United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

February 1997 COMBAT AIR POWER

Joint Assessment of Air

Superiority Can Be

Improved

GAO/NSIAD-97-77

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-260442 

February 26, 1997

Congressional Committees

The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend over $43 billion from fiscal year 1996 to fiscal

year 2001 to acquire weapon systems to equip and modernize forces for the air superiority

missions. DOD will face difficult decisions as it attempts to cover the high cost of these and other

defense acquisitions while the nation is moving toward a balanced budget.

This is an unclassified version of a classified report we recently issued to you. It evaluates the

air superiority missions to identify the overlap among the military services’ planned capabilities

and to determine whether the joint warfighting assessment process relating to air superiority

was useful to assist in making program and budget decisions about these programs. This

evaluation is one of six individual air power evaluations that we have conducted over the past 

2 years.

We believe the concerns identified in this report—namely that the joint warfighting assessment

needs to cover a longer period, include cost-effectiveness analyses of alternative means to

achieve U.S. objectives, identify unnecessary overlap and duplication, and address major issues

such as the need to acquire three new tactical fighters (F/A-18E/F, F-22, and Joint Strike

Fighter)—should be addressed as part of DOD’s efforts to improve its analytical support for

overall decision-making. We are addressing this report to you because of your oversight

responsibility for defense issues and budgets and your interest in this important subject.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this

report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues
B-260442 

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
B-260442 

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Executive Summary

Purpose One of the primary objectives that U.S. combat air power is expected to

achieve is air superiority. Achieving air superiority permits operations in

the air and on land and sea without prohibitive interference from an

enemy’s air forces, cruise missiles, and theater ballistic missiles. The

Persian Gulf War clearly demonstrated the superior U.S. and coalition

forces’ capability to quickly achieve air superiority by paralyzing Iraqi air

defenses and dominating the air-to-air battle.

The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend over $43 billion from

fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year 2001 to acquire weapon systems to equip and

modernize forces for the air superiority mission. Because of the large

investment planned during the next several years and pursuant to its basic

legislative authority, GAO evaluated the air superiority mission to

(1) identify the overlap among the military services’ planned capabilities

and (2) determine whether the joint warfighting assessment process

relating to air superiority was useful to assist in making program and

budget decisions about these capabilities.1

 This is an unclassified version

of an earlier classified report on this subject.

Background Congress has recognized that each service’s military missions and the

capabilities of the services to accomplish those missions overlap one

another, at least to some degree. To achieve a stronger joint orientation in

DOD, Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense

Reorganization Act of 1986. This act gave the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff and the commanders in chief (CINC) of the combatant commands

stronger roles in DOD matters, including the acquisition process. In this

role, the Chairman is expected to advise the Secretary of Defense on the

priority of requirements identified by the CINCs and the extent to which

service program recommendations and budget proposals conform with

these priorities. The Chairman is also expected to submit to the Secretary

alternative program recommendations and budget proposals to achieve

conformance with CINC priorities. Subsequent legislation has given the

Chairman additional responsibilities to examine ways DOD can eliminate or

reduce duplicative capabilities and to assess military requirements for

defense acquisition programs from a joint warfighting military perspective.

To assist the Chairman, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

established in 1994 the joint warfighting capability assessment process.

1

Similar evaluations were conducted on interdiction, close support, air refueling, suppression of enemy

air defenses, and surveillance and reconnaissance missions. A culminating report entitled Combat Air

Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making Program and Budget Decisions

(GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept. 20, 1996) built on and synthesized the findings of these six evaluations.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Executive Summary

The Vice Chairman looked to the process to produce the information the

Chairman needs to meet his program review and assessment

responsibilities and to resolve cross-service requirements issues, eliminate

duplicate programs, and pursue opportunities for enhancing the

interoperability of weapon systems.

Air superiority, the subject of this report, is the degree of dominance one

force possesses over another in the air, governing the extent to which air,

ground, and sea forces can achieve campaign objectives. DOD analytically

divided the achievement of air superiority into two offensive and three

defensive missions. Figure 1 shows that alignment of missions.

Figure 1: The Missions of Air Superiority

Attain air superiority

Conduct offensive 

operations

Defeat enemy fighters

Defeat enemy surface-to-air 

defenses

Conduct defensive 

operations

Defeat enemy aircraft

Defeat enemy cruise 

missiles

Defeat enemy theater 

ballistic missiles

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Executive Summary

For fiscal years 1996-2001, DOD plans to apply most of its acquisition

funding for air superiority systems to aircraft to defeat enemy fighters and

aircraft and to defensive systems to defeat enemy theater ballistic missiles.

The air superiority joint warfighting assessment team evaluated the

services’ joint capabilities by evaluating nine functions that must be

accomplished to successfully achieve the objectives of each mission. DOD

has termed this an “end-to-end” assessment. Overall, the team concluded

that the capabilities to achieve the five air superiority missions were

marginal, or acceptable with some risk, through 2001. A formal assessment

report was not done. Although a team spokesman said the team made

recommendations to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for

preparation of the Chairman’s program assessment, he would not share

the recommendations with us.

Results in Brief The services have overlapping capabilities for achieving each of the five

component missions of air superiority. For example, every service has

weapon systems that perform some portion of each of the five missions

except for the conduct of offensive operations to defeat enemy fighters in

enemy territory, for which the Army has no capability. Overlaps exist

primarily in the systems to defeat enemy aircraft and ballistic missile

systems. While some degree of overlapping capabilities may be necessary

and/or unavoidable, DOD has not determined how best to reduce overlaps

in the post-Cold War era without unnecessary effects on force capabilities.

The process used by DOD’s air superiority joint warfighting capabilities

assessment team to make its assessment provided a useful, though limited,

result and used a meaningful method of displaying the results. An

unclassified summary of the ratings assigned to 45 capabilities 

(9 functional elements, such as detecting targets and engaging targets, for

each of the 5 missions) is shown in figure 2.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Executive Summary

Figure 2: Summary of Ratings

Assigned to Air Superiority

Capabilities Acceptable 31

 Adequate 9

 Inadequate 5

The team identified several functions for which joint capabilities were

determined to be inadequate. DOD classified the descriptions of the

inadequate capabilities.

Although the assessment pointed out several inadequacies in existing

forces, it did not adequately address several major issues regarding the

overlap of capabilities, priorities of future acquisitions of air superiority

weapon systems, or alternative means of meeting the highest priority

requirements. Further, it did not assign ratings of warfighting capability

over a long enough period of time to be useful for establishing acquisition

and budget priorities.

The assessment did not examine certain key issues related to the

modernization of forces for the air superiority mission. For example, the

assessment was limited to the 6-year period, fiscal year 1996 to fiscal 

year 2001, and many of the weapon systems being planned were not

included in the assessment because they are in development and were not

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Executive Summary

scheduled to be available in the active force until after fiscal year 2001.

Further, the results of the assessment indicate that the acquisition of

major aircraft systems like the F-22 may not be justified because

acquisition of new aircraft is not clearly related to the functions rated

inadequate by the joint assessment team.

Other critical issues that were not evaluated during the assessment include

the need for and affordability of the acquisition of three new tactical

fighters (F/A-18E/F, F-22, and Joint Strike Fighter), appropriate timing for

replacing F-15s with F-22s, the need to replace each F-15 with an F-22, the

operational utility of the F/A-18E/F compared with the F/A-18C/D, and the

appropriate size and makeup of the forces to be acquired for theater

ballistic missile defense.

