using the electronic verification system. 

The Basic Pilot system is supposed to respond to the employer within three days 

with either a confirmation or a tentative non-confirmation of the employee’s work 

eligibility. In the cases of a tentative non-confirmation, a secondary verification 

process lasting ten days is initiated to confirm the validity of the information provided and to provide the employer with a confirmation or non-verification of work 

eligibility. Employers are not permitted to terminate individuals that have received 

a tentative non-confirmation until the employer has received a final non-verification 

or the ten-day period has elapsed. 

Although the Basic Pilot has been operational since 1997, and despite the best 

efforts of the men and women who administer this program in the USCIS, we believe it is inadequate to meet the needs of all U.S. employers in the employment 

verification process. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), in 

June of 2005, only 2,300 out of 5.6 million U.S. employers participated in the Basic 

Pilot in 2004. Even with the relatively low participation rate, the GAO found that 

about 15 percent of all queries required additional verification because the automated system was unable to provide confirmation responses on the initial attempt. 

In April 2007, the United States Citizen Immigration Services (USCIS) testified 

before the House Judiciary Subcommittee that that the total number of participating employers has risen to about 16,000 employers and that ‘‘over 92 percent of 

inquiries from employers receive an instantaneous employment authorized response.’’ 

However, these numbers represent only a fraction of the nearly 6 million employers in the United States. According to USCIS, if all employers were required to enroll in the Basic Pilot within 18 months, as called for by some proposals in Congress, USCIS would need to enroll approximately 20,000 employers a day. Expanding this system to cover all employers as proposed—absent federal certification that 

the system is adequately staffed and prepared to handle the increased workload— 

will undoubtedly cause confusion, harm productivity, and deny eligible workers employment opportunities. 

Since a significant percentage of the Basic Pilot queries require human intervention, substantial resources will be needed to purge the various agency databases and 

improve communication between agencies. This problem is likely to be exacerbated 

if participation increases from 16,000 to all 6 million-plus employers. As we have 

seen in other aspects of immigration adjudication, a substantial increase in immigration-related caseload without corresponding increases in resources can lead to 

major processing delays. Using USCIS’s own numbers of a 92 percent verification 

rate, millions of authorized employees’ verification for employment could be in jeopardy. 

As evidenced in several recent high profile situations, there are major concerns 

that the Basic Pilot’s accuracy is severely limited by the proliferation of fraudulent 

identity documents. This is because the Basic Pilot system does not verify the authenticity of the identity being presented for employment purposes, only that the 

identity presented matches information in the Social Security and DHS databases. 

In testimony to House Judiciary Subcommittee in April, Jack Shadley, Senior Vice 

President for Human Resources for Swift & Company detailed the shortcomings of 

the ‘‘Basic Pilot’’ employment verification system. Despite the company’s hiring processes, which included participation in Basic Pilot, the government raided six Swift 

production facilities on the morning of December 12th, 2006, and detained 1,282 employees. Many were using stolen identities that could not be detected by Basic Pilot. 

This event cost the company more than $30 million and disrupted communities that 

Swift has worked hard to enrich. As Mr. Shadley stated in his testimony: 

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‘‘It is particularly galling to us that an employer who played by all the rules and 

used the only available government tool to screen employee eligibility would be subjected to adversarial treatment by our government. These ICE raids once again 

highlight significant weaknesses in the Basic Pilot program.’’ 

In addition to concerns with premature expansion of the Basic Pilot, several Congressional proposals also expose employers to liability for actions beyond their control, such as the actions of subcontractors. We strongly believe that U.S. employers 

should be liable for their own hiring decisions, not those made outside their control. 

Enforcement needs to be vigorous and fair, and should focus on employers that blatantly ignore the law as opposed to employers who commit paperwork or technical 

violations in their attempt to comply. 

Employers need the right tools to verify a legal workforce. However, HR cannot— 

and should not—be America’s surrogate border patrol agents. Rather, employers are 

entitled to an unambiguous answer to the query whether an employee is authorized 

to accept an offer of employment. Unfortunately, mandating the current Basic Pilot 

system will not meet the needs of employers or employees. 

We believe that Congress must transform the current paper-based verification 

process into a state-of-the-art electronic system that is accurate, reliable, cost-efficient, easy-to-use, and shares responsibility among government, employers and employees. Specifically, we advocate a system that would verify identity through additional background checks and the voluntary use of biometric enrollment conducted 

by government certified private vendors. According to SHRM’s 2006 Weapons in the 

Workplace, 85 percent of responding HR professionals indicated their organizations 

conduct background checks of potential employees. 

This system would build upon background checks currently conducted by many 

employers, to include forensic document examination and tailored data mining in 

publicly available databases. An individual’s identity could be ‘‘locked’’ to biometric 

or other secure identifiers through this process. Employees would not need to 

present a card as some have advocated, just themselves. 

Under our proposal, employers would be required to participate in one of two electronic employment verification systems: 

EEVS—A completely electronic employment verification system (EEVS) 

which improves upon the current Basic Pilot system and permits employers 

to access the system via phone and internet. Employers would verify identity by visually examining a limited number of documents presented by the 

employee. Employers would verify work authorization by submitting employee data to the SAVE system. The verification process can be initiated 

either post offer or acceptance of a job by an employee but prior to the commencement of work or within the first 3 days after work commences. The 

databases feeding into the SAVE system must be upgraded to ensure all 

information is accurate and updated and that secondary verifications are 

completed within 10 days. Employers would continue to make subjective determinations that the person presenting the documents is who he claims to 

be and that the documents are valid on their face. The current I–9 form 

would be eliminated. Employers in this system would be subject to the current range of enforcement efforts and penalties. 

SEEVS—A more secure electronic employment verification system (SEEVS) 

that guard against identity theft would be available to employers on a voluntary basis. This state-of-the-art system would verify identity through additional background checks and voluntary biometric enrollment conducted 

by private vendors. The employee’s work authorization would continue to 

be verified through the SAVE databases. By eliminating subjective determinations of work authorization documents, this system will eliminate discrimination and simplify enforcement. There will be only two enforcement 

questions for the government: 1) Did you check every employee through the 

system in a fair and equal manner? 2) Did the employer make his/her hiring decisions consistent with information they received through the system? 

Employers participating in this system would be deemed to be in compliance absent a showing of bad faith. 

The proposed SEEVS system would prevent identity fraud by automatically recognizing an individual based on measurable biological (anatomical and physiological) 

and behavioral characteristics. The new system would be able to answer two vital 

questions: 

1. Is the person identified by name, date of birth, and social security number authorized to accept the employment being offered? 

2. Is the person actually who he or she claims to be? 

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We also believe that any such secure electronic employment verification system 

as described above needs to meet standards set by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) from a technology and a privacy standpoint. The 

SEEVS model for prevention of identity theft lies in authorizing competing private 

entities, certified by the Government with the involvement of NIST, to develop and 

conduct the process necessary to verify the identity. The privately held databases 

would be protected from disclosure by law and held in a segregated fashion that 

would prevent linking of identity to biometrics without the enrolled person presenting his or her biometrics as the key. 

We do not believe a biometric card is necessary to have an effective employment 

verification system. A new biometric card, such as a Social Security card, would cost 

billions of dollars to create, foster visions of a national ID card, and would tax the 

current capabilities of the Social Security system. Finally, as we have discussed and 

has been demonstrated before through cases such as the Swift, government-issued 

identity and work authorization cards eventually can be counterfeited by those who 

want to circumvent the system. 

If adequately funded and fairly administered, SHRM and the HR Initiative believe this new system could eradicate virtually all unauthorized employment—thereby eliminating a huge incentive for illegal immigration. It will also eliminate discrimination by taking the subjectivity out of the verification process. 

