NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

IRA LEE JACKSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-2253

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:15-cv-01382-EDK, Judge Elaine Kaplan.

______________________ 

Decided: November 3, 2016

______________________ 

IRA LEE JACKSON, New Burgh, NY, pro se.

KARA WESTERCAMP, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented 

by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

STEVEN J. GILLINGHAM. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, O’MALLEY, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.
2 JACKSON v. US

PER CURIAM. 

Ira Lee Jackson (“Jackson”) appeals from the decision 

of the United States Court of Federal Claims (the “Claims 

Court”) denying his untimely motion to amend his complaint under Rule 15(a) and his motion for reconsideration 

under Rule 59(a) of the Rules of the United States Court 

of Federal Claims (“RCFC”). Jackson v. United States, 

No. 15-1382C, ECF No. 18 (Fed. Cl. May 9, 2016). Because the Claims Court did not err in dismissing Jackson’s complaint, in denying his motion to amend, and in 

denying his motion for reconsideration, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Mr. Jackson enlisted in the New York Army National 

Guard on April 12, 1984 and was released from active 

duty on September 15, 1984 and discharged from the New 

York National Guard and Army Reserve “Under Honorable Conditions” on December 1, 1989. Jackson v. United 

States, No. 15-1382C, 2016 WL 2841298, at *1 (Fed. Cl. 

May 9, 2016) (“Order”). On November 16, 2015, Jackson 

sued the United States in the Claims Court, alleging: 

(1) unlawful discharge and a request for back pay; 

(2) military disability retirement and a correction of his 

military records; (3) breach of contract; (4) civil rights

violations; and (5) punitive damages based on defamation 

of character, libel, and slander. Order at *2. On February 16, 2016, the government moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

On March 2, 2016, Jackson attempted to submit an 

addendum to his complaint pursuant to “Local Rule 4,” 

but the Claims Court returned it to Jackson, as unfiled, 

because the local rules cited are not applicable to the 

Claims Court, and directed him to RCFC 15(a)(2) for 

amending his complaint. Jackson v. United States, No. 

15-1382C, ECF No. 9 (Fed. Cl. March 2, 2016). On April 

14, 2016, the Claims Court entered an order indicating 

that it had received a motion from Jackson entitled “Mo-
JACKSON v. US 3

tion Pursuant to 62[:] Proceeding of Stay of Complaint,” 

which it would treat as Jackson’s responsive motion 

because it contained objections to the government’s motion to dismiss. Jackson v. United States, No. 15-1382C, 

ECF No. 10 (Fed. Cl. April 14, 2016). 

On May 9, 2016, the Claims Court granted the government’s motion to dismiss Jackson’s complaint on the 

grounds that: (1) Jackson’s claim for unlawful discharge 

and request for back pay was time-barred by the statute 

of limitations; (2) his claim for disability retirement pay 

had not yet accrued because he failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies; (3) the court lacked jurisdiction 

to grant equitable relief to correct his military records; 

and (4) the court lacked jurisdiction over his civil rights 

and tort claims. Order at *2–3.

On May 26, 2016, Jackson filed an untimely motion to 

amend his complaint, which the Claims Court treated as 

a motion to amend the complaint under RCFC 15(a) and 

for reconsideration under RCFC 59(a). Jackson v. United 

States, No. 15-1382C, ECF No. 17 (Fed. Cl. May 26, 2016). 

The Claims Court denied the motion to amend because 

Jackson proposed no specific amendments that would cure 

the deficiencies and, moreover, any amendment would be 

futile because the claims were either outside the court’s 

jurisdiction or time-barred. Jackson, ECF No. 18, at 2. 

The Claims Court denied the motion for reconsideration 

because Jackson did not “present an intervening change 

in controlling law, the availability of previously unavailable evidence, or an argument that reconsideration i[s] 

necessary to prevent a manifest injustice.” Id. 

Jackson appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

We review for an abuse of discretion both the Claims 

Court’s decision on a motion to amend a complaint, Cen-
4 JACKSON v. US

cast Servs., L.P. v. United States, 729 F.3d 1352, 1365 

(Fed. Cir. 2013), and its denial of a motion for reconsideration, Watson v. United States, 281 F. App’x 970, 971 

(Fed. Cir. 2008). 

On appeal, Jackson alleges that the Claims Court 

should have granted a “motion for redact” before dismissing the complaint, indicating that the government representatives “had diff[e]rence of opinion [regarding]

reversal.” Appellant’s Br. 1 (item 2). Jackson also alleges 

that the Claims Court failed to consider “all elements of 

wrong under . . . Regular Army Regulation 635-200 para. 

16-9a, or b. See AR 27-10 June 6, 1995.” Id. (item 4). 

Jackson alleges that the Claims Court was biased in 

denying his motion to amend the complaint and to stay 

the proceedings. Id. (item 5). 