Principal Findings

Services Have Overlapping

Capabilities to Perform Air

Superiority Missions

Overlapping capability among the services exists in each of the five air

superiority missions. Aircraft used for air superiority were generally

developed by one of the services for use within that service except for the

recent initiative to acquire a Joint Strike Fighter for use by the Air Force,

the Navy, and the Marine Corps. Systems in inventory in 1996 with

capability to defeat enemy aircraft include the Navy F-14, the Air Force

F-15 and F-16, the Marine Corps F-18 and AV-8B, and several Army

surface-to-air missile systems. Most of the aircraft in the inventory have a

primary mission other than air superiority but have a significant air

superiority capability. The Air Force is developing the F-22 and it is

expected to be in service in 2004, the Navy is beginning procurement of

the F/A-18E/F in fiscal year 1997, and the Air Force, the Navy, and the

Marine Corps have begun development of the Joint Strike Fighter.

Several systems are commonly used among the services. They consist

primarily of missiles that are developed in joint program offices under DOD

direction. For the most part, however, aircraft have been acquired that are

used only by a single service. The only current exception is the F/A-18

used by both the Navy and the Marine Corps.

Each service is developing its own equipment to defend against theater

ballistic missiles, and as a result, there is an overlap of capabilities

planned. Nine systems currently in development could cost an estimated

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Executive Summary

$71 billion if all are produced. Overlapping systems include the Patriot

Advanced Capability Level 3, the Medium Extended Air Defense System,

the Improved Hawk, the Theater High Altitude Air Defense System, and

the Navy Area System, all of which are intended to intercept enemy

theater ballistic missile systems in the terminal phase of their flight to their

target. Even though there is substantial overlap of capabilities among air

superiority systems, the joint warfighting capabilities assessment did not

evaluate the degree of overlap and duplication among these systems or the

other existing or planned systems that perform the air superiority

missions.

The Joint Warfighting

Capabilities Assessment

Did Not Adequately

Address Some Key Issues

The joint warfighting capabilities assessment process has the potential to

provide decisionmakers better insight into the capabilities of the entire

U.S. military force to perform particular missions. GAO recognizes that it

will take some time for this process to mature. The methodology used in

the air superiority assessment had significant limitations and did not

address key issues confronting the air superiority missions. Further, the

assessment offers little information to achieve one of its objectives, which

was to assist in making program and budget decisions. One limitation is

the relatively short period of time, 6 years, covered by the assessments.

Most major weapon acquisition programs last over 10 years, and

intelligence estimates of the projected threat may cover as much as 

15 years. Thus, this assessment may not include the impact of significant

changes in the U.S. weapon capabilities or significant changes in the

projected threat expected to come about after the 6-year period.

Other limitations are that the assessments do not identify the extent of

overlap among air superiority systems, nor do they evaluate the

cost-effectiveness of alternative weapon mixes. Further, the assessments

did not address several other key issues. For example, a major issue

confronting DOD and Congress is the need to pursue and the affordability

of, as currently planned, three new tactical aircraft programs that will cost

an estimated $355.7 billion. It is crucial to address this issue through an

aggregate assessment of the quantity of U.S. aircraft with air superiority

capabilities compared to potential adversaries. For example, the United

States has over 2,000 frontline fighters (F-14s, F-15s, F-16s, and F-18s), but

potential adversaries have few. An aggregate assessment of capabilities is

absent from the joint warfighting capabilities assessment. This report

identifies additional key issues involving the air superiority missions that

must be addressed.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Executive Summary

Recommendations GAO is not making new recommendations in this report. In its overall

report on combat air power, GAO recommended that the Secretary of

Defense, along with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, develop an

assessment process that yields more comprehensive information in key

mission areas. In making this recommendation, GAO includes the offensive

and defensive aspects of the air superiority mission and the results of this

review of the assessments conducted by the joint warfighting capability

assessment team. GAO said the recommended process could be achieved

by broadening the joint warfighting capability assessments or developing

an alternative mechanism. DOD partially concurred with the

recommendation, agreeing that analytical support for overall

decision-making can be improved, but disagreeing that the Secretary is

currently receiving inadequate advice from a joint perspective.

In DOD’s assessments of air superiority mission areas, GAO believes the

concerns identified in this report—namely that the assessments need to

cover a longer period, include cost-effectiveness analyses of alternative

means to achieve U.S. objectives, identify unnecessary overlap and

duplication, and address major issues set forth in chapter 3—should be

addressed as part of DOD’s efforts to implement GAO’s prior

recommendation.

Agency Comments

and GAO’s Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of the classified version of this report, DOD

agreed that overlap exists among the air superiority missions but stated

that the overlap among the Army’s theater ballistic missile defense

systems is by design. DOD further agreed that analytical support for overall

decision-making can be improved. GAO believes many of DOD’s other

comments were not clearly related to the central message in this report.

DOD stated that it disagreed with assertions that it believes are included in

the report and in a prior report, Combat Air Power: Joint Mission

Assessments Needed Before Making Program and Budget Decisions,

(GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept. 20, 1996). DOD said that GAO implies that the threat

does not warrant investment, and that air power is not important. Neither

report makes such assertions. The intent of this report is to show overlap

in air superiority capabilities and to raise specific issues that future joint

assessments of the air superiority mission could address to improve the

analytical support for decisionmakers.

DOD also believes that this report leaves a misleading impression that the

DOD processes used to develop modernization plans are inadequate. This

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Executive Summary

report identifies equipment overlap among the air superiority missions and

ways to make the joint warfighting capabilities assessment of the air

superiority missions more useful to decisionmakers. This report is not

intended to be a comprehensive evaluation of DOD processes for

developing modernization plans, but suggests that the air superiority joint

warfighting capabilities assessment can be improved to better support the

DOD processes used to develop modernization plans.

DOD further takes the opportunity in its comments to point out an apparent

change in DOD mission descriptions by stating that it wants not only air

superiority but also air dominance, and that its modernization program is

designed to maintain air dominance. However, DOD did not provide a clear

description of the differences between air superiority and air dominance

or the additional capabilities it believes are justified because of this

undefined change of mission objectives.

DOD’s comments and GAO’s detailed evaluation of the comments are in

appendix III.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Contents

Executive Summary 4

Chapter 1 

Introduction

14

Congressional Mandate to Assess Defense Acquisitions From a

Joint Warfighting Perspective

14

Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment Process Established to

Improve Joint Perspective

15

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 15

Chapter 2 

The Services Have

Overlapping

Capabilities to

Perform Air

Superiority Missions

19

Air Superiority Includes Five Missions 19

Funding Planned for Air Superiority Missions 19

Overlap Among Services’ Performance of the Air Superiority

Missions

20

Chapter 3 

Air Superiority Joint

Warfighting

Assessment Did Not

Adequately Address

Some Key Issues

24

Joint Staff Rated Overall Air Superiority Capability as Acceptable

With Some Risk

25

The 1995 Air Superiority Joint Warfighting Assessment Has

Limitations and Did Not Address Major Issues

26

Conclusions 29

Appendixes Appendix I: Services’ Identification of Capabilities for Achieving

Air Superiority

32

Appendix II: Funding for Missions of Air Superiority 42

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense 45

Appendix IV: Major Contributors to This Report 53

Related GAO Products 56

Tables Table 2.1: Approximate DOD Future Years Defense Program

Acquisition Funding for the Missions of Air Superiority, as of

June 1995

20

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Contents

Table 2.2: Services’ Capability to Perform Air Superiority

Missions

21

Table 2.3: Fighter Aircraft in Service or Being Acquired That Have

Capability to Accomplish Air Superiority Missions Against Enemy

Fighters and Other Aircraft

22

Table 2.4: Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Systems 23

Table I.1: Platforms Contributing to Air Superiority 32

Table 1.2: Missiles and Munitions Contributing to Air Superiority 36

Table II.1: Approximate DOD Future Year Defense Program

Acquisition Funding for the Missions of Air Superiority, as of

June 1995

42

Table II.2: Approximate DOD Future Year Defense Program

Funding for Weapon Systems With Some Capability, Not Primary

Responsibility, for the Missions of Air Superiority

44

Figures Figure 1: The Missions of Air Superiority 5

Figure 2: Summary of Ratings Assigned to Air Superiority

Capabilities

7

Abbreviations

CINC commander in chief

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office

JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council

JSF Joint Strike Fighter

JWCA Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Sweeping changes in the global threat environment, sizable reductions in

resources devoted to defense, technological advancements in combat

systems, and other factors have significantly affected the Department of

Defense’s (DOD) combat air power. Ensuring that the most cost-effective

mix of combat air power capabilities is identified, developed, and fielded

to conduct effective, joint military operations in such an environment is a

major challenge that will confront DOD and Congress for years to come.