Finally, we strongly recommend that the Federal Government, specifically the Department of Homeland Security, take sole ownership of enforcing immigration laws 

at the worksite. Recently, partially due to an understandable frustration on the part 

of state and local governments over the lack of immigration control, many jurisdictions have enacted their own laws on employment eligibility verification. With all 

due respect to these states and municipalities, it is the U.S. Congress that has plenary authority, and the expertise, to deal with this issue. Moreover, it is extremely 

hard on employers, especially ones with presence in several states, to keep up with 

the various requirements. Ironically, while law-abiding employers risk exposure because of inadvertent mistakes or confusion over the different and possibly contradictory requirements, unscrupulous businesses can continue to hire off the books with 

virtual impunity. We suggest that worksite enforcement must be vigilant, and that 

the Federal Government must hold all employers to the same standards and same 

set of requirements. 

True employment verification is the only way to ensure fair and equitable treatment for those individuals who should have access to legitimate jobs. It is essential 

for a legal workforce and for America’s national and economic security. 

Both SHRM and the HR Initiative coalition look forward to working with the committee on a new verification system that is effective, secure, easy to use, and in 

which both employees and employers can place their trust. 

f 

Chairman MCNULTY. Thank you very much. 

We have two votes on the House floor. Since this is a 15-minute 

vote and we are just at the beginning of it, we are going to try to 

hear Mr. Neumann’s testimony, perhaps Mr. Rotenberg. We will 

get as far as we can before we have to run over to vote. Then we 

will do two votes back to back and reconvene here as quickly as 

possible, hopefully only detaining for a 15-minute break. 

So, Mr. Neumann may start. 

STATEMENT OF PETER G. NEUMANN, PRINCIPAL SCIENTIST, 

COMPUTER SCIENCE LABORATORY, SRI INTERNATIONAL, 

MENLO PARK, CALIFORNIA, ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. PUBLIC 

POLICY COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTING 

MACHINERY 

Mr. NEUMANN. Thank you very much for the invitation to be 

here. It is a very important topic, and I hope I can shed some constructive background on it. 

I am speaking on behalf of the USACM, the U.S. Public Policy 

Committee of the Association for Computing Machinery, which is 

a nonprofit group, over 80,000 people dedicating to constructive use 

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of computer technology. I also speak as someone who has over 50 

years of experience in research and development, and a sideline interest of collecting stories on things that failed. 

If you ask me questions about it, I will talk about the IRS failure, the air traffic control modernization failure, the FBI virtual 

case file problems, the deadbeat dads, and so on. There are just an 

enormous number of cases in which large systems collapsed. The 

first two of those were $4 billion efforts that were eventually canceled after it was recognized that they could never succeed. 

The task that you are embarking on with a modernization or upgrading of EEVS reminds me of a metaphor, because if you look 

under the eaves, you typically see rodents and termites and dry rot 

from roof leaks in a badly built house, or even some of the wellbuilt houses. You also have ongoing maintenance problems of having to clean out the gutters, and the liability lawsuits when the 

maintenance guy falls off the ladder. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. NEUMANN. So it is a much bigger problem than it is normally conceived. When somebody tells you, yes, we can build this 

system, I will give you hundreds of examples of things that have 

gone wrong over the years, and reasons why most of the systems 

don’t work. 

If Ranking Member Johnson will ask me about tamper-proof systems, there are no such things. There might be some tamper-resistant ones and tamper-evident systems, but some of my colleagues 

can break just about anything that has ever been built. 

I would like to very briefly outline some of the more critical 

issues. In my written testimony, I go through considerable detail 

on things that have to be fixed before this could possibly work, assuming that it ever possibly could work. 

In particular, the sensitive information needs to be protected. 

This is an extremely different problem—difficult problem, rather— 

because many of the privacy problems are extrinsic to the system. 

They involve insiders who have legitimate access and who can misuse that access, for example. They are based on computer systems 

that are not secure, which means, since you put it on the Internet, 

you have a great many problems. 

Authentication: Passwords are mentioned. Passwords are an extremely weak form of protection. We need something much greater 

than that, especially when we start sharing across the Internet. 

One of the biggest problems that you are going to face is the 

scalability problem. I will give you two examples. The simplest example is the man who starts out with a hamburger stand and expands it into a worldwide chain. The logistic problems, the financial problems, the health problems, and so on are orders and orders 

of magnitude more complex. It does not scale in any reasonable 

sense. 

A more computer-related example is taking MS DOS, which had 

no security in it whatsoever, and suddenly saying, we are going to 

build a variant of that that is accessible to everybody in the world 

over the Internet. There is no security in the Internet. There is 

very little security in some of the systems that we are dealing with. 

The result of all of that is that we are living in a world where you 

cannot really guarantee anything about protection. 

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Authentication and accountability are absolutely fundamental. 

Oversight. Audit trails. It represents an enormous problem, but 

then you have the problem of who can look at the audit trail, who 

can modify the audit trail. It should never be modifiable, of course. 

You then have all of the level playing field issues that smaller 

organizations may be very seriously disadvantaged, especially by 

the realtime requirement, where they don’t even have access to 

computers at the time that they need it. 

So, I think the bottom line here is that experience has taught us 

over the years, for those of us who have been deeply involved in 

building systems and analyzing them and analyzing why they don’t 

work, that systems like EEVS are subject to an enormous number 

of pitfalls. those are anticipated from the very beginning, they can 

never be overcome in an incremental way. 

I think the real problem here is that we tend not to anticipate 

all of the problems. We said, oh, let’s go and build this thing. We 

are told that it can work. Our subcontractors are all very happy to 

take our money and build it. And, in fact, when it doesn’t work and 

it get canceled years later, the same guys go off and build another 

system. 

So, I think the problems here are ones that you really need to 

look at proactively before you engage in any legislation. So, on one 

hand, as a technologist, I can say, well, I could build something 

that might work in the small. However, when you scale it up to the 

massive number of uses over the Internet, where they are accessible from anywhere in the world, from any hacker, cracker, terrorist, or anybody else who can either bring down the system or access it, you have a totally different ball game than the one that you 

think you are dealing with. 

Thank you very much for inviting me, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Neumann follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Peter Neumann, Principal Scientist, Computer 

Science Laboratory, SRI International, Menlo Park, California, on behalf 

of U.S. Public Policy Committee of the Association for Computing Machinery 

Security and Privacy in the Employment Eligibility Verification System 

(EEVS) and Related Systems 

This testimony addresses some of the potential pitfalls that should be considered 

when planning systems with extensive computer database applications containing 

personal information, such as the Employment Eligibility Verification Systems 

(EEVS). Many of these concerns are also applicable to related programs such as US– 

VISIT and REAL–ID and to peripheral systems that may depend on EEVS or result 

from interconnections among those other systems. Widespread problems have arisen 

in efforts to develop complex systems that must satisfy critical requirements for security and privacy; these problems are also considered. Furthermore, there is a pervasive tendency to overestimate the benefits of computer-related technologies as 

would-be solutions to societal problems. We should not expect easy technological answers to inherently difficult problems. People are almost always the weakest links, 

although in many cases the system design and implementation create further weak 

links. A deep awareness of the long-term problems is essential before adopting legislation that might promise to help in the short term. 

1. Introduction 

Thank you, Chairman McNulty and Ranking Member Johnson, for the opportunity to testify at today’s hearing exploring issues related to proposed changes to 

the EEVS. I commend you for exploring the policy and technology issues associated 

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with current proposals to expand and make this program mandatory. The computing community has often seen problems that resulted from policies established 

without careful consideration of the inherent limitations of technology. This can result in serious technical and social hurdles, and can lead to problems that are difficult to remediate once they have occurred, but that could have been prevented 

proactively. We hope that your efforts can help to avoid such difficulties. 