The government responds that Jackson provided no 

facts or evidence to substantiate his allegation of bias and 

that he proposed no specific amendments that would cure 

the deficiencies identified by the Claims Court. Appellee’s 

Br. 6. The government also argues that even if he had

proposed such amendments, any amendments would be 

futile, as the Claims Court correctly held. Id. at 8. Finally, the government contends that Jackson presented no 

further facts, or identified any mistake of fact, which 

could confer jurisdiction upon the Claims Court. Id. at 6. 

We agree with the government that the Claims Court 

properly dismissed Jackson’s complaint, properly denied 

his motion to amend the complaint, and properly denied 

his motion for reconsideration. 

The Claims Court correctly concluded that Jackson’s 

claim for unlawful discharge and back pay is time-barred. 

Order at *3. The Military Pay Act, 37 U.S.C. § 204, 

“provides for suit in [the Claims Court] when the military, 

in violation of the Constitution, a statute, or a regulation, 

has denied military pay.” Antonellis v. United States, 723 

F.3d 1328, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Dysart v. United 
JACKSON v. US 5

States, 369 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). However, 

the Claims Court’s jurisdiction under the Military Pay Act 

is subject to the six-year statute of limitations set forth in 

28 U.S.C. § 2501, which accrues when the party is discharged from active duty. Martinez v. United States, 333 

F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc). Jackson’s 

claim for unlawful discharge from the armed services first 

accrued when he was discharged from active duty in 1984; 

thus, his claim for unlawful discharge and back pay 

became time-barred under the six-year statute of limitations in 1990. Because the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction over Jackson’s claim for back pay due to the time bar, 

it also correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over

his claim for correction of his military records. Order at 

*3. The Claims Court may order a correction of military 

records only if it is “incident of and collateral to” a money 

judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2); see also James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 580 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 

The Claims Court also correctly concluded that it 

lacks jurisdiction to review Jackson’s claims for punitive 

damages based on defamation of character, libel, and 

slander. Order at *3. The Claims Court is a court of

limited jurisdiction. Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 

621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1491, limits the jurisdiction of the Claims Court to 

claims for money damages against the United States 

based on sources of substantive law that “can fairly be 

interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal 

Government.” United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 

287, 290 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). In

order for the Claims Court to have jurisdiction under the 

Tucker Act, “a plaintiff must identify a separate source of 

substantive law that creates the right to money damages.” 

Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 

2005). However, it is well settled that the Claims Court 

lacks jurisdiction over tort claims, Shearin v. United 

States, 992 F.2d 1195, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1993), and claims 
6 JACKSON v. US

for punitive damages, Garner v. United States, 230 Ct. Cl. 

941, 943 (1982). Thus, Jackson’s claim for punitive damages based on defamation of character, libel, and slander

is outside of the Claim’s Court’s jurisdiction. 

The Claims Court also correctly held that it lacks jurisdiction over Jackson’s breach of contract claim, Order

at *3, because military pay is governed by statute and not 

by common law rules concerning private contracts. 

Schism v. United States, 316 F.3d 1259, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 

2002) (en banc) (citing Bell v. United States, 366 U.S. 393, 

401 (1961)). 

Finally, the Claims Court correctly determined that it 

lacks jurisdiction over Jackson’s claim for disability 

retirement pay. Order at *3–4. Under 10 U.S.C. § 1201, 

such claims “do not accrue until the appropriate board 

either finally denies [the] claim or refuses to hear it.” 

Real v. United States, 906 F.2d 1557, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 

1990). Jackson has not exhausted his administrative 

remedies because the proper board has not yet acted or 

declined to act on a claim for disability retirement pay. 

Thus, the Claims Court lacks jurisdiction over that claim. 

In light of the foregoing, the Claims Court correctly

dismissed Jackson’s motion to amend the complaint. 

Jackson proposed no specific amendments that would cure 

the afore-mentioned deficiencies. Furthermore, because 

the claims were either outside the Claims Court’s jurisdiction or time-barred, any amendments would have been 

futile. The Claims Court also properly dismissed Jackson’s motion for reconsideration. On that motion, Jackson 

bore the burden of “show[ing] exceptional circumstances 

justifying relief based on a manifest error of law or mistake of fact.” Kaplan v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 491, 

493 (2014) (quoting Stueve Bros/ Farms, LLC v. United 

States, 107 Fed. Cl. 469, 474 (2012)) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Jackson failed to meet this burden 

because he pointed to no “intervening change in control-
JACKSON v. US 7

ling law; . . . availability of previously unavailable evidence; or . . . the necessity of [reconsideration for] preventing manifest injustice.” Id. (citations omitted).

We have considered Jackson’s remaining arguments 

and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the decisions of the Claims Court dismissing 

Jackson’s complaint, denying his motion to amend the 

complaint, and denying his motion for reconsideration are

affirmed. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.