This report, which focuses on air superiority, is one of a series that

examines the overall air power of the United States. The other reports in

the series concentrate on interdiction, close support, defeat of enemy

surface-to-air defenses, surveillance and reconnaissance, and air refueling.

A culminating report, which builds on and synthesizes the findings of

these six evaluations, was issued on September 20, 1996.1

Congressional

Mandate to Assess

Defense Acquisitions

From a Joint

Warfighting

Perspective

Traditionally, the individual services have been the dominant players in

the acquisition process based on their broad responsibilities to organize,

train, and equip their forces under title 10 of the U.S. Code. However, to

achieve a stronger joint orientation in DOD, Congress enacted the

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

This act gave the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the

commanders in chief (CINC)2

 of the combatant commands stronger roles in

DOD matters, including the acquisition process. As principal military

adviser to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is now expected to

advise the Secretary on the priority of requirements identified by the CINCs

and the extent to which service program recommendations and budget

proposals conform with these priorities. The Chairman is also expected to

submit to the Secretary alternative program recommendations and budget

proposals to achieve greater conformance with CINC priorities. The

National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 1993 and 1996 have

given the Chairman additional responsibilities to examine ways DOD can

eliminate or reduce duplicate capabilities and to assess military

requirements for defense acquisition programs from a joint warfighting

perspective.

1

Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making Program and Budget Decisions

(GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept. 20, 1996).

2

CINCs of: (1) Atlantic Command, (2) Central Command, (3) European Command, (4) Forces

Command, (5) Pacific Command, (6) Southern Command, (7) Space Command, (8) Special Operations

Command, (9) Strategic Command, and (10) Transportation Command. CINCs are responsible for

military operations in their geographic region or functional area.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Chapter 1 

Introduction

According to the 1995 National Military Strategy, major modernization

programs involving significant investments are to be undertaken only

when there is “clearly a substantial payoff.” To evaluate the merits of the

services’ weapon investment proposals, programs, and budgets, various

entities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, such as the Director

of the Program Analysis and Evaluation, provide the Secretary

independent analyses. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)

assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out his

responsibilities. This assistance includes identifying and assessing the

priority of the joint military requirements (including existing systems and

equipment), ensuring that the assignment of program priorities reflects

projected resource levels, and considering alternatives to any acquisition

program identified to meet military needs.

Joint Warfighting

Capability Assessment

Process Established

to Improve Joint

Perspective

To assist the JROC in advising the Chairman and the Secretary on joint

warfighting capabilities, the joint warfighting capabilities assessment

(JWCA) process was initiated in April 1994. Under this process, 

10 assessment teams have been established in selected mission areas, 1 of

which is air superiority. The intent of JWCA is to continuously assess

available information on the services’ respective joint capabilities to

identify opportunities to improve warfighting effectiveness. A Joint Staff

official who participated in conducting JWCA for the air superiority mission

told us that the purpose of this assessment was not to identify overlap and

unnecessary duplication among the services.

In expanding the JROC process, including the establishment of the JWCA

teams, it was envisioned that the JROC would be more than simply another

military committee on which members participate strictly as

representatives of their services. Recommendations coming from the JROC

would not simply reflect the sum of each service’s requirements. Rather,

the JROC, with the support of the JWCA process, would produce joint

information the Chairman needs to meet his program review and

assessment responsibilities and to resolve cross-service requirements

issues, eliminate duplicative programs, and pursue opportunities to

enhance the interoperability of weapon systems.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

Because of the large planned investment during the next several years and

pursuant to our basic legislative responsibility, we evaluated the air

superiority mission (1) to identify the overlap among the military services’

planned capabilities and (2) to determine whether the joint warfighting

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Chapter 1 

Introduction

assessment process was useful to assist in making program and budget

decisions about these capabilities.

We visited or obtained information from the following organizations:

Air Force Organizations

• Headquarters, Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force

Base, Ohio.

• Headquarters, Air Force Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base,

Virginia.

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition),

Washington, D.C.

• Air Force Roles and Missions Office, Washington, D.C.

• National Air Intelligence Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.

• Airborne Laser Program Office, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

• F-15 System Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.

• F-16 System Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.

• F-22 System Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.

Navy Organizations

• Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C.

• Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C.

• Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, D.C.

• F/A-18 Program Office, Washington, D.C.

• F-14 Program Office, Washington, D.C.

• Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Virginia.

Army Organizations

• Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans,

Washington, D.C.

• Army Space and Strategic Command, Huntsville, Alabama.

• Medium Extended Air Defense System Project Office, Huntsville, Alabama.

• Theater High Altitude Air Defense Project Office, Huntsville, Alabama.

• Patriot Project Office, Huntsville, Alabama.

• Army Research Development and Engineering Center, Redstone Arsenal,

Alabama.

• Forward Area Air Defense Project Office, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

• Weapon Systems Management Directorate, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

• Army Air Defense Artillery School, Fort Bliss, Texas.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Chapter 1 

Introduction

• Patriot Advanced Capability 3 Project Office, Huntsville, Alabama.

Other DOD Organizations

• Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.

• Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Washington, D.C.

• Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.

• U.S. Central Command, Tampa, Florida.

• U.S. Pacific Command, Honolulu, Hawaii.

• Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.

• Airborne Interceptor Program Office, Los Angeles, California.

• Missile and Space Intelligence Center, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

Non-DOD Organizations

• Central Intelligence Agency, Langley Virginia.

To identify the overlap among the military services’ planned capabilities,

we identified the roles and missions each service is responsible for

performing and listed the existing and planned equipment that could be

used for air superiority missions. We reviewed DOD directives, military

doctrine, and previous roles and mission reports prepared by the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commission on Roles and

Missions of the Armed Forces. We asked weapon system program offices

and/or operating commands, such as Air Combat Command, to identify the

specific air superiority missions the equipment is capable of performing or

is being designed to perform so we could identify the equipment that

performs the same missions, that which is service unique, and that which

is used by more than one service. We discussed the capabilities of existing

and planned equipment with officials at the U.S. Central Command, the

U.S. Pacific Command, the Joint Staff, and the services. From threat

reports prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central

Intelligence Agency we compared U.S. capabilities to the capabilities of

two major regional conflict countries—North Korea and Iraq. Our analyses

covered three timeframes—fiscal years 1995, 2001, and 2010. We used

DOD’s future years defense program database to obtain cost data for fiscal

years 1996-2001. For cost data beyond this period, we used selected

acquisition reports or estimates prepared by program offices.

To determine whether the JWCA process was useful for making program

and budget decisions, we reviewed the methodology and the results of the

air superiority JWCA. Further, we reviewed applicable laws and DOD

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Chapter 1 

Introduction

instructions involving the roles and responsibilities of the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff for conducting and reporting on joint assessments. We

also discussed the usefulness and the strengths and weaknesses of the

JWCA with officials at the U.S. Central Command, the U.S. Pacific

Command, and the services.

We also relied on reports published by the Office of the Secretary of

Defense, Joint Staff, National Air Intelligence Center, Defense Science

Board, Congressional Budget Office, Ballistic Missile Defense

Organization, Air Force Roles and Missions Office, Commonwealth

Institute, RAND Corporation, Congressional Research Service, and our

prior reports (a list of our related products is provided at the end of this

report).

