MATTER OF P 

In DEPORTATION Proceedings 

A-8378327 

Decider! by Board January 8, 1960 

Conviction—Which results in commitment under Federal Youth Corrections 

Act sustains deportability under second part of section 241(a)(4) of 1952 act. 

Conviction which results in commitment under the Federal Youth Corrections 

Act possesses sufficient finality to sustain deportation charge under the second part of section 241(a) (4) which provides for the deportation of twice 

convicted aliens without regard to the sentence imposed. (Cf. Matter of 

V—, A-8583853, Int. Dec. No. 1005.) 

CHARGE: 

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a) (4) (8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (4) ]—Couvicted 

of two crimes (petty larceny ; transporting stolen automobile). 

BEFORE THE BOARD 

Discussion : On Juno 1:Ls, 1958, a special inquiry officer directed 

the respondent's deportation and this order became final, no appeal 

having been taken. The special inquiry officer reconsidered his order 

in the light of a subsequent decision of this Board in another case, 

but again directed deportation on November 6, 1959, and certified the 

case to us for final decision. 

The respondent is a 21-year-old unmarried male: native of Russia 

and citizen of Belgium, who last entered the United States on 

October 2, 1952. Apparently he was ,admitted for permanent residence at that time and had not previously resided in this country. 

On April 7, 1957, he was convicted of petty larceny and on August 

93, 1957, he was convicted of transporting a motor vehicle, in interstate commerce with knowledge that it had been stolen. In connection 

with the latter conviction, the respondent was committed under the 

Federal Youth Corrections Act in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 5010(b). 

The sole issue to be determined is whether this latter conviction 

possesses the degree of finality Which is necessary to support, the 

deportation charge. 

The special inquiry officer's reconsideration of the respondent's 

case arose from our decision in M atier of V , A-8583853, Int. 

Dec. No. 1005, decided June 1, 1959, in which there had also been 
conlinitment under the. Federal Youth Corrections Act. That case. 

involved the first clause of S 1251(a) (4) relating to a single 

conviction. One of its requirements is it sentence to confinement 

(or eon inem en ) in a prison cu. corrective institution for one year. 

On the other hand, this respondent's case is within the purview of 

the second clause of that statutory provision, and here'there is no 

requirement for any sentence to confinement but only that the alien 

must have been "convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude, 

not arising out of a. single scheme of criminal misconduct." 

In 21/a 7t• of V , .orpra, we reserved decision on the question 

of whether there was the required degree of finality of conviction in 

cases disposed of pursuant to the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 

l•tt we held that the alien was not deportable under the feast clause 

of S U.S.C. 1251(a) (4) because a sentence imposed under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, by the terms of the statute, is expressly 

stated to be for treatment and supervision and in lieu of the penalty 

of imprisonment. Since this respondent's ease comes within the 

second clause of 8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (4), the nature and effect of the 

sentence is not material and the only question is whether his conviction has the degree of finality necessary to support deportation.. 

The distinction between the first. and second clauses of 8 U.S.C. 1251 

(a) (4) is illustrated by our decision in Matter of T7 7 I. 8: N. 

Dec. 577 (1957), in which we held that suspension of imposition of 

sentence does not render an alien deportable under the first clause, 

and our decision in Iri7tt:5;),t C 7 1. Sc.T. Dec. 53f) (1957), 

where, we reached a contrary conclusion in a case involving the 

second clause of this statutory provision. 

In Matter of 0 , supra, we discussed the various categories of 

convictions and concluded that under the second clause of 8 U.S.C. 

1251(a) (4) a conviction is "final" if it resulted in suspension of the 

execution of sentence or in suspension of the imposition of sentence 

but not where it resulted in postponement of sentence for further 

consideration. In the latter, the matter is still pending actually or 

theoretically for the imposition of a sentence. The respondent's 

case is not one in which there was a postponement of sentence. Or 

the contrary, sentence was imposed on August 23, 1957, and the 

respondent was committed to the custody of the Attorney Genera 

or his authorized representative until discharged by the Youth Cot 

rection Division. Hence, it is clear that in this respect the respond 

ends case differs from one in which a conviction was not final 13( 

cause of contemplated further action of the court. Here, the cow 

imposed sentence on the respondent; there, was no further action fc 

the court to take in the future; and the question of the respondent 

confinement., treatment, and discharge were entirely matters for tl 

Youth Correction Division. 

518 
We consider it appropriate to state also that a. basic distinction 

exists between the procedure concerning juvenile delinquency (chapter 403, Title-18, 1J.S.C.) and the procedure under the Federal Youth 

Corrections Act (chapter ,102). In the former, there is no trial by 

jury, no criminal prosecution can be instituted for the a Ile -re,(1 violation of law (18 U.S.C. 50321, and the court does not lied the juvenile 

guilty of the offense but only of being a delinquent. Where the 

offender is over 18, the trial proceeds in the regular manner. When 

there has been a judgment. on a verdict or finding of guilty, the 

provisions of the Federal Youth Corrections Act may be invoked if 

the offender was under the age of 22 years at the time- of conviction. Hence, there is an actual conviction for the offense and not 

merely a finding of delinquency. 

In view of the foregoing, we hold that this respondent is deportable on the 'basis of the two convictions mentioned above. For the 

reasons stated by the special inquiry officer, we agree that the respondent is not statutorily eligible for voluntary departure. Accordingly, the special inquiry officer's action is approved. 

Order: It is ordered that the special inquiry officer's order directing deportation be. and the same is hereby approVed.