1

 The petition does not describe the status of this defendant, but the address given for the defendant indicates

that she is in someway connected with Whiteville Correctional Facility at Whiteville, Tennessee.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

On-Brief August 24, 2001

EMMETT K. DUNLAP v. NANCY DAVIS, ET AL.

A Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hardeman County

No. 9370 The Honorable Jon Kerry Blackwood, Judge

No. W2001-00894-COA-R3-CV - Filed October 18, 2001

Plaintiff-inmate, acting pro se, filed a petition for writ of certiorari to review a judgment of

the general sessions court dismissing his case. The trial court denied plaintiff’s petition and he

appeals. We affirm.

Tenn.R.App.P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed and

Remanded

W. Frank Crawford, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ALAN E.HIGHERS,J. and

DAVID R. FARMER, J., joined.

Emmett K. Dunlap, Pro Se

Tom Anderson, Jackson, For Appellees, Nancy Davis, et al

OPINION

Plaintiff, Emmett K. Dunlap, appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition for writ of

certiorari. The only issue for review is whether the trial court erred in denying the petition.

On March 13, 2001, pla intiff filed his petitio n for writ of certiorari in the Circuit Court of

Hardeman County naming as defendants Nancy Davis, et al1 and General Sessions Court for

Hardeman County, Tennessee. Although the petition is somewhat incoherent and disjointed, we

perceive that it alleges that plaintiff previously filed a suit in general sessions court against defendant

Davis concerning a dispute involving his inmate account statement. It appears that the general

sessions suit was dismissed, and, according to plaintiff’s brief, it appears that the dismissal occurred

on March 12, 2000.

The record reflects that no appearance was made by the defendants in the case at bar, and the

trial court entered an order dismissing the petition on March 22, 2001. Although plaintiff sets out
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two issues for review in his brief, we perceive the issue to be as stated: “Whether the trial court erred

in dismissing the petition for writ of certiorari.” 

We should first commen t on plaintiff’s ple adings and the brief filed in this court. As we have

previously noted the pleadings are very difficult to understand and the same holds true for plaintiff’s

brief. While parties who represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal treatment, they are not

excused from comp lying with applicable substantive and procedural law. See Irvin v. City of

Clarksville, 767 S.W.2d 649 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 1988). Pro se litigants are entitled to the same

liberality of construction with regard to their pleading that any litigant is afforded, pursuant to

Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. In our review of the trial court’s proceeding, we have attempted

to give great liberality to plaintiff’s pleadings.

The writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy whose issuance is within the discretion of

the trial court, and it is not available as a matter of right. Robinson v. Traughber, 13 S.W.3d 361

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1999 ). 

Unless we find an abuse of discretion by the trial court, we must affirm. The abuse of

discretion “standard requires us to consider (1) wh ether the decision has a su fficient evidentiary

foundation, (2) whether the trial court correctly identified and properly applied the appropriate legal

principles, and (3) whether the decision is within the range of acceptable alternatives.” State ex rel.

Vaughn v. Kaatrude, 21 S.W.3d 24 4, 248 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 2000).

In plaintiff’s general sessions suit, he was afforded the absolute the right to appeal the general

sessions judgment within ten (10 ) days of the rendition thereof for a trial de novo in the circuit court.

T.C.A. § 27-5-108 (a)(c) (2000). Therefore, he resorts to a petition for writ of certiorari to as a

substitute for appeal. Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a substitute for appeal except when a case

is made in the petition that the appeal was defeated by either (1) by the oppressive or erroneous act

of the court, (2) by the willful or negligent act of the clerk, (3) by the contrivance or procurement of

the adverse party; (4) by inevitable accident, or (5) by the blameless misfortune of the petitioner.

McMurry v. Milan, 32 Tenn. 176 (18 52); Uselton v. Price, 41 Tenn. App. 134, 292 S.W.2d 788

(1956); General Mo tors Acceptance Corp. v. Dennis, 675 S.W.2d 4 89 (Tenn. Ct. App . 1984).

In the instant case, plaintiff has made no allegation as to why his right of appeal for a trial de

novo was defeated. Conside ring the length of time between the dismissal of his general sessions case

and filing a petition for writ of certiorari, plaintiff’s lack of diligence might be involved. If so, then

neglect on the part of petitioner is not a ground to grant the writ of ce rtiorari. See General Motors

Acceptance Corp. v. Dennis, supra at 491.

Accordingly, the trial court’s order denying plaintiff’s petition for writ of certiorari is

affirmed. The case is remanded to the trial court for such further proceedings as may b e nece ssary.

Costs of appeal a re asse ssed against the petitioner/appellant, Emmett K. Dunlap, and his surety.
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__________________________________________

W. FRANK CRAWFORD, PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.