We performed our review from October 1994 through September 1996 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Chapter 2 

The Services Have Overlapping Capabilities

to Perform Air Superiority Missions

Achieving air superiority is a high priority during any conflict. But

independent efforts by the services, without an adequate joint orientation,

has led to overlap among service capabilities that could be excessive.

Each military service plays a role in achieving air superiority and has

capabilities in four of the five missions. However, each service has

acquired mostly unique equipment to perform these missions, although

Congress advocates jointness among the services. DOD plans include over

$43 billion from fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year 2001 for the acquisition of

systems dedicated to the air superiority missions. Most of the planned

funding is for the acquisition of aircraft to defeat enemy aircraft, and

defensive systems to defeat enemy theater ballistic missiles.

Air Superiority

Includes Five

Missions

Air Force doctrine states that the attainment of air superiority is normally

one of the first and most important U.S. military goals in a conflict.

Without the attainment of air superiority, achieving success in a military

campaign is more difficult. Air superiority is the degree of dominance one

force possesses over another in the air, governing the extent to which air,

ground, and sea forces can achieve campaign objectives.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in its assessment of U.S. air superiority

capability, divided it into five distinct missions. Two missions involved

offensive air superiority operations to defeat enemy fighter aircraft and

surface-to-air defenses within enemy territory, and three involved

defensive air superiority to protect friendly territory against enemy

aircraft, cruise missiles, and theater ballistic missiles (see fig. 1).

Funding Planned for

Air Superiority

Missions

Substantial funding is planned from fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year 2001 to

acquire weapon systems that are dedicated or closely related to

achievement of air superiority missions. DOD plans include over $43 billion

for acquisition of dedicated systems, with about 47 percent of the funding

intended to modernize U.S. capabilities to defeat enemy fighters (offensive

operations) and aircraft (defensive operations) and about 44 percent

intended to modernize capabilities to defeat enemy theater ballistic

missiles.

Table 2.1 shows the amounts included in the fiscal years 1996-2001 defense

plan for acquisition of systems for each air superiority mission, as of

June 1995. Additional detail of the funding for each mission is included in

table II.1.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Chapter 2 

The Services Have Overlapping Capabilities

to Perform Air Superiority Missions

Table 2.1: Approximate DOD Future

Years Defense Program Acquisition

Funding for the Missions of Air

Superiority, as of June 1995

Then-year dollars in millions

Missile Amount Percent

Offensive operations

Defeat enemy fighters $20,475.8 47.5

Defeat enemy surface-to-air missiles 807.2 01.9

Defensive operations

Defeat enemy aircraft a

Defeat enemy cruise missiles 3,001.9 7.0

Defeat enemy theater ballistic missiles 18,861.4 43.7

Total $43,146.3 100.0

aThe funding to defeat enemy fighters and aircraft in offensive and defensive operations is not

separable; all is included under offensive operations.

In addition to acquisition of weapon systems primarily dedicated to

achieving air superiority, there are other systems, primarily aircraft, that

have a primary mission other than air superiority but that have a

significant capability to contribute to air superiority missions. This

category includes the Air Force F-15E and F-16, Navy F/A-18, Marine

AV-8B, and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Acquisition of F/A-18 fighters is

expected to consume the greatest amount of resources in fiscal 

years 1996-2001, about $21 billion. Table II.2 includes further information

on these systems.

Overlap Among

Services’ Performance

of the Air Superiority

Missions

While some degree of overlapping capabilities may be necessary and/or

unavoidable, many of the systems that the services have or plan to acquire

to accomplish the five air superiority missions will have overlapping

capabilities. Many of these overlapping capabilities have evolved over the

years. Table 2.2 shows that each service has capabilities in each air

superiority mission, except the Army does not have a capability to

accomplish offensive operations against enemy fighters.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Chapter 2 

The Services Have Overlapping Capabilities

to Perform Air Superiority Missions

Table 2.2: Services’ Capability to

Perform Air Superiority Missions

Air superiority missions Army Navy Air Force

Marine

Corps

Offensive operations

Defeat enemy fighters X X X

Defeat enemy surface-to- air defenses X X X X

Defensive operations

Defeat enemy aircraft X X X X

Defeat enemy cruise missiles X X X X

Defeat enemy theater ballistic missiles X X X X

Note: “X” indicates that the service has or is acquiring capabilities to perform an air superiority

mission.

Appendix I shows the missions and the current and future equipment

planned by each service to perform the five missions to achieve air

superiority. Our display in appendix I of the current and future planned

equipment shows that most equipment in the inventory has been procured

by a service for operational forces within that service. Rarely have the

same systems been used by more than one service, except for certain

missiles and munitions. For example, the Air Force, the Navy, and the

Marines have their own aircraft platforms capable of defeating enemy

fighters and aircraft. The Navy operates F-14s and F/A-18s, the Air Force

operates F-15s and F-16s, and the Marine Corps operates F/A-18s and

AV-8Bs. The Air Force is developing the F-22 fighter and expects it to be in

service in 2004, and the JSF is expected to be in service in 2010. The largest

percentage of acquisition funding included in the DOD’s plans for air

superiority (47 percent) is for defeating enemy fighters and aircraft. About

44 percent of the funding is for acquisition of theater ballistic missile

defenses.

Air Superiority Fighters Although air superiority missions have many components, and many types

of equipment are involved, the acquisition of U.S. fighter aircraft with the

capability to defeat enemy fighters and other aircraft is expected to

consume about 47 percent of the resources planned for air superiority

missions. The Air Force, the Navy, and the Marines all have capabilities to

defeat enemy fighters and other aircraft as a part of offensive and

defensive air superiority missions using aircraft equipped with air-to-air

missiles and guns. Although the missiles used are generally common for

the air superiority missions regardless of the service (AIM-7 Sparrow,

Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile, AIM-9 Sidewinder), the

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Chapter 2 

The Services Have Overlapping Capabilities

to Perform Air Superiority Missions

aircraft in use and being acquired are generally unique to each service.

Table 2.3 shows the fighter aircraft systems in service or being acquired

that have a capability to defeat enemy fighters and other aircraft. Some

fighters have air superiority designated as their primary mission, while

others have a significant capability to accomplish air superiority missions,

but their primary missions are interdiction or are related to the attack of

ground targets.

Table 2.3: Fighter Aircraft in Service or

Being Acquired That Have Capability

to Accomplish Air Superiority

Missions Against Enemy Fighters and

Other Aircraft

Service Aircraft system

Air superiority primary

mission?

Navy F-14 Yes

Navy F/A-18 No

Air Force F-15 C/D Yes

Air Force F-16 No

Air Force F-15E No

Air Force F-22 Yes

Marines AV-8B No

Marines F/A-18 No

Joint JSF No

Successful acquisition of systems that are commonly used among the

services has been accomplished in air-to-air missiles and several

air-to-ground munitions programs. However, despite Congress’ push for

more efficient use of resources by emphasizing jointness among the

services, few joint initiatives, particularly in the acquisition of aircraft,

have been undertaken by DOD. Initiatives to acquire aircraft for joint

service use in the past have often failed. For example, the Air Force was to

develop and acquire the advanced tactical fighter (F-22), and the Navy was

to develop and acquire an advanced tactical aircraft (A-12). These aircraft

were both planned for use by both the Air Force and the Navy. Ultimately,

the Secretary of Defense terminated the troubled A-12 program, and the

Navy withdrew its support for the advanced tactical fighter program

reportedly because of affordability problems.