As Principal Scientist in the Computer Science Laboratory at SRI International 

(formerly Stanford Research Institute), where I have been since 1971, and as someone with 54 years of experience related to computer and communication technologies, I have explored the intersection of technology and policy in numerous contexts, with a particular focus on system trustworthiness, security, and privacy 

issues. These areas are particularly relevant to the technology and policy nexus because privacy and equal treatment under law are fundamental rights; technology 

can at the same time help secure and also undermine those rights—depending on 

the policies and practices for its use. Privacy and security are inextricably linked. 

One cannot ever guarantee complete privacy, but the difficulties are severely complicated by systems that are not adequately secure. Creating complex systems that 

are dependably trustworthy (secure, reliable, survivable in the face of many adversities, and so on) remains a grand challenge of computer science. As we review a proposed expansion to the EEVS, USACM sees a number of issues that should be explored, debated, and resolved before adopting this massive new system for identity 

verification. 

This statement represents my own personal position as well as that of the Association for Computing Machinery’s (ACM) Committee on U.S. Public Policy 

(USACM). ACM is a non-profit educational and scientific computing society of more 

than 80,000 computer scientists, educators, senior managers, and other computer 

professionals in government, industry, and academia, committed to the open interchange of information concerning computing and related disciplines. The Committee 

on U.S. Public Policy acts as the focal point for ACM’s interaction with the U.S. 

Congress and government organizations. It seeks to educate and assist policy-makers on legislative and regulatory matters of concern to the computing community. 

(See http://www.acm.org and http://www.acm.org/usacm.) A brief biographical paragraph is appended. 

2. Issues of Specific Concern in the EEVS 

The information transmitted to and stored in EEVS includes all of the primary 

personal identifiers in the U.S. As such, any compromise, leak, theft, destruction, 

or alteration of this data would have severe consequences to the individuals involved, including, but not limited to, identity theft and impersonation. It is thus essential that the system be designed, constructed, and operated with the quality of 

protection that is essentially that required for classified national security information. 

2.1. Transmission of Information 

Any legislation requiring the transmission of personal information across the 

Internet should require secure transmission of this information. Employers and 

agencies participating in the program should be required to have strong encryption, 

strong authentication, or even elementary security (such as Secure Socket Layer, 

SSL) for transmissions to and from employers. Calling out such specific technologies 

and details would be inappropriate for statutory language; however, the legislation 

should include performance-based standards for security that limit the exposure of 

personal information and provide accountability for every step in handling and processing this information. This will make it clear to agencies that implement the system, and employers who use the system, that the security of personal information 

is as valued by policymakers as the reliability and timeliness of responses. In the 

case of EEVS and many other important systems, it is much more important to 

have continuing trust in the security and accuracy of the information rather than 

to get results in the shortest possible time. 

We recommend that legislation require that the system be designed to protect the 

integrity and confidentiality of information, that an independent security review 

evaluation be conducted before the system is deployed, and periodically after deployment, and that the results of these evaluations be made public. The systems and 

their operation should be required to follow Fair Information Practices. See also 

USACM’s recommendations for database design (http://www.acm.org/usacm/Issues/ 

Privacy.htm). 

We further recommend that the legislation require security breach notification: if 

administrators become aware of any breaches that could potentially affect personally identifiable information, then they must publish a disclosure and must notify 

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all individuals who may be affected. Congress could model this after various state 

disclosure laws, such as one recently passed in California. 

We also recommend that individuals be notified whenever someone accesses their 

records. The cost would be small, relative to other costs of the system: one letter 

or e-mail per job application. 

2.2. Accountability for Access to Information 

Accountability from the end user to the system administrator is vital in a computing system for ensuring the integrity of the system. If people are not held accountable for their actions, then policies intended to curb abuse will be undermined 

as users circumvent policies to make their jobs easier. One way of improving accountability in any computing system is by requiring strong user authentication and 

access controls coupled with thorough tamper-resistant and tamper-evident logging 

of all activity. In addition, all system accesses should log who accessed which 

records, and individuals whose information is stored should be informed who has 

accessed their records. This would then allow concerned individuals to detect misfeasance and improper access to their records. Each employer should identify a compliance officer (distinct from EEVS users). The system should automatically detect 

unusual user behaviors (to the extent technically feasible) and report them to compliance officers. 

Some strong controls are clearly needed to explicitly bind the access of a particular request to a specific authorized requestor acting in a specific role for a specific employer. The same controls should be applied to the operators of the system. 

Names, titles, and SSNs of authorized system users are not enough. 

Access controls are also critical if individual employees are going to access the system to check their own information. Procedures and policy need to be in place to 

restrict employees’ access to only their own information. The ability to check the accuracy of one’s own information is very important. However, such accesses also need 

to be controlled and audited, at least as extensively as the accesses on behalf of an 

employer—particularly to be able to identify systematic misuses. 

2.3. Scalability 

To date the system has functioned as a pilot program. The pilot has about 8,600 

employers (June 2006 number) registered, with about half of those employers considered active users. This is out of about 5.6 million employers (as of 2002) that 

would eventually use the system once the law is fully implemented. Just because 

it seems to work for a small number of employers does not imply that it would work 

for all employers. The scalability of EEVS is a very serious architectural issue, because it will have to handle at least a thousand-fold increase in users, queries, 

transactions, and communications volumes. As a general rule, each time a system 

grows even ten times larger, serious new technical issues arise that were not previously significant. 

At present, eight percent of confirmation requests cannot be handled immediately. 

This percentage needs to be reduced significantly as the number of employers increases. This would reduce the frustration with the system as well as the additional 

time required for manual confirmation for those records that could not be immediately verified. The additional human resources and associated costs necessary to 

handle this burden must be taken into account and included in budgets. 

In general, it is risky to operate a system outside its intended design capacity and 

rely upon it to work under all circumstances, unless it has been carefully designed 

and implemented with scalability specifically in mind. Issues relating to inadequate 

scalability could completely compromise the effectiveness of the resulting system. 

2.4. Accuracy of Information 

The system has weaknesses about the accuracy of information presented to the 

system by an employee or employer as well as the accuracy of the underlying databases. 

Speaking to the first kind of inaccuracies—fraudulent documents—the GAO has 

indicated that the Basic Pilot cannot effectively detect identity fraud. Proposals to 

add a digitized photograph to any employment authorization document would help 

make sure the employer could confirm that the photograph on the documents 

matched the employee presenting them. However, it is unclear how much this would 

reduce identity theft. 

The inevitable cat-and-mouse game that always occurs in security (an ever upward escalating spiral in measures and countermeasures) is likely to occur between 

the security control and those seeking to commit fraud. As it becomes known that 

photo verification is a security feature, obtaining official documents under false pretenses will become more valuable. This could be done by bribing an insider or providing fraudulent documents to obtain the identification. The fraud is simply moved 

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to a different part of the system. We also note that requiring REAL–ID, as envisioned by the DHS’s rules for implementation of the REAL–ID system, will not solve 

the insider threat problem. This was pointed out in USACM’s comments on the 

REAL–ID rulemaking. (See the ‘‘insider threats’’ heading in USACM’s comments: 

http://www.acm.org/usacm/PDF/USACM_REAL_ID_Comments_FINAL.pdf) 

Carefully developed standards for digital photographs are necessary—much like 

those for driver’s licenses—although they will not be sufficient for the prevention 

and detection of forgeries. 

