United States District Court 

for the 

Southern District of Florida 

Christopher Rennie Glenn,

Movant 

v. 

United States of America, 

Respondent.

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 22-21682-Scola 

Crim. Action No. 15-20632-Scola 

Order 

Before the Court is Movant Christopher Rennie Glenn’s motion to vacate 

sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Court has considered Glenn’s motion (ECF 

No. 1) and supporting memorandum of law (ECF No. 1-1), the government’s 

response (ECF No. 5), Glenn’s reply (ECF No. 7), the entire record, and is 

otherwise fully advised. For the reasons explained below, the motion is denied. 

1. Background 

A federal grand jury indicted Glenn for one count of sexual assault of a 

minor, 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a); two counts of sex trafficking by fraud or of a minor,

id. § 1591(a)(1), along with four counts of attempted sex trafficking, id. §§ 

1591(a)(1), 1594(a), and two counts of conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking, id.

§§ 1591(a)(1), 1594(c); one count of travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual 

conduct, id. § 2423(b); and one count of possession of child pornography, id. § 

2252(a)(4)(A). See CR ECF No. 7.1 Following a 24-day jury trial, Glenn was 

convicted of sexual assault of Minor D; sex trafficking of Minor A; attempted sex 

trafficking of Minor D, Minor G, and Minor H; conspiracy to engage in sex 

trafficking between March 2012 and February 2014; travel to engage in illicit 

sexual conduct; and possession of child pornography. See CR ECF No. 309. The 

Court sentenced Glenn to life imprisonment for each count of sex trafficking, 

attempted sex trafficking, and conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, along with 

1 References to docket entries in Glenn’s criminal case, Case No. 15-20632-CR, are 

denoted with “CR ECF No.” 

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concurrent sentences of 180 months for sexual assault, 360 months for travel 

with the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct, and 120 months for 

possessing child pornography. See CR ECF No. 424. Glenn appealed, and the 

Eleventh Circuit affirmed his convictions and sentence. See United States v. 

Glenn, 839 F. App'x 376, 388 (11th Cir. 2020).

2. Legal Standard

A. Section 2255 Motions

Under section 2255, “[a] prisoner in custody under sentence of a court 

established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground 

that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution . . . may move the 

court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Because collateral review is not a substitute for direct 

appeal, the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments under section 2255 

are extremely limited. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982). A 

prisoner is entitled to relief under section 2255 if the court imposed a sentence 

that (1) violated the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) exceeded its 

jurisdiction; (3) exceeded the maximum authorized by law; or (4) is otherwise 

subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); McKay v. United States, 657 

F.3d 1190, 1194 n.8 (11th Cir. 2011). “[R]elief under 28 U.S.C. [section] 2255 is 

reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass 

of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if 

condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Lynn v. United States, 365 

F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (cleaned up). 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees 

criminal defendants the right to assistance of counsel during criminal 

proceedings. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984). When 

assessing counsel’s performance under Strickland, the Court employs a strong 

presumption that counsel “rendered adequate assistance and made all 

significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 

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690. “[T]he Sixth Amendment does not guarantee the right to perfect counsel; it 

promises only the right to effective assistance[.]” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 20 

(2013). 

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must 

demonstrate both (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) a 

reasonable probability that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. 

To establish deficient performance, the petitioner must show that 

“counsel’s conduct fell ‘outside the wide range of professionally competent 

assistance.’” Cummings v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 588 F.3d 1331, 1356 (11th Cir. 

2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Strategic choices made after 

thorough investigation of the law and facts relevant to plausible options are 

virtually unchallengeable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. The court’s review of 

counsel’s performance should focus on “not what is possible or what is prudent 

or appropriate, but only [on] what is constitutionally compelled.” Chandler v. 

United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up).

To establish prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id.

A court need not address both prongs of Strickland if the defendant makes 

an insufficient showing on one of the prongs. See id. at 697; Brown v. United 

States, 720 F.3d 1316, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013).

3. Discussion

A. Timeliness and Exhaustion/Procedural Default

The parties fail to address the motion’s timeliness or 

exhaustion/procedural default. See generally ECF Nos. 1, 5. The Court will also 

skip over this step as the motion is due to be denied on the merits. See Loggins 

v.Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 1215 (11th Cir. 2011) (“When relief is due to be denied 

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even if claims are not procedurally barred, we can skip over the procedural bar 

issues, and we have done so in the past.”).

B. Ground One

Glenn argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss 

the indictment at the pretrial stage for government misconduct. See ECF No. 1-

1 at 23. He asserts that the government presented false testimony to the grand 

jury and under “Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure a motion to 

dismiss an indictment must be challenged by pretrial motion.” Id. at 23–24. 