In a more recent attempt to reduce overlap in future aircraft systems, DOD

initiated the Joint Advanced Strike Technology program in 1993. This

program focuses on affordability and on developing common components

such as engines, aviation electronics, ground support, training, and

munitions for use in three similar, but different JSF variants—one for the

Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps. Operational capability for this

“family” of JSF aircraft is tentatively scheduled for 2010.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
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The Services Have Overlapping Capabilities

to Perform Air Superiority Missions

Theater Ballistic Missile

Defense

The Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps each are

developing some capabilities to defend against theater ballistic missiles by

defeating them at one of three intercept areas—boost phase, midcourse

phase, or terminal phase. DOD plans to fund nine systems from fiscal 

year 1996 through fiscal year 2001 to defeat enemy theater ballistic

missiles. Table 2.4 lists the nine theater missile defense systems that were

included in the DOD plans for fiscal years 1996-2001. The estimated cost to

acquire these nine systems is $71 billion. Five of those planned

systems—three Army, one Navy, and one Marine Corps—are designed to

defeat theater ballistic missiles during the terminal phase of an enemy

missile’s trajectories.

Table 2.4: Theater Ballistic Missile

Defense Systems Service System Intercept point

Army Patriot Advanced Capability

Level 3

Terminal

Army Theater High Altitude Air

Defense System

Terminal and midcourse

Army Medium Extended Air

Defense System

Terminal

Marine Corps Improved Hawk Terminal

Navy Navy Area System Terminal

Navy Navy Theater Wide System Midcourse

Air Force Airborne Laser Boost

Air Force and Navy Airborne Interceptor Boost and midcourse

DOD Space-Based Laser Boost

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Chapter 3 

Air Superiority Joint Warfighting

Assessment Did Not Adequately Address

Some Key Issues

JWCA teams began assessing the U.S. joint warfighting capabilities in 1994,

and in early 1995 rated the overall capability to conduct air superiority

missions as marginal, or acceptable with some risk, through fiscal year

2001. This assessment process is an evolving one. Although the assessment

was useful for displaying and rating the current joint force capability, it

cannot be used to justify the spending planned by DOD for fighter aircraft

planned for deployment beyond fiscal year 2001.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is expected to advise the

Secretary of Defense on the priority of requirements identified by the CINCs

and the extent to which service program recommendations and budget

proposals conform to these priorities. Further, the Chairman is expected

to submit to the Secretary, alternative program recommendations and

budget proposals. Although the assessment was useful in pointing out

several inadequacies in forces that exist at this time, it did not adequately

address several major issues regarding overlap of capabilities, priorities of

future acquisitions of air superiority weapon systems, or alternative means

of meeting the highest priority requirements. Further, it did not assign

ratings of warfighting capability over a long enough period of time to be

useful for establishing acquisition and budget priorities.

To assess the joint capability, the JWCA team evaluated the capabilities of

the services to perform air superiority missions. The assessment was

based on the services’ ability to accomplish nine functions that are

determinants of the overall ability to accomplish the missions. For

example, to defeat enemy fighters, the JWCA evaluated the effectiveness of

the capabilities to integrate command, control, communications,

computers, and intelligence; deploy assets to the theater; plan missions,

detect, identify, track, engage, and kill targets; and assess damage.

A formal report of the assessment was not made. Although a spokesman

for the JWCA team told us that recommendations were made to the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for preparation of the Chairman’s

program assessment, they would not share their recommendations with

us.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
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Air Superiority Joint Warfighting

Assessment Did Not Adequately Address

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Joint Staff Rated

Overall Air

Superiority Capability

as Acceptable With

Some Risk

In February 1995, the JWCA rated overall air superiority capabilities as

acceptable with some risk through 2001. Aspects of several functional

elements, however, were rated inadequate.

In 1994, the JWCA, under the direction of the Vice Chairman, began making

assessments to evaluate the joint warfighting capabilities of U.S. military

forces to perform designated missions. To conduct its assessment of air

superiority, the JWCA divided the five air superiority missions into nine

functional elements. Based on a combination of military judgment and

existing analyses, they rated the capability to effectively accomplish each

functional element through fiscal year 2001. One of three possible ratings

was assigned to each element as follows:

• inadequate (high risk),

• marginal (acceptable with some risk), or

• adequate (low risk).

The marginal rating was determined to be an acceptable level to achieve in

a realistic, fiscally constrained environment.

The Joint Staff briefed each CINC to obtain concurrence with the ratings

and eventually achieved a consensus among the Commanders and the

Joint Staff. The assessment provides an overview of the capabilities of the

joint forces to accomplish the nine functions as they affect each of the five

air superiority missions. The assessment permits a rapid identification of

the immediate problem areas.

Several Elements Rated

Inadequate

Although the overall assessments for the air superiority missions were that

the capabilities were acceptable with some risk through fiscal year 2001,

several elements were rated inadequate. DOD officials told us that all the

services are working to rectify one of the long-standing deficiencies.

The process used by the team to make its assessment provided a useful,

though limited, result and used a meaningful method of displaying the

results. The details of the assessment were classified by DOD. However, the

results of the assessment do not justify the acquisition of major aircraft

systems like the F-22 because correction of the functions rated inadequate

would not necessarily be impacted by acquisition of new aircraft.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Chapter 3 

Air Superiority Joint Warfighting

Assessment Did Not Adequately Address

Some Key Issues

The 1995 Air

Superiority Joint

Warfighting

Assessment Has

Limitations and Did

Not Address Major

Issues

Without broad, comprehensive assessments, the decisionmakers cannot

be sure that they have sufficient information to make the difficult tradeoff

decisions that may be required. At a minimum, we believe that such

assessments should, for the air superiority mission (1) assess the relative

merits of retiring assets, reducing procurement quantities, or canceling

acquisition programs where excesses exist or where substantial payoff is

not clear and (2) determine the most cost-effective means to satisfy

deficiencies. Conducting such assessments could help determine what

priority should be given to competing programs, whether programmed

investments should continue to be funded, and whether new investments

should be made.

The use of a joint perspective to assess U.S. warfighting capability has the

potential to provide decisionmakers better insight into the capability of

the entire U.S. military force to perform particular missions than by

assessing an individual service’s capability to perform a particular mission.

However, there were limitations in the assessments of the air superiority

mission and some major issues were not addressed.

Assessment Limitations DOD limited its assessment to the planned capability contained in the

future years defense program that covers fiscal years 1996-2001. Also, this

assessment did not evaluate the overlap of capability in each mission and

offered no alternative means of achieving the capabilities contained in the

program.

For the warfighter who is concerned about the U.S. capability to fight a

war in the near future, a 6-year period may be sufficient. However, to

improve the usefulness of these assessments to assist program and budget

decisions, comprehensive capability ratings over a longer period are

necessary. Intelligence estimates of the projected threat may cover as

much as a 15-year period. Many major weapon systems included in the

fiscal years 1996-2001 defense plan will not be in the active inventory until

long after fiscal year 2001 and, in some cases, are intended to respond to

threats that may not exist until after fiscal year 2001. Thus, the air

superiority joint warfighting assessment through fiscal year 2001 may not

include the impact of significant changes in U.S. weapon capabilities or

significant changes in the projected threat expected to come about after

the 6 years covered in the defense program.

Another limitation was that the assessments do not examine the

cost-effectiveness of alternative mixes of weapon systems to achieve the

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Chapter 3 

Air Superiority Joint Warfighting

Assessment Did Not Adequately Address

Some Key Issues

objectives of the air superiority mission. For example, the JWCA assessed

current plans to upgrade theater missile defenses and to upgrade fighter

aircraft; yet, they did not identify other possible mixes or combinations of

weapons to achieve the objectives.

Major Issues Not

Addressed

As the nation attempts to achieve a balanced budget, our evaluations of

U.S. air power missions and acquisition plans1

 showed that some programs

would only marginally improve existing capabilities at a very high cost.

The timing of others may be questionable in view of the changed security

environment. For some programs, less costly alternatives could be

pursued to meet identified needs.