Serious areas of concern also exist for the second kind of inaccuracies—bad information in the underlying databases, delays in entering or revising information, and 

inconsistencies and name confusions among different databases. The Social Security 

database is known to have a high number of errors in name matches, as well as 

some duplicate numbers. For example, the Social Security Administration’s Office 

of the Inspector General recently estimated that the SSA’s ‘Numident’ file—the data 

against which Basic Pilot checks worker information—has an error rate of 4.1 percent. If each of 5.6 million employers made a query of a different potential applicant, that percentage suggests that on average more than 200,000 of them might 

get false responses. 

The other databases the system will rely on will have similar issues. We certainly 

recognize and endorse the importance of provisions that allow individuals to check 

the correctness of information in the system that relates to them. However, a better 

defined process of correcting any erroneous information would be the necessary next 

step in improving the reliability of these databases, and the system as a whole. The 

risks of incorrect information are considerable, although establishing standards and 

procedures for accuracy to avoid those risks and to remediate errors and malicious 

misuse is an extremely difficult task. Numerous potential employees could be 

wrongly denied employment because of inaccurate records, if this problem is not addressed. 

Risks of identity theft and privacy violations are also present—for example, if unauthorized or surreptitious accesses, or even changes, can be made. Explicit provisions are needed to protect employees and potential employees from adverse consequences of database and data entry errors. 

Employers should also be held accountable for misuse of their blanket access 

privileges, such as using the data for running credit and insurance checks, engaging 

in blackmail, and other inappropriate purposes. 

USACM encourages Congress to consider undesirable effects of false-positive and 

false-negative results. (A false positive is when a response indicates someone may 

be hired, only to be overturned later. A false negative would be when a response 

indicates someone has not been confirmed, only to be shown later to be incorrect.) 

Given the possibilities for error, identity theft, and system failure, employers should 

be protected from penalties when acting in good faith, and potential employees 

should be protected against discriminatory behavior. This is a policy issue rather 

than a technical issue, but directly arises from using an imperfect system as an arbiter. 

It must be possible for authorized staff, as well as potential employees, to challenge incorrect EEVS data and determinations. 

2.5 National ID System Concerns 

Although there is no national ID card requirement attached to the EEVS, the connections to various databases are similar to the REAL–ID system currently proposed by DHS. If the EEVS does store query information or holds duplicates of information gleaned from the databases it interacts with, then it will have the appearance of a national identity system. As the existence of a national ID is not authorized by the proposed Senate immigration reform legislation, the Department will 

need to take care to avoid even the appearance of providing such documentation. 

The tradeoffs here are extremely complex, but are probably already being discussed 

in other testimony and other hearings. 

2.6. Accessibility Issues 

The potential lack of timely and highly available remote access to EEVS is another concern. Many small employers may not have Internet access or even computers that would allow them to have access. Examples might include small shop 

owners who want to hire clerks, and farmers who want a few hired hands. Furthermore, access via slow-speed dial-up connections is not likely to encourage consistent 

system use. Real-time confirmation of employability is less likely to occur consistently in such cases, and in cases of loss of computing or communication connectivity. 

Perhaps even worse, poorly protected systems and poorly trained users will probably fall victim to ubiquitous security vulnerabilities and malicious software on the 

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Internet. Many casual or novice computer system users could become unsuspecting 

victims of scams, phishing attacks, identity theft, and so on—as a consequence of 

being forced to add computing and connectivity to support use of EEVS. 

It is also a certainty that criminal elements will craft phishing e-mail appearing 

to originate from the Department of Homeland Security. This would include pointers 

(URLs) to what appear to be DHS websites with the DHS seal and apparent certificates that are essentially indistinguishable from the real websites. Unsuspecting 

users who visit these sites might then be victimized, resulting in significant financial losses and other serious consequences that typically result from identity thefts. 

Skilled identity thieves are likely to be able to scam the system itself more readily 

than authorized individuals can protect themselves or correct data errors. 

A further problem is that many of the computer systems used to access EEVS 

may not have adequate security, and may have been compromised. Unfortunately, 

the security of EEVS itself may be subverted by the lack of security in other connected systems (which potentially implies the entire Internet). 

For these reasons, despite its possible benefits, EEVS might actually make identity theft easier and at the same time make remediation and recovery more difficult. 

3. Broader Concerns 

The current state of the art in developing trustworthy systems that can satisfy 

critical requirements such as security, reliability, survivability, and guaranteed realtime performance is truly very poor. This is not a newly recognized problem, and 

was well documented in 1990 in a report, Bugs in the Program, by James Paul (Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the U.S. House Committee on Science, 

Space, and Technology). Subsequently, I presented four testimonies (1997, 1999, 

2000, and 2001) for various House committees—each of which suggested that the 

overall situation had incrementally gotten worse. Of specific relevance to this testimony was my written testimony for the House Subcommittee on Social Security, 

The Social Security Administration: PEBES, Identity Theft, and Related Risks, on 

May 13, 1997—now more than 10 years ago. Similar conclusions appear in my testimonies for Senate committees (1996, 1997, 1998). (These testimonies are all online, 

with links from my website, http://www.csl.sri.com/neumann.) 

Software development fiascos abound—including many highly visible projects that 

have been late, over budget, or indeed abandoned after many years and large expenditures. My Illustrative Risks compendium index (http://www.csl.sri.com/neumann/illustrative.html) cites numerous examples such as the IRS and Air Traffic 

Control modernization programs and the FBI Virtual Case File, to cite just a few. 

See also the PITAC report, Cyber Security: A Crisis of Prioritization: http:// 

www.nitrd.gov/pitac/reports/20050301_cybersecurity/cybersecurity.pdf. 

Privacy problems are also manifold, and becoming increasingly complex as ubiquitous dependence on computerized databases increases. The extent to which computer systems and databases can enforce privacy policies is severely limited by the 

absence of meaningfully secure systems, and by the number of privacy violations occurring outside of the confines of the computer systems. Correctness and timeliness 

of the data are also major concerns. 

Several problems with identity management must be addressed. The existing infrastructure is riddled with security and reliability vulnerabilities, and is not sufficiently trustworthy. Because many of the privacy problems are related to total systems (encompassing computers, communications, people, and procedures), they cannot be adequately protected by technological approaches alone. Identities are typically subject to masquerading and spoofing. Name confusions such as alternative 

spellings and aliases cause major confusions. Authentication is often compromised 

by ′′social engineering′′ and other nontechnological bypasses. Authorization is typically inadequately fine-grained (and worse yet, often supposedly all-or-nothing, but 

bypassable). Blanket authorization should be avoided, observing the Principle of 

Least Privilege—under which access authorizations should be restricted to just what 

is needed to accomplish that intended task rather than being overly broad. 

It is also worth noting that there are cases where identities need to be masked. 

Examples include individuals protected under the Federal Witness Protection Program, individuals granted asylum from other countries and given new identities, undercover intelligence agents, undercover law-enforcement agents working criminal 

cases, and sky marshals. (Note that the Transportation Security Administration 

somehow lost the employee personnel records for 2003–2005.) All of these people 

need to have verifiable identities that stand up to any scrutiny, online or otherwise. 

Exposure of their real identities may result in their violent deaths, compromises of 

national security, and possible violence to their friends and families. Those individuals will likely need employment under their alternate identities, and it must be 

ensured that any system implemented for EEVS does not endanger their cover idenwwoods2 on PROD1PC60 with HEARING

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tities. The more that databases become cross-linked, the more difficult it becomes 

to prevent errors and leakage of such sensitive information. Furthermore, such linkages make these database systems higher-value targets for criminals. 