Glenn states his counsel was ineffective for failing to do so. See id. That said,

Glenn acknowledges his counsel advised “that his suggested motion to dismiss 

the indictment was meritless.” Id. at 15. Instead, based on “the results of his 

investigation and reviews of the search in Honduras,” Glenn’s counsel “filed a 

motion to suppress all Evidence Seized during the Search of Glenn’s residence 

in Honduras and Any Fruits of that Unlawful Search.” Id. at 16. The question 

presented is thus whether counsel was ineffective for filing a motion to suppress 

instead of a motion to dismiss. 

“The decision whether to file [a specific motion] is a matter of professional 

judgment[.]” Green v. Nelson, 595 F.3d 1245, 1249 (11th Cir. 2010). Here, based 

on “the results of his investigation and reviews of the search in Honduras”

Glenn’s counsel exercised professional judgment in deciding to file a motion to 

suppress rather than a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 1-1 at 16. The Court finds

that counsel’s decision was a strategic one “made after thorough investigation of 

the law and facts.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Such strategic decisions are 

“virtually unchallengeable,” and the Court concludes that counsel did not render 

deficient performance. Id. Accordingly, Ground One is denied. 

C. Ground Two

Glenn argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective by raising his 

constitutional issue on appeal “in a perfunctory manner and without any 

citations to legal authority, causing the court of appeals to decline to address it.”

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ECF No. 1-1 at 32. Glenn refers to an issue raised in his initial brief asserting 

that “the sex trafficking statutes are unconstitutional as applied to Glenn’s 

case[.]” Id. This issue was raised as “Issue 5” in his initial brief on appeal. See 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff/appellee, v. Christopher GLENN, 

Defendant/appellant., 2020 WL 553655 (C.A.11), 43. Issue 5 states in part: 

Congress could not have intended to criminalize the giving 

of love and affection by a husband to his wife, or giving her 

a nice place to live, or the giving of birthday or anniversary 

gifts . . . and other ordinary gifts incidental to courtship and 

married life such that virtually every married couple that 

engages in sexual activity would be guilty of sex trafficking. 

Id. at 43–44. While true, Glenn’s case is not one involving the giving of affection 

and gifts between a married couple. As stated by the Eleventh Circuit, Glenn’s 

case involves “a government contractor who sexually exploited young, 

impoverished girls in Honduras.” Glenn, 839 F. App'x at 378. The Eleventh 

Circuit further concluded that “Glenn offered money to his victims and their 

families so that he could engage in sexual acts with them. His conduct is 

prohibited by the plain terms of the statute, which do not require the victim to 

be a prostitute.” Id. at 385. 

 Glenn’s assertion that the appellate court declined to address the issue is 

incorrect. As stated, the Eleventh Circuit considered, and rejected, his 

constitutional challenge. Simply put, the constitutional challenge is meritless. 

Therefore, appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise it. See United 

States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Appellate counsel is not

ineffective for failing to raise claims reasonably considered to be without merit.”) 

And where, as here, appellate counsel briefs a meritless issue, he cannot be 

deemed ineffective when the court denies relief. Accordingly, Ground Two is 

denied. 

D. Evidentiary Hearing 

A district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing where the 

petitioner's allegations are affirmatively contradicted by the record, or the claims 

are patently frivolous. See Aron v. United States, 291 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 

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2002). The Court finds Glenn’s claims to be patently frivolous and that the 

motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that he is not 

entitled to relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). Therefore, his request for an 

evidentiary hearing is denied. 

E. Certificate of Appealability 

A prisoner seeking to appeal a district court’s final order denying his 

petition for writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal, and to 

do so, must obtain a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); 

Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009). Here, Glenn fails to make “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(2). Therefore, upon consideration of the record, the Court denies the 

issuance of a certificate of appealability. 

4. Conclusion 

Accordingly, it is ordered and adjudged as follows: 

1. Movant Christopher Rennie Glenn’s motion to vacate sentence 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 1) is denied. 

2. A certificate of appealability is denied. Because there are no issues 

with arguable merit, an appeal would not be taken in good faith, and 

Glenn is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis. 

3. To the extent not otherwise disposed of, any pending motions are 

denied as moot and all deadlines are terminated. 

4. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. 

Done and ordered, in chambers, in Miami, Florida, on February 15, 

2023. 

 ________________________________ 

 Robert N. Scola, Jr. 

 United States District Judge 

Copies, via U.S. Mail, to 

Christopher Rennie Glenn 

04919−104

Terre Haute−USP

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Inmate Mail/Parcels

Post Office Box 33

Terre Haute, IN 47808

PRO SE

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