An air superiority program that appears to be proceeding at an

unnecessarily fast pace is the Air Force F-22 fighter program. The Air

Force is proceeding with its plan to have a high degree of concurrency in

the development and production of the F-22 aircraft. It plans to begin to

acquire F-22 fighters in fiscal year 1999 and to rapidly accelerate the pace

of production to 48 aircraft a year.2

 The Air Force plans to begin initial

operations with F-22s in November 2004. Our analyses showed that the

existing U.S. frontline fighter, the F-15, compared favorably to the

projected frontline aircraft of potential adversaries used in the

assessments through fiscal year 2010. DOD told us that there are several

current or soon to be fielded foreign fighters that are at parity with the

F-15. Although we recognize several foreign fighter aircraft are in

development that are projected to be roughly comparable with the F-15C

when those foreign aircraft are ultimately developed and fielded, it is

uncertain how quickly the aircraft will be produced. It is also unlikely that

large quantities will be available and affordable by countries that the

United States considers to be potential adversaries. Additionally, there are

risks associated with the concurrent development and production planned

for the F-22, risks that DOD and we have disagreed about, but which need

to be an important consideration in a decision to move into production of

a high technology system such as the F-22.

We previously recommended that, at a minimum, the Joint Staff should

assess the impact on joint warfighting capability of delaying the F-22’s

1

Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessment Needed Before Making Program and Budget Decisions

(GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept. 20, 1996).

2

Tactical Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of F-22 Aircraft Should Be Reduced

(GAO/NSIAD-95-59, Apr. 19, 1995).

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
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Air Superiority Joint Warfighting

Assessment Did Not Adequately Address

Some Key Issues

initial operations to 2010 and adjusting acquisition plans to slow the

acceleration of the production pace and reduce the degree of concurrency.

Another shortcoming in the assessment was that it did not consider

whether the F-15 could be replaced by the JSF instead of the F-22 because

the JSF, with some capabilities similar to the F-22s, is also supposed to

have low-observable characteristics and the capability to launch missiles

against enemy aircraft. The JSF average unit procurement cost is expected

to be lower3

 than an F-22 and is scheduled to become operational in 2010,

compared to 2004 for the F-22.

The assessment also did not deal with the issue of whether there is the

need to replace F-15s with F-22s on a one-for-one basis. The Air Force

plans to replace four wings of F-15s with about four wings of F-22s (438).

Yet, an Air Force analysis indicates that the F-22 would be 12 times more

effective than the F-15C in defeating the same threat.

The assessment, moreover, did not address the issue of whether there was

a more viable alternative to the Navy’s F/A-18E/F fighter program. Our

recent report4

 on the F/A-18E/F program has shown that deficiencies in

the current F/A-18C/D range, carrier recovery payload, survivability, and

system growth the Navy cited in justifying the F/A-18E/F program either

do not exist, can be corrected with minimal changes to the F/A-18C/D, or

will only be marginally improved in the F/A-18E/F model. The assessment

did not discuss the benefits and drawbacks of canceling the F/A-18E/F and

continuing with the less costly F/A-18C/D until the JSF becomes

operational.

A major issue confronting DOD and Congress is the need to pursue three

new tactical aircraft programs that will cost an estimated $355.7 billion in

fiscal year 1997 dollars, according to the Congressional Budget Office.

However, the assessment did not provide an aggregate assessment of the

quantity of U.S. aircraft with air superiority capabilities compared to

potential adversaries. Even with the drawdown of the U.S. fighter

inventory over the past few years, its current and future inventory

numbers about 2,600 frontline fighters (F-14s, F-15s, F-16s, and F-18s).

The size and the makeup of the U.S. theater ballistic missile defense is

another major issue confronting DOD and Congress; yet the JWCA did not

3

CBO Testimony on Modernizing Tactical Aircraft (June 27, 1996).

4

Naval Aviation: F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement at High Cost

(GAO/NSIAD-96-98, June 18, 1996).

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Chapter 3 

Air Superiority Joint Warfighting

Assessment Did Not Adequately Address

Some Key Issues

address this issue. Pursuing all nine systems could cost an estimated

$71 billion, which is probably understated considering that most of these

systems are technologically risky and remain unproven. For example,

none of the nine tests conducted on a Navy and on an Army system were a

complete success. However, the JWCA did not address the issue of what

was the most cost-effective mix of theater ballistic missiles required to

meet mission requirements.

Conclusions It is important that U.S. forces be properly equipped to successfully

achieve air superiority and that the effectiveness of this equipment be

continually modernized. At a time when the country is striving to achieve a

balanced budget, the JWCA on air superiority is not ensuring that resources

are being applied in an efficient, economical, and effective manner.

Moreover, the assessments did not address the key issues involving joint

operations and requirements facing the air superiority missions nor do

they attempt to identify opportunities to reduce duplications and overlaps

in capabilities without unacceptable effects on force capabilities.

We are not making any new recommendations in this report. In our overall

report on combat air power, we recommended that the Secretary of

Defense, along with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, develop an

assessment process that yields more comprehensive information in key

mission areas. In making this recommendation, we included the offensive

and defensive aspects of the air superiority mission and the results of this

review of the assessments conducted by the JWCA team. We said the

recommended process could be achieved by broadening the JWCAs or

developing an alternative mechanism. DOD partially concurred with the

recommendation, agreeing that analytical support for overall

decision-making can be improved, but disagreeing that the Secretary is

currently receiving inadequate advice.

We believe the concerns identified in this report about DOD’s assessments

of air superiority mission areas should be addressed as part of DOD’s

efforts to implement our prior recommendation. Specifically, we believe

the assessments need to

• cover a longer period to permit better analysis of projected capabilities of

both the U.S. and potential adversaries;

• include cost-effectiveness analyses of alternative means to achieve U.S.

objectives;

• identify unnecessary overlap and duplication;

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Chapter 3 

Air Superiority Joint Warfighting

Assessment Did Not Adequately Address

Some Key Issues

• include comparisons and analyses of U.S. capabilities to conduct air

superiority missions to capabilities of adversaries; and

• address major issues including (1) the need to proceed with three new

tactical fighters, (2) the need to proceed with a highly concurrent schedule

and rapid production pace increase for the F-22 program, (3) the need to

replace each F-15 with an F-22, (4) the potential for replacing F-15s with

the JSF rather than F-22s, (5) the need for procuring the F/A-18E/F rather

than modifying F/A-18C/Ds, (6) the most cost-effective mix of theater

ballistic missile defenses required to meet mission requirements, and

(7) U.S. capabilities to defend against certain cruise missile threats.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix I 

Services’ Identification of Capabilities for

Achieving Air Superiority

Table I.1: Platforms Contributing to Air

Superiority Mission Joint

Current Future

Offensive counter air

Defeat enemy fighters JSF

Airfield attack only

Offensive counter air

Defeat enemy surface-to-air defense JSF

Defensive counter air

Defeat enemy fighters JSF

Defensive counter air

Defeat enemy cruise missiles JSF

Ground attack only

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix I 

Services’ Identification of Capabilities for

Achieving Air Superiority

Air Force Army Navy Marine Corps

Current Future Current Future Current Future Current Future

AWACS F-22 F-14 F/A-18 E/F F/A-18 C/D F/A-18E/F

F-15 A-D F/A-18 A-D AV-8B

F-15E E-2C

F-16

F-117

F-111

B-1

B-2

B-52

F-16 (HTS) Multiple Launch

Rocket System

F-14 F/A-18 E/F F/A-18 C/D F/A-18E/F

F-4G F/A-18 A-D

EF-111 EA-6B

F-111

F-117

B-1

B-2

B-52

F-15 A-D F-22 Hawk (Guard

only)

F-14 F/A-18 E/F F/A-18 C/D F/A-18E/F

F-15 E Airborne laser F/A-18 A-D Various Ships AV-8B

F-16 Various ships Hawk mobility

F-111 (partial) E-2C

AWACS

F-15 A-D F-22 Hawk (Guard

only)