The requirement of masking, aliasing, or otherwise providing alternative identities seems to create a fundamental conundrum: maintaining the accuracy of a critical database while simultaneously undermining its accuracy may impair the accuracy of other data in the process. 

Past legislative efforts for improving accuracy and integrity of public databases 

have caused serious problems with the viability of other systems. For example, the 

Help America Vote Act mandated statewide-centralized voter registration databases 

that must verify the accuracy of records by matching them with drivers’ license 

records. States such as California found that the data-matching requirements in 

practice led to high rejection rates in some counties, depending on how strictly the 

data was interpreted across databases. This had the effect of reducing, not improving, voter registration list accuracy, because legitimate voters were removed from 

the rolls because of address typos and name variants. 

4. Conclusions 

The problems identified in this testimony are fundamental in the context of 

EEVS-like systems. There are many risks. Essential concerns for system and data 

security, system and data integrity, and individual privacy must be anticipated from 

the beginning and reflected throughout design, implementation, and operation. 

Many potential slippery slopes must also be anticipated and avoided. Privacy requires a real commitment to creating realistic policies and enforcing them. 

Experience has taught us that the design of information systems is subject to 

many pitfalls that can compromise their effectiveness. If EEVS is not appropriately 

implemented, it could—like many past systems—be subject to problems that include, but are not limited to, the following: 

• Difficulties in maintaining accuracy, correctness, and timeliness of the database 

• Inconsistencies among widely distributed systems with distributed data entry 

• A popular tendency to place excessive faith in the trustworthiness of the system’s responses 

• A common tendency to place excessive faith in the infallibility of identification, 

authentication, and access controls to ensure security and privacy 

• The lack of scalability with respect to ever-growing enormous databases, massive numbers of authorized users, and consequent communication and access 

limitations 

• The complexity of requirements imposed by noncompromisible auditing and accountability, both of which introduce further problems with respect to system 

security and integrity and with respect to data privacy 

• The complexity of audit trails and notification of accesses to audit trails themselves 

• The risks of exacerbated problems that result from mission creep—as further 

applications tend to be linked to the originally intended uses, and as control of 

the above factors becomes less possible 

• Similar risks related to feature creep, with or without any oversight and audit 

mechanisms. 

• ‘‘Piggybacking’’ by other agencies—e.g., law enforcement and DHS might want 

to place silent-hit warnings (as was considered in the late 1980s for the National Crime Information NCIC system) that would inform them who was seeking information for anyone who was under surveillance. Linkages with databases for deadbeat parents, student loan defaulters, and other applications 

might also be contemplated. Each such connection would expand the exposure 

of the system and the dangers of incorrect data and data leakage. 

Congress should establish clear policies and required outcomes, rather than prescriptive or detailed technical processes or systems. The technical challenges to 

achieving the policies and outcomes should be fully documented in the Congressional Record of the legislation. 

Considerably more focused research is needed on total-system approaches that address identity authentication, authorization, and data protection within the context 

of overall system architectures for security and privacy. (For example, some promising new developments enable the use of cryptography to enable certain queries to 

be answered without requiring decryption and release of excessive information in 

violation of the Principle of Least Privilege. These techniques appear to be significantly less subject to misuse, including insider misuse.) Such approaches may be 

more effective than trying to rely on biometric and other devices whose effectiveness 

may be compromised by technological or operational flaws in the systems in which 

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they are placed and errors in human judgment. Finally, incentives are needed to 

ensure that research and innovative prototypes are relevant to the real-world problems and to ensure that these advances find their way into the development and 

operation of practical systems. 

Although similar comments can be made about REAL–ID and any other national 

identification systems, all of these concerns are specifically relevant to systems such 

as EEVS. 

We have not attempted to be complete here, but rather to focus on the main 

issues. There are many relevant reports of the Government Accountability Office, 

the National Research Council, and other sources that I hope you have already seen. 

Whereas USACM and I speak from a technical perspective, we recognize the political imperatives regarding immigration and employment. We urge the Congress to 

focus on creating the right incentives for operators and employers that maximize 

achievement of our immigration laws and each citizen’s right to work while minimizing privacy invasion, ID theft, and criminal activity. In this effort, technology 

should be seen as a supporting block, not the keystone of the arch. 

We look forward to any further questions that might arise from your reading of 

this written testimony or from my oral testimony. 

Acknowledgments 

I am particularly grateful to Cameron Wilson (ACM Director of Public Policy), 

David Bruggeman (USACM Public Policy Analyst), Eugene Spafford (USACM 

Chairman, and Professor at Purdue University), Jim Horning, and many other 

members of USACM for their generous help in my preparing this testimony on rather short notice. 

Contact Information 

Peter G. Neumann 

SRI International, Computer Science Laboratory 

Menlo Park CA 94025–3493 

Neumann@CSL.sri.com 

http://www.csl.sri.com/neumann 

Personal Background Information 

Peter G. Neumann (Neumann@CSL.sri.com) has doctorates from Harvard and 

Darmstadt. His first technical employment was working for the U.S. Navy in the 

summer of 1953. After 10 years at Bell Labs in Murray Hill, New Jersey, in the 

1960s, during which he was heavily involved in the Multics development jointly 

with MIT and Honeywell, he has been in SRI’s Computer Science Lab since September 1971. He is concerned with computer systems and networks, trustworthiness/dependability, high assurance, security, reliability, survivability, safety, 

and many risks-related issues such as voting-system integrity, crypto policy, social 

implications, and human needs including privacy. He moderates the ACM Risks 

Forum (comp.risks), edits CACM’s monthly Inside Risks column, and is the Chairman of the ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy (ACM–CCPP), which 

serves as a review board for RISKS and Inside Risks and is international in scope. 

He is also a member of USACM, which is independent of ACM–CCPP. He created 

ACM SIGSOFT’s Software Engineering Notes in 1976, was its editor for 19 years, 

and still contributes the RISKS section. He has participated in four studies for the 

National Academies of Science: Multilevel Data Management Security (1982), Computers at Risks (1991), Cryptography’s Role in Security the Information Society 

(1996), and Improving Cybersecurity for the 21st Century: Rationalizing the Agenda 

(2007). His book, Computer-Related Risks (Addison-Wesley and ACM Press, 1995), 

is still timely—including many of the problems discussed above. He is a Fellow of 

the ACM, IEEE, and AAAS, and is also an SRI Fellow. He received the National 

Computer System Security Award in 2002 and the ACM SIGSAC Outstanding Contributions Award in 2005. He is a member of the U.S. Government Accountability 

Office Executive Council on Information Management and Technology, and the California Office of Privacy Protection advisory council. He has taught courses at Darmstadt, Stanford University, the University of California at Berkeley, and the University of Maryland. Neumann chairs the National Committee for Voting Integrity 

(http://www.votingintegrity.org). See his website (http://www.csl.sri.com/neumann) 

for prior testimonies for the U.S. Senate and House and for the California state Senate and Legislature, publications, bibliography, and further background. 

Dr. Neumann is Principal Investigator for two SRI projects that are relevant to 

this testimony: 

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• Privacy-Preserving Credentials, one of several subcontracts from Dartmouth 

College, Assessable Identity and Privacy Protection, funded by the Department 

of Homeland Security, 2006–CS–001–000001–02, FCDA #97.001. The SRI 

project is part of a collaborative team project jointly with the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Cornell, Purdue, and Georgia Tech. The project is 

contributing some highly innovative cryptographic research and extensive system experience to the application of practical techniques for advanced identity 

management with demonstrations of applications that will include health care 

and finance but that have significant relevance to identity management generally. 

• A Center for Correct, Usable, Reliable, Auditable and Transparent Elections 

(ACCURATE), NSF Grant number 0524111. ACCURATE is a collaborative effort with colleagues at Johns Hopkins, Rice, the University of California at 

Berkeley, Stanford, the University of Iowa, and SRI. It is examining techniques 

and approaches for voting systems, with particular emphasis on security, integrity, and privacy. SRI 

Neumann contributes to the following DHS project: 

• Cyber Security Research and Development Center (CSRDC), Department of 

Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, DHS Contract 

HSHQDC–07–C-0006 to SRI International. CSRDC is providing extensive support for S&T Program Manager Douglas Maughan’s R&D program. (http:// 

www.csl.sri.com/projects/csrdc and http://www.cyber.st.dhs.gov) 

f 

Chairman MCNULTY. Thank you very much. 

The Members will now run over to the House floor to vote. There 

are 5 minutes left on this vote, and the next vote will be directly 

afterward, so we should be able to vote and hopefully only be gone 

for 15 minutes. When we return, we will hear from Mr. Rotenberg, 

and then allow for questions. Thank you for your patience. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman MCNULTY. The hearing will come to order. Sorry for 

the delay. We know that your time is very valuable, and we very 

much appreciate the fact that you are spending some of it with us 

here today. 

We have heard from the first four witnesses on this panel, and 

we will now hear Mr. Rotenberg. 

STATEMENT OF MARC ROTENBERG, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER 

Mr. ROTENBERG. Thank you very much, Chairman McNulty 

and Ranking Member Johnson, Members of the Subcommittee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

My name is Marc Rotenberg. I am Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center. We are a public interest research organization here in Washington, D.C. We track emerging 

privacy issues. We have also frequently been before the Subcommittee to discuss the privacy impact of proposals that involve 

the use of the Social Security number and SSA records. 

We recently did a detailed report on the employment verification 

systems that are contemplated in both the Senate and the House 

bills. That report is simply titled, ‘‘National Employment Database 

Could Prevent Millions of Citizens from Obtaining Jobs.’’ I would 

like to add that it be included in the hearing record as part of my 

statement, if that is okay. 

Chairman MCNULTY. No objection. 

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Mr. ROTENBERG. Thank you. I would like to today highlight 

the key findings of our report. The central conclusion that we 

reached is that the employment verification system has significant 

weaknesses. It will pose enormous burdens for employers, and put 

the privacy rights of American workers at substantial risk. 

It will also give the Federal Government an extraordinary 

amount of new power over the lives of Americans, as well as greatly expand the role of the Department of Homeland Security in the 

American labor force. 

I want to say a word about the Department of Homeland Security. As Mr. Johnson mentioned earlier, there is, of course, this 

very significant concern about the misplaced disk drive that contained the employment records of 100,000 TSA employees who had 

been hired between January 2002 and September 2005. I think it 

is important to understand the significance of this particular incident. 

You have heard a great deal of testimony this morning about the 

problem of record accuracy. No doubt, if you scale up the Basic 

Pilot Program, the number of workers who may face determinations that say they may not be eligible to work unless they, in effect, clear their status is going to grow dramatically. 

You haven’t heard very much about new threats to privacy and 

security that these proposals raise. I believe that is a key problem 

that the Department of Homeland Security has helped identify because by misplacing the records that they did on the TSA employees, they have, in effect, brought attention to the problem of identity theft and security breaches, which are significantly increasing 

in the United States. In fact, the Federal Trade Commission has 

reported that identity theft is now the number one concern of 

American consumers. A big contributor to that problem is the extraordinary collection of personal information. 

I will say a few words about the current design of this system. 

As other witnesses have noted earlier, the proposal to consolidate 

so much personal information in these centralized government 

databases does significant increase the risks to privacy. 

Now, it is our view that the SSA has done a good job over the 

years trying to narrow the use of the Social Security number and 

Social Security records for the appropriator legislative purposes. Of 

course, when another agency comes forward and proposes new expanded uses of the Social Security number, then new privacy issues 

arise. 

Now, both bills state that the database access will be limited to 

authorized users only. However, it is very easy to understand the 

circumstances under which others could get access to these record 

systems. Dr. Neumann has described the various ways under 

which computer systems can be compromised through weak security. It is also a result of the insider access to the record systems 

that would result as well. 

I would like to say a word about the role that the REAL ID act 

plays in the legislation that is under consideration in both the Senate and the House. As you know, there is a lot of opposition to the 

implementation of the REAL ID Act. The statute, which was 

passed in February of 2005, went forward without a vote, without 

a public hearing. 

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Since that time, more than a dozen states have passed bills to 

oppose the implementation of REAL ID in their states. Four states 

have actually said that they would not have a REAL ID requirement. 

Now, this is a fact worth keeping in mind as you look at these 

legislative proposals because the Department of Homeland Security 

is proposing that the REAL ID document be used as one of the 

ways to establish employment eligibility. In fact, the Senate bill 

would make non-REAL ID-compliant documents of no use for establishing employment eligibility by the year 2013, which means 

you could actually have a situation, if the legislation passes and 

REAL ID is not implemented, that there would be no documents 

available to authenticate employment eligibility. 

Well, let me conclude, Members, if I may briefly with a few key 

recommendations. I think there are some things that could be 

done. 

Obviously, the data accuracy issue has to be addressed before the 

system is scaled. I think the systems of accountability for the dramatically expanded role for the Department of Homeland Security, 

particularly the ability to essentially require biometric identification and perhaps the collection of fingerprints, that needs to be examined. I think the REAL ID provision needs to be revised. 

Finally, these proposals, very costly proposals, to try to make the 

Social Security card tamper-proof, incorporating biometric identity 

factors—even if those were to go forward, as other witnesses have 

testified, I think you would be right back in a couple of years trying 

to design a new card when the flaws in the current card are uncovered. 

Thank you very much for your time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rotenberg follows:] 

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Prepared Statement of Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director, Electronic 

Privacy Information Center 

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f 

Chairman MCNULTY. Thank you, Mr. Rotenberg. Thanks to all 

of you for your testimony, and for the clarity of your testimony. As 

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a matter of fact, I had a number of questions prepared for several 

of you, but you answered them quite clearly in your testimony. 

I do want to ask Ms. Moran, because we have been discussing 

the database discrepancies in the abstract, if you could provide us 

with a real-life example of how the problems with the databases affect people. 

Ms. MORAN. Sure. We provide technical assistance to a lot of 

labor unions and immigrant organizations across the country. In 

fact, we just got a technical assistance call last week from a woman 

in North Carolina. She is Honduran. She had temporary protected 

status. She was work-authorized. She presented her documents. 

She worked at a hog plant. When the company put her information 

in the system, SSA said the stuff didn’t match. 

The long story short is from January to April she went back to 

Social Security Administration four times to try to fix the error in 

the database. Because it wasn’t fixed, ultimately the company fired 

the woman and she was without a job. 

So today, she could theoretically go to another company and get 

a job, but under this new system, if she were fired, she wouldn’t 

be able to go get a new job. Under the proposal that is in the Senate right now, she wouldn’t be able to get back wages. She wouldn’t 

be able to get attorneys fees. She could be out of—a low-income 

worker could be out of a job for a number of months. 

So, that is just one example of many to show, really, it is pretty 

serious, talking about people’s livelihood here. 

Chairman MCNULTY. Thank you. We just received information 

that there was a cloture vote in the Senate, and it failed 55 to 42. 

There is going to be another vote at 5:00, so there is a very real 

question about how far this bill is going to go now. If it goes anywhere, we want to be prepared for it. 

I will now call on the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. 

Johnson, to inquire. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. 