Medium

Extended Air

Defense System

F-14 F/A-18 E/F F/A-18 C/D F/A-18E/F

F-15 E Airborne Laser Patriot F/A-18 A-D Various ships Hawk mobility

F-16 Various ships

F-111 E-2C

B-52

B-1

(continued)

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix I 

Services’ Identification of Capabilities for

Achieving Air Superiority

Mission Joint

Current Future

Defensive counter air

Defeat enemy theater missile defenses Space-based lasera

Boost phase intercept

Ground attack only JSF

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix I 

Services’ Identification of Capabilities for

Achieving Air Superiority

Air Force Army Navy Marine Corps

Current Future Current Future Current Future Current Future

Airborne laser Patriot Theater High

Altitude Air

Defense

F-14D F-14 D (with

inteceptor

missile)

Hawk with

Theater

Missile

Defense

Upgrade

Medium

Extended Air

Defense System

Aegis ships Medium

Extended Air

Defense

System

Patriot

Advanced

Capability -

Level 3

Area system

Theater-wide

system

F-15 A-D F/A-18A-D F/A-18E/F F/A-18C/D F/A-18E/F

F-15E

F-16

B-52

B-1

F-111

Notes:

1. The platforms and munitions listed in the “Current” columns represent what the services use

today.

2. The platforms and munitions listed in the “Future” columns represent what the services plan to

buy or upgrade in the future and include new systems or major capability improvements of

existing system.

3. JSF - Joint Strike Fighter.

4. AWACS - Airborne Warning and Control System.

aThis is a DOD-managed system that can potentially be used by all the services.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix I 

Services’ Identification of Capabilities for

Achieving Air Superiority

Table 1.2: Missiles and Munitions

Contributing to Air Superiority Mission Joint

Current Future

Offensive counter air

Defeat enemy fighters Sparrow AIM-9X

Sidewinder Advanced 

Medium Range

Air-to-Air

Missile—Improvement

Advanced Medium

Range Air-to-Air

Missile

Airfield attack Maverick Joint Direct Attack

Munition

Guided Bomb

Unit 24

Joint Standoff Weapon

Mark 84

Offensive counter air

Defeat enemy surface-to-air defenses High Speed AntiRadiation MissileJoint Direct Attack

Munition

Maverick Joint Standoff Weapon

Mark 82, 84

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix I 

Services’ Identification of Capabilities for

Achieving Air Superiority

Air Force Army Navy Marine Corps

Current Future Current Future Current Future Current Future

Phoenix

Air-to-Ground

Munition 130,

142

GPS Aided

Munition Wind

Corrected

Munition

Standoff Land

Attack Missile

(extended

range)

Cluster Bomb

Unit 5

Walleye

Cluster Bomb

Unit 87

Rockeye

Conventional

Air Launched

Cruise Missile

Laser Guided

Bomb 83

Guided Bomb

Unit 10,15, 27,

28

Mark 83

Mark 82 Tomahawk

Cluster Bomb

Unit 58,87, 97

GPS Aided

Munition

Army Tactical

Missile System

Army Tactical

Missile System

Improvements

Guided Bomb

Unit 24

Guided Bomb

Unit 10, 12,15,

24, 27

Wind

Corrected

Munition

Walleye

Conventional

Air Launched

Cruise Missile

Rockeye

Sensor Fused

Weapon

Laser Guided

Bomb 83

Mark 83

Tomahawk

(continued)

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix I 

Services’ Identification of Capabilities for

Achieving Air Superiority

Mission Joint

Current Future

Defensive counter air

Defeat enemy fighters Sparrow AIM-9X

Sidewinder Advanced Medium

Range Air-to-Air

Missile—Improvement

Advanced Medium

Range Air-to-Air

Missile

Avenger Stinger

Stinger

Defensive counter air:

Defeat enemy cruise missiles Sparrow AIM-9X

Sidewinder Advanced Medium

Range Air-to-Air

Missile—Improvement

Advanced Medium

Range Air-to-Air

Missile

Avenger Stinger

Stinger

Defensive counter air

Defeat enemy theater ballistic missiles

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix I 

Services’ Identification of Capabilities for

Achieving Air Superiority

Air Force Army Navy Marine Corps

Current Future Current Future Current Future Current Future

Patriot

Advanced

Capability 2

Hawk

(National

Guard only)

Medium

Extended Air

Defense System

Close-In

Weapon System

Close-In

Weapon

System

Blocks 1A,

1B, 1C

Hawk mobility Hawk with

Theater

Missile

Defense

Upgrade

Bradley Stinger Rolling Airframe

Missile—Block 0

Rolling

Airframe

Missile—

Block 1

Stinger Stinger

NATO Sea

Sparrow

Evolved Sea

Sparrow

Standard

Missile 2 Block

IIIA

Standard

Missile 2

Blocks IIIB, IV

Phoenix

Patriot

Advanced

Capability 2

Medium

Extended Air

Defense System

Close-In

Weapon System

Close-In

Weapon

System

Blocks 1A,

1B, 1C

Hawk mobility Hawk with

Theater

Missile

Defense

Upgrade

Hawk

(National

Guard only)

Bradley Stinger Rolling Airframe

Missile—Block 0

Rolling

Airframe

Missile—

Block 1

NATO Sea

Sparrow

Evolved Sea

Sparrow

Standard

Missile 2 Block

IIIA

Standard

Missile 2

Blocks IIIB, IV

Phoenix

Patriot

Advanced

Capability 3

Standard

Missile 2,

Block IVA,

Block Theater

Missile

Defense

Hawk with

Theater

Missile

Defense

Upgrade

Medium

Extended Air

Defense System

(continued)

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix I 

Services’ Identification of Capabilities for

Achieving Air Superiority

Mission Joint

Current Future

Ground attack only Joint Standoff Weapon

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix I 

Services’ Identification of Capabilities for

Achieving Air Superiority

Air Force Army Navy Marine Corps

Current Future Current Future Current Future Current Future

Theater High

Altitude Air

Defense

Maverick

Rockeye

Notes:

1. The missiles and munitions listed in the “Current” column represent what the services use today.

2. The missiles and munitions listed in the “Future” columns represent what the services will buy

or upgrade in the future and include new systems or major capability improvements of existing

systems.

3. NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

4. GPS — Global Positioning System.

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix II 

Funding for Missions of Air Superiority

Table II.1: Approximate DOD Future Year Defense Program Acquisition Funding for the Missions of Air Superiority, as of

June 1995

Fiscal years

Then-year dollars in thousands

Missions 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total

Conduct offensive operations:

Defeat enemy fighters

F-15 $92,902 $141,572 $240,911 $302,728 $284,147 $262,121 $1,324,381

F-22 2,138,718 2,048,435 2,346,248 2,214,665 3,014,556 3,933,995 15,696,617

F-14 103,537 206,866 225,499 245,931 193,996 121,697 1,097,526

Advanced Medium

Range Air-to-Air

Missile

266,768 261,160 259,845 243,397 252,639 286,668 1,570,477

Tactical Air-to-Air

Missiles

73,673 110,275 142,661 181,498 138,691 139,984 786,782

Defeat enemy surfaceto-air missiles

High Speed AntiRadiation Missile3,348 4,226 2,586 2,027 0 0 12,187

F-4G Wild Weasel 615 136 0 0 0 0 751

EA-6B 0 59,422 81,304 143,756 152,454 208,738 645,674

Compass Call 18,914 23,918 29,340 18,781 19,399 19,983 130,335

Manned Destructive

Suppression

7,408 2,147 2,150 2,130 2,207 2,166 18,208

Conduct defensive operations:

Defeat enemy aircrafta

Defeat enemy cruise missiles

Airborne Warning and

Control System

356,008 342,620 126,151 117,731 122,318 125,746 1,190,574

E-2C Hawkeye 216,673 303,278 312,945 320,872 324,665 332,921 1,811,354

Defeat enemy theater 

ballistic missiles

Theater High Altitude

Area Defense System

589,927 740,888 867,941 1,269,833 928,486 862,193 5,259,268

Airborne Laserb 19,954 19,954 0 0 0 0 39,908

Navy Area System 254,370 402,161 440,717 499,689 560,328 494,517 2,651,782

Navy Theater-wide

System

30,442 33,400 0 0 0 0 63,842

Medium Extened Air

Defense Systemc

30,442 33,400 0 0 0 0 63,842

Airborne Interceptor 49,061 44,300 66,300 72,300 0 0 231,961

Patriot Advanced

Capability Level 3

690,100 616,670 582,800 453,300 516,700 299,900 3,159,470

(continued)

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix II 

Funding for Missions of Air Superiority

Fiscal years

Then-year dollars in thousands

Missions 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total

Marine Corps’ Hawk 30,794 32,883 25,380 596 614 8,260 98,527

Space-Based Laser 72,832 28,372 28,894 28,593 28,304 27,732 214,727

Other 917,668 920,333 1,163,026 1,022,263 1,448,013 1,606,729 7,078,032

Total $5,964,154 $6,376,416 $6,944,698 $7,140,090 $7,987,517 $8,733,350 $43,146,225

Notes:

1. Acquisition funding includes research, development, test, and evaluation and procurement of

aircraft and missiles as of June 1995.

aThe funding to defeat enemy fighters and aircraft in offensive and defensive operations are not

separable and are essentially all included under the offensive operations.

bAccording to an Air Force official, the Air Force has programmed $693,200,000 in additional

funds for Airborne Laser between fiscal years 1997 and 2001.

cAccording to a Medium Extended Air Defense System project office cost official, the Army has

requested $533 million additional funds for the program for fiscal years 1997-2001.

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix II 

Funding for Missions of Air Superiority

Table II.2: Approximate DOD Future Year Defense Program Funding for Weapon Systems With Some Capability, Not

Primary Responsibility, for the Missions of Air Superiority

Fiscal years

Then-year dollars in thousands

Missions 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total

Conduct Offensive Operations:

Defeat enemy fighters

F-15E $293,559 $280,705 $236,986 $232,245 $262,026 $289,974 $1,595,495

F-16 561,455 456,162 499,594 521,707 565,321 563,848 3,168,087

F-111 597 0 0 0 0 0 597

F/A-18 1,886,685 2,938,028 3,561,884 4,196,792 4,245,141 4,206,668 21,035,198

AV-8B 208,890 406,260 379,072 418,489 408,367 411,050 2,232,128

JSF 331,156 480,061 680,611 841,965 664,507 938,805 3,937,105

Defeat enemy surface-to- air

defenses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Conduct Defensive Operations:

Defeat enemy aircraft a a a a a a a

Defeat enemy cruise missiles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Defeat enemy theater ballistic

missiles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total $3,282,342 $4,561,216 $5,358,147 $6,211,198 $6,145,362 $6,410,345 $31,968,610

Note:

1. Acquisition funding includes research, development, test, and evaluation and procurement of

aircraft as of June 1995.

aThe funding to defeat enemy fighters and aircraft in offensive and defensive operations are not

separable and are essentially all included under the offensive operations.

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 3.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

See comment 4.

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 5.

See commnet 5.

See comment 6.

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 7, 21-22.

See comment 7.

Now on pp. 27-28 and 30.

See comment 8.

See pp. 27-28.

See comment 9.

Now on pp. 28 and 30.

See comment 10.

Now on pp. 28 and 30.

See comment 11.

Now on pp. 8 and 28.

See comment 12.

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 25.

See comment 13.

Now on pp. 7 and 28.

See comment 14.

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are our comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

letter dated October 22, 1996.

GAO Comments 1. This report does not suggest, imply, or infer that air power is not

important or that the threat does not warrant investment. The purpose of

this report is to identify overlap of the military services’ capabilities to

achieve air superiority and evaluate the utility of the joint warfighting

assessment process.

2. The capabilities of the specific threat aircraft mentioned by DOD were

considered in the joint warfighting capability assessment (JWCA) for

1996-2001. The JWCA concluded that U.S. capability to defeat enemy

aircraft through fiscal year 2001 was marginal (acceptable with some

degree of risk). The JWCA considered not only the aerodynamic and

propulsion qualities of individual threat aircraft mentioned by DOD in its

comments, but also the closely related functions of command, control,

communications, mission planning, target detection, tracking,

engagement, and destruction.

3. Our review evaluated U.S. capability to achieve air superiority, which

was 1 of 10 missions assessed by the Joint Staff in its JWCAs. The Joint Staff

did not identify air dominance as one of its missions; however, redefining

the objective as air dominance could have significant implications for

future programming of forces.

4. This report specifically deals with the air superiority JWCA, not the entire

process to develop modernization plans and scrutinize programs. We do

believe JWCA can be substantially improved, as can the analytical support,

and DOD partially concurred with that evaluation in response to the

companion report Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed

Before Making Program and Budget Decisions (GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept. 20,

1996). Although we disagree that further criticism of the DOD decision

processes is intended in this report, there are many facets of DOD’s

assessment process that we believe can and should be improved. We have

and will continue to provide appropriate reports to DOD for comment.

5. DOD did not comment on the specific issues we raised about the JWCA.

6. The intent of this report is to show overlap in air superiority capabilities

and raise specific issues that the air superiority JWCA could address to

improve the analytical support for decisionmakers. In this report, we have

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

not intended to make a case for overturning the decisions made by DOD.

However, because of concerns we have raised in other reports about

tactical aircraft systems (listed on the last page of this report), we believe

those concerns should be addressed by JWCA from the point of view of

joint warfighting capabilities.

7. The report clearly notes that these aircrafts’ primary missions are

air-to-ground. However, their significant air-to-air capabilities cannot be

ignored and are available to the wartime commander.

8. Our prior report demonstrated the high degree of concurrency that

exists with the F-22 program. The ramp up of production from 4, to 12, 24,

and 36 aircraft a year under the low-rate production phase, and planned

initiation of long lead parts procurement for 48 a year essentially

represents a plan to achieve full-rate production before initial operational

test and evaluation is completed.

9. We do not make threat projections. The threat information came

directly from DOD intelligence agencies.

10. We believe this issue is appropriate for an expanded JWCA on air

superiority. We believe DOD’s air superiority JWCA should analyze the need

to replace F-15s with F-22s on a one-for-one basis.

11. We believe that the Joint Staff’s air superiority JWCA should analyze this

as a possible option in the context of joint force capabilities.

12. The report was clarified to identify the specific aircraft that make up

the 2,600 frontline fighters. None of them are A-10s.

13. This comment has been added to the body of the report.

14. We recognize that the E/F will provide some improvements over the

C/D; however, we believe the C/D’s current capabilities are adequate to

accomplish its assigned mission. Based on the marginal nature of the

improvements and the E/F’s projected cost, we believe an analysis

between these two models should be included in the JWCA.

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Robert D. Murphy, Assistant Director

David B. Best, Evaluator

Chicago Field Office Richard L. Strittmatter, Evaluator-in-Charge

Edward R. Browning, Evaluator

Don M. Springman, Evaluator

Atlanta Field Office Barbara Haynes, Site Senior

John Randall, Evaluator

Norfolk Field Office Brenda Waterfield, Site Senior

Henry Arzadon, Evaluator

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
Related GAO Products

Combat Air Power: Assessment of Joint Close Support Requirements and

Capabilities Is Needed (GAO/NSIAD-96-45, June 28, 1996).

U.S. Combat Air Power: Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction

Capabilities Could Save Billions (GAO/NSIAD-96-72, May 13, 1996).

Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently Planned

(GAO/NSIAD-94-118, Mar. 25, 1994).

(707047/707224) Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-97-77 Combat Air Power
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