I wonder if all of you could comment, maybe. Many have advocated the use of biometric ID as an effective way to confirm a person’s identity. I would like your comments and what you think of 

a biometric ID. Is it the right or wrong way to go, and why? 

Ms. MORAN. I will refer to the technology people on that. 

Ms. MEISINGER. I believe that there is some use of biometric 

information. I think it should be voluntary for the employers who 

can afford to develop the system and work with the system, but I 

think the technology is there. I think biometric information has the 

advantage of being carried with a person wherever they go, and 

you don’t need a card for it if you can have it locked in with other 

identification that may be in the system. 

I think there are ways now—and I am not a technologist so I am 

going to defer—to build a system where it is not centralized in one 

government agency, which I agree, I think, is very troublesome to 

many people, the thought that this would all be in some centralized 

database. 

Right now companies do reference checks on a regular basis. 

Data mining takes place. They go out with public data sources— 

where people lived, whether their house was on that street, what 

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the name on the mortgage was—those sorts of things in terms of 

to link the person. 

I just think that what we would like to see is some technology 

experts coming together, privacy as well as employers and government, to sort through what is possible that balances. I don’t think 

there is anything that we will ever develop that provides an absolute protection against privacy because you can’t control people’s 

behaviors, but I think there are ways to design something that gets 

closer to what everybody is trying to get done than what is being 

proposed here. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I will tell you, when we had the eye scan 

out at the airport, which Homeland Security can’t get back in 

again, as you know, I used to like to go to the airport because I 

would look in that thing and it would say, hello, Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. AMADOR. I have to say that from our perspective, as was 

just mentioned, it should be voluntary, because the employers are 

of different sizes and levels of sophistication. Most employers in the 

United States do not have an HR division and an inside legal counsel. 

So, what might be easy for one of the over 7 and a half million 

employers in the United States, about 2 million of those are basically self-employed individuals. Those machines are actually right 

now, and maybe the technology would improve and it will be cheaper, as has happened with computers and others, but right now 

those card readers are very expensive for somebody to—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, you are advocating a private enterprise operation versus government, I think, in that instance. 

Mr. AMADOR. Correct. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. Dr. Neumann? 

Mr. NEUMANN. I would like to generalize your question just a 

little bit because when you start to talk about biometrics, the question is, how are they embedded in the overall system? You have the 

problem of nonsecure operating systems and application software, 

you have the problem of supposedly smart and secure and tamperproof smart cards that aren’t, and then you have the biometrics. 

Well, some biometrics are actually potentially pretty good. When 

they first put the photo and the face recognition stuff in the Palm 

Beach Airport, they could only recognize 40 percent of the people. 

We are photographed with perfect lighting, and that system was a 

failure. Well, then, we will increment it up a little bit, and we will 

get it to 50 and 60 and 70, but most of these systems have the fundamental problem. The gummy bear story is one of the examples 

of the fingerprint system. There was a demonstration at Asiacrypt 

a couple of years ago where somebody had taken essentially an imprint of a thumb on a gummy bear and was able to get through 

all of the fingerprint detection systems that were being demonstrated. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Really? 

Mr. NEUMANN. The next version of that is you cut off the 

thumb, of course, and—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, according to you, there is not a system 

that can be devised that can’t be circumvented. 

Mr. NEUMANN. Well, one of my colleagues has in fact essentially broken every smart card. This is Paul Kotcher, who has done 

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differential power analysis. Just by determining the power consumption of the crypto chip, he can extract the secret key. There 

are some high tech solutions, but I think we are in this escalating 

spiral, where we continually believe that if we throw more technology at it, it will solve the problem. Then there turns out to be 

an utterly trivial countermeasure that completely defeats it. 

In many cases, it is, for example, that a cryptography key is 

stored in memory or a password is pasted up on a Post-It. So, in 

many cases, it is a very simple attack. Here you have built this 

very complex system, and discovered that there is some utterly 

trivial way of breaking it. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. Mr. Rotenberg, do you have a comment? 

Mr. ROTENBERG. Yes. I was just going to say briefly that one 

of the obvious problems with the biometric identifiers is that when 

they are compromised, you have a real problem. You can change 

a credit card number or a bank account number, but it is not so 

easy to change the digital representation of your fingerprint or 

your eye scan. 

It was interesting to us also because we have been studying the 

identity systems that the Department of Homeland Security has 

been pursuing. One of the identity systems that they developed, the 

digital access card, the DAC, was originally designed with only a 

biometric identifier. They decided that was actually a too-risky approach for Federal employees, so they have included a PIN number 

as a backup to the biometric. I think it is a recognition on their 

part that there are going to be problems with biometrics. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCNULTY. Thank you. 

Mr. Brady may inquire. 

Mr. BRADY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding this 

hearing. I think this is one of the most overlooked issues in the 

Senate debate right now, and may be an area where this Committee can play a big role in this whole debate. 

Listening to the panel, the second panel, I think they have exposed two myths in this discussion. The first is that any Federal 

agency will be ready in 18 months to reliably and accurately verify 

employment and identification. It is not a criticism of the agencies. 

The task is simply overwhelming. The data that is currently available is unreliable. The pilot programs we have had in place have 

too many question marks. It is like we are trying to stand an elephant on a toothpick and hoping it will hold. It likely won’t, and 

we know it in advance. 

The second myth is that any single document, including a national ID card, is necessary or in fact desirable in this. I am not 

in the black helicopter caucus, but the truth is I think using multiple documents tailored more—the truth of the matter is some 

workers will be very easily verifiable. Others will be very difficult. 

We ought to have a system that is flexible enough to deal with 

that, and it seems this Committee Chairman ought to be exploring 

some innovative partnership between government and the cuttingedge private companies that are today verifying ID instantaneously, both for companies and for the government itself; find a 

way where it is more decentralized so you don’t have a single, as 

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Dr. Neumann said, hacker, cracker, or terrorist, I think was the 

phrase, able to break it. We have examples today. 

Two questions. Mr. Amador, GAO says the cost of a completely verifiable system will be about $11.7 billion a year, much of it 

borne by employers and workers. Can you talk a little about that? 

Ms. Meisinger, Mr. Ryan wanted to ask about the background 

checks that help confirm identity. From what databases do they 

draw? 

So, Mr. Amador. 

Mr. AMADOR. Yes. Last year—actually, in 2005, GAO testified 

and they said it would be that much. I since have called them, and 

I was trying to find out, well, how do you split it up? They didn’t 

have a rigid split, but what they said, that would be the cost because you will be adding 96 percent of employers to a system. You 

have to find out a way of also making it telephonic. 

So, they said that in addition to considering the fact that you 

have to hire more verifiers, modernize the system, and purchase 

and monitoring additional equipment, employers would also need 

to train employees to comply with the new law requirements and 

devote a great deal of human resources staff to verifying and reverifying the workforce. 

Currently, under the I–9 system, the estimate is that we spend 

about 12 million working hours verifying the 50 to 60 million of individuals that are hired, either—some people are hired more than 

once in a year. Some people have more than one job, but somebody 

is doing the hiring. 

There is also the cost of keeping these documents, filing. The requirements in the Senate right now, which we know are too many, 

too much, are requiring that you keep these documents for like 7 

years. We think that is obviously too long, especially when you 

have a turnover rate that is very high. 

Resolving data errors is going to be a new additional cost that 

is going to be more complicated and expensive than it is under the 

current system. A new issue is going to be dealing with wrongful 

denial of eligibility when you get a tentative nonconfirmation. 

What they are looking at is the employer is going to have to start 

making calls because of course you cannot fire the individual until 

you go through the entire process. In the Senate version, the shortest period that it could take is 152 days. So, you have an employer 

dealing with days and an employee that is going to have to be taking time off from work to go in person to an SSA office to try to 

resolve all these things. 

So, when they put all of these things together, they are just not 

looking at how much the one inquiry costs. They are saying, well, 

how did the entire thing cost? How much was spent in hours from 

the employer’s perspective and from the employee perspective in 

addition to the government’s perspective? And that is when, again, 

they were using that number when they were trying to ask for 

more funding. I notice that now they are trying to use lower numbers. 

It is also important to mention that I think the number is based 

on the study that came in 2002, the Westat study that everybody— 

the independent study that has been mentioned before. There is a 

new study. Tyler mentioned it. The Chamber has been trying to get 

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a copy of it. DHS has it, and we would like to have your help in 

trying to find out if they maybe broke down this number, and some 

other information in it. 

Mr. BRADY. Thank you. 

Ms. Meisinger, I am not suggesting background checks on everyone. The point is, oftentimes using multiple sources you can verify 

quicker and more accurately. 

Ms. MEISINGER. I think if you think of some times when you’ve 

gone online and people ask you for background questions that you 

might answer—mother’s maiden name, street that you lived in 

when you were young—those sorts of things are really embedded 

in databases that exist in a public format. 

I think that would be the recommendation, that it would be public formats, public databases. Criminal records are one that reference checkers always go into and look at. Depending on the level 

of depth that you are going through, you will go to the FBI. Sometimes it will just be local. It depends on the job. 

There are state laws now that require this sort of in-depth background check for certain types of jobs. If it is somebody working 

with children, frequently they will have a much more in-depth 

background check to try and make sure they know everything they 

can know about that person, including that the person is who they 

say they are. 

Mr. BRADY. So, you use different sources for different types of 

jobs and different needs. 

Ms. MEISINGER. Different sources. Right. 

Mr. BRADY. Which I think it would be difficult to accomplish by 

people in the single agency or double agency. 

Ms. MEISINGER. Well, and I think right now you have got credit companies, check companies that track people’s credit history. 

There is a competitive market to try and make sure that you are 

the most accurate, the most reliable, respond the quickest to the 

customers. I think you want to build that same sort of environment. 

Mr. BRADY. Right. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCNULTY. Thank you very much. On behalf of Mr. 

Johnson, Mr. Brady, and all the Members of the Committee, we 

want to thank each of you for your expert testimony. It has been 

extremely helpful. 

We would ask that as the process moves forward, we may keep 

in contact with you for your response to questions by our Members 

and our staff outside of the formal setting of a hearing, so that we 

are able to contact you on a more immediate basis. 

I would just like to say for myself that as I have looked at the 

Social Security agency and the many challenges that it faces, we 

have been tremendously distressed with the lack of progress on the 

issue of the disability backlog, which we have been trying to work 

on for a long time now. 

I think it is an unmitigated disaster and I don’t want to see it 

compounded by another disaster. If you can help us in that regard, 

we are deeply grateful. 

This Committee hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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[Submission for the Record follows:] 

On behalf of the 11,000 front-line Border Patrol employees that it represents, the 

National Border Patrol Council thanks the Subcommittee for holding a hearing to 

examine various methods of verifying the employment eligibility of workers in the 

United States. There is now near-universal agreement with the 1994 finding of the 

U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform that ‘‘reducing the employment magnet is 

the linchpin of a comprehensive strategy to reduce illegal immigration.’’ There is no 

consensus, however, regarding the best method for accomplishing that goal. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 made it a crime to hire illegal aliens, but 

failed to provide employers with a simple and effective means of verifying the authenticity of the numerous documents that were permitted to be used to prove eligibility to work in this country. Thus, it is nearly impossible to establish that an employer ‘‘knowingly’’ hires illegal aliens, rendering the current law largely unenforceable and meaningless. 

The Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 required the 

Attorney General to conduct three pilot programs of employment eligibility confirmation: the basic pilot program, the citizen attestation pilot program, and the machine-readable-document pilot program. Of these, the basic pilot program, now 

known as the Employment Eligibility Verification System, has emerged as the most 

widely-utilized system. Although it is relatively inexpensive and easy to use, it is 

also extremely susceptible to identity fraud, wherein legitimate information is used 

by imposters. This was highlighted by the recent Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement raids against several Swift & Company plants, in which nearly 

thirteen hundred people who were cleared to legally work under the provisions of 

the Employment Eligibility Verification System were arrested for being in the country in violation of our immigration laws. Although the current amount of fraud 

under that system is relatively low, that is due to the fact that only a very small 

percentage of companies are participating in the program, and most illegal aliens 

opt to seek employment in companies that do not use it. If its use became mandatory, however, the amount of fraud would undoubtedly increase exponentially. The 

Federal Trade Commission estimates that about ten million Americans are victimized by identity theft annually. With such a large universe of compromised identities to draw from, criminals would have no problem supplying illegal aliens with 

new identities to circumvent the system. Moreover, the information contained in the 

Social Security Administration’s databases contains a number of inaccuracies, especially concerning citizenship. In fact, a recent study by the Office of Inspector General of the Social Security Administration found that at least 100,000 non-citizens 

are provided with bona fide Social Security numbers every year based on invalid immigration documents. That report also acknowledged that the agency has no way 

of knowing how many Social Security numbers have been improperly issued to illegal aliens. 

The other two employment eligibility confirmation pilot programs suffered from 

similar shortcomings. The citizen attestation pilot program was limited to non-citizens, and was not designed to verify the validity of claims of citizenship, but only 

identity. Thus, this program was by far the most vulnerable to fraud, as well as the 

least useful of the experimental programs. The machine-readable-document pilot 

program relied upon State-issued identity documents that met specified criteria, and 

matched that to the information contained in Social Security Administration and 

Immigration and Naturalization Service databases. Because only one State’s driver’s 

licenses met the specified criteria at that time, this test was quite limited in scope. 

Moreover, its reliability was diminished by its reliance upon the aforementioned incomplete and inaccurate databases. 

The National Border Patrol Council believes that it would be unwise to expand 

any of these experimental systems, but rather recommends that the lessons learned 

from them be used to construct a workable and effective system. 

Such a system must utilize a single, counterfeit-proof, machine-readable document 

that contains a recent digital photograph, as well as embedded biometric information. Since every authorized worker in this country is issued a Social Security number, the logical choice for this document is the Social Security card. Instead of relying upon information contained in one or more incomplete or inaccurate databases 

to check for employment eligibility every time a person applies for a job, the system 

should verify that information conclusively prior to issuing the new secure document. Then, when an applicant presents the employment eligibility document to a 

prospective employer, the only check that would need to be made is a determination 

of whether or not the document is genuine, and that could easily be accomplished 

through means of an electronic reader. At the same time, this process would provide 

the Department of Homeland Security with a record of all employment inquiries, 

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which would facilitate its worksite enforcement efforts. It would be a simple matter 

for investigators to spot-check for compliance by matching employment inquiries 

with payroll and income tax withholding records. 

H.R. 98, the ‘‘Illegal Immigration Enforcement and Social Security Protection Act 

of 2007,’’ would mandate the establishment of such a system, and would also provide the enforcement mechanism and resources to ensure compliance therewith. 

This would effectively eliminate the employment magnet, allowing the Border Patrol 

and other law enforcement agencies to concentrate their scarce resources on stopping terrorists and other criminals from entering the United States. Such a system 

would have the added benefit of greatly reducing the amount of identity theft involving Social Security numbers. 

The consequences of inaction and/or delay are dire. Open borders are an open invitation to further terrorist attacks. These measures need to be enacted swiftly in 

order to safeguard our Nation. 

Æ 

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